THIRD ARTICLE: WHETHER GOD IS THE EXEMPLARY CAUSE OF THINGS, OR WHETHER THERE. ARE OTHER MODELS BESIDES HIM

We are concerned here not with artificial but natural things. St. Thomas himself formulated the title as given above; later certain editors abbreviated the title.

State of the question. The state of the question appears from the arguments advanced by Plato to prove the existence of the ideas which correspond to the uncaused matter which, according to Plato, is "a certain non-being that somehow exists," in which these ideas are received.

First objection. That which is modeled possesses the likeness of the model. But creatures are far removed from the divine likeness. Therefore other subordinate models are required besides God, for example, models of cows, roses, lilies, etc.

Second objection. Everything that is by participation is finally reduced to that which exists per se. But this rose is a rose by participation, since there are many other roses. Therefore there ought to exist a rose essentially so, an essential lily, and an essential cow.

Third objection. The sciences are concerned not with individuals but with universals, for example, psychology deals not with this individual man but with man in general. But these sciences have objective and ontological validity. Therefore the universals ought to exist formally outside of the mind. Indeed, it seems that Dionysius spoke in this way because he seems to say that subsisting being itself is prior to subsisting life itself.

Reply. The reply is that the models of natural things are not outside of God.

In the argument sed contra this is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, who held that the models of things are the divine ideas existing in the divine mind. St. Augustine thought that this was the teaching of Plato himself. Such was also the opinion of Dionysius or Pseudo-Dionysius. On the other hand, Aristotle[745] thought that according to Plato the models were outside God, that they were like separate subsisting forms. Aristotle refuted this teaching, because the separated man, not as a separated soul but as man separated from individuals, ought to have some matter, not individually, but common matter as common bones and flesh. But bones and flesh in themselves imply quantity whose parts are beyond parts and are individuated and therefore bones and flesh cannot exist without being these bones and this flesh.[746]

In the body of the article St. Thomas supports the validity of Platonic exemplarism when it is understood, as St. Augustine understood it, as referring to the divine ideas existing in the divine mind.[747] The argument of the article can be summed as follows. A model is necessary for the production of anything so that the effect will attain a determined form. But it is evident that the things that are produced naturally attain determined forms, for example, the form of a rose, a lily, a lion, etc. Therefore they have an exemplary cause in the divine wisdom, which planned the order of the universe.

This argument coincides to some extent with the proof for the existence of God from the order of the universe, but here we are considering rather the model of all things rather than their ordination to an end, rather their form than their end, but the form of the thing generated is the end of the generation. The minor is evident; the major requires explanation. The major is illustrated in the example of the artificer. But it is not only empirically true; it is evident of itself and necessary and is proved by an explanation of the terms and by a reduction to absurdity, just as the principle of finality, "every agent acts for some end," is proved. St. Thomas proved the truth of the principle of finality[748] by explaining the terms, for every agent tends to something agreeable to itself, but an end is nothing else than an agreeable good to which the agent tends. Further, he defends this principle by a reduction to absurdity, saying: "An agent does not move except with an end in mind. If the agent were not determined to some effect, it would not do this rather than that. In order that it will produce a determined effect it is necessary that the agent be determined to something definite that has the nature of an end." That is, if the eye were not ordered to vision it would not see rather than hear; if the foot were not ordered to walking it would not serve for walking rather than for flying, etc.

This passive ordering of the eye to vision, of the foot to walking, presupposes an active ordering. But ordering is the function of a wise person, because in order that anyone can order different things he must know the relationship of means to an end, and the intellect alone, not the senses or the imagination, can know the nature of things.

Therefore, in spite of what Kant says, a supreme intelligence which is subsisting intelligence itself is required, for every intelligence that is not subsisting intelligence itself is itself ordered to intellection, and this passive ordering presupposes an active ordering which cannot come from anything except subsisting intelligence itself, in which are the ideas of things as something seen by this intelligence in itself without any real plurality.

The major of our proof is therefore the same as the major of the proof for the existence of God from the order in the universe, and it is defended in the same way by a reduction to absurdity. For if in the production of a natural thing a directing idea or model were not necessary, the natural thing would not attain a determined form and it would not rather become this than that. For example, if there were no directing idea in the development of the germ of a nut, the nut would indifferently produce an oak or a pear tree.

Objection. But it suffices that there be a directing idea immanent in the evolution itself. Such was Hegel's opinion in his pantheistic evolution.

Reply. The immanent directive idea is like the passive ordering of this nut to an oak, but every passive ordering presupposes an active ordering, and only the wise being knows the natures of the being of things, and the nature of means to an end. In ascending evolution without a supreme ordering and directing cause more is produced from a minor being than is in it, more perfect beings are produced from imperfect ones, and by this evolution not only more beings but more of being is produced. This is less acceptable than the dogma of creation according to which more does not come from the lesser; in creation, moreover, there are, of course, more beings but there is not more of being or more of wisdom. To be consistent, Hegel should deny the validity of the principle of contradiction and say the radical absurdity is the principle of all things. It is to this state that the mind comes when it rejects creation. Earlier[749] St. Thomas showed that the plurality of ideas in God was only objective inasmuch as God understood the imitability of His essence ad extra, or rather the relation of the imitability of something, for example, a lion, to His essence inasmuch as a lion participates in life and knowledge.

The replies to the objections confirm the conclusion.

Reply to first objection. Humanity is not formally but only virtually in the divine nature, but the idea of man is formally and eminently in God as the terminus of intellection. So also the objective multitude of ideas is formally and eminently in God, whereas it is formally but not eminently in the angel, in whom there are many subordinate ideas. Hence the notion of idea is an analogical notion which is predicated only according to a similarity of proportion of the human idea, the angelic idea, and the divine idea, for, as Dionysius often says, "those things that are divided in inferiors are united as in one in superior beings."

Reply to second objection. Man subsisting per se implies matter and therefore he cannot be without at least common matter, and this common matter cannot exist without individual matter. Bones and flesh by the very fact that they exist are these bones and this flesh.

Reply to third objection. Universals do not exist formally outside the mind as real but only fundamentally in individuals, that is, according to their specific or generic likeness, which can be abstracted from the individuals. But the mode of abstraction and the mode of universality do not exist formally except in the mind.

Spinoza, on the contrary, held that the substantial universal being exists formally in reality and thus the universal being is pantheistically confused with the divine being. Malebranche inclined to the same conclusion because he thought that the first principles of reason were not only in the abstract intelligible being but also in God. Then our natural will would be specifically determined not by the universal good but directly by God Himself as in the case of infused charity. Here we have a pantheistic confusion of the orders of nature and grace, for our nature itself, like sanctifying grace, would be a participation of the divine nature.

Reply to fourth objection. When Dionysius said, "Being itself is prior to that which is life itself and to that which is wisdom itself,"[750] he either meant that we first conceive God as first being before we conceive Him as the first living being, or he was speaking of participated being, which is in all creatures, even in the lowest, whereas life and intelligence are only in the higher beings.