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1. St. Thomas affirms the absolute spirituality of the
angels and therefore that there cannot be two angels of the
same species, because the principle of individuation is
matter marked by quantity. Scotus taught the opposite.
As an eclectic, Suarez held with St. Thomas that the
angels were absolutely spiritual, and with Scotus that
there could be two angels of the same species.
2. For St. Thomas the proper object of the angel's
intellect is the essence of the angel itself, whereas the
proper object of our intellect is the essence of sensible
things. Therefore, whereas the human idea is abstracted
from sensible particulars, the angelic idea is not
abstracted but is naturally impressed on the angel and it
is at the same time universal and concrete, that is, it
represents at the same time the species, for example, of
a lion, and the individuals, both the actual and the past
of which the angel has memory.
Hence the angelic ideas are participations in the divine
ideas, according to which God is the cause of things.
Therefore the angels do not have discursive but simply
intuitive knowledge. They know not by composition and
division, but they see the properties of things in the
essence of things by one simple intuition. In the same
way they see conclusions in the principles and means in the
ends.
Therefore the angels cannot err with regard to the things
that belong or do not belong naturally to things, but they
can err about those things that are entirely contingent and
free, such as, the secrets of the heart and future free
acts.
Scotus, on the other hand, held that an angel, although
it does not have senses, can receive ideas from sensible
things. Scotus was unwilling to designate the proper and
specific object of the angelic intellect, and he concluded
therefore that the angel had discursive knowledge. With
St. Thomas, Suarez admitted this innatism in the
angels, and with Scotus he held that the angels could
reason.
3. With regard to the will of the angels, St. Thomas
admitted that in the angelic will there were certain
necessary acts, such as the natural desire of happiness in
general. Moreover, since nothing is willed unless first
known as agreeable, the angel's free choice is always con
formed to the ultimate practical judgment by which it is
regulated, but the will executes this ultimate judgment,
while it freely accepts it. Scotus, however, held that
every act of the will is free and that a free choice could
be not conformed to the ultimate practical judgment. Here
we see evidence of Scotus' voluntarism.
Because of these viewpoints many differences arose between
St. Thomas and Scotus about the angelic will.
According to St. Thomas, the angel loves by a natural
love not only happiness in general but also God the author
of its nature more than itself,[1189] and therefore
probably the angel cannot sin directly and immediately
against its natural law, which it sees intuitively
inscribed on its own essence.[1190] When Satan
sinned directly and immediately against the supernatural
law, he sinned indirectly against the natural law
St. Thomas held that during the time of probation the
angel could not sin venially but only mortally, because
"the mind of the angel (which is simply intuitive) does
not comprehend those things which are ordered to an end
except as they are placed in the order to the
end."[1191] The angel sees the means in the end as
it sees conclusions in the principles. Thus the angel
cannot turn itself away from the proper means to an end
without turning away from its ultimate end and sinning
mortally. Further, according to St. Thomas, because
of the superiority of the angelic intellect the angel's
free choice is immutable; it is a participation in the
immutability of the divine choice. From this it follows
that the angel's mortal sin is unforgivable, or that the
angel wills irrevocably what it freely chooses with full
and intuitive advertance, that is, a choice made not
after successive consideration, like ours, but after a
simultaneous consideration of all the things that pertain
to the choice without any influence of the passions.
Hence if someone would say to the devil after he had made
his choice, "You did not consider this point," the
devil could answer, "This also I considered." This
explains the obstinacy of the devils, since before their
choice they considered everything and then cannot change
their choice. The only way that the devil could recall
his decision would be by humility and obedience, and this
the devil did not wish to do and does not wish to
do.[1192]
Because of his voluntarism, Scotus held that the choice
of the angels is not always in conformity with the final
practical judgment, and that the devil's first mortal
sin, as such, is not irrevocable or unforgivable. The
demons, he thought, committed many sins before they
became obstinate, and after each sin they could have
returned to God. Hence the diabolical obstinacy is only
extrinsic, that is, it is owing to the fact that after
many sins God declared that He would no longer grant them
the grace of conversion.
In his eclecticism Suarez held with St. Thomas that
the angelic will did not have concupiscible and irascible
parts, but with Scotus he held that, since the angel
could reason, it could sin directly against the natural
law and could also sin venially. He also thought that
after the first mortal sin the angel could return to God,
because the angel's choice need not be in conformity with
the final practical judgment.
Finally Suarez thought that the devil's obstinacy was a
consequence of that miserable state to which he saw himself
condemned. St. Thomas would have replied that it is
precisely damnation itself and the immutability of this
state that must be explained, either intrinsically because
of the intuitive mode of the knowledge that directs the
choice, or extrinsically because God no longer offers the
grace of conversion.
These three doctors teach that the angels were elevated to
the order of grace, and that most probably they were
created in grace. But there are certain differences in
their teachings. St. Thomas denies that the angels
could have sinned in the first instant. He held that
their probation lasted for one instant. He denied that
the angels received essential grace and glory because of
the merits of Christ, because the merits of Christ are
the merits of the Redeemer, and the angels were not
redeemed. On these points Scotus, and Suarez to some
extent, differ from the Angelic Doctor because of the
principles mentioned above.
From this brief review it is apparent that St. Thomas
is more definite in affirming the specific distinction
between angels and men because of the proper and specific
object of their intellects. He affirms that the angels
are purely intellectual and intuitive spirits, not
rational or discursive. He maintains intact the principle
that nothing is willed unless first known as agreeable.
All the differences with Scotus and Suarez flow from
these two principles.
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