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The same may be said of those three kinds of life, the life of
studious leisure and search after truth, the life of easy engagement in
affairs, and the life in which both these are mingled. When it is
asked, which of these should be adopted, this involves no controversy
about the end of good, but inquires which of these three puts a man in
the best position for finding and retaining the supreme good. For this
good, as soon as a man finds it, makes him happy; but lettered
leisure, or public business, or the alternation of these, do not
necessarily constitute happiness. Many, in fact, find it possible do
adopt one or other of these modes of life, and yet to miss what makes a
man happy. The question, therefore, regarding the supreme good and
the supreme evil, and which distinguishes sects of philosophy, is
one; and these questions concerning the social life, the doubt of the
Academy, the dress and food of the Cynics, the three modes of life,
the active, the contemplative, and the mixed, these are different
questions, into none of which the question of the chief good enters.
And therefore, as Marcus Varro multiplied the sects to the number of
288 (or whatever larger number he chose) by introducing these four
differences derived from the social life, the New Academy, the
Cynics, and the threefold form of life, so, by removing these
differences as having no bearing on the supreme good, and as therefore
not constituting what can properly be called sects, he returns to those
twelve schools which concern themselves with inquiring what that good is
which makes man happy, and he shows that one of these is true, the
rest false. In other words, he dismisses the distinction rounded on
the threefold mode of life, and so decreases the whole number by
two-thirds, reducing the sects to ninety-six. Then, putting aside
the Cynic peculiarities, the number decreases by a half, to
forty-eight. Taking away next the distinction occasioned by the
hesitancy of the New Academy, the number is again halved, and
reduced to twenty-four. Treating in a similar way the diversity
introduced by the consideration of the social life, there are left but
twelve, which this difference had doubled to twenty-four. Regarding
these twelve, no reason can be assigned why they should not be called
sects. For in them the sole inquiry is regarding the supreme good and
the ultimate evil, that is to say, regarding the supreme good, for
this being found, the opposite evil is thereby found. Now, to make
these twelve sects, he multiplies by three these four things,
pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the primary
objects of nature which Varro calls primigenia. For as these four
things are sometimes subordinated to virtue, so that they seem to be
desired not for their own sake, but for virtue's sake; sometimes
preferred to it, so that virtue seems to be necessary not on its own
account, but in order to attain these things; sometimes joined with
it, so that both they and virtue are desired for their own sakes, we
must multiply the four by three, and thus we get twelve sects. But
from those four things Varro eliminates three, pleasure, repose,
pleasure and repose combined, not because he thinks these are not
worthy of the place assigned them, but because they are included in the
primary objects of nature. And what need is there, at any rate, to
make a threefold division out of these two ends, pleasure and repose,
taking them first severally and then conjunctly, since both they, and
many other things besides, are comprehended in the primary objects of
nature? Which of the three remaining sects must be chosen? This is
the question that Varro dwells upon. For whether one of these three
or some other be chosen, reason forbids that more than one be true.
This we shall afterwards see; but meanwhile let us explain as briefly
and distinctly as we can how Varro makes his selection from these
three, that is, from the sects which severally hold that the primary
objects of nature are to be desired for virtue's sake, that virtue is
to be desired for their sake, and that virtue and these objects are to
be desired each for their own sake.
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