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6. What then shall we say? Does that which knows itself in part,
not know itself in part? But it is absurd to say, that it does not as
a whole know what it knows. I do not say, it knows wholly; but what
it knows, it as a whole knows. When therefore it knows anything about
itself, which it can only know as a whole, it knows itself as a
whole. But it does know that itself knows something, while yet except
as a whole it cannot know anything. Therefore it knows itself as a
whole. Further, what in it is so known to itself, as that it lives?
And it cannot at once be a mind, and not live, while it has also
something over and above, viz., that it understands: for the souls
of beasts also live, but do not understand. As therefore a mind is a
whole mind, so it lives as a whole. But it knows that it lives.
Therefore it knows itself as a whole. Lastly, when the mind seeks to
know itself, it already knows that it is a mind: otherwise it knows
not whether it seeks itself, and perhaps seeks one thing while
intending to seek another. For it might happen that itself was not a
mind, and so, in seeking to know a mind, that it did not seek to know
itself. Wherefore since the mind, when it seeks to know what mind
is, knows that it seeks itself, certainly it knows that itself is a
mind. Furthermore, if it knows this in itself, that it is a mind,
and a whole mind, then it knows itself as a whole. But suppose it did
not know itself to be a mind, but in seeking itself only knew that it
did seek itself. For so, too, it may possibly seek one thing for
another, if it does not know this: but that it may not seek one thing
for another, without doubt it knows what it seeks. But if it knows
what it seeks, and seeks itself, then certainly it knows itself.
What therefore more does it seek? But if it knows itself in part,
but still seeks itself in part, then it seeks not itself, but part of
itself. For when we speak of the mind itself, we speak of it as a
whole. Further, because it knows that it is not yet found by itself
as a whole, it knows how much the whole is.
And so it seeks that which is wanting, as we are wont to seek to
recall to the mind something that has slipped from the mind, but has
not altogether gone away from it; since we can recognize it, when it
has come back, to be the same thing that we were seeking. But how can
mind come into mind, as though it were possible for the mind not to be
in the mind? Add to this, that if, having found a part, it does not
seek itself as a whole, yet it as a whole seeks itself. Therefore as
a whole it is present to itself, and there is nothing left to be
sought: for that is wanting which is sought, not the mind which
seeks. Since therefore it as a whole seeks itself, nothing of it is
wanting. Or if it does not as a whole seek itself, but the part which
has been found seeks the part which has not yet been found then the mind
does not seek itself, of which no part seeks itself. For the part
which has been found, does not seek itself; nor yet does the part
itself which has not yet been found, seek itself; since it is sought
by that part which has been already found. Wherefore, since neither
the mind as a whole seeks itself, nor does any part of it seek itself,
the mind does not seek itself at all.
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