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State of the question. In this title "the same"
signifies real identity. It appears that the essence is
not the same as the person because there are three persons
and only one essence. Moreover, the persons are distinct
and the essence is not distinct. Finally, the person is
subject to the essence inasmuch as the person is the first
subject of attribution and nothing is subject to itself.
Reply. The reply is in the affirmative: the persons are
not really distinguished from the essence. This doctrine
was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council: "In God
there is only a Trinity, not a quaternity, because each
of the three persons is that thing which is the substance,
the essence, or the divine nature."[525] We have
treated of this matter in question 28, where we referred
to the definition of the Council of Reims (1148)
against Gilbert Porretanus. There we also expounded
Scotus' theory, which tries to establish between the
divine persons and the divine essence a distinction called
formal-actual on the part of the thing.
In the sed contra St. Thomas quotes the authority of
St. Augustine: "When we say the person of the Father
we are saying nothing else than the substance of the
Father."[526] We should note that the words
"nothing else" mean not really distinct. This point is
of major importance with regard to St. Thomas, doctrine
about the real distinction between a created essence and
being. Although St. Thomas does not often say
expressly that a real distinction exists between created
essence and being, he often affirms that opinion. For
example, in the Contra Gentes he says: "It is proper
in every substance, except subsisting being itself, that
the substance itself be one thing and the being
another."[527] In other words, antecedent to the
consideration of our minds Peter is not his being; his
being, which is in him as a contingent attribute, is
something other than his essence. We are now asking
whether a divine person is something other than the divine
essence. St. Augustine answered in the negative.
In the body of the article St. Thomas coordinates and
synthesizes the conceptual analysis given
previously.[528] He reasons as follows: Relations
inhere accidentally in creatures, but in God they are the
essence itself because their "esse in" is
substantial. But a divine person, for example, the
Father, signifies a subsisting relation.[529]
Therefore the divine persons are not really distinct from
the divine essence although they are really distinct from
each other because of the opposition of relation.
Symbolically, in the triangle the three angles are really
distinct from each other but they are not distinct from the
common surface.
Reply to the first objection. This does not involve a
contradiction because the relations are not distinguished
from each other according to their "esse in" but
only according to their "esse ad" because of
their relative opposition.
Reply to the second objection. But the divine persons
are distinguished from the essence just as the divine
attributes are distinguished from one another, and this is
sufficient so that something may be affirmed of the essence
and denied of the persons; for example, the essence is
communicable but paternity is not, just as mercy is the
principle of forgiveness and justice is not.
Reply to the third objection. If it should be said that
nothing is subject to itself, the reply is that the divine
persons are analogically considered as the subject of the
divine essence without any real distinction, whereas in
sensible things there is a real distinction between the
matter, by which the thing is individuated, and the form
which is given to this subject; similarly in created
things a real distinction exists between substance and the
accidents.
Scotus raised certain objections against this article,
but we have already considered them together with
Cajetan's replies.[530] We recall here that the
formal-actual distinction on the part of the thing which
was proposed by Scotus is an impossible middle between a
real distinction and a distinction of reason. A
distinction either precedes the consideration of our minds
and then it is real, however weak it may be, or it does
not precede the consideration of our minds and follows and
then it is not real but of reason although it may often be
founded in the thing and then it is called virtual. In
the present instance the distinction in question is a
virtual distinction of a minor order after the manner of
that which is implicit and explicit, that is, the essence
of God as understood by us implicitly contains the persons
in act and the Deity as seen by the blessed and as it is
in itself explicitly contains the persons in act.
No middle can be found between the distinction which
precedes the consideration of our minds and the distinction
which does not so precede. Scotus, theory of the
formal-actual distinction on the part of the things sins
against the rules of division. A division, as Aristotle
pointed out, must divide the whole, and in order that it
be adequate it must be into two members opposed to each
other by affirmation and negation and not into three
members. In the Porphyrian tree substance is divided per
se, adequately and progressively into members
contradictorily opposed to each other: corporeal and
incorporeal substance; animate and inanimate corporeal
substances; sensitive and non-sensitive living
substances; sensitive rational and sensitive
non-rational. Distinction must be divided in the same
way: real distinction or that which precedes the
consideration of our minds and the non-real, which does
not precede the consideration of our minds; between these
two we cannot conceive, nor can there be, a middle,
because a thing either is or is not antecedent to the
consideration of our minds.
Hence distinction, which is the absence of identity,
must be divided immediately, not into three members (of
reason, formal-actual on the part of the thing, and
real), but into two members opposed to each other by
contradiction:[531]
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1. Real distinction.
2. Distinction of reason, either founded on the thing,
or virtual, or not founded on the thing.
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The major virtual distinction after the manner of that
which is excluded and excluding, for example, between
genus and difference.
The minor virtual distinction after the manner of that
which is implicit and explicit, for example, between the
attributes of God.
A similar case arises in the division of divine
science.[532]
We recall here Cajetan's admirable reply to Scotus on
this question: "The Deity as it is in itself is above
being and above unity, it is above all simply simple
perfections, which it contains formally and eminently in
their formal natures." These words of Cajetan are the
sublimest comment on this entire treatise.[533]
"We fall into error," says Cajetan, "Then we
proceed from the absolute and the relative to God,
because the distinction between absolute and relative is
conceived by us as prior to God and therefore we try to
place God in one or the other of these two members of the
distinction. Whereas the matter is entirely different.
The divine nature is prior to being and all its
differences, it transcends all being and is above
unity... . Thus in God there is but one formal nature
or reason, and this is neither purely absolute nor purely
relative, not purely communicable or purely
incommunicable, but it contains most eminently and
formally both that which is of absolute perfection and
whatever the relative Trinity requires."
This formal and most eminent nature is the Deity as it is
in itself, and when the blessed behold God they see no
distinction between the essence and paternity although the
essence is communicable while the paternity is not. It
appears therefore, as it were a posteriori, that the
Deity is above being, although the Deity formally and
eminently contains being; a sign of this is the fact
that, whereas in the natural order being is particible,
as are also good, truth, intellect, and will, the
Deity as such cannot be participated in naturally by even
the highest angel or creatable angel. Participation in
the Deity can take place only through grace, which
disposes us to see God immediately as He sees Himself,
although not comprehensively.
The Deity inasmuch as it is above being, unity,
intellect, and will is that great darkness of the mystics
because it transcends the limits of intelligibility in this
life.[534]
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