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Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental
emotions, which the Greeks call paqh, while some of our own writers,
as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to
render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even
the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and
controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains
them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists
and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the
founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are
of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations.
But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are
here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words
than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term "goods" to
external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good
is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind.
The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary
phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in
comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of
small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward
things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same
estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are
pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then,
to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental
passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words
rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the
mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the
same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for
brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this
opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus
Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent
and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Atticae
that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he
goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that
when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the
philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on
board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to
see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the
tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them
freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and
luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him
because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been
unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed
himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding
himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered,
"You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee,
but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus." The
rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the
philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what
was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so
zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a
book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which
precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders
of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book
that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the
soul by external objects which they call phantasiae, and that it is not
in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be
invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and
formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of
the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is
depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason
and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these
evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent
is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference
between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's
mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the
wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains
with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things
which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what
Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the
sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I
could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater
brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be
true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the
opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding
mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in
maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to
these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that
the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and
sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom
remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods
and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the
advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that
if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought
he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have
been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of
his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance,
and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety,
which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those
good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of
righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call
them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect
things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages
be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is
alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name
them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure
us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the
threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose
such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit
such things as violate righteousness.
And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no
perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though
they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it
rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them,
administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas
by Virgil when he says, "He stands immovable by tears, Nor
tenderest words with pity hears."
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