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7. For the sake, then, of speaking of things that cannot be
uttered, that we may be able in some way to utter what we are able in
no way to utter fully, our Greek friends have spoken of one essence,
three substances; but the Latins of one essence or substance, three
persons; because, as we have already said, essence usually means
nothing else than substance in our language, that is, in Latin. And
provided that what is said is understood only in a mystery, such a way
of speaking was sufficient, in order that there might be something to
say when it was asked what the three are, which the true faith
pronounces to be three, when it both declares that the Father is not
the Son, and that the Holy Spirit, which is the gift of God, is
neither the Father nor the Son. When, then, it is asked what the
three are, or who the three are, we betake ourselves to the finding
out of some special or general name under which we may embrace these
three; and no such name occurs to the mind, because the
super-eminence of the Godhead surpasses the power of customary
speech. For God is more truly thought than He is altered, and
exists more truly than He is thought. For when we say that Jacob was
not the same as Abraham, but that Isaac was neither Abraham nor
Jacob, certainly we confess that they are three, Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob. But when it is asked what three, we reply three men,
calling them in the plural by a specific name; but if we were to say
three animals, then by a generic name; for man, as the ancients have
defined him, is a rational, mortal animal: or again, as our
Scriptures usually speak, three souls, since it is fitting to
denominate the whole from the better part, that is, to denominate both
body and soul, which is the whole man, from the soul; for so it is
said that seventy-five souls went down into Egypt with Jacob,
instead of saying so many men. Again, when we say that your horse is
not mine, and that a third belonging to some one else is neither mine
nor yours, then we confess that there are three; and if any one ask
what three, we answer three horses by a specific name, but three
animals by a generic one.
And yet again, when we say that an ox is not a horse, but that a dog
is neither an ox nor a horse, we speak of a three; and if any one
questions us what three, we do not speak now by a specific name of
three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs, because the three are not
contained under the same species, but by a gener three animals; or if
under a higher genus, three substances, or three creatures, or three
natures. But whatsoever things are expressed in the plural number
specifically by one name, can also be expressed genetically by one
name. But all things which are generically called by one name cannot
also be called specifically by one name. For three horses, which is a
specific name, we also call three animals; but, a horse, and an ox,
and a dog, we call only three animals or substances, which are generic
names, or anything else that can be spoken generically concerning
them; but we cannot speak of them as three horses, or oxen, or dogs,
which are specific names; for we express those things by one name,
although in the plural number, which have that in common that is
signified by the name. For Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, have
in common that which is man; therefore they are called three men: a
horse also, and an ox, and a dog, have in common that which is
animal; therefore they are called three animals. So three several
laurels we also call three trees; but a laurel, and a myrtle, and an
olive, we call only three trees, or three substances, or three
natures: and so three stones we call also three bodies; but stone,
and wood, and iron, we call only three bodies, or by any other higher
generic name by which they can be called. Of the Father, therefore,
the Son, and the Holy Spirit, seeing that they are three, let us
ask what three they are, and what they have in common. For the being
the Father is not common to them, so that they should be
interchangeably fathers to one another: as friends, since they are so
called relatively to each other, can be called three friends, because
they are so mutually to each other. But this is not the case in the
Trinity, since the Father only is there father; and not Father of
two, but of the Son only. Neither are they three Sons, since the
Father there is not the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit. Neither
three Holy Spirits, because the Holy Spirit also, in that proper
meaning by which He is also called the gift of God, is neither the
Father nor the Son. What three therefore? For if three persons,
then that which is meant by person is common to them; therefore this
name is either specific or generic to them, according to the manner of
speaking. But where there is no difference of nature, there things
that are several in number are so expressed generically, that they can
also be expressed specifically. For the difference of nature causes,
that a laurel, and a myrtle, and an olive, or a horse, and an ox,
and a dog, are not called by the specific name, the former of three
laurels, or the latter of three oxen, but by the generic name, the
former of three trees, and the latter of three animals. But here,
where there is no difference of essence, it is necessary that these
three should have a specific name, which yet is not to be found. For
person is a generic name, insomuch that man also can be so called,
although there is so great a difference between man and God.
8. Further, in regard to that very generic (generalis) word, if
on this account we say three persons, because that which person means
is common to them (otherwise they can in no way be so called, just as
they are not called three sons, because that which son means is not
common to them); why do we not also say three Gods? For certainly,
since the Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy
Spirit a person, therefore there are three persons: since then the
Father is God, and the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, why
not three Gods? Or else, since on account of their ineffable union
these three are together one God, why not also one person; so that we
could not say: three persons, although we call each a person singly,
just as we cannot say three Gods, although we call each singly God,
whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit? Is it
because Scripture does not say three Gods? But neither do we find
that Scripture anywhere mentions three persons. Or is it because
Scripture does not call these three, either three persons or one
person (for we read of the person of the Lord, but not of the Lord
as a person), that therefore it was lawful through the mere necessity
of speaking and reasoning to say three persons, not because Scripture
says it, but because Scripture does not contradict it: whereas, if
we were to say three Gods, Scripture would contradict it, which
says, "Hear, O Israel; the Lord thy God is one God?" Why
then is it not also lawful to say three essences; which, in like
manner, as Scripture does not say, so neither does it contradict?
For if essence is a specific (specialis) name common to three, why
are They not to be called three essences, as Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob are called three men, because man is the specific name common to
all men? But if essence is not a specific name, but a generic one,
since man, and cattle, and tree, and constellation, and angel, are
called essences; why are not these called three essences, as three
horses are called three animals, and three laurels are called three
trees, and three stones three bodies? Or if they are not called three
essences, but one essence, on account of the unity of the Trinity,
why is it not the case, that on account of the same unity of the
Trinity they are not to be called three substances or three persons,
but one substance and one person? For as the name of essence is common
to them, so that each singly is called essence, so the name of either
substance or person is common to them. For that which must be
understood of persons according to our usage, this is to be understood
of substances according to the Greek usage; for they say three
substances, one essence, in the same way as we say three persons, one
essence or substance.
9. What therefore remains, except that we confess that these terms
sprang from the necessity of speaking, when copious reasoning was
required against the devices or errors of the heretics? For when human
weakness endeavored to utter in speech to the senses of man what it
grasps in the secret places of the mind in proportion to its
comprehension respecting the Lord God its creator, whether by devout
faith, or by any discernment whatsoever; it feared to say three
essences, lest any difference should be understood to exist in that
absolute equality. Again, it could not say that there were not three
somewhats (tria quaedam), for it was because Sabellius said this
that he fell into heresy. For it must be devoutly believed, as most
certainly known from the Scriptures, and must be grasped by the mental
eye with undoubting perception, that there is both Father, and Son,
and Holy Spirit; and that the Son is not the same with the Father,
nor the Holy Spirit the same with the Father or the Son. It sought
then what three it should call them, and answered substances or
persons; by which names it did not intend diversity to be meant, but
singleness to be denied: that not only unity might be understood
therein from the being called one essence, but also Trinity from the
being called three substances or persons. For if it is the same thing
with God to be (esse) as to subsist (subsistere), they were not to
be called three substances, in such sense as they are not called three
essences; just as, because it is the same thing with God to be as to
be wise, as we do not say three essences, so neither three wisdoms.
For so, because it is the same thing to Him to be God as to be, it
is not right to say three essences, as it is not right to say three
Gods. But if it is one thing to God to be, another to subsist, as
it is one thing to God to be, another to be the Father or the Lord
(for that which He is, is spoken in respect to Himself, but He is
called Father in relation to the Son, and Lord in relation to the
creature which serves Him); therefore He subsists relatively, as
He besets relatively, and bears rule relatively: so then substance
will be no longer substance, because it will be relative. For as from
being, He is called essence, so from subsisting, we speak of
substance. But it is absurd that substance should be spoken
relatively, for everything subsists in respect to itself; how much
more God?
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