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State of the question. Some deny that the person of Christ is
composite, such as St. Bonaventure, Durandus, Scotus; and this
for reasons posited by St. Thomas in his objections at the beginning
of this article. He points out: (1) that the person of Christ is
the very person of the Word, who is in Himself most simple, and in
no way composite. (2) Moreover, the divine nature cannot be a part
in Christ, because the part is always less perfect than the whole.
(3) It cannot be said that Christ is composed of two natures,
because thus there would be a composite nature, just as the human
nature is composed of soul and body, and then the Deity would be to
the composite as form, and therefore as part. This would be
Monophysitism.
Reply. The person of Christ is one, but is composed of two
natures.
First proof. It rests on the authority of St. Damascene, who is
quoted in the counterargument of this article. Moreover, the Second
Council of Constantinople corroborates the conclusion stated above,
saying: "The Holy Church of God... confesses that the union of
the Word of God with the flesh was by way of composition, which means
that it was subsistential."[595]
Second proof. The argument is from reason, and there are two parts
to it.
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a) The person of Christ in itself is an absolutely simple uncreated
being, even as the nature of the Word is, and therefore in itself is
in no way composite. Thus Christ is one subsisting being.
b) Nevertheless, this person of Christ subsists in two natures, and
thus He can and must be said to be a composite of two natures.
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First objection. The reply is evident from the argumentative part of
the article.
Reply to second objection. The divine nature, however, is not to be
considered as a part of this composite. For "this composition of a
person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason
of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be
composed of them." Hence Christ is not a composite of parts, but of
extremes that are united. St. Thomas explains this point more fully
elsewhere,[596] remarking that composition may be viewed in two
ways.
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1) It may be considered as the union of parts which causes and
results in the totality of the being, and this union implies
imperfection, inasmuch as the part is an incomplete being, not so
perfect as the whole, and inasmuch as the being of the whole is
dependent on its parts and thus is caused.
2) Composition may be viewed as the union of extremes in some third
entity that communicates being to the extremes. The extreme,
however, prescinds from the notion whether it be a complete or
incomplete being. Thus, for example, seeing terminates in the thing
seen without resulting in any imperfection on the part of the object
seen, on which the seeing depends, but which does not depend on the
seeing. Thus the intellect of the blessed is united to God who is
clearly seen, without involving any imperfection on the part of God.
There is something similar to this in the hypostatic union, but in the
order of being and not merely of operation, since the human nature is
terminated by the absolutely simple person of the divine Word, without
involving any imperfection on the part of the divine person. The
person of the Word is related to the human nature not as informing
act, but as terminating act.
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First corollary. Christ is also a composite of the person of the
Word and the human nature, because He consists of these really
distinct and united. Yet it cannot be said that Christ is a
creature, because created being applies to the person, who is what
is. The person of Christ, however, is uncreated, but in Him the
human nature is something created.
Second corollary. Although Christ is thus composite, He is not
more perfect than the Word not made flesh in this composition, because
the Word is the infinite extreme eminently containing the perfection of
the human nature.
In contrast to this, God is not said to be a composite of persons and
nature, because the divine persons, although united in the same
nature, are not united among one another, but are rather in
opposition, not being united with the nature, because They are simply
identical with the nature. Thus They are not really distinct from the
nature, but They are really distinct from one another by a relation of
opposition.
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