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State of the question. According to revelation expressed
in the Scriptures and divine tradition there is a third
divine person, who is often called the Holy Ghost, as
in the formula of baptism, and sometimes the Paraclete
from the words para and kaleo, parakletos that is,
advocate, intercessor, and consoler. As we see, this
is not a simple divine operation, like essential love,
but a person to whom are attributed divine operations and
divine perfection according to our Lord's words: "And
I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another
Paraclete" (John 14:16), and "The Spirit of
truth, who proceedeth from the Father, He shall give
testimony of Me" (John 15:26).
In this article St. Thomas makes a conceptual analysis
of this second procession. In stating the question he
proposes three difficulties: 1. If a second procession
is found in God, why not a third and so to infinity?
2. In every nature we find only one mode of
communicating that nature, namely, generation. 3. The
procession of love cannot be distinguished from the
intellectual procession even in God because in God the
will is not different from the intellect.
Reply. The reply is nevertheless that it is of faith
that "besides the procession of the Word there is another
procession in God," and we add that this is the
procession of love, although this does not appear to be of
faith but the common opinion.
1. This first part is proved from the Scriptures: "I
will ask the Father, and He shall give you another
Paraclete" (John 14:16); and "But when the
Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the
Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the
Father, He shall give testimony of Me" (John
15:26).
2. The second procession is explained theologically.
In God procession takes place according to immanent and
not transient action. But in an intellectual nature
immanent action is twofold: intellection and volition, or
love. Therefore, in God, an intellectual agent, it is
proper that besides the intellectual procession there be
another procession, which is the procession of love.
First doubt. Did St. Thomas intend to demonstrate the
existence of the second procession strictly from the
first? Even if the second procession were not revealed
and if the existence of the Holy Ghost were not
revealed, could the second procession be certainly known
by a theological process.
Reply. This does not seem to have been St. Thomas'
intention, although he uses the words, "In evidence of
this." According to his custom, whenever he was
treating of essentially supernatural mysteries, St.
Thomas wished to show that the mystery is not opposed to
reason. He then offers reasons of propriety, which while
they are profound, especially to those who contemplate the
mystery, are not demonstrative, for this progressive
contemplation does not lead to the evidence of
demonstration but to the higher evidence of the beatific
vision. Such reasons of propriety belong to a sphere that
is above demonstrability. If we were to offer these
reasons as demonstrative, we would minimize rather than
appreciate their force. His argumentation, therefore,
does not strictly prove that there is a second procession
or that there is the existence of a third person, unless
this were revealed.
We may ask, on the supposition that the existence of the
third person and of the second procession are revealed,
can we strictly prove that this second procession is the
procession of love, because it is at least theologically
certain that the first procession is after the manner of
intellection? The argument could be supported with some
difficulty because it is less certain that love has an
immanent term than that intellection or enunciation has as
its term the expressed word.
The immanent term of love is exceedingly mysterious, for
love tends toward the good which is in things outside the
mind, whereas the intellect tends to the truth, which is
formally in the mind in the likeness of the extramental
thing.
In an article entitled "A propos de la procession
d'amour en Dieu",[181] which agrees with
Father Chevalier,[182] Penido proposes this
correction of St. Thomas' text in "De
veritate": "The operation of the will terminates
with things in which there is good and evil, but the
operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in
which there are truth and falsehood, as we read in
"VI Metaph.", chap. 8; and therefore the
will does not have anything proceeding from itself that is
in it, except after the manner of operation; but the
intellect has something in itself that proceeds from it not
only after the manner of operation but also after the
manner of a thing accomplished. Therefore 'the word'
signifies a thing that proceeds but 'love' signifies an
operation that proceeds."[183] In many editions the
word "except" is omitted and the passage appears
unintelligible. In the "Contra
Gentes",[184] St. Thomas says: "That
which is loved is in the will of the lover (not in the
likeness of its species), but as the term of motion in
the proportionate moving principle." That which is loved
exists in the will of the lover as something that inclines
and in a way interiorly impels the lover toward the thing
itself that is loved.
It should be said, therefore, that the argument proposed
in this article is at least an argument of propriety,
explaining the nature of the second procession as the
procession of love. This argument is very profound and
sublime; it shows that the psychological theory of the
Trinity proposed by St. Augustine is in accord with
revelation. When we speak of the Word, however,
revelation itself indicates the analogy in the prologue of
St. John, "In the beginning was the Word...."
But with regard to the second procession we do not find in
Scripture a similar indication; the Holy Ghost is not
called love even by the Greek Fathers. He is indeed
called sweetness and benignity, and the word "spirit"
has an allusion to the will. At the present time it is
the common opinion that the Holy Ghost proceeds as
personal love.[185]
Second doubt. What is the relation of the Holy Ghost
to this second procession?
Reply. The Holy Ghost is the terminus of the
procession of love as the Word is the terminus of the
intellectual procession. Therefore St. Thomas, in the
body of the article, says: "In the second procession
that which is loved is in the lover, as in the conception
of the Word the thing enunciated or understood is in him
who understands."
The terminus of love has no special name. Cajetan offers
the following explanation. "What is loved is not in the
lover except as the affection of the lover for that which
is loved." We have a certain difference here between
intellection and love, for a likeness of that which is
loved is not produced in the lover like the likeness of the
thing understood which is produced in him who understands.
In the lover, however, there is a certain impulse and
propensity of the will toward that which is loved, and
this impulse is in the lover as the unnamed terminus of
love. St. Augustine said, "My love is my weight."
In this sense the second procession is to be understood as
the procession of love.[186]
Solution of the objections. The first objection is:
Therefore we must admit a third procession and so to
infinity.
Reply. In the divine processions it is not necessary to
go on to infinity, for that procession in intellectual
natures which is within is terminated by the procession of
the will. Here the psychological theory is in accord with
revelation and corroborates it. This theory assigns a
reason why there are no more and no less than two
processions, and thus offers a reason of propriety, not a
demonstration, because we are dealing with an essentially
supernatural mystery. That this is not a strict
demonstration will appear in the second objection.
Second objection. In every nature we find only one mode
of communicating that nature, namely, by generation.
Therefore in the divine nature there should be but one
mode of communicating the divine nature, that is, by
intellection and not by the will.
Reply. We deny the parity between the nature of
corruptible things and the divine nature. The disparity
arises from the fact that whatever is in God is God, and
this is not true of other natures. Therefore the divine
nature is communicated by any procession that is not
"ad extra". Hence the divine nature is
communicated even in the procession of love, because
whatever is in God is God and not a part of God.
In his reply, based on faith, St. Thomas shows that
the objection has no force, but he did not intend to prove
the second procession from the first so that the second
procession would be certain even if it had not been
revealed.
I insist. The entire nature is adequately communicated
by the first procession, and therefore it is no longer
communicable. As there is only one Word, so there
should be but one procession.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the entire
nature is totally communicated in the first procession,
that is, in every way that it is communicable, I deny or
I ask you to prove it: that it is communicated entire but
not totally, that is, in every communicable manner, I
concede. For according to revelation we know that not
only the Son but the Holy Ghost also proceeds from the
Father. According to St. Augustine's theory it
appears that the divine nature is communicable and fecund
in two ways: by the intellect and by love. Indeed,
Richard of St. Victor emphasized this second way to
such an extent that he seemed to neglect the first mode by
intellection. Neither should be neglected.
I insist. Whatever is infinite is unique and excludes
all else. But the first procession is infinite.
Therefore it excludes a second procession.
Reply. I distinguish the major: whatever is infinite is
unique in its own order and excludes others of the same
order, I concede; that it excludes things of another
order, I deny. Thus the mercy of God is infinite and
excludes another infinite mercy, but it does not exclude
infinite justice. The same is true of the processions.
Third objection. In God intellect and will are not
distinct. Therefore neither is the procession of love
distinct from the intellectual procession.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that the intellect
and the will in God are not really distinct, I concede;
that they are not distinct by reason and virtually, I
deny; and I distinguish the consequent in the same way.
The two processions are not really distinct except with
regard to the mutually opposed relations. Thus active
spiration is not really distinct from the active generation
by the Father, nor from the passive generation of the
Son, but it is distinct from the passive spiration of the
Holy Ghost.
Moreover, as St. Thomas notes in the same place,
"While in God the will and intellect are not different,
nevertheless because of the nature of the intellect and
will the processions according to the action of each follow
a certain order." For nothing is loved unless known
beforehand, and therefore there is no procession of love
unless there is a process of intellection. Here again we
see the propriety of the psychological theory, and an
indication that an image of the Trinity is to be found in
the soul.
Third doubt. Whether the two divine processions differ
in species and number?
Reply. There is a quasi-difference in species, that
is, they differ not only in number, otherwise both
processions would be generation or spiration. They do
not, however, differ in the proper sense in species
because in God genus and species do not exist in the
strict sense. Speaking analogically with reference to
creatures, we can say that the processions differ in a
certain sense according to species, not by reason of a
diversity of natures but by reason of the personal
properties, which are diverse in the one nature. This is
not true of creatures. It does not follow from this that
the three persons differ in species, for their nature is
one not only in species but also in number.
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