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In every (animal) conception, according to St.
Thomas, "The matter of what is conceived is prepared by
the generative power of the mother; the formative force,
however, is in the seed of the father."[172] Then
follows the development of the embryo, terminating in the
generation of the animal. Conception, therefore, is the
beginning of animal generation.
The word "conception" was then transferred to signify
intellectual conception because our intellect as a passive
potency is fecundated by the object or by the impressed
species derived from the object, and then our
intelligence, fecundated and informed, conceives its
mental word to express to itself some extramental thing or
the mind itself. And indeed it is a great accomplishment
to profoundly conceive something, like a book that we are
about to write or the order observed in the Summa
theologica. But this intellectual conception in us does
not go as far as intellectual generation, because our word
is only an accident in our minds and not a living substance
like the understanding mind itself. On the contrary, in
God, whose intellect is subsisting intellection itself
and subsisting being itself and subsisting life itself,
the Word, mentioned in revelation, cannot be an
accidental word but is the substantial Word, living and
understanding. Therefore in God conception, which is
the initial step in generation, attains to the perfect
generation of the Word, who is true God from true God,
not only God as conceived but really God of true God.
John of St. Thomas says, and in this he agrees with
Ferrariensis, "The procession of the word, standing
precisely in the line of intellection and by the force of
its formality,... purified of every imperfection...
becomes substantial and generative."[173] This
follows not only materially because of the divine subject
but also formally because of the procession of the word
when it is purged of every imperfection. This helps
explain the joy of a great thinker who has found the answer
to some great problem and gives birth to a word; in its
highest sense this parturition of the word would be
generation, not corporeal but spiritual. The reason
given by St. Thomas is that, "Since the divine
intelligence is of the highest perfection, it is necessary
that the divine Word be perfectly one with Him from whom
it proceeds without any diversity of nature."[174]
In the highest state of perfection the procession of the
word is substantial and generative whereas in us it is
accidental. The word in us, called rather a concept than
something generated, is not a living and intelligent
person but only an accident; in God the Word is
substantial, living, and intelligent, and, as we shall
see, a person relative to the Father. We cannot
converse with our word or have communion with it- man
remains alone with his ideas. But the Father has
communion and lives in society with the Son.
First corollary. We see how the notions of generation
and intellectual procession mutually illuminate each
other. It is more certain that there is in God a
procession after the manner of generation than that there
is in God a procession which is properly intellectual.
The first is manifestly of faith; the second is at least
theologically certain. But without an intellectual
procession it would be very difficult to conceive of
generation in God and to show that this generation is
actual and not simply metaphorical. For this reason St.
Thomas speaks in his first article of intellectual
procession and in his second article of generation,
although the latter is more certain. This is one reason
among others on account of which the Latin concept of the
Trinity, sometimes called the psychological theory of
St. Augustine based on revelation, prevailed over other
concepts.
Second corollary. Since this divine generation of the
Word is eternal (above the continuous time of men and the
discrete time of the angels), it follows that in the
ever-present now of eternity the Father always begets and
the Son is always born, or as St. Augustine says, the
divine generation takes place without any newness of
being.[175]
Third corollary. A great joy rises from this eternal
generation. Vestiges of this joy are found in the mother
when a child is born to her, and in a great scholar when
after long labor he perfects his work of making some truth
manifest.
Fourth corollary. In God to be begotten, like the
begetting, implies no imperfection, nor is it less
perfect to be begotten than to beget, nor does it produce
less joy, for it is impossible to beget without someone
being begotten, and being begotten eternally and
necessarily is not a transition from potency to
act.[176] But we do not say that paternity or the
begetting is a simple perfection properly so called, for
although it does not imply any imperfection it is not
simply better to have paternity than not to have it. If
this were so, some simple perfection properly so called
would be denied to the Son, and the Son would not be
God.[177] The essence and dignity of the Father
and the Son are the same; in the Father we have the
relation of the giver, in the Son the relation of the
receiver. Here is the mystery, but we see that the
divine relations by reason of their concepts do not add any
relative perfection that would be virtually distinct from
the absolute perfection of the divine essence. Such is
the thought of most Thomists, as we shall see below.
We are still confronted with the difficulty proposed in
the third objection: "The being of anyone who is
begotten is accepted and received, " and therefore it is
not divine, for the divine being is self-subsisting and
not received.
In his reply to the third objection, St. Thomas says
that the being of anyone who is begotten is accepted indeed
but not received always in some subject. Thus the entire
substance of created things is accepted by God but it is
not received in some receptive subject. So also the being
of the Word is accepted but not received; it is
self-subsisting being itself.
In the perfection of the divine being itself there is
contained both the intelligibly proceeding Word and the
principle of the Word as well as the other things which
pertain to its perfection. From these words of St.
Thomas it appears, in the opinion of many Thomists,
that the relations in God do not by reason of their
concepts add any new relative perfection that is virtually
distinct from the absolute divine perfection.
On the other hand, in several places St. Thomas says
that the being of any created being is not only accepted
from God but also received in the created essence, or
more correctly in the created suppositum. "It should be
said," says St. Thomas, "that at the same time that
God gives being He produces that which receives the
being; and thus fittingly He does not act in dependence
on some pre-existing being."[178]
This text and many others are quoted against Suarez and
his followers to show that for St. Thomas a real
distinction exists between the created essence and the
created being. For the created being is not only accepted
from God, as Suarez admits, but it is also received and
therefore limited by the essence in which it is received.
The divine being, however, is not received, no more in
the Son and the Holy Ghost than in the Father.
Another objection. By reason of the procession the Word
proceeds as understood and not as understanding, for it
proceeds as the term of the paternal intellection.
Therefore because of the procession the Word does not
proceed as like to the Father, and therefore this
procession is not generation.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the Word by
reason of the procession proceeds as understood and not as
understanding notionally or as enunciating, I concede;
not as understanding essentially, I deny. Likeness of
nature is not dependent on the notional qualities or
notional acts like active generation and active spiration,
but on essentials. Analogically in men, although the son
does not proceed as generating but as generated, the son
nevertheless proceeds like the father in nature. So it is
proportionally in God.
Doubt. How does the enunciation of the Father differ
from the essential intellection which is common to the
three persons, as in the statement, "The three persons
understand but the Father alone enunciates"?
Reply. The enunciation of the Father differs only by
reason from the essential intellection and it is not
actually different from the relation of paternity, which
in turn is not really distinct from the divine
essence.[179] St. Thomas offers a profound
explanation: "The origin of motion inasmuch as it begins
with another... is called action. If we remove the
motion, the action implies no more than the order of
origin according to which the action proceeds from some
cause or principle to that which is from the principle.
Since in God there is no motion, the personal action
which produces a person is nothing else than the relation
of a principle to the person who is from the principle.
These relations are the actual divine relations or
notions."[180] No difference exists between them
except in the manner of speaking inasmuch as we speak of
divine things in the manner of sensible things.
Certain difficulties have been proposed by Durandus and
Scotus concerning St. Thomas' first and second
articles; but rather than adding anything to the matter
they tend to obscure it. We shall not delay in
considering them here but content ourselves with a few
words about these difficulties at the end of this
question. They are all solved by St. Thomas later when
he comes to speak of the comparison of the persons with the
essence, relations, and notional acts.
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