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State of the question. 1. Aristotle says that evil is
a genus; therefore it is some kind of nature; 2. evil
is a constitutive difference in moral matters, for
example, we speak of an evil habit, or an evil act; 3.
Aristotle says that good and evil are opposed as
contraries, that is, as positives; 4. evil acts and it
corrupts, therefore it is something; 5. evil pertains
to the perfection of the universe because in its own way it
enhances the good.
Moreover, as Renouvier says:[998] "According to
experience, physical pain is something else than
imperfection or privation, and according to our
consciences moral evil is something else than ignorance.
There is therefore a positive evil."
The pessimists hold that physical evil, such as pain, is
not only something positive but something primitive, in
the sense that pleasure is only secondary and negative,
namely, the cessation of pain. Schopenhauer tried to
prove this point by the following argument: Man always
requires something, he always desires something. This
perpetual desire is not without pain. Therefore the
normal state of man is sad and painful. The pleasure that
comes from the satisfaction of this desire is simply the
cessation of pain. Pain, therefore, is something
primitive and positive.
Before Schopenhauer's time, Kant said that punishment
preceded pleasure because pleasure is the consciousness of
the vital striving and all striving presupposes an obstacle
or punishment. Montaigne said: "Our well-being is
nothing else than the absence of ill-being."[999]
Similarly the Epicureans declared that pleasure is the
absence of pain or perturbation, ataraxia.[1000]
The reply of the article is, however, that evil is not
anything but it is the privation of good.
Proof from authority. Dionysius said, "Evil is not
existing." St. Augustine says the same
thing.[1001]
Proof from reason. This proof begins with the nominal
definition of evil, which according to all thinkers is
opposed to good and is known through this opposition to
good. Going from the nominal definition to the real
definition and from the confused concept to a distinct
concept, we arrive at this explicative syllogism.
Good and being are convertible.[1002] But evil is
opposed to good. Therefore evil is not something positive
but the negation or rather the privation of good.
Proof of the major. Good is everything that is
desirable. But every nature desires to preserve its being
and its perfection. Therefore all being and every
perfection is something good, and therefore, too, evil
is not some being or some positive nature, but it is
either the negation or the privation of good. St.
Thomas says below more explicitly that evil is the
privation of some owing good, that is, in an apt
subject, when and where this good is owing.
Reply to first objection. In what sense does Aristotle
say that evil is a kind of genus?[1003] St.
Thomas replies that in his book on logic Aristotle
offered examples which appeared probable in his time, and
that he took this example from the Pythagoreans. Or,
perhaps, Aristotle meant that the primary contrariety was
habit, or the having of a thing, and privation, because
this contrariety is found in all contraries.
Elsewhere[1004] Aristotle, treating professedly of
the four modes of opposition, distinguishes between
privation and contrariety.
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OPPOSITION BETWEEN BEING AND BEING
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opposition of relation, as between father and son
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opposition of contrariety |
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pleasure and pain
virtue and vice
true and false judgments
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OPPOSITION BETWEEN BEING AND NON-BEING
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opposition of contradiction, as between man and non-man |
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sight and blindness
light and darkness
knowledge and ignorance
good and evil[1005]
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From this division of various kinds of opposition it
appears that evil is not the negation but the privation of
good. No one will say that it is evil for a stone or a
tree not to know, nor does anyone say that wood is
ignorant. Similarly we do not say that it is an evil that
man does not have the strength of a lion. These are
negations, not privations. We see, then, that evil is
the privation of some owing good and not only a negation of
good.
This point is of great importance, for we say that the
non-preservation of our will in good here and now is not
something good, because it is not being, nor is it
something evil, because it is not the privation of some
owing good; it is merely the privation of a good that is
not owing. God is not obliged to preserve all created
wills in good or to prevent every sin. Thus the
non-preservation of our wills in good differs from the
subtraction of divine grace. This withdrawal of divine
grace is the evil of punishment and presupposes the evil of
guilt.
Corollary. A lesser good is not an evil, although it
implies the negation of a greater good, which, however,
is not the privation of an owing good. In the same way,
a lesser evil is not a good. In this sense many
theologians distinguish between an imperfection and the
smallest venial sin, as for instance, between a
diminution of generosity (some remissness in an act of
charity) and negligence. In the concrete, however, it
is extremely difficult to say where the lesser good ceases
and where the lesser evil begins, just as it is difficult
to say when is the lowest degree of sensitive life and when
is the highest degree of vegetative life. Nevertheless
the order of things must not be confused.
All ethics would be destroyed by a relativism which
teaches that a lesser evil, not only physical (as the
amputation of a member) but also moral evil (as a lie)
would be lawful to avoid some greater evil. Such action
would be against reason; such lesser moral evil can be
tolerated but it cannot be positively chosen.[1006]
Reply to second objection. Good and evil are not
constitutive differences, except in moral matters, for
instance, a bad habit, an evil deed. But even in moral
matters evil does not constitute a species, except in the
sense that the privation of a proper end is annexed to an
improper end. Thus the end of the intemperate man is not
to deprive himself of the good of reason, his aim is a
pleasurable thing according to the senses outside the order
of reason. Hence even in moral matters evil, as evil,
is not a constitutive difference.
Consequently a sin of commission is a positive act,
tending to a changeable good as out of harmony with the
rules of morals; thus a good act and an evil act are
contrary, as are virtue and vice. But in the contrary
positive that we call vice we find the privation of an
owing end. Scotus held that good and evil are contrary
opposites, but according to St. Thomas this is not true
except of good and evil in morality, that is, when we
speak of an evil act or a bad habit.
Reply to fourth objection. Evil acts in corrupting the
good, but it does not act efficiently, nor does it act
for an end except by reason of a connected good; evil is
said to corrupt the good by reason of some privation,
because it is the privation of good.
Reply to fifth objection. Evil does not pertain to the
order of the universe except by reason of some connected
good. Thus the corruption of one being disposes to the
generation of another. Nevertheless evil as opposed to
good, commends the good, as, for example, some
lamentable injustice shows forth more clearly the beauty of
justice.[1007]
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