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State of the question. This question seems to have been
solved if we correctly understand the propositions, "The
Father is not the Son," "The Holy Ghost is not the
Father nor the Son," for in these negative propositions
the verb "is not" denies the identity of the subject and
the predicate, and therefore there is a real distinction,
one that precedes the consideration of our mind. The
question, however, requires further examination because
it is not sufficiently clear how the persons are
constituted by the relations and because, as we have said
in the preceding article, the real relations in God are
not really distinct from the essence.
From this arise certain difficulties, which are proposed
at the beginning of this third article.
1. Those things equal to a third are equal to each
other; but the divine relations are equal to a third,
namely, the essence; therefore they are equal to each
other. This is the classic objection of the rationalists
against the mystery of the Trinity, which is sometimes
examined by Thomists in the introduction to this
treatise.
2. Paternity and filiation are, of course,
distinguished mentally from the essence, as are goodness
and omnipotence. Therefore, like goodness and
omnipotence, paternity and filiation are not really
distinguished from each other.
3. In God there is no real distinction except by reason
of origin. But one relation does not appear to originate
from another. Therefore the relations are not really
distinct.
Reply. The reply is nevertheless in the affirmative,
namely, in God a real distinction exists between the
relations opposed to each other.
This teaching pertains to faith, since faith teaches that
there is a real and true Trinity in which the Father is
not the Son, and the Holy Ghost is not the Father or
the Son. The Council of Florence declared: "In God
all things are one except where there is opposition of
relation."[255] At the same council, John, the
Latins' theologian, declared: "According to both
Latin and Greek doctors it is relation alone that
multiplies persons in the divine productions; this
relation is called relation of origin, in which only two
are concerned: the one from whom another is and the one
who is from another."[256] Also at this Council,
Cardinal Bessarion, the most learned theologian of the
Greeks, averred, "No one is ignorant of the fact that
the personal names of the Trinity are
relative."[257]
In his argument St. Thomas quoted Boetius. Other
Fathers who might be quoted are St. Anselm,[258]
St. Augustine,[259] St. Gregory Nazianzen,
St. Gregory of Nyssa, and St. John Damascene, who
said: "The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are
distinct and yet they are one."[260]
In the body of the article St. Thomas explains this
doctrine of faith by an analysis of the concept of relative
opposition as follows.
The nature of a real relation consists in the reference of
one thing to another, according to which something is
relatively opposed to another and the two are therefore
really distinct.
But in God we have real relations opposed to one
another, namely, paternity, filiation, and spiration.
Below it will be explained that active spiration, which
is opposed to passive spiration, is not opposed to
paternity and filiation. Therefore in God there is real
distinction according to these real relations opposed to
one another.
The major explains something that is already admitted
confusedly by the common sense of man and by natural
reason, namely, that relative things, inasmuch as the
Father and the Son are opposed to each other, are really
distinct, since no one begets himself. This analysis of
the ideas of relation, opposition, and distinction is
found in Aristotle's Postpredicamenta, where he
distinguishes the various kinds of opposition.
Opposition properly so called is a definite and determined
repugnance; opposition improperly so called is between
disparate things, as between different species of things.
Thus opposition properly so called requires a determined
extreme, to which something is repugnant, as heat to
cold, blindness to vision. Proper opposition,
therefore, calls for two conditions: the distinction
between the extremes and some determined repugnance between
these extremes.
Opposition may be of four kinds: relative, contrary,
privative, and contradictory. Following Goudin in his
work on logic, we may present the division of opposition
as follows.
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between being and non-being |
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by pure negation: contradictory opposition, e.g., man
and no man, knowledge and nescience
by privation in a suitable subject: privative opposition,
e.g. sight and blindness, knowledge and ignorance
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expelling each other from a subject: contrary opposition,
e.g., virtue and vice, truth and error
based on mutual reference: relative opposition, e.g.,
between father and son
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Thus, as is commonly taught, relative opposition is the
weakest of all; in this kind of opposition one extreme
does not destroy the other, rather one requires the
other. Hence it can be attributed to God because it does
not imply any privation of being but only distinction with
a reference, as St. Thomas pointed out.[261]
Thus the Father and the Son are really distinct by
relative opposition. Relative opposition may be defined
as the repugnance between two things arising from the fact
that they refer to each other.
On the other hand, contradictory opposition is the
strongest of all because one extreme completely destroys
the other; not even the subject survives as in privative
opposition, nor the genus as in contrary opposition, in
which, for example, virtue and vice oppose each other in
the same genus of habit. Thus contradictory opposition is
the cause of the others and is to a certain extent mingled
with them. In a sense we may say that the Father is not
the Son, and virtue is not vice.
It is clear that in these four kinds of opposition, the
word "opposition" is used not univocally but
analogically, and the analogy is not only metaphorical but
proper. The primal analogy contains the greatest
opposition, that is, contradictory opposition. Hence it
is not surprising that contradictory opposition
participates in the other kinds of opposition.[262]
Reply to the first and second difficulties. "Those
things which are equal to a third are equal to each
other," I distinguish: if they are equal to the third
actually and mentally and there is no mutual opposition,
I concede; if they are equal to a third actually and not
mentally and there exists relative opposition, I deny.
But the divine relations are equal to a third, the divine
essence, this I distinguish: they are equal actually but
not mentally, and some of the relations are mutually
opposed, although they are not opposed to the third, this
I concede. Otherwise, I deny.
To put it analogically, according to St. Thomas,
transitive action, taken at least terminatively, and
passion are really the same as movement, but they are
really distinct from each other because of the opposition
of relation, since action is the movement as coming from
the agent and passion is the movement as received in the
recipient.
So also in an equilateral triangle the three equal angles
are actually the same as a third, namely, the surface of
the triangle, but they are really distinguished from each
other because of relative opposition.
First doubt. Are action and passion really and modally
distinct from movement?
Reply. According to the common opinion of Thomists they
are. Aristotle, however, did not consider precisely
this question, and St. Thomas makes reference to his
words, which, although they are somewhat vague, throw
some light on the present problem, as does the reference
to the triangle. Even though the illustration of the
triangle may be deficient, the principle enunciated by
St. Thomas is nevertheless true. We should remember
that it is not necessary for the theologian to show that
this objection is evidently false; it is enough if he
shows that the objection is not necessary and has no
cogency. Thus the revealed mystery remains intact.
Second doubt. Is the principle," hose things equal to
a third are equal..." to be understood as a formal
predication?
Reply. In order to understand this principle we must
distinguish between formal predication and material
predication. Thus it is only materially true to say that
the divine mercy and the divine justice are the same,
because they are not really distinct, and by reason of
their subject or matter they are in a sense the same, just
as when we say that the humanity of Peter is his
individuality. We have here a material predication
because the humanity and the individuality are not actually
distinct, and by reason of the matter and the subject they
are the same. But in these instances we are not uttering
a formal predication in which the predicate belongs to the
subject according to its formal nature. For example, it
does not belong to the divine mercy to punish; the divine
mercy pardons, condones, and it is the divine justice
that punishes, although these two perfections are really
the same, that is, materially the same but not formally.
The laws of the syllogism, however, are not verified
except in formal predications, since the process of
reasoning does not deal with things in themselves but
through the mediation of our concepts. Therefore if we
wish to conclude the identity of two things by our
reasoning, we must consider these two things from the same
formal aspect. Otherwise we do not obey the first law of
the syllogism: the term must be threefold: middle,
major, and minor. According to this law the middle term
must be perfectly distributed, that is, taken in the same
sense in the major and the minor. Hence, for example,
the following argument is not valid because the major is
only a material predication: in God mercy is the same as
justice; but justice is the principle of punishment;
therefore God inflicts punishment through His mercy.
The argument is false because in God mercy and justice
are not the same formally although they are the same
materially. Again, in the Trinity it is conceded that
the Father and the Son are actually the same as the
divine essence, but they are not the same formally.
Moreover the Father and the Son are relatively opposed
to each other, but they are not opposed to the essence.
It is clear, therefore, that the following syllogism is
not valid: This God is the Father, but this God is
the Son, therefore the Son is the Father. Nor is the
following true: This divine essence is the paternity,
but this divine essence is the filiation, therefore
filiation is paternity. In these syllogisms we have
merely material predications, and the form of the
syllogism is not observed.
Objection. The force of this reply is invalidated when,
against Scotus, we say that in God there is not only one
being but one formal eminent reason, namely, the Deity,
and thus in God every predication is not only material but
formal.
Reply. It is true that in God there is but one formal
reason as far as God Himself is concerned, but not with
regard to us.[263] In other words, the objection
would be valid if the Deity identified with itself the
attributes and relations without preserving their formal
reasons; but the objection has no force if these formal
reasons are still found to be in the eminence of the
Deity. In God, of course, the relations are not only
virtually and eminently, as the seven colors are in
white, but formally and eminently; for whereas blue is
not white, God is true, good, paternity, and
filiation. Formal predication, therefore, must be
carefully distinguished from material
predication.[264]
In God the formal reasons or aspects of the attributes
and relations are identified without being destroyed; they
are perfectly preserved in spite of their real identity
with the essence. Indeed, they do not exist in the
purest state except in this identification. Thus
subsisting being itself must be not only intelligible in
act but actually understood in act, and it is therefore
identified with subsisting understanding. The proper
reason or nature of a relation is to be opposed to its
correlative and to be distinguished from it.
This is possible because of the eminence of the Deity.
Analogically, the body of Christ is present to many
consecrated hosts, but these hosts are not present to each
other. At first sight this seems to contradict the
principle that those things which are united to a third are
united to each other, or those things that are present to
a third are present to each other. Thus two bodies cannot
be present in the same space without being present to each
other.
But this is not true if there is a third member which,
remaining the same, is in many distant places as if not
being in that place. Thus the same body of Christ is
present in the manner of substance in many distant hosts.
So in the natural order the head and the foot are present
to the same soul and yet they are not parts present to each
other and close to each other.
Second objection. A real distinction is not founded on
that which prescinds from reality. But the "esse
ad" of a relation prescinds from reality. Therefore
it does not provide a basis for the real distinction of
relations or of the persons.
Reply. I distinguish the major: a real distinction is
not founded on that which prescinds from reality and is not
real, I concede; on that which is real, I deny. I
contradistinguish the minor in the same sense and I deny
the consequence and the consequent. The "esse
ad" is said to prescind from reality inasmuch as it
may be either in a real relation or a relation of reason;
but this "esse ad" in a real relation is real,
not formally because of itself but because of the real
"esse in", which is common to all accidents.
Thus in created beings the "esse ad" of the
relation of paternity is something real and not something
of the mind; both the father and the son therefore are
necessarily distinct, since no one begets himself. The
real relations in God are really distinct more as
relations than as real, because as relations they are
opposed to each other and as real they have the same
"esse in" since their "esse in" is not
accidental but substantial. Hence in God there are four
real relations, as we shall see below, but not four
relative realities as if there were four actions, for
example. We shall also see below that of these four real
relations active spiration is not really distinguished from
paternity and filiation because it is not opposed to them.
Third doubt. Why is not the "esse ad" of a
real relation real because of itself, as Suarez taught?
Reply. Because, as St. Thomas says,[265] a
real relation formally as a relation is not something but
to something, and therefore there can be relations that
are not real, whose "esse in" is not real. On
the other hand there is no such thing as quantity or
quality mentally. Suarez, however, held that the
"esse ad" of a relation is real because of
itself, just as he held that the created essence is actual
because of itself and is therefore not really distinct from
its existence. Suarez thought of being (ens) only as
that which is and not as that by which a thing is, whereas
for St. Thomas the essence is that by which a thing is
in a certain species. Hence Suarez concluded that the
relations of reason (mental relations) are not true
relations.[266] From this he went so far as to infer
that the divine relations have their own relative existence
and perfection, virtually distinct from the infinite
perfection of the essence. In this way Suarez to some
extent inclined to Scotus' teaching on the formal
distinction. It will be seen therefore that the Father
is lacking some perfection, namely, filiation and passive
spiration. Now it becomes very difficult to safeguard the
unity and absolute simplicity of the divine nature, just
as when the Greeks in their treatise on the Trinity began
with the three persons rather than with a study of the
divine nature.
Thus Suarez was not able to reply to the principal
objections against the mystery of the Trinity as the
Thomists were.[267] How was Suarez to solve the
objection: "Those things equal to a third are equal to
each other"? At a loss in answering this objection,
Suarez declared that the principle of identity (or
contradiction), if taken in complete abstraction and
analogy of being, prescinding from created and uncreated
being, from both finite and infinite, is false.
According to Suarez this principle is true inductively
only in created beings, and the truth of the principle
arises only within the limits of created being. It is a
law of finite being, not an analogical law of being itself
in common. Henceforth the theologian could not argue
about the divine perfections because his argument is based
on the principle of identity or contradiction. This is
pure agnosticism. According to our teaching, to say that
the principle of identity or contradiction is not verified
analogically in the mystery of the Trinity is to say that
this mystery is absurd, not above reason but opposed to
reason. This much we can say: that most eminent mode
according to which this principle is verified in the
Trinity cannot be positively known by us here on earth;
it can be known only negatively and relatively.
Another difference arises between St. Thomas and
Suarez from the fact that for St. Thomas the three
persons have only one being since, as it is commonly
expressed, the being of an accident is being in
another.[268] But in God the "esse in" of
the relations is substantial and is therefore identified
with the divine essence, which is therefore unique. For
Suarez, on the contrary, who proceeded from other
principles of being, the essence, the being, and the
relations are three relative existences in God.[269]
The doctrine of St. Thomas, as Del Prado shows,
"Perfectly preserves the supreme simplicity of the divine
being because in God there is but one being; the real
relations, on the one hand, do not make a composition
with the essence, and on the other hand they really
distinguish the persons. From this it follows that in the
three divine persons there is one divinity, equal glory,
co-eternal majesty, and the same absolute perfection.
No perfection is found in one person that does not exist
in the other." Del Prado continues: "Those who like
Suarez deny the real composition of being and essence in
creatures are forced to place three beings in God, and
they must place in one person a perfection that is not in
another, nor can they solve the difficulty arising from
the principle of identity."[270] The difference
between St. Thomas and Suarez has its roots in their
basic philosophy and in their positions about the real
distinction between essence and being in creatures.
Suarez, as we have said, whether he wishes to or not,
multiplies something absolute in God, namely, being,
and therefore the objection based on the principle of
identity remains unsolved.[271]
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