|
State of the question. The traditional division is into
evil of guilt and penalty but we must now prove that this
division is legitimate. We are confronted with the
following difficulties. 1. The death of brute animals
is something evil for them, yet it does not appear to be
either guilt or penalty. 2. The diseases of animals are
something evil, yet they are neither guilt nor penalty.
3. In us temptation is something evil, yet it is not
guilt if it is immediately resisted, indeed it is an
occasion for exercising virtue; neither is temptation a
penalty, since it precedes sin. Indeed temptation
preceded the first sin of the first man. Further, the
trials of the just are something evil, yet they are not
always penalties for sins.
In the argument "sed contra", the objection is
given in the opposite sense, namely, every evil is a
penalty because every evil is harmful. Therefore guilt is
not distinct from penalty.
Reply. In voluntary beings every evil is either a
penalty or guilt, that is, it is guilt arising from an
inordinate will or the penalty against a culpable will.
What is the meaning of this reply? It refers to
"voluntary beings," not all things, not brute animals,
not even men, because the trials of the just are neither
sin nor a penalty for the sins of the just, nor are they
something inflicted on a culpable will.
This difficulty is explained above in the article in the
treatise, The One God, "whether God wills
evils."[1043] Here a distinction is made between
the evil of guilt (moral evil) and the evil of nature
(physical evil), which can be a penalty if it is
inflicted for sin or not a penalty if it exists where no
sin is to be punished.
|
EVIL OF NATURE (PHYSICAL)
|
|
|
penalty of loss, penalty of senses
|
|
|
as merely physical evil (blindness)
or the trials of the just
|
|
Here we approach the great problem proposed in the Book
of Job: whether all human trials are inflicted because of
sin.
What proof can be offered for St. Thomas' conclusion
given above? It should be noted that the division of evil
is based on its definition, and by two syllogisms it is
shown that St. Thomas' division as given in the
conclusion is legitimate.
In his argument St. Thomas, as in many other
instances, begins with the minor, a method that is
sometimes more natural in the search for truth. But if we
follow the formal method and begin with the major, the
syllogism would be as follows:
Good consists in perfection, in first act, that is, in
the form and integrity of a thing, or in second act, that
is, in proper operation. But evil is the privation of an
owing good. Therefore evil consists either in some
subtraction from the form or the integrity (blindness) or
in the subtraction of some proper operation.
This first syllogism does not yet give the distinction
between guilt and penalty, which, as was stated in the
reply to the second objection, do not present a division
of simple evil, but a division of evil in voluntary
things. Thus in brute animals there are evils, such as
blindness, which are neither guilt nor penalty. This is
also true of men, for instance, when our Lord was
asked, "Who hath sinned, this man, or his parents,
that he should be born blind?" our Lord replied,
"Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but
that the works of God should be made manifest in
him."[1044] Hence blindness in itself is neither
guilt nor penalty. How do we then reach the conclusion
that evil is either guilt or penalty? We must remember
that the conclusion is limited to voluntary beings. We
have therefore the following syllogism.
Evil, like good, is the object of the will; it has a
special reference to the will. But with reference to the
will we correctly divide evil into that evil which is from
the will, namely, a disorder of the will's operation or
guilt, and that evil which is against the will, namely,
the privation of the form or the integrity of the
(culpable) voluntary agent, that is, penalty, for
instance death or mutilation. Therefore evil in voluntary
things is correctly divided into the evil of guilt or sin
and the evil of penalty.
Difficulty. In what sense does St. Thomas say that
the evil of penalty can be through the subtraction not only
of the integrity but also of the form of the agent, for in
the latter case not even the subject of the evil would
remain?
Reply. The penalty by the subtraction of the integrity
is mutilation; the penalty by the subtraction of the form
is death. It is true that in the latter case the subject
(man) does not remain, but the soul does; and by this
penalty man does not become evil, indeed in this way he
makes reparation for his sin.
Another difficulty remains. The trials of the just are
against their wills, as we see from the Book of Job,
and Christ Himself said, "Let this chalice pass from
Me." On the other hand, a guilty man sometimes freely
accepts the penalty that is justly imposed on him. Hence
not every evil that is against the will is a penalty, for
example, the tribulations of Job, the blindness of one
born blind; nor is every penalty opposed by the one who is
punished.
To solve this difficulty we should point out that,
although the division of evil into the evil of guilt and
the evil of penalty given in the body of the article is
legitimate, we do not yet have an explicit statement of
the specific difference of penalty by which it is
distinguished from the trials of the just. We have
clearly stated the proximate genus of penalty (an evil
opposed to the will of the one punished), but to
ascertain the specific difference the penalty must be
compared with guilt. According to common sense every
penalty presupposes guilt.
This explanation will be found partly in the reply to the
third objection, where it is stated that temptation is not
guilt except in the tempter when it is resisted, and
partly in the following article in the reply to the
objections, and particularly in the "Summa
theologica", in the question on penalty as the effect
of sin.[1045] The seventh article of this question
asks, whether every penalty is inflicted because of some
guilt, and the reply is, "If we are speaking of penalty
"simpliciter", in the sense that it has the
nature of punishment, then it always has a reference to
guilt, either personal, actual, or original.....
But it sometimes happens that a man suffers some loss in a
minor good in order that he may gain a greater good, for
example, for the salvation of his soul or for the glory of
God. Such loss is not an unqualified evil for the man,
but an evil "secundum quid", and therefore it is
not an unqualified penalty ("simpliciter"),
but it is rather medicinal." Such were the tribulations
of Job and the blindness of one born blind. Moreover,
"sometimes one who has not sinned voluntarily undergoes
punishment for another," as Christ did for us.
What, therefore, is the definition of penalty as it
differs from the trials of the just and also from voluntary
mortification? The answer is given in "De
malo",[1046] where St. Thomas enumerates
three things that belong to the nature of penalty: 1. it
is an evil inflicted for committed sin (St. Thomas says
this is the tradition of faith), and in this it differs
from the trials of the just; 2. it is something
repugnant to the will, either actual or habitual or
radical, that is the natural inclination which tends to
the proper good (in this way this explains that a culpable
man sometimes freely accepts a just penalty, which however
is still repugnant to the inclination of his nature);
3. it is from an extrinsic principle, which inflicts an
afflictive suffering (thus it is distinguished from the
mortification which a man inflicts on himself).
Hence penalty in itself is defined as an evil inflicted
for some committed fault or guilt by an extrinsic principle
against the natural inclination of the culpable agent.
It is enough, says St. Thomas, that the penalty be
against the natural inclination of the will, "as when an
individual is deprived of the habit of virtue when he does
not wish to have the virtue; nevertheless the natural
inclination of the will is to the good of the
virtue."[1047]
From this definition of penalty we learn its division,
namely, the penalty of the senses, inflicted on the
sensible part, and the penalty of loss, or the absence of
the divine vision. The first is owing to the fault
because of the inordinate turning to some changeable good,
the second is owing to a grave sin because of the aversion
or turning away from the ultimate end.[1048]
First corollary. The trials of the just do not always
arise from their sins. From the foregoing definition we
can see Baius' error in his seventy-second proposition:
"All the afflictions of the just are punishments for
their sins; hence Job and the martyrs underwent whatever
they suffered for their sins."
This statement is against the tradition of faith and of
the Scriptures. For example, "Now this trial the
Lord therefore permitted to happen to him, that an
example might be given to posterity of his patience, as
also of holy Job";[1049] "And because thou wast
acceptable to God, it was necessary that temptation
should prove thee";[1050] of the man born blind our
Lord said, "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his
parents; but that the works of God should be made
manifest in him."[1051]
Second corollary. Hence not every purification of the
just is properly penalty; it may be a purification from
some imperfection distinct from sin. "In the Blessed
Virgin the Holy Ghost effected a twofold purgation.
The first was preparatory to the conception of Christ,
and this was not a purification from any impurity of guilt
or sin but it served to recollect her mind and lift it
above the multitude. For the angels, too, are said to
be purified and no impurity is found in them. Thus there
is a twofold purgation: the purgation from guilt by grace
and the purgation from ignorance by the light of
doctrine.[1052]
The principal differences between guilt and penalty are
clearly given in St. Thomas' "De
malo".[1053] The difference is threefold:
|
1. The guilt is the evil of the voluntary action
itself; the penalty is the evil of the voluntary agent
consequent on the evil of the action, for example, the
privation of the form or the penalty of death, or the
privation of integrity or the penalty of mutilation.
2. The guilt is according to the will, whereas the
penalty is against the will.
3. The guilt is in the acting, the penalty is the
suffering.
|
|
Moreover it should be noted that the evil that is a
disorder in action can be not only in the will but also in
the intellect, for example, a speculative error, and in
this latter instance the evil is sometimes voluntary and
sometimes not. So also with regard to the will we can
have a material and involuntary sin, which is not guilt
because of the defect of attention.
Doubt. Can all the divisions of evil be reduced to the
foregoing, namely, the division between guilt and
penalty?
Reply. All the divisions of guilt cannot be reduced to
these two because this division refers only to evil in
voluntary things. Evil has other divisions inasmuch as it
is opposed to transcendental good, which under the aspect
of being is divided into the ten categories of
being,[1054] and thus we have an evil man, an evil
fruit, an evil quantity, quality, action, passion, or
relation.
Evil is again divided as it is opposed to good in
general, which, under the aspect of good, is divided
into the honest, delightful, and useful.[1055]
Thus evil is divided into the dishonest or base (which
conforms to guilt), the painful (which conforms to
penalty),[1056] and finally the harmful, which
conforms to both guilt and penalty, but more with guilt,
as we shall see in the following question, because a just
penalty in itself is something good, and evil only
"secundum quid".[1057]
St. Thomas gives another division into the evil of
guilt, or moral evil, namely the privation of moral
rectitude, and the evil of nature, namely, the privation
of the good of nature, which can be a penalty if it is
inflicted for guilt, or it may not be a penalty if not
inflicted for guilt, as the blindness of one born blind,
as mentioned in the Gospel.[1058]
|
Evil as the privation of an owing good
|
|
|
mortal: the privation of the order to God, the ultimate end
venial: the privation of the order in means to the end
|
|
|
for guilt: penalty of loss /
penalty of the senses
|
|
|
without guilt: as a mere physical evil, for example, the blindness of
one born blind
|
|
In these instances evil is predicated analogically. So
also sin is predicated analogically when we speak of mortal
and venial sin. According to the Thomistic definition of
analogy as distinct from Suarez' definition, venial sin
is farther removed from mortal sin for St. Thomas than
for Suarez. According to Suarez, in an analogy things
are the same "simpliciter" and diverse
"secundum quid"; for St. Thomas analogical
things are diverse "simpliciter" and the same
"secundum quid", or proportionately the same.
For instance, animality, which is univocal, is the same
"simpliciter" and diverse "secundum
quid" in man and in the worm.
|
|