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For, among those beings which exist, and which are not of God the
Creator's essence, those which have life are ranked above those which
have none; those that have the power of generation, or even of
desiring, above those which want this faculty. And, among things
that have life, the sentient are higher than those which have no
sensation, as animals are ranked above trees. And, among the
sentient, the intelligent are above those that have not intelligence,
men, e.g., above cattle. And, among the intelligent, the
immortal such as the angels, above the mortal, such as men. These
are the gradations according to the order of nature; but according to
the utility each man finds in a thing, there are various standards of
value, so that it comes to pass that we prefer some things that have no
sensation to some sentient beings. And so strong is this preference,
that, had we the power, we would abolish the latter from nature
altogether, whether in ignorance of the place they hold in nature,
or, though we know it, sacrificing them to our own convenience.
Who, e.g., would not rather have bread in his house than mice,
gold than fleas? But there is little to wonder at in this, seeing
that even when valued by men themselves (whose nature is certainly of
the highest dignity), more is often given for a horse than for a
slave, for a jewel than for a maid. Thus the reason of one
contemplating nature prompts very different judgments from those
dictated by the necessity of the needy, or the desire of the
voluptuous; for the former considers what value a thing in itself has
in the scale of creation, while necessity considers how it meets its
need; reason looks for what the mental light will judge to be true,
while pleasure looks for what pleasantly titilates the bodily sense.
But of such consequence in rational natures is the weight, so to
speak, of will and of love, that though in the order of nature angels
rank above men, yet, by the scale of justice, good men are of greater
value than bad angels.
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