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[687] Cf. IIIa, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.
[688] The obediential power in itself implies only a non-repugnance to
elevation, because God's power to elevate is limited only by
repugnance. Thus in every individualized human nature, such as in
Peter and Paul, there is an obediential power for the hypostatic
union, and this applies even to the angelic nature; but besides the
obediential power there can be a certain fitness in the nature. But
besides the obediential power in our intellect to be raised to the
supernatural order and hence to the beatific vision, there is a certain
fitness in the intellect, which is not absolutely the same as the
obediential power or capacity of being raised to this order. This
point is not sufficiently taken note of by some theologians, when they
read in the works of St. Thomas (Ia q. 12, a. 1) of the
natural desire of seeing God in His essence
[689] Com. in III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1.
[690] Prov. 8:31
[691] Heb. 2:10, 16f.
[692] Wherefore only a rational nature or intellectual nature is
capable of the merit and satisfaction that are required in offering the
sacrifice of redemption, and this sacrifice had to be offered by one
whose nature is specifically the same as the human race that had to be
redeemed.
[693] Com. in III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1
[694] Cf. IIIa, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3.
[695] Cf. ad 3
[696] Cf. Ia, q. 64, a. 2
[697] But the devil, after his confirmation in sin, cannot consider
anything previously not considered about the sin. There is only one
way for him to return to God, which is by humility and obedience, and
pride makes him unwilling to accept this way, even though it were
offered to him
[698] Summa theol., Ia, q. 3, a. 3.
[699] Ibid., IIIa, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3
[700] Cf. Ia, q. 3, a. 3
[701] Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 52
[702] Denz., no. 217
[703] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2. Cf.
Cajetan, who in his famous commentary on this article gave his
interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching on personality. We have
already (supra, q. 2, a. 2) expounded the doctrine of St.
Thomas on personality, and there is no need of again referring to it.
[704] Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 2: "In intellectual
substances (and in every creature), there is a difference between
existence and what is."
[705] Com. in IIIam, q. 4, a. 2, no. 7
[706] Ibid., no. 8.
[707] Contra Gentes, Bk. II, chap. 52
[708] Objection. But Peter is not his personality.
Reply. I concede the statement. But personality is a most formal
part of Peter, formally constituting Peter as a person, thus
enabling him to receive existence
[709] Matt. 1:21f. Cf. infra, q. 16, a. 1
[710] These personalities or subsistent relations are only virtually
distinct from the divine nature or essence. See God, His
Existence, II, 7f. Also The One God, pp. 303-5.
There is also a virtual distinction between God's absolute
subsistence and the relative subsistences of the divine persons. The
human nature was united with the relative subsistence of the Word,
for, as the absolute subsistence of God cannot denote
incommunicability of perseity to the other persons, all. three persons
would have assumed the human nature, which is contrary to revelation.
(Tr.)
[711] Cf. infra, q. 16, a. 1.
[712] Ibid
[713] The human nature can be considered apart from its individualizing
notes, but it cannot exist separated from them; for it implies common
matter, that is, bones and flesh, which can exist only if they are
these particular bones and this particular flesh. (Cf. Met.,
Bk. VII, chap. 15, no. 2.) On the contrary, being,
one, true, good, do not claim in their definition common matter, and
can exist apart from singular sensible things.
[714] I Cor. 3:22..
[715] Feast of Ascension, Hymn for Matins
[716] Job 14:4
[717] Summa theol., IIIa, q. 2, a. 2, ad. 2
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