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St. Thomas replies affirmatively, as above in question
30, and also refutes the opinion of Alexander of
Hales, attributed to St. Bonaventure, according to
which the persons are constituted by the active and passive
origins, for example, the Father is constituted by
active generation and not by the relation of paternity.
To this St. Thomas replies that a person should be
constituted by something intrinsic to the person itself
that is stable and permanent in actual being. But the
active and passive origins are rather extrinsic to the
persons and they are conceived as in the state of
becoming. Moreover, an active origin, like active
generation, cannot formally constitute the person which it
presupposes, since it is the Father who generates.
Hence, according to our mode of conception it is better
to say that the divine persons are constituted by the
subsisting relations. Thus the Father signifies the
First Person, and the generator is the property of this
person.
Objection. That which presupposes a distinction cannot
be the first principle of the distinction. But relation
presupposes the distinction of the things that are
related, since to be related means to have a reference to
another. Therefore relation cannot be the first principle
of distinction in God.
Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor:
a relation that is an accident presupposes the distinction
of the supposita, I concede; a relation that is
subsisting, I deny, because such a relation constitutes
the persons and brings the distinction with it. So the
reply to the third difficulty. Moreover, in proof of the
minor it should be said that a relation has a reference to
the correlative that is prior, this I deny; to the
correlative that is simultaneous in nature, this I
concede.
I insist. This was examined above. The relation which
follows on active generation cannot constitute the person
who generates. But the relation of paternity follows
active generation since it is founded on active
generation. Therefore the relation of paternity cannot
constitute the person of the Father.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the relation as
actually referring to the terminus, or that which in the
exercise of the act refers to the Son (follows the
person), this I concede; the relation which in the
signified act modifies the divine essence (follows the
person), this I deny. And I contradistinguish the
minor.
Thus the first angle constructed in the triangle is a
geometric figure even before it actually has a reference to
the two other angles. So we can conceive whiteness in
itself as that by which (ut quo) before we conceive it as
modifying the wall (ut quod). Similarly habitual grace
is conceived in itself before it is conceived as expelling
sin; essence is conceived first in its formal act (in
actu signato), as that which is capable of existence,
before it is conceived as in the exercise of the act as
having reference to a produced existence.
This distinction is not futile or without an analogy, but
it must be said that relation, which is a predicamental in
creatures, has a substantial "esse in" only in
God and only in God can it constitute a person.
Relation constitutes a person in God inasmuch as it is
incommunicable and subsisting, and it constitutes a
relative personality inasmuch as it is a relation.
In the third article of this question St. Thomas
insists on the identity of the persons with the relations
by which they are constituted, and he shows that the
intellect cannot abstract the relations from the persons.
This is contrary to the opinion attributed to St.
Bonaventure. In explanation St. Thomas distinguishes
between total abstraction, or logical abstraction, in
which the entire universal (as genus or species) is
abstracted from the particular, as, for example, animal
from man, and formal abstraction, in which form is
abstracted from matter, as, for example, when the form
of the circle is abstracted from all sensible matter.
With respect to God we cannot use total or logical
abstraction because God is not in any genus; hence we
cannot abstract the relations from the persons. Nor can
we by formal abstraction abstract the personal relations
from the persons, for example, paternity from the
Father, because there is no matter in God. The Father
is His paternity and if we abstract the paternity nothing
remains of the Father. On the other hand the form of the
circle can be abstracted from all sensible matter, for
example, from wood or stone.
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