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7. Why therefore is it enjoined upon it, that it should know
itself? I suppose, in order that, it may consider itself, and live
according to its own nature; that is, seek to be regulated according
to its own nature, viz., under Him to whom it ought to be subject,
and above those things to which it is to be preferred; under Him by
whom it ought to be ruled, above those things which it ought to rule.
For it does many things through vicious desire, as though in
forgetfulness of itself. For it sees some things intrinsically
excellent, in that more excellent nature which is God: and whereas it
ought to remain steadfast that it may enjoy them, it is turned away
from Him, by wishing to appropriate those things to itself, and not
to be like to Him by His gift, but to be what He is by its own, and
it begins to move and slip gradually down into less and less, which it
thinks to be more and more; for it is neither sufficient for itself,
nor is anything at all sufficient for it, if it withdraw from Him who
is alone sufficient: and so through want and distress it becomes too
intent upon its own actions and upon the unquiet delights which it
obtains through them: and thus, by the desire of acquiring knowledge
from those things that are without, the nature of which it knows and
loves, and which it feels can be lost unless held fast with anxious
care, it loses its security, and thinks of itself so much the less,
in proportion as it feels the more secure that it cannot lose itself.
So, whereas it is one thing not to know oneself, and another not to
think of oneself (for we do not say of the man that is skilled in much
learning, that he is ignorant of grammar, when he is only not thinking
of it, because he is thinking at the time of the art of medicine);
whereas, then, I say it is one thing not to know oneself, and
another not to think of oneself, such is the strength of love, that
the mind draws in with itself those things which it has long thought of
with love, and has grown into them by the close adherence of diligent
study, even when it returns in some way to think of itself. And
because these things are corporeal which it loved externally through the
carnal senses; and because it has become entangled with them by a kind
of daily familiarity, and yet cannot carry those corporeal things
themselves with itself internally as it were into the region of
incorporeal nature; therefore it combines certain images of them, and
thrusts them thus made from itself into itself. For it gives to the
forming of them somewhat of its own substance, yet preserves the while
something by which it may judge freely of the species of those images;
and this something is more properly the mind, that is, the rational
understanding, which is preserved that it may judge. For we see that
we have those parts. of the soul which are informed by the likenesses
of corporeal things, in common also with beasts.
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