|
State of the question. This was affirmed by Aristotle,
namely, that pure act is the end of all things and
immovably moves to attract all things and moves as the
supreme desirable end.[751]
Many have denied that God is the final cause. For
example, Spinoza simply denied final causes, saying that
the end does not move the agent because the end does not
yet exist or is not obtained while the agent is acting, as
if there were no foundation for the distinction between the
intentional order, in which the end is first, and the
order of execution, in which the end is later. Kant
averred that God did not create us on account of Himself
but on account of us, for otherwise there would be
transcendental egoism in God.
The objections placed at the beginning of the article
indicate how difficult is this question of the motive of
creation.
First objection. To act for an end seems to indicate the
need of an end. But God in no way needs anything.
Second objection. In generation the agent and the end
are numerically distinct. But God is the first agent.
Therefore He cannot be the ultimate end.
Third objection. Not all things desire God because not
all things can know Him.
Fourth objection. The end is the first of all causes.
If therefore God is both agent and end, there is in Him
priority and posteriority
Reply. The reply is nevertheless affirmative and of
faith according to the Vatican Council: "This only and
true God by His goodness and omnipotent power, not for
the sake of acquiring or increasing His own happiness,
but to manifest His perfection through the gifts which He
bestows on creatures, by a most free counsel established
creatures" (Denz., no. 1783). The meaning of
this definition is that God created not because of some
finite end, or because of His external glory, if we
understand this to mean something created, as that clear
knowledge of God with praise which the blessed have in
heaven. This clear knowledge of God is itself ordered to
God as the ultimate end. Thus we read in the
Scriptures; "The Lord hath made all things for
Himself."[752]
Hence God created all things for an uncreated end, but
every end has the nature of good, and therefore God
created on account of His uncreated goodness, not indeed
to increase it, since it is already infinite, nor to
acquire anything, since He is subsisting being itself,
but to manifest His uncreated perfection through the good
that He imparts to creatures. In almost the same words
this thought of the Vatican Council is found in the body
of this article.
This truth is proved from reason by the fact that God is
the supreme agent,[753] because according to the
theory of the four causes the order of those who act should
correspond to the order of the ends. By virtue of this
correspondence we can prove conversely from the fact that
God is the ultimate end of all things (which Aristotle
clearly affirmed) that He is the first efficient cause
(this the Philosopher stated less explicitly). Thus
from the fact that Aristotle expressly said that God is
the ultimate end of all things he should have had some
understanding that God is the efficient cause of all
things. This conclusion is called for according to the
theory of the four causes and also according to the
Aristotelian principle that there is no process in
infinity in any genus of causes.[754]
The argument of the article can be stated as follows.
Every agent acts for an end, and the end of the agent is
the same as the end of the patient inasmuch as the patient
acquires what the agent imprints. But the supreme agent,
who is in no way passive, can have no other end than to
communicate His goodness, which other beings seek to
participate in. Therefore the divine goodness, which is
to be communicated, is the end of all things.
The major is the principle of finality, which can once
more be demonstrated by a reduction to absurdity: "for
otherwise the action of the agent would not result in one
thing rather than another," for example, from the
structure of the eye vision would not result rather than
hearing, from the acorn there would not be produced an oak
rather than a pear tree. Some modern Scholastics say
that these demonstrations by a reduction to absurdity both
of the principle of efficient causality and the principle
of finality contain a vicious circle. They say this
because they are unable to distinguish between an indirect
demonstration and a direct demonstration in which intrinsic
evidence is revealed. These demonstrations by way of
absurdity are recognized by all Scholastics as well as by
Kant and Suarez, but these modern philosophers are under
the influence of empiricism and Kant. In such
demonstrations St. Thomas did not try to deduce the
principles of efficient causality and finality from the
principle of contradiction; he wished merely to show that
these subordinate principles could not be denied without
denying the supreme principle of reason, namely, the
principle of contradiction which is founded immediately on
the idea of being and on its opposition to nothing. If
these demonstrations by absurdity are not valid, we ought
to say that an uncaused contingent being is neither
impossible nor absurd, and tendency without finality is
also neither impossible nor absurd. This would be pure
empirical nominalism, a negation of all of our metaphysics
and of the proofs for God's existence. Moreover, the
principle of finality itself is immediately evident if the
terms are clearly understood, for every agent as such
tends to produce something determined agreeable to itself,
and this thing is the end. Chance, however, cannot be
the first cause of the ordering of beings, because chance
is a cause only per accidens which presupposes a cause per
se ordered to its effect.
In our major we add that the end of the agent is the same
as the end of the patient but in a different way, inasmuch
as the patient acquires that which the agent imprints, for
example, the generator tends to confer the specific
likeness of its form, which the patient receives.
The minor is evident from what was said above. God is
agent only and not patient, since He is, as first
mover, both His own action and His own being; He is
being itself and pure act. Therefore it is not fitting
that God should act to acquire some end, or to increase
His goodness, which of itself is infinite, but God acts
to communicate this goodness, as the Vatican Council
declared.
Corollary. The love of God gives; it does not properly
receive, because it is not perfected. So with man, the
higher he is elevated the more his love for his neighbor is
active; so the Apostle was more active and higher in
love, whereas those who marry not only give but also
receive.
Since, then, the end of the agent and the patient is the
same, all other beings strive to attain the perfection of
the first agent, which is the participated likeness of
this divine goodness. Thus, as St. Thomas says in the
reply to the third objection, "all things desire God as
their end, by desiring whatever is good by the
intelligible appetite, or sensible appetite, or even the
natural appetite, which is without knowledge, because
nothing has the nature of good or desirable being except so
far as it participates in God's likeness. Aristotle is
sufficiently explicit on this matter,[755] although
he is less explicit in affirming that God is the efficient
cause of all things.
Indeed, St. Thomas says farther on: "Because every
creature, inasmuch as it is, is naturally of God, it
follows that every creature in its own way naturally loves
God more than itself."[756] All things tend to a
certain likeness with God: the stars in the universal and
necessary attraction which holds the universe together,
the earth moving about the sun, the plants that strive for
their own preservation and propagation, as also the
animals and the birds, the hen that gathers her young
under her wings against the attack of the hawk and loves
the good of the species more than herself, the eye that
sees, the ears that hear, the bee that builds its hive
and makes its honey, man who tends not only to the
enjoyable and useful good but also to the moral good,
which is found especially in the supreme good. In the
canticle of the three young men we read: "All ye works
of the Lord, bless the Lord. . ., the heavens bless
the Lord." The goodness of God, therefore, is the
end of all things.
First doubt. Whether the divine goodness is really the
final cause with reference to the creative action. The
difficulty arises because this action is never an effect,
not even in the order of finality.
Reply. The goodness of God is not a final cause really
distinct from the creative action, nor is it an end to be
produced or acquired. But analogically the divine
goodness has the aspect of an end with respect to the
creative action. As St. Thomas says: "The first
principle of all things is one in reality, but there is
nothing to prohibit us from considering many things in it
according to reason, of which some will in our intellect
be prior to others."[757] The Thomists point out:
"The divine goodness is not properly and strictly the
final cause of the immanent divine operation, because
between a cause properly so called and an effect there is
necessarily a real distinction and a real dependence of the
effect on the cause. Rightly we should say that the
divine goodness is the reason for the divine operation or
the reason why God wills and acts." For this a
distinction of reason is sufficient, nor is a real
dependence of one on another needed. As St. Thomas
said earlier: "The immutability of God is the reason
for His eternity, and His immateriality is the reason
for His intellection."[758] Hence because God
perfectly loves His goodness He freely wills to
communicate it by participation to others.
Second doubt. How is the creative action itself ordered
to the creature and to the production of created goodness?
Reply. Not as a means to an end, for then God would be
subordinated to the creature, but the creative action is
ordered to the creature as the eminent cause to an inferior
effect without any real relation to the creature, since
the real relationship is only of the creature to God and
not conversely. Thus the Incarnation is ordered to the
Redemption, not as a means, but as an eminent cause.
The creature is in no way the end of the act of uncreated
love, but the creature is the end of the good which God
wills to give it. It is in this way that we interpret the
words, "The Lord hath made all things for
Himself."[759]
Kant objected that this would mean there was in God a
transcendental egoism.
Reply. When this egoism is defined, it appears that it
is not a simply perfect perfection that can be predicated
of God, even with the adjective "transcendental," nor
is egoism a perfection secundum quid. Egoism is an
inordinate love of oneself by which one loves himself more
than the good of the family, or the good of his country,
or the supreme good. God, however, cannot love Himself
more than the supreme good, with which He is identified.
Therefore there is in God no egoism, not even
transcendental.
Indeed, if God did not love Himself, that is, His
own goodness, above all things, He would love some
created good more, for example, our dignity. Then there
would be mortal sin in God and this would be the supreme
absurdity, since mortal sin consists in the aversion from
the supreme good, to which some changeable and finite good
is preferred. Finally, our own happiness would be
decreased, because then the creature would have for its
last end some finite good, for example, its own dignity
and not the ultimate infinite end.
Corollary. On the contrary, instead of egoism there is
the highest liberality in God, because God made all
things without any need for them, since He was infinitely
happy before the creation, and He made all things to
manifest His goodness. This is the characteristic of the
highest liberality. "God Himself alone is most
liberal, because He acts not on account of His own needs
but only to communicate His goodness."[760] "Give
glory to the Lord, for He is good."[761] Thus we
conclude that God is the efficient cause of all things,
and the model and final cause of all things, so that all
things, so far as their being is concerned, even prime
matter, are caused by Him.
|
|