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1. What did St. Augustine mean when he contended that
the "ad aliquid" of the relation was not intended
to refer to the substance?
Reply. St. Augustine's meaning was that the "ad
aliquid" is not predicated of God as something
absolute but as something relative, but he did not say
that the divine relations are really distinct from the
substance. In several places he declared that in God the
relations are not accidents.[235] St. Thomas
points out that in God there are only two predicaments,
substance and relations, and the "esse in" of
the relations is substantial. We are dealing here not
with a transcendental relation but with a predicamental
relation (paternity, filiation, etc.), whose
"esse in" or "being in" in God, however, is
substantial.
2. The term, "inor virtual distinction," is the
happiest expression for the relations as they are in God,
because the Deity as conceived by our minds actually and
implicitly contains the relations.
3. In reply to the third objection, St. Thomas shows
that it does not follow from the preceding that the divine
essence is something relative.[236]
First doubt. Whether the Deity, not as conceived by us
but as it is in itself and is seen by the blessed,
contains the relations explicitly or only implicitly.
Reply. The Deity contains the relations explicitly
because the virtual distinction is a distinction of reason
subsequent to the consideration of our minds, and this
distinction is not found in the divine essence so as to be
seen by God and the blessed. Similarly the divine nature
as imperfectly conceived by us contains the divine
attributes implicitly, since we gradually deduce the
attributes from the divine essence; but as it is in
itself, the Deity explicitly contains the attributes.
The blessed in heaven have no need of deduction to know
the divine attributes; they see them intuitively as they
are formally and eminently in God, not only as virtually
eminently, as is the case with the mixed perfections.
In rejecting Scotus' formal actual distinction between
the Deity and the relations, Cajetan explains: "There
is in God actually, or in the order of reality, only one
being, which is not purely absolute or purely relational,
neither mixed nor composite, or resulting from either of
these, but most eminently and formally possessing that
which is relational and that which is absolute. So in the
formal order, or the order of formal reasons, in
Himself, not in our mode of speaking, there is in God
only one formal reason or essence. This is neither purely
absolute nor purely relational, neither purely
communicable nor purely incommunicable, but most eminently
and formally containing both that which is absolutely
perfect and that which the relational Trinity demands.
We are in error, however, whenever we proceed from the
absolute and relational to God because we imagine that the
distinction between the absolute and the relational is
prior to the divine nature. The complete opposite is
true, for the divine essence is prior to all being and all
of its differences; it is above being, above one,
etc."[237]
And yet the Deity as an essence is really communicated to
the Son and the Holy Ghost without any communication of
paternity or filiation, just as in the triangle the first
angle constructed communicates its whole surface to the
other angles without communicating itself. The danger of
agnosticism does not arise in this statement; such danger
would be present, however, if we said that the divine
relations and attributes were in God virtually and
eminently, like mixed perfections, and not eminently
formally. This doctrine may be reduced to this simple
thought: the Father is God, and in this proposition the
verb "is" expresses the real identity of the subject and
predicate.[238]
Second doubt. Can we safeguard the idea of God as the
most pure, most simple, and infinite act if we admit the
formal-actual distinction?
Reply. The Thomists reply in the negative.[239]
In this hypothesis the divine essence is conceived as
having a foundation in itself that is in potency to the
relations, that is actuable by the relations, as by
something extraneous, like the genus of animality which is
actuable by an extraneous specific difference. But it is
repugnant to the most pure act that it be conceived as
having a basis in itself for further realization; this
would be repugnant to the simplicity and infinity of God.
In this way the Thomists have adhered to Cajetan's
explanation; other equivalent expressions may be found in
Billuart's exposition of this article.
Third doubt. Is the concept of the divine essence more
extensive than the concept of paternity or of any other
relation taken separately?
The reply is in the affirmative, because the Deity as
conceived by us implicitly contains the idea of filiation,
but the idea of filiation is not even implicitly contained
in the concept of paternity, except correlatively since it
is opposed to paternity.
Fourth doubt. Does Deity belong to our explicit concept
of the person of the Father?
The reply is in the affirmative, for while paternity is
only implicitly contained in our concept of the Deity,
Deity is explicitly contained in the paternity because
Deity is more extensive than paternity, including also
filiation. Similarly, in created beings, being is
explicit in the concept of substance, while substance is
not explicitly in the concept of being because being is
more extensive than substance.
Scotus' objection. If Deity is conceived by us as
containing paternity in act, it follows that in begetting
the Son the Father communicates paternity to Him. Then
the Son would be the Father. Or if paternity is not
communicated to the Son, then the Deity is not
communicated to Him. Further, Scotus argued that if
being implicitly contains substance and accidents, then
whenever anything is predicated both substance and
accidents are predicated.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: if the Deity is
conceived by us as explicitly containing paternity, I
concede; as implicitly containing paternity, I
sub-distinguish: both implicitly and copulatively, I
concede; implicitly and disjunctively, I deny. For the
Deity is disjunctively either in the Father, or in the
Son, or in the Holy Ghost. A virtual distinction is
enough to safeguard the truth of the propositions about the
communicability of the nature without the communication of
paternity, just as it suffices to say that God punishes
by His justice but not by His mercy. In the same way
the concept of being contains substance and accidents
implicitly, not copulatively but disjunctively, and
therefore it does not follow that substance is accident.
Many difficulties are solved in this manner, namely, how
it is the Father who begets and not the essence with which
the Father is really identified; how each divine person
is really God and still not the other persons, which are
really implicitly included in the Deity.
I insist. But if the Deity, as it is in itself and is
clearly seen by the blessed, explicitly contains the
paternity, it follows that the Father in begetting the
Son communicates paternity to Him, and thus the Son is
the Father or He is not God.
Reply. This would be true if in the eminent being of the
Deity the absolute and the relative, the communicable and
the incommunicable, would be identified to such an extent
as to be destroyed, this I concede; otherwise, I
deny. Indeed, the absolute communicable and the
incommunicable relative are found in God in a formally
pre-eminent manner, just as mercy and justice in God are
identified without being destroyed, since they are in God
not only virtually (like the seven colors in white light)
but also formally and eminently. Here is the mystery of
the divine pre-eminence. We therefore rightly conceive
the divine essence as being communicated to the Son
together with all the absolute essential things which it
contains and which are communicable, without any
communication of the relative (paternity) because of the
opposition to the terminus to which the essence is
communicated. Thus in the triangle the first angle
communicates its entire surface to the second and third
angles but not itself.
In a word, the Father communicates the divine essence to
the Son with regard to everything except where the
opposition of relation intervenes, because a relative
cannot be communicated to its correlative opposite. This
statement is in accord with Cajetan's explanation: "In
God (as He is in Himself) there is but one formal
reason, neither purely absolute, nor purely relative,
nor purely communicable, nor purely incommunicable, but
eminently and formally containing both whatever is of
absolute perfection and whatever the relational Trinity
demands."[240] Cajetan declared also: "It
remains that (God) is both communicable and
incommunicable."[241]
Fifth doubt. What is the foundation of the relations of
paternity and filiation?
Reply. In created beings the foundation is active and
passive generation; this is also true proportionately of
God. It should be noted that the "esse in" of
the relation is not the foundation of the relation because
the "esse in" is something common to all
accidents, expressing at the same time the existence of
the accident, for the being of the accident is the
"esse in" at last aptitudinally.
The foundation of paternity as a relation is active
generation, and the foundation of the relation of
filiation is passive generation, that is, the actual
procession. Similarly, spiration is the foundation of
the relations between the Holy Ghost and the Father and
the Son, who spirate in one active spiration.
Sixth doubt. Whether the divine relations (or persons)
have their own proper relative existences, or whether they
exist by the one absolute existence of the essence.
Reply. In opposition to Scotus and Suarez, the
Thomists and many other theologians reply in the
negative. This reply is based on many texts of St.
Thomas; for example, "Since the divine person is the
same as the divine nature, the being of the person is not
different from the being of the nature. Therefore the
three divine persons have but one being; they would have a
triple being if in them the being of the nature were other
than the being of the persons."[242]
In these texts St. Thomas is clearly speaking of the
being of existence and not the being of the essence,
particularly in the passage where he inquires whether there
is one being in Christ although there are two natures,
and answers in the affirmative.[243]
In explaining this answer to Scotus and Suarez we may
say that the existence of the relation is nothing more than
its "esse in." But, as we have said, the
"esse in" of the relations in God is
substantial, the same as the being of the divine nature.
Therefore the divine relations do not have their own
existences. Just as in God there is not a triple
intelligence nor a triple will, so all the more there is
no triple being, for in God all things are one and the
same except where there is the opposition of relation.
This teaching is confirmed by the Athanasian Creed,
which declares, "not three uncreated,... but one
uncreated." If there were three uncreated existences
besides the absolute existence common to the three
persons, there would be three uncreated beings, not only
adjectively but substantively, because the form and the
subject would be multiplied. We would then have three
entities having three uncreated existences. Scotus and
Suarez, therefore, are in some danger of tritheism.
Fundamentally this is why Suarez was unable to solve the
objection arising from the principle of identity: those
things which are equal to a third are equal to each other.
By multiplying being in God, Suarez multiplied the
absolute in God and placed in jeopardy the principle that
in God all things are one and the same except where there
is the opposition of relation.
Further confirmation is had from the fact that in God
essence and being are the same. But the essence is common
to the three persons. Therefore being is also common to
all three. Being is communicated together with the nature
because it is completely identified with the nature. The
divine nature is subsisting being itself according to the
Scriptures, "am who am."[244] If the same
intelligence and will are communicated, all the more the
same existence is communicated.
Further, relative existences would be superfluous, for
that which is already in existence does not need further
existence; by the first existence a being is beyond
nothingness and beyond its causes (if it has a cause).
To say that what is already beyond nothingness and its
causes is once again placed beyond causes and nothingness
is to imply a contradiction. It would also imply a
contradiction to have two ultimate realities of the same
order, for neither would be the ultimate. Existence,
however, is the ultimate reality of a thing. When the
Fathers said that to be God was different from being the
Father, they understood this being God with respect to
Himself and the being the Father with respect to some one
else. It does not follow from this that there are several
existences in God.
Objection. Existence is nothing more than being in act.
But the relations are really in act as distinct from the
essence. Therefore they have their own existences.
Reply. The Thomists deny the major, for existence is
not the thing itself but the actuality of the thing by
which it is placed beyond nothingness and its causes. In
God, however, essence and being are the same, and since
the essence is common to the three persons the divine
existence is also common to them. The relations,
therefore, are truly in act, but they are so by the
absolute existence of the essence.
Objection. All production terminates with existence.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the production of a
contingent being terminates in the production of a new
existence, I concede; but communication terminates in an
existence that is not new but in an existence that is
communicated to the person who proceeds. So in some way
the uncreated being of the Word is communicated to the
assumed humanity since there is only one existence in
Christ; so also the being of the separated soul is
communicated to the body in the resurrection because there
is only one substantial existence in man. Scotus and
Suarez, however, deny the real distinction between
created essence and being and therefore they multiply
substantial being in man, assigning one to the body and
one to the soul. They also declare that there are two
beings in Christ and three relative existences in the
Trinity.
I insist. Each thing that is distinct from others has
its own existence. But the divine persons are distinct
from one another. Therefore they have their own
existences.
Reply. Each thing has its own existence, either proper
or common, I concede; that the existence is always
proper, I deny. Thus the humanity of Christ does not
have its own proper existence, and in us the body does not
have its proper existence distinct from the existence of
the soul. Our bodies exist by the existence of the soul,
which is spiritual. It is not repugnant, therefore,
that in God the relations, whose "esse in" is
substantial, exist by the existence of the divine nature
itself.
I insist. Therefore in God the Father refers to
Himself and not to another and not to the Son.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the Father refers
to Himself with regard to His "esse in", I
concede; with regard to His "esse ad", I
deny.
Final objection. Besides the absolute subsistence in
God there are three relative subsistences or
personalities; therefore there should be besides the
absolute existence three relative existences.
Reply. I deny the consequence. The difference arises
from the fact that the absolute subsistence confers only
the perseity of independence but not the perseity of
incommunicability; the three relative subsistences are not
superfluous since they are required for incommunicability.
On the other hand, the absolute existence, communicated
with the nature, places the persons beyond nothingness,
so that relative existences are superfluous, as was said
above.
Seventh doubt. Whether the divine relations by reason of
their "esse ad" add some relative perfection to
the absolute perfection of the divine essence virtually
distinct from it.
State of the question. It is most certain that the
divine relations (which are, as we shall see below, the
divine persons) are most perfect since they are identified
with the divine essence, which is infinite subsisting
perfection itself. Thus the divine relations are
necessarily loved by God and must be accorded the
adoration of latria on our part. The question is whether
the relations by reason of their "esse ad" add
some relative perfection, virtually distinct from the
absolute perfection of the divine essence, which they
include.
The reply is in the negative. This reply is at least the
more probable one and is held by such Thomists as
Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, the
Salmanticences, Gonet, and Billuart. But some
Thomists (John of St. Thomas, Contenson, and
Bancel) hold the contrary opinion.
1. Proof from authority. In his work on the Trinity,
St. Augustine says: "The Father is good, the Son
is good, the Holy Ghost is good; but there are not
three good, only one is good. If goodness and perfection
are actually multiplied in the three divine persons, they
could be said to be three good and three perfect persons
not only adjectively but also substantively because what
these words signify both materially and formally would be
multiplied inasmuch as there would be three relative
perfections really distinct from one another.[245]
St. Thomas declared: "Paternity is a dignity of the
Father as is the essence of the Father, for it is an
absolute dignity and pertains to the essence. Just as,
therefore, the same essence which in the Father is
paternity and in the Son is filiation, so the same
dignity which in the Father is paternity is filiation in
the Son."[246] So analogically in the triangle,
the one surface which is the surface of the first angle is
the surface of the second and third angles; no relative
surfaces are found besides the absolute and common
surface.
Billuart and others rightly point out that in these words
St. Thomas not only openly asserts our conclusion but
proves it, since the dignity or perfection of the Father
is absolute and pertains to the essence.
2. Proof from theology. A thing is not good or perfect
except inasmuch as it exists or implies an order to being.
But the divine relations indeed exist according to their
"esse in", but according to their "esse
ad" they are not anything but only in reference to
something.[247] Therefore by reason of their
"esse ad" the relations do not add a relative
perfection virtually distinct from the absolute, infinite
perfection of the essence. In other words, the
existence, and the perfection too, of the predicamental
relation, with which we are now dealing, has reference to
the subject and not to the terminus, and therefore the
"esse ad" does not imply an order to existence,
but prescinds from existence. For this reason it is
possible to have certain relations which are not real and
are of the mind only, namely, those whose "esse
in" is not real.[248]
Here it is that the divine relations differ from the
divine attributes, which by their nature look to the
essence and have an order, not to something else, but to
themselves. Thus the attributes are called absolute or
absolutely simple perfections, which it is better to have
than not to have. So the divine will is an absolute
perfection, virtually distinct from the perfection of
God's being and from subsisting intellect itself,
although all these are identified without being destroyed
in the eminence of the Deity, in whom they are found not
only virtually and eminently but formally and eminently.
Corollary. The divine relations, taken formally
according to their "esse ad", are not absolutely
simple perfections properly so called because, although
they do not involve imperfection, it is not better to have
them than not to have them; their "esse ad" is a
pure reference, prescinding from perfection and
imperfection. So also in God the free act of creation
(I am not speaking here of freedom but of the free act)
is not an absolutely simple perfection, since God is not
more perfect because He created the universe.[249]
God was not improved because from eternity He willed to
create the world; to create the world is indeed something
befitting, but not to have created is nevertheless not
unbefitting.
On this point there is agreement, but Cajetan offered a
formula that was not acceptable to other Thomists: "For
God to will other beings is a voluntary and entirely free
perfection whose opposite would not be an
imperfection."[250] He expresses it better when he
says: "To communicate oneself implies perfection not in
him who communicates but in those to whom the communication
is made."[251]
In the formula, rejected by other Thomists, as we have
noted elsewhere,[252] Cajetan seems to confuse a
modal proposition referring to the saying with the modal
proposition referring to the thing. It is correct to say
that it is befitting that God created, in the sense that
it is not unbefitting not to have created; but it is
incorrect to say that the free volition to create is a new
free perfection in God (virtually distinct from His
essential perfection), even though the opposite is not an
imperfection. Otherwise God would be more perfect
because He willed to create the universe, as Leibnitz
wrongly concluded. These observations should throw some
light on this present question, namely, that the divine
relations with regard to their "esse ad" do not
add a new perfection.
Confirmation from the following incongruities.
1. Otherwise it would follow that the Father lacked one
perfection, namely, filiation, and also passive
spiration. None of the divine persons would therefore be
perfect, none would have every perfection, and none would
be God. For God must have all absolutely simple
perfections, those perfections which it is better to have
than not to have.
2. It would follow that all three persons would be more
perfect, at least extensively, than any one person, and
against this St. Augustine declared: "The Father is
as great by Himself as are the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost together."[253]
3. The Father and the Son would be more perfect than
the Holy Ghost because besides their proper perfection
they would have the perfection of active spiration,
whereas the Holy Ghost would have but one perfection,
passive spiration.
Objection. The Father does not have filiation formally
but eminently because of the divine essence. Hence
filiation is properly an absolutely simple perfection.
Reply. In that case the Father would not have any
absolutely simple perfection formally, and that would be
improper.
I insist. The Father has filiation compensatively and
terminatively, if not constitutively.
Reply. In that case the Father would not be infinitely
perfect; and the Holy Ghost would be less perfect
because He would have only one relative perfection and not
two. Hence He would not even be compensatively perfect.
Another objection. A relative perfection implies a
subject that is perfectible in order to something else, as
we see in the case of potencies or faculties and habits.
Hence it is wrong to say that a relation with regard to
its "esse ad" prescinds from perfection. For
the perfection of our intellect arises from its relation to
being. Such was Contenson's argument.
Reply. Contenson, as Billuart pointed out, here
confuses the transcendental relation of a faculty to its
specific object with the predicamental relation, namely,
paternity or filiation, which are pure references to a
pure terminus and therefore do not consider the subject by
reason of itself but by reason of the terminus.
Final difficulty. The created personality implies a
perfection really and modally distinct from the perfection
of the nature. Therefore for an equal or stronger reason
the divine personalities, which are constituted by
subsisting relations, imply a perfection distinct from the
nature.
Reply. In agreement with many others I distinguish the
antecedent. The created personality is a perfection with
regard to the perseity of independence, I concede; with
regard to the perseity of incommunicability, I deny,
because it is not a perfection not to be able to
communicate to another. The divine personalities confer
incommunicability but not the perseity of independence,
which is common to all three persons.[254]
This should suffice in explanation of St. Thomas'
second article, in which he teaches that the real
relations in God are not distinguished really from the
essence, but are only virtually distinct. This truth can
be succinctly stated as, "The Father is God." In
this statement, as in every affirmative proposition, the
verb "is" expresses the actual identity of the subject
and the predicate. In other words: the Deity as known
by us contains the divine relations implicitly; the Deity
as it is in itself contains them explicitly, or formally
and eminently without the formal-actual distinction
proposed by Scotus. This teaching implies no leaning to
agnosticism; such danger would arise if we said that the
real relations were in God not formally and eminently but
only virtually and eminently like mixed perfections, as
when we say that God is angry.
Indeed the divine relations are in God like the divine
attributes, to a greater degree than colors are contained
in white because the seven colors are contained in white
only virtually and not formally. White is not blue; but
the Deity is true, it is good, it is also the
paternity, although the Deity is communicated by the
Father to the Son without a communication of paternity.
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