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State of the question. It seems that there are no real
relations in God and that there are only relations of
reason like the relation of identity between a thing and
itself, because the terms are not really distinct.
Moreover, if a real relation were found in God, it
would be the relation of a principle to the principled.
But the relation of God to creatures as their principle
is not a real relation but one of reason, whereas the
relation of creatures to God is real. Neither does that
relation which is founded on the intellectual procession of
the Word seem to be real since it does not precede the
operation of the intellect but follows it.
Reply. Nevertheless the reply is in the affirmative and
is defined as of faith. This is evident from the
condemnation of Sabellius. According to the Sabellian
heresy, God is not really the Father and the Son, but
only according to our way of thinking. Against this
heresy the Church has declared that God is really the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost in such a way
that the Father is not the Son but is really distinct
from Him.[209] The Father is so called only
because of His paternity, which is a relation; the Son
is so called because of filiation, which is also a
relation, as is also spiration. Therefore in God we
find the real relations of paternity, filiation,
spiration, and, as we shall see below, of active and
passive spiration.
The major of this argument from authority is the
affirmation of the dogma against Sabellius. The minor is
an analysis of the words, Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost. As found in the Scriptures these nouns are
relative: the Father is so called with relation to the
Son, and the Son with relation to the Father, and in
this way these two persons are really distinguished by the
opposition of relation.
This idea of relation was gradually developed by the
Fathers; their teaching became more and more explicit on
the point that the divine persons are distinguished among
themselves by relations alone.[210] St. Gregory
Nazianzen said, "Father is not the name of the essence
or of an action but it indicates the relation which the
Father has to the Son, or that which the Son has to the
Father."[211] Among the Greeks, St. Gregory
of Nyssa and St. John Damascene, and among the
Latins, St. Augustine, St. Fulgentius, Boetius,
St. Isidore, and St. Anselm, employ similar
language.[212]
In his work on the Trinity,[213] St. Augustine
had already evolved a theory of relations, as Tixeront
points out,[214] explaining that the divine persons
are relations which are not something absolute like the
divine essence and which are not accidents. St.
Augustine wrote: "These things are not said according
to the substance, because each one does not refer to
Himself, but these things are said mutually and to each
other; they are not said according to accidents, because
that which is said to be the Father and what is said to be
the Son is something eternal and incommunicable. These
things are said not as of substances but as something
relative, but the relative thing is nevertheless not an
accident, because it is not changeable.[215] Thus
the Father is so called with regard to the Son, the Son
with regard to the Father, and the Holy Ghost with
regard to the Father and the Son.
This doctrine of the divine relations was clearly defined
by the Eleventh Council of Toledo in 675: "By the
relative names of the persons, the Father is referred to
the Son, the Son to the Father, and the Holy Ghost
is referred to the other two persons, and when the three
persons are spoken of in a relative sense, we nevertheless
believe in one nature and one substance... . For that
which is the Father is not referred to Himself but to the
Son; and that which is the Son is not referred to
Himself but to the Father...; with reference to
themselves each person is said to be God." 18 In the
Council of Florence particularly the famous dogmatic
principle, "In God all things are one where there is no
opposition of relation," was proclaimed.[216] At
this council, John, the theologian for the Latins,
declared: "According to both Greek and Latin doctors,
it is relation alone that multiplies the persons in the
divine production, and it is called the relation of
origin, which has two characteristics: that from which
another is and that which is from another."[217] At
this same council, the learned Cardinal Bessarion,
archbishop of Nicaea, declared: "No one is ignorant of
the fact that the personal names of the Trinity are
relative."[218]
St. Thomas treated this question in several of his
works.[219] From a study of these various works it
is clear how his understanding of the matter became more
sublime and more simple as he approached the pure intuition
of truth. Later, however, in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries the thinking of many theologians,
among them Durandus and others, became excessively
complicated so as to impede the contemplation of divine
things.
This and the following articles can be reduced to this
simple truth: the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Ghost are God; but the Father is not the Son, the
Son is not the Father, and the Holy Ghost is neither
the Father nor the Son. In this article St. Thomas
proves from the processions that there are real relations
in God. His argument may be reduced to the following.
When anything proceeds from a principle of the same nature
it is necessary that both, namely, that which proceeds
and that from which it proceeds, should concur in the same
order and have real references to each other. But the
processions in God take place in the identity of nature
(preceding question). Therefore it is necessary that
according to the divine processions we accept real
relations, namely, of the Father to the Son, of the
Son to the Father... . On the other hand, when
anything proceeds from God ad extra, such as a creature,
that which proceeds is not in the same order as God
Himself, the two are not mutually ordered to each other,
and the creature alone depends on God, but God does not
depend on the creature nor is He ordered to the creature.
Hence only the creature has a real relation to God; and
God in no way has a real relation to the creature.
Reply to first objection. These real relations,
however, do not inhere in God as an accident inheres in a
subject. This will be explained in the following
article, where it will be shown that in God the "being
in" ("esse in") of the relations is
substantial and not accidental.
Reply to second objection. Boetius merges the relations
in God with the relation of identity (a relation of
reason alone) inasmuch as the divine relations do not
diversify the divine substance; but Boetius continued to
accept as true that the Father is not the Son and that
they are opposed by the opposition of real
relation.[220]
Reply to third objection. God the Creator does not have
a real relation to creatures because the Creator and
creatures are not in the same order and are not ordered to
each other. Creatures indeed are ordered to God upon
whom they depend, but God is not ordered to creatures.
It is in the nature of the creature to depend on God,
but it is not in God's nature to produce creatures,
since He produced them most freely. On the other hand,
the Father and the Son are of the same order and are
ordered to each other, just as in men active and passive
generation are in the same order and thus are the basis for
real mutual relations.
Reply to fourth objection. The relation of filiation in
God follows the operation of the divine intellect, but
not as a logical entity such as the distinction between the
subject and predicate; it follows as something real,
namely, as the expressed word, which as the terminus of
mental enunciation is something real in the mind.
First doubt. Is the "esse ad" of a
relation always real? The reply is in the negative. The
reason is that many relations are of reason only and each
of these relations has its "esse
ad"; consequently the "esse
ad" as such is not necessarily a real being or a
being of the mind but may be either, depending on whether
the foundation of the relation and its "esse in"
are real or beings of the mind only.
Second doubt. Are the relations in God real not only
according to their "esse in" but also according
to their "esse ad"? The reply is in
the affirmative. The reason is that when the "esse
in" is real the "esse ad" is
also real. Thus in man the relation of paternity to the
son is a real accident, existing in the father antecedent
to the consideration of our minds. If in God the
"esse ad" were not real, the real
distinction between the persons, which is founded on the
opposition of real relation, would be destroyed. It is
the reference to (respectus ad) alone that causes the
relative opposition.[221] The reason why the
"esse ad" is real is because the
relation really exists in some subject in accord with the
real foundation of the relation independently of the
consideration of our mind. The "esse in" is the
title to reality of the "esse ad".
In the "De potentia", St. Thomas gives the
following explanation. "The relation itself, which is
nothing more than the order of one creature to another, is
one thing inasmuch as it is an accident and something else
inasmuch as it is a relation or an order. Inasmuch as it
is an accident it has its being in a subject, but not
inasmuch as it is a relation or an order, for as a
relation it is order to another, as if passing over to
another and in some way assisting the related
thing."[222]
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