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Articles one and two inquire whether there are several
persons in God, and articles three and four inquire in
what this plurality consists.
Article 1. In God there are several persons because
there are several real subsisting relations opposed to one
another. In the reply to the fourth difficulty, St.
Thomas notes that each divine person is not a part nor is
the divine reality the whole, because the Father is as
great as the entire Trinity, as will become clear
below,[321] when St. Thomas explains: "All the
relations are one according to essence and being, and all
the relations are not greater than one alone; nor are all
the persons greater than one alone since the entire
(infinite) perfection of the divine nature is in each of
the persons."[322]
Article 2. In God there are not more than three
persons. This truth is revealed in the form of baptism
and stated in the creeds. The theological explanation is
that the divine persons are constituted by mutually opposed
subsisting relations. But these three relations are three
in number. One of the four relations, active spiration,
is opposed neither to paternity nor to filiation. This
active spiration, therefore, belongs to the Father and
to the Son. Passive spiration, however, cannot be
attributed to the Father and to the Son for then the
procession of love would precede the procession of
intellection. The reader is referred to the reply to the
first difficulty in the text. It should be noted that the
fact that no opposition exists between active spiration and
filiation is an implicit affirmation of the
Filioque.[323]
Article 3. Whether anything is added to God by the
numeral terms.
State of the question. Is there any positive
significance when we say that God is wise, or any
negative significance when we say that God is
incorporeal? This is Cajetan's interpretation of the
sense of this title.
Reply. The numeral terms do not add anything positive to
God since they express not a quantitative but a
transcendental plurality, which is not properly speaking a
number. The transcendental multitude refers to the many
of which it is predicated in the same way that
transcendental unity refers to transcendental being.
Transcendental unity merely predicates the indivisibility
of being without adding any accident. We say not only
that the scholastic school of thought is one among many
theological schools but that it is also perfectly one and
united. So also the Summa Theologica is not only one
among many works written by St. Thomas but it is a work
that is perfectly one because of the intimate connection
between its parts. We refer the reader to the text.
Thus, as was explained elsewhere,[324]
transcendental unity differs from the unity which is the
principle of number, which is a kind of quantity. St.
Thomas in concluding the body of the article says:
"When we say that the divine persons are many, this
signifies these persons and the indivisibility of each of
them since it is of the nature of a multitude that it
consist of unities." In his reply to the third
difficulty, he says: "Multitude does not do away with
unity; it removes division from each of those entities
which constitute the multitude."[325]
This may be better understood when we see it verified in
several instances. The numerical multitude of individuals
does not do away with the unity of the species; the
transcendental multitude of species does not do away with
the unity of genus; the transcendental multitude of genus
does not do away with the analogical unity of being, nor
does the multitude of accidents in a suppositum destroy its
unity. Similarly the transcendental plurality of persons
in God does not destroy the unity of God. But if it
were a numerical plurality in God, the divine nature
would be multiplied in the three individuals, and there
would be three gods.
The unity of God is a unity pure and simple, whereas the
specific unity of many men is only a qualified unity, that
is, a unity according to the specific likeness of these
men, who together are a pure and simple multitude.
Wherefore the plurality of the divine persons in the bosom
of the simple unity of the divine nature is best compared
analogically with the plurality of accidents, such as,
for example, the plurality of faculties in one suppositum
that is simply one rather than with the plurality of
individuals in the same species.
Corollary. Thus there is in God a simple unity and a
qualified plurality. The unity is the unity of the divine
nature; the transcendental plurality is the plurality of
the opposing relations. In a nature numerically one and
the same this plurality arises from the opposition of
relations of origin. Therefore it cannot be said that
there are three gods, but we must say there is one God.
Again, as we shall see in the following article, we
cannot say that God is threefold, but we say He is
triune in order to safeguard the simple unity which is at
the same time substantial together with the plurality that
arises from the opposing relations. Thus we say that God
is one in three persons.
Article 4. Whether the term "person" is common to the
three divine persons. It seems that it is not, since
nothing is common to the three persons except the divine
essence.
Reply. The term "person" is a common noun according to
reason because that which is a person is common to the
three persons, namely, the subsisting relation opposed to
other relations. It is not, however, common to the
three persons by a community of the actual thing as is the
divine essence, which is one whereas there are three
persons. If something were common to the persons
actually, there would be but one person as there is one
nature.
Even when applied to men, the term "person" is common
by a community of reason, not indeed as are genus and
species but as an undetermined individual, as some man,
that is something subsisting of itself and distinct from
others. Analogically this notion is common to the three
divine persons since each divine person subsists in the
divine nature distinct from the others. The term
"person, " therefore, is common to the three divine
persons by a community of reason but not actually, as
St. Thomas explains in the reply to the third
difficulty. It is common but not as genus is a common
term, because the three divine persons have one being and
are subsisting being itself, which is above all genus.
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