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First objection. This objection is stated as the first
difficulty in St. Thomas, article, namely, Sacred
Scripture states that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father but it never says He proceeds from the Son.
Reply. Sacred Scripture does not express this truth in
so many words, I concede; it does not express this
truth, I deny; for as we have seen, the Son says of
the Holy Ghost, "We shall receive of Mine"; "All
things whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine. Therefore
I said, that He shall receive of Mine."[453]
Second objection. The First Council of
Constantinople, which was the second ecumenical council,
does not make any mention of the Son.
Reply. St. Thomas replies that the procession of the
Holy Ghost from the Son was not explicitly mentioned in
this council because the opposite error had not yet
arisen. But later, when the error arose, the Filioque
was added to the creed, first in Spain and later in
France and Germany in the fifth, sixth, and seventh
centuries.[454] Thereupon Benedict VIII
approved the addition and finally it was accepted by the
ecumenical councils of Lyons (II) and Florence by
both the Greeks and Latins present at these
councils.[455]
In the reply to the third difficulty, St. Thomas notes
that St. John Damascene, following the Nestorian
error on this point, spoke inaccurately in his
book,[456] although some commentators say that he
(lid not expressly deny the Filioque.[457]
Petavius points out that St. John Damascene understood
that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son as from
the first font of origin because among the Greeks the
preposition ex and the noun principium denote the first
font of origin.[458]
In D'Ales' words, "St. John Damascene did not
deny simply that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son
but that He proceeded from the Son as from the first
principle. He had evolved a physical theory of the
Trinity, according to which the procession was like a
breath coming from the mouth, a figure certainly less apt
than that of St. Augustine."[459]
St. John Damascene approaches the Latin doctrine when
he compares the Father to the sun, the Son to the ray,
and the Holy Ghost to the brightness, which is from the
ray. Indeed, in his book, De fide
orthodoxa,[460] he says that the Holy Ghost is the
image of the Son as the Son is the image of the Father.
This is a sufficient defense of the Church's doctrine on
the Filioque. In the third article we shall see that it
is permissible to say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Father through the Son, according to the Greek
Fathers, and St. Hilary among the Latin
Fathers.[461] The reason is that the Son has from
the Father that by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from
the Son.
Other objections. Whatever is in God is either common
or proper. But the spiration of the Holy Ghost is not
common to the entire Trinity. Therefore this spiration
is proper to one person, namely, to the Father and does
not belong to the Son.
Reply. I distinguish the major: whatever is in God is
either common (to the three persons) or strictly proper,
as risibility in man, I deny; is common or proper in a
broad sense, I concede as, for instance, spirituality
and freedom properly belong to the human soul and also to
the angels.
I insist. But to spirate the Holy Ghost is strictly
proper to the Father, for absolutely contrary properties
cannot belong to the same person. But the property of the
Son consists in receiving, of which spiration is a
contrary property. Therefore the Son cannot actively
spirate the Holy Ghost.
Reply. I distinguish the major: properties that are
contrary with respect to the same other person cannot
belong to the same person, I concede; with respect to
distinct persons, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor
in the same way: the Son is both active and passive with
respect to distinct persons and not to the same person.
This is not an impossible contrariety.
I insist. The Son is no more in agreement with the
Father than the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost does
not concur with the Father in the generation of the Son.
Therefore the Son does not concur with the Father in the
spiration of the Holy Ghost.
Reply. I distinguish the major: with regard to
essentials, I concede; with regard to the notional act
of spiration, I deny.
The second article contains references to the discussion
between the Thomists and Scotus, which we shall examine
immediately.
Doubt. If the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the
Son, would He be distinguished from Him?
In the beginning of the body of this article St. Thomas
answers negatively, and not only the Thomists but most
other theologians agree with him. Scotus and his
followers, however, reply in the affirmative, arguing
that if the impossible were true and the Holy Ghost were
not spirated by the Son, the Son would still be
distinguished by filiation from the Holy Ghost because
the Holy Ghost would not be the Son.
St. Thomas, position is based on that principle
commonly accepted and explicitly formulated in the Council
of Florence: "In God all things are one and the same
except where there is opposition of relation"; in other
words, the divine persons are really distinguished only by
the relation of origin, which is founded on the
processions, as was explained above. If therefore the
Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, He would not
be distinct from the Son. The reader is referred to the
body of the article.
It should be noted that this principle is found prior to
the Council of Florence in the writings of the Fathers,
particularly in St. Augustine,[462] St. Gregory
of Nyssa,[463] and St. Anselm.[464] The
Council of Florence[465] proved against the Greeks
that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Son; its
principal reason was that otherwise the Holy Ghost would
not be distinguished from the Son. In the eighteenth
session John the Theologian declared: "According to
both the Latin and the Greek doctors, it is relation
alone that multiplies the divine persons in the divine
productions, and this relation is the relation of
origin." None of the Greeks, not even Mark of
Ephesus, the most prominent adversary of the Latin
theologians, opposed this principle. While this was not
a definition of the Council, this argument ought to have
great weight because by it the Church was disposed to
define the dogma of the procession of the Holy Ghost from
the Son.
What is the basis for the axiom: In God all things are
one and the same where there is no opposition of relation?
Note that the axiom does not say merely a distinction of
relation. The basis for the axiom is that, since God is
most simple being, He admits no real distinction in
Himself except that distinction which, according to
revelation, is founded on the procession of origin,
namely, the distinction between the principle and that
which is of the principle.
Objection of the Scotists. The principle accepted and
expressed in the Council of Florence is to be understood
as referring not only to the relative opposition of
relation but also the disparate opposition of relation.
The first kind of opposition is that between two relations
that have reference to each other, as between paternity
and filiation, and between active and passive spiration.
Disparate opposition of relation exists between two
relations that have no reference to each other, as between
filiation and passive spiration.
Reply. I deny the antecedent, since disparate relations
are not impossible in the same person, as paternity and
active spiration, and as filiation and active spiration.
Therefore it is not sufficient that two relations, like
filiation and passive spiration, are disparate in order to
constitute two distinct persons.
The Scotists insist. Even though paternity and active
spiration are not incompatible in the same person,
nevertheless filiation and passive spiration are
incompatible and require two persons, because that would
imply that the same person was produced by two complete
productions, which would be the case if the one person
were at the same time the terminus of generation and
spiration. This is the crux of the problem.
Reply. This insistence begs the question; it proves a
thing by itself. There are not two complete, distinct
productions except when they tend to two distinct termini
or to two really distinct persons as on the way to the
terminus, for the production of a person is a person in
becoming (in fieri). As the two sides of the triangle
are not two except because they tend toward constituting
with the base the two inferior angles opposed to each other
and therefore distinct, so two processions in God are not
two except inasmuch as they tend to constitute two
proceeding persons opposed to each other and therefore
distinct. Thus the adversaries prove that there are two
proceeding persons and not one because there are two
proceeding persons and two processions, which is begging
the question. It is incumbent on the Scotists to find
another reason to prove that even if the Holy Ghost did
not proceed from the Son He would be distinct from Him.
In this hypothesis generation and passive spiration would
be one and the same total procession, formally and
eminently generative and spirative, just as generation and
active spiration are only virtually distinct in the
Father.
The other Scotist objections are of minor import.
They say that the person of the Son is sufficiently
constituted and distinguished by filiation. We reply that
it is constituted but not distinguished from the Holy
Ghost without the opposition of relation.
They insist that by filiation the Son has incommunicable
being, otherwise He would not be a person, and this
distinguishes Him from the Holy Ghost.
Reply. In God being is unique and it is communicated to
the Son and to the Holy Ghost; that which is
incommunicable is only the subsisting relation which is
opposed to another. Thus the Father has communicable
being but He is a distinct person by the paternity, which
is opposed to filiation; similarly, active spiration is
opposed to passive spiration.
I insist. By filiation the Son is distinguished from
any other who is not the Son. But the Holy Ghost is
not the Son. Therefore the Son is distinguished from
the Holy Ghost by filiation alone.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the Son is thus
distinguished from any other person who is opposed to
Him, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I
contradistinguish the minor: if the person is opposed to
the Son, I concede; otherwise, I deny.
We must conclude that the Scotists do not safeguard the
doctrine of the Fathers and of the Council of Florence,
according to which all things in God are one and the same
except where there is opposition of relation or relative
opposition based on a procession. If therefore the Holy
Ghost does not proceed from the Son, He is not distinct
from the Son. The fiction of disparate opposition is an
abuse of the terms and in violation of common sense, or,
as Billuart rightly says, a confusion of the notions of
things. Things are disparate when they are not opposed,
for example, white and cold. Thus St. Thomas,
opinion stands.
The triangle lends confirmation to this view. If in the
triangle the third angle constructed did not proceed from
the first and second, it would not be distinguished from
the second, and then there would not be two sides because
they would be identified in their tendency to the same
terminus. Similarly, if the will did not presuppose the
intellect and did not depend on it, it would not be
distinguished from it; there would be not two but one
faculty. Spinoza, in his absolute intellectualism
inclines to this view; he reduces the will to a natural
appetite or the natural inclination of the intellect itself
to truth. At most there would be two entirely equal
faculties (ex aequo), and this is impossible for there
would be no order between them, as was explained in the
third argument of St. Thomas' second article. For it
to be a rational appetite, the will must proceed from the
substance of the soul, presupposing the emanation from the
intellect; thus the will proceeds from the intellect and
is distinguished from it; and so also analogically if the
Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, He is not
distinct from the Son.
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