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We have treated of this question at great length in
another place;[1215] here we will refer only to the
essential points. This problem refers not only to the
angel but also to man and analogically to every creature.
St. Thomas shows that the fundamental natural
inclination found in every creature is right and remains
right, although it has been weakened in us by original sin
and by our personal sins and must be perfected by infused
charity. Thus we see in this article that grace does not
destroy nature but perfects and elevates it. St.
Thomas' reply in this article is therefore in the
affirmative, and he offers the following proof.
Everything that naturally, according to its nature,
belongs to another inclines more to that to which it
belongs than to itself, as is true of any natural part,
for example, the hand is inclined to the defense of the
body even though the hand may suffer mutilation. But
every creature naturally, according to its nature,
belongs to God. Therefore every creature naturally
inclines to the love of God, the author of its nature,
more than to the love of itself.[1216]
If this were not so, the natural inclination would be
perverse and would not be perfected by infused charity;
indeed infused charity would destroy the natural
inclination.[1217]
First doubt. Does this apply to the innate natural
inclination or to the elicited natural inclination?
Reply. To both.
Second doubt. Is this natural love of God necessary or
elective when it is elicited?
Reply. It is necessary at least with regard to its
specification, because in God the author of nature
nothing can be found to move the angel to the hatred of
God.
Third doubt. Whether this natural love of God when it
is elicited is necessary even with regard to its exercise?
Reply. Bannez, Gonet, and Billuart think that the
affirmative is more probable,[1218] because the
angel cannot desist from the consideration of itself or
from the consideration of God, whom it knows in the
mirror of its own essence. The love of itself and the
love of God preserving its natural life are natural
movements, just as in the animal the movement of the heart
is, as it were, a natural property.
Fourth doubt. Does this natural love of God above all
things exist in some way in all creatures?
Reply. It exists even in the stone, which tends to the
center of the earth because of the cohesion of the universe
and thus contributes to the good of the universe to
manifest God's goodness. So the hen gathers her little
ones under her wings to protect them from the hawk because
it tends to the preservation of its species for the good of
the universe, and it would sacrifice itself if it were
necessary for the good of the species. The canticle,
"All ye works of the Lord, bless the
Lord,"[1219] expresses the thought that every
creature in its own way tends toward God, or to the good
of the universe to manifest the goodness of God. There
is here no pantheism; the creature is considered not as a
part of God but as a part of the universe, which is
ordered to the glorification of its author and to the
manifestation of His goodness.
First objection. Natural love is based on natural
union. But the angel is naturally united rather to itself
than to God. Therefore the angel naturally loves itself
more than God.
Reply. I distinguish the major: natural love is founded
on a natural union and on a natural dependence on God, I
concede; on a natural union without this dependence on
God, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: the angel
is more naturally united to itself and depends on God more
than on itself, I concede; that the angel does not
depend more on God than on itself, I deny.
I insist: in spite of this dependence the angel loves
itself more naturally. Whoever loves anything naturally
loves it inasmuch as it is good for itself. But in loving
anything as good for itself the lover loves the object for
its own self. Therefore whoever loves God naturally
loves Him for the lover's sake and less than the lover
himself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: whoever loves anything
naturally loves it inasmuch as it is good for itself as the
subject for which it is desired, I concede; loves it for
itself as the permanent end, I deny. I
contradistinguish the minor: whoever loves something as a
good for the lover, loves it for the sake of the object if
it is a good subordinate to the lover, I concede; but if
it is a good that is superior to the lover, I deny.
The angel desires God for itself but on account of God,
its natural ultimate end. The end for whose sake a thing
is desired and the subject for which a thing is desired are
not the same. On the other hand, I desire a piece of
fruit for myself and on account of myself because the fruit
is inferior and subordinate to myself. When the angel,
and man too, rightly loves God even naturally, it
subordinates itself to God and does not subordinate God
to itself.
Second objection. Nature reflects on itself and first
tends to its own preservation. But nature would not be
reflecting on itself if it tended to something other than
itself. Therefore by its natural love the angel loves
itself more.
Reply. I distinguish the major: nature reflects on
itself not only with regard to its own individuality but
rather with regard to the universal in itself as a part of
the universe ordered to the good of the universe and for
the manifestation of God's goodness, I concede;
otherwise, I deny.
I insist. If this is true, the brute animals tend to
some ethical good. As a matter of fact, however, they
tend only to some pleasurable good or some useful good.
Reply. The brute animals tend to some ethical good not
explicitly or consciously but implicitly and
unconsciously, just as the hen that gathers its chicks
under its wings loves its species more than itself.
I insist. The error of this thesis is apparent from the
consequent incongruity, namely, that charity would be
useless. The characteristic of charity is that by it one
loves God more than oneself. But charity is not a
natural but an infused love. Therefore by its natural
love the angel does not love God more than itself.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the characteristic of
charity is loving God more than oneself as the author of
grace, I concede; as the author of nature, I deny.
I insist. At any rate this thesis cannot explain the sin
of the angels, since this natural love of God will
perdure as long as the nature perdures. But the love of
God does not remain in the sinning angel, which hates
God. Therefore loving God as the author of its nature
more than itself is not natural to the angel.
Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor:
the angel's love of God as the judge does not perdure,
I concede; the angel's love of God as the author of
nature does not perdure, I deny. For as a judge God
commands the angel to do something that is displeasing to
the angel, whereas God as the author of the angel's
nature is the cause that preserves the life of the bad
angel in a kind of physical manner, something like the
physical premotion that we speak of in the spiritual
order.
I insist. But a devil cannot at the same time be turned
to God as the author of its nature and turned. away from
God as the author of grace because a sin against God the
author of grace is at the same time indirectly against God
the author of nature.
Reply. A devil is turned away from God the author of
grace and from God the author of the law of nature freely
and morally; nevertheless the devil at the same time
remains necessarily and physically turned to God the
author of his nature in its physical aspect. This
lamentable opposition in the devil pertains to his
damnation.
How does man naturally love God more than himself? By
an innate love and by an implicit elicited love; in this
way man loves God under the aspect of happiness in
general.
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