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As I see that I have still to discuss the fit destinies of the two
cities, the earthly and the heavenly, I must first explain, so far
as the limits of this work allow me, the reasonings by which men have
attempted to make for themselves a happiness in this unhappy life, in
order that it may be evident, not only from divine authority, but also
from such reasons as can be adduced to unbelievers, how the empty
dreams of the philosophers differ from the hope which God gives to us,
and from the substantial fulfillment of it which He will give us as our
blessedness. Philosophers have expressed a great variety of, diverse
opinions regarding the ends of goods and of evils, and this question
they have eagerly canvassed, that they might, if possible, discover
what makes a man happy. For the end of our good is that for the sake
of which other things are to be desired, while it is to be desired for
its own sake; and the end of evil is that on account of which other
things are to be shunned, while it is avoided on its own account.
Thus, by the end of good, we at present mean, not that by which good
is destroyed, so that it no longer exists, but that by which it is
finished, so that it becomes complete; and by the end of evil we
mean, not that which abolishes it, but that which completes its
development.
These two ends, therefore, are the supreme good and the supreme
evil; and, as I have said, those who have in this vain life
professed the study of wisdom have been at great pains to discover these
ends, and to obtain the supreme good and avoid the supreme evil in this
life. And although they erred in a variety of ways, yet natural
insight has prevented them from wandering from the truth so far that
they have not placed the supreme good and evil, some in the soul, some
in the body, and some in both. From this tripartite distribution of
the sects of philosophy, Marcus Varro, in his book De
Philosophia, has drawn so large a variety of opinions, that, by a
subtle and minute analysis of distinctions, he numbers without
difficulty as many as 288 sects, not that these have actually
existed, but sects which are possible.
To illustrate briefly what he means, I must begin with his own
introductory statement in the above-mentioned book, that there are
four things which men desire, as it were by nature without a master,
without the help of any instruction, without industry or the art of
living which is called virtue, and which is certainly learned: either
pleasure, which is an agreeable stirring of the bodily sense; or
repose, which excludes every bodily inconvenience; or both these,
which Epicurus calls by the one name, pleasure; or the primary
objects of nature, which comprehend the things already named and other
things, either bodily, such as health, and safety, and integrity of
the members, or spiritual, such as the greater and less mental gifts
that are found in men.
Now these four things, pleasure, repose, the two combined, and the
primary objects of nature, exist in us in such sort that we must either
desire virtue on their account, or them for the sake of virtue, or
both for their own sake; and consequently there arise from this
distinction twelve sects, for each is by this consideration tripled.
I will illustrate this in one instance, and, having done so, it will
not be difficult to understand the others. According, then, as
bodily pleasure is subjected, preferred, or united to Virtue, there
are three sects. It is subjected to virtue when it is chosen as
subservient to virtue. Thus it is a duty of virtue to live for one's
country, and for its sake to beget children, neither of which can be
done without bodily pleasure.
For there is pleasure in eating and drinking, pleasure also in sexual
intercourse. But when it is preferred to virtue, it is desired for
its own sake, and virtue is chosen only for its sake, and to effect
nothing else than the attainment or preservation of bodily pleasure.
And this, indeed, is to make life hideous; for where virtue is the
slave of pleasure it no longer deserves the name of virtue. Yet even
this disgraceful distortion has found some philosophers to patronize and
defend it. Then virtue is united to pleasure when neither is desired
for the other's sake, but both for their own.
And therefore, as pleasure, according as it is subjected,
preferred, or united to virtue, makes three sects, so also do
repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the prime natural
blessings, make their three sects each. For as men's opinions vary,
and these four things are sometimes subjected, sometimes preferred,
and sometimes united to virtue, there are produced twelve sects.
But this number again is doubled by the addition of one difference,
viz., the social life; for whoever attaches himself to any of these
sects does so either for his own sake alone, or for the sake of a
companion, for whom he ought to wish what he desires for himself. And
thus there will be twelve of those who think some one of these opinions
should be held for their own sakes, and other twelve who decide that
they ought to follow this or that philosophy not for their own sakes
only, but also for the sake of others whose good they desire as their
own. These twenty-four sects again are doubled, and become
forty-eight by adding a difference taken from the New Academy. For
each of these four and twenty sects can hold and defend their opinion as
certain, as the Stoics defended the position that the supreme good of
man consisted solely in virtue; or they can be held as probable, but
not certain, as the New Academics did. There are, therefore,
twenty-four who hold their philosophy as certainly true, other
twenty-four who hold their opinions as probable, but not certain.
Again, as each person who attaches himself to any of these sects may
adopt the mode of life either of the Cynics or of the other
philosophers, this distinction will double the number, and so make
ninety-six sects. Then, lastly, as each of these sects may be
adhered to either by men who love a life of ease, as those who have
through choice or necessity addicted themselves to study, or by men who
love a busy life, as those who, while philosophizing, have been much
occupied with state affairs and public business, or by men who choose a
mixed life, in imitation of those who have apportioned their time
partly to erudite leisure, partly to necessary business: by these
differences the number of the sects is tripled, and becomes 288.
I have thus, as briefly and lucidly as I could, given in my own
words the opinions which Varro expresses in his book. But how he
refutes all the rest of these sects, and chooses one, the Old
Academy, instituted by Plato, and continuing to Polemo, the fourth
teacher of that school of philosophy which held that their system was
certain; and how on this ground he distinguishes it from the New
Academy, which began with Polemo's successor Arcesilaus, and held
that all things are uncertain; and how he seeks to establish that the
Old Academy was as free from error as from doubt, all this, I say,
were too long to enter upon in detail, and yet I must not altogether
pass it by in silence. Varro then rejects, as a first step, all
those differences which have multiplied the number of sects; and the
ground on which he does so is that they are not differences about the
supreme good. He maintains that in philosophy a sect is created only
by its having an opinion of its own different from other schools on the
point of the ends-in-chief. For man has no other reason for
philosophizing than that he may be happy; but that which makes him
happy is itself the supreme good. In other words, the supreme good is
the reason of philosophizing; and therefore that cannot be called a
sect of philosophy which pursues no way of its own towards the supreme
good. Thus, when it is asked whether a wise man will adopt the social
life, and desire and be interested in the supreme good of his friend as
in his own, or will, on the contrary, do all that he does merely for
his own sake, there is no question here about the supreme good, but
only about the propriety of associating or not associating a friend in
its participation: whether the wise man will do this not for his own
sake, but for the sake of his friend in whose good he delights as in
his own. So, too, when it is asked whether all things about which
philosophy is concerned are to be considered uncertain, as by the New
Academy, or certain, as the other philosophers maintain, the
question here is not what end should be pursued, but whether or not we
are to believe in the substantial existence of that end; or, to put it
more plainly, whether he who pursues the supreme good must maintain
that it is a true good, or only that it appears to him to be true,
though possibly it may be delusive, both pursuing one and the same
good. The distinction, too, which is founded on the dress and
manners of the Cynics, does not touch the question of the chief good,
but only the question whether he who pursues that good which seems to
himself true should live as do the Cynics. There were, in fact, men
who, though they pursued different things as the supreme good, some
choosing pleasure, others virtue, yet adopted that mode of life which
gave the Cynics their name. Thus, whatever it is which distinguishes
the Cynics from other philosophers, this has no bearing on the choice
and pursuit of that good which constitutes happiness. For if it had
any such bearing, then the same habits of life would necessitate the
pursuit of the same chief good, and all-verse habits would necessitate
the pursuit of different ends.
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