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[277] St Thomas, Posterior Analytics, Bk. II.
[278] Aristotle, De categoriis, chap. 2
[279] St. Thomas, Post. Analyt., Bk. II,
chaps. 12 f.
[280] St. Thomas frequently points this out as, for
example, in Contra Gentes, Bk. II chap. 52:
"In every substance besides God the substance itself,
or that which is, is different from the existence. -"
Thus personality is that by which something is what it
is, namely, a suppositum with a rational nature, whereas
existence is that by which a thing exists
[281] Scotus, in III Sent., 1, q. 1, nos. 5
f
[282] Suarez, Disp. met., disp. 34, sect. 1,
2, 4, etc.; De Incarnatione, disp. XI, sect.
3.
[283] Cajetan, on IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, nos. 8
f.; cf. Capreolus, III Sent., V, q. 3, a.
3, no. 2
[284] L. Billot, De Verbo Incarnato (5th ed.),
q. 2, pp. 75, 84, 137, 140.
[285] Summa, IIIa, q. 2, a. 2.
[286] Contra Gentes, Bk. 11, chap. 52.
[287] Summa, IIIa q. 17, a. 2 ad 1.
[288] Cajetan, on IIIa, q. 4, a. 2, no. 8.
[289] Objection. One per se does not result from one or
more acts. But the suppositum is one per se. Therefore
it cannot be constituted by three acts, namely, essence,
subsistence, and existence.
Reply. One nature does not result from several acts,
this I concede; one suppositum does not result from
several acts, this I deny. The suppositum is indeed per
se subsisting, but the created suppositum and its
existence are not one per se, and they are not one
nature, since the existence does not pertain to the nature
but is only a contingent predicate. Moreover, in Christ
there are one suppositum and two natures.
[290] "Person adds something over and above the
individuated nature, as an act of the nature, but not as
a substantial form or an accident, but in the manner that
the being of an actual existence is said to be the act of
the essence by which it exists and by which the suppositum
is what it is..... The suppositum is the same as the
individual having being per se." Capreolus, loc. cit.
[291] Summa, Ia, q. 39, a. 3 ad 4.
[292] St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a.
4 ad 4; cf. I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2 ad
4: "The term 'person' is imposed by the personal
propriety, which is the form signified and determined by
the terminal being."
[293] Summa, IIIa, q. 4, a. 2.
[294] Ibid., q. 17, a. 2 ad. 1
[295] Ibid., ad 3.
[296] St. Thomas, Quodl., II, q. 2, a. 4.
[297] Cf. Revue thomiste, March 1933, "La
personnalite, ce qu'elle est formellement,"
Garrigou-Lagrange
[298] Summa, IIIa, q. 77, a. 2.
[299] Ibid., q. 2, a. 2.
[300] Ibid., q. 77, a. 2.
[301] Ibid., Ia, q. 29, a. 3. St. Thomas,
De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, 2.
[302] An ontological personality, therefore, is that by
which a thinking subject is a subject; a psychological
personality is that by which this subject is conscious of
itself; a moral personality is that by which this subject
is of its own right (sui juris). The intellectual
personality is manifested in its courage, nobility, and
universality of judgment; the moral personality appears in
the degree that the interrelated virtues which constitute
character are able to prevail over the physical
temperament. The religious personality manifests itself
in the degree that a man is intimately united to God
[303] Cf. De Regnon, op. cit., I, 227.
[304] Denz., nos. 115, 216
[305] The correlation of abstract and concrete terms is as
follows:
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CONCRETE TERMS / ABSTRACT TERMS
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person / personality
suppositum / subsistence
subsisting in itself / existence of the substance
inhering / existence of the accident
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Cf. Post. Analyt., Bk. I, chap. 4, lect.
10
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[306] Cf. Fourth Lateran Council.
[307] Boethius, De Trin., chap. 6, in sed
contra. Cf. Eleventh Council of Toledo (675),
Denz., no. 278
[308] Denz., no. 280
[309] Ibid., no. 703; cf. Petau, De
Trinitate, IV
[310] Summa, q. 27
[311] St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 4
[312] Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3
[313] Summa, Ia, q. 3, a. 2
[314] Denz., no. 428
[315] Ibid., no. 703
[316] Summa, Ia, q. 40, a. 2
[317] Ibid., a. 4
[318] St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 21, q. 2
[319] Contra Gentes, Bk IV, chap. 14; De
potentia, q. 9, a. 5 ad 15.
[320] Summa, Ia, q. 29, a. 2 ad 2
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