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[1766] cf. IIIa, q. 1, a. 1, 2
[1767] John 3:14
[1768] Luke 24:26
[1769] Rom. 5:8
[1770] I Pet. 2:21
[1771] I Cor. 6:20
[1772] Ibid., 15:57
[1773] Preface of Passiontide
[1774] Com. in Joan., tract. 109
[1775] cf. IIIa, q. 46, a. 4, ad 1
[1776] Heb. 12:2.
[1777] Gal. 3:13
[1778] John 3:16
[1779] Rom. 8:32.
[1780] Cf. IIIa, q. 46, a. 3, ad 2
[1781] Isa. 53:4.
[1782] This proposition was condemned: "The inferior part of
Christ's soul on the cross did not communicate to the higher part its
involuntary emotions" (Denz., no. 1339); but this
proposition was condemned because of the word "involuntary." Christ
willed to permit these emotions.
[1783] cf. De veritate, q. 26, a. 9, 10. As we shall see
farther on, in chapter 32, a. 2, concerning the union in Christ
of extreme grief and supreme happiness, although Christ's sadness and
joy were not about the same object, and hence they were not strictly
contraries, nevertheless their union was a miracle; for, because of
the different ways in which joy tends toward its object, if the joy is
most perfect, then it naturally is incompatible with sadness.
As the commentators observe, to understand what St. Thomas says in
his reply to the second objection of article 7 of this question, the
higher reason and the lower reason are one faculty, it being called
higher, inasmuch as it considers divine and eternal things (cf. Ia,
q. 79, a. 9). For example, if sin is considered according to
lower and human reason, then sorrow arises in the inferior parts of the
will. But if sin is considered according to higher and divine reason,
inasmuch as it is an offense against God, then there is sadness in the
higher part of the will.
But Christ was sorry for our sins inasmuch as they are an offense
against God; hence He felt sad, not only in the sensitive faculty,
but in the lower reason inasmuch as it was ruled by the higher reason,
as Cajetan maintains (Com. in art. 7, no. 6), because sin is
something temporal, which is then considered in its eternal aspects.
Others, such as Sylvius, say that Christ, grieving over the
offense against God, was sad also in the higher reason or in the
higher part of the will, but not from its primary object, which is
God. So Sylvius interprets the words of St. Thomas in his reply
to the second objection of the seventh article of this question, who
says: "On the part of the proper object, Christ's higher reason
did not suffer." See below, chap. 32.
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