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Since the objections are difficult, we present them
formally.
First objection. Reward is a greater good than merit.
But guilt is related to penalty as merit is to reward.
Therefore guilt is less an evil than penalty is.
Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor:
inasmuch as guilt terminates in penalty, I concede;
inasmuch as guilt is intended on account of penalty as
merit is on account of reward, I deny. I distinguish
the conclusion: if guilt were intended on account of
penalty as merit is intended on account of reward, I
concede; if otherwise, I deny.
Second objection. That is the greater evil which opposes
the greater good. But the penalty opposes the good of the
agent, which is a greater good than the good of the
action, to which guilt is opposed.
Reply. I distinguish the minor: if by the good of the
action is meant the good of the action of the speculative
intellect or of the members, I concede; but if the good
of the action is the good of the action of the will, which
tends to the good of the whole man, I deny, because by
an evil will a man becomes purely evil.
The difficulty in this reply to the second objection
arises from the fact that a second perfection, which is an
accident, is said to be better than a first perfection,
which is the substance. How can an accident be more
perfect than the substance?
Cajetan replies that the accident is not more perfect than
the substance but that the substance as operating is more
perfect than a substance that is not yet operating. Only
in God is it true that the substance operating "ad
extra" is not more perfect than the substance as not
operating "ad extra". Hence we say that every
created being is because of its operation, in the sense
that it is because of itself as operating.
Third objection. The privation of the order to an end is
less than the privation of the end itself. But guilt is
the privation of the order to the end, and the penalty of
damnation is the privation of the end itself. Therefore
guilt is less an evil than the penalty is.
Reply. Let the major pass. I distinguish the minor:
the penalty of damnation is the privation of the end itself
inasmuch as man is removed from the end, I concede;
inasmuch as the infinite dignity of the ultimate end is
denied to God, I deny. I distinguish the conclusion:
if guilt were only the privation of the good of man, I
concede; if it opposes the uncreated good in itself, I
deny. Here is subject matter for a sermon: it is guilt
alone that makes man evil and is opposed to the divine
goodness.
We should note that this doctrine, that guilt is a
greater evil than any penalty, even death, was clearly
understood in pagan antiquity, particularly in Plato's
dialogue, entitled Gorgias.
The thesis which Plato is defending in this dialogue is
that it is a greater evil to do injustice than to suffer
it, and that it is a greater evil for the criminal to go
unpunished than to be punished.
This dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and the
three Sophists, Pollus, Callicles, and Gorgias, the
rhetorician.
Plato asked Gorgias, "What is rhetoric? What is its
object?"
"Orations, speeches, and discourses," replied
Gorgias.
"Is it every discourse on any subject, even on the
kitchen?" asked Plato.
"It is the discourse intended to persuade men so that the
opinion of the rhetorician will prevail," answered
Gorgias.
"Is it intended to persuade men of what is really true
and just, or that which only appears true and just, or
even something purely unjust?" asked Plato. "If this
is the object of rhetoric, then the rhetorician acts
against right reason, he is immoral, and rhetoric is not
even an art but simply an empty exercise."
Gorgias was silent. Pollus tried to defend him, and
said, "This is the force of rhetoric: that by his art
the rhetorician can persuade men to do what he wishes."
Socrates replied: "What is it he wishes to do? Is it
wishing and effecting what is good, what is right for us,
and not what is only apparently right; what is really
right for us, namely, what is actually good and true?"
"Does the rhetorician," asked Socrates, "do what he
wishes when he brings it about that a good citizen is sent
into exile? Indeed, he wishes and does something that is
not good, something unjust, and therefore something that
is not good even for himself. Then this rhetorician is
not happy, because that man is happy who wills and does
the good."
At the end Socrates stated what the criminal and his
defender should do. In order that he may will his own
true good, the criminal should go to the judges and say,
"I committed a crime," just as a sick man goes to the
physician to be cured. And the criminal should willingly
submit to the penalties imposed for his crime so that he
will once again be reinstated in the order of justice and
the good and thus find happiness.
Thus Socrates supports the teaching that it is a greater
evil to do injustice than to suffer injustice, and for the
criminal it is a greater evil to go unpunished than to be
punished, especially if he submits willingly and accepts
the punishment justly imposed on him.[1067]
The truth that the evil of penalty is something just and
that it repairs the evil of guilt appears in its splendor
in the supernatural order in the sacrament of penance when
the criminal, whose crime is hidden, willingly accuses
himself and makes satisfaction in union with Christ the
Redeemer.
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