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The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the
Greeks hqikh, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief
good, that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be
blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not
for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is
called the end, because we wish other things on account of it, but
itself only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore,
according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others,
from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For
they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore they
believed that from i either of these two, or from both together, their
well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good, which
could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all their
actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that good
itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good things,
which they call extrinsic, as honor, glory, wealth, and the like,
have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be
sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be sought
for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of good is
good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether they have
sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or from both
together, it is still only from man they have supposed that it must be
sought. But they who have sought it from the body have sought it from
the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from the mind, from
the superior part; and they who have sought it from both, from the
whole man. Whether therefore, they have sought it from any part, or
from the whole man, still they have only sought it from man; nor have
these differences, being three, given rise only to three dissentient
sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have
held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body, and the
good of the mind, and the good of both together. Let, therefore,
all these give place to those philosophers who have not affirmed that a
man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by the enjoyment of the
mind, but by the enjoyment of God, enjoying Him, however, not as
the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but
as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison
between these things. But what the nature of this comparison is,
will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the best of my
ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention that Plato
determined the final good to be to live according to virtue, and
affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and imitates God,
which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness.
Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to love God, whose
nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows that the student of
wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become blessed when he
shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is not necessarily
blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many are miserable by
loving that which ought not to be loved, and still more miserable when
they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed who does not enjoy that
which he loves. For even they who love things which ought not to be
loved do not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by enjoying
them. Who, then, but the most miserable will deny that he is
blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and
highest good? But the true and highest good, according to Plato, is
God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves God;
for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he
who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.
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