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These notes are briefly recalled by St. Thomas in the
body of the first article, and it is suggested that the
reader consult the first part of the body of the article.
The category of relation is distinguished by Aristotle
from the categories of substance, quantity, quality,
transitive action, passion, etc. Thus a man is called
relatively a father of another and a son of another.
Aristotle calls relation "to prosti", or the
"ad aliquid", or the "to something"; it is
also called the reference (to something else), the order
(to something else) or the habitude.
Many Nominalists declare that there are no real relations
in creatures; that all the relations are relations of
reason. On the other hand, moderate realism sees real
relations in creatures, for apart from anyone's thinking
about it a man is really the father of the son he begets.
So also two white things are really alike apart from any
consideration of the mind. Paternity and likeness,
however, are merely relations; therefore there are real
relations in things. St. Thomas explains that the good
of the universe, which is something real, consists mainly
in relation, namely, in the order of things to themselves
and to God, and if this order is removed, all things
will be in confusion as when an army is without any
coordination and subordination of the soldiers.[202]
Relation is twofold: real and of reason. Real relation
is the order in things themselves. Thus, for example,
an effect is related to the cause on which it depends, a
part to the whole, potency to act, and an act to its
object. A relation of reason is the order cogitated by
the mind, as the order of the predicate to the subject,
and of species to genus. From various texts of Aristotle
and St. Thomas[203] we present the following
synopsis of the division of relation.
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transcendental or essential, such as essence to existence
and matter to form, and the relation of faculties,
habits, and acts to the specific object.
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predicamental or accidental,
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according to quantity, as equal, unequal, twofold, threefold
according to quality, as like and unlike
according to action, as paternity
according to passion, as filiation
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Relation of reason between things not really distinct as
predicate to the subject in a judgment as the relation of
real identity of one thing with itself between things
really distinct as the knowable to knowledge as God to the
creature.
Real relations are divided into transcendental and
predicamental. A transcendental relation is the order
included in the essence of a thing as, for example, the
soul's transcendental order to the body, that of matter
to form, essence to being, accident to the subject,
science to its object, etc. All these things have these
relations by their very essence, and the transcendental
relation perdures even when the term disappears. Thus a
separated soul continues to be individuated by its relation
to the body which is to rise again. It is called
transcendental because it transcends the special
predicament of relation and is found also in other
categories, for example, in substance and quality;
indeed there is scarcely anything that is not ordered to
something else by its nature.
Predicamental relation, which is also called relation
according to being (secundum esse), is defined by
Aristotle as a real accident whose whole being is to be
ordered to something else.[204] This relation is not
included in the essence of the thing, but it comes to the
essence as an accident. It is pure order or reference to
a term, as, for example, paternity, filiation, the
equality of two quantities, likeness.
The real existence of these relations is certain, for,
antecedent to any consideration of the mind and apart from
anyone's thinking, two white things are really alike and
this man is really the father of another. On the
contrary, the relation of the predicate to the subject in
a sentence is a relation of reason, which does not exist
until after the consideration of the mind and as the result
of the mind's activity.
The predicamental relation requires a real basis in the
subject and a real terminus really distinct from this basis
in the subject; this relation does not perdure after the
terminus disappears, and in this it differs from the
transcendental relation. The basis of the predicamental
relation is the reason for the reference or ordering.
Thus, in the relation of paternity the man who begets a
son is the subject, the son is the terminus, to whom the
father has a reference, and generation is the basis of the
relation, since the reason why the father is referred to
the son is the fact that he begot him.[205]
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