|
The difficulty arises from the fact that everything that
is triune is threefold, whereas God is not threefold
since He possesses the greatest unity. Nevertheless the
reply is in the affirmative as an article of faith. In
the Athanasian Creed we read, "The Unity is to be
worshiped in Trinity and the Trinity in
Unity."[327]
Theology offers the following explanation. In God there
is a transcendental plurality of persons. The term
"Trinity" according to revelation limits this plurality
to the three persons. Therefore the term Trinity can
rightly be used.
Reply to the first objection. Etymologically the term
"Trinity" seems to signify the unity of three, but in a
special way it signifies the transcendental number of
persons of one essence. Thus we cannot say that the
Father is the Trinity. The term "Trinity" signifies
at the same time the number of persons and the unity of the
essence.
Reply to the second objection. St. John declared,
"And these three are one" (I John 5:7). Hence
we have the name "Trinity."
Reply to the third objection. Nevertheless in God there
is no triplicity because triplicity denotes a proportion of
inequality as do duplicity and quadruplicity. Thus we
cannot say that God is threefold. That which is
threefold has in a sense been tripled, as, for instance,
a triple crown signifies the union of three crowns.
If God were said to be threefold, the three persons
together would be more than one alone, and one person
would not have infinite perfection. But we can say that
the persons are threefold and the processions are twofold,
because by adding person and procession we exclude
sufficiently the multiplicity of nature.
Reply to the fourth objection. Unity in Trinity
signifies that there is one nature in three persons, and
Trinity in unity signifies three persons in one nature.
Reply to the fifth objection. We cannot say that the
Trinity is threefold for this would mean that there were
three supposita of the Trinity, whereas there are only
three supposita of the Deity.
First corollary. From the foregoing the Thomists,
especially Gonet, conclude that those things that belong
to the persons by reason of the essence alone are
predicated only singly. Those things, however, that
belong to the persons by reason of the persons alone are
predicated only in the plural. Those things that belong
to the persons by reason of the essence and the relations
are predicated both in the singular and in the plural.
The reason for this rule is that in God all things are
one and the same except where there is the opposition of
relation; only the relations are multiplied in God, the
essence is not. This was defined by the Council of
Toledo: "Number is discovered in the relation of the
persons; but we find nothing that is numbered in the
substance of the divinity. Thus number is indicated only
in this, that they are mutually related; and they lack
number in this, that they are in themselves."[328]
From this rule it follows that it is correct to say that
there are three persons or three hypostases in God but not
three individuals because the nature is multiplied in
individuals. In its formal signification person denotes
personality; in its material signification it denotes
nature. On the other hand, the individual in its formal
signification denotes nature; in its material
signification it denotes personality.
Thus we do not say that there are three individuals or
three gods, because in the three persons God is
numerically one. According to the Fourth Lateran
Council, we may say that there are three divine beings,
three co-eternal and omnipotent beings if these terms are
used adjectively because the multiplication of the
suppositum is sufficient for the multiplication of the
adjective term without a multiplication of the form. Thus
"three divine beings" signifies three that possess the
Deity.
It is wrong, however, to say three divine beings if this
expression is taken substantively. It is in this sense
that the Athanasian Creed declares, "And yet they are
not three eternals, but one Eternal," for the plural
substantive requires the multiplication of both the form
and the suppositum. We can say, "In God there is one
thing (res)" which is the essence, and several relative
realities inasmuch as the divine relations are something
real and not fictitious. We can then predicate reality of
God both in the singular and plural number according to
the aforesaid rule because reality belongs to the persons
both by reason of the essence and the relations.
Second corollary. As Cajetan declared: "In God
according to actuality or in the real order there is one
being, neither purely absolute nor purely relational, not
mixed or composed or resulting from these two, but
eminently and formally possessing both that which is
relational (with several relational beings) and that
which is absolute."[329] This is generally admitted
even by the Scotists.
Third corollary. In opposition to the Scotist
formal-actual distinction on the part of the thing,
Cajetan also declared: "Even in the formal order or the
order of formal reasons in themselves, not in our manner
of speaking, there is in God one formal reason, neither
purely absolute nor purely relational, neither purely
communicable nor purely incommunicable, but eminently and
formally containing both whatever is of absolute perfection
and whatever the relational Trinity demands." In God
there is no distinction antecedent to our consideration
except between the divine relations that are opposed to
each other. Still the divine nature is actually
communicated to the Son without a communication of
paternity. So also with regard to the Holy Ghost the
divine nature is communicated without a communication of
paternity, filiation, or active spiration, as in the
triangle the entire surface of the first angle is
communicated to the second and third angles without a
communication of the first angle. Paternity cannot be
communicated to the Son, because it is opposed to
filiation, as spiration is also opposed to procession.
Fourth corollary. The unity of God is more clearly
manifested after the revelation of the Trinity than
before, because it now appears as that simple unity which
exists notwithstanding the real distinction of the persons
and which contains in itself eminently and formally
whatever is absolute and relational. These are the lights
and shadows in our view of the Trinity.
|
|