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1. We must now discourse concerning wisdom; not the wisdom of God,
which without doubt is God, for His only-begotten Son is called the
wisdom of God; but we will speak of the wisdom of man, yet of true
wisdom, which is according to God, and is His true and chief
worship, which is called in Greek by one term, qeoseaeia. And this
term, as we have already observed, when our own countrymen themselves
also wished to interpret it by a single term, was by them rendered
piety, whereas piety means more commonly what the Greeks call
eusebeia. But because qeosebeia cannot be translated perfectly by any
one word, it is better translated by two, so as to render it rather by
"the worship of God."
That this is the wisdom of man, as we have already laid down in the
twelfth book of this work, is shown by the authority of Holy
Scripture, in the book of God's servant Job, where we read that
the Wisdom of God said to man, "Behold piety, that is wisdom; and
to depart from evil is knowledge;" or, as some have translated the
Greek word episuhmhn, "learning," which certainly takes its name
from learning, whence also it may be called knowledge. For everything
is learned in order that it may be known. Although the same word,
indeed, is employed in a different sense, where any one suffers evils
for his sins, that he may be corrected. Whence is that in the
Epistle to the Hebrews, "For what son is he to whom the father
giveth not discipline?" And this is still more apparent in the same
epistle:
"Now no chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but
grievous: nevertheless afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of
righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby." Therefore God
Himself is the chiefest wisdom; but the worship of God is the wisdom
of man, of which we now speak.
For "the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." It is in
respect to this wisdom, therefore, which is the worship of God, that
Holy Scripture says, "The multitude of the wise is the welfare of
the world."
2. But if to dispute of wisdom belongs to wise men, what shall we
do? Shall we dare indeed to profess wisdom, test it should be mere
impudence for ourselves to dispute about it? Shall we not be alarmed
by the example of Pythagoras? who dared not profess to be a wise man,
but answer answered hat he was a to be a wise man, but philosopher,
i.e., a lover of wisdom; whence arose the name, that became
thenceforth so much the popular name, that no matter how great the
learning wherein any one excelled, either in his own opinion or that of
others, in things pertaining to wisdom, he was still called nothing
more than philosopher. Or was it for this reason that no one, even of
such as these, dared to profess himself a wise man, because they
imagined that a wise man was one without sin? But our Scriptures do
not say this, which say, "Rebuke a wise man, and he will love
thee." For doubtless he who thinks a man ought to be rebuked, judges
him to have sin. However, for my part, I dare not profess myself a
wise man even in this sense; it is enough for me to assume, what they
themselves cannot deny, that to dispute of wisdom belongs also to the
philosopher, i.e., the lover of wisdom. For they have not given
over so disputing who have professed to be lovers of wisdom rather than
wise men.
3. In disputing, then, about wisdom, they have defined it thus:
Wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine. And hence, in
the last book, I have not withheld the admission, that the cognizance
of both subjects, whether divine or human, may be called both
knowledge and wisdom. But according to the distinction made in the
apostle's words, "To one is given the word of wisdom, to another
the word of knowledge," this definition is to be divided, so that the
knowledge of things divine shall be called wisdom, and that of things
human appropriate to itself the name of knowledge; and of the latter I
have treated in the thirteenth book, not indeed so as to attribute to
this knowledge everything whatever that can be known by man about things
human, wherein there is exceeding much of empty vanity and mischievous
curiosity, but only those things by which that most wholesome faith,
which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended,
strengthened; and in this knowledge most of the faithful are not
strong, however exceeding strong in the faith itself. For it is one
thing to know only what man ought to believe in order to attain to a
blessed life, which must needs be an eternal one; but another to know
in what way this belief itself may both help the pious, and be defended
against the impious, which last the apostle seems to call by the
special name of knowledge. And when I was speaking of this knowledge
before, my especial business was to commend faith, first briefly
distinguishing things eternal from things temporal, and there
discoursing of things temporal; but while deferring things eternal to
the present book, I showed also that faith respecting things eternal
is itself a thing temporal, and dwells in time in the hearts of
believers, and yet is necessary in order to attain the things eternal
themselves. I argued also, that faith respecting the things temporal
which He that is eternal did and suffered for us as man, which manhood
He bare in time and carried on to things eternal, is profitable also
for the obtaining of things eternal; and that the virtues themselves,
whereby in this temporal and mortal life men live prudently, bravely,
temperately, and justly, are not true virtues, unless they are
referred to that same faith, temporal though it is, which leads on
nevertheless to things eternal.
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