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17. What then is love? Will it not be an image? Will it not be a
word? Will it not be begotten? For why does the mind beget its
knowledge when it knows itself, and not beget its love when it loves
itself? For if it is the cause of its own knowing, for the reason
that it is knowable, it is also the cause of its own love because it is
lovable. It is hard, then, to say why it does not beget both. For
there is a further question also respecting the supreme Trinity
itself, the omnipotent God the Creator, after whose image man is
made, which troubles men, whom the truth of God invites to the faith
by human speech; viz.. why the Holy Spirit is not also to be either
believed or understood to be begotten by God the Father, so that He
also may be called a Son. And this question we are endeavoring in
some way to investigate in the human mind, in order that from a lower
image, in which our own nature itself as it were answers, upon being
questioned, in a way more familiar to ourselves, we may be able to
direct a more practised mental vision from the enlightened creature to
the unchangeable light; assuming, however, that the truth itself has
persuaded us, that as no Christian doubts the Word of God to be the
Son, so that the Holy Spirit is love. Let us return, then, to a
more careful questioning and consideration upon this subject of that
image which is the creature, that is, of the rational mind; wherein
the knowl edge of some things coming into existence in time, but which
did not exist before, and the love of some things which were not loved
before, opens to us more clearly what to say: because to speech also
itself, which must be disposed in time, that thing is easier of
explanation which is comprehended in the order of time.
18. First, therefore, it is clear that a thing may possibly be
knowable, that is, such as can be known, and yet that it may be
unknown; but that it is not possible for that to be known which is not
knowable. Wherefore it must be clearly held that everything whatsoever
that we know begets at the same time in us the knowledge of itself; for
knowledge is brought forth from both, from the knower and from the
thing known. When, therefore, the mind knows itself, it alone is
the parent of its own knowledge; for it is itself both the thing known
and the knower of it. But it was knowable to itself also before it
knew itself, only the knowledge of itself was not in itself so long as
it did not know itself. In knowing itself, then, it begets a
knowledge of itself equal to itself; since it does not know itself as
less than itself is, nor is its knowledge the knowledge of the essence
of some one else, not only because itself knows, but also because it
knows itself, as we have said above What then is to be said of love;
why, when the mind loves itself, it should not seem also to have
begotten the love of itself? For it was lovable to itself even before
it loved itself since it could love itself; just as it was knowable to
itself even before it knew itself, since it could know itself. For if
it were not knowable to itself, it never could have known itself; and
so, if it were not lovable to itself, it never could have loved
itself. Why therefore may it not be said by loving itself to have
begotten its own love, as by knowing itself it has begotten its own
knowledge? Is it because it is thereby indeed plainly shown that this
is the principle of love, whence it proceeds? for it proceeds from the
mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself, and so
is the principle of its own love by which it loves itself: but that
this love is not therefore rightly said to be begotten by the mind, as
is the knowledge of itself by which the mind knows itself, because in
the case of knowledge the thing has been found already, which is what
we call brought forth or discovered; and this is commonly preceded by
an inquiry such as to find rest when that end is attained. For inquiry
is the desire of finding, or, what is the same thing, of
discovering. But those things which are discovered are as it were
brought forth, whence they are like offspring; but wherein, except in
the case itself of knowledge? For in that case they are as it were
uttered and fashioned. For although the things existed already which
we found by seeking, yet the knowledge of them did not exist, which
knowledge we regard as an offspring that is born. Further, the desire
(appetitus) which there is in seeking proceeds from him who seeks,
and is in some way in suspense, and does not rest in the end whither it
is directed, except that which is sought be found and conjoined with
him who seeks. And this desire, that is, inquiry, although it does
not seem to be love, by which that which is known is loved, for in
this case we are still striving to know, yet it is something of the
same kind. For it can be called will (voluntas), since every one
who seeks wills (vult) to find; and if that is sought which belongs
to knowledge, every one who seeks wills to know. But if he wills
ardently and earnestly, he is said to study (studere): a word that
is most commonly employed in the case of pursuing and obtaining any
branches of learning. Therefore, the bringing forth of the mind is
preceded by some desire, by which, through seeking and finding what we
wish to know, the offspring, viz. knowledge itself, is born. And
for this reason, that desire by which knowledge is conceived and
brought forth, cannot rightly be called the bringing forth and the
offspring; and the same desire which led us to long for the knowing of
the thing, becomes the love of the thing when known, while it holds
and embraces its accepted offspring, that is, knowledge, and unites
it to its begetter. And so there is a kind of image of the Trinity in
the mind itself, and the knowledge of it, which is its offspring and
its word concerning itself, and love as a third, and these three are
one, and one substance. Neither is the offspring less, since the
mind knows itself according to the measure of its own being; nor is the
love less, since it loves itself according to the measure both of its
own knowledge and of its own being.
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