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10. Perhaps we can rightly call vision the end and rest of the
will, only with respect tO this one object [namely, the bodily thing
that is visible]. For it will not will nothing else merely because it
sees something which it is now willing. It is not therefore the whole
will itself of the man, of which the end is nothing else than
blessedness; but the will provisionally directed to this one object,
which has as its end in seeing, nothing but vision, whether it refer
the thing seen to any other thing or not. For if it does not refer the
vision to anything further, but wills only to see this, there can be
no question made about showing that the end of the will is the vision;
for it is manifest. But if it does refer it to anything further, then
certainly it does will something else, and it will not be now a will
merely to see; or if to see, not one to see the particular thing.
Just as, if any one wished to see the scar, that from thence he might
learn that there had been a wound; or wished to see the window, that
through the window he might see the passers-by: all these and other
such acts of will have their own proper [proximate] ends, which are
referred to that [final] end of the will by which we will to live
blessedly, and to attain to that life which is not referred to anything
else, but suffices of itself to him who loves it. The will then to
see, has as its end vision; and the will to see this particular
thing, has as its end the vision of this particular thing. Therefore
the will to see the scar, desires its own end, that is, the vision of
the scar, and does not reach beyond it; for the will to prove that
there had been a wound, is a distinct will, although dependent upon
that, of which the end also is to prove that there had been a wound.
And the will to see the window, has as its end the vision of the
window; for that is another and further will which depends upon it,
viz. to see the passers-by through the window, of which also the end
is the vision of the passers-by. But all the several wills that are
bound to each other, are a once right, if that one is good, to which
all are referred; and if that is bad, then all are bad. And so the
connected series of right wills is a sort of road which consists as it
were of certain steps, whereby to ascend to blessedness; but the
entanglement of depraved and distorted wills is a bond by which he will
be bound who thus acts, so as to be cast into outer darkness. Blessed
therefore are they who in act and character sing the song of the steps
[degrees]; and woe to those that draw sin, as it were a long rope.
And it is just the same to speak of the will being in repose, which we
call its end, if it is still referred to something further, as if we
should say that the foot is at rest in walking, when it is placed
there, whence yet another foot may be planted in the direction of the
man's steps. But if something so satisfies, that the will acquiesces
in it with a certain delight; it is nevertheless not yet that to which
the man ultimately tends; but this too is referred to something
further, so as to be regarded not as the native country of a citizen,
but as a place of refreshment, or even of stopping, for a traveller.
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