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State of the question. This article is introduced to
distinguish "the Word" properly so called from "the
word" improperly so called, namely, from the thing
understood in the word and also from the intellection which
is common to the three persons.
Reply. The affirmative reply is of faith as revealed in
St. John's prologue, "The Word was with God, and
the Word was God... . And the Word was made flesh"
(1:1, 14). In this text "the Word" designates
the same person as "the only-begotten Son who is in the
bosom of the Father" (1:18).
This doctrine was defined by St. Damasus I and the
Fourth Council of Rome in these words: "If anyone
shall not say that the Word of God, the Son of God,
God even as God His Father, is able to do all things
and know all things and is equal to the Father, let him
be anathema."[384] Similarly, the Second Council
of Constantinople declared: "If anyone does not confess
the two nativities of the Word of God... let him be
anathema";[385] the Lateran Council: "If anyone
does not confess that God the Word descended from
heaven...";[386] and the Eleventh Council of
Toledo, explaining the words," and the Word was made
flesh, " corroborated this doctrine.[387]
Doubt. Did these councils wish to define solemnly by
these words that divine generation is properly by
intellectual enunciation?
Reply. It does not seem that this has been properly
defined, but it is revealed in the prologue of St.
John's Gospel that the Son of God proceeds from the
Father as an intellectual word. Therefore all
theologians admit that it is at least theologically certain
that the first procession is after the manner of
intellection. Indeed, it seems that this truth is of
faith according to the Scriptures although it is not
solemnly defined.
In the body of the article it is shown that the name
"Word" in God if used in its proper meaning is a
personal and not an essential name. The reason is that
"the Word" signifies something proceeding from another
as a concept of the mind. But that which signifies
something proceeding from another in God is personal since
the divine persons are distinguished by their origin.
So that we may understand this reply, St. Thomas, in
the first part of the body of the article, shows that the
term "word" is used properly in three ways with reference
to ourselves (the word of the mind, the word of the
imagination, and the vocal word), and besides this it is
also used improperly:
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the interior concept of the mind. imagination of the sound
to be emitted.
the sound which signifies the mental concept.
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that which is signified by the word, not the sign, but
its meaning.
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In God, however, "Word" is used properly only in the
first sense, as a concept of the mind; all other words in
God are only metaphorical because they are something
sensible or even corporeal and external. Hence St.
Thomas says that the mental word in its proper meaning is
not that which is understood but that in which the thing
understood is known.[388] If St. Thomas sometimes
says, "It is the word which is understood," he is
using "word" improperly for the thing signified by the
word. For Descartes, on the other hand, the interior
word is that which is understood, although he does not
deny every relation of the word with the extramental
thing.
Between these two concepts, that is, between realism and
idealism, a great abyss exists, as we see when Descartes
did not hesitate to write in the beginning of his
Discourse on method: "For us a square circle is
something unthinkable but perhaps it may not be something
really impossible outside the mind. Perhaps God is able
miraculously to make a square circle."
For realism, however, this is absolutely and evidently
impossible outside the mind, and according to realism I
in my mental word and you in your mental word understand
the same law of extramental being, namely, that a thing
cannot be and not be at the same time. This law of
extramental being is what is understood in my mental word
and in your mental word.
If, however, the mental word itself is what is
understood, then this law of extramental being is placed
in jeopardy. Obviously there is a great abyss between
realism and idealism. In this fundamental question of
philosophy it is important that we preserve the proper
meaning of our terms, otherwise we will always be talking
incorrectly in our conclusions.
Some have tried to preserve their realism by conceding to
the idealists that it is the mental word that is understood
but they add later, as indeed the Scholastics generally
hold, that the mental word has an essential relation with
the extramental thing. But this qualification is not in
harmony with the first statement. If the mental word
itself is what is properly understood, how can we
afterward pass over to the extramental thing, or to its
essence? How shall we be able to compare the thing itself
with the word that expresses it, when the thing itself
cannot be known except in the word? How can we
distinguish between the word that conforms to the
extramental thing and the word that does not conform, as
we are able to distinguish between a statue that represents
a real man and a statue that represents an imaginary man?
We cannot have recourse to the principle of causality
because the validity of that very principle must be proved
first.
Obviously an immense abyss stretches between Descartes,
idealism and realism, and it would be exceedingly
dangerous to concede to the idealists that the mental word
is that which is properly understood. St. Thomas always
says that the object of the intellect is being
(extramental) and he does not say that the object of the
intellect is the mental word of being. We are obliged
always to speak so carefully about the word that it will be
entirely clear, in opposition to Descartes, that a
square circle is not only unthinkable but really impossible
outside the mind. Descartes was not able to safeguard the
validity of sensitive and intellectual knowledge except by
having recourse to the criterion of God's veracity as the
author of our faculties. But this implies a vicious
circle because we must first prove God's existence by
effects and by the principle of causality.
Reply to the first objection. The Arians said that the
Son of God was a metaphysical word which was external,
but, as St. Thomas says, an external word presupposes
an internal word. Moreover, in St. John's Gospel we
read, "The Word was God, " and God was the Word,
and so the Word cannot be something created or produced
outside of God.
Reply to the second objection. In God intellection is
predicated essentially and belongs to the three persons.
Reply to the third objection. In God enunciation is
predicated personally; only the Father enunciates, and
the three persons understand. The Son alone is
enunciated as the Word; the other persons are enunciated
as things expressed in the Word.
Reply to the fourth objection. Sometimes "word" is
used improperly for the thing signified by the word.
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