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State of the question. The meaning of the title is whether Christ
had any other knowledge besides the uncreated knowledge. Why is it
that any other knowledge is not superfluous since the uncreated
knowledge already includes all other kinds of knowledge?
Reply. The answer is in the affirmative, namely, that Christ had
created knowledge as well as uncreated knowledge. The conclusion is de
fide.
Scriptural proof. That Christ had created knowledge is, indeed,
quite clear, for He says of Himself: "I know Him[My Father]
and do keep his Word, ';[1094] but He kept his Father's
word by created actions as man. Therefore He likewise knew His
Father by created knowledge. Moreover, Christ prayed, merited,
obeyed, and performed many other human acts, and it is only by acts of
the created intellect and of the created will that these can be
performed. It was not, indeed, as God that He prayed, merited,
and obeyed; for these acts presuppose the subordination of the created
will under the guidance of the created intellect to the uncreated will.
Hence the Monothelites were condemned by the Third Council of
Constantinople for refusing to admit two wills in Christ, namely,
the uncreated will and the created will. This Council defined that
Christ "is perfect both in His divine nature and in His human
nature, truly God and truly man, of rational soul and body... and
has two natural wills not contrary to each other..., and His human
nature is in every respect human, sin absolutely
excepted."[1095]
Medina maintains that it is manifestly heretical to deny that
Christ's soul had created knowledge, at least in act.
As John of St. Thomas observes, concerning the last sentence in
the body of this article, it was not indeed defined by the Council
that Christ has two kinds of knowledge, but two wills and operations,
and that He had a human nature, and all that belongs to it, except
sin. From these definitions, by closer attention to the meaning than
to the words, it follows that the Council condemned the view of those
who deny two kinds of knowledge in Christ.
Theological proof. It is taken from the argumentative part of this
article, and may be expressed in the following syllogistic form.
The human nature is imperfect without its connatural and proper act of
knowledge. But the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature.
Therefore the Son of God had the connatural and proper created act of
intellective knowledge.
Major. Three reasons are given for its proof.
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1) That the intellective soul is imperfect unless it be reduced to
its act of understanding, for which it is ordained.
2) That everything is on account of its operation, or as Cajetan
explains, operating on account of itself, not that the knowledge is
innate, but inasmuch as, when the terms of the principles have been
proposed, the intellect naturally adheres to them.
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Minor. It is revealed, but it is also clearly stated in the
previously quoted canons of the Third Council of
Constantinople.[1096] Hence human intelligence would be for no
purpose in Christ unless He could make use of it, and in this respect
His soul would be more imperfect than the souls of the rest of
mankind.
Doubt. Could Christ, as man, understand by communication from the
uncreated act of understanding, as the Master of Good Hope
thought?[1097]
Reply. This possibility is generally denied by theologians. For the
act of understanding in the soul is a vital act, since it proceeds from
an intrinsic principle, from the soul and its faculty. But the Deity
cannot function as the soul, or a faculty, or a habit, for example,
as the light of glory. In such a case it would not be the form as
terminating but as confirming, and hence would be less perfect than the
whole composite of which it is a part. Therefore Christ's soul could
not understand by communication from the uncreated intellect.
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