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IT has already, in the preceding book, been shown how the two cities
originated among the angels. Before I speak of the creation of man,
and show how the cities took their rise so far as regards the race of
rational mortals I see that I must first, so far as I can, adduce
what may demonstrate that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to speak
of a society composed of angels and men together; so that there are not
four cities or societies, two, namely, of angels, and as many of
men, but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the other of
the wicked, angels or men indifferently.
That the contrary propensities m good and bad angels have arisen, not
from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the good
Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from a
difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible to doubt.
While some steadfastly continued in that which was the common good of
all, namely, in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and
love; others, being enamored rather of their own power, as if they
could be their own good, lapsed to this private good Of their own,
from that higher and beatific good which was common to all, and,
bartering the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the
most assured verity for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for
factious partisanship, they became proud, deceived, envious. The
cause, therefore, of the blessedness of the good is adherence to
God. And so the cause of the others' misery will be found in the
contrary, that is, in their not adhering to God. Wherefore, if
when the question is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly
answered, because they adhere to God; and when it is asked, why are
the latter miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not
adhere to God, then there is no other good for the rational or
intellectual creature save God only. Thus, though it is not every
creature that can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and things
of that kind have not this capacity), yet that creature which has the
capacity cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of
nothing, but only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is
blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable. He,
then, who is blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be
miserable, because he cannot lose himself.
Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one,
true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good
because from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out
of nothing. Although, therefore, they are not the supreme good, for
God is a greater good, yet those mutable things which can adhere to
the immutable good, and so be blessed, are very good; for so
completely is He their good, that without Him they cannot but be
wretched. And the other created things in the universe are not better
on this account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would say
that the other members of the body are superior to the eyes, because
they cannot he blind. But as the sentient nature, even when it feels
pain, is superior to the stony, which can feel none, so the rational
nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than that which lacks
reason or feeling, and can therefore experience no misery. And since
this is so, then in this nature which has been created so excellent,
that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness by
adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God: and since it is not
satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus blessed
save in God, in this nature, I say, not to adhere to God, is
manifestly a fault.' Now every fault injures the nature, and is
consequently contrary to the nature. The creature, therefore, which
cleaves to God, differs from those who do not, not by nature, but by
fault; and yet by this very fault the nature itself is proved to be
very noble and admirable. For that nature is certainly praised, the
fault of which is justly blamed. For we justly blame the fault because
it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we say that
blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight belongs to the
nature of the eyes; and when we say that deafness is a defect of the
ears, hearing is thereby proved to belong to their nature;, so, when
we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature that it does not
cleave to God, we hereby most plainly declare that it pertained to its
nature to cleave to God. And who can worthily conceive or express how
great a glory that is, to cleave to God, so as to live to Him, to
draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy this so great
good, without death, error, or grief? And thus, since every vice
is an injury of the nature, that very vice of the wicked angels, their
departure from God, is sufficient proof that God created their nature
so good, that it is an injury to it not to be with God.
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