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St. Thomas was certainly not ignorant of the second
canon of the Council of Orange, in which original sin is
called the death of the soul, that is, the privation of
the spiritual life of grace.[1486] He must also
have read similar expressions in the works of St.
Augustine, when St. Augustine explained that prior to
baptism there is in concupiscence the guilt of sin,
although concupiscence is not in itself culpable, nor does
it remain culpable in the baptized. Nor was St. Thomas
unaware of the teaching of St. Anselm, who wrote:
"(Adam) lost that grace which he had been able to
preserve for those who were to descend from him," "he
lost that grace which he had always been able to preserve
for his descendants."[1487] "Because therefore,
having been placed in the high position of such a great
grace, he of his own will abandoned the good things which
he had received to be preserved for himself and them (his
posterity), and thus his children lost what the father
might have given them by preserving it and what he
abandoned by not preserving it."[1488]
Some of the aforesaid writers think that St. Anselm is
here speaking of grace in the broadest sense, inasmuch as
creation itself is a certain grace.[1489] From the
context, however, it is clear enough that St. Anselm
is speaking of grace in the proper sense and of
preternatural gifts.[1490]
St. Thomas' definitive doctrine on this question is
found not in the Commentary on the
"Sentences", but in the works that he wrote
toward the end of his life, especially in the Theological
Summa. The opinion St. Thomas gives in the
Commentary on the "Sentences" was regarded by
himself as less probable, and later he receded from it
more and more. No clear text to support it can be found
in the Theological Summa; indeed in the work "De
malo" many opposing passages can be found.
In the Commentary on the "Sentences" St.
Thomas does present the opinion that in the innocent Adam
sanctifying grace was only a personal gift and not a gift
to human nature, but even then he considered the opposite
opinion probable, and later in the Theological Summa he
defends only this opposite opinion.
In the Commentary on the "Sentences" St.
Thomas asks, Whether in the state of innocence children
are born in grace? The holy doctor then presents two
opinions: "Some say that the first man was created with
only natural gifts and not with gratuitous gifts, and from
this it seems that for such justice some preparation by
personal acts would be required. Hence according to this
view such grace would be a personal property belonging to
the soul, and thus it would be in no way transmitted,
except as an aptitude. Others, however, say that man
was created in grace, and according to this view it seems
that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human
nature itself, and hence grace would be infused at the
same time that human nature was transmitted."[1491]
In the Commentary on the "Sentences" St.
Thomas defends this second opinion as more probable:
"This however is more probable: since man was created
with integral natural gifts, which could not have been
given without a purpose, turning to God in the first
instant of his creation, man obtained grace, and this
opinion should be supported."[1492]
In the Theological Summa St. Thomas speaks more
confidently: "Some say that the first man was not
created in grace..... But as others say, he was
established in grace, and this seems to be required by
that righteousness of man's first state in which God made
him, according to the words, 'God made man
right.'[1493] This righteousness consisted in the
fact that reason was subject to God, the lower powers
were subject to reason, and the body was subject to the
soul. The first subjection is the cause of the second and
the third. As long as reason remained subject to God,
the lower powers were subject to reason, as St.
Augustine said. It is clear, however, that this
subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers
to reason was not natural..... Hence it is also clear
that that first subjection of reason to God was not only
according to nature but according to the supernatural gift
of grace, for the effect cannot be more powerful than the
cause."[1494]
As St. Thomas' teaching developed, the corollary of
the opinion referred to earlier became more firmly
established: "Others say that man was created in grace,
and from this it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice
was conferred on human nature itself, and hence grace
would be infused at the same time as human nature was
transmitted."[1495]
In the Theological Summa, considering the same
question, whether men were born with justice, he says,
"Original justice, however, in which the first man was
established, was an accident of the nature of the
species; not as if it were caused by the principles of the
species but only as a gift divinely conferred on the whole
nature." "In reply to the second difficulty, in which
some say that children were not born with gratuitous
justice, which is the principle of meriting, but with
original justice: since the root of original justice, in
whose righteousness man was created, consists in the
supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which by
grace makes man pleasing to God, it is necessary to say
that, if children were born in original justice, they
were also born with grace, just as we said
above[1496] that the first man was established with
grace."[1497]
Nor can it be said, according to St. Thomas'
definitive teaching, that sanctifying grace was the
extrinsic root of original justice.
In "De malo" St. Thomas says, "Original
justice includes grace gratum faciens."[1498] In
the same work, replying to the objection: "But the
divine vision is not owing to one who has original
justice, since he is able not to have grace. Therefore
the perpetual lack of the divine vision does not correspond
to original sin," St. Thomas replied: "In reply to
the thirteenth difficulty I say that this reasoning is in
accord with those who say that grace gratum faciens is not
included in the idea of original justice. This I believe
to be false, because, since original justice consists
primordially in the subjection of the human mind to God,
which subjection cannot be permanent without grace,
therefore original justice cannot be without
grace."[1499]
Hence, according to St. Thomas grace gratum faciens is
included in the idea of original justice. But what is
included in the idea of a thing is not an extrinsic
efficient cause, otherwise God would be included in the
idea of the creature. Nor is this grace merely an
extrinsic condition "sine qua non", because the
subjection of the mind to God "cannot be permanent
without grace." Thus grace and charity, which flows
from grace, are more than conditions "sine qua
non" of this primordial subjection because they
positively influence it. This habitual primordial
subjection is the formal effect of infused charity.
Moreover, according to this text, original justice
implies the subjection of the mind to God as the author of
grace, because from the integrity of nature with
proportionate natural helps alone there results the
efficacious love of God as the author of
nature.[1500] If therefore the subjection of the
mind to God required for original justice "cannot be
permanent without grace," it must be a subjection of the
mind to God as the author of grace and not of nature
alone.[1501]
This conclusion reached in "De
malo"[1502] is the same as that found in the
Theological Summa: "Since the root of original
justice, in whose righteousness man was created, consists
in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God,
which by grace makes man pleasing to God, as we said
above,[1503] it is necessary to say that if children
were born in original justice, they were also born in
grace, just as we said above that man was established in
grace."[1504] Because, as he had said
earlier,[1505] "man was created in grace, and
according to this view it seems that the gift of gratuitous
justice was conferred on human nature itself, and hence
grace would be infused at the same time as human nature was
transmitted."
Nor can it be said that sanctifying grace in the innocent
Adam was only the intrinsic root of original justice, as
infused faith is the root of sacred theology, which is
acquired by human study. St. Thomas says: "Original
justice belonged primordially to the essence of the soul,
for it was a divine gift conferred on human nature, which
refers rather to the essence than to the potencies of the
soul. The potencies seem to belong rather to the person
inasmuch as they are the principles of personal acts.
Hence the potencies are the proper subjects of actual
sins, which are personal sins."[1506] If
therefore "original justice belonged primordially to the
essence of the soul," there was nothing primordially
besides the entitative habit of sanctifying grace. For
there were not in the essence of the soul two entitative
habits, namely, the habit of the integrity of nature and
the habit of sanctifying grace, just as there are not two
distinct habits of healing habitual grace and elevating
habitual grace.
Nor is the aforesaid opinion supported by the fact that
St. Thomas frequently said that grace gratum faciens is
the root of original justice. A root is not necessarily
extrinsic, for example, the root of a tree is a part of
the tree. Moreover, as the essence of the soul is the
root of the faculties, so sanctifying grace is the root of
the infused virtues, and a fortiori sanctifying grace,
which is included in original justice, is the root of
original justice, inasmuch as "original justice belonged
primordially to the essence of the soul,"[1507] and
consisted in the threefold subjection of the mind to God,
of the lower powers to reason, and of the body to the soul
(by the privilege of immunity from pain and death).
This was Cajetan's understanding of the word
"root."[1508] Cajetan also remarked:
"According to him (St. Thomas), grace gratum
faciens belongs to the idea of original
justice."[1509]
Capreolus pointed out against Durandus: "Grace gratum
faciens alone was not original justice, which included
something more than grace; baptism restores this grace but
not those other things that belong to this kind of
justice. Hence baptism does not restore original justice
completely but only a part of it."[1510]
Ferrariensis wrote: "From this we can see that original
justice included grace as its root because, just as the
subjection of the body and the lower powers was
supernatural through original justice, which was a grace
gratis data, so the subjection of reason to God had to be
supernatural, through grace gratum faciens, whose
function it is to subject the soul
supernaturally."[1511]
We see, therefore, that there are no texts, at least no
clear texts in the Theological Summa, to support the
contention that the aforesaid opinion represents the
definitive doctrine of St. Thomas. Indeed there are
many contrary texts. Perhaps for this reason one of the
recent exponents of this theory cited no texts from the
Theological Summa, but instead injected his theory of
adoption, according to which sanctifying grace can only be
personal and not a gift to human nature to be transmitted
with that nature.[1512]
This theory, however, is without any foundation. When
a rich man adopts a poor man he can give him a hereditary
title of nobility. Why cannot God do the same for Adam
and in him elevate the human race to the order of grace,
as the Vatican Council declared, "God in the beginning
elevated the whole human race in its head to the
supernatural order of grace"?[1513] This is what
St. Thomas said: "Others say that man was created in
grace, and according to this view it seems that the gift
of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature
itself, and when human nature is transmitted grace is
transmitted at the same time."[1514] At that time
St. Thomas held this view to be the more probable and in
his later works he defended it more and more.
Objection may be made that St. Thomas wrote: "The
first sin of the first man not only deprived the sinner of
his own personal good, namely, grace and the proper order
of the soul, but also of the good that belonged to the
common nature."[1515] From this and similar
passages it seems at first that in the innocent Adam
sanctifying grace was only a personal gift.[1516]
But if we study these texts carefully we see that
sanctifying grace was a personal gift as conferred on a
person, but not to one single person alone, but to that
person as a part and the head of the community which is the
human race. This is clear from what St. Thomas says in
"De malo" when he asks, whether any sin is
contracted by origin: "We must say absolutely that sin
is transmitted from the first parents to his posterity by
origin. In support of this we must consider that an
individual man can be considered in two ways. In the
first place a man is a certain single person; in the
second place he is part of a group (collegium). Thus
the entire multitude of men receiving human nature from the
first parent should be considered as one group, or as the
one body of one man, and in this multitude each man, even
Adam himself, can be considered as one individual person
or as a member of this multitude, which by natural origin
is derived from one man. To the first man at the time of
his creation God gave a certain supernatural gift,
original justice, by which the reason was made subject to
God, the lower powers were subjected to the reason, and
the body was made subject to the soul. This gift,
however, was not given to the first man as a single person
alone but as the principle of all human nature, which was
to be derived from him through origin by his posterity.
Having received this gift, the first man, when he sinned
voluntarily, lost it under the same aspect as that under
which he had received it, namely, for himself and for all
his posterity."[1517]
From all this it is sufficiently clear that sanctifying
grace was, according to St. Thomas and also according
to reason, not merely a personal gift to the innocent
Adam, but an endowment of nature, since "original
justice includes grace gratum faciens."
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