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The question is whether, for instance, we can say, the
divine essence is the Father, God is the Father, as we
say that the Father is God.
The reply is in the affirmative. This proposition is
true: the Deity is the Father. The reason is that
personal substantive names, like Father, can be
predicated of the essence because of the real identity of
the essence and the person. Thus we can say, the divine
essence is the Father, and the divine essence is the
Son; but we cannot say that the divine essence generates
or is generating or spirating, because these are adjective
names, which are attributed to persons but not to the
three persons.
Cajetan notes that this proposition, "The divine
essence is the Father, " is true and necessary, not by
formal predication but by identical predication, that is,
solely because of the identity of the subject but not by
reason of the thing signified. In the same way when we
say the divine will is the divine intelligence, this is
true identically but not formally. If it were formally
true, we could substitute divine will for divine
intelligence in every instance, just as we can substitute
Tullius wherever we find Cicero. Then we could say that
God knows by His will, that He pardons by His
justice, and punishes by His mercy.
The proposition, "The divine essence is the Father,
" is true identically, while the proposition, "The
essence generates, " is false. It is also false to say
that the divine will understands, for the adjective
signifies the form in the subject, and in this last
statement there can only be a formal predication and not an
identical predication because the divine will is a form and
not the subject of a form. The divine subject does indeed
understand but not by the will. The willing God
understands, but it is not God's will itself that
understands.
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