|
State of the question. The inquiry concerns human nature as
assumable, not according to its natural passive power nor according to
its obediential power,[687] but according to its
fitness.[688] The more common opinion among theologians affirms
with St. Thomas[689] that according to God's absolute power
any other nature is assumable. The discussion here concerns only its
fitness.
This question is of some importance in determining whether besides the
obediential power there is a fitness attached to the nature, but not
necessarily so, for example, a fitness of assumption in the human
nature rather than in the angelic.
First objection. The difficulty is that God's absolute power is not
limited to one nature; for just as there is no such thing actually as
the best of all possible worlds, so there is no created nature that is
more fitted for the hypostatic union.
Second objection. The difficulty is that also in irrational creatures
there is a trace of God's image.
Third objection. In the angelic nature we find a more perfect
likeness of God than in the human nature, and there is need of
redemption for angels that are sinners.
Fourth objection. Finally the whole universe is more capable of
assumption than the human nature.
Conclusion. It was more fitting, says St. Thomas, for the human
nature to be assumed by the Word, than any other nature.
Authoritative proof. This fittingness is intimated in various
passages of Scripture. Thus the Wisdom of God is represented as
saying: "My delights were to be with the children of
men."[690] Similarly St. Paul writes: "For it became
Him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, who had
brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their
salvation, by His passion.... For nowhere doth He take hold of
the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold. Wherefore it
behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that
He might become a merciful and faithful high priest before God, that
He might be a propitiation for the sins of the people."[691]
Christ had to be both priest and victim because no other victim was
worthy of fulfilling this role.
Theological proof. It may be reduced to the following syllogism.
This greater fitness may be viewed both according to the dignity and
the necessity or need of the assumable nature.
But the human is more worthy than the irrational nature since it can
attain to union with the Word by knowledge and love.[692]
Moreover, it needed reparation, since it was subjected to original
sin, which is not true of the angels, for all did not sin, and those
who did are already confirmed in their sin and incapable of redemption.
Therefore it was more fitting for the human nature than any other
nature to be assumed by the Word. This conclusion must be understood
in the sense given by St. Thomas at the end of the argumentative part
of this article, where he says: "Hence it follows that only human
nature was assumable."
Moreover, as St. Thomas remarks in another of his works,[693]
the human nature is a quasi-compendium of the universe, a microcosm,
inasmuch as it contains within itself being, as in minerals, life as
in the lower forms of living animals, intelligence as in the angels,
although in not so perfect a way.
The solution of the difficulties raised in the objections confirms this
last observation of St. Thomas.
Reply to first objection. Here it is shown that besides the
obediential power, which includes everything that is not in itself
repugnant to reason, there can be a certain fitness or congruity in the
human nature for its being assumed by the Word in the hypostatic
union, a fitness that is not found either in stones, plants, a lamb,
or a dove. Hence St. Thomas says in this reply: "Therefore a
creature is said to be not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything
from the power of God, but in order to show the condition of the
creature which has no capability for this." Therefore this
capability, which is in neither stone nor dove, is not this
obediential power for assumption, which is in either a stone or in any
animal, for example, in the most spotless lamb.
As Cajetan remarks, St. Thomas did not ask whether the Word can
assume the nature of a stone. There is nothing intrinsically
impossible in this according to God's purely absolute power, but
there would be no end or purpose in doing this. Thus God can by His
purely absolute power annihilate the Blessed Virgin Mary, but there
is no reason for doing so on the part of the end in view. Therefore
this is repugnant, if not by God's purely absolute power, at least
by His ordained power, either ordinary or extraordinary.
Yet there is truly in the nature of either a stone, a lamb, or a dove
a non-repugnance or obediential power for the hypostatic union,
although there is no capability in the sense of congruity.
From this reply to the first objection, it seems to follow that the
capability or fitness of our nature to be elevated to the beatific
vision is not this obediential power, which of itself requires nothing
else but a non-repugnance to this elevation, inasmuch as God can do
whatever is not repugnant. In fact, as will be stated farther on,
there is in the most holy soul of Christ the obediential power for a
greater degree of the light of glory.[694] The obediential power
of our intellect is in itself unrestricted, because our intellect by
God's absolute power, can always be raised to a higher degree of the
light of glory, and our will to a higher degree of charity.
There remains this obediential power in the nature of the damned for
being raised to the beatific vision, but it is no longer any
fittingness in them.
Reply to second objection. "The irrational creature which falls
short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to be united
with Him in personal being."
Reply to third objection. Concerning the reply to this third
objection, which must be real, Cajetan observes against Scotus,
that for St. Thomas personality is something positive and real that
is distinct from the individualized nature, for instance, from
Michaelness, because St. Thomas says: "In this way, nothing
pre-existing would be corrupted in it,"[695] if God, by
producing a new angelic nature, were to unite it to Himself.
In this same reply, it is pointed out that the bad angels fell
irreparably, though not indeed absolutely, but according to the way
that is consistent with divine providence, as already explained by
St. Thomas, for, when asking whether the will of the demons is
confirmed in evil, he says: "The angel's free will is flexible to
either opposite before the choice, but not after."[696] This
means that the angel's choice elicited by means of intuitive and
simultaneous knowledge of those things that must be considered in the
object, is irrevocable, and thus it participates in the immutability
of the divine choice, which is both most free and absolutely
immutable. On the contrary, our choice is elicited by means of
abstractive and discursive knowledge, which only gradually acquires the
knowledge of all those things that must be considered. Hence it is
revocable, inasmuch as after the choice we can consider certain new
things not previously considered.[697]
Hence man is capable of redemption, but not the angel. Moreover,
the first man was tempted by the devil and fell, whereas the devil fell
solely by his own will. Hence the human nature is more worthy of
compassion than the nature of the fallen angel.
First doubt. Can an irrational nature, such as that of a lamb or
dove, be united befittingly with the person of the Word?
Reply. Several theologians give an affirmative answer, just as it
was not unbecoming for the Word incarnate to be scourged, spit upon,
and to die. In fact, during the three days of death, the Word
remained hypostatically united to the corpse, not personally, but
subsistentially. But these reasons do not rest on solid grounds, for
the Word was united to the corpse of Christ, only because it was
previously united to His human nature, and, if the Word was scourged
and crucified, this was meritorious for our redemption. Whereas there
is no comparison in the above-mentioned hypothesis, because the dove
and the lamb are incapable of meriting and satisfying.
Second doubt. St. Thomas says in various passages that suppositum
and nature are the same in the angels;[698] yet in his reply
here[699] he holds that the angelic nature is assumable, which
cannot be unless it is distinct from the suppositum.
Reply. Cajetan, Medina, Alvarez, Gonet, and Billuart say that
St. Thomas in the passage cited above[700] means that the
angelic nature is not distinct from its individualizing notes; but he
holds that the angel has its own subsistence or personality that is
distinct from its nature, which it would lose if the angelic nature
were united with the Word. On several occasions St. Thomas says
that there is a difference between what is (suppositum), and being
(existence).[701] For it is manifest that Michael has not only
his nature or Michaelness, but also his being and accidents, such as
successive intellections and volitions.
|
|
