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If this article was not written by St. Thomas, it was
composed by one of his disciples from what St. Thomas
says on this matter elsewhere.[916] This article
completes the question and serves as a preamble to the
fourth article: whether there is only one world.
In this article it is asked whether the subordination of
agents is not only formal but also dynamic. It appears
that it is not dynamic: 1. because the omnipotent God
can act without an intermediate subordinate agent; 2.
because this dynamic subordination would be a return to the
separated ideas of Plato, for the subordinate agents
would at the same time be exemplary ideas; 3. if one
creature were the active cause of another, it would also
be its final cause; and God alone is the end of all
things.
Reply. Nevertheless the reply is in the affirmative,
that is, in creatures the subordination of agents
corresponds to the subordination of ends.
Proof from authority. "There is no power but from
God; and those that are, are ordained from
God."[917] As Dionysius said, in this way God
rules the lower through the higher.
Proof from reason. The proof is twofold: indirect and
direct.
a) The indirect proof is a refutation of the doctrine of
occasionalism, already proposed in St. Thomas' day,
according to which it is not the fire that heats but God
in the fire.[918]
Reply. The active powers, as well as the qualities and
forms, attributed to things would be futile if they
effected nothing. St. Thomas says: "Indeed all
created things would seem to be somehow futile if they were
stripped of their proper operation, because all things are
because of their operation," [919] or as Cajetan
says, because of themselves as operating. "It is not
due to some lack of power that God acts through the
mediation of creatures, but because of the abundance of
His goodness inasmuch. . . as He communicates the
dignity of causality to creatures."[920] This
causality is explained by the distinction between potency
and act, which Malebranche and Leibnitz failed to
recognize and therefore they fell back on occasionalism
when they were unable to explain the transitive activity of
creatures.
b) The conclusion is proved directly from the inequality
required in creatures to manifest the divine goodness, as
we stated in the preceding article. The proof may be
reduced to the following: The more perfect is compared to
the less perfect as act to potency, and it is the nature
of what exists in act that it act on that which is in
potency. But there is inequality in creatures inasmuch as
one is more perfect than another. Therefore it is
necessary that one creature act on another, by the power
of God, the first agent. We have in mind here agents
that are "per se" subordinate, not univocal
causes, subordinate "per accidens", such as men
who are successive by the succession of generation.
Explanation of the major. If in nature some inferior
being is in potency to receive some perfection, it is of
the nature of a superior being in act that it act on that
which is in potency, for example, if the fruits of the
earth need warmth to ripen, it is in order that the sun,
which is hot in act, should provide heat for the earth.
The minor is evident. Therefore there must be a
subordination of agents.
Corollary. The order or subordination of agents
corresponds to the subordination of ends, as St. Thomas
frequently pointed out: "It is necessary, since every
agent acts for an end, that every cause direct its effects
to its end, and therefore, since there is an order of
ends according to the order of agents or movers, it is
necessary that man be directed to the ultimate end by the
movement of the first mover."[921] Hence St.
Thomas says also in this article, "matter is ordered to
the form, the elements to mixed beings, plants to
animals, and animals to man." We see then that the
order of the universe arises from the fact that one
creature acts on another and that one creature is made to
the likeness of another (for every agent acts in some way
similar to itself) and that one creature is the end of
another. Thus minerals are assimilated by plants, plants
by animals, and animals by men. We see here an external
finality of the inferior being to the superior which can be
corroborated by the internal finality of the superior
being, for example, the animal acts for an end and in
assimilating the plant for its own sustenance it uses an
appropriate means to the end of sustaining itself and thus
it appears that according to external finality plants are
because of animals.[922]
First corollary. Man is a microcosm, a sort of
compendium of the universe inasmuch as he reflects this
subordination of agents and ends. The intellective part
of the soul moves the sensitive faculties and members and
uses them for its higher end, because the end of the agent
and patient is the same but in different ways. So also
the sensitive part uses the vegetative part, and the
vegetative part uses the lower aliments which it
assimilates through the nutritive function and by
respiration.
In this microcosm we see the dynamic order of the whole
universe, the threefold subordination of agents, ends,
and forms inasmuch as the superior agent in acting in a
manner similar to itself is also a kind of exemplar of the
effect produced in the inferior being. St. Thomas
says: "God is the prime exemplar of all things, but
secondarily the creature is an exemplar of another
creature." For example, our reason is modified by
prudence, and this is an exemplar of the rectitude of the
sensitive appetite governed by temperance.
Second corollary. The pantheists look for a substantial
unity in the universe and without reason deny the two
extrinsic causes of the world, the efficient and final
causes, while evidently the world has a dynamic unity
which participates in efficient and final causality.
Third corollary. From all this it appears that the
principle of finality (every agent acts for an end) is no
less necessary and no less evident than the principle of
efficient causality (every thing that is made has an
efficient cause). Indeed there can be no efficient
causality without finality, nor can there be a tendency
which does not tend to an end. The end is the first and
supreme of the four causes and thus, at least in itself,
the principle of finality is prior to the principle of
efficient causality and better known "per se".
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