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State of the question. In this article inquiry is made
for the definition of person, and the definition given by
Boetius and commonly accepted is defended. St.
Thomas, following the Aristotelian method, goes from
the nominal definition to the real definition by a division
of the genus of substance and by an inductive comparison of
the thing to be defined with similar and dissimilar
things. These are the principal rules to be followed in
the search for a real definition as proposed in the
Posterior Analytics.[277]
In the beginning St. Thomas mentions three difficulties
against the Boethian definition, "I person is an
individual substance with a rational nature."
1. No individual is defined; for example, Socrates is
not defined because a definition expresses an essence that
is common to many individuals. The reply will be: If
this individual is not definable, individuality can be
defined, and individuality pertains to a person.
2. It appears that the adjective "individual" is
superfluous because the term "substance" stands for first
substance which, for Aristotle, is the individual
substance.
3. The third and fourth difficulties are of minor
importance. The fifth difficulty is that a separated soul
is an individual substance with a rational nature and is
not a person.
The reply of St. Thomas affirms that Boetius'
definition is acceptable for these reasons:
1. Because of Boetius' authority and because the
definition has been accepted generally by theologians.
2. The acceptability of the definition can be rationally
explained. St. Thomas assumes that the nominal
definition of "person," although it is etymologically
derived from impersonation or representation of another's
features or gestures, nevertheless designates some
individual rational being distinct from others, for
example, Socrates, Plato, anyone who is able to say,
"I am," or "I act," is called a person. So also
all peoples in their grammar commonly distinguish between
the first, second, and third person: I, you, he.
The ancient jurists added that a person is distinguished
from things inasmuch as the person is of his own right,
and at one time they taught that in the legal sphere a
slave was not a person because he was not of his own
right. At the inception of this philosophical inquiry it
is sufficient to have a general idea of person: an
individual rational being, a singular rational being
distinct from others; in French un particulier, in
Italian, un tale. Briefly a person is a free and
intelligent subject. The nominal definition, which tells
what the term signifies, contains intimations of the real
definition, which tells what the thing really is.
The real definition is not demonstrated; it is itself the
foundation of the demonstration of the properties of the
thing defined. The real definition is methodically sought
out by a division of the genus and by inductive
comparison. In going from the nominal to the real
definition of a person, therefore, we must consider the
supreme genus of the thing to be defined and this genus
must be correctly divided. The article should be read
carefully.
The genus of the thing to be defined is substance. On
this point St. Thomas notes at the beginning of the body
of the article that in the genus of substance the
individual is a special instance. Substance itself is
individuated by itself whereas accidents are individuated
by the subject in which they are. Hence individual
substances have some special name; they are called
hypostases or first substances or supposita, that is, the
first subject of attribution of those things belonging to
these substances. For example, this tree is a suppositum
as is this dog. Aristotle calls individuals first
substances (as Peter, Socrates); second substances
are the genera and species, as man, animal, living
being. Therefore this distinction is a division into
individual and universal substances. Aristotle said that
second substances are predicated of first substances as of
subjects not because they inhere like accidents but because
they express the nature of this particular
subject.[278]
Aristotle said that individuals subsist per se and that
genera and species do not subsist except in individuals.
The suppositum is that which exists separately and acts
per se. First substance therefore is the same as the
suppositum or the subject of attribution of nature,
existence, and accidents, for example, this tree and
this dog. Thus the person that we are to define is
compared with things dissimilar to it, namely, with
accidents, and with genus and species.
In the second part of the body of the article, St.
Thomas compares person with things similar to it, that
is, with other supposita. "The particular and the
individual in rational substances is found to have a
special and more perfect mode because it has dominion over
its acts and acts per se independently. Therefore the
individual substance with a rational nature bears a special
name, person. A person is defined, then, as an
individual substance with a rational nature.
"This real definition expresses that reality which is
vaguely contained in the nominal definition, namely, a
rational being, individual and distinct from others, such
as Socrates, Plato, I, you, and he."
Confirmation. The validity of this definition is
confirmed as we solve the objections.
1. This individual or this person, Socrates, is
indeed not defined, but the individuality and the person
abstractly considered are defined.
2. In Boetius' definition the adjective "individual"
is not superfluous since it signifies that we are dealing
with first substance, with the individual or suppositum;
in other words, with the real subject which cannot be
attributed to another subject.
3. The term "individual" is used to designate that
mode of existence which belongs to particular substances,
which alone are able to subsist separately per se. Hence
"individual" means as much as incommunicable to another
suppositum; the person of Peter cannot be predicated of
another subject or attributed to another subject.
4. In this definition nature signifies essence.
5. A separated soul is not called a person because it is
a part of a human species, whereas "person" signifies
the complete whole existing separately, for example,
Peter and not his soul, which is attributed to him.
Having set up the definition of person, we must now
examine the nature of personality.
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