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First objection. Good is like a good tree. But a good
tree cannot bear evil fruit. Therefore good cannot be the
cause of evil.
Reply. I distinguish the major: a good tree is a figure
of the will that is morally good, I concede; of the
natural will that is physically good, I deny. I
distinguish the minor: the good tree, or the will that is
morally good, cannot bear evil fruit, I concede; the
natural will that is physically good cannot bear evil
fruit, I subdistinguish: "per se", I
concede; "per accidens", I deny. Hence good
can be the cause of evil "per accidens".
Second objection. One of two contraries cannot be the
cause of the other. But evil is contrary to good.
Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.
Reply. One of two contraries cannot "per se"
be the cause of the other, I concede; "per
accidens", I deny. Thus the goodness of fire can
cause the evil of the wood's destruction or the burning of
a house.
Third objection. An evil or deficient effect does not
proceed except from a deficient cause. But a deficient
cause is evil. Therefore evil comes only from evil.
Reply. I distinguish the major: in voluntary things,
I concede; in physical things, I deny, because
sometimes evil proceeds from the power of a contrary
agent. Moreover, a deficient cause is not evil as cause
but only as deficient.
In his reply to the third difficulty, St. Thomas
points out that the defect of a voluntary action proceeds
"from the fact that the will does not subject itself in
act to its rule. This defect is not indeed a fault or
guilt, but it is followed by guilt because the will
operates with this defect or fault."
In his work, "De malo", St. Thomas says:
"The fact that the will does not in act attend to such a
rule considered in itself is not evil and it is neither
guilt nor penalty, because the soul is not bound nor can
it attend to a rule of this kind always in act. But it
takes on the first aspect of guilt when without actual
consideration of the rule it proceeds to a particular
election..... Man sins by the fact that he does not
have a rule, or does not attend to one, and thus proceeds
to making a choice. For this reason St. Augustine said
that the will is the cause of sin inasmuch as it is
deficient."[1076] And the will is deficient
inasmuch as it recedes from a worthy good under the
influence or attraction of some delectable unworthy good.
Thus even in moral matters the major of the first argument
of this article is verified: "The fact that anything
departs from its natural and due disposition comes only
from some cause that draws the thing away from its proper
disposition." Hence evil always has some cause "per
accidens" in the good.[1077]
The fifteenth objection in "De malo". An
accidental cause does not intend the effect that follows
"per accidens". But evil has only an accidental
cause. Therefore no one who does evil sins.
Reply. An intelligent cause does not contemplate the
accidental effect that rarely follows, I concede; the
accidental effect that is always joined to the principal
effect, I deny.
The seventeenth objection. Whatever follows accidentally
happens in rare instances. But evil follows in many
instances, as we read, "The number of fools is
infinite."[1078] Therefore the cause of evil is
"per se" and not "per accidens".
Reply. A thing is said to follow "per
accidens" not only if it follows in rare instances but
because it follows, though not intended "per
se", even if it follows in the majority of
instances. St. Thomas says: "The accidental thing
does not always take place in rare cases, sometimes it
follows in all cases or most cases, for example, the
adulterer intends a certain sensible good to which an evil
is always joined and he always falls into that
evil..... The evil of guilt happens so often in the
human race (and in it alone) because there are so many
more ways to deviate from the middle than holding the
middle path, as we read, 'the sensible goods are better
known by many than the goods of the mind.'"[1079]
On a higher plane and with clearer distinction St.
Thomas proposes this doctrine in a manner that seems to
oppose the theory of optimism: "The good that is
proportionate to the common state of nature occurs in most
instances, and the defect from this good occurs in fewer
instances. But the good that is above the common state of
nature is found in fewer instances..... It is evident
that many men have sufficient knowledge to govern their own
lives....: but very few men attain to a profound
knowledge of intelligible things."[1080]
This limitation of optimism is owing to the human
composite and to original sin.
1. The lowest kind of intelligence has for its object
the lowest of intelligible things, namely, the
intelligible thing in sensible things, and thus this
intelligence must be united with sensible things. First,
therefore, we know sensible things and we live according
to the senses, and many men are attracted rather to the
good of the senses than to the good according to right
reason.
2. "Some signs of original sin probably appear in the
human race. Since God takes cognizance of human acts in
such a way that He fixes a reward for good acts and
penalties for evil acts,....we can certify the guilt
from the penalty. It is evident that the human race
suffers various kinds of penalties, both corporal and
spiritual..... Among the spiritual penalties the
greatest is the weakness of reason, and because of this
penalty man has difficulty in knowing the truth, he easily
falls into error, he cannot entirely overcome his bestial
appetites, and he is often overwhelmed by these lower
impulses. Someone might say that these defects are not
penal, but natural defects arising necessarily from
matter..... But if we study the matter carefully, we
can conclude with sufficient probability that divine
providence, which has conjoined congruous perfectibles to
the particular perfections, united the higher nature (the
soul) to the lower (the body) so that the soul would be
dominant, and if any impediment should arise against this
dominion from the defect of nature, God would have
removed it by a special and supernatural act of
beneficence."[1081]
Pascal said: "Without this mystery man would be more
incomprehensible than this mystery is incomprehensible to
man." The doctrine of original sin offers the solution
to the puzzling problem of the coexistence in man of such
great weakness and misery and such strong aspirations to
the sublime.[1082] But, as St. Thomas says,
"God permitted evil to happen that something better might
come of it."[1083] Hence we read, "And where
sin abounded, grace did more abound,"[1084] and in
blessing the paschal candle we chant, "O happy fault
that merited so great a Redeemer!"
Indeed, according to revelation: "For if by one man's
offense death reigned through one; much more they who
receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of
justice, shall reign in life through one, Jesus
Christ."[1085] Thus the motive of the
Incarnation was formally a motive of mercy, for the
reason behind mercy is the alleviation of
misery.[1086] God predestined Christ to the glory
of the Redeemer and permitted Adam's sin that Christ
might be the Redeemer of the human race.
But while we clearly see the sensible existence of evil in
the world, the existence of the concupiscence of the flesh
and of the eyes, and the pride of life, we do not clearly
understand the spiritual heights and the infinite value of
the mystery of the redemptive Incarnation, and we do not
appreciate the price of all the graces that flow invisibly
from this mystery to the souls of all generations. "We
have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency
may be of the power of God, and not of us,....that
the life also of Jesus may be made manifest in our mortal
flesh."[1087]
The solution of this problem, that God permits evil only
for some greater good, is at once clear and obscure; it
is clear in the abstract and in general but obscure in the
concrete and in particular, because only in heaven shall
we see this greater good because of which God permits
evil. We are loved by God much more than we think, just
as St. Anne, the mother of the Blessed Virgin Mary,
did not understand the greatness of the blessing which her
daughter had received. Grace is the seed of glory, and
our trials and tribulations can obtain for us the eternal
reward of glory.
But this solution of the problem of evil will not bring
peace and quiet to anxious souls in this life without the
influence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost and without the
special inspiration of the gifts of understanding and
wisdom, from which we obtain a quasi-experimental
knowledge of the good things promised to those who
believe. Hence St. Thomas says that these gifts are
necessary for salvation.[1088]
It is true, therefore, that good is the efficient cause
of evil only "per accidens". And if this occurs
frequently, it is only so in the human race because of the
union of the soul with the body and because of original
sin. Such is not the case with the angels. St. Thomas
says that the multitude of angels is very
great,[1089] like the multitude of the
stars,[1090] and that more angels remained constant
than sinned. In the angels there is only the intellectual
nature; there is no attraction to sensible things, and
there is no original sin in them. St. Thomas wrote
these words in explanation of the passage, "Thousands of
thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a
hundred thousand stood before Him."[1091] Thus
the number of all the elect, if the angels are included,
is greater, according to St. Thomas, than the number
of the damned.
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