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State of the question. The precise state of the question
appears in the second difficulty. This difficulty is as
follows: In those things where there is an order of
nature one thing is prior to another, if not in time at
least in nature or intellection. But in the divine
persons nothing is earlier or later, as we learn from the
Athanasian Creed. Moreover, in God the nature is most
simple and numerically the same in the three persons and
hence there is no order in the divine nature.
Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that there is an order
of nature in the divine persons, an order not according to
earlier and later but according to origin.
1. This is proved from general principles in the
argument sed contra as follows: Wherever there is
plurality without order we have confusion. But in God
there is no confusion; therefore there must be order.
2. It is also proved from particular principles. Order
is always predicated with regard to some principle, for
example, with regard to the principle of the line, the
principle of number, the principle of demonstration, the
principle of causal influence, or the chief end. But in
God we predicate the principle of origin without any
priority. Therefore in God there is the order of origin
without priority or posteriority.
The minor was explained above:[582] "Although the
term 'principle' with regard to that from which its
significance is derived seems to come from priority, it
does not signify priority but origin. For that which a
term signifies is not the same as that from which the term
is derived, as was explained above."[583] Thus the
Latin word for stone, lapis, seems to be derived from
some action of the stone, namely, to injure the foot,
laedit pedem.
Reply to the second objection. In created beings order
is a disposition with regard to priority and posteriority
in view of some principle, for example, the principle of
the line or of motion, the principle of demonstration, or
the principle of causality in any one of the four kinds of
causes. But in God the concept of order is preserved
analogically in view of the principle of origin without
priority or posteriority, because posteriority either in
duration or being would be an imperfection, which cannot
be predicated of the Son or of the Holy Ghost. More
briefly: whatever is posterior to another in nature must
depend according to its own nature upon the nature of the
other (as the nature of the ray depends on the nature of
the sun). But we cannot speak of God in this way
because there is but one nature in God. In this reply to
the second difficulty St. Thomas shows that where there
is no priority of time in created beings there is still a
priority of nature, for example, the sun is prior to its
brightness. But he adds: "If we consider not the
entity of the cause but the relations themselves of the
cause and that which is caused, of the principle and that
which is principled, it is evident that the relatives are
simultaneous in nature and intellect inasmuch as the one is
contained in the definition of the other. But in God the
relations are subsisting persons in one nature. Therefore
one person is not prior to another either on the part of
the nature or on the part of the relations. Nor is one
person prior to another in intellection.
We have then an order of origin without any priority,
even that of nature. This is, of course, quite
mysterious. Cajetan notes that many theologians admit a
"priority and posteriority of origin." His reply was:
"Let them have this opinion, but let them be quiet about
it." He probably meant that they could hold this opinion
inasmuch as there is a kind of priority and posteriority
according to our imperfect method of understanding but not
in fact, and that as far as possible we ought to try to
correct our imperfect method of knowledge. To safeguard
the words of the Athanasian Creed, "In this Trinity
there is nothing before or after," we ought to say with
St. Thomas, "nothing is before or after, either in
time or nature or honor." We preserve the analogy by
noting that "between God and creatures there is no
similarity so great that there is not always a greater
dissimilarity.[584]
A trace of this truth is found in the equilateral
triangle, in which the three angles are entirely similar
and equal. We can say that the angles are without any
priority in this sense, that in constructing the triangle
we can begin with any angle, and we can invert the
triangle so that the apex becomes the extremity of the
base.
Reply to the third objection. "The order of nature is
predicated not in the sense that the divine nature itself
is ordered but that the order among the divine persons
follows according to natural origin, " for the Father
generates according to His own nature, and the Father
and the Son spirate the Holy Ghost by the will as it is
the divine nature.
Reply to the fourth objection. It is called the order of
nature rather than the order of the essence because nature
to a certain extent implies the idea of principle.
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