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But herein, no doubt, lies the great necessity for this absurdity,
so unworthy of the gods, that the ethereal gods, who are concerned
about human affairs, would not know what terrestrial men were doing
unless the aerial demons should bring them intelligence, because the
ether is suspended far away from the earth and far above it, but the
air is contiguous both to the ether and to the earth O admirable
wisdom! what else do these men think concerning the gods who, they
say, are all in the highest degree good, but that they are concerned
about human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy of worship,
whilst, on the other hand, from the distance between the elements,
they are ignorant of terrestrial things? It is on this account that
they have supposed the demons to be necessary as agents, through whom
the gods may inform themselves with respect to human affairs, and
through whom, when necessary, they may succor men; and it is on
account of this office that the demons themselves have been held as
deserving of worship. If this be the case, then a demon is better
known by these good gods through nearness of body, than a man is by
goodness of mind. O mournful necessity, or shall I not rather say
detestable and vain error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine
nature! For if the gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance
of bodies, see our mind, they do not need the demons as messengers
from our mind to them; but if the ethereal gods, by means of their
bodies, perceive the corporeal indices of minds, as the countenance,
speech, motion, and thence understand what the demons tell them, then
it is also possible that they may be deceived by the falsehoods of
demons. Moreover, if the divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by
the demons, neither can it be ignorant of our actions. But I would
they would tell me whether the demons have informed the gods that the
fictions of the poets concerning the crimes of the gods displease
Plato, concealing the pleasure which they themselves take in them; or
whether they have concealed both, and have preferred that the gods
should be ignorant with respect to this whole matter, or have told
both, as well the pious prudence of Plato with respect to the gods as
their own lust, which is injurious to the gods; or whether they have
concealed Plato's opinion, according to which he was unwilling that
the gods should be defamed with falsely alleged crimes through the
impious license of the poets, whilst they have not been ashamed nor
afraid to make known their own wickedness, which make them love
theatrical plays, in which the infamous deeds of the gods are
celebrated. Let them choose which they will of these four
alternatives, and let them consider how much evil any one of them would
require them to think of the gods. For if they choose the first, they
must then confess that it was not possible for the good gods to dwell
with the good Plato, though he sought to prohibit things injurious to
them, whilst they dwelt with evil demons, who exulted in their
injuries; and this because they suppose that the good gods can only
know a good man, placed at so great a distance from them, through the
mediation of evil demons, whom they could know on account of their
nearness to themselves. If they shall choose the second, and shall
say that both these things are concealed by the demons, so that the
gods are wholly ignorant both of Plato's most religious law and the
sacrilegious pleasure of the demons, what, in that case, can the gods
know to any profit with respect to human affairs through these mediating
demons, when they do not know those things which are decreed, through
the piety of good men, for the honor of the good gods against the lust
of evil demons? But if they shall choose the third, and reply that
these intermediary demons have communicated, not only the opinion of
Plato, which prohibited wrongs to be done to the gods, but also their
own delight in these wrongs, I would ask if such a communication is
not rather an insult? Now the gods, hearing both and knowing both,
not only permit the approach of those malign demons, who desire and do
things contrary to the dignity of the gods and the religion of Plato,
but also, through these wicked demons, who are near to them, send
good things to the good Plato, who is far away from them; for their
inhabit such a place in the concatenated series of the elements, that
they can come into contact with those by whom they are accused, but not
with him by whom they are defended, knowing the truth on both sides,
but not being able to change the weight of the air and the earth.
There remains the fourth supposition; but it is worse than the rest.
For who will suffer it to be said that the demons have made known the
calumnious fictions of the poets concerning the immortal gods, and also
the disgraceful mockeries of the theatres, and their own most ardent
lust after, and most sweet pleasure in these things, whilst they have
concealed from them that Plato, with the gravity of a philosopher,
gave it as his opinion that all these things ought to be removed from a
well-regulated republic; so that the good gods are now compelled,
through such messengers, to know the evil doings of the most wicked
beings, that is to say, of the messengers themselves, and are not
allowed to know the good deeds of the philosophers, though the former
are for the injury, but these latter for the honor of the gods
themselves?
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