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State of the question. In this article we establish the
equivalence of the Latin term persona with the Greek term
"hypostasis". St. Thomas, as is clear from
his replies to the second and third difficulties, realized
the difficulties arising on this point between the Greeks
and Latins. The Greeks refused to accept the term
"person" because for them it signified the mask which
actors in the theater wore to represent famous personages;
and since an actor successively wore masks to impersonate
different heroes, they sensed the danger of
Sabellianism, according to which the divine persons are
merely different aspects of God acting ad extra.
On the other hand, the Latins rejected the term
"hypostasis" because it often designated
substance and thus implied the danger of Arianism, which
taught that there were in God three substances, some of
which were subordinate substances.
These difficulties were eliminated by St. Basil's
clear distinction between the meaning of the terms ousia
and "hypostasis". Ousia, he said, signifies
the substance which is numerically common to the three
persons; "hypostasis" signifies that which is
individual and real so that there is a real distinction
between the persons. Then the Greek formula of three
hypostases was accepted as equivalent to the Latin of
three persons. Nevertheless the Greek formula could not
be expressed in the Latin translation because the terms
"subsistence" and "suppositum" were not yet in use.
These terms, the correlative abstract and concrete
forms, did not exist in the fourth century; St. Hilary
and St. Augustine did not know them. The term
"subsistence" was invented by Rufinus about
400.[303] Rufinus derived the term
"subsistence" from subsistere just as "substance" came
from substare. This was logical enough because the
Latins had said that the divine persons subsist. The
word "hypostasis" was finally accepted by the
Latins, and the union of the two natures in Christ was
even called the hypostatic union.[304]
Boethius, writing at the beginning of the sixth century,
did not appreciate Rufinus, happy discovery and taught
that if the Church would permit it, absolutely speaking
we could say that there were three substances in God. In
this present article, St. Thomas strove to place a
favorable interpretation on Boethius' words, and out of
this came the complexity of this article. Thus in
explaining Boethius' words, in his reply to the second
difficulty, he says: "We say that in God there are
three persons and subsistences as the Greeks say there are
three hypostases. But since the term 'substance' which
in its proper significance corresponds to
'"hypostasis"' is used equivocally by us,
sometimes meaning essence and sometimes
"hypostasis", the Latins in order to avoid any
error preferred to translate '"hypostasis"' by
the term 'subsistence', rather than the term
'substance.'" This was happily done by Rufinus.
But Boethius, misunderstanding the matter,
distinguished differently between subsistere and substare
when he said that substare referred to accidents and
therefore only individuals were substances with respect to
their accidents, whereas only genus and species, which do
not have accidents, could be said to subsist. Here was
Boethius, principal error: he inverted Rufinus,
formulas and said that in God there were three substances
and one subsistence (or substantial nature).
Rufinus, however, had said that in God there were three
subsistences and one substance. Thus Boethius gave a
false meaning to the word "subsistence" invented by
Rufinus. Rusticus, a deacon of the Roman Church,
restated the true meaning of the word. From that time
"hypostasis" has been translated by
"subsistence" and later by "suppositum" for the
concrete form. Indeed the concrete correlative of
subsistentia is not subsistere but suppositum just as the
concrete correlative of "personality" is "person."
The complexity of this present article can be attributed
to these fluctuating translations and especially to
Boethius, unfortunate interference. The first two
difficulties proposed at the beginning of the article are
therefore not objections, because after explanations are
made they conclude as does the article itself. The two
arguments in the sed contra are objections taken from
Boethius, who misunderstood the meaning of
"hypostasis"."
Reply. In spite of these objections the conclusion of
the article is clear: in the genus of rational substances
the term "person" signifies what these three terms,
"hypostasis", substance, things in nature (res
naturae) signify in the whole genus of substances,
namely, the suppositum or the first subject of
attribution. We recall that substance is said to be
twofold: second substance, or ousia, and first
substance, which has four names: suppositum,
subsistence, "hypostasis", and thing in
nature.
The first name, "uppositum," signifies the logical
relation of the subject of attribution to the predicate;
the three others signify the thing itself and not the
logical relation. Thus "subsistence," taken
concretely, signifies the first substance as existing
separately per se; "thing in nature" signifies first
substance as it is placed under some common nature; and
"hypostasis" as it is placed under accidents.
It should be noted that "hypostasis" in the
concrete is the same as first substance, and subsistence
is now understood in the abstract and corresponds to
personality and not to person.
The following should be kept clearly in mind: The
concrete correlative of subsistence is the suppositum as
personality corresponds to person. Certain authors,
attempting to identify subsistence with the existence of
substance, say that the concrete correlative of
subsistence is to subsist (subsistere), just as to exist
is the correlative to existence. This is erroneous
because the suppositum, of which subsisting and existing
are predicated as contingent predicates, ought to have in
itself that by which it is a suppositum, and this is
subsistence, or if it is a rational being, personality.
Clearly the concrete correlative of personality is not
"to subsist" but the person. Actually, the abstract
correlative of "to subsist" is the existence of the
substance, just as the existence of the accident
corresponds to inhering itself.[305]
Briefly this article may be reduced to this: In the
genus of rational substances person designates the same as
"hypostasis" or suppositum in the whole genus of
substances, namely, that which exists separately per se.
St. Thomas' replies to the second, fourth, and fifth
difficulties are favorable interpretations of certain texts
of Boethius, who wrote rather inaccurately on this
question.
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