CHAPTER XXV: QUESTIONS 48, 49 THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR

[982] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 15

[983] ibid., q. 5, 6

[984] cf. Denz., nos. 58, 62, 85, 223, 271, 705, 1461

[985] cf. Enneades, I, 8, 3; III, 6, 7, 14f

[986] cf. De civitate Dei, Bk. IX, chap. 10; Bk. X, chap. 29; Bk. XIV, chaps. 3, 5 f.

[987] cf. De natura boni, PL, XLII, 18

[988] cf. Enchiridion, PL, XL, 10-12

[989] Ibid., col. II

[990] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 2, a. 3 ad 1.

[991] cf St. Thomas, Expositio in Dionysium de divinis nominibus, chap. 4, lect. 13-22

[992] ibid., lect. 13

[993] ibid., lect. 17

[994] ibid., lect. 18

[995] ibid., lect. 20

[996] Ibid., lect. 21

[997] ibid

[998] cf. Renouvier, Histoire et solution des probl. metaphysiques, p. 164.

[999] cf. Montaigne, Essais, II, 12, "Notre bienetre n'est que la privation d'etre mal." cf. Cicero, De finibus, I, II.

[1000] On the other hand some philosophers denied the existence of evil, whether moral or physical. Thus Socrates and Plato, when they reduced virtue to the knowledge of good, reduced moral evil to ignorance or error, as if malice did not properly exist.

The Stoics held that death, sickness, and poverty are indifferent things and not evil. In his determinism, Spinoza denied the existence of both moral good and moral evil. He reduced moral evil to foolishness and held that the fool is not obliged to observe the law of reason, of which he is ignorant.

So also with regard to the distinction between moral good and moral evil, contradictory opinions have been proposed. Some have denied the distinction by confusing the real good with the apparent good. In antiquity as well as in modern times the hedonists and utilitarians have reduced the honorable good to that which is delightful or useful. Luther did the same thing in his theory of extrinsic justification by fiducial faith without good works; for Luther the just man was still unjust. Similar theories were held by the quietists, who denied the necessity of asceticism, by Rousseau, many of the Romanticists, and by the revolutionaries, who idealized violence and destruction.

On the other hand, those who defend what they call order against violence admit an absolute distinction between good and evil, but sometimes order for them represents not only the order based on the nature of things but also that traditional order which suits their purposes, and in this way they shut their eyes to the needs of the poor.

[1001] St. Thomas, De malo. q. 1, a. 1

[1002] The good and being are convertible, that is, every good is being, and every being is good, at least to the being itself inasmuch as every being strives to conserve its being. Thus good is a property of being just as risibility or the faculty of laughing is a property of man; these things are convertible since every man is risible and every risible being is a man.

[1003] cf. De praedicamentis, chap. 10.

[1004] cf. Metaphysica, Bk. V, chap. 10.

[1005] ibid. See the index under Opposita and Privatio

[1006] St. Thomas, De mendacio, Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 110, a. 3 ad 4

[1007] cf. De malo, q. 1, a 1 ad 14

[1008] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 35. a. 1.

[1009] ibid

[1010] ibid., a. 6

[1011] cf. Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Massoulie, and Gonet

[1012] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 47, a. 1.

[1013] ibid., ad 3.

[1014] ibid., q. 25, a. 6

[1015] ibid., q. 47, a. 2

[1016] St. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 11

[1017] Col. 1 24.

[1018] Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3

[1019] The Imitation of Christ, Bk. II, chap. 12

[1020] II Cor. 4:16f

[1021] Matt. 5:31

[1022] I Cor. 7.

[1023] cf. other passages in St. Thomas' works indicated in the Tabula aurea under permissio. cf. below, Ia, q. 49, a. 3 ad 5

[1024] Isa. 5 20

[1025] St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 14

[1026] Denz., no. 2058

[1027] Ibid., no. 1701

[1028] Isa. 5:20

[1029] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1. ad. 2

[1030] cf. the beginning of the treatise on grace: The states of nature with regard to grace and original sin

[1031] St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 12

[1032] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 1

[1033] ibid

[1034] ibid

[1035] ibid., ad 2, 3

[1036] ibid., ad 1.

[1037] St. Thomas, De malo, q. 2, a. 12

[1038] ibid

[1039] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3

[1040] St. Thomas, De malo, loc. cit

[1041] ibid., a. 2, a. 9, II f

[1042] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 85, a. 2, 3.

[1043] Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 586 ff.

[1044] John 9:2

[1045] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87.

[1046] De malo, q. 1, a. 4.

[1047] ibid

[1048] Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 4

[1049] Tob. 2:12

[1050] Ibid., 12:13

[1051] John 9:3; cf Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 6, 7, 8; Commentarium in Job, chaps. 4, 6, 8; De malo, q. 5, a. 4

[1052] On the trials Of the just, cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Job, chaps. 4, 6, 8; De malo, q. 5, a. 4; Summa Theol., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 7, 8.

[1053] St. Thomas, De malo, q. 1, a. 4

[1054] Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, a. 6 ad 1.

[1055] ibid

[1056] De malo, q. 1, a. 4 ad 12

[1057] Summa Theol., IIa IIae, q. 19, a. 1.

[1058] Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 9

[1059] ibid., Ia IIae, q. 87, a. 3 ad 3.

[1060] Ibid., Ia, q. 19, a. 1; q. 80, a. 1. ad 3; cf. Cajetan's commentary on this passage; Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3; q. 57, a. 1

[1061] ibid., Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3

[1062] ibid., IIa IIae, q. 27, a. 3

[1063] cf. Cajetan, commentary on the following question, a. 3, no. 4.

[1064] Summa Theol. IIIa, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3

[1065] Ibid., IIa IIae, q. 19, a. 1

[1066] ibid., the following question, 49, a. 3

[1067] cf. Opera Platonis (ed. Didot), I, 342-46. "It is worse to do injustice than to receive it, and to flee punishment than to submit to it," I, 346