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WE HAVE seen the progress in revelation on the doctrine
of the sufferings in hell. According to many
theologians it is very probable that only the souls of
obstinate and inveterate sinners go into hell. "The
Lord," says St. Peter, "dealeth patiently for your
sake." [230]
We must first consider the reasons for sufferings after
death, then those for an eternity of pain in hell.
First of all, the justice of God demands that sins
which have not been expiated in this life be punished
in the other. As sovereign Judge of the living and the
dead, God owes it to Himself to render to each one
according to his works. This is often affirmed in
Scripture. [231] Further, as sovereign Legislator,
Ruler, and Remunerator of human society, God must add
to His laws an efficacious sanction.
St. Thomas [232] argues thus: One who rises up unjustly
against justly established order must be repressed by
the ruler, by the same prince, who has given the order,
since he also must watch over its maintenance. Here we
find extended to the moral and social order the natural
law of action and reaction which repairs the damage
caused. He who freely acts against conscience merits
the remorse from that conscience. He who acts against
the social order merits sufferings at the hand of the
magistrate who is guardian of that order. He who acts
against the divine law must be punished by the divine
Legislator. One and the same principle runs through all
these orders.
Plato in one of his most beautiful dialogues, the
Gorgias, says that the greatest evil which could befall
a criminal would be to go unpunished. If he knew his
own happiness he would say to the judges: "I have
committed this crime: inflict on me the punishment I
have merited: only by voluntary acceptance of this pain
can I re-enter into the order of justice which I have
violated." This sublime view is perfectly realized in
the supernatural order, both in the tribunal of penance
and in purgatory, in which souls are happy to pay their
debt to divine justice, to expiate in fullest measure
the wrong they have done.
Thus we explain suffering in the world. But why should
these pains be eternal?
First of all, we admit that this eternity of suffering
cannot be demonstrated apodictically. Why? Because it
is a revealed mystery, a mystery of justice which is
the consequence of a mystery of iniquity, namely, of
mortal sin that remains without repentance. Now the
mysteries of iniquity and wickedness, and their
consequences, are more obscure than the mysteries of
grace. They are obscure, not only to us, but even in
themselves. The mysteries of grace in themselves are
very luminous. They are obscure only by reason of our
feebleness of spirit, which resembles the eye of the
owl in the presence of the sun. On the contrary, the
mysteries of iniquity are obscure in themselves, not
only for us. And final impenitence, of which hell is a
consequence, is the darkest of all mysteries. Just as
we cannot demonstrate apodictically either the
possibility or the existence of the Holy Trinity, of
the redemptive Incarnation, of eternal life, so
similarly we are unable to demonstrate apodictically
the eternity of the sufferings in hell.
Nevertheless, though we cannot give apodictic reasons
for this truth, we can still find reasons of
appropriateness, reasons which are deep and fertile. To
illustrate: the sides of a polygon inscribed in a
circle may be multiplied indefinitely though they never
coalesce with the circumference.
The chief reasons of appropriateness for the eternity
of these sufferings are thus given by St. Thomas. [233]
Mortal sin without repentance is an irreparable
disorder, an offense with an immeasurable gravity. Sin
merits punishment because it upsets an order justly
established. As long as this disorder lasts, the sinner
merits the punishment due to the sin which caused the
disorder. Disorder is irreparable if the vital
principle of order has been violated. The eye cannot be
cured if the principle of sight has been destroyed. No
organism is curable if it has been mortally wounded.
But mortal sin turns man from God, his last end, and
robs him of grace, the principle and germ of eternal
life. Hence the disorder in this case is irreparable,
and must therefore of its nature last forever. By
special mercy God sometimes converts the sinner before
death, but if the sinner resists and dies in final
impenitence, mortal sin remains as a habitual disorder
which can have no end. Hence it merits punishments
which have no end.
A second reason is founded on the nature of mortal sin.
Mortal sin, as offense against God, has a gravity that
is unmeasured, since it denies to God the infinite
dignity of being our last end and our sovereign good,
to whom the sinner prefers a finite good. He loves
himself more than he loves God, though the Most High is
infinitely better than he. [234]
Offense is more grave as the dignity of the offended
person is higher. It is more grave to insult a
magistrate, or a bishop, than to offend the first man
we meet in the street. But the dignity of the sovereign
good is infinite. Mortal sin, which denies to God this
supreme dignity, has therefore a gravity without
limits, which can be repaired only by the love of the
Son of God, the theandric act of a divine incarnate
person. But if the immense benefit, the redemptive
Incarnation, is unrecognized and scorned, as happens in
mortal sin without repentance, then the sinner merits,
for offense of a gravity without measure, also
punishment without measure. This punishment is the
privation of God, of infinite good, a suffering, a
pain, which is itself infinite in its duration. [235]
Anyone with such sin on his soul has definitively
turned away from God, has deprived himself of God
eternally.
As regards the disordered love of finite good preferred
to God, it merits the pain of sense, a pain which is
finite, being the privation of finite good. But,
according to revelation, this pain too will last
eternally, because the sinner is fixed and settled on
this wretched good. He remains captive to his sin, and
judges always according to his evil inclination. He is
like a man who jumps into a well. His act, as foreseen,
is eternal, leaving no hope of escape.
We must add a third reason. We said above that God,
sovereign Legislator, and judge of the living and the
dead, owes it to Himself to give to His laws an
efficacious sanction. God cannot allow Himself to be
scorned with impunity. Now if the pains of hell were
not eternal, the obstinate sinner could persevere in
his revolt, since no adequate sanction would repress
his pride. His rebellion, we may say, would have the
last word, would be the triumph of iniquity. To quote
Father Monsabre: "If we deny to the moral order an
eternity of suffering, we obscure the notion of good
and evil, which becomes clear only under the light of
this dogma." [236]
Finally, if beatitude, the recompense of the just, is
eternal, it is surely right that the suffering due to
obstinate malice should also be eternal. One is the
recompense for merit, the other the punishment for
demerit. As eternal mercy shines forth on one side, so
the splendor of eternal justice shines on the other.
St. Paul says: "What if God willing to show His wrath
(or to avenge His justice) and to make His power known,
endured (or permitted) with much patience vessels of
wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the
riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He
has prepared unto glory?" [237] Since justice, like
mercy, is infinite, each demands to be manifested in a
duration without limit.
Such, then, are the principal reasons of congruity for
this revealed dogma. These arguments differ from an
ordinary argument of probability, which may be false.
Reasons of congruity for a revealed mystery are true,
but they are not apodictic or demonstrative. They tend
toward the truth, which they incline us to admit, but
they do not show it absolutely. Thus a polygon
inscribed in a circle, when its sides are multiplied,
tends continually to identify itself with the
circumference, but never becomes completely identified.
Thus also, sufficient grace, which gives the proximate
power to perform a salutary act, approaches efficacious
grace which makes us do this act, but it is never
identified with it. Thus, too, the certitude of hope is
a certitude of tendency. It approaches the certitude of
salvation, but is never perfectly identified with it,
apart from a special revelation, and apart from the
assurance given by particular judgment to souls in
purgatory. We see by the precision of these terms that
theology is a true branch of knowledge.
Theology reaches sure conclusions, but does not reach
the evidence whereon these conclusions rest. Why?
Because the theologian does not have here on earth
evidence of his principles, that is, of the articles of
faith. His theology is a subalternated branch of
knowledge, subordinated to the knowledge which God has,
just as optics is subalternated to geometry. Only the
theologian who sees God face to face will have evidence
of the principles of theology, and consequently also
evidence on certain conclusions of his science. Thus,
to illustrate, a man who knows optics practically, may
in studying geometry see the evidence for his
conclusions, which were heretofore obscure. Theology is
thus a true science, a true branch of knowledge, but
here below it remains in an imperfect state.
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