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State of the question. In this title cause is understood
in its most general sense, without any determination of
the kind of cause.
It seems that good cannot be the cause of evil:
1. because "a good tree cannot bear evil fruit," as
our Lord said;
2. because one contrary cannot be the cause of another
contrary, for every agent acts in a manner similar to
itself, that is, it acts in accord with its own determination;
3. because evil is a deficient effect; which can proceed
only from a deficient cause as such, that is, from a
cause that is not good but evil, for the cause that is
deficient is evil;
4. finally, Dionysius declared, "evil does not have a
cause."[1068]
But on the other hand, St. Augustine said: "There
was absolutely nothing from which evil could arise except
out of good."[1069]
Reply. The reply has four parts:
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1. it is necessary to point out that every evil has some
kind of cause;
2. evil has neither a formal nor a final cause;
3. evil has a material cause, namely, the good in which
it is;
4. evil has an efficient cause "per accidens",
which is some good. Thus good is the material cause and
the accidental efficient cause of evil.
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First conclusion. It is necessary to point out that evil
has some kind of cause. In his proof St. Thomas
enunciates first the minor; but we begin with the major as
follows:
The fact that anything is deficient in its natural and due
disposition can arise only from some cause that draws the
thing outside its disposition; for example, an agent does
not defect in its action except by reason of some
impediment. But evil is the deficiency of some good that
is due. Therefore evil has some kind of cause, and
nothing can be a cause unless it is being and good in some
way.
The major of this syllogism illustrates the entire
article, as we shall see. Up to this point there is no
difficulty, and the foregoing argument will appear even
clearer at the end of the article when we distinguish
between evil in action and evil in effect.
Second conclusion. Evil has neither a formal nor a final
cause; this is evident because evil is the privation of
form and the privation of the right ordination to an end.
The divine permission of evil takes place because of a
greater good, but the evil itself is not useful nor is it
of itself ordered to the greater good; if it were, it
would be something good as matter ordered to the form.
Evil, however, is only the occasion and the condition
"sine qua non" of some greater good, as, for
example, persecution is the occasion of the great
constancy of the martyrs. A condition and an occasion
differ from a cause inasmuch as they have no influence on
the effect, neither efficiently nor finally nor formally
nor materially.
Third conclusion. That evil has a material cause is
evident because evil is privation in an apt subject, and
thus it is in good as in a subject.
Fourth conclusion. This conclusion is more difficult.
Evil cannot have an efficient cause "per se" but
only an efficient cause "per accidens", and this
is something good.
The proof is rather complex. The following synopsis may
be helpful.
Obviously evil does not have an efficient cause "per
se", for such a cause is in some way being and good,
which "per se" produces some good, for example,
fire produces fire and motor power produces
movement.[1070] Hence evil can have an efficient
cause only "per accidens". But accidental
causes are of many kinds; likewise evil is of many kinds,
and therefore this subdivision is necessary.
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GOOD IS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF EVIL
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for a cause "per se" is
some being and some good, which "per se"
produces something like itself, that is, something good;
for example, fire produces fire, motive power produces
motion
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in action, from the defect of the agent
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principal: e.g., weakness in walking.
instrumental: lameness
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from the power of the agent "per se" producing an
opposite form; thus the sun dries up some fruits
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of the agent and the action: e.g., poor speech;
of the matter: e.g., a monstrosity.
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1. Evil in action, for example, weakness in walking or
lameness is caused by the defect of the principal cause (a
weakness of the motive power) or by a defect of the
instrumental cause (curvature of the leg bones).
2. Evil in anything is of three kinds: a) from the
power of a contrary agent, for example, the form of wood
or of a house is destroyed by the power of fire; b) from
the defect of an action followed by a proper deficient
effect, for example, poor hearing is the effect of poor
pronunciation; c) from the indisposition of the matter,
for example, the birth of a monstrosity.
This enumeration is complete because evil in a thing
cannot be produced except by the agent or the matter as
considered with regard to the form and the end. Thus the
four kinds of causes are included. And evil cannot come
from the agent except by reason of the power of a contrary
agent or from the defect of the proper agent.
Finally it is clear that in these three cases the
efficient cause is only an accidental cause, but the
difficulty arises from the fact that causes are said to be
accidental in different ways.
It is accidental that a proper agent be defective, for
example, that a man speaks poorly because of the presence
of some impediment. The deficiency happens to a good
thing which "per se" has the power to act.
So also it is accidental that matter be indisposed to
properly receive the action of an agent. Lastly it is
only by accident that the privation of a form takes place,
for example, the destruction of wood or of a house by the
force of a contrary agent, namely, fire. Per se this
contrary agent tends to induce its proper form; fire
produces something similar to itself, it produces fire,
and it does not "per se" tend to the privation of
an opposite form. This privation, however, follows
necessarily. It is true that this is not the first but
the second acceptation of the term "accidental cause,"
as explained by Aristotle.[1071]
Aristotle divides accidental causes as
follows.[1072]
The division of quasi- "per accidens" and not
contingently will appear obscure to many. It is difficult
at first to conceive of a contrary agent producing a
physical evil "per accidens" and of necessity;
the terms "per accidens" and "necessarily"
seem to be irreconcilable to those who do not clearly
understand the difference between a cause that is
absolutely "per accidens", like chance, and an
accidental cause that always produces the accidental
effect. Such a cause is nevertheless a cause "per
accidens" even though the accidental effect follows
always and of necessity, because this cause is not
"per se" ordered to this effect. Fire acts in a
way similar to itself; "per se" it does not tend
to the destruction of wood or of a house, but to the
production of fire. The terms "per
accidens" and "of necessity"," at
first sight irreconcilable, can be reconciled.
Doubt. With regard to a voluntary agent, is the
accidental effect separated from the intention of the
agent?" Sometimes the accidental effect is connected
with the principal effect rarely and in few instances, and
in this case when the agent intends the effect "per
se" it is not necessary that the agent intend the
accidental effect. But sometimes the accidental effect
accompanies the principal effect at all times or in the
majority of instances, and then the accidental effect
cannot be said to be separate from the intention of the
agent. If therefore the good intended by the will is
joined to some evil in rare instances, the will can be
excused from sin, as in the case of accidental homicide
which occurs beyond the intention of the will. But if at
all times or in most instances the evil is joined to the
good which the will intends "per se", it is not
excused from sin, even though the will does not intend
this evil "per se". Even though the sinner does
not will the evil in itself, yet he wills to fall into
this evil rather than go without the connected
good."[1073]
3. Thus good is the material cause and "per
accidens" the efficient cause of evil. For this
reason we say, for instance, of a conflagration or of a
fractured bone, it was an accident.
The conclusion of the body of the article will appear
clearer in the light of this principle, "The fact that a
thing is deficient in its natural and proper disposition
can arise only from some cause that draws it away from that
disposition."[1074]
The evil of an action arising from the defect of the agent
and the evil in a thing arising from the defect of the
agent or from the defect of the matter in the final
analysis arise from some cause that draws the thing or the
agent away from its disposition. This disturbing cause is
a cause "per accidens" because "per se"
it tends to its proper effect; for example, fruits are
dried up owing to an excessive influence from the sun, and
on the other hand fruits do not ripen from an insufficient
influence from the sun. Physical evil, as Leibnitz
says, happens because of the interconcurrence of the laws
of nature. But each of these laws is good. The evil
follows accidentally, and it is the condition of a greater
good according to the disposition of Providence. And
while we deplore these accidental evils, we unconsciously
confess that the things that happen ordinarily are well
ordered by divine Providence.
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