TWO THEORIES ABOUT THE HYPOSTATIC UNION

It is of faith, as we have said, that the union of the two natures in Christ was personal or subsistential,[469] as the Council of Ephesus stated,[470] and for this reason the union is called hypostatic. But theologians dispute about what formally constitutes a person, or what is meant properly by personality or subsistence.

Hence, after a brief examination of the theories condemned by the Church, we must explain those freely disputed among theologians.

Theories condemned by the Church. There are two, namely, Gunther's system that reduces personality to consciousness of oneself, and Rosmini's that would have personality to consist in freedom of will or in dominion over oneself.

Gunther's theory.[471] According to Gunther the fundamental question in philosophy is the theory of knowledge, which, he said, has its foundation in the consciousness of oneself, which is what Descartes taught. Gunther rejects pantheism, of course, but he admits a substantial unity of all created beings, considering these to be manifestations of the same substance, which he calls nature. This nature that is unconscious of itself, becomes conscious in man.

Hence Gunther holds that personality properly consists in a consciousness of oneself, and this note belongs to the rational soul.

From the notion of personality Gunther seeks to explain the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. He is unwilling to admit that God is conscious of Himself by His essence, for then there would be only one person in God. If, therefore, says Gunther, God knows Himself, it is because in Him subject and object are in opposition, and he affirms the equality of each. The subject conscious of itself is the Father, the object conscious of itself is the Son; finally, the consciousness of equality between each results in the Holy Spirit. Thus Gunther seeks to demonstrate the Trinity, and reduce it to the order of philosophical truth. In this we have the essence of semi-rationalism, which does not deny supernatural revelation, but seeks to reduce all revealed mysteries to truths of the natural order, as if revelation were supernatural only as to the manner of its production, not substantially or essentially, namely, on the part of the object revealed.

Gunther also denies the freedom of creation, admitting the absolute optimism of Leibnitz. Just as the elevation of the human race to the supernatural order was necessary, as Baius contends, so also was the Incarnation.

Finally, Gunther explains the union of the Word incarnate. His theory that personality consists in a consciousness of oneself leads to Nestorianism, for there are in Christ two consciousnesses, just as there are two intellectual natures. Gunther, however, in order to avoid the heresy of Nestorianism, devises a theory that scarcely differs from it, inasmuch as he makes the human nature in Christ conscious of its subordination and dependence on the divine nature. But this condition is already verified in all the saints, and is not something special that is found in Christ alone.

This theory, as also Gunther's semi-rationalism, was condemned by Pius IX in his papal brief to Cardinal de Geissel, archbishop of Cologne.[472]

This theory is refuted philosophically and theologically.

Philosophically. Consciousness of oneself testifies to or asserts the identity of our person, but does not constitute it. This means that we know and remember from our past lives that we are the same persons, and consciousness of ourselves tells us that we are today the same persons we were in the past. Therefore both memory and consciousness imply or presuppose an already constituted person; they merely announce the presence of or are attributed to person. They constitute only the psychological aspect of personality.

Hence the saying: I am conscious of myself or of my personality; if consciousness constituted personality, we should have to say: I am conscious of my consciousness. Person is a substance, whereas consciousness is an act.

Confirmation of the preceding. If consciousness together with memory constituted personal identity, this identity would be lessened, in fact would be destroyed, as often as the exercise of memory or consciousness is lessened or suspended.[473]

Expressed briefly, a person is a subject conscious of itself, but it must be first constituted as a subject in order that it be conscious of itself.

Theologically. Gunther's theory is refuted by the very fact that it posits in Christ two persons regardless of his wishes; for Christ's humanity is conscious of itself, and so is the Godhead. Nor does he avoid the error of Nestorianism by saying that Christ's humanity is conscious of the subordination to and dependence on the Godhead; for this union, which is already realized in the saints, is nothing else but a moral and accidental union with God's judgment and will. Pius IX was right in condemning this theory. Modernists express themselves in almost the same terms as Gunther.

Rosmini's theory. Rosmini (1797-1855) did not start, as Gunther did, with the "cogito" of Descartes, being more of an ontologist than Gunther. St. Thomas says: "The first thing conceived by the intellect is being. Hence being is the object of the intellect."[474] But Rosmini teaches[475] that what is first conceived by the intellect is the beginning of being, which is something divine, belonging to the divine nature; it is something divine not by participation, but in the strict sense it "is an actuality that is not distinct from the remainder of the divine actuality";[476] "it is something of the Word."[477]

All Rosmini's theories are deduced from this principle.

This theory is refuted both philosophically and theologically about the same way as Gunther's.

Philosophically. It is false to say that the will constitutes the person in human beings, for the will is attributed to an already ontologically established person, such as Peter or Paul, and the will is this will, since in that it is the will of this particular subject, by itself separately existing. Person is a substance, whereas will is its accident, an inseparable accident, indeed, but a predicamental accident, although it is not a predicable, which means that it is not contingent.

Theologically. Rosmini's theory leads to Nestorianism, for the union it admits is only a union of wills or a moral union, such as we find in the saints, who would differ from Christ only according to the degree of their love for Him.

What results from the condemnation of these two theories?

It follows that merely phenomenalist or dynamistic notions of personality cannot be reconciled with the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, as we showed in another work.[482]

According to the empiric phenomenalism of Hume, Stuart Mill, and Taine, we have knowledge only of phenomena or states of consciousness, but not of the "ego" itself as substance. But conscious facts are united according to the laws of association, and then personality is established by a dominating state of consciousness. But if there be a psychological disturbance, as in madness, some think that there are two personalities, for at times a person considers himself a king, and at other times a servant.

The rational phenomenalism of Renouvier considers personality to be an a priori form of our mind, which unites all that belongs to us. Our existence is merely so far as it is represented.[483]

As for the dynamic evolutionism or philosophy of becoming (of such philosophers as H. Bergson), person is neither an association of phenomena nor a certain category of the mind, but it is a vital and free impulse, which manifests itself in an unbroken series of divers states of consciousness.

It is evident, however, that the person of the Word incarnate, as conceived by the Catholic Church, cannot be either a certain association of phenomena or a certain category of the mind, or a vital and free impulse; all these pertain to the finite and hence created order, and cannot constitute the uncreated personality of the Word incarnate.

But in contrast to either empiric or rational phenomenalism, or the philosophy of becoming, traditional philosophy may be called the philosophy of being, inasmuch as the formal object of our intellect is neither an internal nor an external phenomenon, nor a category of the mind, but it is the intelligible being of sensible things. This is, as H. Bergson avows, the natural metaphysics of human intelligence, or the conception of natural reason, or the sensus communis, which develops by a gradual process from the confused state of rudimentary knowledge to the clearly defined state of philosophic knowledge. Gradually our intellect ascends from the knowledge of the being of sensible things to the knowledge of the soul and of God, who is conceived as the First Being or as the self-subsisting Being.

According to this philosophy of being, however, person is something more profound than phenomena and their laws, either empiric or a priori, something of even deeper significance than the becoming of being that underlies phenomena, for it is a substance of a rational nature by itself separately existing, or an intelligent and free individual subject, permanent in itself, by itself operating, and hence conscious of itself and because of free will responsible for its actions. Briefly, person is an intelligent and free subject. Hence the aforesaid theories consider only the psychological or moral aspects of personality, but not ontological personality, on which these aspects depend. This ontological personality is that by which a person is a subject or a whole by itself separately existing, intelligent and free.

As we said, a person enjoys a threefold independence, inasmuch as its being, its understanding, and its will are not intrinsically dependent on matter. Thus it is evident that ontological personality is the foundation of psychological personality and of moral personality.

It is also apparent that those notes which constitute personality, namely, a subject subsisting in itself, endowed with intelligence and freedom, are absolutely simple perfections, which can be attributed analogically and in the proper sense to God, whereas, on the contrary, merely phenomenal personality cannot be attributed even analogically to Him, since God is absolutely above the phenomenal order.

Various Scholastic Views About Personality

There are different views about ontological personality among the Scholastics. They are radically divided: some admit and others do not admit a real distinction between what is and its existence, a distinction that is declared among the greater in the philosophy of St. Thomas, and which forms one of the twenty-four theses approved by the Sacred Congregation of Studies in 1916.

Some say, in these days, that the first of these twenty-four propositions on which the others depend, is not found in the works of St. Thomas, who admitted, so they say, only logical composition of potentiality and act, but not real composition in every created:[484]

On the contrary, St. Thomas said explicitly: "Everything that is in the genus of substance is a real composite...; and its existence must be different from itself.... Therefore everything that is directly in the predicament of substance is composed at least of existence and that which exists."[485] This means that there is a real distinction in the created suppositum between that which exists and its existence. The suppositum is the whole, and its existence is a contingent predicate.

Again he writes: "The act that is measured by aeviternity, the aeviternal existence, differs indeed really from that whose act it is";[486] which means that an angel's essence differs really from his existence. On this point Father Norbert del Prado, O. P., has collected many similar texts from St. Thomas in the famous book he wrote on this subject.[487] In this work, he shows that the first truth by way of doctrinal judgment though the highest of causes is that in God alone essence and existence are the same; He alone can say: I am who am.

These truths presupposed, however, among Scholastics who deny a real distinction between what is and its existence, and between essence and existence, Scotus says that personality is something negative, namely, the negation of the hypostatic union in a singular nature.[488] Suarez considers personality to be a substantial mode that presupposes the existence of a singular nature, and that renders it incommunicable.[489]

Among those Scholastics who admit a real distinction between existence and what exists, there are especially three opinions. Cajetan and very many Thomists say that personality is that by which a singular nature becomes immediately capable of existence.[490]

Others, following Capreolus, say less clearly that personality is a singular nature as constituted before it exists.[491] Lastly, Father Billot reduces personality to existence that actuates the singular nature.[492]

Real distinction admitted

Real distinction denied

All these theologians wish to retain the ontological validity of the common notion of person, namely, an intelligent and free subject, and they wish to pass methodically, although they do not all do so, by the light of revelation, from this common notion of person to the more philosophical notion of person, which is like the guiding star.

We said, however, that according to natural reason, a person is an intelligent subject by itself separately existing, and this absolutely must be maintained.

Moreover, it must be observed that there are assertions of natural reason confirmed by revelation, and these must likewise be preserved intact. First of all, there are affirmative judgments, in which those things that pertain to a person are predicated of the person as a real subject of predication, such as: Peter is a man, Peter is existing, Peter is acting. In these affirmative propositions, however, the verb "is" affirms real identity between subject and predicate, and postulates the same real subject underlying nature, existence, and operation.

Lastly, the following truth must be retained. God alone is His existence, He alone can say: "I am who am."[493] Peter is not his existence. This statement means that the act of existence even when in act is included only in God's essence, which is related to existence as A is to A, for God's essence is the self-subsisting Being.[494] On the other hand, no created essence is its existence, no created essence contains existence as an essential predicate, for in such a case it would be self-existent and would not be created; but existence befits it as a contingent predicate, inasmuch as it is possible for this essence not to exist. Hence it is said of Michael the archangel, that he is not his existence, just as a grain of sand is not its existence. These propositions are commonly admitted by theologians as true, which means that they correspond to a reality, and hence we must say, as the Thomists assert, that before the consideration of our mind, Michael's essence or man's essence is not his existence, which means that it is really distinct from its existence.[495]

Nevertheless we say that Michael is existing, Peter is existing. Thus the verb "is" signifies real identity between subject and predicate notwithstanding the real distinction between created essence and existence.

This principle is the criterion in the judgment of the above-mentioned opinions, and it is manifest that it makes a considerable difference in the notion of person, to whom essence and existence are attributed, according as a real distinction between essence and existence is or is not admitted. The true teaching about person has its foundation in this, that it is a requisite for the verification of the following judgments: Peter is existing, but is not his existence, whereas Christ is existing, and is His existence, just as "He is truth and life."[496]

1) Opinion of Scotus. Scotus holds that a twofold negation is added to the notion of person as applied to a singular human nature, namely, actual dependence on the divine person, and aptitudinal dependence on this same divine person.[497] Thus this humanity of ours is a person, because it is neither naturally apt to be terminated, nor actually terminated by the divine personality.

Scotus gives the following reasons for this conclusion:[498]

(1) Because then there would be some positive entity in the human nature that would be incapable of assumption by the Word. (2) Because it would follow that the human nature assumed by the Word would be wanting in some positive entity... and thus Christ would not be universally a man.

Criticism. Cajetan[499] reproduces exactly these arguments of Scotus, and examines them.[500] Capreolus had already examined them.[501] Later on John of St. Thomas,[502] Zigliara,[503] and Billot[504] had discussed these arguments. The Thomists show that this opinion of Scotus is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas, and that it does not preserve the common notion of person.

Fundamental argument. The constitutive element of that which is not perfect in nature cannot be assigned to something negative. But as St. Thomas says, "Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature, that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature."[505] Therefore its constitutive element or its personality cannot be assigned to something negative. John of St. Thomas explains this point well.

Thus infinity in substance; although it is explained negatively, yet it is something positive. Hence God's independence in being constitutes His greatest perfection.[507] Therefore that by which anything is a subject by itself, separately existing, cannot be a mere negation, for it is that which constitutes a subject as the first subject of attribution. Likewise every negation has its foundation in something positive, as Father Billot says against Scotus.

Some Scotists say that a subject is a singular nature.

Reply. The nature itself is not this subject, for as St. Thomas often says: "nature, i. e., humanity, is that by which anything is such, i. e., a man; it is not that which is."[510] Individuation alone is not that by which anything is a who or a what, for matter constitutes this individuation in Christ, namely, this humanity; yet it does not constitute a subject distinct from the Word. Individuation is also found in the parts of a nature, for example, in this flesh, these bones, but these parts do not have the incommunicability that belongs properly to the suppositum.

Moreover, as we said, individuation derived from matter is something very low in dignity, but subsistence and especially personality is something far nobler, for it is that by which anything is a subject by itself separately existing and operating. On the contrary, matter is not that which is, but that by which anything is material.

Wherefore we said that the true doctrine of person has its foundation in this, that it postulates the truth of the following judgments: Peter is existing, but is not existence; whereas Christ is existing and is His existence.

2) Opinion of Suarez.[513] This opinion of Suarez is examined after that of Scotus, since the two views are much alike, although Suarez departs from Scotus inasmuch as he holds personality to consist in something positive, namely, in a substantial mode, which in his opinion presupposes existence for the essence. How does Suarez reach this conclusion?

Often in his eclecticism, Suarez searches for a via media between St. Thomas and Scotus. In the present question, he sees, as the Thomists say, that personality must consist in something positive, and then he says: this positive element cannot be an accident, since person is a first substance. Therefore it must be a substantial mode by which a singular nature is rendered incommunicable, which is what Cajetan said. In Christ, he says, the human nature is not a person, because the mode of personality is wanting to it, the mode of the union taking its place.

But, on the other hand, Suarez holds, as Scotus does, that there is no real distinction between created essence and existence. Hence, in his opinion, the substantial mode which constitutes ontological personality, presupposes not only essence or nature, but also existence.

Thus Suarez frequently in accordance with his eclecticism, as in this question, refutes Scotus by St. Thomas, and St. Thomas by Scotus. But this via media is most difficult to follow, since it is very difficult to maintain the proper equilibrium or stability by this method, so that Suarez in the development of his theses not infrequently fluctuates or oscillates between St. Thomas and Scotus, not taking a firm stand for either view.

Criticism. The Thomists reply:

1) This opinion does not preserve what is fundamental in the truth of the following proposition: Peter is not his own existence, for only God is His existence. He alone can say: "I am who am,"[514] "I am the truth and the life,"[515] and not merely "I have being, truth, and life." But these judgments, acknowledged to be true by all theologians, demand a real distinction between created essence and existence; for, that these propositions be true even before any consideration of our mind, there must be a real distinction between Peter and his existence, whereas, on the contrary, God is really His existence, without even the least of real distinctions.

Hence the Sacred Congregation of Studies (1916), among the twenty-four propositions of St. Thomas that it declared to be the greater, posited a real distinction between created essence and existence. It is the third proposition which reads: "All other beings (except God) which participate in being, have a nature which is limited by existence, and consist of essence and existence, as really distinct principles."[516]

Furthermore, the Thomists with John of St. Thomas[517] say that the substantial mode, which is subsistence, does not presuppose existence, for it is by subsistence that the suppositum is formally constituted as either a suppositum or a person. But, as St. Thomas says: "Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which has being, but upon that whereby a thing is such; whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of the hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality of the nature."[518] Peter is that which is, and first comes the concept of person and personality before existence that is attributed to the person when we say: Peter is existing, but is not his existence.

Hence personality terminates the nature and ultimately comes existence as primarily befitting the suppositum, and through the intermediary of the suppositum the nature. This is the constant teaching of St. Thomas.[519] There is no existing subject unless the whole being is terminated and incommunicable (e. g., Peter), to whom existence is applicable as a contingent predicate. Being and becoming befit the suppositum, as St. Thomas shows,[520] for the terminus of creation, or even of generation, is that which is, not that by which anything is such as it is.

Therefore very many Thomists say with Cajetan that the substantial mode is the terminus that causes the singular nature to be incommunicable and terminated, just as the point terminates the line and does not continue it,[521] nor is subsistence an unexplainable entity. But it must be something real that constitutes this mode, not nature alone, however, nor existence. Therefore it must be by what terminates the mode. Thus John of St. Thomas, following Cajetan.[522]

2) The Thomists and Father Billot also say against Suarez:

Since the existence of substance is its ultimate actuality, as St. Thomas often says, whatever accrues to substance already complete in its existence accrues to it accidentally. But this mode consisting in personality or subsistence, according to Suarez, accrues to substance after existence. Therefore the mode is not substantial as he would have it, but accidental.

Hence, as already stated against the opinion of Scotus, the union of the Word incarnate would thus be merely accidental, since each nature would have its own existence, or its ultimate actuality.

3) Opinion of Father Billot. Father Billot, S. J.,[523] insists especially on this, that St. Thomas maintains there is only one existence in Christ.[524] Father Billot vigorously asserts this against Scotus and Suarez, because he firmly defends against them the opinion of a real distinction between essence and existence. On this point he is truly in agreement with St. Thomas and the Thomists.

But on the other hand, Father Billot, always attacking Suarez, will not admit a substantial mode even in Cajetan's sense, for-he says: "There is nothing positive about the terminus itself except what it terminates, for all that the point does which terminates a line is to deny its further extension, adding absolutely nothing to it."[525]

Cajetan would reply by saying that the terminus itself is not indeed a new thing or reality, but is a real mode, really and modally distinct from the thing itself. Thus a line is made up of divisible parts and of indivisible points; a point that terminates a line, or two lines that converge in it, is neither a nonentity nor a part;[526] So the roundness of a metallic sphere is not nothing; it is something really and modally distinct from substance, even from the metallic quantity that it terminates; the quantity of this metal is not its roundness, and it could have another shape.[527]

But since Father Billot refuses to admit this substantial mode as terminating the nature, so that it is immediately capable of existing, he says that person is a singular nature under its own existence, and he identifies subsistence or personality with the existence of the substance.[528]

He quotes for his opinion especially the passage[529] in which St. Thomas asserts, and in similar passages, that there is one being in Christ. This assertion is indeed valid against Scotus and Suarez, but not against Cajetan, for he also maintains that there is one being in Christ.

Father Billot,[530] who quotes Capreolus for his view, interprets him as saying that person is a singular nature with its existence. Cajetan's answer would be: Yes, it is a singular nature (terminated) with its existence, but it must be declared terminated, for nature in itself is only that by which anything is such as it is, it is not that which is.

The exact words of Capreolus on this point are: "1. The name suppositum is affirmed of that individual which subsists by itself. 2. Understood formally, as a mode, and then by suppositum is meant the composite that consists of the individual with its suchness and its own subsistence."[531] It cannot be inferred from this text that a person and the singular nature are identical, for a person is what is, and the nature that by which something is; nor can it be said that personality is existence, for personality is attributed to a person already formally constituted as a person.

Criticism of Father Billot's opinion. It may be reduced to the following arguments.

1) This opinion is not in harmony with the teaching of St. Thomas, who says: "Being is consequent upon nature not as that which has being, but upon that whereby a thing is; whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis as upon that which has being."[532] Hence being or existence does not formally constitute personality, because it is consequent upon a person already formally constituted as such by personality. St. Thomas speaks similarly in the body of the article just quoted.

2) Moreover, St. Thomas takes up this disputed point in discussing Christ's unity of being,[533] by considering, as he himself says in the prologue to the previous question,[534] the consequences of the union. Therefore he first established his teaching on the hypostatic union,[535] and from this that there is only one person in Christ. Then he goes on to deduce that there is one being in Christ, inasmuch as being is immediately consequent not upon nature, but upon person, which alone is what is.

Hence if Father Billot's opinion were the true teaching of St. Thomas, the holy Doctor ought to have shown at the beginning of this treatise[536] that there is one being in Christ, so as to make it clear that there is only one person and only one personality in Christ. But he considers this point only farther on,[537] which presupposes the solution of the problem concerning what constitutes the hypostatic union.

3) The Complutenses Abbreviati[538] note that St. Thomas teaches that "the angel is composed of existence and what is."[539] Thus Michael is existing but is not his existence. Hence the holy Doctor teaches that existence enters into composition not only with essence, but also with the suppositum. It would not be so, however, if existence were the same as subsistence or personality. Likewise, the principium quod of the theandric operations in Christ is not common to the three divine persons.[540] But existence is common to the three divine persons. Therefore the principium quod in Christ is not formally constituted by existence.

4) St. Thomas says: "Existence does not pertain to the notion of a created suppositum,"[541] which means that Peter is not his existence. But subsistence pertains to the notion of suppositum, and personality to the notion of person. Therefore they are not really the same as being or existence, at least for St. Thomas.

Finally, St. Thomas[542] treats as distinct the following two questions, namely, whether essence and existence are the same, and whether essence and suppositum are the same. This would be superfluous if there were no real distinction between existence and subsistence. Such is the excellent observation of the Complutenses Abbreviati.

Moreover, it must be observed so as to avoid ambiguity, that subsistence does not mean existence of substance, but subsistence is the abstract name that is the correlative of the concrete name suppositum. Hence subsistence is to suppositum as personality is to person, as existence is to exist, and as running is to run.

Hence subsistence is not an abstract name that would correspond to the concrete to subsist, but to the concrete that is called suppositum. But to avoid this ambiguity, it is better to use the word personality than subsistence, because it is evident that personality corresponds in the concrete to person, and not as such to the word "subsist." Hence subsistence is to suppositum as personality is to person, and as existence is to exist or to being.

5) Father Billot's opinion leads to the denial of a real distinction between essence and existence, a distinction that he firmly maintains nevertheless against Scotus and Suarez. For it must be said that being which is not its existence, is, before the consideration of the mind, really distinct from its existence. But Peter's person, even his personality, is not his existence. Therefore Peter's person, even his personality, is really distinct from his existence.

The major of this argument is the principle from which we deduce that there is a real distinction between essence and existence, and this Father Billot accepts. But the minor is most certain, namely, that Peter's person is not his existence, and therefore it differs from the person of the Word; moreover Peter's personality is not his existence, because it formally constitutes Peter's person, which is not his existence.

In other words, the denial of a real distinction between a created person, constituted as such by his own personality and existence, means that a real distinction between created essence and existence is without any foundation; for a being that is not its own existence is, before the consideration of the mind, really distinct from its existence. But Peter's person, formally constituted as such by his personality, just as his essence, is really distinct from his existence. Only God is His existence, and the truth of this assertion will be most clearly seen in the beatific vision.

This point was more fully explained by quoting several texts of St. Thomas,[543] and in the examination of the recent work of Father Charles Giacon, S. J.[544]

Certain disciples of Father Billot advance the following objection. Peter is not his nature. Yet there is no real distinction between him and his nature. Therefore between him and his existence there is no real distinction.

Reply. I concede the major. I deny the minor and parity of agreement. For Peter is not his nature, because his nature is an essential part of himself, and even an essential part is not identified with the whole.

Thus I concede the major: Peter is not his nature. I deny the minor, for there is a real distinction between Peter and his nature, just as there is a real distinction between the real whole and its real part, and I deny also the parity of argument, because Peter's nature is an essential part of himself, but his existence is not. Thus when we say, "Peter is a man," man is an essential predicate; on the contrary, when we say, "Peter is existing," existing is a contingent predicate.

Father G. Mattiussi replies to this as follows: "St. Thomas says that existence is not included in the notion of suppositum, inasmuch as existence is not essential to any finite thing; but the suppositum can be considered in the order of possible things, without its actually existing"[545]

To this it must be said: When I say that Peter is not his existence, I am not concerned with Peter's possible existence, but with his actual existence; just as when we say that the essence of a created thing really differs from its existence, it is not a question of a possible essence, but of a real essence that underlies the existence which it limits. For as Father Mattiussi himself admits, the act of existing is multiplied and limited only by the real essence and not the possible, in which it is received. Similarly, existence is a contingent predicate of existing Peter, and not of possible Peter. Of existing Peter we say that Peter is existing, but is not his existence; whereas of God, we say that God exists and is His existence.

That being which is not its existence is really distinct from its existence. But Peter's person, even his personality, is not his existence, which is a contingent predicate. Therefore Peter's person, even his personality, is really distinct from his existence, which is really distinct from his personality.

Father Mattiussi[546] quotes three texts of St. Thomas in proof that he, too, was of the same opinion, namely, that subsistence is the existence of substance. On the contrary, in these texts we read: "Subsistence is said of that whose act is to subsist, just as essence is said of that whose act is to exist."[547] On the contrary, these texts do not in any way contradict Cajetan's opinion. Father Mattiussi does not search for that by which anything is a what, or for that in which the concrete, this man differs from this humanity. This man is what is, humanity that by which he is. They differ however by that which constitutes man the first subject of attribution, for it is the concrete that is constituted, whereas the form is in the subject. The Complutenses Abbreviati present this argument in various forms and excellently, showing that otherwise the proposition, man is existing, would be an eternally true proposition, just as this proposition, man is a substance of a rational nature. They insist on this, that subsistence or personality is intrinsic to the notion of a created person, whereas existence accrues to it and is completely outside the notion of person.[548] Hence Father Billot's opinion denies the truth of the following proposition: Peter is not his existence.

6) Moreover, Father Billot's opinion denies the truth of another proposition, -namely, that Peter is existing. For in every affirmative proposition, the word "is" expresses real identity between subject and predicate. This real identity, however, must have its foundation in some real positive thing, in that by which anything is a what. But that by which anything is a what, is neither even a singular nature nor existence. For nature is that by which anything is such, for example, a man; existence is that by which anything is established beyond nothing and its causes. And two elements related to each other as by which, do not constitute a one that is a what, that is, a subject of itself separately existing.[549]

7) Moreover, Father Billot overlooks the fact that in God there are three personalities and one existence, not three relative existences but one esse in that is substantial. St. Thomas says: "There is only one being in God and three subsistencies."[550] Therefore personality is not being.[551]

8) Capreolus does not say that personality is formally constituted by existence, but he says, supported by Cajetan on this point: "The being of actual existence is called the act of the essence as whereby of the suppositum, and the act of the suppositum as what exists....Existence thus pertains to the notion of suppositum, not forming a part of the suppositum, nor is it included in the essence of this latter, but is related to it by way of connotation and is implied indirectly, which is about the equivalent of saying that the suppositum is identical with the individual substance having existence. Such was the opinion of St. Thomas, so I think."[552] Cajetan admits this. There is, indeed, a more recent opinion that maintains person is the singular nature itself underlying its existence.

Criticism. This does not explain whereby anything is properly what is, or the first subject of attribution subsisting of itself, first substance. For the singular nature, for example, this humanity, is not what is, but whereby anyone, namely, Peter or Paul, is a man. Hence we say: Peter is not his humanity, because the whole is not its part, it is not identical with its part, but includes other things besides; thus Peter includes his nature, existence, and accidents. Hence we seek that whereby a person is formally constituted the first subject of attribution, not attributable to another subject; whereas, on the contrary, this humanity is attributed to each human being.

Moreover, this humanity immediately is not capable of the act of existing, for it is not what exists. We are seeking the subject of this singular nature, of its existence and accidents.[553]

Common opinion among Thomists. It is Cajetan's opinion, which he explains,[554] and very many Thomists follow.

Cajetan passes methodically from the commonly accepted definition of person, namely, a subject of a rational nature, to the definition of personality. He notes that the name personality signifies that whereby a person is constituted the first subject that is of itself separately, so that it cannot be attributed to another subject.

But that whereby anything is a subjective what, cannot be anything accidental, or a permanent accident, such as the intellectual faculty, or the free will, or a transitory accident, such as an act of conscience or even a free act. It must be something substantial, as constituting the subject of attribution.

But this substantial can be neither a singular nature that is an essential part of this subject but not the subject itself, nor existence, which is a contingent predicate of whatsoever created person, and hence does not formally constitute it. Therefore personality is a substantial mode that terminates the singular nature, so that it may become the immediate subject of existence, for the subject is what is, and not the nature.

This substantial mode terminates the singular nature in some way as the point terminates the line and makes of the line a complete whole; thus, when a line is divided by a point into two lines, whichever of these, that before was in potentia to be continued, now becomes a line in act, becomes some whole in act, by the very fact that it is terminated. Similarly, the line itself, for instance, a circular line terminates the surface of a scroll. This is also the case in the order of substances, for, when an animal of the lower order, a worm, for instance, is divided in two, then we have two worms, two supposita; before the division they were potentially two, now they are actually two.

Thus this humanity, which is in Christ, could be terminated in its own right, and thus it would be a distinct suppositum, a human person. De facto, however, it is terminated by the pre-existing personality of the Word, just as a line is extended so that it remains one line and not two lines; or, better still, just as two lines terminate in the same point at the apex of an angle.[555]

Cajetan's fundamental argument. It may be reduced to the following syllogism.

Something real and positive is required by which the created subject is what is, which is against Scotus. But this cannot be either the singular nature, which is related to the subject as whereby, or existence, which is a contingent predicate of the created subject, which is against other opinions. Therefore something else positive is required, namely, personality, which ultimately disposes the singular nature for existence. It would indeed be repugnant if a substantial mode accrued to substance already existing, for then it would be an accident, which is against Suarez; but it would not be so if it accrued to substance before it existed.

Cajetan's opinion is admitted by Francis Sylvester (Ferrariensis),[556] by Bannez,[557] by John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Goudin, by Billuart,[558] by the Salmanticenses, and by very many Thomists.

There are two proofs for this opinion. 1. It is proved on the authority of St. Thomas; 2. it is proved from reason; 3. it explains satisfactorily the dogma of the Incarnation; 4. it is defended against those who attack the opinion.

Proof from St. Thomas. Cajetan quotes four texts,[559]

Proof from reason. Cajetan's opinion has its foundation in the principle that on the part of the object it is required that the commonly accepted definition of person, namely, an intelligent and free subject, be true, and that these two judgments are true: Peter is existing, but is not his existence.

Cajetan says: "If we all acknowledge this principle, in examining the quiddity of the thing signified, why turn away from what is commonly admitted?"[567] In other words, in the transition from the nominal definition to the real definition, why depart from the nominal definition of person, which is, what exists separately of itself in a rational nature? The quiddity of the name contains confusedly the quiddity of the thing, and the explicit definition must not be the negation of the implicit or nominal definition, but must be in conformity with it, otherwise philosophical reason disagrees with the findings of natural reason.

Moreover, for the verification of the two above-mentioned judgments (Peter is existing, but is not his existence), there must be a foundation for the real identity between subject and predicate, which is affirmed in the first judgment, yet such that there is not identity, which is rightly so denied in the second judgment. But this foundation, must be something positive, real, which is substantial and not accidental, which is not existence, however, for this is a contingent predicate of Peter, or nature, which is related as whereby and as an essential part of this subject. It must formally be that whereby anything is a what or a real subject of these divers predications.

Therefore a terminus is required or a mode that is substantial and not accidental. This argument, namely, that on the part of the object there is required real identity between subject and predicate in the affirmative judgment, Peter is existing, is confirmed by several theologians.[568]

The search or hunt for the definition of personality can be more briefly set forth, by beginning with the nominal definition, and by comparing personality with those things unlike it, namely, with negations and accidents, and with those things like it and related to it, such as with the singular nature and with existing substance, as also by separating in this way those things that do not pertain to the genus of substance to which person belongs.

This is the commonly accepted opinion among Thomists, and this real definition of personality corresponds to the nominal definition, that personality is that whereby any intelligent subject is a person, just as existence is that whereby a subject exists. This latter assertion is almost frankly admitted by all, and in a confused manner implies that personality is not the same as a person's existence.

3) Finally, Cajetan's opinion very well explains the dogma of the Incarnation.

Moreover, as St. Thomas says, "the three persons in God have only one being."[569] Therefore St. Thomas is of the opinion that personality or subsistence is not being or existence, nor is it the singular nature, which is related to the suppositum as whereby and as an essential part. Therefore personality is a substantial mode by which a singular nature is made immediately possible of receiving existence.

The truth of this doctrine is to be seen in the instinct of self-preservation. Now, for instance, every suppositum whether mineral, vegetable, or animal seeks to retain what it possesses. Similarly the human person seeks to retain his nature, body and soul, his existence, his faculties, his integral parts, his operations; he seeks to retain all he possesses. It is not his individualized nature that possesses all these things, but his very person considered as the first subject of attribution, his very "ego."

What has been said also clearly shows the sublimity of Christ's personality; for He has not a human personality, and therefore all that pertains to His human nature is under the dominion of the Word incarnate. It is the person of the Son of God who possesses all these things, and therefore nowhere in creation has there been such a perfect illustration of God's supreme dominion both in the past and in present times, as in the case of Christ's most holy humanity.

The Complutenses Abbreviati give a good explanation of this doctrine in their philosophical works. It is fitting here to quote their proofs. They remark: "It must be said that there is a real distinction between subsistence and existence. Such is the teaching of St. Thomas, for he says: 'Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which has being, but upon that whereby a thing is; whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being.’[570] But that which is consequent upon another is really distinct from it.... He also says: 'An angel is composed of existence and what is,’[571] and he expounds this doctrine here remarkably well by saying that existence forms a composite not only with the essence of a thing, but also with its suppositum; but if it were really identical with the subsistence of a thing, it could not enter into composition with the suppositum, but we should have to say that it formally constitutes the suppositum. Then in another work, he says: 'Existence does not pertain to the notion of suppositum,’[572] but subsistence belongs to the notion of suppositum, and even formally constitutes it as such....

"Finally, the holy Doctor, in discussing various questions, asks whether essence and existence are identical in created things, and also whether the essence and suppositum are the same.[573] This would be superfluous if existence and subsistence are not really distinct....

"The second proof for this thesis is founded on an argument taken from St. Thomas,[574] which may be presented as follows: Act is really distinct from the real subject in which it is received; but the suppositum is the real susceptive subject of existence. Therefore the suppositum is really distinct from its existence. This second consequence is a legitimate inference from the first consequence; for it is by subsistence that the suppositum is formally constituted. Hence if existence really differs from the suppositum, and is received in this latter, it must presuppose subsistence as a reality, and be really distinct from this latter. The minor is clarified: because that receives as what existence, which comes into being as what and operates as what; for becoming is ordered to being, and being to operation; but to come into being as what, and to operate as what belongs properly to the suppositum, which is the common teaching of scholastic theologians and philosophers. Therefore the suppositum really is the recipient as what of existence.

"The third proof for this assertion made above is taken from the previously quoted argument of St. Thomas,[575] and is substantially as follows: That which belongs intrinsically to the notion of suppositum is really distinct from that which accrues to it and is completely superfluous to the proper notion of suppositum; but subsistence belongs intrinsically to the notion of suppositum, whereas existence accrues to it and is not at all included in its proper notion. Therefore existence is really distinct from subsistence. The major and the consequence are evident. But the first part of the minor is sufficiently clear, ... and the Complutenses give a brief proof and conclude that this is an eternal verity, namely, the suppositum is a subsisting substance and incapable of being attributed to another.... The second part of the minor is expounded as follows: Existence does not apply necessarily and essentially to the suppositum, otherwise this proposition, the suppositum exists, would be an eternal truth, which is absurd. Therefore existence is an accidental attribute of the suppositum, and is not included in its proper notion.

"The first confirmation of these proofs is that the suppositum is identical with the first substance that is directly assignable among the predicamentals; but the aforesaid substance is not constituted a reality by existence, inasmuch as all things placed among the predicamentals prescind from the notion of existence....

"The second confirmation is that existence and subsistence are lacking in every principle of identity. Therefore they are not really the same. The antecedent is proved first of all because existence does not pertain to the notion of subsistence; otherwise anything of which subsistence is predicated would also require existence to be predicated of it. Consequently, just as this proposition, man is subsisting, is eternally true, so also this proposition, man is existing, would be eternally true, which nobody would concede. Again, existence does not enter into the concept of any third object by which it would be identified with subsistence: for no third object can be thought of, except the suppositum, whose concept, however, does not include the notion of existence, as we have just seen. Finally, existence and subsistence do not originate from the same form."[576] Such are the splendid comments of the Complutenses, who preserve absolutely intact, therefore, the interpretation of St. Thomas offered by Cajetan.

First objection. In a certain work we read: "The necessity of this substantial mode is freely affirmed, namely, that an individualized substance be immediately capable of existing separately; it is of the very notion of an individualized and complete substance that it exist in itself and of itself."[577]

Reply. Substance or individualized nature is not what exists, but whereby any subject is such as it is, constituted in a certain species with its individualizing conditions. What exists is not this humanity of Peter. Otherwise this humanity of Christ would already be what is, and thus there would be two supposita in Christ, or two persons. On the contrary, there is only one suppositum in Christ, to whom the two natures are attributed.

Such is the common teaching of theologians in discussing the theandric acts of Christ, and the infinite value of His merits and satisfaction. They say these meritorious and satisfactory acts are of infinite value not because of the principle from which they are elicited, namely, the human nature, its faculties and infused virtues, but because of the subjective principle that elicits these acts, that is, the divine suppositum or divine person.

Personality must therefore be a real, positive, and substantial thing, distinct from the individualized nature and also from existence that is a contingent predicate of the created person. This means that personality is properly that whereby any intelligent and free subject is what is. Thus the common teaching of St. Thomas is that, in any creature whatever, there is a difference between what is and being.[578]

Second objection. On the part of substance, to subsist is to exist. But the relation between subsistence and to subsist is the same as between existence and to exist, with which latter it is identified. Therefore subsistence is the same as existence.

Reply. I concede the major, inasmuch as subsistence is the fact of existence attributed to the person, but not constituting the person, for the person is the thing that de facto exists. Hence we concede the major, or let it pass without comment.

I deny the minor; for the relation is not between subsistence and to subsist, but between subsistence and the suppositum, which is the same as between existence and to be or to exist; which means that it is a relation between the abstract and the concrete, as between a race and running. This becomes clearer if we substitute "personality" for "subsistence"; for the relation is not between personality and subsistence, but between personality and person, which is a relation between the abstract and the concrete. Hence the relation is the same as that between existence and to exist, and between a race and running. And thus there is a real distinction between personality or subsistence and existence, or between to exist and to subsist, which de facto is attributed to the suppositum as a contingent predicate.

St. Thomas admits this distinction; for he writes: "The relation between life and to live is not the same as that between essence and to exist; but rather as that between a race and to run, one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete."[579]

Thus there is a threefold order in the signification of both the abstract and the concrete:

As St. Thomas says: "The three persons in God have only one being,"[580] and this latter is identified with the divine essence, which is not really distinct from the divine persons, although there is a real distinction between the persons.

Against Cajetan's argument other objections have been proposed in our times, such as the following.

Objection. St. Thomas says: "Being and operation belong to the person by reason of the nature, yet in a different manner. For being belongs to the very constitution of the person, and in this respect it has the nature of a term, that is, as ultimate actuality; consequently unity of person requires unity of the complete and personal being. But operation is an effect of the person by reason of the former nature. Hence plurality of operations is not incompatible with personal unity."[581]

Reply. In this text St. Thomas is not inquiring into the formal constituent of person, which has already been determined;[582] but why there are two operations just as there are two natures, whereas there is one being. He replies that "being belongs to the very constitution of the person,"[583] namely, to the person constituted as a person, as to that which has being, as St. Thomas said. For it is the person that immediately is, whereas operation, which follows personal being, belongs to the person through the intermediary of the nature and its faculties. Thus in Christ there are one being and two operations, just as there are two natures. In this text St. Thomas is not inquiring about the formal constituent of person, since this he had already done,[584] and had no need to postpone the determination of this formal constituent of person, when confronted by the doubt, which he proposed to himself, namely, whether there is only one operation in Christ;[585] for operation follows being, and what belongs to being must be considered before what concerns operation.

Father Mattiussi, S. J.,[586] presents three texts from the works of St. Thomas in proof that he taught the identity between subsistence and existence. But the true gist of these texts is: "Subsistence is said of that whose act is to subsist, as essence is said of that whose act is to exist."[587] Therefore, as existence is really distinct from essence in which it is received, so suppositum and subsistence that formally constitutes suppositum, is distinct from existence.

Another objection. From two acts there does not result per se unity; wherefore prime matter must be pure potency. But essence, subsistence, and existence are three acts.[588] Therefore these three acts cannot result in per se unity.

Reply. I distinguish the major. That there cannot result from two acts a nature one per se, this I concede; that there cannot result a suppositum one per se, this I deny. I concede the minor. Essence, subsistence, and existence are three acts, yet so ordered that one is the terminus of the other. I distinguish the conclusion. Therefore from these three acts there does not result a third per se nature, this I concede; that there does not result a one per se suppositum, this I deny. For when the rational nature is completed by personality, it is constituted a person, to whom existence applies accidentally or contingently. Aristotle distinguished between four modes of per se predication:[589] (1) definition which shows that the nature is one per se; (2) per se predicate that denotes a necessary property; (3) per se predication that declares something is of itself subsisting or a suppositum, which means that it is one per se as a subject, although it may be an essential part and have accidental parts; (4) predication that denotes a cause that is per se, and not per accidens. It must be noted that in a certain article of a Carmelite periodical, personality is something relative and is only reduced to the category of substance.[590] In reply to this, we say that the divine personalities are indeed relative entities, that is, they are subsisting relations, paternity, filiation, passive spiration, whose esse in (or inexistence) is substantial. But either human personality or angelic personality is not a relative entity, but an absolute entity; for it does not imply reference to another person, as paternity does. It is predicated as belonging indirectly to the category of substance, as a substantial mode, whereby an individual nature becomes immediately capable of existence.

Conclusion. Thus in the opinion held by Cajetan there is a legitimate transition from the commonly accepted definition of person, namely, that person is the first subject of attribution in a rational nature, to the philosophical notion of personality. Cajetan so very well says: "If all acknowledge this, then why in scrutinizing the quiddity of the thing signified, do we turn away from the common admission?"[591]

According to this common admission, person is that which exists separately of itself in a rational nature, and personality is that whereby person is formally constituted as a what of itself separately existing, to whom existence is attributed contingently.

Hence the entire opinion of Cajetan reduces itself to what is required on the part of the object, which is the verification of these two judgments admitted by all theologians, namely, the person of Peter exists, but he is not his existence. And just as no created essence is its existence, so no created person, formally constituted as such, by its own personality, is his own existence. Only God is His existence.

Doubt. Does Cajetan consider subsistence or personality to be the intrinsic terminus of substance?

Reply. He certainly does, inasmuch as subsistence is the formal constituent of first substance, or the suppositum, although it does not belong to the notion of nature. Thus subsistence pertains to the substantial order. Father Hugon correctly says: "The metaphysical foundation for this opinion is the radical difference prevailing between what belongs to the existential order and what belongs to the substantial order. This means that no created person is his existence. Likewise the end of motion is what properly terminates it, but it is no longer motion, which has ceased; so also it is subsistence that terminates the nature, but is not the nature; however, it constitutes the first substance, or suppositum. No created person, whether understood denominatively as a singular nature, or formally, that is, with personality, is its existence. The second article of St. Thomas may now be read again, so that this doctrine may be more clearly understood."[592]

Recapitulation. The principal argument in this opinion that is held by very many Thomists is reduced to the following conclusion, as stated above. Something real and positive is required whereby a created and existing subject is what is, which is against Scotus. But this something cannot be either the singular nature, which is related to the subject as constituting it in its species, or existence, which is a contingent predicate of the created subject, which is against other opinions. Therefore some other positive entity is required, namely, personality, which is the ultimate disposition of a singular nature for existence. A substantial mode that would accrue to substance already existing would, indeed, be a contradiction in terms, for it would thus be an accident, which is against Suarez; but there would be no contradiction if it came to substance before it existed.