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State of the question. The materialists, pessimists,
and all who reject divine providence deny any governance of
the world. They hold, as we shall see in the third
difficulty, that in their movements the principal parts of
the world are determined to one end by some necessity and
therefore do not need any governance.
Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that the world is
governed, and this truth is of faith. All the texts of
Scripture that affirm the existence of divine providence
can be offered as proof. St. Thomas cites the text,
"But Thy providence, O Father, governeth
it."[928] God is considered the Father who gives
life, and who nourishes, elevates, and governs His
children with knowledge and benevolence.
The divine governance is proved "a posteriori"
as follows: Means are not ordered to an end except by a
governing intellect which understands the nature of the
means. But in the world there are many means excellently
ordered to a good end. Therefore the world is governed by
one intelligence. Moreover, in opposition to Kant,
this intelligence must be its own being and intellection,
wisdom and truth itself, for otherwise this intelligence
itself would be ordered to intellection and to truth by
some higher governor.
The existence of the divine governance can also be proved
"a priori" to a certain extent from a
consideration of the divine goodness inasmuch as it
produces things in being, so it also pertains to it to
lead things to their end, which is to rule. To govern,
properly speaking, is to lead things conveniently to their
proper end as the arrow is directed by the
archer.[929]
Reply to third objection. In natural things we find a
certain necessity by which they are determined to one end;
thus the eye is determined to seeing, the ear to hearing,
the foot to walking, so that this end constitutes the
reason for the existence of these means that are ordered to
itself. But this ordering presupposes an ordering
intellect in the Author of nature. Otherwise the
intelligibility in things would come from
non-intelligence, from a blind and material necessity;
order would come from the privation of order, the more
perfect from the less perfect in opposition to the
principle of causality, and all things would be without a
reason for their existence, that is, without any reason
for being rather than not being.
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