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State of the question. The difficulty arises because the
Father is not the cause of the Son and therefore it seems
that He cannot be the principle of the Son. It would
also follow that the Son proceeded from a principle and
would therefore be created, or at least that there were
priority and posteriority in God. That which is later
depends on that which is earlier, and dependence implies
imperfection, which cannot exist in a divine person.
Reply. Nevertheless the Father is a principle. This
is of faith since the Father is defined by the Council of
Florence as "the principle without
principle."[376] In many earlier councils,
especially in the Sixth Council of Toledo, the same
doctrine was defined: "We confess the unbegotten and
uncreated Father, the font and origin of the entire
Trinity, with whom there is not only paternity but also
the principle of paternity." St. Augustine says:
"The Father is the principle of the entire
Deity."[377]
St. Thomas explains the meaning of the word
"principle" in the body of the article and in the reply
to the first objection. A principle is nothing other than
that from which something proceeds. For example, a line
proceeds from the initial point, a series of numbers
proceeds from unity, the light of day proceeds from the
aurora. But the Father is He from whom the Son and the
Holy Ghost proceed in God. Therefore the Father is a
principle and this not in a metaphorical but the proper
sense. This is a simple explanation of the meaning of
"principle."
Reply to the first objection. This will be made clearer
by contrast with the meaning of cause, for as Aristotle
himself remarks, "The meaning of principle is more
general than cause."[378] Thus we say that the
point is the principle of the line and not its cause. For
the term "cause" (especially an extrinsic cause) seems
to imply the diversity of substance and dependence of one
on another, but this is not implied in the term
"principle." Hence, although the Greeks in speaking
of God used the two terms 'arche' and 'aitia' the
Latin doctors never use the word "cause," restricting
themselves to the term "principle." The reader is
referred to the reply to the first objection.
Reply to the second objection. The Latins do not even
use the expression "principle" of the Son and the Holy
Ghost because this implies a certain subordination. The
Son is said to be the principle from a principle, light
from light, and the Holy Ghost is similar in His own
way. The beautiful text of St. Hilary is quoted here:
"The Son is not less because the one being is given to
Him." The Father and the Son both possess subsisting
being itself, yet the Father communicates this being to
the Son. Analogically, two brothers possessing
something in common communicate to each other certain
gifts.
Reply to the third objection. Here the objection that
principle is derived from priority is solved. But in God
there is no priority and no posteriority. I distinguish
the major: principle is derived from priority according to
the use of the word, let it pass; according to its formal
significance, I deny; for principle does not denote
priority but origin. In God, however, there is the
relation of origin without priority.[379] Certainly
there is no priority of time because the processions are
eternal; nor is there priority of nature because the
divine nature is numerically the same in the Father and
the Son and the relation of paternity is not conceived
without the opposing relation of filiation. Relative
things are simultaneous in nature and in the intellect
since one is in the definition of the other. The Father
is not constituted by something absolute, as is the man
who begets before he begets. In God, the Father does
not become the Father, but of Himself and from all
eternity He is the Father and He is formally so
constituted by the subsisting relation of paternity, whose
correlative is filiation, by which the Son is
constituted. So it is with the three angles of an
equilateral triangle.
In question 42,[380] speaking of the equality of
the divine persons, St. Thomas says: "(In God)
dignity is absolute and pertains to the essence. As the
same essence which is paternity in the Father is also
filiation in the Son, so the same dignity which is
paternity in the Father is filiation in the Son. But in
the Father this dignity is according to the relation of
the giver; in the Son it is according to the relation of
the receiver." But to receive subsisting and infinite
being in itself is not something less perfect than giving
it. In the equilateral triangle the second angle
constructed is not less perfect than the first, and for
the second angle to receive the total area is not less
perfect than for the first angle to communicate it. Hence
the term principle notionally belongs to the Father. The
term principle, however, is also used essentially with
respect to creatures, and in this case it is common to the
three persons.
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