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We consider first the distinction between good and evil
and then the distinction between the spiritual and
corporeal creature.
St. Thomas proceeds methodically by considering first
created being as being in the question on creation, then
being as one and multiple in the question on the
distinction of things in general, and now being as good
and the evil that may be in it.
Thus St. Thomas considers creatures with regard to the
transcendental properties of being before he considers
genera and species. He does not treat of being expressly
as true because truth is formally in the intellect, as was
already explained in the question on truth in
God.[982] In the present question St. Thomas
treats rather of evil than of good, because the good in
general was already discussed in the question on the divine
goodness.[983]
On the subject of evil there are two questions: on evil
itself with relation to being and to good (question
48); on the cause of evil, having in mind especially
the problem of God's relationship to evil and whether
God is in any way the cause of evil.
Question 48 is divided into two parts: 1. the nature
of evil; 2. the kinds of evil. The first part, on the
nature of evil, has four articles: 1. whether evil is
some kind of nature; 2. whether evil is found in
things; 3. whether the good is the subject of evil;
4. whether evil completely corrupts the good. The
second part, concerning the kinds of evil, has two
articles: 5. the division of evil into that of
punishment and guilt; 6. which is more evil, punishment
or guilt. St. Thomas explained these questions at great
length in his "De malo."
Errors. In these questions we find an exposition of the
doctrine of St. Augustine and Dionysius as developed in
their controversies against the Manichaeans, who posited
two principles, one beneficent, the other malevolent,
and against the Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus, who
taught that matter was the ultimate terminus of emanation,
a kind of non-being and the cause of both physical and
moral evil.
The following is an outline of Manichaeism and
Plotinus' doctrine on evil. Reviving the errors of the
Marcionites, the Gnostics, and of Zoroaster, the
Manichaeans posited two supreme principles, one
beneficent, the other evil, in order to explain the evil
found in the world, since evil cannot come from God, the
good principle. They also taught that matter and the
flesh are from the evil principle, as is also the inferior
or sensitive soul in man, whereas the spiritual soul is
derived from the good principle. Thus they said that the
concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit, and the war
of the spirit against the flesh is nothing more than the
battle between two souls. They execrated generation and
condemned marriage, but not an infecund sexual union.
Hence their peculiar immorality. They also taught that
Christ did not assume true flesh. Finally, according to
their theory, the end of the world will be the separation
of the good kingdom from the evil kingdom inasmuch as the
good souls will be separated from matter for all eternity
while the other souls will be bound to matter forever.
This theory reduces Christianity to a natural philosophy
and confuses evil with matter.[984] As descendants
of Manichaeism we find the Priscillianists in Spain in
the fifth century and the Bulgarians in Bulgaria in the
eleventh century, who, when they migrated to the west,
originated the sects of the Albigenses and the Cathari.
Many of their errors are also found in the teachings of
Huss, Wyclif, and Luther on original sin and the fall
of man.
Plotinus posited only one principle, the One-Good,
but he also taught that an intimate connection existed
between matter and evil. In his view the world is
explained as a necessary emanation from the One-Good
principle; he held a descending evolution, in which
through a series of divine generations a gradual descent is
made from the perfect to the imperfect, and finally the
primitive energy became so weak by these successive
emanations that it was no longer able to bring forth real
being and in the end there came forth a kind of
non-being, that is, matter, which existed somehow,
which was said to be the root of all evil and the principle
of all corruption. Thus the supreme good by a necessity
of its nature produced the root of every evil. Such is
the paradox of this emanatism. For Plotinus, matter is
evil; it is the primary evil inasmuch as it is the
privation of being and good. Thus it is the root of all
evils, both physical and moral, for physical evils, such
as disease and death, are a kind of corruption inasmuch as
matter tries to escape the domination of the form. The
spiritual soul, however, is good in itself but it becomes
evil as the slave of the body by intemperance and
ignobility. From this teaching arose many
errors.[985]
St. Augustine attacked Manichaeism and the Neoplatonic
doctrine on evil in his "De civitate
Dei."[986] He admitted that the body
accidentally weighs down the soul, but he showed that
matter is not evil, that the flesh in its rightful place
is good, and that there will be a corporeal resurrection.
Hence we cannot attribute our sins to our flesh and
indirectly to God, who is the author of our bodies; nor
do all sins come from sensuality, for example, the
spiritual pride of the devils. Further, St. Augustine
insisted that the condition of moral evil is our liberty,
which is not its own rule and can, therefore, deviate
from the rule. In his work, "De natura
boni", written against the Manichaeans in 405,
he demonstrated that prime matter is not evil: "Nor is
that matter to be called evil, which because of the
complete privation of species can hardly be conceived.
For it possesses the capacity for forms. Therefore, if
a form is some kind of good, without doubt the capacity
for a form is also some kind of good."[987] St.
Thomas adopted and developed this doctrine.
Finally, in his "Enchiridion",[988]
St. Augustine gave the definition of evil, which later
became classical and offered a solution for the problem of
evil which was accepted and explained by all theologians.
St. Augustine said that evil is nothing more than the
privation of good, and from this came the classic
definition, evil is the privation of some good that is
owing, for example, sickness is the privation of health,
and moral evil is the privation of moral rectitude. St.
Augustine points out that sickness is not a substance but
the privation of health in the body, which itself is the
substance and something good.
He affirms that all natures are good since the author of
all natures is the highest good, but in these natures the
good can be decreased, and this decrease is evil. Then
he solves the problem of evil, as follows: "God, since
He is the highest good, would in no way allow any evil in
His works, unless He were so omnipotent and so good that
He could turn evil into good."[989]
St. Thomas frequently quotes these words of St.
Augustine as a solution of the problem of evil, for
example, "God does not permit evil except for some
greater good."[990] This truth had already been
stated by Plato and is expressed in different ways in
Holy Scripture. The divine permission of evil would not
be good and holy unless it were ordered to some good and
all things in the universe would not cooperate to good.
St. Thomas also perfected Dionysius' doctrine on evil
in his work, "Expositio in Dionysium de divinis
nominibus." In several instances Dionysius
corrects the teaching of Plotinus by showing that matter
is not evil.[991]
In the beginning he shows that "evil is neither existing
being, nor from some existing being, nor in existing
beings."[992] These last words mean, as St.
Thomas says,[993] that evil is not something
positive in existing beings as a part or an accident; that
in creatures evil is not something positive;[994]
that "in the devils and in souls evil is not as something
existing but like the defect of the perfection of proper
goods."[995]
In a later passage,[996] in opposition to
Plotinus, he shows that matter is not evil. He offers a
threefold proof: 1. with regard to form; 2. with
regard to God the creator of matter; 3. and with regard
to the good of the whole universe.
1. Under the form, matter participates in being and
beauty, and therefore it is not evil. Indeed, even
without the form it is not evil or the principle of all
evils because without the form matter is not a principle of
action, because matter cannot destroy or corrupt
anything, and because matter is the receptive capacity of
the form, and therefore good, as St. Augustine said.
With regard to God. The matter which the Neoplatonists
call non-being either is or it is not; if it is not, it
is neither good nor bad; if it is, it is produced by a
good God, and therefore it cannot be bad, as St.
Augustine again pointed out.
3. With regard to the good of the universe. Matter is
necessary, for example, it is necessary for the
generation of plants and animals and for their nutrition,
and thus inasmuch as it enters into the order of the
universe it is good.
In his commentary on this book of Dionysius,[997]
St. Thomas notes that when many of the ancient
philosophers, like Plato, say that matter is evil and
the principle of evils this was because they were unable to
distinguish between privation and matter, and therefore,
like Plato, they called matter non-being and
consequently non-good.
But Aristotle showed that it is only "per
accidens" that matter is non-being, that is, matter
is non-being not by its nature but by reason of the
privation that is in it. Indeed, matter is something
positive, namely, the real capacity for receiving a
form, or passive potency, and therefore it is not evil.
Finally Dionysius showed that matter is not the cause of
malice in the soul, necessarily drawing the soul to evil,
for many souls are not drawn to evil and have a tendency to
good. He adds that the malice comes from the
inordinateness of free will. These teachings of St.
Augustine and Dionysius were stated metaphysically by
St. Thomas, as we see in the beginning of the present
question.
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