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[1335] Cf. Acta Apost. Sedis, VI, 383 ff.
[1336] Proponantur veluti tutae normae directivae.
[1337] Can. 1366, § 2.
[1338] Les vingt-quatre theses thomistcs, Paris, Tequi,
1922.
[1339] Ibid.: p. vii.
[1340] P. Guido Mattiussi, S. J.: had written already
in 1917 a work of first importance on this subject: Le XXIV
tesi della filosofia di S. Tommaso d'Aquino approvate dalla
SacraCongreg. degli Studi, Roma.
[1341] Parmenides.
[1342] Heraclitus.
[1343] Real potency of movement, say, for example, in a
billiard ball, is not the mere negation, the mere privation, of
movement, nor even the simple possibility of existence; though the
latter suffices for an act of creation, which does not presuppose any
real subject, any real potency.
[1344] Suarez holds that prime matter, since it is not pure
potentiality, but involves a certain actuality, can exist without
form. This view shows why he likewise maintains that our will is a
virtual act, capable, without divine premotion, of passing to second
act.
Leibnitz substitutes force for real potency, active or passive. In
consequence, passive potency disappears and with it prime matter
Movement too can no longer be explained as a function of intelligible
being, primordially divided into potency and act. Further, force
itself, supposed to explain all else, is a simple object of internal
experience, unattached to being, man's first intelligible notion.
This dynamism of Leibnitz breaks on the principle that activity
presupposes being.
[1345] la, q. 2, a. 3.
[1346] Created person, like created essence, cannot be
formally constituted by what belongs to it only as a contingent
predicate. Now only as a contingent predicate does existence belong to
a created person. Peter of himself is Peter, nothing more. He of
himself is not existence, and in this he differs from God, who alone
is His own existence. To deny the real distinction in creatures, of
person, of suppositum, from existence is to jeopardize also the real
distinction between essence and existence. In every created
substance, says St. Thomas (Cont. Gent.: II, 52): quod
est differs from existence. Quod est is the person, the suppositum.
It is not the essence of Peter, it is Peter himself. Existence,
says St. Thomas again (IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1):
follows person as that which has existence. Now if existence follows
person, it cannot constitute person. Each of the two concepts,
created person and created existence, is a distinct and irreducible
concept.
[1347] Ia, q. 14, a. 1.
[1348] Cf. IIIa, q. 17, a. 2, ad 3.
[1349] See above the words of Benedict XV (note 2).
[1350] "La theologie dogmatique hier et aujourd'hui" in
Nouvelle revue theologique, 1929, p. 810.
[1351] Pascendi and Sacrorum Antistitum.
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