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The reply is in the negative.
Indirect proof. The action of a thing differs more from
the substance than the being of the thing for the operation
follows the being. But the being of no creature is its
substance; this is true only of God. Therefore a
fortiori the intellection of the angel is not its
substance.
Direct proof. 1. From the fact that action is the
ultimate actuality of an agent. Action is the ultimate
actuality of an operative power just as being is the
ultimate actuality of an essence. But only pure act,
namely, God, is His own ultimate actuality. Therefore
only God, pure act, is His own action just as He is
His own being.
The major is clear because the operative faculty is
ordered to action, for example, the intellect is ordered
to intellection as its ultimate perfection.
The minor is evident from the opposition between the word
"to be" and the word "to have." Pure act not only has
its own ultimate actuality, namely, its being and its
action, but it is its own ultimate actuality.
2. From a consideration not only of action itself but
also of intellection. If the intellection of the angel
were its substance, it would be as subsistent as its
substance. But subsisting intellection can be only one,
it is unique (as, for instance, whiteness, if it
subsisted). Therefore the substance of the angel would
not be distinct from the substance of God or from the
substance of the other angels.
Objection. That which is not pure act cannot indeed be
every actuality but it can be some actuality with an
admixture of potentiality. Therefore the reasoning is not
valid.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that which is not
pure act can be some actuality that is not ultimate, I
concede; thus Michael is his own Michaelity; that which
is not pure act can be ultimate actuality, I deny.
Action is the ultimate actuality in the order of operation
just as being in the order of being. If the angel were
its own action, this ultimate actuality in the angel would
be unreceived and moreover as ultimate it would be
irreceptive, and thus it would be pure act.
I insist. If Michael's intellection were subsistent,
it would be unique in his species but not simply unique,
for there could be other subsisting intellects. Therefore
the difficulty remains.
Reply. I deny the antecedent. Such intellection would
not be delimited, either by the subject in which it is
received because it is not received, or by the object to
which it is ordered because a substance cannot be specified
by something extrinsic to itself. Therefore subsisting
intellect cannot be unless it has its formal object in
itself, that is, unless it is subsisting being itself at
all times and of itself intellection in act.
I insist. But this subsisting intellect of Michael
could be specified by itself as in divine intellection.
Reply. This I deny, because intellection must be
specified by intelligible being as by its formal and
adequate object. And if Michael's intellect were
specified by itself, it would not be able to know anything
except itself and that which could be known through
itself, and hence it would not be able to know other
substances except confusedly.
This reply of John of St. Thomas is taken from the
following article. Without anticipating the following
article, Cajetan replies as follows: If the
intellection of the angel were of such great perfection
that it would be a substance, it would be one, because it
would identify in itself three absolutely simple
perfections, namely, a spiritual nature, intellection,
and subsistence in itself. These perfections, however,
cannot be identified in anyone but God, and because of
this these perfections are identified with the other
absolutely simple perfections, with subsistent will, with
love, mercy, and justice.
Objection. For living beings to live is to be, as
Aristotle said. But to understand is to live.
Therefore the intellection of the angel is its substantial
being.
Reply. I distinguish the major: to live in actu primo
is substantial being, I concede; to live in actu
secundo, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: to
understand is to live in actu secundo, I concede; to
understand is to live in actu primo, I deny.
I insist. In us the acting intellect is its action, and
yet it is not God. Therefore the angel can be its own
action.
Reply. Our acting intellect is always in act and then it
is its own action improperly, not essentially but
concomitantly. Thus the sun is always actually giving
light, but the sun is not essentially this action. In
the same way the heart is always beating but it is not its
own movement.
I insist. If the extremes are one, the middle is not
really different from the extremes. But when the angel
understands itself, the subject and the object are one,
and the intellection is the middle. Therefore the
intellection does not differ from the angel.
Reply. Let the major pass without comment. I deny the
minor: intellection is not really a middle; it follows
the union of the subject with an object that is
intelligible in act, for intellection follows the union of
the faculty with an impressed species. When the angel
understands itself it does not require an impressed
species, it requires only an expressed species because it
is itself intelligible in act, but not understood in act.
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