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State of the question. It seems that God is the cause
of evil because:
1. We read in the Scriptures, "I am the Lord and
there is none else: I form the light, and create
darkness, I make peace, and create evil" (that is,
the evil of penalty);[1092]
2. If good is the cause of evil, as we have said,
God, who is the cause of all good things, is also the
cause of evil;
3. Aristotle says that the cause of the ship's safety
and the cause of the shipwreck are the same, that is, the
pilot according as he is vigilant or negligent. But God
is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore it
seems that He is the cause of every loss and every evil,
that is, because of insufficient care or lack of help.
This last objection implies negligence in God, but
divine negligence is a contradiction in terms and a denial
of providence.
On the other hand, St. Augustine says: "God is not
the author of evil (that is, of guilt), because He is
not the cause of the tendency to non-being."[1093]
The conclusion of the article is in two parts: 1. God
is not the cause of the evil that consists in defect of
action, that is, the evil of guilt; 2. God is
"per accidens" the cause of the physical evil of
natural things and of the evil of penalty.
First conclusion. God is in no way the cause of the evil
of guilt.[1094]
a) Proof from Scripture. We read, "The works of
God are perfect, and all His ways are judgments: God
is faithful and without any iniquity, He is just and
right";[1095] "Is there injustice with God?
God forbid";[1096] "Let no man, when he is
tempted, say that he is tempted by God. For God is not
a tempter of evils, and He tempteth no
man";[1097] "He that committeth sin is of the
devil";[1098] "For thou hatest none of the things
which Thou hast made";[1099] "But to God the
wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike";[1100]
"Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only
in Me."[1101]
Against the Calvinists the Council of Trent declared:
"If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to go
his evil ways, but that God does the evil works as He
does the good works, not only permissively but properly
and "per se", so that the treason of Judas and
the calling of Paul are equally God's work, let him be
anathema."[1102] Against the Predestinationists
the Council of Carisiac declared: "When some are saved
it is because of the gift of salvation; when some are lost
it is because of those who are lost"[1103];
"Destruction is thy own, O Israel." And the Third
Council of Valencia clearly affirmed against Scotus
Eriugena that God is the author of penalties but not of
guilt.[1104]
From these definitions it is clear that God is neither
the direct nor the indirect cause of sin. He is not the
direct cause of sin, by moral or physical movement to
sin; nor indirectly, that is, by negligence, because of
insufficient assistance, as the negligent pilot is the
indirect cause of the shipwreck. This last point has been
expressly defined by the Church against the Protestants
and the Jansenists, who held that God is in some way the
cause of sin because of insufficient assistance. In its
definition,[1105] the Council of Trent quotes the
words of St. Augustine: "God does not command the
impossible, but when He commands He admonishes us to do
what we can and to petition for that which we cannot
do."[1106] We learn the same from the condemnation
of the first proposition of Jansenius:" Some of God's
precepts are impossible for just men who will and try (to
fulfill them) with the powers that they now have: besides
they lack the grace that would make these precepts possible
of fulfillment."[1107]
St. Thomas explains the divine permission of sin by
enumerating the various ways in which the term
"permission" is understood.[1108] His enumeration
may be reduced to the following synopsis.
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the permission of a licit concession;
for example, for a religious to visit his parents
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permission of indulgence; for example, second marriages
permission of dispensation; for example, for a Dominican
to eat meat
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permission of tolerance; for example, giving a bill of
divorce to avoid homicide
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the permission of support, in this way God permits even
serious sins for some greater good
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We see that permission is not used univocally in all these
instances. In the last case the will of the one
permitting intervenes to a much smaller degree than in the
first, and the will to permit is the same as the will not
to impede. Hence God is in no way the cause of sin.
b) Proof from reason. The evil which consists in the
defect of the action is always caused by the defect of the
agent. But God is the agent who is absolutely
indefectible and never deficient. Therefore God can in
no way be the cause of the evil of action or of guilt.
The major is clear from the preceding article, where it
was shown that the evil of action does not have a cause
"per se" but only "per accidens", as
coming from the defect of the agent, whether it be the
principal agent, as weakness in walking, or the
instrumental agent, as lameness on account of a curvature
of the leg bone. In physical things, of course, this
defect of the agent comes from some disturbing cause or
from some impediment, that is, from some power of a
contrary agent.
But in free agents the evil of a voluntary action comes
only from the defect of the operator. "In voluntary
things the defect of the action proceeds from a will
deficient in act, inasmuch as the will does not subject
itself in act to its rule. This defect is, however, not
guilt, but guilt follows upon it because the will operates
with this defect." That is to say that the
non-consideration of the rule is only a negation before
the agent operates, but it becomes privation and is called
in consideration when the agent begins to operate without
consideration of the rule. As St. Thomas says: "The
will takes on the first aspect of guilt from the fact that
the will proceeds to this kind of choice without actual
consideration of the rule."[1109] Further, this
inconsideration becomes at least virtually voluntary and
culpable when a man in a state of alertness should and
could consider the rule of right reason in his operation.
God does not command the impossible. Therefore every
venial sin is avoidable, although without a very special
help all venial sins cannot be avoided continuously.
The minor is clear. God is absolutely indefectible,
that is, He cannot be the author of a defect either
directly or indirectly. Not directly, because He cannot
move either morally or physically to sin as sin, that is,
to something inordinate under the aspect of privation; not
indirectly, that is, through neglect or carelessness,
because divine negligence implies a contradiction. This
is quite clear in the abstract and in general, although in
concrete and particular cases it is difficult to explain
the divine movement in the direction of sin.
Therefore, if God were to command the impossible, sin
would be unavoidable, and then it would not be sin, nor
could man be justly punished especially for all eternity;
that would be the greatest injustice. For this reason
Jansenius eventually arrived at the denial not only of
mercy but also of divine justice.
Moreover, if by an impossible hypothesis God were to
wish to be the cause of sin, He could not be because sin
is outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence,
which is indefectible and cannot produce what is the
privation of being and goodness but can produce only what
has the nature of being and goodness. Thus when God
moves toward the physical entity of sin He necessarily
prescinds from the malice involved. Nothing is more
exactly defined than the adequate object of a potency or
power; as sight cannot see sounds, so God cannot be
either the direct or the indirect cause of
sin.[1110]
In another place St. Thomas explains this conclusion
more clearly in two ways by distinguishing between direct
and indirect causality.[1111]
1. God cannot be the direct cause of sin. To be the
direct cause of sin is to incline one's own will or that
of another to sin. But God cannot incline His will or
that of another to sin. Therefore God cannot be the
direct cause of sin.
The major is clear.
Proof of the minor. God inclines and converges all
things to Himself as to their last end, for every agent
acts for a proportionate end, and the order of actions
corresponds to the order of ends. Hence God cannot be
the direct cause of any sin, since every sin is a
departure from the order to God as to an end.
This reason is in conformity with the reason given above
in the article, whether God wills evils: "God cannot
be author of the evil of guilt,....because the evil of
guilt is directly opposed to the uncreated good; it is
contrary to the fulfillment of the divine
will."[1112] "Evil is never desired except
"per accidens", that is, when the good to which
the evil is joined is desired more than the good that is
deprived by the evil. But God wills no good more than
His own goodness..... Hence God in no way wills the
evil of guilt, which denies the order to the divine
good."[1113]
To put it briefly: God, as the indefectible cause,
cannot be the cause of the evil of guilt, because this
evil denies the order to the divine good, which God wills
above all things. Otherwise God would be a defective
cause and He would depart from Himself, from truth and
goodness, which is obviously impossible since God is
essential goodness itself.
What, then, is the direct cause of sin? It is the
sinner, inasmuch as he tends to an object out of harmony
with the rules of morals; the sinner wills "per
se" some changeable good and consequently he wills the
inordination of his act.
2. God cannot be the indirect cause of sin. To be the
indirect cause of sin is to refrain from preventing it when
we can and should prevent it. But according to His
wisdom and justice God is not bound to prevent the sins
which He permits. Therefore, when God does not provide
the help to avoid sin, He is not the indirect cause of
the sin.
The major is certain; it is the definition of the
indirect voluntarium; for example, the pilot is the
indirect cause of the shipwreck when he neglects to guide
the ship and is able and obliged to do so.
The minor is proved as follows: "The universal provider
allows a certain defect to occur in some particular
instance lest the good of the whole be impeded.....
The corruption of one individual is the generation of
another and so the species is preserved. Since God is
the universal provider of all being, it pertains to His
providence that He permit certain defects in particular
things lest the perfect good of the universe be impeded.
If all evils were to be impeded, the universe would lose
many good things; it would lose the life of the lion, the
patience of the martyrs, if animals would not be killed or
if tyrants would not persecute."[1114]
Before we consider the second conclusion concerning
physical evil, we reply to the objections to the first
conclusion.
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