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[1365] See Vocabulaire technique et critique de la
philosophie, revised by the members of the Societe francaise de
philosophie, 1926.
[1366] Methode, 1, 7.
[1367] See note I.
[1368] Bulletin de le Societe francaise de philosophie,
session of May 7, 1908, p. 294.
[1369] See Vocabulaire technique...: s. v.
Pragmatisme, p. 611.
[1370] Dogme et critique, p. 25.
[1371] Denz.: no. 2026.
[1372] De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10;
la, q. 16, a. 1.
[1373] Denz.: no. 2080.
[1374] "Point de depart de la recherche philosophique" in
Annales de philosophie chretienne, June 15, 1906, p.
235.
[1375] J. de Tonquedec, in his book Immanence, 1913,
pp. 27-59, shows the limitless consequences, unforeseen by its
author, of the new definitions. Here is one sentence from
Tonquedec: "It will no longer be possible to demonstrate by argument
(independently o action) the existence of God or the reality of the
supernatural or the fact of divine intervention" (p. 28).
[1376] Denz, no. 2058.
[1377] This reproach addressed to the philosophy of action was
expressed already in 1896 by our teacher, Father Schwalm, O.
P.: in Rev. thom.: 1896, pp. 36 ff.: 413;
1897, pp. 62 239, 627, 1898, p. 578. We
ourselves expressed the same view (in the same review, 1913, pp.
351-71.
[1378] La science et l'hypothese, pp. 112-19.
[1379] See our book, Dieu, 5th ed.: p. 778
[1380] Being is being, non-being is non-being, or, being
is not non-being.
[1381] Everything that exists has its raison d'etre,
intrinsic or extrinsic.
[1382] Every contingent being depends on an efficient cause.
[1383] Every agent, including natural agents not endowed with
cognition, acts for an end.
[1384] Rom. 8:16.
[1385] IIa Ilae, q. 8, a. 1, 2, q. 45, a. 2.
[1386] This conception, that theology is nothing but a
spirituality which has developed its own regimen of intelligibility,
comes in great measure from John Moehler, in particular from his
book, Die Einheit in der Kirche, oder das Princip des
Katholizismus (Tubingen, 1825). This book would call for a
critical and theological study to correct its deviations. It reduces
faith to religious experience. Cf. Dict. theol. cath.: s. v.
Moehler, cols. 2057ff.
[1387] la IIae, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.
[1388] Ethica, VI, 2.
[1389] la IIae, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.
[1390] Ethica, VI, 2.
[1391] In the corpus he had argued: Goodness in the will,
speaking properly, depends onthe object aimed at by the will. Now the
will's object is proposed to it by the reason. Hence goodness in the
will depends on the reason, just as it depends on its object.
[1392] Denz.: no. 2058.
[1393] See note 10.
[1394] L'Etre and les etres, 1935, p. 415.
[1395] Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 6: In truths to which the
intellect assents naturally, in first principles, we cannot choose
between assent or dissent, but our necessary assent is a work of
nature.
[1396] Ibid.: ad I, 2.
[1397] La science et la religion, 1908, p. 290.
[1398] Cf. De veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
[1399] We hold that St. Thomas would see, in this
replacement of the traditional definition of truth by the pragmatic
definition, an insensate enterprise, an unlimited imprudence, fated
to destroy all truth, even that of prudent judgment, which presuppose
a higher truth.
We speak thus to young seminarians, who, fearing not to be up to
date, prefer the doctrine of Maurice M. Blondel, or even that of
Henri Bergson, to the doctrine of St. Thomas. Now it is easy,
without being a prophet, to foresee that a hundred years hence Henri
Bergson will be forgotten, whereas St. Thomas, like St.
Augustine, will live forever.
Bergson, we admit, the author of Matiere et memoire and of Donnees
immediates de la conscience, has indeed liberated many minds from
materialism and mechanism, but his book, L'evolution creatrice, has
drawn many others away from higher certitudes, especially during the
epoch of modernism. I seem to hear him still, as, in
1904-1905, at the College de France, he was explaining
Book XII of Aristotle's Metaphysics. His commentary on
Aristotle's proofs for God's existence ran thus: "Gentlemen, it
is astounding that Aristotle seeks to explain motion by aught else than
itself, whereas for us motion explains everything else. "
These words say, equivalently, that what is in process of becoming is
more than what is, more even than He who eternally is being itself.
To compare Bergson with Aquinas is to compare a pretty villa with a
Gothic cathedral. Surely it has been justly said, "Anyone not
informed by ancient learning can never read such works without
danger."
[1400] Rev. de met. et de mor.: July, 1907, pp.
448 f.
[1401] Cf. Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 7th ed.:
pp. 133 ff.: 156 ff.: where we examine the theories of
Bergson and Le Roy.
[1402] These positions return to that of Nicholas
d'Outrecourt, who held that all first principles are merely
probable. As one example of many who agree with us, see M. J.
Maritain, Reflexions sur l'intelligence, 1924, chap. 3,
pp. 78-141. See also p. Descoqs, Praelect. theol.
naturalis, 1932, 11, 287ff. ; 1, 150. P. Descoqs
quotes a long passage from Archambault, one of the most faithful of
Blondel's disciples, and compares it with a proposition condemned by
the Holy Office in 1924.
[1403] Cursus philos.: II, 341.
[1404] Philosophers are often better than their philosophy.
Hume, to escape from his skepticism, would play billiards. Stuart
Mill, to escape empiricism, would assume the viewpoint of religion.
Beneath the philosopher, or rather above, is the man, the
Christian. But the question remains: Does not his philosophy lead
men away from wisdom rather than toward it? The Church thus
questioned the philosophy of that holy priest whom we call Antonio
Rosmini.
[1405] Acta Acad. rom. S. Thomae, p. 51.
[1406] Ibid.: pp. 174-78.
[1407] Conformity of mind with life must replace the abstract
and chimerical conformity of intellect with reality (Annales phil.
chre't.: 1906, p. 235). Metaphysics has its essence in
the acting will. It reaches truth only under this experimental point
of view. It is the science of what is to be rather than of what is
(L'Action, 1893, p. 297).
Accord of thought with reality must be replaced by immanent conformity
of ourselves with ourselves (L'illusion idealiste, 1898, pp.
12, 17).
[1408] We quoted his retraction in Acta. Acad.: 1935,
p. 54.
[1409] La pensee, 1, 39, 130, 131, 136,
347, 355.
[1410] Ibid.: II, 39, 65, 67, go, 96,
196.
[1411] See the condemned propositions of Nicholas
d'Outrecourt (Denz.: nos. 553 f.: 558 567, 570).
See also the propositions condemned by the Holy Office (December,
1924): in Monitore ecclesiastico, 1925, p. 194, in
Documentation catholique, 1925, I, 771 ff.: and in
Descoqs, Praelect. theol. nat.: 1932, I, 150, 11,
287 ff.
[1412] We have, we may add, always admitted, as valid proof
of God's existence, man's desire for happiness (see la IIae, q.
2, a. 8). But this proof presupposes the ontological validity of
the principle of finality; every agent, and in a special manner the
rational agent, acts for a purpose.
[1413] Cf. Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.
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