|
Reply. The power of generating signifies directly the
divine nature and indirectly the relation of paternity.
This is another way of saying what was said at the
beginning of this treatise in the question on the
processions, namely, the proximate principle quo of the
processions is the divine nature itself as modified by the
relations of paternity and spiration. In the present
article this principle quo is called the notional power of
generating or spirating.
St. Thomas offers proof for this for the power of
generating, which is more easily understood than the
second power: In the created order every agent produces
what is like to itself according to the form by which it
acts inasmuch as it determines its production according to
its own proper determination. Thus a cow generates a
cow, a horse generates a horse, and everything that
generates produces something like itself according to its
species or nature. Hence in the one who generates, the
nature is the principle quo of generation; thus Socrates
generates as a man and generates a man. If Socrates
generated as Socrates he would generate Socrates.
Therefore the active principle of generation is directly
the nature of the generator and indirectly it is the
personality of the generator, for when Socrates
generates, the principle quo of generation is human nature
as it is in Socrates; so also in God the principle quo
of generation is the divine nature as it is in the
Father. Similarly the superficies of the triangle is
communicated to the second and third angles as it is in the
first angle. Particular attention should be given to what
St. Thomas says at the end of the body of the article:
"In created things the individual form constitutes the
person of the generator, but it is not that by which the
generator generates, otherwise Socrates would generate
Socrates. Hence paternity cannot be taken as that by
which the Father generates, but it must be understood as
the form that constitutes the person of the generator,
otherwise the Father would generate a Father."
According to St. Thomas, then, the personality of
Socrates is the individual form, namely, that by which
something is what it is, or the first subject of
attribution.[569] But this individual form of
Socrates is not matter marked by quantity, or the
individuating conditions, since it is called the
individual form; nor is this form Socrates' existence,
which is a contingent predicate in Socrates.[570]
|
|