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State of the question. After asking the question whether
a thing is we ask the question what it is. The difficulty
arises from the fact that the relative element, the "to
another," is not understood as something substantial,
for then the essence of God would not be something
substantial but relative.
The reply, however, is affirmative and of faith,
namely, the relations in God are actually the same as
His essence, although they are distinguished by reason
from the essence. This truth was defined in the Council
of Reims against Gilbert Porretanus: "When we speak
of the three persons, the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost, we say that they are one God and one
substance. Conversely, we confess that the divine
substance is three persons."[223] "We believe that
there are no relations in God that are not
God."[224]
In these propositions, as in every affirmative
proposition, the verb "is" affirms the real identity of
the subject and the predicate, as, for example, the
Father is God and the paternity is the deity, because
God is His own deity and the Father is His own
paternity.[225] The same teaching was defined by the
Fourth Lateran Council,[226] and the following
proposition of Eckard was condemned, "In God there can
be no distinction and none can be conceived."[227]
The most common opinion of theologians is that the divine
relations are distinguished from the divine essence only by
reason with a foundation in reality, that is, only
virtually. To this the Thomists generally add that the
distinction is a minor virtual distinction after the manner
of that which is implicit and explicit inasmuch as our
concept of the divine essence implicitly contains the
relations. Before considering St. Thomas' argument,
we will briefly explain the meaning of these terms.
A virtual distinction, or a distinction of reason with a
foundation in reality, may be minor or major. A major
virtual distinction is after the manner of that which
excludes and that which is excluded. Such a distinction
exists between the genus and the differences extrinsic to
it which the genus contains, not implicitly, but only
virtually. Thus animality may be without rationality,
and with regard to rationality it has a foundation in
actuality as something potential and perfectible.
A minor virtual distinction, however, is after the
manner of those things that are implicit and explicit.
Thus subsisting being itself, according to our concept,
implicitly contains the divine attributes, but it does not
have a foundation in actuality for these attributes as
something potential, or as something imperfect and
perfectible by the divine attributes, because subsisting
being, according to our concept, is pure act. For when
we speak of subsisting being we do not yet speak explicitly
of mercy and justice. It must be noted, however, that
this minor virtual distinction is more than the verbal
distinction between Tullius and Cicero. We cannot
equivalently use the names, divine essence, divine
mercy, or divine justice in the same way that we
equivalently use the names Tullius and Cicero. We
cannot say, for instance, that God punishes by His
mercy and pardons by His justice.
Lastly, it may be recalled that Scotus held that the
distinction between the divine essence, the attributes and
the relations was formal actual from the nature of things,
because the distinction, in his view, is not real since
it is not between one thing and another but between two
formalities of the same thing.
To this the Thomists reply that this formal actual
distinction based on the nature of the thing either
antecedes the consideration of our minds and then, however
small it is, it is real; or it does not antecede the
consideration of our minds, and then it is a distinction
of reason with a foundation in the thing or a virtual
distinction. There is no middle point in the distinction
between what antecedes and what does not antecede the
consideration of our minds.
After these preliminaries we shall consider how St.
Thomas proved the commonly accepted doctrine that the real
relations in God are not really distinct from the divine
essence but are distinguished from it only by reason.
St. Thomas explained this proposition by two arguments:
by the indirect argument (sed contra) and the direct
argument.
The indirect argument. Everything that is not the divine
essence is a creature. But the relations really belong to
God. If therefore they are not the divine essence, they
are creatures; and the worship of latria cannot be offered
to the divine relations.
The direct argument. Whatever in created things has an
accidental being in another ("esse in"), when
transferred to God has a substantial being in another
("esse in"), because no accidents are found in
God. But in created things a relation is really
distinguished from its subject solely because it has an
accidental being in another ("esse in") from
which it derives the reality of its "esse
ad" or reference to another. Therefore in God
a relation is not really distinct from its subject inasmuch
as its "esse in", or being in another, is
substantial from which is derived the reality of its
reference to another, its "esse
ad". The major is evident from the fact that
in God, who is pure act, there can be no accident
perfecting something potential and perfectible.[228]
The minor is explained by the fact that in creatures a
relation places nothing real in the subject except so far
as it places in the subject that which is common to all
accidents, namely, the "esse in", which is an
accidental being really distinct from substance.
According to its own peculiar structure, a relation is
not properly in a subject, as are quantity and quality,
but it is a reference to something else.
If therefore, for example, the relation of paternity is
transferred to God where the "esse in" will be
substantial, the relation will not be really distinct from
the divine essence; it will be distinguished only by
reason since it expresses a reference to something else,
namely, of the Father to the Son. Therefore neither by
the divine relations nor by the divine attributes is the
divine essence something potential and perfectible because
of a foundation in its nature. Hence the divine essence,
as it is conceived by us, implicitly contains the divine
relations, from which it is distinguished by a minor
virtual distinction. By this latter term the Thomists
have epitomized this present article.
It must be carefully noted that what is the peculiar
feature of a relation, namely, the "esse
ad", does not properly inhere in the subject as
does the peculiar feature of the accident of quality. If
the "esse ad" properly inhered in the
subject, there could be no relative opposition between the
real relations without there being at the same time
opposition in the very essence of God, which is
impossible. This entire article is reduced to this simple
thought: the Father is God, the Son is God, the
Holy Ghost is God, and the paternity is the deity
because God is His own deity and the Father is His own
paternity. In all these statements the verb "is"
expresses the real identity of the subject and the
predicate.
The difference between St. Thomas and
Suarez.[229] The principle that "in God all
things are one and the same except where there is
opposition of relation" is not understood in the same way
by St. Thomas and by Suarez since they do not
understand relation in the same way. For St. Thomas
being (esse) does not formally belong to accidental or
predicamental relation (paternity, for instance)
according to its "esse ad", because
the "esse ad" prescinds from
existence; it is found also in a relation of reason (in
the relation of God to creatures, for example).
Being, however, belongs formally to an accidental
relation according to its "esse in", namely, as
it is an accident inhering (at least aptitudinally) in a
real subject. If the "esse in" is real, then
the "esse ad" is real, but it takes
its title to reality not from itself but from the
"esse in."[230]
But in God the "esse in" cannot be an
accident, since God is pure act and no accident is found
in Him. Therefore in God the "esse in" of the
divine relations is identified with the one existence of
the divine substance; it is identified with subsisting
being itself.[231] From this it follows that in the
Trinity the divine relations have the same "esse
in" since they exist by the one existence of the
divine essence itself.[232] "Since a divine person
is the same as the divine nature, in the divine persons
the being of the person is not different from the being of
the divine nature. Therefore the three divine persons
have but one being." Similarly in Christ there is one
being for the two natures because Christ is one person,
and this presupposes a real distinction between created
essence and being.
Suarez, on the contrary, did not admit this real
distinction and held that there were two existences in
Christ and three relative existences in the Trinity.
For Suarez the relations have their own proper existence
even according to their "esse ad".
He found it difficult to solve the objection arising from
the axiom that two things that are the same as a third are
also the same as each other. But the divine persons are
the same as a third, namely, the divine essence.
Therefore they are the same as each other.
Suarez did not know how to solve this objection except by
denying the major with respect to God.[233] He was
aware of St. Thomas' reply that those things which are
the same as a third are the same as each other unless there
is present the opposition of relation. But because he had
a different concept of relation he held that this
convenient answer did not solve the difficulty since
nothing like this is found in creatures. Therefore he
concluded that this axiom taken in its most universal
extension, prescinding from created and uncreated being,
is false for, while it is true in certain cases, that
is, in creatures, it cannot be inferred for the entire
extension of being.
This is the same as saying that this axiom does not apply
to God. But this axiom is directly derived from the
principle of contradiction or identity, which patently
must be applicable to God analogically because it is the
law of being as being, the most universal law therefore,
apart from which there is nothing but absurdity, which
would be unthinkable.
The principal difference between Suarez and St. Thomas
is that for Suarez the "esse ad" of
a relation is real by reason of itself, just as he held
that the created essence is actual by reason of itself and
is therefore not really distinct from its existence.
Suarez did not conceive being other than that which is,
not as that by which a thing is. He did not admit a real
distinction between essence, either of a created substance
or accident, and being. This is the foundation of the
difference. Whether he wished it or not, Suarez
multiplied the absolute in God, and therefore the
objection based on the principle of identity remained
unanswerable.[234]
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