|
This an article of faith that the intellective soul is
"per se" and essentially the form of the body.
This truth was defined by the Council of Vienne
(1311-12): "We define that if anyone shall
presume to assert, defend, or hold that the rational or
intellective soul is not "per se" and essentially
the form of the human body, he shall be considered a
heretic."[1290] In these words the Council of
Vienne condemned the error of Olivi, who taught that the
rational soul informed the body not "per se" but
that it did so through the vegetative and sensitive
faculties.
This definition states three things. 1. The human soul
is the form of the human body, or the soul is
substantially united to the body as form to matter, not
like a mover to a thing that is moved, but constituting
one nature with the body. 2. This union is "per
se" and not through another, not through the
mediation of a sensitive or vegetative principle, but
directly and immediately through the soul. 3. The union
is essential, that is, by the essence of the soul and not
through some faculty, or consciousness of operation, or
some accidental influx, so that the essence of the soul is
the radical principle of the vegetative and sensitive
operations together with the body with which it is united.
Among the condemned propositions of Rosmini we find:
"The union of the soul and the body properly consists in
an immanent perception by which the subject, comprehending
an idea, affirms the sensible part, after having
comprehended its own essence in the idea."[1291]
In a declaration against the false doctrine of A.
Guenther, Pius IX said: "The rational soul is the
true form of the body, "per se" and
immediate."[1292]
Cardinal Zigliara concludes: "The fathers of the
Council of Vienne used the word 'form' in its strict
scholastic sense,"[1293] which was the sense
commonly accepted by those to whom the Council addressed
itself. The Council, however, as Zigliara points
out, did not wish to condemn Scotus' thesis which admits
the form of corporeity besides the rational soul. Hence
the Council did not define that the rational soul was the
only form of the human body, but rather that it is the
substantial form and the principle of the vegetative and
sensitive life of the human body.
Corollary. Hence, as Vacant points out,[1294]
it cannot be admitted that there are several souls in man,
as the Gnostics, Manichaeans, Apollinaris, and
Guenther said. We must hold that the intellective soul
is the only soul in man and the principle of the
vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life of man,
even though it has not been defined that it is the only
form. Indeed, Palmieri was able to make a defense for
his atomism, according to which the rational soul is still
the principle of even vegetative life.
St. Thomas, however, proves from reason that the
rational soul is not only the form of the human body and
the only soul in man but also that it is the only form
because if any other substantial form existed beforehand it
would follow that the soul was only accidentally united to
the body.
St. Thomas wrote: "That by which anything is
primarily operated is the form to which the operation is
attributed..... But it is evident that that by which
the body lives primarily is the soul....For it is the
soul by which we are nourished, feel, move in place, and
by which also we primarily think..... For it is the
same man who perceives that he thinks and feels; and
feeling cannot take place without the body..... If
the intellect is not united to Socrates' body, except as
the mover of the body, Socrates would not be absolutely
one, and consequently he would not be a simple
being."[1295]
Nevertheless the rational soul is not immersed in matter,
for as St. Thomas says: "The more noble a form is the
more it dominates the corporeal matter and the less it is
immersed in it, and the more it excels the matter by its
operation and power."[1296] "The soul
communicates that being in which it subsists to the
corporeal matter..... For this reason, when the body
is destroyed, the soul retains its own being, which is
not true of other forms."[1297]
The intellective principle is multiplied as the human
bodies are multiplied; otherwise Socrates and Plato
would be one intelligence. "If there were but one
intellect in all men, the variety of phantasms found in
this man and that could not cause the variety of
intellectual operations of this or that man."[1298]
When it is separated from its body the soul remains
individuated, because it preserves its natural relation to
this particular body rather than to another.
Nor are there other souls in man, because then man would
not be simply one, "for nothing is simply one except by
one form."[1299] "The intellective soul contains
the sensitive soul of the animal and the nutritive soul of
the plants, just as the pentagon contains the
tetragon."[1300]
Nor is the form of corporeity in man distinct from the
intellective soul "because the substantial form confers
being absolutely. If besides the intellective soul some
other substantial form existed beforehand in matter by
which the subject of the soul would be in act, it would
follow that the soul would not confer being absolutely and
that consequently it would not be the substantial
form."[1301] This was the opinion held by
Thomists at all times in opposition to Scotus and his
followers. "That which is "per se" one,
namely, one nature, does not come into being out of two
acts but out of potency and act. This was Cajetan's
conclusion from the words of Aristotle himself.
Finally, it is fitting that the intellective soul be
united to a proper body for the purpose of sensation to
become a human body, because "the intellective soul is
the lowest grade of intellectual substances," and
therefore its proportionate object is the lowest
intelligible being of sensible things, knowable through
the senses. "Hence it is proper that the intellective
soul have not only the power of intellection but also the
power of sensation. The action of the senses, however,
does not take place without a corporeal instrument. It is
proper, therefore, that the intellective soul be united
to a body which can be a proper organ for the
senses."[1302]
Thus man is a microcosm in which there is the being of the
stone, life as we find it in plants and animals, and
intellection as it is in the angels. And in man we see
the highest degree of the lowest form of life, namely the
highest degree of sensitive life as found in the
imagination, and at the same time the lowest degree of the
highest kind of life, namely, the lowest degree of
intellection. The human species appears, therefore, as
a unique species, that is, there cannot be several
ontologically distinct species of rational animals. In
this one species the highest degree of the lowest life
unites with the lowest degree of the highest life, while
an immeasurable distance remains between sensitive and
intellective life.
|
|