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State of the question. It seems that creation is proper
to one person. 1. The procession of the creature from
God "ad extra" presupposes the procession of the
divine persons ad intra, and that which is prior and more
perfect is the cause of that which is later and less
perfect. 2. In the creeds the creation of all visible
and invisible things is attributed to the Father, and of
the Son it is said only that all things were made through
Him, and the Holy Ghost is called the vivifier. 3.
In these different statements it does not seem correct to
say that they are only appropriations and to say that
creation is appropriated to the Father, because every
divine effect is caused by the three attributes which are
appropriated to the divine persons, namely, by the power
which is appropriated to the Father, by the wisdom which
is appropriated to the Son, and by the essential love
which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, who is personal
love.
Reply. The reply is in the negative and of faith.
Proof from authority. St. Thomas cites the authority
of Dionysius, who said: "All the causal things are
common to the entire Trinity."[838] These words of
Pseudo-Dionysius witness the tradition of the time when
he wrote.
In Sacred Scripture the work of the creation is
attributed equally to one or the other of the persons:
"All things were made by Him (the Word)";[839]
"The same God, who worketh all in all. . . . But
all these things one and the same Spirit
worketh";[840] "For in Him (the Word) were all
things created in heaven and on earth."[841]
In the definitions of the Church the work of creation is
equally attributed to the three persons; for example, in
the Creed: "I believe in one God, the Father
almighty, creator of heaven and earth, and in one Lord
Jesus Christ. . . by whom all things were made."
And the Church chants, "Come, Holy Ghost,
Creator."
Finally there are many definitions and declarations of the
Church,[842] particularly the declaration of the
Fourth Lateran Council (1215) against the
Albigenses and the Waldensians: "We firmly believe
that one alone is the true God. . . the Father
generating, the Son begotten, the Holy Ghost
proceeding: consubstantial, coequal, co-omnipotent,
and coeternal, one principle of all things, the creator
of all visible and invisible things."[843] Earlier
the First Council of the Lateran (649) declared:
"If anyone does not confess that the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Ghost are a Trinity in unity. . . the
creator and protector of all things, let him be
condemned."[844] The Eleventh Council of
Toledo: "These three persons are inseparable in their
action and in what they make," even in the work of the
Incarnation.[845] In the decree of Pope Eugenius
IV for the Jacobites we read: In the Trinity "all
things are one where there is no opposition of
relation";[846] "The Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost are not three principles of the creature but
one principle."[847]
The opinion of Lulle that the three persons can be known
certainly and clearly by natural reason because in created
effects something is found that is produced by the Father
alone, something produced by the Son alone, and
something produced by the Holy Ghost alone, must be
judged heretical. St. Thomas proved[848] against
many earlier theologians (Abelard, Richard of St.
Victor) that the mystery of the Trinity cannot be
demonstrated from creatures because the creative power is
common to the entire Trinity and pertains to the unity of
the essence and not to the Trinity of persons.
"Proof from reason." Since every agent acts in
a manner similar to itself, the principle of an action can
be known from the effect. But to create is to produce the
being of things as being. Therefore creation belongs to
God according to His being, which is His essence and is
common to the three persons.
Explanation of the major. Is this principle, "every
agent acts in a manner similar to itself," only an
experimental law, as when, for instance, light
illuminates, the cow generates a cow, etc., or is it a
necessary principle, evident in itself from an analysis of
the involved notions? We reply that it is a necessary and
evident principle, since to act is to determine or actuate
something, and an agent cannot determine except according
to its own determination or form. Hence we say that an
agent acts inasmuch as it is in act. But the subject on
which the agent acts is sometimes able to receive a form
similar in species to the agent, for example, when the
cow generates a cow; but sometimes the subject can receive
only an imperfect and analogical likeness of the agent,
and thus creatures agree only analogically with God,
either in being, or living, or intellection. St.
Thomas says:" Since every agent acts in a manner
similar to itself, for it acts always according to its
form, it is necessary that there be a likeness of the form
of the agent in the effect,"[849] or at least an
analogical likeness inasmuch as the effect may or may not
attain to the perfect likeness of the agent. For
example, when St. Thomas was teaching he did not
communicate the fullness of his wisdom to all his
disciples, but they received his wisdom according to their
capacities.
This principle is not merely an experimental law but a
principle of natural philosophy; at first we recognize it
in the sensible order and later we apply it metaphysically
to all agents, and finally to the supreme agent in a
fitting analogy. By virtue of this law, then, the
principle of an action is known in its effect. But to
create is to produce the being of things as such.
Creation therefore belongs to God according to His
being, which is His essence and is common to the three
persons. That is, God produces the being of things
inasmuch as He is subsisting being "per se";
but He produces created being most freely and not by any
necessity of nature.
Corollary. Creation is predicated of God not personally
but essentially.
Doubt. In the Our Father we say, "Our Father,.
. . Thy kingdom come." Are these words addressed to
God personally or essentially? According to St.
Thomas they are used essentially,[850] because the
three persons operate "ad extra" as one
principle, for example, in the justification of man, who
thereby becomes a son of God by participation in the
divine nature, which is common to the three persons.
Thus when we say, "Thy kingdom come," we are speaking
not only of the kingdom of the Father, but also of the
kingdom of the Son and the Holy Ghost. The same is
true when we say, "Thy will be done."
Doubt. When Jesus addresses the Father, as, for
example, "I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of
heaven and earth,"[851] is He speaking essentially
or personally? He is speaking primarily personally
because it is the person of the Son speaking to the
Father ad intra, as when the Father said, "Thou art
My son, this day have I begotten Thee."[852]
But the address "Father" may be used essentially by
Christ when He speaks according to His human nature.
The body of the article contains a second conclusion which
pertains to appropriation. It may be stated as follows:
The processions of the divine persons so far as they
include essential attributes appropriated to the persons
are reasons for the production of creatures, or more
briefly: each person is said by appropriation to have a
special causality with regard to creatures.
The proof is as follows: God operates through
intelligence and will. But the Son proceeds as the Word
in an intellectual manner, and the Holy Ghost proceeds
after the manner of love. Therefore we may say that God
creates through His Son and through the Holy Ghost.
In the reply to the second objection, St. Thomas
says: "Being the Creator is attributed to the Father
as not having the creative power from another. Of the
Son we say, 'by whom all things were made, ' inasmuch
as He has power from another (or as the principle from a
principle). But to the Holy Ghost, who has the same
power from the first two persons, is attributed the
position of governing and vivifying the creatures of the
Father and the Son by dwelling in them." At the end of
this reply St. Thomas recalls the theory of
appropriation: to the Father is appropriated power, to
the Son wisdom, and to the Holy Ghost goodness. In
the reply to the third objection, he says, "Thus
creation is reduced to power, ordering is reduced to
wisdom, and justification to goodness."[853]
Appropriation is generally defined as the attribution of
some essential property to one person for that person's
manifestation. Hence a property is not an appropriation.
A property is attributed to one person and cannot be
attributed to another; an appropriation, however, is
common to the entire Trinity, but for the sake of the
greater manifestation of that person it is attributed to
one person because of some similarity. For instance,
those things that pertain to the intellect are appropriated
to the Son, because the Son proceeds by intellection.
Thus the Latin Fathers, proceeding in their
speculations about the Trinity from the unity of nature to
the Trinity of persons and attaining to this Trinity only
with difficulty, tried to throw as much light as possible
on the three persons. The Greek Fathers, on the other
hand, proceeded from the three persons to the unity of
nature and thus found no difficulty in distinguishing the
persons and had little need for the theory of
appropriation, found among most of the Latin Fathers.
But the Greek Fathers had difficulty in explaining the
unity of nature, and these difficulties were solved later
by St. Augustine and St. Thomas. At the beginning
of the treatise on the Holy Trinity we explained why the
concept of the Latin Fathers prevailed, because it
solved the difficulties that remained in the Greek
concept.
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