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We are concerned here not with artificial but natural
things. St. Thomas himself formulated the title as
given above; later certain editors abbreviated the title.
State of the question. The state of the question appears
from the arguments advanced by Plato to prove the
existence of the ideas which correspond to the uncaused
matter which, according to Plato, is "a certain
non-being that somehow exists," in which these ideas are
received.
First objection. That which is modeled possesses the
likeness of the model. But creatures are far removed from
the divine likeness. Therefore other subordinate models
are required besides God, for example, models of cows,
roses, lilies, etc.
Second objection. Everything that is by participation is
finally reduced to that which exists per se. But this
rose is a rose by participation, since there are many
other roses. Therefore there ought to exist a rose
essentially so, an essential lily, and an essential cow.
Third objection. The sciences are concerned not with
individuals but with universals, for example, psychology
deals not with this individual man but with man in
general. But these sciences have objective and
ontological validity. Therefore the universals ought to
exist formally outside of the mind. Indeed, it seems
that Dionysius spoke in this way because he seems to say
that subsisting being itself is prior to subsisting life
itself.
Reply. The reply is that the models of natural things
are not outside of God.
In the argument sed contra this is proved by the authority
of St. Augustine, who held that the models of things
are the divine ideas existing in the divine mind. St.
Augustine thought that this was the teaching of Plato
himself. Such was also the opinion of Dionysius or
Pseudo-Dionysius. On the other hand,
Aristotle[745] thought that according to Plato the
models were outside God, that they were like separate
subsisting forms. Aristotle refuted this teaching,
because the separated man, not as a separated soul but as
man separated from individuals, ought to have some
matter, not individually, but common matter as common
bones and flesh. But bones and flesh in themselves imply
quantity whose parts are beyond parts and are individuated
and therefore bones and flesh cannot exist without being
these bones and this flesh.[746]
In the body of the article St. Thomas supports the
validity of Platonic exemplarism when it is understood,
as St. Augustine understood it, as referring to the
divine ideas existing in the divine mind.[747] The
argument of the article can be summed as follows. A model
is necessary for the production of anything so that the
effect will attain a determined form. But it is evident
that the things that are produced naturally attain
determined forms, for example, the form of a rose, a
lily, a lion, etc. Therefore they have an exemplary
cause in the divine wisdom, which planned the order of the
universe.
This argument coincides to some extent with the proof for
the existence of God from the order of the universe, but
here we are considering rather the model of all things
rather than their ordination to an end, rather their form
than their end, but the form of the thing generated is the
end of the generation. The minor is evident; the major
requires explanation. The major is illustrated in the
example of the artificer. But it is not only empirically
true; it is evident of itself and necessary and is proved
by an explanation of the terms and by a reduction to
absurdity, just as the principle of finality, "every
agent acts for some end," is proved. St. Thomas
proved the truth of the principle of finality[748] by
explaining the terms, for every agent tends to something
agreeable to itself, but an end is nothing else than an
agreeable good to which the agent tends. Further, he
defends this principle by a reduction to absurdity,
saying: "An agent does not move except with an end in
mind. If the agent were not determined to some effect,
it would not do this rather than that. In order that it
will produce a determined effect it is necessary that the
agent be determined to something definite that has the
nature of an end." That is, if the eye were not ordered
to vision it would not see rather than hear; if the foot
were not ordered to walking it would not serve for walking
rather than for flying, etc.
This passive ordering of the eye to vision, of the foot
to walking, presupposes an active ordering. But ordering
is the function of a wise person, because in order that
anyone can order different things he must know the
relationship of means to an end, and the intellect alone,
not the senses or the imagination, can know the nature of
things.
Therefore, in spite of what Kant says, a supreme
intelligence which is subsisting intelligence itself is
required, for every intelligence that is not subsisting
intelligence itself is itself ordered to intellection, and
this passive ordering presupposes an active ordering which
cannot come from anything except subsisting intelligence
itself, in which are the ideas of things as something seen
by this intelligence in itself without any real plurality.
The major of our proof is therefore the same as the major
of the proof for the existence of God from the order in
the universe, and it is defended in the same way by a
reduction to absurdity. For if in the production of a
natural thing a directing idea or model were not
necessary, the natural thing would not attain a determined
form and it would not rather become this than that. For
example, if there were no directing idea in the
development of the germ of a nut, the nut would
indifferently produce an oak or a pear tree.
Objection. But it suffices that there be a directing
idea immanent in the evolution itself. Such was Hegel's
opinion in his pantheistic evolution.
Reply. The immanent directive idea is like the passive
ordering of this nut to an oak, but every passive ordering
presupposes an active ordering, and only the wise being
knows the natures of the being of things, and the nature
of means to an end. In ascending evolution without a
supreme ordering and directing cause more is produced from
a minor being than is in it, more perfect beings are
produced from imperfect ones, and by this evolution not
only more beings but more of being is produced. This is
less acceptable than the dogma of creation according to
which more does not come from the lesser; in creation,
moreover, there are, of course, more beings but there is
not more of being or more of wisdom. To be consistent,
Hegel should deny the validity of the principle of
contradiction and say the radical absurdity is the
principle of all things. It is to this state that the
mind comes when it rejects creation. Earlier[749]
St. Thomas showed that the plurality of ideas in God
was only objective inasmuch as God understood the
imitability of His essence ad extra, or rather the
relation of the imitability of something, for example, a
lion, to His essence inasmuch as a lion participates in
life and knowledge.
The replies to the objections confirm the conclusion.
Reply to first objection. Humanity is not formally but
only virtually in the divine nature, but the idea of man
is formally and eminently in God as the terminus of
intellection. So also the objective multitude of ideas is
formally and eminently in God, whereas it is formally but
not eminently in the angel, in whom there are many
subordinate ideas. Hence the notion of idea is an
analogical notion which is predicated only according to a
similarity of proportion of the human idea, the angelic
idea, and the divine idea, for, as Dionysius often
says, "those things that are divided in inferiors are
united as in one in superior beings."
Reply to second objection. Man subsisting per se implies
matter and therefore he cannot be without at least common
matter, and this common matter cannot exist without
individual matter. Bones and flesh by the very fact that
they exist are these bones and this flesh.
Reply to third objection. Universals do not exist
formally outside the mind as real but only fundamentally in
individuals, that is, according to their specific or
generic likeness, which can be abstracted from the
individuals. But the mode of abstraction and the mode of
universality do not exist formally except in the mind.
Spinoza, on the contrary, held that the substantial
universal being exists formally in reality and thus the
universal being is pantheistically confused with the divine
being. Malebranche inclined to the same conclusion
because he thought that the first principles of reason were
not only in the abstract intelligible being but also in
God. Then our natural will would be specifically
determined not by the universal good but directly by God
Himself as in the case of infused charity. Here we have
a pantheistic confusion of the orders of nature and grace,
for our nature itself, like sanctifying grace, would be a
participation of the divine nature.
Reply to fourth objection. When Dionysius said,
"Being itself is prior to that which is life itself and
to that which is wisdom itself,"[750] he either
meant that we first conceive God as first being before we
conceive Him as the first living being, or he was
speaking of participated being, which is in all
creatures, even in the lowest, whereas life and
intelligence are only in the higher beings.
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