CHAPTER IV: QUESTION 2: THE MODE OF THE UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE

[383] See Tixeront, History of Dogmas, for an account of these heresies in their historical aspect

[384] Contra Arianos, II, 7

[385] Denz., nos. 54, 61, 705, concerning the definitions of the Church against the Arians. Cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "Arianisme.

[386] Denz., nos. 85, 206, 223, 227, 271; definitions of the Church against Apollinaris

[387] Ibid., nos. 113, 168. Cf. also P. Jugie, Nestorius et la controverse Nestorienne; also Dict. theol. cath., art. "Union hypostatique, " col. 471, and art. "Nestorius"

[388] Denz., no. 1917

[389] Cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "Eutyches."

[390] Ibid., art. "Kenose." This heresy is also known as the kenotic theory, from the Greek kenosis, which means "an emptying."

[391] Denz., no. 6.

[392] The Greek text reads: Homoosion toi patri, "of one and the same nature with the Father."

[393] Denz., nos. 85, 86.

[394] Ibid., no 40

[395] Ibid., no. 114

[396] Ibid., no. 118

[397] The Greek text reads: kai eis hen prosopon kai mian hupistasin

[398] Ibid., no. 148

[399] Ibid., no. 2031; proposition 31

[400] Ibid., no. 220

[401] Ibid., no. 115. St. Cyril's expression is: henosis physiche

[402] Ibid., no. 114 kath hypostasin

[403] The exact signification of the terms ousia, hypostasis, prosopon in the Greek Church, however, was the result of a gradual process of determination. In the Greek language prosopon signifies a theatrical mask or face, a figure used by actors to represent heroes, and therefore it often designates a dramatic person on the stage

[404] The Greek text reads: en duo physesin asygchytos

[405] Denz., no. 148. The concluding words of this quotation in the Greek read: eis en prosopon kai mian hypostasin.

[406] Ibid., nos. 219f.

[407] Ibid., no. 40

[408] Isa. 9:6

[409] John 14:6

[410] Phil. 2:6.

[411] I John 1:1.

[412] Cf. II Phys., chap. 1

[413] Similarly pantheism, since it confuses the divine nature with created natures, involves a contradiction, and de facto this theory means either that the world is absorbed in God, and then we have acosmism as taught by Parmenides, or pantheism; or else it means that God is absorbed in the world, as in the case of absolute evolutionism, a theory that maintains God is in a process of becoming in the world and never will be a reality.

[414] Denz., no. 220

[415] The Greek text is: henosis physike

[416] Denz., no. 114. The Greek words are: henosis kath hypostasin

[417] Ibid., nos. 114-18; henosis kath hypostasin

[418] Ibid., no. 117.

[419] Ibid., no. 124

[420] Theotokon

[421] Denz., no. 113

[422] Ibid., no. 148

[423] Ibid., no. 40

[424] John 14:6

[425] Ibid., 1:14

[426] The expression sui juris as applied to the definition of person implies a subject to whom ultimately all the actions are attributed. It also means a subject that has a complete nature that is individualized, and consequently incommunicable as such to any other. Just what constitutes a subject sui juris is very much disputed in the schools of Catholic theology. When a subject is intelligent and sui juris it follows that it must be endowed with freedom, though it may not always be able to exercise this power. On this point, cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, II, 306

[427] John 14:6.

[428] Cf. Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion patristicum, Index theol., nos. 384f.

[429] Summa theol., Ia, q. 54, a. 1.

[430] Concerning the correlation prevailing between abstract terms and concrete terms, it must be said: just as humanity is that by which a man is a man, so personality is that by which a person is a person, and subsistence is that by which a suppositum is a suppositum; more briefly, subsistence or even personality is that by which a thing is a what or subject of attribution.

[431] The words in parentheses are the translator's explanation.

[432] This fundamental doctrine concerning the suppositum is found in the writings of Aristotle. In his Perihermeneias (On Judgment), Bk. 1, lect. 3, 5, 8, the significance of the verb "is" in affirmative judgments is explained. In the Metaphysics, Bk. V, chap. 6, lect. 7, it is shown that every verb is resolved into the following parts of the verb "to be": "am, art, is, " and its participle.

The source of judgment is the verb "is." Thus, "Peter walks" signifies "Peter is walking, " or that Peter is the same real subject that is walking.

See also Met., chap. 7, lect. 9 of St. Thomas, no. 893, where we read: "Any verb whatever can be reduced to a form that includes the verb 'is.' Hence it is evident that there are as many modes of predication as there are modes of being, such as substantive, or quantitative, qualitative, active, passive, relative, and so forth. Thus the predicaments or categories of being are like different adornments of the verb 'is, ' as when we say: "Peter is substantially a man, quantitatively great, qualitatively wise, " and so forth.

Similarly, in Aristotle's Post. Analytics, Bk. II, lect. 10 of St. Thomas, on the third mode of per se predication, it is stated that first substance, or anything that subsists by itself (Peter, for instance), is not in another as in its subject, whereas second substance, as in the case of humanity, is attributed to Peter, as also are his accidents, although in another manner. The first mode of per se predication is the definition, the second is the necessary property, the third is first substance, the fourth is the proper cause which is of itself and immediately as such required for the production of its proper effect, as singing is required for a singer, or killing for a killer. On this point God, His existence, I, 379f. (Tr.)

St. Thomas says (Ia, q. 13, a. 12): "In every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subjects signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea." Other citations on this point from St. Thomas are: Ia, q. 14, a. 14; q. 85, a. 5; IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, 6; q. 4, a. 2 (Cajetan's Comment.) q. 16, a. 1; q. 17, a. 2. Contra Gentes, Bk. 1, chap. 57.

Cf. also the Tabula aurea of the works of St. Thomas, under the word verbum, nos 77f.

We have treated this question at length in Le sens commun et la philosophie de l'etre. pp. 50, 320-58.

[433] Summa theol., Ia, q. 29, a. 3

[434] Ibid., Ia, q. 13, a. 9; IIIa, q. 77, a. 2.

[435] De ente et essentia

[436] Summa theol., Ia, q. 29, a. 3.

[437] If matter were that which is, and not that by which stones, plants, and animals are something material, materialism would be true: for then all bodies, even the human body, and man himself would be accidental modifications of this particular matter that exists by itself, which was the view of Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus

[438] Summa theol., Ia, q. 29, a. 3 et ad 4.

[439] Ibid.

[440] Ibid., Ia, q. 3, a. 3, ad 4; q. 19, a. 3, ad 4.; q. 29, a. 3, ad 4. De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 2; Summa theol., IIIa, q. 72, a. 2. Cf. Tabula aurea, under the heading "Incommunicable." This question has been given considerable attention in the book entitled Le sens commun, pp. 320-58.

[441] See the appendix to this article, concerning the various theories about personality

[442] See Cajetan's commentary, nos. 6f.

[443] Ibid., no. 8

[444] Ibid.

[445] Ibid., no. 9

[446] Summa theol., IIIa., q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; see also IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2 et ad 3.

[447] cf. God, His Existence. I, 216, no. 19

[448] Denz., nos. 1655f.

[449] Ibid., no 1917

[450] Summa theol., Ia., q. 29, a. 1, which gives the definition of person; a. 3, which asks whether the name "person" should be applied to God; also IIIa, q. 2, which inquires whether the union took place in the person.

[451] Denz., no. 1810

[452] See Aristotle's Ethics, definition of virtue.

[453] Magna moralis, Bk. VII, De bona fortuna

[454] John 12:25

[455] Ibid., 4:34

[456] Summa theol., IIa IIae, q. 17, a. 6, ad 3

[457] Gal. 2:20.

[458] Phil. 1:21

[459] Com. in Epist. ad Phil., 1:21

[460] Les Pensees, p. 267

[461] Summa theol., IIa IIae, q. 17, a. 6, ad 3

[462] Gal. 2:20

[463] Denz., no. 1917

[464] John 11:25

[465] Ibid., 10:30

[466] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 1, a. 1

[467] Ibid., IIIa, q. 9, a. 22.

[468] Ibid., q. 18, a. 5

[469] kath hypostasin

[470] Denz., no. 114

[471] nos. 1665f.; see also Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, 130. Gunther was a German priest born in 1873, who sought to put new life into theology by means of a Kantian inspired philosophy

[472] Denz., no. 1655

[473] Cf. Zigliara's Ontologia, chap. 29

[474] Summa theol., Ia, q. 5, a. 2, C

[475] Denz., 1891

[476] Ibid., no. 1893

[477] Ibid., no. 1897

[478] Ibid., nos. 1915f.

[479] Ibid., nos. 1908

[480] Ibid., nos. 1911

[481] Ibid., no. 1917. This philosophical system about person was condemned by the Holy Office, December 14, 1887

[482] Le sens commun, pp. 320-23.

[483] Renouvier, Logique, II, 493.

[484] Revue de philosophie, December, 1938

[485] De veritate, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8. See also Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 52

[486] Cf. I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2

[487] De veritate fundamentali philosophiae Christianae, pp. 23f.

[488] Cf. III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, nos. 5f. According to Scotus, person and personality are negative notions, since not being assumed by a higher principle constitutes the formal notion of person or personality in human beings. Since the human nature of Christ was actually and aptitudinally such that it was assumed by the person of the Word, it did not have its own person or personality. As Garrigou-Lagrange points out, therefore the hypostatic union for Scotus consisted in something negative in this respect. The term "singular" is applied to anything that cannot be multiplied numerically. (Tr.)

[489] Disp. Met., disp. 34, sects. 1, 2, 4; disp. II, sect. 3.

[490] Cajetan, 4, a. 2, no. 8.

[491] Cf. Capreolus, Com in IV Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3, pp. 109-19

[492] De Verbo incarnato, q. 2, pp. 75, 84, 140. See also Dict. theol. cath., art. "HypoStase cols. 411f.

[493] Exod. 3:14

[494] Summa theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 4

[495] Ibid.

[496] John 14:6.

[497] Com. in III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, par. 2, p. 105

[498] Ibid.,

[499] Ibid., q. 4, a. 2, nos. 3, 13.

[500] Ibid., nos. 15f.

[501] Ibid., d. 5, q. 3, par. 2, p. 105

[502] Cursus phil., phil. nat., q. 7, a. 1

[503] Ont., chap. 29.

[504] De Verbo incarn., q. 2, par. 1, p. 125

[505] Summa theol., Ia, q. 29, a. 3

[506] Cursus phil, m phil. nat., q. 7, a. 1

[507] Our conception of God's independence is negative, because our first knowledge is of creatures that are dependent on God. So also we conceive spiritual beings negatively, as immaterial, because our first knowledge is of material things. On the contrary, God and the angels, whose first knowledge is of spiritual beings, must conceive material beings negatively, as non-spiritual. See in which Garrigou-Lagrange points out that self-subsisting Being is the supreme truth from which all God's attributes are derived. (Tr.)

[508] The One God, loc. cit.

[509] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

[510] Ibid., q. 17, a. 2.

[511] Ibid.

[512] Billot, De Verbo incarn., q. 2, p. 125; also Zigliara, Summa phil., Ontologia, chap. 29, par. 4.

Father Billot says that Scotus and Father Tiphanus, S.J., hold almost similar views on this question. The latter, in his work entitled De hypostasi et persona, chaps. 10-24, holds that there is merely a logical distinction between nature and suppositum, inasmuch as a complete and singular nature is a person by the very fact that it is a whole in itself, or because it is not either actually or aptitudinally united with another suppositum. According to Father Billot the arguments against Scotus are equally valid against Tiphanus on this point, concerning the concept of person.

This seems true, as also Father Hugon observes in his De Verbo incarnato., q. 2, a. 2. But Tiphanus, op. cit., chap. 7, differs from Scotus in that he holds a real distinction between essence and existence, which he says is fundamental and clearly taught by St. Thomas.

Opinions similar to that of Scotus are held by Franzelin, De Verbo incarnato., props. 7-9; Galtier, De incarnatione et redemptione, thesis 15.

Hugon, De Verbo incarnato., q. 2, a. 2, par. 5, sums up all the arguments against the aforesaid opinion of Scotus as follows: "The constituent of that which is most perfect in nature cannot consist in something negative. But person, as St. Thomas says (Ia, q. 29, a. 3), is that which is most perfect in nature. Therefore the constituent of person cannot consist in something negative."

[513] Disp. Metaph., disp. 34, sects., 1, 2, 4, nos. 9f.: De incarn., disp. 11, sect. 3. Almost similar views are held by De Lugo De incarn., disp. 12, sect. 1, nos. 1-4. Vasquez, Com. in Summam theol., IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 31, chap. 6

[514] Exod. 3:14

[515] John 14:6

[516] Acta Apost., Sedis, VI, 383

[517] Cursus philosophicus, loc. cit.

[518] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1.

[519] Ibid., q. 2, a. 5, ad 1

[520] Ibid., Ia, q. 45, a. 4

[521] Similarly the period serves a useful purpose in terminating a proposition, such as: This is My body. For if the period is not inserted at the end, the proposition is not considered complete, and someone could add an adjective, such as figurative, which would completely change the meaning of the proposition, because then the body of Christ would be in the Eucharist only figuratively and not really

[522] Cursus phil., phil. nat., q. 7, a. 1.

[523] De Verbo incarn., q. 2, pp. 75-84, 137f.

[524] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, and similar passages

[525] De Verbo incarn. p. 88

[526] It was Euclid who gave us the postulate, that a point is that which has position but not magnitude. (Tr.)

[527] Roundness is indeed a mode that is really distinct from quantity, for the same quantity could have another shape. But there could be no roundness without quantity, whereas in the Eucharist the quantity of the bread is without substance

[528] De Verbo incarn., pp. 89, 140

[529] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2.

[530] De Verbo incarnato., p. 69

[531] Com in IIIam., d. 5, q. 3 (toward the end).

[532] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1

[533] Ibid., q. 17 (in toto)

[534] Ibid., q. 16

[535] Ibid., q. 2.

[536] Ibid.

[537] Ibid., q. 17.

[538] De generatione, disp. 15, q. 3

[539] Summa theol., Ia, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3

[540] By the principium quod is meant the suppositum or. person that performs the act.(Tr.)

[541] Quodlibet 2, q. 2, a. 4

[542] Ibid

[543] Cf. Angelicum, June, 1945, pp. 83-55

[544] I grandi commentatori di S. Tomaso.

[545] De Verbo incarnato., p. 116.

[546] Ibid., pp. 118f

[547] Summa theol., Ia, q. 29, a. 2; De potentia, q. 9, a. 1; I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1. In the above-quoted text it is manifest that subsistence or personality is distinct from existential substance or from subsisting; for St. Thomas says in this text: "Subsistence or personality is said of that whose act is to subsist"; therefore it is not identified with the act that is received in it. In other words, subsistence is an abstract term that does not correspond to this concrete that is said to subsist, but to this concrete that is the suppositum.

[548] De generatione, disp. 15, q. 3

[549] Objection. But subsistence or personality also is related to the subject as that by which. Therefore the difficulty remains.

Reply. Personality is that by which a person is formally a what, or a subject of itself separately existing. But essence is that which constitutes the being in a certain species and existence places it outside nothing. Hence there is no parity of argument, for personality is that by which most formally anything is constituted a what but it differs from a person as the abstract term does from the concrete term.

[550] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3

[551] Cf. Penido, Le role de l'analogie en theologie dogmatique, Part II, chap. 1, La Trinite.

[552] Com. in IIIam Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3, no. 2

[553] Cf. no. 5, the refutation of Scotus' opinion.

[554] Com. in IIIam, q. 4, a

[555] Cajetan, loc. cit., nos. 6-11, gives the following interpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine on this point: "We must say that there is some real difference between this humanity and this man, so that man includes something real... whereby this man is susceptible of both the act of existing, as of real filiation.... For this difference between this man and this humanity belongs to the nature of things... and for this reason cannot be reduced to a difference in the various ways of understanding the terms, or to a difference according as it is outside the scope of connotated things, whatever these may be; for this difference precedes all extrinsic things and modes of understanding and signifying. The difference does not come within the scope of negations, for a negation does not constitute the real entity of the subject.... Hence there must be something positive included in this man that is not included in this humanity, by which this man becomes primarily and directly susceptible of this thing (existence) of which humanity is not capable."

But this positive element must be that whereby first substance is what exists separately of itself. Therefore it must be something substantial, like a terminus, as the point is the terminus of the line. Cajetan says (loc. cit., no. 11): "Just by dividing a line each part acquires a new terminus in the genus of quantity... for each part becomes actually a whole (something)." Likewise, as Aristotle teaches (De anima, Bk. II, chap. 2, lect. 4 of St. Thomas): "just by dividing an imperfect animal, such as a worm, we get two actual substances, two animals." St. Thomas considers that this analogy applies to the Incarnation, for he says (III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3): "What is assumed, is drawn to something more complete, existing incomplete before its assumption; and this is contrary to the notion of person, which has the maximum of completion."

And St. Thomas concedes (Ibid., ad 3): "If Christ were separated from His assumed humanity, solely by such separation this humanity would become this man." To the objection that, from the thing separated nothing is acquired by the thing separated, St. Thomas replies: "Separation gives to each of the parts totality, and in things of continued quantity it also gives to each of the parts actual existence. Hence, in the supposition that Christ were to cease as man, that man would subsist of himself in the rational nature, and by this very fact would be entitled to be called a person, " just as in things of continued quantity, by the fact that the part separated from the whole is terminated, and has actual existence, so in the substantial order, a singular nature by the fact that it is terminated receives actual existence.

[556] Bk. IV, chap. 43.

[557] Com. in Iam, q. 3 a. 5

[558] d. 4, a. 1

[559] a. 2.

[560] 2, ad 1

[561] q. 35, a. 5, ad 1

[562] Ibid., q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; see also q. 4, a. 1, c. et ad 3; q. 2, a. 3, ad 2.

[563] Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 43.

[564] Com. in I Sent., d. 23, q. I, ad. I. See also De potentia, q. 9, a. I; Summa theol., Ia, q. 29, a. 2; III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3, c. et ad 3.

[565] Summa theol., Ia, q. 39, a. 3, ad 4

[566] Com. in I Sent., d. 73, q. l, a. 4, ad 4. See also I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.

[567] Com. in IIIam, q. 4, a. 2, no. 8

[568] Cf. Billuart, Index, the word "person"; also his Dialectica, Bk. II, chap. 1, art. 2 (19); III, chap. 2; Ibid., 21, nos. 5, 6; Ibid., 22, no. 7. Also Zigliara, Della luce intellectuale, II, Bk. III, no. 374. Gonzales, Logica, p. 51; St. Bonaventure says something similar in his Com. in IIIam Sent., d. 4, a. 1, q. 3, and IV Sent., d. 8, q. 1.

[569] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.

[570] Ibid., ad I.

[571] Ibid., Ia, q. 50, ad 3

[572] Quodl., II, q. 2, a. 4.

[573] Ibid., II, a. 3, 4; Com. in II Sent., d. 3, a. 1, 2.

[574] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1

[575] Quodl., II, a. 3, 4

[576] De generatione, disp. 15, q. 3.

[577] Cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "hypostase, " col. 418

[578] Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 52

[579] Summa theol., Ia, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2.

[580] Ibid., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.

[581] Ibid., q. 19, a. 1, ad 4.

[582] Ibid., Ia, q. 29, a. 1, 2; also IIIa, q. 2, a. 2.

[583] Ibid., IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.

[584] Ibid., q. 17, a. 2.

[585] Ibid., q. 19

[586] De Verbo incarnato, p. 118

[587] Cf. I Sent. d. 23, q. I, a. I; De pot., q. 9, a. 1. Summa theol., Ia, q. 29, a. 2.

[588] One per se, or unity per se, is said of a being that is specifically one, lion, and not a combination of several specific essences. (Tr.)

[589] Post Anal., Bk. I, lect. 10.

[590] Etudes carmelitaines, April, 1936, pp. 125f., art. "Recherche de la personne."

[591] Com. in IIIam, q. 4, a. 2, no. 8.

[592] De Verbo incarnato, p. 351.

[593] Denz., no. 114.

[594] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 2, a. 3, ad. 2., for a more complete explanation of the notion of person

[595] Denz., no. 216

[596] Cf. Com. in II Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3.

[597] Cf. ad I, ad 2, ad 3

[598] Denz., no. 114

[599] See replies to objections in this article, especially ad 2 and ad 3

[600] See his commentary on this article, no. 10

[601] Cf. Post. Anal., Bk. 1, chap. 4 (lect. 10 of St. Thomas).

[602] The expression per se as used here, means that the humanity is in the Word as a substance, and not as in a subject of inhesion, in that the Word has given to the humanity, not only individualization, but also subsistence and existence. (Tr.)

[603] Com. in IIIam, q. 2, a. 6, no. 9.

[604] See reply to the second objection of this article

[605] See a. 8 of this question.

[606] In fact, Father de la Taille says that the grace of union may be called created, whereas St. Thomas and the majority of theologians say that this grace is uncreated. See infra q. 6, a. 6; De veritate q. 29, a. 2 (about end); also the Tabula aurea of the works of St. Thomas, under the word "Christ, " nos. 68f.

[607] Cf. Dict, theol. cath., art. "Incarnation, " cols. 1525f.

[608] Cf. Summa theol., Ia, q. 45, a. 3.

[609] Cf. Com. in III Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula prima

[610] Summa theol., Ia, q. 45, a. 3

[611] Ibid., a. 2. ad 2

[612] Ibid., a. 3, c. Transitive action is motion as it is coming from the agent, and passion is motion as it is in the patient. Therefore, when motion is removed from action and passion, nothing remains but a relation of dependence operates by an action that is not formally transitive

[613] See reply to the second objection of this article

[614] Cf. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, for a clearer explanation of this truth

[615] See reply to the fourth objection of this article

[616] De consideratione Bk. V, chap. 8.

[617] Cf. IIIa, q. 2, a. 9, obj 3

[618] Ibid., ad 3.

[619] Ibid. q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

[620] Matt. 4:9.

[621] Ibid., 4:10

[622] Com in IIIam, 2, a. 9.

[623] Ibid.

[624] Cf. argumentative part of this article, and ad 1.

[625] Little Office of B.V.M., Ant. at Benedicturs

[626] De praed. sanct., chap. 15

[627] Titus 3:5.

[628] Summa theol., Ia, q. 23, a. 5.

[629] Denz., nos. 65, 85, 88, 233

[630] John 1:17

[631] Ibid., 1:16

[632] Cf. IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3

[633] St. Thomas seems to say something more (III Sent., d. 4, q. 3, a. 1, ad 6.), for he writes: "The Blessed Virgin did not merit the Incarnation, but, presupposing the Incarnation as an established fact, she merited that it should take place through her not by condign merit, but by congruous merit, inasmuch as it was becoming for the Mother of God to be most pure and most perfect." On careful consideration, however, this way of presenting the case does not make any addition to the previous statement. It merely asserts that the Blessed Virgin merited that the Incarnation should take place through her, inasmuch as she merited that degree of purity and holiness, which befitted the Mother of God, and no other virgin could merit this, because no other virgin received from her conception this original plentitude of grace. So the Blessed Virgin Mary in the order of execution could have prepared herself for the divine maternity, but she could not have merited it, for, such being the case, she would have merited the Incarnation.

[634] Cf. Gonet, disp. 7, a. 3.

[635] Summa theol., Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 9; De veritate q. 29, a. 6.

[636] See solution of objections in Gonet, disp. 7, a. 3; Billuart, diss. 5, a. 1.

[637] Cf. Salamenticenses disp., 7, dub. 2, par. 7.

[638] We are here concerned with circumstances that are necessarily connected according to a hypothetical necessity with the Incarnation in the concrete, as it is willed by God, such as the conception and birth of Jesus

[639] That Christ merited what preceded His conception presents no difficulty, and so He merited the redemption of the just of the old Testament. The reason is that merit is not a physical but a moral cause; a physical cause exerts no influence before it exists, whereas God, foreseeing and willing the future merits of Christ, gave grace to those who were justified before the coming of Christ.

[640] Cf. IIIa, q. 19, a. 3

[641] Com. in IIIam, disp. 7, dub. 2, par. 7, no. 53

[642] Luke 1 78

[643] Titus 3:4f.

[644] Denz., no. 1641. Bull Ineffabilis Deus

[645] Because of this principle, St. Thomas at times feared to affirm the privilege of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, when, for instance, he did not have in mind her preservative redemption.

[646] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2.

[647] Matt. 1:21.

[648] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 2, ad 2.

[649] Cf. Billuart and Gotti on this difficulty, who discuss the problem better than Gonet and the Salmanticenses

[650] By the word "adult" the Catholic Church understands those who have come to the use of reason. (Tr.)

[651] Whereas merit refers to divine justice, at least according to an amicable right, prayer as such not necessarily meritorious, refers to divine mercy

[652] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 2, a. 11, c (end).

[653] Ibid., ad 3

[654] Com. in III Sent., d. 4, q. 3, a. 1, ad 6

[655] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 2, a. 11 c (middle).

[656] Ibid., q. 31, a. 5; a. 32, a. 4, c.

[657] Ibid., Ia, q. 45, a. 5.

[658] Cf. Dict. theol. cath., art. "Incarnation, " cols. 1509 Also art. "Marie, " col. 2362. Cf. also John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanticenses, Contenson.