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State of the question. This article seeks to offer a
more precise real definition of evil, inasmuch as
privation differs from negation. It appears that evil is
not in things, because then something would be in them and
God would not always make that which is better.
Reply. The reply is that evil is found in things,
indeed the perfection of the universe requires that there
be certain things which can be deficient in goodness, and
from this it follows that some things are deficient in
goodness.
1. This is proved from the fact that there are
prohibitions and penalties, which would not exist except
because of evils.
2. An "a priori" proof can be found by
reducing this problem to the preceding question about the
multiplicity and inequality of beings. The argument may
be reduced to the following. The perfection of the
universe requires that there be inequality in things,
namely, a degree of indefectible goodness and a degree of
defectible goodness, that is, corruptible being, which
can be defective and sometimes is defective. But the
nature of evil is that some being is deficient of some
good. Therefore in things we find evil, like
corruption, and this is in agreement with the perfection
of the universe, or serves to manifest the divine goodness
in the various grades of goodness, since, as was said
above,[1012] "the divine goodness cannot be
adequately represented by one creature and therefore God
made many subordinate beings."
This article explains the meaning of the statement often
made by St. Thomas: "it follows that what is
defectible is sometimes deficient," that is to say, it
is not surprising that a being is sometimes deficient.
The expression, "it follows," is explained in this
article in this way: "The perfection of the universe
requires that there be some beings that can defect from
goodness, and it follows from this that some beings
sometimes are deficient."[1013]
This expression does not mean that it is congruous that a
being should sometimes be deficient, for such deficiency
is actually not agreeable to that being, but it is
congruous for the good of the universe; for instance, the
corruption of one being is the generation of another, and
this corruption is agreeable for the generation of the
other.
This article more than any other on evil offers an
opportunity to explain St. Augustine's and St.
Thomas' teaching on the greater good on account of which
God permits evil.
Reply to first objection. Evil is not pure negation but
the privation of an owing good in an apt subject. Thus we
do not say that a piece of wood is ignorant, but that wood
has no knowledge. For this reason the Scholastics reject
Leibnitz's expression, metaphysical evil, which he used
to designate the imperfection of any creature inasmuch as
it did not possess every perfection.
Reply to second objection. This privation of an owing
good is in things as in an apt subject, for example,
blindness is in the eye, not indeed as something positive
but as a privation. And when we say that there is
blindness, the word "is" does not signify a real entity
but the truth of the proposition, namely, that it is true
that this man is blind, or deprived of vision.
Reply to third objection. St. Thomas explains that,
although there is evil in things and God does not make
what is better in every part of the universe, God makes
that which is better in the whole, and in the parts with
relation to the whole of the universe. He does not mean
that the actual world is the best possible of all worlds,
for above he said: "God is able to make a being better
than any being He has made...., that is, He can
always make something better if the better is understood
substantively...., but He cannot make something
better if the "better" is understood adverbially, that
is, with greater wisdom and goodness."[1014] In
another place he shows that the inequality in creatures
manifests the divine goodness.[1015]
Now St. Thomas explains the congruity of the divine
permission of evil in two ways.
1. On the part of the material cause or the subject.
He says: "It is of the very nature of things that those
things that can be deficient are sometimes deficient."
It is fitting, therefore, that God does not interfere
or that he permits this deficiency.
2. On the part of the end. This divine permission is
fitting because it is for a greater good. As St.
Augustine says: "God, since He is the highest good,
would in no way allow anything evil in His works unless
He were so omnipotent and so good that He could make good
come from evil."[1016] For example, the life of
the lion would not be preserved unless the ass were
killed, nor would there be the patience of martyrs unless
there were the iniquity of the persecutor.
This is the solution of the problem of evil, which is at
once clear and obscure; it is clear in principle, in the
abstract and formally, but it is obscure in the
particular, in the concrete and materially. The solution
is clear inasmuch as it shows that the most holy and
omnipotent God cannot permit evil except for some greater
good, otherwise the divine permission would not be holy.
But on the other hand this solution remains obscure in the
particular and in the concrete because this greater good is
generally not clearly understood until we see it in
heaven. Nevertheless it sometimes happens that this
greater good on account of which God permits evil is
clearly seen.
1. In the mineral kingdom we see that the corruption of
one being is the generation of another; indeed, of the
four elements distinguished by the ancients, the highest,
fire, originates from the corruption of the others,
especially air. Fire devours and destroys all things,
but fire itself has the higher properties, and many things
are made through fire.
2. In the animal kingdom, the slaying of inferior
animals furnishes food for the higher animals, such as the
lion, the eagle; and man.
3. In the human race itself, pain is the stimulus or
the goad that urges men on in the intellectual, moral,
social, and religious order.
In the intellectual order pain and poverty and need make
man inventive and skillful in the arts; a high state of
civilization arises in part from the struggle against
pain. This accounts for the rise not only of medicine and
surgery but also of legislation. In the speculative order
higher systems of thought arise from the painful conflict
of other systems, and thus a thesis provokes the
antithesis before the human mind attains the superior
synthesis. In general, as soon as one force appears
another opposing force appears, and from the conflict
frequently comes equilibrium and harmony. In this
struggle for life each individual works with his greatest
energy, and sometimes the result is a higher synthesis.
In the moral order, the most painful injustice emphasizes
the beauty of justice; the innocent man who suffers a
great injustice either desires revenge, and thus becomes
evil, or he feels within himself the thirst and hunger for
justice and thus becomes holy, according to our Lord's
words: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after
justice: for they shall have their fill" (Matt.
5:6). If they had not seen these great injustices,
many would never thirst and hunger in this way for
justice.
Similarly, out of the knowledge of our own misery arises
the desire for a good life. Good exists scarcely anywhere
in the world except as the result of struggle. In the
social order, the need and suffering of our neighbor
arouses sympathy, charity, and benevolence. An unjust
war prompts men to make greater sacrifices to defend their
country. In the religious order, God permits sin in the
lives of the saints, for example, St. Peter's triple
denial, so that the saints may attain greater humility and
that God Himself may manifest His mercy and justice.
The insufficiency of sensitive life prompts the desire and
aspiration for the rational life, and the insufficiency of
the rational life prompts men to aspire to a still higher
life. Finally, although pain seems to be altogether
futile, in the sacrifice of reparation pain is used as the
supreme test of love for God and men, and thus pain
becomes most fruitful. Indeed, this principle, "God
does not permit evil except for some greater good,"
appears in splendor in the mystery of the cross and in the
life of Christ the Redeemer; it appears participatively
in the lives of the saints, who can say with St. Paul,
"I fill up those things that are wanting of the
sufferings of Christ, in my flesh, for His body, which
is the Church."[1017]
St. Thomas also states clearly that God permitted
original sin because of the greater good of the redemptive
Incarnation. He says: "Nothing stood in the way that
after sin human nature should be led to something higher.
God permitted evil to happen that some thing better might
come of it. Hence St. Paul said, 'And where sin
abounded, grace did more abound.'"[1018] And in
the blessing of the paschal candle, we sing, "O happy
fault, that merited so great a Redeemer."
This providential law finds its highest expression in the
fact that from something that was not only useless but also
harmful, the torment of crucifixion, Christ established
the font of all spiritual goods. God permitted this most
grievous sin of deicide so that Christ by His heroic
death might save us from sin. Hence we address the
cross, "O Cross, our one reliance, hail!"
This is the Christian solution of the problem of evil,
which cannot be comprehended except by faith that is
illumined by the gifts of understanding and wisdom. In
the chapter on "The Royal Way of the Holy Cross,"
the Imitation of Christ says: "In the cross is
salvation, in the cross is life,....in the cross joy
of the spirit, in the cross the perfection of
holiness....; if you willingly carry the cross, the
cross will bear you up."[1019] "Though our
outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed
day by day. For that which is at present momentary and
light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure
exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."[1020]
This is the true law of progress and ascent, which cannot
be understood according to the dicta of determinism and
pantheism, for there are many setbacks in the world,
there are many crosses that are unfruitful to him who bears
them with ill will, like the bad thief. But still they
serve to manifest God's justice and the love of God as
the supreme good that is to be loved above all things.
Thus we explain evil according to its three causes: 1.
according to its formal cause it is the privation of an
owing good; 2. according to the material cause it is in
a defectible subject, which at times is defective; 3.
according to its final cause, it is not impeded by God,
but is permitted for some greater good. Finally, in
question 49 we shall see that evil does not have an
efficient cause "per se", but merely either an
efficient cause "per accidens", when evil
follows on the production of some form, or a defective
cause. From this we shall see that the divine permission
of evil is nothing but a condition "sine qua non"
of evil and in no way the cause of evil.
The concept of the divine permission of evil. From the
reply to the third objection we see that the fact that God
does not impede evil is the same as the permission of
evil; this is especially true in the case of moral evil of
which God is not even the indirect or accidental cause.
St. Thomas explains the nature of this divine permission
in his commentary on St. Matthew:[1021] "There
are five kinds of permission," and in his enumeration of
these five kinds of permission, the object of the first
four is not sin, and the object of the fifth is sin. He
says: "It should be noted that there are several kinds
of permission. The first is the concession of a licit
thing, as when the prior grants you permission to visit
your parents, which is no sin. The second kind is
dispensation, when the superior allows you to eat what is
not lawful for you, as eating meat, which is not a sin
but would be against the rule unless you were dispensed.
The third kind of permission is tolerance, as when the
lesser of two evils is permitted to avoid the greater
evil; such was Moses' permission to write a bill of
divorce. He is said to have granted permission because he
tolerated divorce lest a greater evil, namely, murder,
follow. This divorce would have been a sin if Moses had
not tolerated it, and it is said that Moses did this
because of the hardness of their hearts. The fourth
permission is indulgence, that is, when something is
permitted whose opposite is better, as when the apostles
permitted second marriages,[1022] when continence of
the marital survivor would have been better. The fifth
kind of permission is sustaining, as when God permits
evil that He may elicit good things," that is, God
does not impede and does not wish to impede evil, but this
He does on account of a greater good.
We must not confuse this last kind of permission with the
others, with which it has not affinity, except with the
third. This last kind of permission is called permission
only analogically.[1023]
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