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17. Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things, of
which the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially consider
and discuss these three memory, understanding, will. For we may
commonly discern in these three the character of the abilities of the
young also; since the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and
the more acutely he understands, and the more ardently he studies, the
more praiseworthy is he in point of ability. But when the question is
about any one's learning, then we ask not how solidly and easily he
remembers, or how shrewdly he understands; but what it is that he
remembers, and what it is that he understands. And because the mind
is regarded as praiseworthy, not only as being learned, but also as
being good, one gives heed not only to what he remembers and what he
understands, but also to what he wills (velit); not how ardently he
wills, but first what it is he wills, and then how greatly he wills
it. For the mind that loves eagerly is then to be praised, when it
loves that which ought to be loved eagerly. Since, then, we speak of
these three ability, knowledge, use the first of these is to be
considered under the three heads, of what a man can do in memory, and
understanding, and will. The second of them is to be considered in
regard to that which any one has in his memory and in his
understanding, which he has attained by a studious will. But the
third, viz. use, lies in the will, which handles those things that
are contained in the memory and understanding, whether it refer them to
anything further, or rest satisfied with them as an end. For to use,
is to take up something into the power of the will; and to enjoy, is
to use with joy, not any longer of hope, but of the actual thing.
Accordingly, every one who enjoys, uses; for he takes up something
into the power of the will, wherein he also is satisfied as with an
end. But not every one who uses, enjoys, if he has sought after
that, which he takes up into the power of the will, not on account of
the thing itself, but on account of something else.
18. Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, wills are
not three lives, but one life; nor three minds, but one mind; it
follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but one
substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind, and
substance, is so called in respect to itself; but it is called
memory, relatively to something. And I should say the same also of
understanding and of will, since they are called understanding and will
relatively to something; but each in respect to itself is life, and
mind, and essence. And hence these three are one, in that they are
one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are severally
called in respect to themselves, they are called also together, not
plurally, but in the singular number. But they are three, in that
wherein they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not
equal, and this not only each to each, but also each to all, they
certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is each
contained by each, but also all by each. For I remember that I have
memory and understanding, and will; and I understand that I
understand, and will, and remember; and I will that I will, and
remember, and understand; and I remember together my whole memory,
and understanding, and will. For that of my memory which I do not
remember, is not in my memory; and nothing is so much in the memory as
memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole memory. Also,
whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I
will whatever I will; but whatever I know I remember. Therefore I
remember the whole of my understanding, and the whole of my will.
Likewise, when I understand these three things, I understand them
together as whole. For there is none of things intelligible which I
do not understand, except what I do not know; but what I do not
know, I neither remember, nor will. Therefore, whatever of things
intelligible I do not understand, it follows also that I neither
remember nor will. And whatever of things intelligible I remember and
will, it fol lows that I understand. My will also embraces my whole
understanding and my whole memory whilst I use the whole that I
understand and remember. And, therefore, while all are mutually
comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is equal to each
as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as wholes; and
these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence.
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