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State of the question. It seems that the union is not anything
created, and this for the following reasons.
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1) Because this union is in God, for it is God united to the human
nature, and there can be nothing created in God.
2) The terminus of the union is the uncreated person of the Word.
Therefore the union itself is not anything created.
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This question presents considerable difficulty, because there are
three possible meanings to the word "union." It may be understood:
(1) as unitive action; (2) as rather the passive union of some
things into one; (3) as a relation that follows from this union.
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1) If we consider the union as meaning the act of uniting the human
nature with the Word, then certainly the action is uncreated, and it
is common to the whole Trinity, for the Father and the Holy Ghost
united Christ's human nature with the Word, although they did not
assume it.[605] This action common to the whole Trinity,
inasmuch as it is dependent on the omnipotence that is common to the
three Persons, is formally immanent, but virtually transitive, and
hence is certainly uncreated.
2) If we consider the union as implying a real relation of dependence
on the part of Christ's human nature on the Word, St. Thomas
clearly shows it to be something created, and so it presents no
difficulty.
3) But if we consider the union rather as denoting a passive
combination of Christ's humanity with the Word, then theologians
dispute whether it is something real and created that is distinct from
the human nature. Scotus, Suarez, Vasquez, and certain
Thomists, such as the Salmanticenses and Godoy, as also Father de
la Taille in recent times, affirm this view.[606] But Scotus
would have it to be something relative that is an extrinsic adjunct,
whereas others say it is a substantial mode and the foundation of the
real relation of which St. Thomas speaks.
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On the contrary, Cajetan and several other Thomists, such as
Billuart and Father Billot, deny that the union is something
created, remarking that there is no substantial mode in this case, one
that is a quasi-intermediate connection formally uniting the human
nature with the Word, so that it is impossible to detect any other
formal union distinct from the extremes united, except the relation
itself that follows from the passive change effected in the human nature
by the action of the Word uniting to Himself. So says Billuart.
Thus passive creation is merely a real relation of dependence, nothing
else, and it has its foundation in the being of a creature, inasmuch
as a creature is not its own existence. This seems to be the true
solution of the difficulty.[607] Let us see what St. Thomas
says.
In the counterargument he observes that this union began in time,
therefore it is something created. In the body of the article,
however, he determines what this something created formally is. St.
Thomas speaks only of relation here. His argument is reduced to the
following syllogism.
Every relation between God and the creature is real in the creature
and logical in God. But the relation about which we speak is a
certain relation of Christ's humanity to the Word. Therefore this
union is in Christ's humanity as something real, and created,
namely, a real relation of dependence on the Word assuming this
nature, just as creation is a real relation of dependence of the
creature on the Creator.[608]
But what is the foundation for this relation? St. Thomas says in
the body of this article: "By the change effected in the creature
such a relation is brought into being," that is, this foundation is
passion that corresponds to the unitive action. Whether this passion
is really distinct from the human nature passively assumed, is a
disputed point among the above-mentioned theologians.
Let us see whether the replies to the objections define more clearly
the nature of this union.
Reply to first objection. It declares that this union is not anything
real in God.
Reply to second objection. It states that this union is something
real and created in the human nature. It is not apparent from this
reply that the union is anything more than a real relation.
Did St. Thomas speak more explicitly on this point elsewhere? He
certainly did; for in another of his commentaries he says: "We must
know that in the union of the human nature with the divine there can be
nothing intervening that is the formal cause of the union with which the
human nature is joined before it is united with the person. For, just
as there can be no intervening entity between matter and form that would
be in the matter prior to the substantial form, otherwise accidental
existence would be prior to substantial existence, which is
impossible; so also between the nature and the suppositum there can be
nothing intervening in the above said mode."[609] Thus there is
nothing intervening between the Word and the humanity. Hence union in
the passive sense or created is nothing else but a real relation of the
human nature that is dependent on the Word as a person, just as
creation in the passive sense is nothing else but a real relation of
dependence of the creature on the Creator.
Which is the more probable opinion? An intervening substantial mode
between the Word and the human nature, as Cajetan, Billuart and
others show, appears to be inadmissible.
Proof. The Word is united with the human nature by that whereby the
Word terminates and maintains it. But the Word by Himself or solely
by his personality, every formal connection excluded, terminates and
sustains the human nature. Therefore the Word Himself or His
personality is united with the human nature.
The union of the Word with the human nature means nothing else but the
termination of this latter; thus analogically, in the order of
operation, God clearly seen immediately terminates the beatific
vision.
First confirmation. Created subsistence is by itself immediately
united with created nature. Therefore a fortiori uncreated subsistence
is so united, as it is most actual in the notion of terminating.
Second confirmation. Likewise existence, as the ultimate actuality,
by itself immediately actuates the created suppositum; similarly
personality by itself immediately is united with created nature, or
terminates it; so also one and the same point immediately terminates
two lines that meet in it, which is a very faint image of the union of
the two natures in the Word.
Doubt. Was the human nature changed in being assumed by the Word?
Reply. In the strictest sense of the term, it was not, because it
did not exist before it was assumed, inasmuch as it did not have its
own personality, but was assumed by another personality. A nature
must be first produced before it can be assumed.
Thus St. Thomas shows[610] that creation is not a change except
as we conceive it, for he says: "Change means that the same
something should be different now from what it was
previously."[611] But this cannot be either in creation, or
even in the assumption of Christ's humanity, which did not exist
before its assumption. And St. Thomas says: "When motion is
removed from action and passion, only relation remains."[612]
Hence creation in the passive sense is nothing but a real relation of
dependence that has its foundation in created substantial being.
Similarly, in the hypostatic union, the soul of Christ is created as
dependent on the Word as a person. If other authors wish to affirm
that it is something else, namely, a special substantial mode, let
them prove its existence. St. Thomas never spoke about this special
mode.
What is therefore the foundation of the relation in the hypostatic
union? It is Christ's humanity, inasmuch as it is not terminated by
its own created personality, and so it can be terminated and possessed
by the Word.
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