|
[1395] Denz., no. 251, Epistle of Pope Honorius I
(634); see also no. 289, Third Council of Constantinople
(680), in which it was defined that there are two wills in
Christ; also no. 1465.
[1396] Luke 22:42
[1397] Matt. 26:39
[1398] John 5:30
[1399] cf. Summa theol., q. 18, a. I, ad 4
[1400] Denz., no. 1094
[1401] De malo, q. 6
[1402] cf. IIIa, q. 18, a. 4
[1403] Denz., nos. 148, 288
[1404] Ibid., nos. 122, 286, 319, 462, 794f.
[1405] cf. IIIa, q. 15, a. 1
[1406] Denz., no. 224
[1407] cf. Summa theol., IIIa, q. 15, a. 1
[1408] John 10:17f
[1409] Ibid., 14:30f.
[1410] Rom. 5:19; Phil. 2:8; I Pet. 2:21
[1411] Dict. theol. cathol
[1412] De incarnatione, theses 29, 30
[1413] Mysterium fidei, elucid., 7, 8; pp. 89, 95, 99
[1414] De incarnatione, disp. 74, chap. 5.
[1415] Ibid., disp. 26, sect. 7, no. 82; sect. 8, no.
102
[1416] De Summo Bono Bk. II, no 185
[1417] De justificatione, Bk. V, chap. II
[1418] Summa theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 2, 3.
[1419] Ibid., Ia, q. 20, a. 3, 4
[1420] Mysterium fidei, elucidationes 7, 8, pp. 89-93.
[1421] John 10:17f.
[1422] Ibid., 1:18; 14:31. St. John, who wrote his
Gospel in Greek, used the words entello, entole which always mean a
strict command. (Tr.)
[1423] Matt. 5:19; 22:36.
[1424] John 14:30f.
[1425] Ibid., 15:10
[1426] Luke 22:22
[1427] Ibid., 22:42
[1428] Heb. 10:5f. Also Acts 4:28; Ps. 39:8.
[1429] Phil. 2:8.
[1430] Rom. 5:19
[1431] Acts 4:28. If God had only permitted the crime of the
Jews against Jesus, as He permitted the persecution against the
martyrs, Christ's death would also infallibly have come to pass and
He would have had to accept this consequence of the divine permission
[1432] Phil. 2:8
[1433] Matt. 26:56.
[1434] John 13:1
[1435] Isa. 53:10
[1436] Denz., nos. 799f.
[1437] John 15:10
[1438] Ibid., 10:17f.
[1439] See pp. 324f.
[1440] See God, His Existence, II, 293f. (Tr.)
[1441] Hence St. Thomas defines liberty as the faculty of choosing
the means, "'keeping the order of the end in view, " but "it comes
of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from
the order of the end, and this is to sin... just as it belongs to
the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different
conclusions, according to different principles; but for it to proceed
to some conclusion, by passing out of the order of principles, comes
of its own defect" (Ia, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3). See also
Ia, q. 83, a. 4, c
[1442] The French word "desobeir" means more than "ne pas
obeir."
[1443] This distinction is of great importance, and in omitting it
there is danger of saying that a person can be punished before that
person has begun to be guilty whereas punishment can be inflicted only
on account of guilt. Such a doctrine would lead to Calvinism
[1444] Summa theol., Ia, q. 14, a. 13, ad 2, 3
[1445] Perihermeneias, Bk. 1, chap. 9 (lect. 15 of St.
Thomas).
[1446] Denz., no. 1783
[1447] This point has been explained at length in God, His
Existence, II, 342-54
[1448] Summa theol., Ia, q. 19, a. 2, 3
[1449] Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 2. See also IIIa, q. 1,
a. 1, in which the same reason is given for the manifestation of the
possibility and fitness of the Incarnation
[1450] OEuvres de Leibnitz (Erdmann ed.), 563 a
[1451] Denz., no. 1783
[1452] Summa theol., la, q. 19, a. 3. See also ad 5; and
Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chaps. 76, 82
[1453] There is a distinction between the speculative-practical
judgment and the practico-practical judgment as in the common saying I
see and approve of the better (speculative-practical judgment), but
I choose the worse (ultimate practico-practical judgment and
choice). The ultimate practico-practical judgment that immediately
directs the choice, is not always in conformity with the
speculative-practical judgment, and this already presupposes an actual
affection for the object to be chosen. In the absence of this actual
affection the practico-practical judgment, as is evident in the
above-mentioned saying and in any sin, is not in conformity with the
speculative-practical judgment, from which there arises in the
intellect advertence to sin.
[1454] cf. a. 4, ad 3
[1455] cf. Billuart, Com. in Iam IIae, q. 13
[1456] See God, His Existence, II, 296f. The aforesaid
Molinist definition does not sufficiently consider the object from
which freedom receives its specification; but the faculty must be
defined with reference to its specificative object; that is, freedom
is the dominating indifference of judgment and will concerning an object
that is not universally good. The determinate act also remains
intrinsically free because of the object.
[1457] Summa theol. Ia, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.
[1458] Ibid., Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2
[1459] Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 3
[1460] Ibid., c. et ad 2
[1461] De incarnatione, disp. 17, a. 3, no. 14.
[1462] Other Thomists, who appeal to Christ's infused knowledge,
nevertheless say that this act as regulated by the beatific vision
belonged to Christ not as wayfarer, but as comprehensor. Thus this
act, although it was free, was not meritorious, for merit requires
not only freedom, but the state of the wayfarer. To this we can reply
by saying that this act belonged, however, to Christ, who at this
particular time was still a wayfarer
[1463] Matt. 26:39
[1465] cf. IIIa, q. 18, a. 5, c
[1466] Denz., no. 291
|
|
