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The reply is in the negative and it is of faith.
1. This is known from the Scriptures and from the
definitions of the Church, according to which there are
only three persons, one that does not proceed and two
others that proceed, and hence there are but two
processions.
2. This truth is also explained by the psychological
theory, which more and more appears as a concept based on
revelation; because in every intellectual nature there are
only two immanent actions, intellect and will.
The divine nature as good is diffusive of itself and it is
diffusive in a twofold manner: through the intellectual
procession and through the procession of love, "Inasmuch
as God understands and loves His essence, truth, and
goodness." Thus St. Thomas, even in this treatise,
preserves the principle frequently quoted by St.
Bonaventure: good is essentially diffusive of itself,
and the higher the nature the more intimately and
abundantly is it diffusive of itself. But within God
this diffusion is not through final or efficient causality
but above the order of causality. Yet there is a
completely intimate and superabundant diffusion in the
communication of the entire and infinite divine nature
through generation and spiration.
Doubts about this whole question.
First doubt. What is the "principium quod" of
each procession, considered actively, that is, what is
the principle that generates and the principle that
spirates?
Reply. It is the Father that generates, and the
Father and the Son that spirate. "The divine nature
does not beget, is not begotten, and does not proceed;
but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is
begotten, and the Holy Ghost who proceeds."[187]
With regard to the second procession, it has been
defined: "The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and
the Son."[188] If the divine nature generated,
the generation would be in the three persons and the three
persons would generate, and so the Holy Ghost would
generate a fourth person and so to infinity. Again, if
the divine nature were begotten, the three persons would
be begotten; if the divine nature proceeded, the three
persons would proceed.
Second doubt. What is the principle through which
("principium quo") each procession takes place
actively considered?
Reply. According to revelation each procession
terminates with one person who proceeds not from the divine
nature taken in itself, but the Son proceeds from the
divine nature as it is of the Father (because it is the
Father who generates), and the Holy Ghost proceeds
from the divine nature as it is of the Father and the
Son, since these two spirate.
Therefore we say that the "principium quo" (the
principle through which) of each procession actively
considered is the intellect and the will in the divine
nature as modified by the relations of paternity and active
spiration. It is important to add "as modified" because
essential intellection and essential love are common to the
three persons and thus are not processions. Such is the
common teaching of the Thomists. The psychological
theory, although it wishes to pluck out the persons from
the processions, to a certain extent must suppose the
persons and relations in order fully to define the
processions. This is part of the obscurity of this
theory, and we should not be surprised at it because these
notions of procession, relation, and person mutually
illustrate each other just as in ontology the notions of
being, unity, truth, goodness, and beauty throw light
on one another.[189]
From these passages from St. Thomas we see that the
"principium quo" of the divine processions
implies something absolute and something relative: it is
absolute in recto as form, and relative in obliquo as
mode. Thus we say that the proximate "principium
quo" of the processions is the intellect and the love
in the divine nature, but as modified by the relations of
paternity and active spiration. The three persons know,
but only the Father enunciates by generating or generates
by enunciating; the three persons love, but only the
Father and the Son spirate. This is sufficiently clear
in spite of the obscurity of the mystery.
Third doubt. Is the power of generating in God a
perfection?
Reply. The difficulty arises from the fact that this
perfection would be lacking in the Son and the Holy
Ghost, belonging only to the Father, and thus the three
persons would not be equally perfect.
The reply is based on the fact that the power of
generating directly
(in recto) signifies the divine nature, but indirectly
(in obliquo) the divine relation, as will be more
clearly explained below.[190] This is to say that
the power of generating pertains to the divine nature as it
is in the Father. Wherefore the power of generating in
God is a perfection with respect to that which it
signifies directly, namely, the absolute, which is the
divine nature; but it is not a perfection with respect to
that which it signifies indirectly (in obliquo),
namely, the relation of paternity, which according to its
relative being ("esse ad")
abstracts from perfection and imperfection, because it
does not involve imperfection nor is it a new perfection
superadded to the infinite perfection of the divine
nature. Something similar is taught concerning the free
act of creation, which is virtually distinct from the
necessary act of love, since the act of creation does not
involve an imperfection nor does it add a new perfection.
Thus God was not improved by the fact that He freely
willed to create the universe.
Fourth doubt. Whether the divine processions, actively
considered, are true and proper actions or only
emanations, like the faculties that emanate from the
essence of the soul.
Reply. In their reply the Thomists oppose Suarez.
They say that the processions are true actions, but
actions that are merely immanent because they are the act
of the intellect ad intra, namely, enunciation, and the
act of the will, namely, active spiration. This
immanent action can be purified of every imperfection, as
is indeed the creative act, an immanent action which is
virtually transient and transitive.
But we do not say that God the Father as begetting is
truly and properly acting, but only truly and properly
understanding and enunciating; so also the Father and the
Son in active spiration are not properly acting, because
in common usage the expression "acting" is taken to mean
an efficient cause and not a principle alone. The Father
is not the cause of the Son, and the Son is not an
effect. Indeed although the Father is the principle of
the Word, the Son is not said to be principled,
because, as St. Thomas points out,[191] to be
principled or derive from a principle implies an
imperfection that cannot be attributed to the Son.
The Word is not principled, but He is a principle from
a principle. Therefore there is no other distinction
between the Father and the Son except the distinction of
origin; no distinction exists with regard to nature,
dignity, omnipotence, and the like: "All things
whatsoever the Father hath, are Mine" (John
16:15). For this reason it is better to speak of
quasi-active generation and quasi-active spiration, and
especially of quasi-passive generation and quasi-passive
spiration, for passivity, properly speaking, corresponds
to transitive action. Generation and spiration,
however, are simply immanent actions above the order of
causality; through them the divine nature is not caused
but communicated.
Fifth doubt. How does the divine Word differ from our
word?
Reply. It differs in many ways.[192] 1. The
Word of God is something substantial, living, and
intelligent; it is, moreover, a person, but our word is
only an accident of our minds. God alone is subsisting
intellect. 2. The divine Word exists, not like ours
because of a need, but from the infinite abundance and
fecundity. 3. The divine Word is co-eternal with the
Father, it is immutable, and is begotten perpetually,
all of which is not verified in our word. 4. The divine
Word is unique because it is adequate; our word is
inadequate and therefore multiple, indeed it is more
multiple in the inferior created intellects.
Nevertheless an analogy remains between the two words,
because both are termini of the enunciating intellect or
enunciation, and both are images or representations of the
thing that is known; both are conceived by the mind, but
only in God does this conception deserve the name of
generation in its proper sense; both are simply
spiritual, intrinsically independent of matter and the
corruption of material things. But, according to the
declaration of the Fourth Lateran Council, "The
similarity between the Creator and the creature is never
so great that the dissimilarity is not always
greater."[193] These declarations might serve as a
definition of analogy, for, as we have often shown with
St. Thomas,[194] things are analogous when they
have the same name, but what is signified by the name is
the same "secundum quid" and proportionately but
simply different in these analogous things.
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