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Those emotions which the Greeks call eupaqeiai, and which Cicero
calls constantioe, the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead
of three "perturbations" in the soul of the wise man, they
substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy,
contentment; and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain,
which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to call sorrow, they denied
that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks
the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in
good that is possessed, and this the wise man continually possesses.
Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man ought to avoid. But
sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose
that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative
of sorrow in his mind. According to them, therefore, none but the
wise man wills, is contented, uses caution; and that the fool can do
no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three
affections Cicero calls constantioe, the last four perturbationes.
Many, however, calls these last passions; and, as I have said,
the Greeks call the former eupaqiai, eupaqiai, and the latter paqh.
And when I made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether
this terminology was sanctioned by it, I came upon this saying of the
prophet: "There is no contentment to the wicked, saith the Lord;"
as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding
evils, for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found
also that verse in the Gospel: "Whatsoever ye would that men should
do unto you, do ye even so unto them: which seems to imply that evil
or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will.
Indeed, some interpreters have added "good things," to make the
expression more in conformity with customary usage, and have given this
meaning, "Whatsoever good deeds that ye would that men should do unto
you." For they thought that this would prevent any one from wishing
other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful
gratifications, luxurious banquets, for example, on the supposition
that if he returned the like to them he would be fulfilling this
precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is
translated, "good" does not occur, but only, "All things
whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto
them," and, as I believe, because "good" is already included in
the word "would;" for He does not say "desire."
Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise
proprieties of language, we are not to be always bridled by them; and
when we read those writers against whose authority it is unlawful to
reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages where
a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those
instances we adduced partly from the prophet, partly from the Gospel.
For who does not know that the wicked exult with joy? Yet "there is
no contentment for the wicked, saith the Lord."
And how so, unless because contentment, when the word is used in its
proper and distinctive significance, means something different from
joy? In like manner, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon
men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should
themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another
by shameful and illicit pleasure? And yet the precept, "Whatsoever
ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them," is very
wholesome and just. And how is this, unless because the will is in
this place used strictly, and signifies that will which cannot have
evil for its object? But ordinary phraseology would not have allowed
the saying, "Be unwilling to make any manner of lie," had there not
been also an evil will, whose wickedness separates if from that which
the angels celebrated, "Peace on earth, of good will to men." For
"good" is superfluous if there is no other kind of will but good
will. And why should the apostle have mentioned it among the praises
of charity as a great thing, that "it rejoices not in iniquity,"
unless because wickedness does so rejoice?
For even with secular writers these words are used indifferently. For
Cicero, that most fertile of orators, says, "I desire, conscript
fathers, to be merciful." And who would be so pedantic as to say
that he should have said "I will" rather than "I desire," because
the word is used in a good connection?
Again, in Terence, the profligate youth, burning with wild lust,
says, "I will nothing else than Philumena." That this "will"
was lust is sufficiently indicated by the answer of his old servant
which is there introduced: "How much better were it to try and banish
that love from your heart, than to speak so as uselessly to inflame
your passion still more!" And that contentment was used by secular
writers in a bad sense that verse of Virgil testifies, in which he
most succinctly comprehends these four perturbations,- "Hence they
fear and desire, grieve and are content"
The same author had also used the expression, "the evil contentments
of the mind." So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious,
and contented; or, to say the same thing in other words, good and bad
men alike desire, fear, rejoice, but the former in a good, the
latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is right or wrong.
Sorrow itself, too, which the Stoics would not allow to tie
represented in the mind of the wise man, is used in a good sense, and
especially in our writings.For the apostle praises the Corinthians
because they had a godly sorrow. But possibly some one may say that
the apostle congratulated them because they were penitently sorry, and
that such sorrow can exist only in those who have sinned. For these
are his words: "For I perceive that the same epistle hath made you
sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that ye
were made sorry, but that ye sorrowed to repentance; for ye were made
sorry after a godly manner, that ye might receive damage by us in
nothing. For godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation not to be
repented of, but the sorrow of the world worketh death. For,
behold, this selfsame thing that ye sorrowed after a godly sort, what
carefulness it wrought in you!" Consequently the Stoics may defend
themselves by replying, that sorrow is indeed useful for repentance of
sin, but that this can have no place in the mind of the wise man,
inasmuch as no sin attaches to him of which he could sorrowfully
repent, nor any other evil the endurance or experience of which could
make him sorrowful. For they say that Alcibiades (if my memory does
not deceive me), who believed himself happy, shed tears when
Socrates argued with him, and demonstrated that he was miserable
because he was foolish. In his case, therefore, folly was the cause
of this useful and desirable sorrow, wherewith a man mourns that he is
what he ought not to be. But the Stoics maintain not that the fool,
but that the wise man, cannot be sorrowful.
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