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The Son of God could, indeed, have assumed the human nature created
anew, just as Adam was created.
Reply. The answer is, nevertheless, that it was fitting for the
Son of God to assume the human nature of the stock of Adam, and this
for three reasons: 1. so that He might satisfy for the race that had
sinned; 2. because the conqueror of the devil should come from the
race conquered by the devil; 3. to manifest God's omnipotence
that. raised a weakened and corrupt nature to such virtue and dignity.
God permits evil only for a greater good.
Hence in the Roman Breviary, the Church recites: "That flesh
hath purged, what flesh hath stained."[715] The Scripture
says: "Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed. Is
it not Thou who only art?"[716] Thus there are sinners in
Christ's genealogy, although He is separated from sinners in this
respect.
Reply to first objection. Christ's innocence is the more wonderful
in this, that, although He assumed His nature from a mass tainted by
sin, it was endowed with such purity.
Reply to second objection. It was not fitting for the Word to assume
the particular nature of Adam, who was a sinner; because Christ,
who had come to cleanse all sinners, had to be separated from all who
sinned.
Third objection. The difficulty is this: "If the Son of God
wished to assume human nature from sinners, He ought rather to have
assumed it from the Gentiles than from the stock of Abraham, who was
just."
Reply to third objection. Christ, indeed, had to be like sinners in
His assumed nature, but He also had to be separated from them as
regards sin. Hence it was fitting that between the first sinner and
Christ, some just men should intervene, who were to be in certain
respects conspicuous types of Christ's future holiness, and these
began in Abraham.
But why the Jewish race was chosen in preference to any of the
Gentile nations depends on God's absolute free choice, just as the
predestination of Christ, of His Blessed Mother, of Abraham,
Isaac, Jacob, and the prophets are so dependent. The mystery of
predestination is apparent in the whole course of Jewish history,
since one is chosen in preference to another, for instance, Abel to
Cain, Noe to those who died in the flood, Isaac to another son of
Abraham, Jacob to Esau; and so it is with other descendants. It
must be noted that the merits of the elect are not the cause of their
predestination, because they are its effects. This is especially
evident both as regards Christ's predestination to divine natural
sonship, and the predestination of the Blessed Virgin Mary to divine
maternity.
Supplementary Questions
First doubt. Does the human nature united with the Word still have
an innate desire for its own subsistence?
Reply. The common opinion of the Thomists, especially of Cajetan
and John of St. Thomas, is that it has no such desire as a
reflected act (actus secundus), because it is perfected by a more
perfect subsistence, which contains formally and eminently absolutely
whatever there would be in its own subsistence. Therefore the natural
desire of the assumed human nature rests satisfied in the higher
subsistence.[717]
Second doubt. Can incomplete substances and accidents be assumed
immediately by the Word, such as prime matter, non-subsistent
forms, for instance, the substantial form of bread, or of another
body?
Reply. The query is denied, because these incomplete realities are
intrinsically incapable of having their own subsistences. Thus prime
matter, the substantial form of bread, and accidents cannot be assumed
except mediately, that is, through the mediation of substance, whose
parts they are, or in which they inhere. But the rational soul
separated from the body, which is capable of having its own subsistence
and existence, is assumable.
Corollary. Integral parts of the human body, such as the hand, the
head, feet, so long as they are united to the whole, cannot be
assumed unless the whole is assumed. But if these parts are separated
by death, they can remain united with the Word, because these parts
separated from the whole are capable of having their own subsistence and
existence, distinct from the subsistence and existence of the whole.
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