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State of the question. This question is posited, as the preceding
questions are, so as to make it known more clearly in what the mystery
of the Incarnation consists on the part of the person assuming.
The difficulty is that there would be one suppositum for two natures of
the same species, for example, the same divine person would be Peter
and John. Another difficulty is that it could not then be said that
the person incarnate is one man, because He would have two human
natures; nor several men, because several men have distinct
supposita. It is not apparent how these two human natures could be
united to each other, one of these natures being perhaps in one part of
the world, and the other in another part.
Reply. St. Thomas affirms, however, the possibility of such an
assumption.
Indirect proof. It is taken from the counter-argument of this
article, and may be expressed by the following syllogism.
Whatever the Father can do externally, the Son also can do. But
after the Incarnation, the Father can assume a human nature distinct
from that assumed by the Son. Therefore the Son can assume a human
nature distinct from the one He assumed.
Direct proof. This same principle is again invoked, as in the
following syllogism.
The power of a divine person, both as regards the principle in the
assumption and as regards the term of the assumption, is infinite; nor
can it be restricted to what has been created. But a divine person
would be restricted in power if He could assume only one human nature.
Therefore a divine person can assume more than one human nature.
Some have objected that such two human natures would interpenetrate.
Reply. To establish the truth of this conclusion, it is not
necessary for the divine person to assume these two natures in the same
place; for divine immensity makes it possible for any of the divine
persons to assume one of the human natures in Rome, and the other in
some place far away from this city. Such action involves no
absurdity.[677]
Reply to first objection. "There can be a numerical multitude on the
part of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without
distinction of supposita."
Reply to second objection. There would still be one man, and not
several, because there is only one suppositum. In fact, one divine
person could assume many individual human natures, and there would be
no pantheism in this for there would be no confusion of the divine
nature with the human nature; but all these natures would be
impeccable. Toletus gave us a good rule to follow, one that is taken
from the teaching of St. Thomas. He says: "For the
multiplication of concrete substantive names both kinds of multitude are
required, namely, of supposita and of forms; the absence of one
results in unity."[678]
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