CHAPTER XXV: QUESTIONS 48, 49 THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR


THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL

We consider first the distinction between good and evil and then the distinction between the spiritual and corporeal creature.

St. Thomas proceeds methodically by considering first created being as being in the question on creation, then being as one and multiple in the question on the distinction of things in general, and now being as good and the evil that may be in it.

Thus St. Thomas considers creatures with regard to the transcendental properties of being before he considers genera and species. He does not treat of being expressly as true because truth is formally in the intellect, as was already explained in the question on truth in God.[982] In the present question St. Thomas treats rather of evil than of good, because the good in general was already discussed in the question on the divine goodness.[983]

On the subject of evil there are two questions: on evil itself with relation to being and to good (question 48); on the cause of evil, having in mind especially the problem of God's relationship to evil and whether God is in any way the cause of evil.

Question 48 is divided into two parts: 1. the nature of evil; 2. the kinds of evil. The first part, on the nature of evil, has four articles: 1. whether evil is some kind of nature; 2. whether evil is found in things; 3. whether the good is the subject of evil; 4. whether evil completely corrupts the good. The second part, concerning the kinds of evil, has two articles: 5. the division of evil into that of punishment and guilt; 6. which is more evil, punishment or guilt. St. Thomas explained these questions at great length in his "De malo."

Errors. In these questions we find an exposition of the doctrine of St. Augustine and Dionysius as developed in their controversies against the Manichaeans, who posited two principles, one beneficent, the other malevolent, and against the Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus, who taught that matter was the ultimate terminus of emanation, a kind of non-being and the cause of both physical and moral evil.

The following is an outline of Manichaeism and Plotinus' doctrine on evil. Reviving the errors of the Marcionites, the Gnostics, and of Zoroaster, the Manichaeans posited two supreme principles, one beneficent, the other evil, in order to explain the evil found in the world, since evil cannot come from God, the good principle. They also taught that matter and the flesh are from the evil principle, as is also the inferior or sensitive soul in man, whereas the spiritual soul is derived from the good principle. Thus they said that the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit, and the war of the spirit against the flesh is nothing more than the battle between two souls. They execrated generation and condemned marriage, but not an infecund sexual union. Hence their peculiar immorality. They also taught that Christ did not assume true flesh. Finally, according to their theory, the end of the world will be the separation of the good kingdom from the evil kingdom inasmuch as the good souls will be separated from matter for all eternity while the other souls will be bound to matter forever.

This theory reduces Christianity to a natural philosophy and confuses evil with matter.[984] As descendants of Manichaeism we find the Priscillianists in Spain in the fifth century and the Bulgarians in Bulgaria in the eleventh century, who, when they migrated to the west, originated the sects of the Albigenses and the Cathari. Many of their errors are also found in the teachings of Huss, Wyclif, and Luther on original sin and the fall of man.

Plotinus posited only one principle, the One-Good, but he also taught that an intimate connection existed between matter and evil. In his view the world is explained as a necessary emanation from the One-Good principle; he held a descending evolution, in which through a series of divine generations a gradual descent is made from the perfect to the imperfect, and finally the primitive energy became so weak by these successive emanations that it was no longer able to bring forth real being and in the end there came forth a kind of non-being, that is, matter, which existed somehow, which was said to be the root of all evil and the principle of all corruption. Thus the supreme good by a necessity of its nature produced the root of every evil. Such is the paradox of this emanatism. For Plotinus, matter is evil; it is the primary evil inasmuch as it is the privation of being and good. Thus it is the root of all evils, both physical and moral, for physical evils, such as disease and death, are a kind of corruption inasmuch as matter tries to escape the domination of the form. The spiritual soul, however, is good in itself but it becomes evil as the slave of the body by intemperance and ignobility. From this teaching arose many errors.[985]

St. Augustine attacked Manichaeism and the Neoplatonic doctrine on evil in his "De civitate Dei."[986] He admitted that the body accidentally weighs down the soul, but he showed that matter is not evil, that the flesh in its rightful place is good, and that there will be a corporeal resurrection. Hence we cannot attribute our sins to our flesh and indirectly to God, who is the author of our bodies; nor do all sins come from sensuality, for example, the spiritual pride of the devils. Further, St. Augustine insisted that the condition of moral evil is our liberty, which is not its own rule and can, therefore, deviate from the rule. In his work, "De natura boni", written against the Manichaeans in 405, he demonstrated that prime matter is not evil: "Nor is that matter to be called evil, which because of the complete privation of species can hardly be conceived. For it possesses the capacity for forms. Therefore, if a form is some kind of good, without doubt the capacity for a form is also some kind of good."[987] St. Thomas adopted and developed this doctrine.

Finally, in his "Enchiridion",[988] St. Augustine gave the definition of evil, which later became classical and offered a solution for the problem of evil which was accepted and explained by all theologians. St. Augustine said that evil is nothing more than the privation of good, and from this came the classic definition, evil is the privation of some good that is owing, for example, sickness is the privation of health, and moral evil is the privation of moral rectitude. St. Augustine points out that sickness is not a substance but the privation of health in the body, which itself is the substance and something good.

He affirms that all natures are good since the author of all natures is the highest good, but in these natures the good can be decreased, and this decrease is evil. Then he solves the problem of evil, as follows: "God, since He is the highest good, would in no way allow any evil in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and so good that He could turn evil into good."[989]

St. Thomas frequently quotes these words of St. Augustine as a solution of the problem of evil, for example, "God does not permit evil except for some greater good."[990] This truth had already been stated by Plato and is expressed in different ways in Holy Scripture. The divine permission of evil would not be good and holy unless it were ordered to some good and all things in the universe would not cooperate to good.

St. Thomas also perfected Dionysius' doctrine on evil in his work, "Expositio in Dionysium de divinis nominibus." In several instances Dionysius corrects the teaching of Plotinus by showing that matter is not evil.[991]

In the beginning he shows that "evil is neither existing being, nor from some existing being, nor in existing beings."[992] These last words mean, as St. Thomas says,[993] that evil is not something positive in existing beings as a part or an accident; that in creatures evil is not something positive;[994] that "in the devils and in souls evil is not as something existing but like the defect of the perfection of proper goods."[995]

In a later passage,[996] in opposition to Plotinus, he shows that matter is not evil. He offers a threefold proof: 1. with regard to form; 2. with regard to God the creator of matter; 3. and with regard to the good of the whole universe.

1. Under the form, matter participates in being and beauty, and therefore it is not evil. Indeed, even without the form it is not evil or the principle of all evils because without the form matter is not a principle of action, because matter cannot destroy or corrupt anything, and because matter is the receptive capacity of the form, and therefore good, as St. Augustine said.

With regard to God. The matter which the Neoplatonists call non-being either is or it is not; if it is not, it is neither good nor bad; if it is, it is produced by a good God, and therefore it cannot be bad, as St. Augustine again pointed out.

3. With regard to the good of the universe. Matter is necessary, for example, it is necessary for the generation of plants and animals and for their nutrition, and thus inasmuch as it enters into the order of the universe it is good.

In his commentary on this book of Dionysius,[997] St. Thomas notes that when many of the ancient philosophers, like Plato, say that matter is evil and the principle of evils this was because they were unable to distinguish between privation and matter, and therefore, like Plato, they called matter non-being and consequently non-good.

But Aristotle showed that it is only "per accidens" that matter is non-being, that is, matter is non-being not by its nature but by reason of the privation that is in it. Indeed, matter is something positive, namely, the real capacity for receiving a form, or passive potency, and therefore it is not evil.

Finally Dionysius showed that matter is not the cause of malice in the soul, necessarily drawing the soul to evil, for many souls are not drawn to evil and have a tendency to good. He adds that the malice comes from the inordinateness of free will. These teachings of St. Augustine and Dionysius were stated metaphysically by St. Thomas, as we see in the beginning of the present question.