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[982] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 15
[983] ibid., q. 5, 6
[984] cf. Denz., nos. 58, 62, 85, 223,
271, 705, 1461
[985] cf. Enneades, I, 8, 3; III, 6, 7,
14f
[986] cf. De civitate Dei, Bk. IX, chap. 10;
Bk. X, chap. 29; Bk. XIV, chaps. 3, 5 f.
[987] cf. De natura boni, PL, XLII, 18
[988] cf. Enchiridion, PL, XL, 10-12
[989] Ibid., col. II
[990] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, a. 3 ad 1.
[991] cf St. Thomas, Expositio in Dionysium de
divinis nominibus, chap. 4, lect. 13-22
[992] ibid., lect. 13
[993] ibid., lect. 17
[994] ibid., lect. 18
[995] ibid., lect. 20
[996] Ibid., lect. 21
[997] ibid
[998] cf. Renouvier, Histoire et solution des probl.
metaphysiques, p. 164.
[999] cf. Montaigne, Essais, II, 12, "Notre
bienetre n'est que la privation d'etre mal." cf.
Cicero, De finibus, I, II.
[1000] On the other hand some philosophers denied the
existence of evil, whether moral or physical. Thus
Socrates and Plato, when they reduced virtue to the
knowledge of good, reduced moral evil to ignorance or
error, as if malice did not properly exist.
The Stoics held that death, sickness, and poverty are
indifferent things and not evil. In his determinism,
Spinoza denied the existence of both moral good and moral
evil. He reduced moral evil to foolishness and held that
the fool is not obliged to observe the law of reason, of
which he is ignorant.
So also with regard to the distinction between moral good
and moral evil, contradictory opinions have been
proposed. Some have denied the distinction by confusing
the real good with the apparent good. In antiquity as
well as in modern times the hedonists and utilitarians have
reduced the honorable good to that which is delightful or
useful. Luther did the same thing in his theory of
extrinsic justification by fiducial faith without good
works; for Luther the just man was still unjust.
Similar theories were held by the quietists, who denied
the necessity of asceticism, by Rousseau, many of the
Romanticists, and by the revolutionaries, who idealized
violence and destruction.
On the other hand, those who defend what they call order
against violence admit an absolute distinction between good
and evil, but sometimes order for them represents not only
the order based on the nature of things but also that
traditional order which suits their purposes, and in this
way they shut their eyes to the needs of the poor.
[1001] St. Thomas, De malo. q. 1, a. 1
[1002] The good and being are convertible, that is,
every good is being, and every being is good, at least to
the being itself inasmuch as every being strives to
conserve its being. Thus good is a property of being just
as risibility or the faculty of laughing is a property of
man; these things are convertible since every man is
risible and every risible being is a man.
[1003] cf. De praedicamentis, chap. 10.
[1004] cf. Metaphysica, Bk. V, chap. 10.
[1005] ibid. See the index under Opposita and
Privatio
[1006] St. Thomas, De mendacio, Summa Theol.,
IIa IIae, q. 110, a. 3 ad 4
[1007] cf. De malo, q. 1, a 1 ad 14
[1008] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 35. a. 1.
[1010] ibid., a. 6
[1011] cf. Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, John
of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Massoulie, and
Gonet
[1012] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 47, a. 1.
[1013] ibid., ad 3.
[1014] ibid., q. 25, a. 6
[1015] ibid., q. 47, a. 2
[1016] St. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 11
[1017] Col. 1 24.
[1018] Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3
[1019] The Imitation of Christ, Bk. II, chap.
12
[1020] II Cor. 4:16f
[1021] Matt. 5:31
[1022] I Cor. 7.
[1023] cf. other passages in St. Thomas' works
indicated in the Tabula aurea under permissio. cf.
below, Ia, q. 49, a. 3 ad 5
[1024] Isa. 5 20
[1025] St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 14
[1026] Denz., no. 2058
[1027] Ibid., no. 1701
[1028] Isa. 5:20
[1029] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1.
ad. 2
[1030] cf. the beginning of the treatise on grace: The
states of nature with regard to grace and original sin
[1031] St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 12
[1032] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1
[1035] ibid., ad 2, 3
[1036] ibid., ad 1.
[1037] St. Thomas, De malo, q. 2, a. 12
[1039] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2,
ad 3
[1040] St. Thomas, De malo, loc. cit
[1041] ibid., a. 2, a. 9, II f
[1042] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2,
3.
[1043] Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp.
586 ff.
[1044] John 9:2
[1045] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87.
[1046] De malo, q. 1, a. 4.
[1048] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 4
[1049] Tob. 2:12
[1050] Ibid., 12:13
[1051] John 9:3; cf Summa Theol., Ia IIae,
q. 87, a. 6, 7, 8; Commentarium in Job,
chaps. 4, 6, 8; De malo, q. 5, a. 4
[1052] On the trials Of the just, cf. St. Thomas,
Commentarium in Job, chaps. 4, 6, 8; De malo,
q. 5, a. 4; Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87,
a. 7, 8.
[1053] St. Thomas, De malo, q. 1, a. 4
[1054] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, a. 6 ad 1.
[1056] De malo, q. 1, a. 4 ad 12
[1057] Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 19, a.
1.
[1058] Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 9
[1059] ibid., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 3 ad 3.
[1060] Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 1; q. 80, a.
1. ad 3; cf. Cajetan's commentary on this passage;
Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3; q. 57, a. 1
[1061] ibid., Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3
[1062] ibid., IIa IIae, q. 27, a. 3
[1063] cf. Cajetan, commentary on the following
question, a. 3, no. 4.
[1064] Summa Theol. IIIa, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3
[1065] Ibid., IIa IIae, q. 19, a. 1
[1066] ibid., the following question, 49, a. 3
[1067] cf. Opera Platonis (ed. Didot), I,
342-46. "It is worse to do injustice than to
receive it, and to flee punishment than to submit to
it," I, 346
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