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As soon as Eusebius reached Alexandria, he in concert with
Athanasius immediately convoked a Synod. The bishops assembled on
this occasion out of various cities, took into consideration many
subjects of the utmost importance. They asserted the divinity of the
Holy Spirit and comprehended him in the consubstantial Trinity: they
also declared that the Word in being made man, assumed not only
flesh, but also a soul, in accordance with the views of the early
ecclesiastics. For they did not introduce any new doctrine of their
own devising into the church, but contented themselves with recording
their sanction of those points which ecclesiastical tradition has
insisted on from the beginning, and wise Christians have
demonstratively taught. Such sentiments the ancient fathers have
uniformly maintained in all their controversial writings. Irenaeus,
Clemens, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, and Serapion who presided over
the church at Antioch, assure us in their several works, that it was
the generally received opinion that Christ in his incarnation was
endowed with a soul. Moreover, the Synod convened on account of
Beryllus bishop of Philadelphia in Arabia, recognized the same
doctrine in their letter to that prelate. Origen also every where in
his extant works accepts that the Incarnate God took on himself a
human soul. But he more particularly explains this mystery in the
ninth volume of his Comments upon Genesis, where he shows that Adam
and Eve were types of Christ and the church. That holy man
Pamphilus, and Eusebius who was surnamed after him, are trustworthy
witnesses on this subject: both these witnesses in their joint life of
Origen, and admirable defense of him in answer to such as were
prejudiced against him, prove that he was not the first who made this
declaration, but that in doing so he was the mere expositor of the
mystical tradition of the church. Those who assisted at the
Alexandrian Council examined also with great minuteness the question
concerning 'Essence' or 'Substance,' and 'Existence,'
'Subsistence,' or 'Personality.' For Hosius, bishop of
Cordova in Spain, who has been before referred to as having been sent
by the Emperor Constantine to allay the excitement which Arius had
caused, originated the controversy about these terms in his earnestness
to overthrow the dogma of Sabellius the Libyan. In the council of
Nicaea, however, which was held soon after, this dispute was not
agitated; but in consequence of the contention about it which
subsequently arose, the matter was freely discussed at Alexandria.
It was there determined that such expressions as ousia and hypo-stasis
ought not to be used in reference to God: for they argued that the
word ousia is nowhere employed in the sacred Scriptures; and that the
apostle has misapplied the term hypostasis owing to an inevitable
necessity arising from the nature of the doctrine. They nevertheless
decided that in refutation of the Sabellian error these terms were
admissible, in default of more appropriate language, lest it should be
supposed that one thing was indicated by a threefold designation;
whereas we ought rather to believe that each of those named in the
Trinity is God in his own proper person. Such were the decisions of
this Synod. If we may express our own judgment concerning substance
and personality, it appears to us that the Greek philosophers have
given us various definitions of ousia, but have not taken the slightest
notice of hypostasis. Irenaenus the grammarian indeed, in his
Alphabetical [Lexicon entitled] Atticistes, even declares it to be
a barbarous term; for it is not to be found in any of the ancients,
except occasionally in a sense quite different from that which is
attached to it in the present day. Thus Sophocles, in his tragedy
entitled Phoenix, uses it to signify 'treachery': in Menander it
implies 'sauces'; as if one should call the 'sediment' at the
bottom of a hogshead of wine hypostasis. But although the ancient
philosophical writers scarcely noticed this word, the more modern ones
have frequently used it instead of ousia. This term, as we before
observed, has been variously defined: but can that which is capable of
being circumscribed by a definition be applicable to God who is
incomprehensible? Evagrius in his Monachicus, cautions us against
rash and inconsiderate language in reference to God; forbidding all
attempt to define the divinity, inasmuch as it is wholly simple in its
nature: 'for,' says he, 'definition belongs only to things which
are compound.' The same author further adds, 'Every proposition
has either a "genus" which is predicted, or a "species," or a
"differentia," or a "proprium," or an "accidens," or that which
is compounded of these: but none of these can be supposed to exist in
the sacred Trinity. Let then what is inexplicable be adored in
silence.' Such is the reasoning of Evagrius, of whom we shall again
speak hereafter. We have indeed made a digression here, but such as
will tend to illustrate the subject under consideration.
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