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State of the question. The sense of the question is
whether the Father voluntarily generates the Son and
whether the Father and the Son voluntarily spirate the
Holy Ghost.
As is clear from the texts cited from the Fathers at the
beginning of this treatise, the difficulty arises because
on the one hand we cannot say that the Father freely
generates the Son, for then the Son would be a
creature, as the Arians taught; and on the other hand we
cannot say that the Father involuntarily generates the
Son as if forced to do so. From the words quoted in the
argument sed contra we see that St. Augustine was aware
of this difficulty: "The Father generates the Son
neither by His will nor by necessity (by force)."
Reply. St. Thomas solves the difficulty by a
distinction between the concomitant will and the antecedent
will, which latter is subdivided into necessary and free.
It should be noted that the antecedent will is in
opposition to the concomitant will and to the consequent
will but not in the same way.[560] With respect to
the consequent will, the antecedent will is
inefficacious;[561] with respect to the concomitant
will it may be efficacious. St. Thomas' division may
be reduced to the following.
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Antecedent, as an effective principle
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as nature: that is, as a natural and necessary
principle. Thus man naturally wills happiness in general
as free: as a principle acting indifferently as to
judgment. Thus God freely wills creatures.
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Concomitant, not as an effective principle
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In this way I will to be a man and I am pleased to be a
man, but the fact that I am a human being does not depend
on my will
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Having made this division, we draw three conclusions.
1. The notional acts, to generate and to spirate, are
voluntary by a concomitant will. Thus the Father
voluntarily generates the Son, just as He wills Himself
to be God; the Father does not generate the Son
involuntarily nor do the Father and the Son spirate the
Holy Ghost unwillingly.
As we read in the reply to the first objection, St.
Hilary wrote: "The Father does not generate the Son
induced by a natural necessity. He is not forced to
generate the Son."[562] Such was also the
declaration of the Council of Sardinia, and St.
Augustine rightly says, "The Father generates the Son
not by the necessity of force."[563]
2. The notional acts are not voluntary by an antecedent
will as free, because what proceeds in this way from the
free will is able not to be, and the notional acts are not
able not to be. Otherwise it would be possible for the
Son and the Holy Ghost not to be. St. Thomas might
have been content with this explanation, but in the body
of the article he recalls the roots of liberty explained
earlier[564] in the question, "Whether God freely
wills things other than Himself." He explains that,
whereas the form by which a natural agent acts is one (the
natural form), it follows that in the same circumstances
such an agent always produces the same effect (by the
principle of induction), since it is determined to one
effect. On the other hand, the form by which the will as
free acts is not one only but consists of many reasons in
the intellect and many possible judgments, and therefore
in the deliberation there is an indifferent mistress of
judgments and also of choice. Therefore what is freely
willed can be either one or another. But this cannot be
in God or in the processions, otherwise it would be
possible for the Son and the Holy Ghost not to be and
then they would be creatures, as the Arians thought.
3. Active spiration is by an antecedent will as nature;
generation, however, which, as enunciation, proceeds
not from the will but from the intellect, proceeds prior
to the will. God therefore understands the generation
before He wills it. Spiration proceeds from the
antecedent will because the Holy Ghost proceeds as love;
consequently He proceeds by the will, namely, as the
terminus of that volition by which the Father and the Son
naturally and necessarily love each other. In this same
way man naturally loves happiness in general, at least by
a necessity of specification; in this way also the blessed
love God by an act of the will which is entirely
spontaneous but also necessary, an act of the will that is
not inferior to liberty but above it, because the will of
the blessed is invincibly drawn to God's goodness when
they see Him clearly.[565] In this beatific love
there is no liberty of specification or freedom of exercise
and yet this love is most spontaneous; it is therefore an
excellent example of the non-free and spontaneous active
spiration. Thus the Holy Ghost proceeds not after the
manner of nature, because He is not begotten, but from
the will as nature.
Scotus, who in this question seems to follow St.
Bonaventure and Richard of St. Victor, held that the
procession of the Holy Ghost is an act that is free by an
essential freedom. To this the Thomists reply that this
essential liberty cannot be a liberty by necessity or a
liberty of indifference for then it would be possible for
the Holy Ghost not to be and then He would be a
creature. The term, "essential liberty," then, can
be understood only as liberty by compulsion, which is
simply the spontaneity of natural and necessary volition.
The difference is really only nominal, because the
Thomists readily admit such spontaneity, as in the
beatific love, which is not in any way free yet is most
spontaneous. Scotus found himself obliged to say that
active spiration, although free by an essential freedom,
was necessary inasmuch as the Holy Ghost is necessarily
spirated and necessarily exists, but he did not wish to
call the spirating will natural.[566]
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