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[758] Denz., no. 204
[759] Ibid., no. 205.
[760] Cf. infra, IIIa, q. 33, a. 2, in which St. Thomas
asks whether Christ's body was animated at the first moment of its
conception. He answers in the affirmative, giving as his reason that
for the conception to be attributed to the Son of God, as we say in
the Apostles' Creed, "who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, "
We must say that the body itself of Christ, When it was conceived,
was assumed by the Word of God. But now in this first article it is
shown that the Word assumed the body through the intermediary of the
soul without which the body would not have been a human body
St. Thomas also says (loc. cit.): "In the generation of other
men, he is first of all a living thing, and afterward an animal, and
after that a man (so that animation or passive conception is completed
after the inceptive passive conception of the embryonic body), because
the body is successively formed and disposed for the soul...; but
Christ's body, on account of the infinite power of the agent was
perfectly disposed instantaneously. Wherefore, at once and in the
first instant it received a perfect form, that is, the rational
soul." Nevertheless the period of gestation was not shortened. Even
in accordance with the present condition of medical science, the
hypothesis can very safely be admitted which teaches that the ordinary
process is for the spiritual soul not to be created and united with the
embryonic body until one month after the conception of the embryonic
body. The dogmatic definition of the Immaculate Conception affirms
nothing that is contrary to this hypothesis, for it is concerned solely
with the preservation of the person of the Blessed Virgin Mary from
original sin; but the person does not exist prior to the existence of
the spiritual soul. The dogmatic definition is not concerned with the
question of the first moment of the conception of the body as distinct
from its animation.
[761] Denz., no. 204
[762] Cf. IIIa, q. 33, a. 3.
[763] Denz., nos. 63, 85, 88, 233.
[764] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 33, a. 3.
[765] Cf. IIIa, q. 50, a. 2, 3, where this statement is
made clearer
[766] The Greek word nous corresponds to "intellect, " whereas
psyche refers to the sensitive soul
[767] Denz., no. 204
[768] Cf. ad 2
[769] Cf. Ia, q. 85, a. 7; IIIa, q. 31, a. 5.
Also Tabula aurea, under the word "anima, " nos. 69, 72,
73.
[770] Cf. Ia, q. 76, a. 5
[771] Aristotle, De anima, Bk. II, chap. 9
[772] Summa theol., Ia, q. 85, a. 7.
[773] Ibid., IIIa, q. 31, a. 5.
[774] De veritate, q. 24, a. 8, ad 6
[775] Elementa philosophiae, I, no. 461
[776] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 33, a. 2, 3
[777] Denz., nos. 204, 205; also nos. 63, 85, 88,
233
[778] De fide orthod., Bk. III, chap. 2 (about the end);
see also IIIa, q. 33, a. 2, sed contra
[779] Denz., no. 205: "If anyone says or thinks that the body
of our Lord Jesus Christ was first formed in the womb of the Blessed
Virgin Mary, and that afterward God, the Word, and the soul were
united with it, as if it had already existed, let him be anathema."
Thus St. Gregory says (Moral., Bk. XVIII, chap.
27): "As soon as the angel announced it, as soon as the Spirit
came down, the Word was in the womb within the womb the Word was made
flesh." St. Thomas says: "For the conception to be attributed to
the very Son of God, as we confess in the Creed, when we say, Who
was conceived by the Holy Ghost, we must say that the body itself,
in being conceived, was assumed by the Word of God. Now it has been
shown above (q. 6 a. 1, 2) that the Word of God assumed the
body by means of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit"
(IIIa, q. 33, a. 2), because it is only by means of the
rational soul that the flesh is human (cf. Ibid., ad 3). If the
divine maternity were to terminate in the conception of the flesh that
is not united with the Word, the Blessed Virgin would not be the
Mother of God, but the mother of a man, who in losing afterward His
own personality, would have received the divine personality.
[780] Cajetan says (Com. in IIIam, q. 6, a. 4, no. 3):
"The proper matter of any form is said to be either in the process of
becoming, and so it is prior even in time to the reception of the
form; or else it is actually in being, and thus it is proper only at
the very moment that it receives the form."
[781] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 33, a. 2, ad 3.
[782] Ibid., a. 4.
[783] Ibid., q. 27, a. 2.
[784] Elementa philosophiae, no. 536.
[785] Propedeutica ad psychologiam, p. 461 (Mss.).
[786] Cf. ad 1 (end).
[787] Cf. Ia, q. 23, a. 2. The whole of this article should
be read, as also the replies to the first and second objections
[788] Cf. IIIa, q. 2, a. 7
[789] Ibid., q. 2, a. 10
[790] Ibid., q. 6, ad 2
[791] Com. in III Sent., d. 2, q. 2., quaestiuncula Ia
[792] Ibid., q. 3
[793] Summa theol., Ia, q. 45, a. 3; IIIa, q. 2, a.
7.
[794] Ibid., IIIa, q. 2, a. 7.
[795] Ibid., Ia, q. 45, a. 2
[796] Ibid., a. 3. Transitive action is motion as coming from the
agent, and passion is motion that is in the patient. Hence with the
removal of action and passion, there is nothing left but a relation of
real dependence
[797] Com. in III Sent., d. 2, q. 2, quaestiuncula Ia.
[798] Cf. IIIa, q. 16, 17
[799] Ibid., q. 17, a. 2
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