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Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to
be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the
cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not
unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him
who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such
essence. And this vice, what else is it called than pride? For
"pride is the beginning of sin."1 They were unwilling, then, to
preserve their strength for God: and as adherence to God was the
condition of their enjoying an ampler being, they diminished it by
preferring themselves to Him. This was the first defect, and the
first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was
created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness in
the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; whilst by abandoning Him it
should become, not indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less
ample existence, and therefore wretched.
If the further question be asked, What was the efficient cause of
their evil will? there is none. For what is it which makes the will
bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action bad? And
consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing
is the efficient cause of the bad will. For if anything is the cause,
this thing either has or has not a will. If it has, the will is
either good or bad. If good, who is so left to himself as to say that
a good will makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be
the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition. On the other hand, if
this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know what made it
so; and that we may not go on forever, I ask at once, what made the
first evil will bad? For that is not the first which was itself
corrupted by an evil will, but that is the first which was made evil by
no other will. For if it were preceded by that which made it evil,
that will was first which made the other evil. But if it is replied,
"Nothing made it evil; it always was evil," I ask if it has been
existing in some nature. For if not, then it did not exist at all;
and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and corrupted it,
and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good. And therefore
the evil will could not exist in an evil nature, but in a nature at
once good and mutable, which this vice could injure. For if it did no
injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will in which it was,
could not be called evil. But if it did injury, it did it by taking
away or diminishing good. And therefore there could not be from
eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there
had been previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to
diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from eternity,
who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested in reply
is, that something which itself had no will, made the will evil. I
ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior, or equal to
it? If superior, then it is better. How, then, has it no will,
and not rather a good will? The same reasoning applies if it was
equal; for so long as two things have equally a good will, the one
cannot produce in the other an evil will. Then remains the supposition
that that which corrupted the will of the angelic nature which first
sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will. But that thing,
be it of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly itself good,
since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of its own in its
own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing be the efficient
cause of an evil will? How, I say, can good be the cause of evil?
For when the will abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is
lower, it becomes evil, not because that is evil to which it turns,
but because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an
inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself which has
become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing. For
if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the same
corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an
illicit enjoyment while the other steadfastly maintains a modest
restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about, that there
is an evil will in the one and not in the other? What produces it in
the man in whom it exists? Not the bodily beauty, for that was
presented equally to the gaze of both, and vet did not produce in both
an evil will. Did the flesh of the one cause the desire as he looked?
But why did not the flesh of the other? Or was it the disposition?
But why not the disposition of both? For we are supposing that both
were of a like temperament of body and soul. Must we, then, say that
the one was tempted by a secret suggestion of the evil spirit? As if
it was not by Iris own will that he consented to this suggestion and to
any inducement whatever! This consent, then, this evil will which he
presented to the evil suasive influence, what was the cause of it, we
ask? For, not to delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are
tempted equally and one yields and consents to the temptation while the
other remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the
matter than this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to
fall away from chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in
cases at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament is
identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both;
the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence.
However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern
nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil. For if we say
that the man himself made his will evil, what was the man himself
before his will was evil but a good nature created by God, the
unchangeable good? Here are two men who, before the temptation, were
alike in body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who
persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to desire that
lovely body which was equally before the eyes of both. Shall we say of
the successfully tempted man that he corrupted his own will, since he
was certainly good before his will became bad? Then, why did he do
so? Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made of
nothing? We shall find that the latter is the case. For if a nature
is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say than that evil
arises from good or that good is the cause of evil? And how can it
come to pass that a nature, good though mutable, should produce any
evil, that is to say, should make the will itself wicked?
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