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Contrition in general, whether perfect or imperfect, is thus defined
by the Council of Trent: "Inward and dolorous detestation of sin,
with proposal not to sin again." [956] Perfect contrition
proceeds from charity, whereas attrition, imperfect contrition,
exists in a soul which is still in the state of sin. Hence arises a
difficult problem: How can attrition be supernatural, and how is it
related to the love of God?
1. Two extremes are to be avoided: laxism and Jansenism. The
laxists maintained as probable the statement that attrition, if it is
naturally good, united with sacramental absolution, suffices for
justification. [957] The Jansenists, on the contrary, seeing
no medium between cupidity and charity, [958] said that the
attrition which is not accompanied by benevolent love toward God is not
supernatural. [959] In this view, attrition seems to include
an initial act of charity and hence, though it includes the intention
of receiving the sacrament of penance, nevertheless justifies the
penitent before he actually receives absolution.
We are, then, to show that attrition without charity is still good,
that it can be supernatural, and thus suffices for the fruitful
reception of sacramental absolution.
The Thomistic teaching on this point is expounded by Cajetan.
[960] He says [961] that attrition is a contritio
informis, which, by reason of an initial love of God, already
detests sin as an offense against God.
What qualities, then, must attrition have if absolution is to be
fruitful? Is the attrition inspired simply by fear of God's
judgments [962] sufficient? Or must it include also love of
God, and if so, what kind?
First, we must say against the laxists that the attrition which is
only naturally good, [963] but not supernatural, is not
sufficient, even when united with sacramental absolution, because this
act, remaining in the natural order, is neither itself a salutary act
nor even a disposition to supernatural justification. Much less is it
a meritorious act since merit presupposes the state of grace.
Further, it cannot include even the smallest act of charity, since,
if it did, it would justify the penitent even before he receives
absolution.
2. The difficulty lies in finding a middle ground between cupidity
and charity, to use Augustine's terms. Now there is no middle
ground between the state of mortal sin, the state of cupidity, the
unregulated love of self, and the state of grace which is inseparable
from charity. How, then, can we find in a person who is in the state
of mortal sin, an act which is not only naturally good, ethically
good, but also salutary, even though not meritorious?
All theologians admit and the Church has defined that the state of
mortal sin does not prevent the sinner from having "uninformed" acts
of faith and hope, which acts are personally supernatural and
salutary, although not meritorious. Hence attrition also which
presupposes these acts of faith and hope, [964] may also be
salutary without being meritorious.
3. Must we go a step further? Must we admit that this salutary
attrition, which disposes us for sacramental justification, implies
also an initial benevolent love of God, which nevertheless is not an
act of charity, however small? The Thomists above cited say Yes.
That attrition which suffices as disposition for the sacrament of
penance, thus the Salmanticenses, [965] necessarily implies
some love for God, the fountain of justice. And the Council of
Trent, speaking of adults preparing for baptism, after mentioning
their acts of faith, fear, and hope, continues thus: "They begin
to love God as the source of all justice, and thus are moved to hate
and detest their sins." [966] Now it is true that the Council
in another text [967] where it treats of the difference between
attrition and contrition, does not mention this act of love for God as
the author of all justice. The reason probably is that the Council
wishes to leave open a question disputed among theologians, but does
not in any way modify the affirmation cited above. [968] .
Further, the Thomists we have cited add the following theological
argument. Attrition, according to the Council, [969]
contains detestation of the sin committed. Now this detestation of
sin, of an offense against God, can simply not exist without an
initial benevolent love for God as the source of justice. Why not?
Because love is the very first of the acts of the will, and hence must
precede hate or detestation. A man can detest injustice only because
he loves justice, hence he can detest an injury done to God only
because he already loves God as the source of justice. This argument
is solid. Only he can detest a lie who already loves truth. Only he
can detest the evil of sin who loves the good opposed to that evil.
This is surely the thought of St. Thomas, [970] when he says
that penance detests sin as an offense against God supremely lovable.
But, for justification, the sinner must have an act of true penance.
Hence attrition, in the mind of St. Thomas, must include some
initial love of benevolence for God as the author of all justice.
But then, so runs an objection, this initial benevolent love must be
itself an imperfect act of charity, and hence would justify the
penitent before absolution. The Thomists cited reply thus: No,
this initial love of benevolence is not an act of charity, because
charity includes, not merely mutual benevolence between God and man,
but also a convictus a common life with God which exists only by man's
possession of sanctifying and habitual grace, the root of infused
charity. Charity, says St. Thomas, [971] is a friendship
which presupposes, not merely mutual benevolence, but a habitual
convictus, [972] a communion of life. Between two men who,
living far apart, know each other only by hearsay, there can exist a
reciprocal benevolence, but not as yet friendship. Now this common
life between God and man begins only when man receives that
participation in the divine life which we call habitual grace, the root
of charity, the seed-corn of glory. [973] But attrition, as
distinguished from contrition, does not give man the state of grace.
Cajetan's description of attrition is based on a profound study of
St. Thomas. It runs thus: "In the line of contrition comes first
an imperfect contrition (not yet informed by charity) which is
displeasure against sin as the most hateful of things, together with a
proposal to avoid and shun sin as of all things most to be shunned, the
displeasure and the proposal arising from a love of God as of all
things the most lovable." [974] This description tallies with
that initial love of benevolence for God which we gave above from the
Council of Trent. [975] God Himself, by actual grace,
leads us to attrition, to this initial love of Himself, before He
justifies us by sacramental absolution. Sin, as the best Thomists
have ever insisted, is not merely an evil of the soul, but essentially
and primarily an offense against God, and we cannot detest this
offense without an initial love of God as source of all justice,
without that initial love of benevolence which is the previous
disposition for that common life with God which presupposes charity.
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