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2. For we say that in this Trinity two or three persons are not
anything greater than one of them; which carnal perception does not
receive, for no other reason except because it perceives as it can the
true things which are created, but cannot discern the truth itself by
which they are created; for if it could, then the very corporeal light
would in no way be more clear than this which we have said. For in
respect to the substance of truth, since it alone truly is, nothing is
greater, unless because it more truly is. But in respect to
whatsoever is intelligible and unchangeable, no one thing is more truly
than another, since all alike are unchangeably eternal; and that which
therein is called great, is not great from any other source than from
that by which it truly is. Wherefore, where magnitude itself is
truth, whatsoever has more of magnitude must needs have more of truth;
whatsoever therefore has not more of truth, has not also more of
magnitude. Further, whatsoever has more of truth is certainly more
true, just as that is greater which has more of magnitude; therefore
in respect to the substance of truth that is more great which is more
true. But the Father and the Son together are not more truly than
the Father singly, or the Son singly. Both together, therefore,
are not anything greater than each of them singly. And since also the
Holy Spirit equally is truly, the Father and Son together are not
anything greater than He, since neither are they more truly. The
Father also and the Holy Spirit together, since they do not surpass
the Son in truth (for they are not more truly), do not surpass Him
either in magnitude. And so the Son and the Holy Spirit together
are just as great as the Father alone, since they are as truly. So
also the Trinity itself is as great as each several person therein.
For where truth itself is magnitude, that is not more great which is
not more true: since in regard to the essence of truth, to be true is
the same as to be, and to be is the same as to be great; therefore to
be great is the same as to be true. And in regard to it, therefore,
what is equally true must needs also be equally great.
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