CHAPTER III: QUESTION 29 THE DIVINE PERSONS

[277] St Thomas, Posterior Analytics, Bk. II.

[278] Aristotle, De categoriis, chap. 2

[279] St. Thomas, Post. Analyt., Bk. II, chaps. 12 f.

[280] St. Thomas frequently points this out as, for example, in Contra Gentes, Bk. II chap. 52: "In every substance besides God the substance itself, or that which is, is different from the existence. -" Thus personality is that by which something is what it is, namely, a suppositum with a rational nature, whereas existence is that by which a thing exists

[281] Scotus, in III Sent., 1, q. 1, nos. 5 f

[282] Suarez, Disp. met., disp. 34, sect. 1, 2, 4, etc.; De Incarnatione, disp. XI, sect. 3.

[283] Cajetan, on IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, nos. 8 f.; cf. Capreolus, III Sent., V, q. 3, a. 3, no. 2

[284] L. Billot, De Verbo Incarnato (5th ed.), q. 2, pp. 75, 84, 137, 140.

[285] Summa, IIIa, q. 2, a. 2.

[286] Contra Gentes, Bk. 11, chap. 52.

[287] Summa, IIIa q. 17, a. 2 ad 1.

[288] Cajetan, on IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, no. 8.

[289] Objection. One per se does not result from one or more acts. But the suppositum is one per se. Therefore it cannot be constituted by three acts, namely, essence, subsistence, and existence.

Reply. One nature does not result from several acts, this I concede; one suppositum does not result from several acts, this I deny. The suppositum is indeed per se subsisting, but the created suppositum and its existence are not one per se, and they are not one nature, since the existence does not pertain to the nature but is only a contingent predicate. Moreover, in Christ there are one suppositum and two natures.

[290] "Person adds something over and above the individuated nature, as an act of the nature, but not as a substantial form or an accident, but in the manner that the being of an actual existence is said to be the act of the essence by which it exists and by which the suppositum is what it is..... The suppositum is the same as the individual having being per se." Capreolus, loc. cit.

[291] Summa, Ia, q. 39, a. 3 ad 4.

[292] St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4; cf. I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2 ad 4: "The term 'person' is imposed by the personal propriety, which is the form signified and determined by the terminal being."

[293] Summa, IIIa, q. 4, a. 2.

[294] Ibid., q. 17, a. 2 ad. 1

[295] Ibid., ad 3.

[296] St. Thomas, Quodl., II, q. 2, a. 4.

[297] Cf. Revue thomiste, March 1933, "La personnalite, ce qu'elle est formellement," Garrigou-Lagrange

[298] Summa, IIIa, q. 77, a. 2.

[299] Ibid., q. 2, a. 2.

[300] Ibid., q. 77, a. 2.

[301] Ibid., Ia, q. 29, a. 3. St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, 2.

[302] An ontological personality, therefore, is that by which a thinking subject is a subject; a psychological personality is that by which this subject is conscious of itself; a moral personality is that by which this subject is of its own right (sui juris). The intellectual personality is manifested in its courage, nobility, and universality of judgment; the moral personality appears in the degree that the interrelated virtues which constitute character are able to prevail over the physical temperament. The religious personality manifests itself in the degree that a man is intimately united to God

[303] Cf. De Regnon, op. cit., I, 227.

[304] Denz., nos. 115, 216

[305] The correlation of abstract and concrete terms is as follows:

CONCRETE TERMS / ABSTRACT TERMS

person / personality

suppositum / subsistence

subsisting in itself / existence of the substance

inhering / existence of the accident

Cf. Post. Analyt., Bk. I, chap. 4, lect. 10

[306] Cf. Fourth Lateran Council.

[307] Boethius, De Trin., chap. 6, in sed contra. Cf. Eleventh Council of Toledo (675), Denz., no. 278

[308] Denz., no. 280

[309] Ibid., no. 703; cf. Petau, De Trinitate, IV

[310] Summa, q. 27

[311] St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 4

[312] Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3

[313] Summa, Ia, q. 3, a. 2

[314] Denz., no. 428

[315] Ibid., no. 703

[316] Summa, Ia, q. 40, a. 2

[317] Ibid., a. 4

[318] St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 21, q. 2

[319] Contra Gentes, Bk IV, chap. 14; De potentia, q. 9, a. 5 ad 15.

[320] Summa, Ia, q. 29, a. 2 ad 2