|
This article is both a recapitulation of the preceding articles and the
completion of their definition of the hypostatic union.
State of the question. It seems that this union is accidental, for
whatever accrues to a being after it is complete as an entity, accrues
to it accidentally. Whatever does not pertain to the essence of
anything, is its accident. But the human nature does not pertain to
the divine nature of the Son of God. Therefore the union of the
human nature with the divine nature is accidental.
Reply. It is given about the end of the argumentative part of the
article. St. Thomas says: "The Catholic faith, holding an
intermediate position between Monophysitism and Nestorianism, does
not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or
nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence
or hypostasis."[598]
|
1) Indirect proof. It is drawn from the counterargument, and is
expressed by the following argument. Whatever is predicated
accidentally, is not predicated substantially, but quantitatively or
qualitatively. But the humanity of Christ is not predicated
quantitatively or qualitatively. Therefore it is not predicated
accidentally.
2) Direct proof. It is founded on the arguments defining the faith
on this point, which declare that the union is not natural, which is
against Eutyches, nor accidental, which is against Nestorius, but
is subsistential. The two opinions quoted by the Master of the
Sentences in this article may be included in the error of Nestorius.
The argument may be reduced to the following syllogism.
The union of substantial things that form the composite of one person
is not accidental. But such is the union of the Word incarnate.
Therefore the union is in no way accidental, but substantial, which
means that it is subsistential.
This implies more than the expression "in the person," for even
accidents are in the person to whom they are attributed.[599]
|
|
To
understand this article it must be noted that there are four modes of
per se predication, and that personal union means more than union in
the person, as Cajetan observes.[600]
There are four modes of per se and not per accidens predication, as
Aristotle explains.[601] St. Thomas says in his commentary on
Aristotle: In the first mode of per se predication, definition is
predicated of the subject, for instance, man is per se or essentially
a rational animal.
In the second mode of per se predication a property is predicated of
the subject, for instance, man is risible, or has the power of
laughing, which manifests itself on his countenance as an indication of
intelligence, and this power does not belong either to the angel or to
the irrational animal.
The third mode of per se predication is more the mode that pertains to
existence, and not to predication, since it signifies something that
exists in itself and not in another as in a subject. Thus first
substance, for example, Peter, is per se or in himself existing, in
opposition to accident, and to second substance, for example to
humanity, which is predicated of Peter and is in him.
The fourth mode of per se predication is according to the notion of
causality, when the proper effect is attributed to its proper cause.
Thus the doctor restores to health, that is, he does this inasmuch as
he is a doctor; strangling kills, light illumines. Contrary to
this, it is accidental that the doctor sings.
It is evident that the humanity is united with the Word neither in the
first mode, nor in the second mode, nor in the fourth mode, but in
the third mode, inasmuch as it exists in the Word not per accidens,
but per se,[602] and as Cajetan says,[603] it is united
with the Word not only as in the person or in the hypostasis, as
accidents are so united with substance, but it is united with the Word
hypostatically, which means substantially, according to the third mode
of predication.
Solution of difficulties. Durandus holds that this union is not
predicamentally or physically accidental, because humanity belongs to
the predicamental substance, and not to any of the others. But the
union is predicably or logically accidental, because the predicable
accident is defined as that which can be either present or absent from
its subject of predication, without the corruption of this latter.
But the humanity can be either present or absent from the Word, which
remains unchanged.
The principal objections in scholastic form are the following.
First objection. What accrues to anything after the completion of its
being, accrues to it accidentally. But the human nature accrues to
the Word after the completion of the former as a being. Therefore the
human nature is united with the Word accidentally.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if it is not drawn into the same
personal being, I concede the major; otherwise I deny it. I
contradistinguish the minor: that the human nature is drawn into the
personal being of the Word,[604] this I concede; that it is
not, this I deny.
But I insist. Even though it is drawn into the same personal being,
it is united accidentally. The accident that accrues to any subject is
drawn into the same being of the subject. But the accident is united
with this subject. Therefore the human nature is united with the Word
accidentally.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that it is drawn into the same being
of the suppositum, this I deny; improperly so, I concede; for it
has its own being, but inheres in a subject. It belongs to the being
of accident to inhere. I concede the minor. I distinguish the
conclusion: if the human nature were an accident inhering in the
Word, then I concede the conclusion; otherwise I deny it.
The human nature is truly united with the Word not only in the person
as accidents are, but also substantially inasmuch as it is terminated
by the personality of the Word, and has one personal being or one
existence with it, just as body and soul are so united.
Again I insist. Nevertheless the union is accidental at least
predicably, if not predicamentally as Durandus says.
What is not predicated of a subject per se is a predicable accident.
But the human nature is not predicated per se of the Word.
Therefore the human nature is united with the Word as a predicable
accident.
Reply. I distinguish the major; what is in no way predicated per
se, I concede; what is at least predicated per se in the third mode
or per se as subsisting, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor, and
I deny the consequent and consequence. The humanity of Christ does
not indeed belong to the definition of the Word or of the Second
Person of the Trinity, nor is it a property of the Word, but the
Word subsists in the human nature, and the human nature in the Word.
Finally I insist. Nevertheless, what can be either absent or
present, the subject remaining intact, is united with the subject
accidentally. But the human nature can be absent from the Word,
which remains intact. Therefore the human nature is united with the
Word accidentally.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the subject remaining intact
considered as a composite, this I concede; the subject considered as
a mere subsisting form, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: the
human nature can be absent, the Word remaining intact considered in
Himself, as the eternal person, I concede; considered as the Word
incarnate, I deny.
Thus the body is not united accidentally with the soul, and yet the
body can be separated from the soul, this latter continuing to exist,
though the composite ceases as such. In other words, there can be no
separation of the body from the soul unless there is a cessation of the
composite, and so the union is per se and not per accidens. Similarly
the humanity is united with the Word, although the union between the
two is not essential.
Corollary. Hence the hypostatic union differs from an essential union
that would result in one sole composite nature, such as the union
between body and soul. It also differs from an accidental union. It
is, however, an absolutely unique union of its kind, one that is
subsistential or hypostatic, or a formally personal union, and not
only a material union in the person, for even accidents, which accrue
to man, are united to him materially in the person, but not formally
as constituting the person.
Therefore Christ's human nature in the Word is neither a
predicamental accident, as, for example, the intellectual faculty is
in the rational soul or in the angel, nor a predicable or contingent
accident as, for example, a certain person may be sitting instead of
standing.
Thus is determined the exact meaning of this conciliar expression,
namely, "hypostatic union." We are not concerned here with a
theological conclusion deduced from the dogma, but with a metaphysical
explanation of the dogma. The hypostatic union is not a new truth
concerning the Incarnation, but it is a metaphysical explanation of
this revealed truth.
|
|
