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In this present article we can examine a particular
difficulty arising from the concept of the Latin
theologians. The problem is as follows: The relation
which follows upon active generation cannot constitute the
person who begets. But the relation of paternity follows
upon active generation, for it is founded on it.
Therefore this relation of paternity cannot constitute the
person of the begetting Father. The person must first
exist before it begets, because operation follows being.
This objection is somewhat clearer than the reply because
the difficulty arises from our imperfect manner of
thinking, whereas the reply must come from the heights of
this ineffable mystery.
In examining this difficulty, St. Thomas says: "The
special property of the Father, His paternity, can be
considered in two ways. First, as it is a relation and
as such according to our understanding it presupposes the
notional act of generation because the relation as such is
founded on the act. Secondly, as it constitutes the
person, and as such it is understood as prior to the
notional act just as a person in act is understood as prior
to the action."[317]
This is to say that the relation, of paternity for
example, as a relation actually referring to its terminus
does indeed presuppose active generation and is founded on
it, just as the relation of filiation is founded on
passive generation. But the active generation itself
presupposes the begetting person and its personal
property, that is, paternity, as it constitutes the
person of the Father. There is here no contradiction
because this relation of paternity is not considered under
the same aspect, but first as a relation actively looking
toward the terminus and founded on active generation, and
secondly as the proximate principle (principium quo) of
active generation or as constituting the begetting person.
As in the equilateral triangle the first angle
constructed, while it is alone, is itself a geometric
figure, that is, an angle, but it does not yet refer to
the other two angles not yet constructed.
In explaining St. Thomas' teaching, Thomists have
offered two replies to this objection. Some Thomists
reply by distinguishing the major: the relation of
paternity, considered as referring to something, follows
generation; but considered as in something, it precedes
generation. But the difficulty remains since the
"esse in" is something common to the divine
relations and the three persons and therefore it cannot
constitute a particular person as distinct from the others
and as incommunicable. The "esse in" does not
confer incommunicability; only the "esse ad"
does this.
Other Thomists (Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, and
Billuart) reply as follows to this important difficulty.
Even with regard to the "esse ad" the relation
of paternity as that by which the divine essence is
modified in actu signato precedes the active generation,
although it follows it with regard to the "esse
ad" in the actual exercise (in actu exercito), that
is, in the actual exercise of that respect after the
manner of the actual tendency and attainment of the
terminus. Hence these Thomists say that the relation of
paternity, as that by which the divine essence is modified
in actu signato, constitutes the person of the Father;
and the relation of paternity as that which in the exercise
of the act (in actu exercito) is founded on active
generation supposes the person of the Father as already
constituted. Thus the doctrine of St. Thomas is
maintained: the persons are constituted by the relations
as subsisting and not as relations. And thus the notional
act of active generation has its origin in the person of
the Father as subsisting and in the relation itself as
really incommunicable.
I insist. Relative things are the same in nature and in
knowledge. But the Father, as has been said, is
understood before generation. Therefore the Son also is
understood before generation, which is absurd.
Reply. I distinguish the major: relative things are the
same in nature and knowledge in actu exercito, I
concede; in actu signato, I deny. I contradistinguish
the minor: the Father is understood before generation in
actu signato as a subsisting person, I concede; in actu
exercito with regard to the Son, this I deny.
In other words, the ad as such denotes the respect to
another either by the opposition of the terminus or by the
attainment of the terminus. In the relation of opposition
itself we may consider either the opposition between two
persons or the exercised relation of one to another; for
example, I refer to you, but I am distinct from you.
So the Father refers to the Son, but the Father is not
the Son.
I insist. The first thing in the "esse ad" is
to refer in act to the terminus rather than being a
relative incommunicable entity. Therefore the difficulty
remains.
Reply. I deny the antecedent. Just as the first thing
is for whiteness to be constituted in itself as that by
which something is made white before the wall is whitened
(ut quod), for the form precedes its formal effect not
by the priority of time but of causality.
I insist. The opposition in a relation arises from the
reference, since it is the opposition of one relative
thing to the correlative. Therefore the reference in act
is prior to the opposition to the terminus. And the
difficulty remains.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the exercised
opposition in the relation arises from the exercised
reference (in actu exercito), I concede; the
entitative opposition arises from the reference in actu
exercito, this I deny. The entitative opposition arises
in the actu signato. Similarly, whiteness in actu
signato is opposed to blackness in actu signato, and
whiteness as actually existing in a wall actively opposes
blackness existing in another wall. In a word, the form
precedes its formal effect not in time but by nature.
The following analogies illustrate this point.
Sanctifying grace is thought of first as it is in itself
before we think of it as driving out sin and making the
soul pleasing to God. The rational soul is thought of
first in itself as a nature before we think of it as
conferring a specific being and life on the body.
Similarly a relation first affects the subject as that by
which (ut quo) and later it refers exercite to the
terminus, for first a thing must be constituted in itself
before it tends toward something else. We cannot conceive
of it as attaining its terminus before it is in itself.
In human generation, in that indivisible instant in which
the rational soul is created and united to the body, the
ultimate disposition of the body in preparation for the
soul precedes the creation of the soul in the genus of
material or dispositive causality; but it follows the
creation of the soul (as a property of the soul) in the
genus of formal, efficient, and final causality. For it
is the rational soul itself which in this instant of time
gives to the body not the penultimate but the ultimate
disposition to itself; and this disposition is then a
property of the soul. When this property of the soul in
its body is destroyed by death, the soul is separated from
the body. Here there is no contradiction because the
ultimate disposition precedes and follows the form but not
in the same genus of causality. Thus the causes are
causes of one another but in different classes and thus
there is no vicious circle.
In the same way the phantasm precedes the idea in the line
of material causes, but the phantasm completely assumed to
express sensibly an idea does not exist prior to the idea.
When a man succeeds in discovering a new idea, in the
same moment he often discovers the appropriate phantasm for
the sensible expression of that idea.
So also the motion of sensibility precedes and follows
volition under a twofold aspect. Again, at the end of a
period of deliberation the final practical judgment
precedes the free choice, which it influenced, but at the
same time it is the free choice which made the practical
judgment final by accepting it.
In the contract of marriage the consent of the man is
expressed in a word, but that word has no effect unless it
is accepted by the woman. After the woman accepts, the
marriage is definitively ratified, but not before. Here
the consent of the man precedes as consent and, although
it is pronounced relatively to the woman, it does not
actively affect the consent of the woman unless later the
woman consents and expresses that consent. These
analogies are to some extent explicative of the matter.
We return to St. Thomas, teaching. The divine person
is constituted by the relation as subsisting and not as a
relation. Thus the generation of the Son terminates in
the person of the Son but not as that which is the object
of the relation. For, as the philosophers say, movement
or generation does not terminate per se and directly in a
relation. In God, therefore, generation terminates in
the person of the Son as subsisting, or in the relation
of filiation as it is subsisting being, but not as a
relation. Such was St. Thomas, distinction which
without too much complication was able to solve this
difficulty as much as it could be solved by men.
Fourth doubt. Whether in God, prior to the
consideration of relations and persons, there is some
absolute subsistence besides the three relative
subsistencies.
Theologians are not agreed. The Thomists commonly reply
in the affirmative; many other theologians reply in the
negative. Durandus taught that an absolute subsistence
was sufficient without relative subsistences; but this is
rejected by most theologians.
The common opinion of Thomists is that God, considered
in Himself, prior to the persons and relations, is
subsisting, that He is therefore not only the Deity but
also God, subsisting being itself, and for that reason
He is understood as having intellect, will, and the
power to create ad extra. But God is not said to be
subsisting with regard to Himself by a relative
subsistence. Therefore He subsists by an absolute
subsistence.
Confirmation. Subsistence implies the highest
perfection, namely, the most perfect manner of being.
But God, prior to our consideration of the persons,
possesses every perfection because He is pure act,
existing because of Himself. Therefore He derives no
perfection from the relations, because if paternity would
be a new perfection that perfection would be lacking in the
Son and thus the Son would not be God.
Confirmation. Antecedently to the consideration of the
persons, God possesses being or the existence of that
which is. But such existence presupposes subsistence or
that by which something is what it is. In other words,
prior to the consideration of the persons God is that
which is, indeed He is subsisting being itself. This
seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas: "The divine
nature exists having in itself subsistence apart from any
consideration of the distinction of the
persons."[318] On other occasions St. Thomas
said, "In God there are many subsisting beings if we
consider the relations, but only one subsisting being if
we consider the essence."[319] This opinion seems
to follow upon the concept of the Latins, who begin, not
with the three persons, but with the divine nature.
First objection. If we place an absolute subsistence in
God we have a quaternity.
Reply. This I deny because this absolute subsistence
confers the perseity of independence from any other
sustaining being but not the perseity of
incommunicability. Thus there are not four persons. It
is certain that, considered in Himself, God is
singular, since He is not a universal. In Him, God
and the Deity are one. From revelation it is certain
that in itself the divine nature is communicable by the
Father to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
Second objection. According to the councils and the
Fathers subsistence is the same as
"hypostasis". But no theologian admits the
existence of an absolute "hypostasis".
Reply. The councils and the Fathers did not deal with
this scholastic question and, when they spoke of the
divine persons, they did indeed say that subsistence is
the same as the "hypostasis" but they did not
intend to exclude the absolute subsistence of which we are
now speaking.
Third objection. In order that the divine nature subsist
independently and at the same time be incommunicable the
personalities or relative subsistences are sufficient.
For if in God there were one personality, this would be
able to confer both kinds of perseity, of independence and
incommunicability. Why cannot this perseity be conferred
by three persons?
Reply. If in God there were one personality, this
would be an absolute perfection and thus it would confer
both the perseity of independence and incommunicability.
This one personality would really be that absolute
subsistence of which we are speaking and in addition it
would confer incommunicability. But such is not the case
because it has been revealed that in God there are three
persons. Besides it would be incongruous that this most
perfect manner of existence in God would depend on the
relations which do not add any new perfection.
I insist. In rational creatures personality confers both
the perseity of independence and incommunicability.
Therefore it should all the more do so in God.
Reply. In rational creatures personality is an absolute
subsistence, not relative as in God. In God
perfections are derived only from the essence;
incommunicability comes only from the relations.
Final objection. That which derives its existence from
another does not exist in itself. But the divine nature,
prior to the relations or persons, seeks its existence in
them. Therefore it does not exist in itself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that which seeks its
existence in another because of its own indigence, I
concede; that which seeks its existence in another because
of its infinite fecundity, I deny. I contradistinguish
the minor: the divine nature does not seek existence in
the relations or persons because of any indigence, so that
it can exist by itself. It is already able to exist by
itself because it is subsisting being itself, but because
of its infinite fecundity it seeks to exist in the persons
as the precise terms of its existence and not as sustainers
of its own being.
I insist. The divine nature cannot exist without the
relations; therefore it is complemented by them because of
its own indigence in existence.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: the divine nature
cannot exist without the relations because it is supremely
fecund, I concede; because it is deficient, I deny.
It is itself subsisting being. In the same way
omnipotence cannot exist without the possibility of
creatures, not because of its own indigence but because of
its fecundity. So also the Father enunciates the Word
not because of any need but because of His fecundity.
Final doubt. Why is not the absolute subsistence,
modified by the relations, sufficient without relative
subsistences, as Durandus taught?
Reply. 1. Because the councils and the Fathers have
often stated that each divine person has its proper
subsistence. St. Thomas declared: "As we say that in
God there are three persons and three subsistences, so
the Greeks say there are three hypostases."[320]
2. According to the Catholic faith there are three
persons in God. But a person is formally constituted by
subsistence, which confers incommunicability. Therefore
in God there are three relative subsistences.
3. Otherwise no basis would exist for incommunicability
nor would the principle of active generation and active
spiration be established.
Confirmation. If there were only one subsistence,
modified by the three relations, we could not truly say
that there are three persons in God, just as we could not
say that there are three gods because there is one nature
modified by the three relations. We would have to confess
one person alone just as we confess one God. In order to
multiply a substantive noun such as person we must also
multiply the form, which is the personality. We return
then to St. Thomas, statement that the divine persons
are constituted by relative subsistences, as they are
subsisting and opposed to each other. Thus we have three
relative subsistences.
The Father is then the principle quod of active
generation; the Son with the Father is the principle
quod of active spiration. God, antecedent to any
consideration of the persons, is the principle quod of the
essential actions, which are common to the three persons,
such as essential intellection and essential love as
distinct from notional love (active spiration) and
personal love (the Holy Spirit).
Confirmation. The humanity of Christ is united to the
Word in His personal subsistence, which supplies the
place of the created subsistence; otherwise the three
divine persons would be incarnate.
From the foregoing we may be able better to solve a
difficulty that often comes to mind. Personality renders
a nature incommunicable to another suppositum; but
paternity does not render the divine nature incommunicable
to the Son, on the contrary it communicates it to the
Son; therefore paternity cannot constitute the person of
the Father, and, therefore, there cannot be three
persons in God.
Reply. I distinguish the major: personality renders a
nature incommunicable as personified, I concede;
personality renders a nature incommunicable in itself, I
subdistinguish: in created beings, where personality is
absolute, I concede; in God, where personality is
relative, I deny. Thus the person of the Father
renders the divine nature incommunicable as personified
(there is but one Father in God), but it does not
render the divine nature incommunicable in itself. Indeed
the Father, inasmuch as He implies the relation to the
Son, communicates to the Son the divine nature and thus
manifests the infinite fecundity of the divine nature.
We have sufficiently examined the questions about the
processions of the divine persons (question 27), the
divine relations (question 28), and the divine persons
considered absolutely and in common (question 29). We
now turn to the plurality of the persons, and after this
lengthy explanation of the fundamental ideas we may now
proceed more rapidly. We shall now study the corollaries
that can be inferred from the foregoing and the correct
terminology to be used in speaking of these truths. But
we will not neglect to gather the precious gems of
knowledge which can be found in the following articles.
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