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According to the teaching of faith, a soul separated from
the body enters into the particular judgment immediately
after death, and then God "renders to every man
according to his works."[1341]
The Second Council of Lyons declared that "soon after
death" the souls of men either enter heaven, or go down
to hell, or are placed in purgatory. This presupposes a
particular judgment.[1342] Benedict XII on two
occasions makes use of this formula, "soon after death
according to their different merits,"[1343] which
likewise presupposes a particular judgment. This truth,
taught by faith, is expressed in various ways in Holy
Scripture: "For it is easy before God in the day of
death to reward every one according to his ways.....
And in the end of a man is the disclosing of his
works."[1344] "And as it is appointed unto men
once to die, and after this the judgment."[1345]
"I must work the works of Him that sent me, whilst it
is day: the night cometh, when no man can
work."[1346] Hence retribution follows immediately
on death. Patristic tradition also supports this teaching
that the soul is subjected to the particular judgment when
it leaves the body.[1347]
Out of this particular judgment the elect receive the
certainty of salvation and confirmation in grace even
though they must first pass through purgatory; the rest
receive the certainty of perdition.
How can we explain the immobility of the separated soul
from the instant of separation from the body without the
beatific vision for all souls, even those that are not
among the elect?
Scotus and Suarez teach that this immobility is only
extrinsic, inasmuch as God no longer offers the grace of
conversion to the souls that leave the body in the state of
sin, and inasmuch as He grants the souls in purgatory a
special protection that wards off sin, both mortal and
venial, so that these souls do not recede any farther from
heavenly bliss.
St. Thomas and the Thomists assign an intrinsic
reason,[1348] namely, by the fact that the soul is
separated from the body it becomes subject to the normal
conditions of intellectual life of a pure spiritual
creature.[1349] St. Thomas says: "The
apprehension of the angel differs from the apprehension of
man in this, that the angel apprehends immovably through
the intellect just as we apprehend first principles, with
which the intellect is concerned. Man (in this life),
however, apprehends movably through reason, proceeding
from one thing to another, since for him the way is open
to proceed to both opposites. Hence the will of man (in
this life) adheres to a thing movably, being in a
position to abandon one thing and adhere to the contrary.
The will of the angel, however, adheres fixedly and
immovably. And therefore, if we consider the angel's
will before it adheres to a thing, it is able to adhere
freely to one thing or to the opposite in those matters
which it does not will naturally, but after it has adhered
to a thing it adheres to it immovably. Hence we say
customarily,....the free will of the angel is flexible
with regard to either opposite before the choice is made
but not after."[1350]
This follows from the purely intuitive mode of cognition
as contrasted with the abstractive and successive mode of
cognition. The intellect that knows by abstraction sees
the various aspects of the decision to be made at the end
of the deliberation only successively and therefore it is
able to change its free judgment and its voluntary choice.
On the other hand, the intellect that knows in a purely
intuitive manner sees all the aspects, both for and
against, of the decision to be made not successively but
at one time, and afterward it does not change its final
practical judgment or its voluntary choice. If some one
were to say to the intuitive intellect, "You did not
consider this aspect," it would reply, "I considered
even this aspect." Hence for the devil there is no way
to return except the road of humility and obedience, which
the devil did not accept and does not now accept.
This immutability of choice in created spirits is a
participation in the immutability of the divine choice,
which remains most free even though it is entirely
immutable since from eternity God considered everything
that was to be considered. And the separated soul is like
the angels in their mode of knowledge.
Doubt. In the very instant of separation from the body
is a final merit possible for those souls that remained in
mortal sin in the final moment of their union with the
body?
Cajetan takes the affirmative view. He said: "The
soul becomes obstinate by the first act that it elicits in
the state of separation; at this point the soul merits not
as here on earth but as in its terminus."[1351]
This instant is the first moment when it is no longer in
via, the first instant of its separation from the body.
Immediately before this, time is divisible in infinity.
Other Thomists reject this solution as contrary to
Scripture and tradition and to the teaching of St.
Thomas in the "Contra Gentes": "As soon as
the soul is separated from the body it receives the reward
or punishment for what it has done while in the
body."[1352] There is therefore no possibility of
final meriting in the separated soul by which it can repair
the sin in which it perdured to the last moment of its
union with the body.
The Salmanticenses declared: "This manner of speaking
(proposed by Cajetan) is commonly rejected because of
the testimony of Scripture, which expressly says that men
can gain merit or demerit only before death and not in
death. This is the sense of the words, 'I must
work....whilst it is day; the night cometh, when no
man can work.'[1353] Moreover, if in this first
instant after the separation of the soul from the body a
final meriting is possible, it would also be possible that
the souls that were in the state of grace in the last
moment of union with the body could lose their merits,
which no one is willing to admit, as Suarez
says."[1354]
In rejecting Cajetan's opinion, Ferrariensis points
out that there is an element of truth in it, "While in
the instant of separation the soul has an immutable
apprehension and in that instant begins to be obstinate,
nevertheless it does not in that instant merit or lose
merit, as some say, because merit and demerit are not
gained by the soul alone but by the composite, that is,
by man. In that instant (of separation) man is not in
being; this is the first instant of his non-being, the
first instant in which the soul is separated and obstinate
(or confirmed in good). Man does not continue so that
he can merit."[1355] Hence, Ferrariensis
concludes, the obstinacy in man is caused inchoatively by
the mutable apprehension of some end while here on earth,
and the obstinacy is completed by the immutable
apprehension existing in the soul while it is separated.
The element of truth in the inadmissible opinion of
Cajetan is that in the first instant of separation from
the body the merit or demerit of the last moment of union
with the body becomes definitive because of the mode of
consideration, not only extrinsically, as Scotus and
Suarez thought, inasmuch as God no longer grants the
grace of conversion.[1356]
St. Thomas' solution therefore appears to be between
and above the opposing opinions of Scotus and Cajetan.
In the words of Ferrariensis, "In man obstinacy is
caused inchoatively by the mutable apprehension of some end
while here on earth, and the obstinacy is completed by the
immutable apprehension existing in the soul while it is
separated."[1357]
Objection. The immutability of the free will of the
separated soul is not sufficiently explained by the
separation from the body because this separation is too
extrinsic with regard to the free will; nor is it
explained by the immobile apprehension of the intellect,
unless we admit with Cajetan that in man, as in the
angel, the final free choice is elicited in the first
instant of the separation and depends on that immobile
apprehension, which considers everything that is to be
considered.
Reply. Obstinacy, as Ferrariensis says, is caused
inchoatively by the mobile apprehension of an end here on
earth and is completed by the subsequent immobile
apprehension. If we give careful consideration to the
reason offered by St. Thomas,[1358] this is
sufficient to explain the immobility of the disposition of
the will of the separated soul. St. Thomas says:
"According to the kind of individual, such will be the
end, that is, each one makes a practical judgment about
an end according to his own inclination.....
(Therefore) when the disposition remains by which
something is desired as a final end, the desire of that
end cannot be moved, because the final end is desired
above all things. Hence a person cannot be withdrawn from
the desire of an ultimate end by something more desirable.
This is the major of the argument; the minor follows.
The soul, however, is in a mutable state as long as it
is united to the body. Thus the transitory disposition of
a passion can be removed; even the disposition of a habit
can be removed, and a vice can be eradicated. Since the
body serves the soul in its proper operations, it was
given to the soul that the soul, existing in the body,
might be perfected in its movement to perfection. The
conclusion is as follows: When therefore the soul is
separated from the body it is not in the state of movement
to the end, but now it quiesces in the attained end. The
will then will be immobile with regard to the desire of the
ultimate end, because that disposition by which this or
that is desired as the ultimate end will remain
immobile."
That is to say that while the internal disposition by
which something is desired as the ultimate end remains,
this desire is immutable. But when the soul is separated
from the body this disposition in the soul remains
immovable, because the soul no longer apprehends mutably
as when it was in the body but immutably like a pure
spirit. Hence the final merit or demerit here on earth,
while the soul was united to the body, becomes definitive
by reason of the soul's intuitive manner of
consideration, and not only extrinsically, inasmuch as
God no longer grants the grace of conversion. The
obstinate soul then cannot return to God except on the
road of humility and obedience, and the soul does not will
to take this road. The obstinate soul should not be
regarded as desirous of returning to God if God were to
grant the grace of conversion but rather as not willing the
way of conversion by humility and obedience. Hence it is
generally said of the damned that they do not repent of the
evil they have committed because of the guilt but because
of the penalty. The damned are grieved because the will
of God is fulfilled and they desire that all souls be
damned because they are saddened by every good, especially
by the happiness of the blessed, because of their profound
and perfect hatred.[1359]
The souls in purgatory after the particular judgment,
which takes place in the instant the soul is separated from
the body, possess the certitude of salvation and are
confirmed in grace.[1360] Hence we refer to them as
the holy souls. This confirmation in grace prior to the
beatific vision is explained by St. Thomas and the
Thomists not only by God's special protection which
wards off sin, as Suarez taught, but by the fact that
the separated soul accepts the normal conditions of the
intellectual life of a purely spiritual being, which
apprehends immutably by its intellect and adheres immutably
to the final end even though this end is not yet clearly
seen. After this, when in the light of glory the final
end, which is God in His infinite goodness, is clearly
seen, the love the soul has for God is no longer free but
above freedom. It is at the same time spontaneous and
necessary, like the love that God has for Himself, and
then the soul is no longer able in any way to turn itself
away from God or to interrupt the act of loving God or
the act of beatific vision. "It is impossible that
anyone beholding the divine essence would wish to not see
it..... The vision of the divine essence fills the
soul with all good things since it unites the soul with the
font of all goodness."[1361]
Thus the immutability of the separated soul, in good or
evil, is explained not only extrinsically but also
intrinsically by the soul's manner of immutably
considering the final end.
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