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8. This is to be made clear by examples. And first we must notice,
that by the word begotten is signified the same thing as is signified by
the word son. For therefore a son, because begotten, and because a
son, therefore certainly begotten. By the word unbegotten,
therefore, it is declared that he is not son. But begotten and
unbegotten are both of them terms suitably employed; whereas in Latin
we can use the word "filius," but the custom of the language does not
allow us to speak of "infilius." It makes no difference, however,
in the meaning if he is called "non filius;" just as it is precisely
the same thing if he is called "non genitus," instead of
"ingenitus." For so the terms of both neighbor and friend are used
relatively, yet we cannot speak of "invicinus" as we can of
"inimicus." Wherefore, in speaking of this thing or that, we must
not consider what the usage of our own language either allows or does
not allow, but what clearly appears to be the meaning of the things
themselves. Let us not therefore any longer call it unbegotten,
although it can be so called in Latin; but instead of this let us call
it not begotten, which means the same. Is this then anything else
than saying that he is not a son? Now the prefixing of that negative
particle does not make that to be said according to substance, which,
without it, is said relatively; but that only is denied, which,
without it, was affirmed, as in the other predicaments. When we say
he is a man, we denote substance. He therefore who says he is not a
man, enunciates no other kind of predicament, but only denies that.
As therefore I affirm according to substance in saying he is a man,
so I deny according to substance in saying he is not a man. And when
the question is asked how large he is? and I say he is quadrupedal,
that is, four feet in measure, I affirm according to quantity, and
he who says he is not quadrupedal, denies according to quantity. I
say he is white, I affirm according to quality; if I say he is not
white, I deny according to quality. I say he is near, I affirm
according to relation; if I say he is not near, I deny according to
relation.
I affirm according to position, when I say he lies down; I deny
according to position, when I say he does not lie down. I speak
according to condition/when I say he is armed; I deny according to
condition, when I say he is not armed; and it comes to the same thing
as if I should say he is unarmed. I affirm according to time, when
I say he is of yesterday; I deny according to time, when I say he
is not of yesterday. And when I say he is at Rome, I affirm
according to place; and I deny according to place, when I say he is
not at Rome. I affirm according to the predicament of action, when
I say he smites; but if I say he does not smite, I deny according
to action, so as to declare that he does not so act. And when I say
he is smitten, I affirm according to the predicament of passion; and
I deny according to the same, when I say he is not smitten. And,
in a word, there is no kind of predicament according to which we may
please to affirm anything, without being proved to deny according to
the same predicament, if we prefix the negative particle. And since
this is so, if I were to affirm according to substance, in saying
son, I should deny according to substance, in saying not son. But
because I affirm relatively when I say he is a son, for I refer to
the father therefore I deny relatively if I say he is not a son, for
I refer the same negation to the father, in that I wish to declare
that he has not a parent. But if to be called son is precisely
equivalent to the being called begotten (as we said before), then to
be called not begotten is precisely equivalent to the being called not
son.
But we deny relatively when we say he is not son, therefore we deny
relatively when we say he is not begotten. Further, what is
unbegotten, unless not begotten? We do not escape, therefore, from
the relative predicament, when he is called unbegotten. For as
begotten is not said in relation to self, but in that he is of a
begetter; so when one is called unbegotten, he is not so called in
relation to himself, but it is declared that he is not of a begetter.
Both meanings, however, turn upon the same predicament, which is
called that of relation. But that which is asserted relatively does
not denote substance, and accordingly, although begotten and
unbegotten are diverse, they do not denote a different substance;
because, as son is referred to father, and not son to not father, so
it follows inevitably that begotten must be referred to begetter, and
not-begotten to not-begetter.
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