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Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which
the Stoics labored to make such distinctions among the causes of things
as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion of
necessity. and to subject others to it. Among those things which they
wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing
that they would not be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is
to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though
we be unwilling effects what it can effect, as, for instance, the
necessity of death, it is manifest that our wills by which we live
up-rightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many
things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do.
This is primarily true of the act of willing itself, for if we will,
it is; if we will not, it is not, for we should not will if we were
unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to which we
say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or
be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any
dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do
not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if
we should say that it is necessary that God should live forever, and
foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say
that He cannot die or fall into error, for this is in such a way
impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of
less power. But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though
He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent
on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His
suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He
would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things
for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that
it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so
saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not stilI
subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. Our
wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by
willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling. But when
any one suffers anything, being unwilling by the will of another, even
in that case will retains its essential validity,, we do not mean the
will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it into
the power of God. For if a will should simply exist, but not be able
to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a more powerful will.
Nor would this be the case unless there had existed will, and that not
the will of the other party, but the will of him who willed, but was
not able to accomplish what he willed Therefore, whatsoever a man
suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not to attribute to the will
of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to His
will who gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that
because God foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is
for that reason nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew
this did not foreknow nothing. Moreover, if He who foreknew what
would be in the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but
something, assuredly, even though He did foreknow, there is
something in the power of our wills. Therefore we are by no means
compelled, either, retaining the prescience of God, to take away the
freedom of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny
that He is prescient of future things, which is impious. But we
embrace both. We faithfully and sincerely confess both. The former,
that we may believe well; the latter, that we may live well. For he
lives ill who does not believe well concerning God. Wherefore, be it
far from us, in order to maintain our freedom, to deny the prescience
of Him by whose help we are or shall be free. Consequently, it is
not in vain that laws are enacted, and that reproaches, exhortations,
praises, and vituperations are had recourse to; for these also He
foreknew, and they are of great avail, even as great as He foreknew
that they would be of. Prayers, also, are of avail to procure those
things which He foreknew that He would grant to those who offered
them; and with justice have rewards been appointed for good deeds, and
punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore sin because God
foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be doubted but that it is
the man himself who sins when he does sin, because He, whose
foreknowledge is infallible, fore knew not that fate, or fortune, or
something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who, if
he wills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this
did God foreknow.
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