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14. But some one will say, That is not memory by which the mind,
which is ever present to itself, is affirmed to remember itself; for
memory is of things past, not of things present. For there are some,
and among them Cicero, who, in treating of the virtues, have divided
prudence into these three memory, understanding, forethought: to
wit, assigning memory to things past, understanding to things
present, forethought to things future; which last is certain only in
the case of those who are prescient of the future; and this is no gift
of men, unless it be granted from above, as to the prophets. And
hence the book of Wisdom, speaking of men, "The thoughts of
mortals," it says, "are fearful, and our forethought uncertain."
But memory of things past, and understanding of things present, are
certain: certain, I mean, respecting things incorporeal, which are
present; for things corporeal are present to the sight of the corporeal
eyes. But let any one who denies that there is any memory of things
present, attend to the language used even in profane literature, where
exactness of words was more looked for than truth of things. "Nor did
Ulysses suffer such things, nor did, the Ithacan forget himself in
so great a peril." For when Virgil said that Ulysses did not forget
himself, what else did he mean, except that he remembered himself?
And since he was present to himself, he could not possibly remember
himself, unless memory pertained to things present. And, therefore,
as that is called memory in things past which makes it possible to
recall and remember them; so in a thing present, as the mind is to
itself, that is not unreasonably to be called memory, i which makes
the mind at hand to itself, so that it can be understood by its own
thought, and then both be joined together by love of itself.
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