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4. But as there are two things (duo quaedam), the mind and the
love of it, when it loves itself; so there are two things, the mind
and the knowledge of it, when it knows itself, Therefore the mind
itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things
(tria quaedam), and these three are one; and when they are perfect
they are equal. For if one loves himself less than as he is, as for
example, suppose that the mind of a man only loves itself as much as
the body of a man ought to be loved, whereas the mind is more than the
body, then it is in fault, and its love is not perfect. Again, if
it loves itself more than as it is, as if, for instance, it loves
itself as much as God is to be loved, whereas the mind is incomparably
less than God, here also it is exceedingly in fault, and its love of
self is not perfect. But it is in fault more perversely and wrongly
still, when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved. Also,
if knowledge is less than that thing which is known, and which can be
fully known, then knowledge is not perfect; bill if it is greater,
then the nature which knows is above that which is known, as the
knowledge of the body is greater than the body itself, which is known
by that knowledge. For knowledge is a kind of life in the reason of
the knower, but the body is not life; and any life is greater than any
body, not in bulk, but in power. But when the mind knows itself,
its own knowledge does not rise above itself, because itself knows,
and itself is known. When, therefore, it knows itself entirely, and
no other thing with itself, then its knowledge is equal to itself;
because its knowledge is not from another nature, since it knows
itself. And when it perceives itself entirely, and nothing more,
then it is neither less nor greater. We said therefore rightly, that
these three things, [mind, love, and knowledge], when they are
perfect, are by consequence equal.
5. Similar reasoning suggests to us, if indeed we can any way
understand the matter, that these things [i.e. love and knowledge]
exist in the soul, and that, being as it were involved in it, they
are so evolved from it as to be perceived and reckoned up
substantially, or, so to say, essentially. Not as though in a
subject; as color, or shape, or any other quality or quantity, are
in the body. For anything of this [material] kind does not go beyond
the subject in which it is; for the color or shape of this particular
body cannot be also those of another body. But the mind can also love
something besides itself, with that love with which it loves itself.
And further, the mind does not know itself only, but also many other
things. Wherefore love and knowledge are not contained in the mind as
in a subject, but these also exist substantially, as the mind itself
does; because, even if they are mutually predicated relatively, yet
they exist each severally in their own substance. Nor are they so
mutually predicated relatively as color and the colored subject are; so
that color is in the colored subject, but has not any proper substance
in itself, since colored body is a substance, but color is in a
substance; but as two friends are also two men, which are substances,
while they are said to be men not relatively, but friends relatively.
6. But, further, although one who loves or one who knows is a
substance, and knowledge is a substance, and love is a substance, but
he that loves and love, or, he that knows and knowledge, are spoken
of relatively to each other, as are friends: yet mind or spirit are
not relatives, as neither are men relatives: nevertheless he that
loves and love, or he that knows and knowledge, cannot exist
separately from each other, as men can that are friends. Although it
would seem that friends, too, can be separated in body, not in mind,
in as far as they are friends: nay, it can even happen that a friend
may even also begin to hate a friend and on this account cease to be a
friend while the other does not know it, and still loves him. But if
the love with which the mind loves itself ceases to be, then the mind
also will at the same time cease to love. Likewise, if the knowledge
by which the mind knows itself ceases to be, then the mind will also at
the same time cease to know itself. just as the head of anything that
has a head is certainly a head, and they are predicated relatively to
each other, although they are also substances: for both a head is a
body, and so is that which has a head; and if there be no head, then
neither will there be that which has a head. Only these things can be
separated from each other by cutting off, those cannot.
7. And even if there are some bodies which cannot be wholly separated
and divided, yet they would not be bodies unless they consisted of
their own proper parts. A part then is predicated relatively to a
whole, since every part is a part of some whole, and a whole is a
whole by having all its parts. But since both part and whole are
bodies, these things are not only predicated relatively, but exist
also substantially. Perhaps, then, the mind is a whole, and the
love with which it loves itself, and the knowledge with which it knows
itself, are as it were its parts, of which two parts that whole
consists. Or are there three equal parts which make up the one whole?
But no part embraces the whole, of which it is a part; whereas, when
the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows itself perfectly,
then the knowledge of it extends through the whole of it; and when it
loves itself perfectly, then it loves itself as a whole, and the love
of it extends through the whole of it. Is it, then, as one drink is
made from wine and water and honey, and each single part extends
through the whole, and yet they are three things (for there is no part
of the drink which does not contain these three things; for they are
not joined as if they were water and oil, but are entirely commingled:
and they are all substances, and the whole of that liquor which is
composed of the three is one substance), is it, I say, in some such
way as this we are to think these three to be together, mind, love,
and knowledge? But water, wine, and honey are not of one substance,
although one substance results in the drink made from the commingling of
them. And I cannot see how those other three are not of the same
substance. since the mind itself loves itself, and itself knows
itself; and these three so exist, as that the mind is neither loved
nor known by any other thing at all. These three, therefore, must
needs be of one and the same essence; and for that reason, if they
were confounded together as it were by a commingling, they could not be
in any way three, neither could they be mutually referred to each
other. Just as if you were to make from one and the same gold three
similar rings, although connected with each other, they are mutually
referred to each other, because they are similar. For everything
similar is similar to something, and there is a trinity of rings, and
one gold. But if they are blended with each other, and each mingled
with the other through the whole of their own bulk, then that trinity
will fall through, and it will not exist at all; and not only will it
be called one gold, as it was called in the case of those three rings,
but now it will not be called three things of gold at all.
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