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State of the question. As we see from the first
difficulty, the title asks whether it is an article of
faith or a preamble of faith that the world had a
beginning. A preamble of faith is a demonstrable
conclusion, as for instance that God is the efficient
cause of all being and thus the Creator; such a preamble
of faith can be demonstrated. An article of faith differs
from a preamble of faith, for, as St. Thomas says,
"Where something is found not seen by a special reason,
there we have a special article (of faith)."[877]
"Thus there are twelve articles of faith (or according
to another listing, fourteen) and among these is the
article on creation: 'I believe in one God the Father
almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.'"[878]
The question is, then, whether it is repugnant that God
created the world from all eternity, in the sense that
God would precede the existence of the world by a priority
only of nature and causality and not by a priority of
duration, just as if a foot were on the sand from all
eternity it would precede the footprint not by duration but
by causality.
This question should be proposed with a restriction:
whether some creature, at least one that is permanent and
immobile like an angel, could be created from eternity
even though movement and time must have a beginning.
St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, and Petavius and many
more recent writers hold that eternal creation is
repugnant; St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Capreolus,
Francis Sylvester (Ferrariensis), Cajetan,
Suarez, and almost all Thomists and Scholastics hold
that it is not repugnant.
The question is not of great importance, although it is
important to show that the proofs for the existence of
God, in particular St. Thomas' five proofs, are
still valid even though the world was from all eternity.
Of the difficulties proposed at the beginning of the
article the sixth and seventh are the most important:
"If the world was always, an infinite number of days
would have preceded this day. But the infinite cannot be
crossed. Therefore this day would never have arrived."
"If the world were eternal, man would be generated by
another and so to infinity, and thus there would be an
infinite succession of subordinate efficient causes, and
therefore it would be impossible to demonstrate the
existence of the first cause." Moreover, according to
the eighth difficulty, there would now be an infinite
multitude of the souls of the deceased.
Reply. The reply is that it is an article of faith and
not a demonstrable conclusion that the world began.
1. Proof from authority. That God is the Creator,
in the sense that "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth" is an article of faith in the proper sense.
But articles of faith are distinguished from the preambles
of faith by the fact that they cannot be demonstrated.
With regard to creation natural reason can prove that all
things outside of God are from God, and from this it
follows that God produced these things from
nothing.[879] It can also be proved that God
created most freely and not from a necessity of nature.
But, according to St. Thomas, we know only by faith
that God did not create the world from eternity. The
idea of creation contains three truths: 1. God created
the universe from nothing, 2. most freely, 3. and not
from eternity. The third truth is not demonstrable.
Objection. But this is not a supernatural mystery and
therefore it can be known by reason alone.
Reply. This is not a mystery because the matter is
essentially supernatural, I concede; but it is a mystery
because of the contingency of the matter, like a future
contingent of the natural order. This is, however, a
past contingent.
2. Proof from reason. The conclusion which we wish to
prove is that it is impossible to demonstrate that the
world began.
The beginning of the world cannot be proved except on the
part of the world or on the part of God. But in neither
way can it be demonstrated. Therefore it is entirely
indemonstrable.
Proof of the first part of the minor: the beginning of
the world cannot be proved on the part of the world.
The principle of demonstration is the definition of the
thing. But the definition of any created thing abstracts
from here and now. Therefore the beginning of the world
is indemonstrable on the part of the world.
Objection. The definition of the thing is the principle
of the "a priori" demonstration from the
properties of the thing. But besides this there is a
demonstration "a posteriori". Hence perhaps the
beginning of the world can be demonstrated "a
posteriori".
Reply. If the world could not be from eternity, its
beginning would be a property and could therefore be
demonstrated from the definition of the world or of the
things in the world. In other words, the beginning of
the world, like the end of the world, is a contingent
fact not included in the definition of the world, and it
cannot be known except by experience, that is, "a
posteriori" and not as the existence of the cause is
demonstrated by the effect.
I insist. If the universals are always and everywhere,
it is necessary that individuals be not always and
everywhere. But the world is composed of particulars and
individuals. Therefore the world could not be always.
Reply. The universals are always and everywhere
negatively inasmuch as they abstract from here and now.
Thus individuals cannot be always negatively because they
do not abstract from here and now but are positively here
and now. But it does not follow that they cannot be
always positively. If the movement of the heavens was
from eternity it would always be true to say that the
heavens are in motion.
I insist. The beginning of the world can at least be
proved "a posteriori" by the law of the
diminution of energy, according to which the energy of the
world is qualitatively diminished, as, for instance, the
heat produced by local motion cannot in turn produce an
equal amount of local motion. Hence the world is tending
to a state of immobility and frigidity.
Reply. God could renew the physical energy of the world
as He daily renews the spiritual energy of the world by
creating souls. Moreover, even if this demonstration
were valid it would prove at most the beginning of motion
and not the beginning of a permanent and immobile creature
such as the substance of the angel.
Proof of the second part of the minor, namely, the
beginning of the world cannot be proved on the part of
God, the cause.
The most free will of God when it is not manifested in
act cannot be investigated by our reason. But God most
freely created the world and at a time when He most freely
willed. Therefore the beginning of the world, depending
in this way on God's free will, cannot be demonstrated
and can be known only by faith.
The major is clear. The free will of God can be
manifested by a fact, for example, when the end of the
world comes. This fact will make known God's free will
about the end of the world. But in the first part of the
article it was said that the beginning of the world is not
made manifest either in the definition of the world or by
any fact. Hence by reason of the contingency and not of
the supernatural character of the matter the free will
cannot be investigated. Hence it is that we cannot know
with any certainty contingent futures, which depend on
God's free will.
The minor is certain from what we have said
earlier:[880] God operates most freely "ad
extra", not by a necessity of nature, or a necessity
of wisdom, whatever Leibnitz says, because the infinite
goodness of God exists without creatures, and God's
perfection is not increased by creatures.
From what he says at the end of the article, we see that
at the time of St. Thomas many believed there could be a
demonstration of this matter, and some thought that the
demonstrations of the existence of God depended on a
non-eternal world. St. Thomas, however, understood
that the position of the Averroists on the eternity of the
world was against faith and not against reason, at least
if it is admitted that the being of things depends
efficiently on God.
Reply to first difficulty. If creation were from
eternity, God would have a priority only of nature and
causality but not of time with reference to the world,
just as in the case of the foot which is impressed on the
sand always, as St. Augustine says.[881]
Reply to second difficulty. It would still be true to
say that God created the world from nothing, that is,
from no presupposed subject, although creation would not
be after nothing.[882]
Reply to fourth difficulty. Those who admit the eternity
of the world must perpetually look for new sciences and new
civilizations, that is, the civilization which appears to
be primitive is perhaps not the first of all, and if the
world is from eternity we cannot determine the first race,
or the first movement of the sun, or the first day.
Reply to fifth difficulty. If the world were always it
would not be equal to God in eternity because in the life
of the world there would be a succession and the existence
of the world would not be entirely at the same moment.
Reply to sixth difficulty. There would not be a first
day or a first movement of the sun. In the "Contra
Gentes" St. Thomas says that this argument is not
cogent: "if the world were always there would not be a
first movement of the sun and thus not transition (from
the first day to today because such transition always
requires the two extremes)."[883]
I insist. It would then follow that a new day would be
added to infinity.
Reply. To the prior part of the infinite an addition can
be made from the posterior part of infinity, and thus time
would be longer under the finite aspect, that is, in the
posterior part although it is infinite in the prior part.
I insist. But this multitude of days would be an
infinite number, which is repugnant.
Reply. It would be an innumerable multitude but not a
number, for number adds to the multitude a determined
relation to unity inasmuch as numbers begin with the first
one. Hence an infinite number is repugnant but not an
innumerable multitude, as would be the multitude of acts
of the intellect and will of a separated soul in the future
without end.
I insist. If there were no first day, or second, or
third, there would be no actual day.
Reply. I concede the antecedent: if there were no first
day, there would be no second or third. I deny the
consequence: because it is not necessary that the
multitude of days past be numerable or numerated. In
Aristotle's hypothesis there would be an innumerable
multitude. As St. Thomas says: "Number adds to
multitude the idea of mensuration, for a number is a
multitude measured by one."[884] Hence it is
conceded in Aristotle's hypothesis that there would not
be a first day, or a second, etc., namely, because
there could not be a progressive numeration of days but
only a regressive numeration, going back to the most
ancient times and never arriving at the most ancient day.
Such was St. Thomas' reply to the sixth difficulty.
Eternity, whose now is always stable and not fluent,
would be to infinite time in its prior part as the apex of
the cone is to the circular base of the cone, which is
continually described as without beginning or end; in the
apex there is but one point whereas in the circle of the
base there is a perpetual succession.
I insist. But if time were from eternity, the infinite
and innumerable multitude of hours would be much greater
than the infinite multitude of days. But one infinite
multitude cannot be greater than another equally infinite.
Reply. I distinguish the minor: the infinite multitude
cannot be greater considered as infinite, I concede;
considered as finite, I deny. Thus to the infinite
multitude in its anterior part there can be an addition
from the posterior part and thus it is greater considered
as finite.
Reply to seventh difficulty. There cannot be an infinite
process of efficient causes that are subordinate "per
se", but there seems to be no repugnance in an
infinite process of causes subordinate "per
accidens" in which the causality of the posterior does
not depend on the causality of the antecedent, for
example, "it happens that this man who generates is
generated by another, but he generates inasmuch as he is a
man and not inasmuch as he is the son of another man."
Reply to eighth difficulty. It is objected the souls of
the dead would constitute an infinite multitude in act.
Algazel replies that this would be infinite only "per
accidens" and only with regard to the posterior part.
St. Thomas refuted this objection earlier,[885]
remarking that "every multitude must be in some species of
multitude," but it is disputed whether his refutation is
apodictical since St. Thomas himself says that this
argument is only probable because an innumerable multitude
does not seem to be repugnant.[886] On another
occasion St. Thomas wrote, "It has not yet been
demonstrated that God cannot make infinite things in
act,"[887] and "To make something infinite or
infinite things in act is not repugnant to the absolute
divine omnipotence."[888] At the end of the reply
to the eighth difficulty St. Thomas notes that, even
though human generations cannot be from eternity, it does
not follow that the physical world cannot be from eternity
and that the series of brute generations had a beginning.
Last objection. If a thing is created, we must be able
to say that at some time it is created. But that which
does not have a principle of duration cannot be said to be
created at some particular time.
Reply. In this case it would be true to say that the
world is created always, just as if the foot were on the
sand from eternity, it would be true to say that the
footprint was always imprinted.
I insist. But then there would be no difference between
creation and conservation, for creation is the first
production of a thing and conservation is the continuation
of that production. That is to say, creation must take
place in some instant.
Reply. The concept of creation from eternity is
difficult because we conceive a divine action analogously
to created action, which has a beginning. Nevertheless
I deny the inference and distinguish in this way:
creation in time is the first production of a thing, I
concede; creation from eternity, I deny. Actually
creation and conservation are one single act which is
called creation inasmuch as it confers being, and is
called conservation inasmuch as it continues that being
either in finite or infinite duration. This distinction
remains even if creation were from eternity. Although
this cannot be represented to the imagination, it does not
seem to involve any repugnance, just as in the example of
the foot on the sand from eternity. It is therefore at
least probable that the world could be from eternity.
Doubt. Is this theory more probable with regard to
permanent beings, like the angel, the rational soul, a
stone, the sky, than with regard to successive things
which consist in a certain flux, like movement and time?
Many Thomists, among them John of St. Thomas and
Billuart, say that this theory is more probable with
regard to permanent beings, and that it is probable that
the world could not be from eternity with regard to
successive beings, like movement and time, although
Aristotle thought that movement and time were from
eternity.
According to these Thomists the second part of the
argument is not apodictical, and to many others it does
not seem to be more probable. They say that if the
movement of heavenly bodies were from eternity it would
perdure in an infinite duration without the flux of the
earlier part that ceases and the later part that begins,
and therefore this movement would at the same time be
something permanent and something successive, which is
impossible. Other Thomists, like Cajetan,
Capreolus, Ferrariensis, and the Salmanticenses,
concede the possibility of movement from eternity.
Reply. If the movement of the heavenly bodies were from
eternity, there would be no first circular movement of the
sun, as St. Thomas says earlier, and the movement
would always have been something successive, that is,
always in the flux of the earlier part that ceases and the
later part that begins. The movement, therefore, would
not be successive and permanent under the same aspect; it
would be successive with regard to the parts that ceased
and permanent with regard to the whole. It is sufficient
to note that if movement had no beginning, there would be
in movement no part that was the first of all, for
example, there would be no first movement of the sun.
Moreover, St. Thomas holds that it is not repugnant
for the world to be from eternity in the same way as
Aristotle, and Aristotle held that the world was from
eternity even with regard to successive beings.
Finally if the angel were created from eternity, he would
have no first cogitation. At least this cannot be
demonstrated to be impossible. If it is probable that
time should have a beginning, this is because it seems
that creation, as distinct from conservation, ought to
take place in some instant which is the beginning of time.
But our explicit distinction between creation and
conservation can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to
creation from eternity.
This problem appears again in Kant's writings. Kant
presents the first antinomy, whose thesis is: the world
began in time and is limited in space, and the antithesis
is: the world is infinite in time and space.
In the thesis it is proved that the world began because,
as Kant says, it is repugnant that an infinite series of
days should be terminated now by the present day. We
reply that if this series were infinite in its anterior and
posterior part it would be repugnant, but if the series is
infinite only in the anterior part, it would not be
repugnant.
Kant demonstrates the antithesis as follows: If the
world began, it was preceded by vacant time and there is
no reason why the world should begin now rather than
earlier or later. St. Thomas would have replied: the
world began at that moment determined by God's free
will. From his antinomies Kant concluded that
metaphysics was impossible and that time and space are e
priori forms of sensible knowledge and that causality is an
"a priori" form of our intellects.
Hence St. Thomas would have said there is no antinomy
because an antinomy is a contradiction whose two parts are
proved apodictically, and thus metaphysics is impossible.
But actually neither part is proved because this matter
depends on God's free will, and God could, if He
wished, create the world from eternity just as He created
it in time.
The second antinomy concerns the substance composed of
simple parts or parts divided in infinity; but a continuum
cannot be constituted by indivisible points. The reply is
that the continuum is divisible in infinity but not divided
in infinity.
The third antinomy concerns free will in the sense that
free choice is against the principle that the same cause in
the same circumstances produces the same effect. Reply:
the same cause determined to one effect, I concede; not
determined to one effect, I deny.
The fourth antinomy concerns the existence of the first
cause. Kant says that if God began to act He would be
measured by time. Reply: an eternal action produces its
effect in time whenever it wills.
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