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11. But yet again, take the case of another trinity, more inward
indeed than that which is in things sensible, and in the senses, but
which is yet conceived from thence; while now it is no longer the sense
of the body that is informed from the body, but the eye of the mind
that is informed from the memory, since the species of the body which
we perceived from without has inhered in the memory itself. And that
species, which is in the memory, we call the quasi-parent of that
which is wrought in the phantasy of one who conceives. For it was in
the memory also, before we conceived it, just as the body was in place
also before we [sensuously] perceived it, in order that vision might
take place. But when it is conceived, then from that form which the
memory retains, there is copied in the mind's eye (acie) of him who
conceives, and by remembrance is formed, that species, which is the
quasi-offspring of that which the memory retains. But neither is the
one a true parent, nor the other a true offspring. For the mind's
vision which is formed from memory when we think anything by
recollection, does not proceed from that species which we remember as
seen; since we could not indeed have remembered those things, unless
we had seen them; yet the mind's eye, which is informed by the
recollection, existed also before we saw the body that we remember;
and therefore how much more before we committed it to memory?
Although therefore the form which is wrought in the mind's eye of him
who remembers, is wrought from that form which is in the memory; yet
the mind's eye itself does not exist from thence, but existed before
it. And it follows, that if the one is not a true parent, neither is
the other a true offspring. But both that quasi-parent and that
quasi-offspring suggest something, whence the inner and truer things
may appear more practically and more certainly.
12. Further, it is more difficult to discern clearly, whether the
will which connects the vision to the memory is not either the parent or
the offspring of some one of them; and the likeness and equality of the
same nature and substance cause this difficulty of distinguishing. For
it is not possible to do in this case, as with the sense that is formed
from without (which is easily discerned from the sensible body, and
again the will from both), on account of the difference of nature
which is mutually in all three, and of which we have treated
sufficiently above. For although this trinity, of which we at present
speak, is introduced into the mind from without; yet it is transacted
within, and there is no part of it outside of the nature of the mind
itself. In what way, then, can it be demonstrated that the will is
neither the quasi-parent, nor the quasi-offspring, either of the
corporeal likeness which is contained in the memory, or of that which
is copied thence in recollecting; when it so unites both in the act of
conceiving, as that they appear singly as one, and cannot be discerned
except by reason? It is then first to be considered that there cannot
be any will to remember, unless we retain in the recesses of the memory
either the whole, or some part, of that thing which we wish to
remember. For the very will to remember cannot arise in the case of a
thing which we have forgotten altogether and absolutely; since we have
already remembered that the thing which we wish to remember is or has
been, in our memory. For example, if I wish to remember what I
supped on yesterday, either I have already remembered that I did
sup, or if not yet this, at least I have remembered something about
that time itself, if nothing else; at all events, I have remembered
yesterday, and that part of yesterday in which people usually sup, and
what supping is. For if I had not remembered anything at all of this
kind, I could not wish to remember what I supped on yesterday.
Whence we may perceive that the will of remembering proceeds, indeed,
from those things which are retained in the memory, with the addition
also of those which, by the act of discerning, are copied thence
through recollection; that is, from the combination of something which
we have remembered, and of the vision which was thence wrought, when
we remembered, in the mind's eye of him who thinks. But the will
itself which unites both requires also some other thing, which is, as
it were, close at hand, and adjacent to him who remembers. There
are, then, as many trinities of this kind as there are remembrances;
because there is no one of them wherein there are not these three
things, viz. that which was stored up in the memory also before it was
thought, and that which takes place in the conception when this is
discerned, and the will that unites both, and from both and itself as
a third, completes one single thing. Or is it rather that we so
recognize some one trinity in this kind, as that we are to speak
generally, of whatever corporeal species lie hidden in the memory, as
of a single unity, and again of the general vision of the mind which
remembers and conceives such things, as of a single unity, to the
combination of which two there is to be joined as a third the will that
combines them, that this whole may be a certain unity made up from
three?
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