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2. When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three things,
as is most easy to do, are to be considered and distinguished:
First, the object itself which we see; whether a stone, or flame,
or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; and this certainly
might exist also already before it was seen; next, vision or the act
of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object itself
which is presented to the sense; in the third place, that which keeps
the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz.
the attention of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there
an evident distinction, but also a diverse nature. For, first, that
visible body is of a far different nature from the sense of the eyes,
through the incidence of which sense upon it vision arises. And what
plainly is vision itself other than perception informed by that thing
which is perceived? Although there is no vision if the visible object
be withdrawn, nor could there be any vision of the kind at all if there
were no body that could be seen; yet the body by which the sense of the
eyes is informed, when that body is seen, and the form itself which is
imprinted by it upon the sense, which is called vision, are by no
means of the same substance. For the body that is seen is, in its own
nature, separable; but the sense, which was already in the living
subject, even before it saw what it was able to see, when it fell in
with something visible, or the vision which comes to be in the sense
from the visible body when now brought into connection with it and
seen, the sense, then, I say, or the vision, that is, the sense
informed from without, belongs to the nature of the living subject,
which is altogether other than that body which we perceive by seeing,
and by which the sense is not so formed as to be sense, but as to be
vision. For unless the sense were also in us before the presentation
to us of the sensible object, we should not differ from the blind, at
times when we are seeing nothing, whether in darkness, or when our
eyes are closed. But we differ from them in this, that there is in
us, even when we are not seeing, that whereby we are able to see,
which is called the sense; whereas this is not in them, nor are they
called blind for any other reason than because they have it not.
Further also, that attention of the mind which keeps the sense in that
thing which we see, and connects both, not only differs from that
visible thing in its nature; in that the one is mind, and the other
body; but also from the sense and the vision itself: since this
attention is the act of the mind alone; but the sense of the eyes is
called a bodily sense, for no other reason than because the eyes
themselves also are members of the body; and although an inanimate body
does not perceive, yet the soul commingled with the body perceives
through a corporeal instrument, and that instrument is called sense.
And this sense, too, is cut off and extinguished by suffering on the
part of the body, when any one is blinded; while the mind remains the
same; and its attention, since the eyes are lost, has not, indeed,
the sense of the body which it may join, by seeing, to the body
without it, and so fix its look thereupon and see it, yet by the very
effort shows that, although the bodily sense be taken away, itself can
neither perish nor be diminished. For there remains unimpaired a
desire [appetitus] of seeing, whether it can be carried into effect
or not. These three, then, the body that is seen, and vision
itself, and the attention of mind which joins both together, are
manifestly distinguishable, not only on account of the properties of
each, but also on account of the difference of their natures.
3. And since, in this case, the sensation does not proceed from
that body which is seen, but from the body of the living being that
perceives, with which the soul is tempered together in some wonderful
way of its own; yet vision is produced, that is, the sense itself is
informed, by the body which is seen; so that now, not only is there
the power of sense, which can exist also unimpaired even in darkness,
provided the eyes are sound, but also a sense actually informed, which
is called vision. Vision, then, is produced from a thing that is
visible; but not from that alone, unless there be present also one who
sees. Therefore vision is produced from a thing that is visible,
together with one who sees; in such way that, on the part of him who
sees, there is the sense of seeing and the intention of looking and
gazing at the object; while yet that information of the sense, which
is called vision, is imprinted only by the body which is seen, that
is, by some visible thing; which being taken away, that form remains
no more which was in the sense so long as that which was seen was
present: yet the sense itself remains, which existed also before
anything was perceived; just as the trace of a thing in water remains
so long as the body itself, which is impressed on it, is in the
water; but if this has been taken away, there will no longer be any
such trace, although the water remains, which existed also before it
took the form of that body. And therefore we cannot, indeed, say
that a visible thing produces the sense; yet it produces the form,
which is, as it were, its own likeness, which comes to be in the
sense, when we perceive anything by seeing. But we do not
distinguish, through the same sense, the form of the body which we
see, from the form which is produced by it in the sense of him who
sees; since the union of the two is so close that there is no room for
distinguishing them. But we rationally infer that we could not have
sensation at all, unless some similitude of the body seen was wrought
in our own sense. For when a ring is imprinted on wax, it does not
follow that no image is produced, because we cannot discern it unless
when it has been separated. But since, after the wax is separated,
what was made remains, so that it can be seen; we are on that account
easily persuaded that there was already also in the wax a form impressed
from the ring before it was separated from it. But if the ring were
imprinted upon a fluid, no image at all would appear when it was
withdrawn; and yet none the less for this ought the reason to discern
that there was in that fluid before the ring was withdrawn a form of the
ring produced from the ring, which is to be distinguished from that
form which is in the ring, whence that form was produced which ceases
to be when the ring is withdrawn, although that in the ring remains,
whence the other was produced. And so the [sensuous] perception of
the eyes may not be supposed to contain no image of the body, which is
seen as long as it is seen, [merely] because when that is withdrawn
the image does not remain. And hence it is very difficult to persuade
men of duller mind that an image of the visible thing is formed in our
sense, when we see it, and that this same form is vision.
4. But if any perhaps attend to what I am about to mention, they
will find no such trouble in this inquiry. Commonly, when we have
looked for some little time at a light, and then shut our eyes, there
seem to play before our eyes certain bright colors variously changing
themselves, and shining less and less until they wholly cease; and
these we must understand to be the remains of that form which was
wrought in the sense, while the shining body was seen, and that these
variations take place in them as they slowly and step by step fade
away. For the lattices, too, of windows, should we happen to be
gazing at them, appear often in these colors; so that it is evident
that our sense is affected by such impressions from that thing which is
seen. That form therefore existed also while we were seeing, and at
that time it was more clear and express. But it was then closely
joined with the species of that thing which was being perceived, so
that it could not be at all distinguished from it; and this was vision
itself. Why, even when the little flame of a lamp is in some way, as
it were, doubled by the divergent rays of the eyes, a twofold vision
comes to pass, although the thing which is seen is one. For the same
rays, as they shoot forth each from its own eye, are affected
severally, in that they are not allowed to meet evenly and conjointly,
in regarding that corporeal thing, so that one combined view might be
formed from both. And so, if we shut one eye, we shall not see two
flames, but one as it really is. But why, if we shut the left eye,
that appearance ceases to be seen, which was on the right; and if, in
turn, we shut the right eye, that drops out of existence which was on
the left, is a matter both tedious in itself, and not necessary at all
to our present subject to inquire and discuss. For it is enough for
the business in hand to consider, that unless some image,precisely
like the thing we perceive, were produced in our sense, the appearance
of the flame would not be doubled according to the number of the eyes;
since a certain way of perceiving has been employed, which could
separate the union of rays. Certainly nothing that is really single
can be seen as if it were double by one eye, draw it down, or press,
or distort it as you please, if the other is shut.
5. The case then being so, let us remember how these three things,
although diverse in nature, are tempered together into a kind of
unity; that is, the form of the body which is seen, and the image of
it impressed on the sense, which is vision or sense informed, and the
will of the mind which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and
retains the vision itself in it. The first of these, that is, the
visible thing itself, does not belong to the nature of the living
being, except when we discern our own body. But the second belongs to
that nature to this extent, that it is wrought in the body, and
through the body in the soul; for it is wrought in the sense, which is
neither without the body nor without the soul. But the third is of the
soul alone, because it is the will. Although then the substances of
these three are so different, yet they coalesce into such a unity that
the two former can scarcely be distinguished, even with the
intervention of the reason as judge, namely the form of the body which
is seen, and the image of it which is wrought in the sense, that is,
vision. And the will so powerfully combines these two, as both to
apply the sense, in order to be informed, to that thing which is
perceived, and to retain it when informed in that thing. And if it is
so vehement that it can be called love, or desire, or lust, it
vehemently affects also the rest of the body of the living being; and
where a duller and harder matter does not resist, changes it into like
shape and color. One may see the little body of a chameleon vary with
ready change, according to the colors which it sees. And in the case
of other animals, since their grossness of flesh does not easily admit
change, the offspring, for the most part, betray the particular
fancies of the mothers, whatever it is that they have beheld with
special delight. For the more tender, and so to say, the more
formable, are the primary seeds, the more effectually and capably they
follow the bent of the soul of the mother, and the phantasy that is
wrought in it through that body, which it has greedily beheld.
Abundant instances might be adduced, but one is sufficient, taken
from the most trustworthy books; viz. what Jacob did, that the sheep
and goats might give birth to offspring of various colors, by placing
variegated rods before them in the troughs of water for them to look at
as they drank, at the time they had conceived.
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