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First objection. If whiteness were subsisting it would
be one alone. Therefore if being is subsisting there is
but one being.
Reply. In the antecedent it is supposed that whiteness
cannot be participated in; on the contrary, being is
shared.
I insist. There is a certain participation but it is
after the manner of the emanation of an accident from a
substance.
Reply. We reply in two ways: a posteriori and a
priori.
A posteriori. From an experience illuminated by the
light of reason we know that there are many substances in
the world, for example, the substance of water is
distinct from the substance of hydrogen and the substance
of oxygen of which it is composed, for it has entirely
different properties. Again, the animal is substantially
different from the inanimate food that it assimilates. We
note particularly in the world about us the individuality
of the higher animals, especially the individuality of
man, which is confirmed by the testimony of
consciousness, according to which each one of us is
substantially distinct from others, as the just man is
distinct from the criminal, and Jesus from Barabbas.
Moreover, in proving the existence of God, the first
mover, first cause, and supreme being, it was not
necessary to show first that there was a multiplicity of
substances in this world. It was sufficient to show that
the substance of the world changes, and then to point out
that every movement required a mover and in the final
analysis an immovable mover, who is his own action and
consequently his own being. It was clear then that this
first immovable mover was really distinct from the mobile
substance of the world. It was sufficient to show that
every multitude presupposed a superior unity, and that
every imperfect being or composition of perfection and
imperfection presupposed a perfect, pure, and simple
being, which was really and essentially distinct from the
changeable and composite world. "God, who is unique and
singular, a completely simple and unchangeable spiritual
substance, must be said to be really and essentially
distinct from the world and ineffably exalted above all
things which are by Him and which can be
conceived."[732]
A priori. Supposing the existence of the first being as
proved, it is evident that the world is not related to
God as an accident to a substance. It was proved
earlier[733] that a substance is compared to an
accident as potency to act, since the substance is in some
way perfected by the accident. But subsisting being
itself is in no way in potency to anything, it cannot be
perfected, it is pure act, the ultimate actuality, a
being to which no addition can be made, since it is
already the fullness of being. Hence Spinoza was able to
deduce from God infinite attributes but no finite modes.
Hence if God alone exists, as Parmenides taught, there
is no change anywhere, no multitude.
I insist. But Spinoza thought that the world needed
neither an efficient nor a final cause, being like the
circle which in itself does not require these extrinsic
causes, for the circle is a circle of itself.
Reply. Spinoza here made use of the mathematical
method, which abstracts from the existence of the circle
and considers its essence and which abstracts from the
existence of all things, from movement, for instance,
and therefore from efficient and final causes, and which
considers only the formal cause of numbers and geometrical
figures, as St. Thomas explains in this article. But
the mathematical method is a special method which is valid
in the study of the essence of quantity, whether
continuous or discrete, but it is not a universal method
which is valid in the study of beings, particularly with
regard to their existence. For if anything comes into
existence which did not exist before, as this plant, this
animal, this recently generated man, it requires not only
a formal cause but also an efficient and a final cause.
The mathematical method is not adequate in physics or in
metaphysics. Spinoza's theory is an abuse of the
mathematical method, which in its own order prescinds from
efficient and final causes. Metaphysics, however,
cannot prescind from these causes in this way, since it is
the science of being as being through the highest causes,
as Aristotle explained at length in the beginning of his
metaphysics.
I insist. The essences of things are eternal and
absolutely necessary and they do not depend on God, for
example, man is a rational animal eternally and
independently of God. Therefore not every being depends
on God.
Reply. The essences of things are eternal negatively,
that is, inasmuch as they prescind from the here and now,
I concede; positively eternal, as always existing, I
deny, or I ask you to prove it. Again I distinguish:
the essences as absolutely necessary do not depend on
God, if their necessity is not participated, I
concede; if it is otherwise, I deny. These essences do
not indeed depend on God effectively unless they are
produced here and now, but they do depend formally on
God, since they are the divine essence as imitable ad
extra in a participated likeness.[734] Just as every
existence presupposes the first existence, so every
essence presupposes the first essence, of which it is an
analogical imitation, at least in the nature of being,
and so also every truth presupposes the first truth. As
St. Thomas says in this article, "certain necessary
things have a cause for their necessity, as necessary
conclusions."
In the Contra Gentes,[735] St. Thomas says:
"From the fact that the truths that we understand are
eternal with regard to what is understood, we cannot
conclude that the soul is eternal, but that the understood
truths are based on something eternal. They are in fact
based on the first truth itself as in a universal cause
containing all truth."
I insist. Spinoza also objected that one substance
cannot produce another substance, since the second
substance would have the same essential attributes and
therefore it would not be distinct from the first
substance.
Reply. I distinguish: the second substance would have
the same attributes at least analogically, I concede;
the same attributes numerically, I deny.
I insist. By substance we understand that which subsists
per se. But that which subsists per se is the one
subsisting being itself. Therefore there is only one
substance.
Reply. I distinguish the major: a substance subsists
independently of a subject in which it inheres, I
concede, for example, man is a substance, whiteness is
not; independently of the cause of its existence, I
deny. I distinguish the minor: that which subsists per
se independently of the cause of existence, I concede;
merely independently of a subject of inherence, I deny.
Hence we cannot define substance, as Spinoza did, as
being of itself but as being in itself and not in another,
although it can be from another.
I insist. Besides the infinite there can be nothing.
But the substance of God is infinite. Therefore there
is nothing besides God.
Reply. I distinguish the major: nothing that is
infinite and of itself, I concede; nothing that is
finite and of another, I deny.
I insist. Neither can there be anything finite besides
God. A finite substance added to the infinite makes it
something more. But this is absurd.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the infinite would
become something more intensively, I deny; extensively,
I concede. There would be not a major entity but more
entities. After the creation there is not more of being
but there are more beings, not more of wisdom but more
wise persons. We have the same thing when a student
understands St. Thomas: another understands, but there
is not more wisdom.
I insist. That which contains another is not really
distinct from it. But the infinite God contains the
world, otherwise He would not be infinite. Therefore
God is not really distinct from the world.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that which contains
another formally or materially, I concede; that which
contains another eminently and virtually, I deny. I
distinguish the minor: God contains the world formally or
materially, I deny; eminently and virtually, I
concede, inasmuch as God can produce the world, and all
the perfections in the world pre-exist eminently in the
subsisting being itself, who is the plenitude of being.
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