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It is evident that God nowise is free to sin, that is, He cannot
turn away from Himself, from His infinite goodness which He
necessarily loves. Nevertheless He is supremely free in what pertains
to good, as regards His goodness inasmuch as it is the reason of His
love for creatures, or the reason for the communication, diffusion,
and manifestation of His goodness. These assertions are of faith as
defined by the Vatican Council.[1446]
There is indeed a mystery in this, namely, although it was truly
fitting that God create the world, inasmuch as good and especially the
supreme good is self-diffusive, yet God created with such absolute
freedom that He could have most properly not created; it would not
have been improper if He had not created. Whatever Leibnitz may
say, God would not have been deficient either in wisdom or goodness if
He had not created.[1447] God is neither greater nor better for
having created the universe.
Likewise, although it was truly fitting for God to have raised the
human race and the angels to the life of grace, yet He could have not
so raised them. Also, although it was truly fitting that God sent
His Son into the world for our redemption, it was in His power not
to have willed the redemptive Incarnation.
St. Thomas explains elsewhere the two aspects of this mystery of
uncreated freedom.[1448]
The fittingness of creation, as also the fittingness of the
Incarnation, is apparent from the fact that good is self-diffusive.
As St. Thomas says: "If natural things, so far as they are
perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain
to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others,
as much as possible."[1449]
The fitness of creation that has its foundation in the aforesaid
principle appears of such importance that Leibnitz, and several
philosophers before him, said: "If God had not created, He would
have been neither infinitely good nor infinitely wise."[1450]
Nevertheless the Vatican Council defined it to be of faith that
"God with absolute freedom of counsel created."[1451] St.
Thomas explains this assertion as follows: "The divine will has a
necessary relation to the divine goodness, which is its proper object.
Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily.... But God wills
things apart from Himself so far as they are ordered to His own
goodness, as their end.... Hence, since the goodness of God is
perfect and can exist without other things, inasmuch as no perfection
can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart
from Himself is not absolutely necessary."[1452]
Hence we can present the argument in the following syllogistic form.
God is free, not to love His goodness in itself, but inasmuch as it
is the reason for His loving creatures, which have no right to being.
And although God is infinitely good and wise, He does not become
better from the fact that He willed most freely to create. Thus, He
enjoys supreme freedom as well as impeccability, namely, supreme
freedom in what appertains only to good.
But the human will of Christ is the most pure reflection of the
uncreated will, inasmuch as it is the human will of the incarnate Son
of God. Therefore the human will of Christ must be likewise both
impeccable and most free, not indeed in its relation to the divine
goodness considered in itself and clearly seen, but in its relation to
the divine goodness inasmuch as it is the reason for His loving
creatures. There is no reason for surprise that there is a mystery in
this, just as there is a mystery in uncreated freedom.
In other words, Christ as man, was not free to sin, for this
results from a certain defectibility in our nature. He was truly not
only sinless, but absolutely impeccable, and this for three reasons:
(1) because of the hypostatic union; (2) because of the
inamissible fullness of grace; (3) because of His having the
beatific vision.
Strictly speaking, on account of the beatific vision, Christ
necessarily loved the divine goodness clearly seen as it is in itself,
and this act of love was indeed spontaneous, though it transcended
freedom; but, like God, He freely loved the divine goodness,
inasmuch as it is the reason for God's love of creatures. The
mystery, indeed, is that for God to create is so fitting that not to
create would be unfitting, and there is a similar mystery in Christ's
human will.
However, there is a special difficulty to be explained. For God,
though it is fitting for Him to create, there is no command. On the
contrary, Christ was bound to obey the commands of His Father, even
the command to die for our salvation. It is, indeed, easy to
understand that, just as God most freely chose whom He wills for
eternal salvation, Christ freely chose and called certain fishermen in
preference to others for the grace of the apostolate. But it is very
difficult to understand how He was free in the observance of His
Father's commands. The whole difficulty, as we say, concerns the
command; for if Christ could refrain from performing the act
commanded, He could sin, for He was perhaps sinless but not
impeccable. But if He could not refrain from performing the act
commanded, then He was not free, and therefore He could not merit
for us. This dilemma is the Thermopylae of theology, just as is the
difficulty of defending the reconciliation of God's foreknowledge with
free will, especially with true culpability in the sinner.
Solution
Christ, though impeccable, was free as regards the commands of His
Father, especially concerning the command to die for our salvation.
The argument for reconciling freedom with the commands imposed upon the
impeccable Christ may be reduced to the following syllogism.
A command in the strict sense does not indeed leave the will morally
free, in that it imposes an obligation, but it does leave it
psychologically free; in fact, of itself the command is given for the
free fulfillment of the act, and, if it were to destroy this
psychological freedom, it would destroy its very nature as a command.
But before the command, Christ has psychological and impeccable
freedom of will, a freedom, as was stated, that is the most pure
reflection of the uncreated freedom concerning those things that are not
necessarily and intrinsically connected, hic et nunc, with beatitude.
Therefore this psychological freedom is not destroyed by the commands
of the Father, otherwise these commands would lose their very nature
as such.
The major is evident from what has been said.
Explanation of minor. Indeed Christ's love for God clearly seen,
as the ultimate end, and the means that are intrinsically and
necessarily connected hic et nunc with this end, such as being, life,
understanding, are not a free act but a necessary one; yet He freely
loves the means that are only accidentally connected with the ultimate
end because of an extrinsic command. There is, indeed, a
speculative-practical judgment arising from the command, namely, this
must be done;[1453] but the practico-practical judgment,
namely, death on the cross here and now is simply to be loved, remains
undetermined because of the indifferent merits of the object; for the
object commanded is not universally good, but is good in a certain
sense as being useful for the salvation of man, and as being
commanded; and in another sense it is not good, on account of the
horrible pain it involves.
For the formation of this practico-practical judgment, namely, death
on the cross is here and now simply to be loved, there must be an
actual preference for the offering of this holocaust, or there must be
an intervention of the free will. But there is befitting intervention
of Christ's will, because the will of Christ, who is impeccable,
is absolutely upright. Hence this ultimate practical judgment and the
subsequent choice are necessary only by a necessity of consequence or of
infallibility, but not by a necessity of consequent. There remains,
therefore, liberty of exercise between willing to obey and not willing
to obey in the negative sense, or refusing death in itself, but not
between willing to obey and not willing to obey, in the privative
sense, or refusing death as a command. Experience itself makes
sufficiently clear the distinction between not obeying in the negative
sense and not obeying in the privative sense. For if a superior were
to command a most obedient religious something truly difficult, for
example, not to go on a long journey to give the last absolution to his
most beloved spiritual son, whom another priest will be able to assist
in this case, then this obedient religious is right in feeling sad
because it would be most sweet for him to assist his spiritual son who
is dying and clamoring for him. Nevertheless, because he is
obedient, he is not even inclined to do so against the command of his
superior, that is, not to obey in the privative sense. On the
contrary, another less obedient religious in this case, not only would
be right in feeling sad, but would be inclined not to obey in the
privative sense, and perhaps would not sufficiently resist the
temptation.
A good religious would wish to perform this ministerial act in itself,
but not inasmuch as it is forbidden. Likewise Christ could refuse
death in itself, and it made Him sad; but He could not refuse death
inasmuch as it was commanded, nor did it make Him sad inasmuch as it
was commanded. Therefore this distinction is not merely a subtle play
upon words, but has its manifest foundation in something
psychological.
This problem is made clear for us in two most exalted examples of
obedience: Abraham's obedience and that of the Blessed Virgin Mary
on Calvary.
When Abraham had to prepare to sacrifice his son, he did not even
think of the possibility of not obeying; he immediately was disposed to
obey. Nevertheless he saw very clearly that the object of this act was
in one aspect good, and in another aspect not good, even repugnant to
natural paternal love. Therefore in the formation of the ultimate and
determinate practical judgment, namely, this is for me here and now
good, not only relatively but absolutely, and to be done, although it
is most difficult, in the formation of this ultimate practical
judgment, which directs the choice, Abraham's free will had to
intervene, so that the former aspect of the object might prevail over
the latter; but Abraham's will, moved by efficacious grace,
befittingly intervened, freely indeed, and heroically. He could obey
and not obey in the negative sense; in fact, because he was not
impeccable, he could disobey in the privative sense by an act of
disobedience or at least by a sin of omission, but he did not even
think of this. So immediate, holy, and most meritorious was his
obedience that he became for all posterity an example of both heroic
obedience and perfect faith.
In this example we find verified what is said about free will in the
twenty-four Thomistic theses proposed by the Sacred Congregation of
Studies. The twenty-first reads: "The will that is free in its
choice follows the judgment of reason, but that this judgment be the
last and that another in opposition to it be not subsumed, this is
effected by the free will, in accepting or not accepting this
intellectual direction."
The Blessed Virgin Mary on Calvary gave us another example of
heroic obedience. When she had to give her consent to the immolation
of her Son, she did not even think of the possibility of disobedience
or of deliberately praying that it may not happen.
Yet she most clearly saw that the object of this act of obedience was
in one aspect good for our salvation, and in another aspect it was a
very great affliction to her maternal heart. To form the ultimate
practical judgment which directs the choice, the free will of the
Blessed Virgin Mary must intervene, so that one aspect of the object
may predominate over the other. But under the influence of efficacious
grace and the special assistance of the Holy Ghost, by which she was
preserved from even the least stain of sin, the will of the Blessed
Virgin intervened most befittingly, freely indeed and heroically, so
that she became forever the Queen of martyrs.
In these two examples, we have a clarification of the problem
concerning Christ's impeccable freedom which is increasingly seen to
be the most perfect reflection of God's impeccable freedom. It is
freedom for good and not for evil, namely, free will confirmed in
good,[1454] as St. Thomas with the greatest of wisdom and
brevity had said in the present article.
Confirmation. If this were not true, the blessed would not retain
their freedom concerning those things that are not necessarily and
intrinsically connected with beatitude. It is the common opinion among
theologians, however, that the blessed, for example, St.
Dominic, by necessarily loving God's goodness clearly seen, freely
loves this son of his living on this earth and freely prays to obtain
for him this or that grace. Even though God were to command St.
Dominic to pray for this religious, he would still freely pray for
him, because the command that is given for the free fulfillment of the
act cannot destroy the psychological freedom of this act, for then the
very nature of the command would be destroyed. Thus all the blessed
are impeccable and yet they retain their freedom concerning certain
things, but for good and not for evil. Such was the case for Christ
here below. But the saints no longer merit because they are no longer
wayfarers.
Solution Of Objections
If we posit the certainty of command to die for us, we say that
Christ, who was impeccable, did not obey freely. Therefore the
thesis is false. I prove it.
First objection. Anyone freely wills anything when he is able not to
will it. But, posited the certainty to die for us, Christ, who was
impeccable, had to will to die for us. Therefore, posited the
certainty to die for us, Christ, who was impeccable, did not obey
freely.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that anyone freely wills anything
when he is able at least in one aspect of the object not to will it,
this I concede; that anyone must be able not to will anything in every
aspect of the object, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor:
Christ had to will death as commanded, I concede; death in itself,
that I deny; for this the object was not universally good, and the
fact that it was also commanded did not change the nature of this
object, and, through taking away moral liberty by imposing this
obligation, nevertheless the command left the will free.
I insist. But Christ, posited the certainty of the command, was
incapable of not willing death in itself. Therefore the difficulty
remains.
Proof. Christ, who was impeccable, could not disobey. But if,
the certainty of the command to die being posited, He had not willed
death in itself, then He would have disobeyed. Therefore, posited
the certainty of this command, He had to will death in itself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: Christ, who was impeccable, had
to obey in the privative sense, this I concede; in the negative
sense, that I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. So that He
would have disobeyed in the negative sense, this I concede; in the
privative sense, that I deny.
Explanation. Inasmuch as Christ was indeed impeccable, He did not
have the power to sin, not even by omission; but this freedom as
regards specification of the object that is a contrary to either good or
evil, is not required for free will. But He was capable of not
obeying in the negative sense, because the supervening command, as
stated, being quasi-extrinsic to the will, did not change the will
psychologically and is given for the free fulfillment of the act. Not
even Christ could sin in sensu diviso (as we can), but He was
capable of not obeying in the negative sense.
Again I insist. But Christ was also incapable of disobeying in the
negative sense, though this was not disobedience in the privative
sense. Therefore the difficulty remains.
Proof. Not to obey in the negative sense is to separate the refusal
to die from the command to die for us. But Christ, who was
impeccable, could not separate the refusal to die from this command,
or rid Himself of the command. Therefore Christ, who was
impeccable, was incapable of not obeying in the negative sense, though
this was not disobedience in the privative sense.
Reply. I distinguish the major. That not to obey in the negative
sense is a positive separation, a quasi-separation of the refusal of
death from the command to die, this I deny; that it is a precise
separation of the refusal to die from the command to die, this I
concede. I contradistinguish the minor in the same way.
I explain the distinction. In a true and good object, the intellect
in attaining to truth does not separate it from the good, for there is
only a distinction of reason between them, but it prescinds from the
good; there is nothing more possible to prescind from than the formal
object of a faculty. Likewise we cannot separate essence from
existence, but we consider existence to be a contingent predicate of
whatsoever creature, and that before the consideration of our mind, a
creature is not its existence, and that its essence is really distinct
from it. Therefore the notion of existence can be prescinded from that
of essence without separating them.
Moreover, it sufficed for Christ's freedom that He could posit the
refusal to die considered in itself, prescinding from the command,
because the act was specified by an object that does not infallibly
abstract the will, and the superadded command did not change the nature
either of the specificative object or of the specified act; but the
nominalists do not understand this, for they consider solely the
concrete act but not its nature that is specified by the object.
Moreover, it would follow from the denial of what has been said that
the angels would not comply freely with God's commands; that the
angel Gabriel did not come freely to the Blessed Virgin on the day of
the Annunciation.
Hence Christ obeyed freely, not in this sense, that He could go
against the command, but in this sense, that He had the power not to
do what, because of another only, was commanded. Thus Christ freely
obeyed the command to die for us by liberty of exercise.
Moreover, it must be noted that these objections presuppose the
Molinist definition of psychological freedom; namely, a faculty
that, presupposed all things required as prerequisite for acting, it
can still act and not act.
The Thomists in their treatises on free choice[1455] most wisely
distinguish by saying that psychological freedom is a faculty that,
presupposed what is required by a priority of time for acting, can
still act or not act, even in sensu composito; but, presupposed all
that is required only by a priority of nature, such as the divine
efficacious motion and the ultimate practical judgment, it can still
act or not act only in sensu diviso, that is, under the divine
efficacious motion to act there remains only the power not to
act.[1456]
Finally, it must be noted that liberty of equilibrium is of rare
occurrence, and it is not at all required for free will. Liberty of
equilibrium is that which exists between two goods that are equally
eligible, so that there is no reason why one is more to be preferred
than the other. This is the very ideal of freedom, as when a workman
constructs a wall of absolutely equal stones, he most freely takes one
stone for the highest part of the wall and another for the lowest.
Thus God could have chosen and predestined Judas in preference to
Peter in accordance with His most free good pleasure.[1457]
But generally freedom is found without this perfect equilibrium as to
choice, as when a man chooses honest good in preference to delectable
and dishonest good. Honest good is absolutely good and qualifiedly not
good, and the converse is true for merely apparent good.
Hence freedom is defined[1458] as the dominating indifference of
the will concerning an object that is not universally good. St.
Thomas does not say, concerning an object that is equally good under
one aspect and not good under another; even though the object may
appear far more lovable than what is lacking in some good, as God not
yet clearly seen, freedom remains intact.
Moreover, our mind does not pass from the speculative-practical
judgment, namely, to see the better things and approve of them, to
the practico-practical judgment, but I follow the worse, judging
practically here and now that they must be chosen, unless our will
already begins to be attracted actually by the object which de facto is
chosen, and which thus appears to me here and now as absolutely good,
although to be sure, if it concerns a sinful object, it is good only
in a qualified sense.
Hence it is false to say that anyone is said freely to will anything
for which the will already has an actual affection, when the will has
the power not to will it even though this incipient actual affection of
the will for this same object remains. This actual incipient affection
must be repressed so that here and now this object be repudiated. Thus
anger must be repressed for correct judgment.
The adulterer never gives up the sin of adultery unless the actual
affection for it is given up and yet, though this affection for it
remains, the sin is freely committed.
Similarly, in the present case, Christ refrained from obeying only
when there was no command and yet, posited this command, He obeyed
freely. Hence He freely willed death as commanded, although He was
obliged to will it inasmuch as it was commanded, that is, although He
could not commit sin. Thus He could obey in the negative sense, but
not in the privative sense.
This distinction, however, is not understood by the nominalists
because they consider only the fact, for example, either of obeying or
of disobeying, and not the very nature of the fact, in our case the
very nature of the free act that is specified by an object that is not
in every respect good. There is a very great difference between their
mental attitude concerning this problem and that of the truly
speculative theologian. Their approach turns the mind away from the
contemplation of divine things rather than disposing for it.
The distinction remains intact between disobeying in the privative
sense and disobeying in the negative sense, which was explained
analogically by examples taken from the lives of Abraham and the
Blessed Virgin Mary.
Other objections concern the commandment of loving God, and other
natural commandments of the Decalogue, especially negative
commandments. In such cases the problem presents greater difficulty.
Objection. The blessed must love God clearly seen, even as regards
the exercise of the act. But Christ already on earth enjoyed the
beatific vision. Therefore He was not free concerning the command to
love God.
The Thomists reply in two ways to this objection.
1) Capreolus, Francis Sylvester (Ferrariensis), Medina, and
Soto say that the love of God in Christ, inasmuch as it was
regulated by the beatific knowledge, was a necessary act, this I
concede; that the love of God as regulated by the infused knowledge
was a necessary act, this I deny. Thus there are two acts, or two
kinds of love, which are specifically distinct, not substantially,
but modally, on account of the twofold regulation, although they
proceed from the same infused virtue of charity, concerning the same
object, but taken in a different sense.
But this modal distinction suffices so that these two acts may be both
present, one as a necessary act, the other as a free act.
Thus it is at least probable that Christ merited, not only by loving
creatures for God's sake, but by loving God in Himself and for His
own sake as known, not by the beatific vision, but by the infused
knowledge.
However, even though this probable solution were not true, there
would be this second solution, that must immediately be explained.
2) John of St. Thomas, who thinks both solutions are probable,
and Alvarez and Gonet say that in the same act of love that is
regulated by the beatific vision, there is a double termination: the
first terminates in the divine goodness considered in itself, inasmuch
as it is the reason for loving God and His necessary perfections; the
second terminates in the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is the reason
for loving creatures or the means not essentially and intrinsically
necessary for the preservation of happiness.
Proof. Thus, according to the teaching of St.
Thomas,[1459] God's uncreated love is necessary as regards
His own goodness, and free as regards this same goodness, in that it
is the reason for His loving creatures, inasmuch as "God's
goodness, which is infinite in perfection, can exist without other
things, '[1460] But this twofold termination is not
incompatible with Christ's created love as regulated by the beatific
vision; for even as regards this created love, creatures are not
necessarily and intrinsically connected with the possession of God
clearly seen. John of St. Thomas says: "It is befitting for the
same act to be free and necessary, but from different points of view,
as is evident in the act of beatific love, which, as it refers to
God, is necessary, but as it refers to creatures is
free."[1461] Thus the saints in heaven, whereas they
necessarily love God clearly seen, freely pray for this or that
wayfarer, requesting for such a person this or that grace.
In fact, this free act that is regulated by the beatific vision could
have been meritorious as long as Christ was both wayfarer and
comprehensor; because the subject in question was still a wayfarer,
this act was not only free, but meritorious.[1462] This second
solution appears to us to be more probable.
Therefore Christ's impeccability is compatible with His freedom even
in things commanded. Therefore His freedom and His merit must not be
restricted. It suffices to bear in mind: (1) that Christ's will
is the most pure reflection of God's will that is both absolutely
impeccable and absolutely free as regards creatures; (2) that,
although the command takes away moral freedom, it does not take away
psychological freedom concerning the means that are not necessarily,
intrinsically, and evidently connected here and now with beatitude.
In fact, every command presupposes this psychological freedom,
inasmuch as it is directed for the free fulfillment of the act, and if
it were to take away this freedom, then it would destroy its own nature
as command.
These two truths are most commonly accepted.
Thus the mystery indeed remains, but contradiction is avoided, and
Christ is the most perfect model of free and meritorious obedience to
the divine commands. On the contrary, the other explanations unduly
restrict Christ's freedom and merit to those things that are not
commanded. Thus they do not solve the question of Christ's freedom
and merit, but either take it away or avoid it.
Corollary. But if Christ's freedom remains notwithstanding that
there are three causes for His impeccability, namely, the hypostatic
union, the fullness of inamissible grace, and the beatific vision,
and notwithstanding the fact that He always received efficacious grace
which is intrinsically efficacious, a fortiori our freedom remains
intact under the influence of intrinsically efficacious grace; but we
have the power to sin, which Christ did not have. Under the
influence of this grace the free will has the power to refuse its
consent if it so wills, but under this influence it never wishes to
refuse its consent.
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