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We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the
doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding
these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may
rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate
and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we
do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is
angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness;
not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any
right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which
seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the
suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The
Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much
more honorable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had
he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a
fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far
better and more humane, and more consonant with pious sentiments, are
the words of Cicero in praise of Caesar, when he says, "Among your
virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion."
And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery,
which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient
to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when
the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew
how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the
Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the
book of the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno
and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they
admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom
they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these
very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the
wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and
that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and
of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere
logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for
contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked,
whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow
virtue, is a part of the infirmity Of this life? For the holy angels
feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God
consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they
relieve the miserable, I no fear while they aid those who are in
danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental
emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts
resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even
God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any
perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance,
not of the disturbing mental affection.
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