SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

In the solution of these objections we must keep in mind the manner in which God moves toward the physical act of sin.[1115] These points should be carefully noted.

1. We presuppose that there is in God an eternal positive and effective decree with regard to the entity of sin, and a permissive decree with regard to the defect of sin proceeding solely from the deficient cause. Hence from eternity there was a twofold decree with regard to the sin of Christ's enemies at some determined hour.

2. The divine motion is previous, since God is the cause of the act of sin and not only of the sin as being. The cause always precedes the effect, at least by nature and causality; the will needs to be moved so that it can act, because the will is not its own action just as it is not its own being.

3. This divine motion is predeterminative, but not in the same way as the divine motion by which we are moved to a good act; in the case of evil the divine motion is predeterminative as executing the divine will, but for an evil act there is a twofold decree instead of a single decree: the positive decree with regard to the entity of the sin and the permissive decree with regard to the lack of moral rectitude, or with regard to the malice.

4. This divine motion in its execution follows upon, at least by nature if not in time, the moral or objectively defective motion, which as such is not from God but from the devil, from an evil man, or from concupiscence. On the other hand, the moral motion which is a prerequisite to a good act is from God, at least as from the first cause, because it is good.

Once this defective moral motion is posited and after the intervention of some inconsideration on the part of man, the physical influx of God begins to flow into the will itself and effects the entity of the act of the will, but it prescinds from the malice; the freedom remains as in other acts because God moves not only toward the act but also that the act be free.

5. God does not determine the material part of the sin before the creature has in some way determined itself to the formal part of the sin. As the universal provider, God moves only that will to sin which is in itself evilly disposed and which thus disposed needs to be moved. Thus Christ said to Judas: "That which thou dost, do quickly."[1116] That which on the part of God precedes the determination of the will to the formal part of sin is only the permission to sin, which is a penalty, not for the first sin but for the other sins.

6. The inconsideration, which is the beginning of the sin, is voluntary and culpable, at least virtually, inasmuch as a rational agent can and should consider the rule of right reason in his action, and if he does not consider it, he is culpable; this is the beginning of the sin. Finally, since the will is naturally inclined to the good, it does not turn to the evil or the apparent good without first virtually turning itself away from the true good, at least by not considering the law when it could and should. This predetermination to the act of sin is not something primary in Thomism; it is secondary, something consequent and merely philosophical.

First objection. (The second objection in the article.) This objection, which attempts to show that God is the direct, although not the immediate, cause of sin, is stated as follows: The effect of a second cause is referred to the first cause. But the evil of guilt is sometimes the effect of a second cause. Therefore the evil of guilt is referred to the first cause.

Reply. I distinguish the major: with regard to the entity and perfection, I concede; with regard to the effect, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as a defect, I concede; as being, I deny; for example, whatever there is of motion in lameness is caused by the motive power, but whatever there is of deformity is not of the motive power but from the curvature of the bone. That is to say, the divine motion prescinds from malice.

I insist. But God moves the will to the act as it issues from the will itself. But the act of sin as it issues from the will does not prescind from malice. Therefore God in moving to this act does not prescind from malice.

Reply. I distinguish the major: as the act issues effectively from the will, I concede; defectively, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as it issues from the will defectively, I concede; effectively, I deny.

I insist. The cause of anything is also the cause of that which essentially belongs to it. But some physical acts are essentially evil in a moral sense, as hatred of God. Therefore in moving toward these acts God cannot prescind from their malice.

Reply. I distinguish the major: the cause of anything in the physical order is also the cause of that which essentially belongs to it in the same order, I concede; in the moral order and outside the adequate object of its causality, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and the malice is in the physical order and is within the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, I deny; and the malice is in the moral order and outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, I concede.

Thomists commonly point out that nothing is more clearly delimited than the causality of a potency or power, which is so completely concerned with its object that it touches on nothing else, no matter how closely anything else may be conjoined to its object. Thus in the same apple three things, color, taste, and smell, are intimately connected, and yet sight takes in the color but not the taste and smell. Sight cannot see sounds. Indeed, a distinction of reason is sufficient to delimit a potency; thus the good and true are distinguished only by reason, for example, in the true goodness of virtue, and yet the true is known and the good is loved. The intellect touches the good under the aspect of truth but not under the aspect of the good. Similarly, in God the paternity is distinguished from the divine nature only by reason, and the divine nature alone is communicated to the Son, without the communication of the paternity. In sin, however, the act taken physically and the moral malice are much more distinct from each other; these things pertain to two different orders, and the malice is outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, for every agent acts in a manner at least analogically similar to itself, and between God and the malice of guilt there is not even an analogical similarity. Hence, even if God willed to be the cause of sin, He could not, just as a man who willed to see sound could not.

I insist. But the formal constituent of a sin of commission is a positive element, according to St. Thomas and many Thomists. But God causes whatever is positive in sin. Therefore God causes the formal constituent of a sin of commission.

Reply. I distinguish the major: it is a positive element under the aspect of defectible being, or as forming the basis of the inordination, I concede; under the aspect of effectible being, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: God causes whatever is positive under the aspect of effectible being, I concede; under the aspect of defectible being, I deny. Thus, as defectible being the sin does not come within the adequate object of the divine omnipotence.

I insist. Whatever causes a form, "per accidens" produces the annexed privation. But the privation of moral rectitude is annexed to the act of sin. Therefore God, causing the act of sin, "per accidens" produces the privation of rectitude.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if this privation follows from the very nature of this form, I concede; in this way God is the cause "per accidens" of the physical evil of penalty or of the death of an animal because He wills the life of the lion; but if the privation proceeds from a defective principle, I deny. In this latter instance the privation is not even "per accidens" from an indefectible principle.

Thus we say that the sinner himself is "per accidens" the cause of the malice of his act, inasmuch as he tends "per se" to some unworthy good; but God is not even "per accidens" the cause of this malice, because this malice is outside the adequate object of omnipotence.

Other objections attempt to prove that God is at least indirectly the cause of sin.[1117]

The same pilot is the cause of the safety of the ship and of the shipwreck. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore God is the cause of moral shipwreck, or sin.

Reply. I distinguish the major: inasmuch as the pilot is defective, or does not guide the ship when he can and should, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and God is deficient in doing what is necessary for salvation, I deny; and God is still indefectible, I concede.

I insist. But he who does not prevent a sin when he can do so is still the indirect cause of the sin. But God does not prevent sin when He is able. Therefore God is the indirect cause of sin.

Reply. I distinguish the major: when he can and should, I concede; when he can and is not obliged to do so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: God is able not to prevent, or permit, that a defectible agent fails, or sins, because of a greater good which is occasioned by a sin.[1118] Thus God is not obliged to prevent sin.

I insist. St. Thomas says:[1119] "If affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation, as Aristotle says; for example, the rising of the sun is the cause of the day, and the non-rising of the sun is the cause of darkness. But the conferring of grace is the cause of a salutary act. Therefore the non-conferring of grace, included in the permission of even the first sin, is the cause of the omission of the salutary act."

We see that St. Thomas was not ignorant of this objection with which Thomists have been always confronted in almost the same terms.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if we are dealing with one cause alone, as the sun rising or not rising, or the pilot watching or not watching, I concede; but if we are dealing with two causes of which one is indefectible and the other defectible, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and the omission of the salutary act proceeds from one and the same cause as that which confers grace, I deny; from another defectible and deficient cause, I concede.[1120]

I insist. He who denies grace apart from antecedent guilt is the indirect cause of sin. But God, by permitting the beginning of the first sin (for example, in a baptized person), denies grace apart from antecedent guilt. Therefore God is the indirect cause of the beginning of the first sin.

Reply. The reply is contained in St. Thomas' words concerning the principle, "mutual causes are causes in different genera," which is applied inversely in justification and the loss of grace by sin. I distinguish the major: apart from guilt antecedent by a priority of nature, I concede; by a priority of time, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: apart from guilt antecedent by a priority of time, I concede; by a priority of nature, I deny.

Explanation. The denial of grace is indeed a penalty, which can be inflicted only for guilt. Thus the denial of grace implies more than the simple divine permission of sin, which simply antecedes sin as a condition "sine qua non". It is true that the permission of the second sin is a penalty for the first sin, as St. Thomas says,[1121] but the permission of the first sin, for example, in the angels, or in the innocent Adam, or in a baptized person, does not have the nature of penalty.

God does not deny grace except for some antecedent guilt, but this guilt can be antecedent by a priority not of time but of nature only, in the genus of material cause, or of a defectible and deficient cause.

This is illustrated by the principle proposed by St. Thomas,[1122] mutual causes are causes in different genera, without there being a vicious circle. Thus in the same instant, on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness, but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated the removal of darkness is first in the order of nature, although the two things are simultaneous. Since the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are considered on the part of God as justifying, the infusion of grace is prior to remission of guilt in the order of nature. But if these things are considered on the part of man who is justified, the converse is true: liberation from guilt (we do not say remission of guilt) is prior in the order of nature to the attainment of justifying grace (we do not say infusion of grace because this expression views the matter from the viewpoint of God and not from the viewpoint of man, who is justified).

Speaking absolutely, the infusion of grace is prior to the remission of guilt, because these things are predicated on the part of God.

On the other hand, the loss of grace and the commission of sin are predicated of man sinning, and absolutely speaking from the viewpoint of the material cause, or of man losing grace, it is true that the beginning of the first sin is prior to the denial of divine grace, that is at least initial guilt is absolutely prior to penalty. The only thing that precedes this beginning of the first sin is the divine permission, which is a condition "sine qua non" of the sin. The denial of grace implies more than the simple permission of sin, which is not a penalty especially in the case of the first sin.

I insist. The Council of Trent declared: "God does not desert by His grace those who are once justified unless He is first deserted by them."[1123]

Reply. This statement was made by St. Augustine, who nevertheless solved the problem of evil.[1124] The statement means that God does not withdraw habitual grace except for some antecedent sin. In the case of actual grace, however, there is a desertion properly so called, which is the denial of actual grace by God. But this is not true of the simple divine permission for the beginning of the first sin, because God is not bound to preserve even the just man from sin by a special and efficacious help which is not due to man. But God does not refuse sufficient grace by which, if man does not resist it, he can attain to good; but if man resists sufficient grace, God can justly deny him efficacious grace.

I insist. As the best friend, God should always give man efficacious grace to avoid sin. But God is the best friend of every man. Therefore God should always give all men efficacious grace to avoid sin.

Reply. I ask you to prove the major, namely, that God as Adam's best friend was bound to offer him at all times not only sufficient grace but also efficacious grace, that is, by preventing Adam's resistance to sufficient grace.

I insist. But sufficient grace is required for the fulfillment of the commandments. And God because of the abundance of His goodness owes it to Himself to give us more help than is required to make the commandments possible of fulfillment.[1125] Therefore because of the abundance of His goodness God owes it to Himself to give us more than sufficient grace, namely, efficacious grace.

Reply. I distinguish the minor: frequently for the human race and also for the just man, I concede; always unto the end, this I ask you to prove.

I insist. God owes it to Himself at all times to unite mercy and justice in all His works.

Reply. I distinguish: by abundant sufficient graces, by sermons, good examples, let it pass; by graces that are always efficacious, this I ask you to prove. Even when God punishes, His mercy is united to justice, because even in hell the punishment is less than condign.

I insist. He who does not preserve a man in good is the indirect cause of the sin of a man who needs this preservation. But, by permitting the beginning of the first sin, God does not preserve a man in good. Therefore God is the indirect cause of sin.

Reply. I distinguish the major: he who does not preserve a man in good when he is able and obliged to do so, I concede; when he is able but not obliged to do so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. God is not obliged to preserve all defectible things in good, otherwise defectible things would never fail, and preservation from sin would not have been a most special privilege for the Blessed Virgin, but it would be something most common. God actually gives more than justice demands because of the superabundance of His goodness;[1126] He does this even for each person frequently, but not always to the end, that is, He does not conduct each person to his last end.

If it is said that man needs to be preserved in good so that he might remain in the good, the reply is: that man requires and has a right to be preserved in good and that God owes it to Himself to preserve man in good, this I deny; that man requires this preservation without having the right to it, I concede. In himself man is defectible and from this it follows that he sometimes fails; he fails sometimes physically and without guilt, like the agents inferior to him, and sometimes he fails morally and voluntarily with guilt, and God is not obliged to prevent this guilt. If God were so bound, no sin would ever be committed and defectible things would never fail. To no one, not even to the elect, is owing the efficacious election to glory, otherwise all men would be saved.

St. Thomas expresses this thought in these words:[1127] "It happens that God does not extend to some that help to avoid sin which, if it were extended, would prevent them from sinning. But God does all this according to the order of justice and wisdom, since He Himself is justice and wisdom. Hence it cannot be imputed to God that someone sins, as if He were the cause of sin, just as the pilot is not the cause of the shipwreck because of the fact that he does not steer the ship unless when he withdraws his guidance he could and should be steering the ship." The pilot is blamed only for negligence, and divine negligence is a contradiction in terms. This objection is indeed difficult, but it is not cogent.

I insist. St. Thomas says: "Out of the abundance of His goodness God dispenses those things that are owing to some creature more generously than the importance of the thing demands."[1128]

Reply. This is often true, but God does not always lead every man to the last end, preserving him and elevating him above sin. We are here face to face with a profound mystery, indeed the mystery of iniquity is more obscure than the mystery of grace since it is obscure not only with regard to us but also in itself. But the apparent contradiction will be obviated if we keep clearly in mind the following two most certain principles:

1. "God does not command the impossible, but when He commands He admonishes you to do what you are able and to ask for what you cannot do."[1129] This principle was invoked against the Protestants by the Council of Trent.[1130]

2. In the article, "Whether God loves all things equally,"[1131] St. Thomas formulated this principle: "Since the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things, one thing would not be better than another if God had not willed a greater good for one thing than for another." This is the principle of predilection as found in revelation: "For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will,"[1132] "For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?"[1133]

These two principles were promulgated by the Council of Carisiac in the words of St. Prosper: "The omnipotent God wills all men without exception to be saved, even though all are not saved. The fact that some are saved is owing to the gift of Him who saves them; the fact that some are lost is owing to themselves."[1134]

Taken separately, these two principles are most certain according to revelation; even in the natural order they are evident. But their intimate reconciliation remains obscure, and no created intelligence by its own powers can make this reconciliation, because it would be necessary to see how the infinite mercy, the infinite justice, and supreme liberty are intimately reconciled in God. No one can see God in this way except in the light of glory. In the words of Bossuet: "In this state of captivity we must humble our intelligence before the divine mystery and admit these two graces, one that leaves our will inexcusable before God, the other that prevents us from glorying in ourselves."[1135]

Hence St. Paul says: "He that glorieth, may glory in the Lord";[1136] "For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory. For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them."[1137]

An article could be written comparing false evidence with the obscurity of true faith to illustrate why so often, especially in this question of evil, the objections at first sight seem clearer than the replies. This matter might at least be considered in a chapter on faith as illumined by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The principal reason is that the objections are taken from the superficial appearances of reality, whereas the replies are taken from that highest reality which is with God and which is so profound for us because of our defectibility and therefore remains so obscure.

Indeed in this present problem there are two obscurities opposed to each other: the higher obscurity of the divine reality which is translucent and the lower obscurity of sin itself, which is itself the privation of light, truth, and goodness. Between these two opposing obscurities is the true clarity of these certain principles: "God does not command the impossible," and "no one would be better than another if he were not loved more by God." The reconciliation of these principles is a mystery, but the evidence of the principles themselves indicates that the objections are superficial and false. In the objections we always find some sophistic falsehood, and none of the objections is either cogent or necessary.

These objections are useful because they arouse in the just a desire to contemplate the mystery of the Deity on a plane above every distinct idea. Such contemplation when it proceeds from faith illumined by the supernatural gifts with a certain experimental knowledge of God remains obscure with a translucent obscurity of which St. John of the Cross spoke so eloquently.[1138]

Second conclusion. God wills and causes "per accidens" physical evil and the evil of penalty.

An agent that by its power "per se" produces some form as a consequence and quasi- "per accidens" causes the privation of the opposite form. But God wills and causes "per se" and principally the good of the universe, which requires defectible things that are sometimes deficient, and God wills and causes the order of justice, which requires that penalty be inflicted on sinners. Therefore God wills and causes as a consequence and quasi- "per accidens" physical evil and the evil of penalty.

It should be noted that St. Thomas bases this proof not only on efficient causality but also on the divine intellect and will, because whatever God causes "per accidens" He also wills in the same manner; from eternity God willed and foresaw whatever He would do even "per accidens" in these or other circumstances. We, however, sometimes produce "per accidens" certain evils which we do not will or foresee. Such is not the case with God.

St. Thomas returns to the proof which he had already given above in the article, "Whether the will of God is concerned with evil," where he says: "God wills the evil of natural defect or the evil of penalty by willing some good to which such evil is joined."[1139] But God can in no way will the evil of guilt, which negates the order to the divine good willed by God above all things.

Doubt. Is the following proposition true: "While evils are not good, nevertheless it is good that there be evils, because those things that are evil in themselves are ordered to some good"? If this proposition is true, then the following is also true: "It is good that there are sins."

St. Thomas replies in the negative: "Some say that, although God does not will evils, nevertheless He wills that evils should be and should come into being..... But this is not a correct statement, because evil is not "per se" ordered to good but only "per accidens". The fact that some good ensues from a sin is beyond the intention of the sinner, just as it is beyond the intention of tyrants that the patience of martyrs is glorified in persecution."[1140] Hence we should say that "per accidens" and as a consequence God wills physical evil and the evil of penalty, and that He wills to permit sin by not preventing them and occasionally deriving some good from them. Only in this sense do we say, "O blessed fault which merited so great a Redeemer.!"

This entire article can be reduced to the following synopsis. God in no way wills or causes the evil of guilt, neither on the part of the end, because sin negates the order to the divine good loved by God above all things; nor on the part of the efficient cause, because sin is from a deficient voluntary agent, at least by inconsideration, and this defect cannot be predicated of the indefectible God. God wills physical evil and penalty "per accidens", on the part of the end, because He wills the good of the universe and justice, and from this evils sometimes follow; on the part of the efficient cause, because these evils proceed from the power of the agent producing a form which entails the privation of the opposite form.