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18. And yet we say that "time is long and time is short;" nor do
we speak of this save of time past and future. A long time past, for
example, we call a hundred years ago; in like manner a long time to
come, a hundred years hence. But a short time past we call, say,
ten days ago: and a short time to come, ten days hence. But in what
sense is that long or short which is not? For the past is not now,
and the future is not yet. Therefore let us not say, "It is
long;" but let us say of the past, "It hath been long," and of
the future, "It will be long." O my Lord, my light, shall not
even here Thy truth deride man? For that past time which was long,
was it long when it was already past, or when it was as yet present?
For then it might be long when there was that which could be long, but
when past it no longer was; wherefore that could not be long which was
not at all. Let us not, therefore, say, "Time past hath been
long;" for we shall not find what may have been long, seeing that
since it was past it is not; but let us say "that present time was
long, because when it was present it was long." For it had not as
yet passed away so as not to be, and therefore there was that which
could be long. But after it passed, that ceased also to be long which
ceased to be.
19. Let us therefore see, O human soul, whether present time can
be long; for to thee is it given to perceive and to measure periods of
time. What wilt thou reply to me? Is a hundred years when present a
long time? See, first, whether a hundred years can be present. For
if the first year of these is current, that is present, but the other
ninety and nine are future, and therefore they are not as yet. But if
the second year is current, one is already past, the other present,
the rest future. And thus, if we fix on any middle year of this
hundred as present, those before it are past, those after it are
future; wherefore a hundred years cannot be present. See at least
whether that year itself which is current can be present. For if its
first month be current, the rest are future; if the second, the first
hath already passed, and the remainder are not yet. Therefore neither
is the year which is current as a whole present; and if it is not
present as a whole, then the year is not present. For twelve months
make the year, of which each individual month which is current is
itself present, but the rest are either past or future. Although
neither is that month which is current present, but one day only: if
the first, the rest being to come, if the last, the rest being past;
if any of the middle, then between past and future.
20. Behold, the present time, which alone we found could be called
long, is abridged to the space scarcely of one day. But let us
discuss even that, for there is not one day present as a whole. For
it is made up of four-and-twenty hours of night and day, whereof the
first hath the rest future, the last hath them past, but any one of
the intervening hath those before it past, those after it future. And
that one hour passeth away in fleeting particles. Whatever of it hath
flown away is past, whatever remaineth is future. If any portion of
time be conceived which cannot now be divided into even the minutest
particles of moments, this only is that which may be called present;
which, however, flies so rapidly from future to past, that it cannot
be extended by any delay. For if it be extended, it is divided into
the past and future; but the present hath no space. Where,
therefore, is the time which we may call long? Is it nature? Indeed
we do not say, "It is long," because it is not yet, so as to be
long; but we say, "It will be long." When, then, will it be?
For if even then, since as yet it is future, it will not be long,
because what may be long is not as yet; but it shall be long, when
from the future, which as yet is not, it shall already have begun to
be, and will have become present, so that there could be that which
may be long; then doth the present time cry out in the words above that
it cannot be long.
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