SECOND ARTICLE: WHETHER EVIL IS FOUND IN THINGS

State of the question. This article seeks to offer a more precise real definition of evil, inasmuch as privation differs from negation. It appears that evil is not in things, because then something would be in them and God would not always make that which is better.

Reply. The reply is that evil is found in things, indeed the perfection of the universe requires that there be certain things which can be deficient in goodness, and from this it follows that some things are deficient in goodness.

1. This is proved from the fact that there are prohibitions and penalties, which would not exist except because of evils.

2. An "a priori" proof can be found by reducing this problem to the preceding question about the multiplicity and inequality of beings. The argument may be reduced to the following. The perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality in things, namely, a degree of indefectible goodness and a degree of defectible goodness, that is, corruptible being, which can be defective and sometimes is defective. But the nature of evil is that some being is deficient of some good. Therefore in things we find evil, like corruption, and this is in agreement with the perfection of the universe, or serves to manifest the divine goodness in the various grades of goodness, since, as was said above,[1012] "the divine goodness cannot be adequately represented by one creature and therefore God made many subordinate beings."

This article explains the meaning of the statement often made by St. Thomas: "it follows that what is defectible is sometimes deficient," that is to say, it is not surprising that a being is sometimes deficient. The expression, "it follows," is explained in this article in this way: "The perfection of the universe requires that there be some beings that can defect from goodness, and it follows from this that some beings sometimes are deficient."[1013]

This expression does not mean that it is congruous that a being should sometimes be deficient, for such deficiency is actually not agreeable to that being, but it is congruous for the good of the universe; for instance, the corruption of one being is the generation of another, and this corruption is agreeable for the generation of the other.

This article more than any other on evil offers an opportunity to explain St. Augustine's and St. Thomas' teaching on the greater good on account of which God permits evil.

Reply to first objection. Evil is not pure negation but the privation of an owing good in an apt subject. Thus we do not say that a piece of wood is ignorant, but that wood has no knowledge. For this reason the Scholastics reject Leibnitz's expression, metaphysical evil, which he used to designate the imperfection of any creature inasmuch as it did not possess every perfection.

Reply to second objection. This privation of an owing good is in things as in an apt subject, for example, blindness is in the eye, not indeed as something positive but as a privation. And when we say that there is blindness, the word "is" does not signify a real entity but the truth of the proposition, namely, that it is true that this man is blind, or deprived of vision.

Reply to third objection. St. Thomas explains that, although there is evil in things and God does not make what is better in every part of the universe, God makes that which is better in the whole, and in the parts with relation to the whole of the universe. He does not mean that the actual world is the best possible of all worlds, for above he said: "God is able to make a being better than any being He has made...., that is, He can always make something better if the better is understood substantively...., but He cannot make something better if the "better" is understood adverbially, that is, with greater wisdom and goodness."[1014] In another place he shows that the inequality in creatures manifests the divine goodness.[1015]

Now St. Thomas explains the congruity of the divine permission of evil in two ways.

1. On the part of the material cause or the subject. He says: "It is of the very nature of things that those things that can be deficient are sometimes deficient." It is fitting, therefore, that God does not interfere or that he permits this deficiency.

2. On the part of the end. This divine permission is fitting because it is for a greater good. As St. Augustine says: "God, since He is the highest good, would in no way allow anything evil in His works unless He were so omnipotent and so good that He could make good come from evil."[1016] For example, the life of the lion would not be preserved unless the ass were killed, nor would there be the patience of martyrs unless there were the iniquity of the persecutor.

This is the solution of the problem of evil, which is at once clear and obscure; it is clear in principle, in the abstract and formally, but it is obscure in the particular, in the concrete and materially. The solution is clear inasmuch as it shows that the most holy and omnipotent God cannot permit evil except for some greater good, otherwise the divine permission would not be holy. But on the other hand this solution remains obscure in the particular and in the concrete because this greater good is generally not clearly understood until we see it in heaven. Nevertheless it sometimes happens that this greater good on account of which God permits evil is clearly seen.

1. In the mineral kingdom we see that the corruption of one being is the generation of another; indeed, of the four elements distinguished by the ancients, the highest, fire, originates from the corruption of the others, especially air. Fire devours and destroys all things, but fire itself has the higher properties, and many things are made through fire.

2. In the animal kingdom, the slaying of inferior animals furnishes food for the higher animals, such as the lion, the eagle; and man.

3. In the human race itself, pain is the stimulus or the goad that urges men on in the intellectual, moral, social, and religious order.

In the intellectual order pain and poverty and need make man inventive and skillful in the arts; a high state of civilization arises in part from the struggle against pain. This accounts for the rise not only of medicine and surgery but also of legislation. In the speculative order higher systems of thought arise from the painful conflict of other systems, and thus a thesis provokes the antithesis before the human mind attains the superior synthesis. In general, as soon as one force appears another opposing force appears, and from the conflict frequently comes equilibrium and harmony. In this struggle for life each individual works with his greatest energy, and sometimes the result is a higher synthesis.

In the moral order, the most painful injustice emphasizes the beauty of justice; the innocent man who suffers a great injustice either desires revenge, and thus becomes evil, or he feels within himself the thirst and hunger for justice and thus becomes holy, according to our Lord's words: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice: for they shall have their fill" (Matt. 5:6). If they had not seen these great injustices, many would never thirst and hunger in this way for justice.

Similarly, out of the knowledge of our own misery arises the desire for a good life. Good exists scarcely anywhere in the world except as the result of struggle. In the social order, the need and suffering of our neighbor arouses sympathy, charity, and benevolence. An unjust war prompts men to make greater sacrifices to defend their country. In the religious order, God permits sin in the lives of the saints, for example, St. Peter's triple denial, so that the saints may attain greater humility and that God Himself may manifest His mercy and justice.

The insufficiency of sensitive life prompts the desire and aspiration for the rational life, and the insufficiency of the rational life prompts men to aspire to a still higher life. Finally, although pain seems to be altogether futile, in the sacrifice of reparation pain is used as the supreme test of love for God and men, and thus pain becomes most fruitful. Indeed, this principle, "God does not permit evil except for some greater good," appears in splendor in the mystery of the cross and in the life of Christ the Redeemer; it appears participatively in the lives of the saints, who can say with St. Paul, "I fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh, for His body, which is the Church."[1017]

St. Thomas also states clearly that God permitted original sin because of the greater good of the redemptive Incarnation. He says: "Nothing stood in the way that after sin human nature should be led to something higher. God permitted evil to happen that some thing better might come of it. Hence St. Paul said, 'And where sin abounded, grace did more abound.'"[1018] And in the blessing of the paschal candle, we sing, "O happy fault, that merited so great a Redeemer."

This providential law finds its highest expression in the fact that from something that was not only useless but also harmful, the torment of crucifixion, Christ established the font of all spiritual goods. God permitted this most grievous sin of deicide so that Christ by His heroic death might save us from sin. Hence we address the cross, "O Cross, our one reliance, hail!"

This is the Christian solution of the problem of evil, which cannot be comprehended except by faith that is illumined by the gifts of understanding and wisdom. In the chapter on "The Royal Way of the Holy Cross," the Imitation of Christ says: "In the cross is salvation, in the cross is life,....in the cross joy of the spirit, in the cross the perfection of holiness....; if you willingly carry the cross, the cross will bear you up."[1019] "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."[1020]

This is the true law of progress and ascent, which cannot be understood according to the dicta of determinism and pantheism, for there are many setbacks in the world, there are many crosses that are unfruitful to him who bears them with ill will, like the bad thief. But still they serve to manifest God's justice and the love of God as the supreme good that is to be loved above all things.

Thus we explain evil according to its three causes: 1. according to its formal cause it is the privation of an owing good; 2. according to the material cause it is in a defectible subject, which at times is defective; 3. according to its final cause, it is not impeded by God, but is permitted for some greater good. Finally, in question 49 we shall see that evil does not have an efficient cause "per se", but merely either an efficient cause "per accidens", when evil follows on the production of some form, or a defective cause. From this we shall see that the divine permission of evil is nothing but a condition "sine qua non" of evil and in no way the cause of evil.

The concept of the divine permission of evil. From the reply to the third objection we see that the fact that God does not impede evil is the same as the permission of evil; this is especially true in the case of moral evil of which God is not even the indirect or accidental cause. St. Thomas explains the nature of this divine permission in his commentary on St. Matthew:[1021] "There are five kinds of permission," and in his enumeration of these five kinds of permission, the object of the first four is not sin, and the object of the fifth is sin. He says: "It should be noted that there are several kinds of permission. The first is the concession of a licit thing, as when the prior grants you permission to visit your parents, which is no sin. The second kind is dispensation, when the superior allows you to eat what is not lawful for you, as eating meat, which is not a sin but would be against the rule unless you were dispensed. The third kind of permission is tolerance, as when the lesser of two evils is permitted to avoid the greater evil; such was Moses' permission to write a bill of divorce. He is said to have granted permission because he tolerated divorce lest a greater evil, namely, murder, follow. This divorce would have been a sin if Moses had not tolerated it, and it is said that Moses did this because of the hardness of their hearts. The fourth permission is indulgence, that is, when something is permitted whose opposite is better, as when the apostles permitted second marriages,[1022] when continence of the marital survivor would have been better. The fifth kind of permission is sustaining, as when God permits evil that He may elicit good things," that is, God does not impede and does not wish to impede evil, but this He does on account of a greater good.

We must not confuse this last kind of permission with the others, with which it has not affinity, except with the third. This last kind of permission is called permission only analogically.[1023]