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St. Thomas takes up this problem after the first five
questions. Recent theologians generally treat of it in
the beginning of the treatise to support the validity of
their investigations into the divine processions. The
order adopted by St. Thomas is excellent in itself,
although from our standpoint it is useful to consider the
indemonstrability of this mystery at least briefly in the
beginning. We will here consider the problem at some
length.
State of the question. The question is well put by St.
Thomas in the three difficulties proposed at the beginning
of the article. 1. Many Platonic and Neoplatonic
philosophers admitted a certain kind of Trinity with three
hypostases, namely, the One, the Logos, and the world
soul. 2. Richard of St. Victor tried to demonstrate
the Trinity from the infinity of the divine goodness,
which communicates itself infinitely in the procession of
the three divine persons and from the fact that there can
be no joyous possession of any good without some consort or
association in that enjoyment. In a similar way, St.
Augustine proceeded to show the Trinity of persons from
the procession of the word and of love in our human minds.
3. If the mystery of the Trinity had no relation to our
reason, its revelation would seem to be superfluous.
We might add that Abelard tried to demonstrate the
Trinity.[333] St. Anselm frequently attempted to
construct demonstrations to prove the Trinity and
sometimes indulged in what were at least wordy
extravagances. In recent times Guenther also wished to
demonstrate this mystery,[334] as did Rosmini, who
brought down on himself the Church's
condemnation.[335] More recently Schell, in
opposition to the rationalists and Unitarians, who said
this mystery was openly opposed to reason, tried to prove
the Trinity from the nexus between aseity and immanent
processions.[336]
The reply, however, is in the negative: the Trinity of
the divine persons cannot be known by natural reason, that
is, it cannot be understood or demonstrated. This
statement does not depress but rather pleases the
theologian.
The proof is from 1. Scripture; 2. the authority of
the Fathers; 3. the definitions and declarations of the
Church;[337] 4. theological reasoning.
1. The authority of the Scriptures. From our Lord's
words, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father:
neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, and
he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him"
(Matt. 11:27), it is clear that the Trinity of
the divine persons is above created natural knowledge,
even that of the angels. This is confirmed by our
Lord's words to St. Peter, "Blessed art thou,
Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood hath not
revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven"
(Matt. 16:17). The second text, it is true,
refers directly to the mystery of the Incarnation, but if
the incarnation of the Son of God is above natural
reason, the mystery of the Trinity is all the more above
human reason. Hence Pope Hormisdas in writing to the
Emperor Justin said: "No visible or invisible nature
is able to investigate the secret of the
Trinity."[338]
2. The authority of the Fathers. In his argument sed
contra St. Thomas quotes St. Hilary and St.
Ambrose. He also adduces the authority of St. Gregory
of Nyssa, St. Fulgentius, and St.
Jerome.[339] He quotes St. Gregory of Nyssa's
words, "No words can express the ineffable depth of this
mystery."[340]
3. The authority of the Vatican Council: "The
mysteries hidden in God are proposed for our belief and if
they had not been divinely revealed they could not be
known... . These divine mysteries by their very nature
exceed the created intellect and even when they are handed
down by revelation and received by faith remain covered
with the veil of faith and wrapped up in obscurity for us
as long as we are journeying in this life toward the
Lord, for we walk not through the species of things but
by faith."[341] The same Council declared: "If
anyone shall say that the divine revelation does not
contain true and proper mysteries, but that all the dogmas
of faith can be understood and demonstrated from natural
principles by the efforts of reason, let him be
anathema."[342]
The Church did not in these words define that the mystery
of the Trinity is a mystery properly so called, but it is
commonly believed in the Church that the Trinity is
supreme among all mysteries, since it is the mystery of
God's intimate life, and if this mystery is not
essentially supernatural, the other mysteries, of the
incarnation of the Son of God, our redemption, the
sending of the Holy Ghost, would not be essentially
supernatural mysteries. Then these mysteries would not be
indemonstrable except for their contingency, since the
physical world was not created from eternity but in time,
and they would not be indemonstrable by reason of their
essential supernatural nature. However, the Council
declared: "The divine mysteries are above the created
intellect by their very nature to such a degree that even
when they are handed down by revelation and received by
faith" they cannot be demonstrated. This truth was
affirmed against the semirationalists Guenther and
Frohschammer.
Several declarations were made by the Church against
Guenther.[343] The following propositions by
Rosmini were condemned by the Church: "After the
mystery of the Trinity had been revealed, its existence
can be proved by purely speculative arguments, although
these arguments are negative and indirect, and these
arguments can reduce this truth to the realm of philosophy
so that it becomes a scientific proposition like others in
philosophy. If this proposition were denied, the
theosophic doctrine of pure reason would not only be
incomplete but it would be destroyed because of consequent
absurdities."[344] Rosmini's teaching that there
are "three supreme forms of being, namely,
subjectivity, objectivity, and holiness and, when these
forms are transferred to absolute being, they cannot be
conceived as anything else than living and subsisting
persons," was also condemned.[345]
Guenther taught something like this when he defined
personality as the consciousness of oneself.
"Consciousness," he said, "presupposes the duality of
the subject and the object and the knowledge of their
identity. The subject is the Father, the object is the
Son or the Word, and their substantial identity is the
Holy Ghost." Further he declared, "If in God there
were but one person, God would not be conscious of
Himself."[346] This last statement is obviously
false since God is subsisting intellect itself.
Moreover, according to Guenther's theory, there should
be not only three who are conscious of themselves but also
three consciousnesses in order that there be three
personalities, and then in God there would be three
intellects. This would be tritheism, and something
essential in God would be multiplied.[347]
Because of these different authoritative statements it is
clear that the Holy Trinity cannot be known naturally,
even after its existence is known by revelation. It is
also clear that the real possibility of this mystery cannot
be positively demonstrated even after revelation. If once
the possibility could be proved, the actual existence
would also be proved because in necessary things existence
follows possibility, and the Trinity is not contingent as
are the Incarnation and the Redemption.
4. The theological proof. In God only that can be
known naturally which is necessarily and evidently
connected with creatures.
We can know nothing about God naturally except through
created effects, as was shown above,[348] and the
natural principles which are known from a consideration of
created being. But from these created effects, at least
those that are natural, we cannot arrive at the knowledge
of the Trinity because these effects proceed from the
creative power or God's omnipotence, which is common to
the entire Trinity and, like the divine intelligence and
the divine will, pertains to the unity of the essence and
not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore it is
impossible to come to the knowledge of the Trinity by
natural reason.
The major of this argument is philosophically and
theologically certain.[349] The minor is of faith
according to the Fourth Lateran Council, which said
that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are
"co-omnipotent and co-eternal, one principle of all
things."[350] By philosophy and theology it can be
shown that omnipotence pertains to the divine nature as it
is one and not as it is threefold in the persons, since
each person does not have its own proper and distinct
omnipotence. Thus created effects do not per se proceed
from God as triune but only concomitantly inasmuch as the
creative power is one and the same in the three persons.
The reader is referred to St. Thomas' article, in
which he clarifies this truth more than did his
predecessors.
Objection. If created effects were known more
perfectly, as they are known, for instance, by the
angels, perhaps the Trinity could be known from them.
Reply. An effect, no matter how perfectly it is known,
will not lead to the knowledge of the cause except under
that aspect by which it proceeds from the cause and
according to the dependence of the effect on the cause.
Thus a painting makes known the painter, but it does not
tell whether the painter was large or small, fat or lean.
Created effects, at least natural effects, do not depend
on God as triune but only as He is one.
Confirmation. In the body of the article St. Thomas
adds two theological arguments. "Anyone who tries to
prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason derogates
from faith in two ways. 1. He derogates from faith
because it is concerned with things that do not appear and
are hidden in God... . 2. Such an attempt arouses
the derision of non-believers since they are led to
believe that we depend on human reasonings and believe
because of them." The holy doctor concludes: "We
should not try to prove the things that are of
faith...; it is enough to make a defense by showing
that what faith proclaims is not impossible." He says
"make a defense," that is, by solving objections and
offering reasons of convenience.
Reply to the first objection. The philosophers did not
know a Trinity of persons, but the attributes which were
later attributed to the persons. The Neoplatonists spoke
of three subordinate hypostases which were not equal and
which were quite different from the three equal divine
persons. They spoke of 1. the one, which is also the
supreme good (the god of Plato); 2. the first
intelligence (the god of Aristotle); 3. and the world
soul (the god of the Stoics).
Reply to the second objection. Concerning the Trinity,
reason can offer non-demonstrative reasons, arguments of
convenience. Thus from the infinite goodness of God we
are persuaded by an argument of convenience to accept
God's fecundity within Himself, but this is no proof.
In the same way from the fact that our intellect produces
a word we cannot prove that there is a word in God; in us
the word is a result of need, in God the word is from
superabundance.
Reply to the third objection. Nevertheless the
revelation of the Trinity is not without relation to the
truths of the natural order, which it confirms. The
Trinity confirms the freedom of creation, for if God
made all things by His Word, He did not create by a
necessity of nature or of knowledge; since He is already
fecund within Himself He does not need to create in order
to be fecund.[351] The revelation of the Trinity
was especially necessary for a correct understanding of the
salvation of the human race, which is accomplished by the
incarnate Son and by the gift of the Holy Ghost. These
two mysteries presuppose the mystery of the Trinity.
First doubt. Whether after the revelation of this
mystery it can be clearly demonstrated by reason alone.
The reply is in the negative: 1. from the authority of
the councils, according to which mysteries in the strict
sense cannot be demonstrated even after they are revealed;
2. from theological reason because divine revelation does
not indicate that creatures depend and proceed per se from
God as triune
Second doubt. Whether the possibility of the mystery of
the Trinity at least can be apodictically proved by reason
after it has been revealed. The reply is in the
negative: 1. because, as has been said, only that can
be known naturally in God which necessarily is connected
with creatures. But the possibility of the Trinity is no
more clearly connected with creatures than its existence,
because the creative power is common to the three persons.
2. Moreover, in necessary things existence follows from
a real intrinsic possibility as, for instance, if it is
true that God can be wise then He is indeed most wise.
But the Trinity is not something contingent but
necessary. Therefore, if by reason alone we can prove
conclusively that the Trinity is intrinsically possible,
we would also prove its existence. Such is the reasoning
of many Thomists, among them Gonet and Billuart.
Objection. Whatever can be shown to involve no
contradiction is proved to be possible. But by reason
alone it can be shown that the Trinity involves no
contradiction. Therefore it can be proved to be
possible, for intrinsic possibility is simple
non-repugnance to being.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if it can be shown
positively and evidently to involve no contradiction, I
concede; if only negatively and probably, I
deny.[352] Thus St. Thomas says: "Theology
makes use of philosophy to counter those things which are
said against the faith by showing either that these things
are false or that they are not necessary."[353]
This means, Billuart notes, when we solve the
objections from reason and the contradictions which oppose
the possibility of this mystery, we show that these
arguments are at least not necessary or cogent. It
suffices that this mystery be not judged to be impossible,
but not that it is evidently possible.[354] We have
shown that the possibility of this mystery cannot be
disproved, nor can it be strictly proved because we have
here a mystery in the strict sense, which has no necessary
and evident connection with creatures that are naturally
knowable. The reason given by St. Thomas in the body
of the article is entirely formal. In order to understand
the possibility of this mystery we must be able to see that
if God were not triune He would not be God just as we
see that if God were not omnipotent He would not be
God. This truth is not manifest even in the
extraordinary intellectual visions which are granted by
means of infused species such as the angels possess; this
truth cannot be seen except when the essence of God itself
is seen, and God's essence cannot be known as it is in
itself by any created species.[355]
I insist. No middle exists between the possible and the
impossible. But the rationalists cannot prove that this
mystery is impossible. Therefore the theologians can
prove that it is possible.
Reply. I deny the consequence. Although no middle
exists between the possible and impossible, a middle does
exist between the demonstration of possibility and the
demonstration of impossibility, for the possibility of the
Trinity is plausible although it cannot be proved. So it
is with all mysteries that transcend demonstration; they
are not contrary to reason, they are above it. Their
possibility cannot be positively proved or disproved; it
is only plausible. Such is the possibility of the
Incarnation, of eternal life, of the beatific vision,
of the light of glory, and the possibility of grace,
which is the seed of glory.
I insist. In the treatise on the Trinity it is at least
shown that the Trinity implies no contradiction.
Therefore it is possible.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: that we see
clearly that the Trinity implies no contradiction, this
I deny; that it appears plausible, this I concede. We
say, for instance, that in God to be begotten is not
less perfect than to beget, that to be spirated is not
less perfect than to spirate, but this is not evident.
We cannot prove conclusively that passive generation
imputes no imperfection in the Son of God; we only
indicate it with some probability while it is revealed
elsewhere.
I insist. God as one is no less supernatural than as
triune. But God as one can be naturally known.
Therefore He can be known naturally also as triune.
Reply. I distinguish the major: God as one is no less
supernatural in being as He is in Himself, I concede;
as a knowable object with regard to creatures, I deny.
I distinguish the minor: God is known in this way by
creatures, I concede; otherwise, I deny.
Third doubt. Whether reason by itself alone can find
analogies to make known the divine processions. For
example, if the Son of God had not been called the Word
of God in St. John's Gospel, would St. Augustine
have been able to discover the analogy of our mental word
with the Word of God?
We reply with St. Thomas.[356]
1. St. Augustine would not have been able, before the
revelation of the Trinity, to propose this analogy in
such a way that it would have led him to certitude about
the existence of the Trinity.
2. But after the Trinity was revealed he would have
been able to propose the analogy as probable. Indeed, it
is more than probable that the analogy was not discovered
by St. Augustine, but that it is to some extent
revealed in the prologue of St. John's Gospel.
Explanation. In his reply to the second difficulty,
St. Thomas says concerning the arguments of fitness
given by St. Augustine and Richard of St. Victor:
"Once the Trinity has been established, these arguments
show its congruity but not in such a way that they would be
able to prove the Trinity of persons... . So, in
astronomy, in order to explain the movement of the
planets, a system of eccentrics and epicycles is adopted
in order to explain the sensible appearances of heavenly
movements, but these theories are not sufficient to prove
anything, because these appearances could be proved by
some other theory."
St. Thomas adds that this is clear in these individual
instances.
1. With regard to the divine goodness being diffusive of
itself. It is proposed as an argument of fitness that
good is essentially diffusive of itself and the higher the
good the more intimately and abundantly is it diffusive.
Hence it is congruous that God the Father should beget
the Son and with Him spirate the Holy Ghost in the
unity of nature. But this is only an argument of
congruity, for, as the Angelic Doctor says: "It is
not necessary, if God is to communicate Himself in His
infinite goodness, that some infinite being should proceed
from God, but that some being should receive the divine
goodness according to its own mode of being." Thus it
was that God created from nothing finite beings because of
His infinite goodness. By this argument it cannot be
demonstrated that God is infinitely fecund within Himself
by that certain diffusion of goodness which exceeds the
order of efficient and final causality and takes place by
the communication of the divine nature itself to two
uncreated persons.
2. Richard of St. Victor declared that there can be
no joyous possession of any good without friendship or
association, and from this argument of fitness he showed
that there should be in God some association between
distinct persons. This argument is not demonstrative
because the alleged principle applies when perfect goodness
is not found in one person and therefore this person
requires the good of another person associated with itself
in order to enjoy goodness fully. But God is essentially
goodness itself and He possesses it fully and thus He
differs entirely from a created person who needs the
association of friends. If there is any association in
God, it exists not because of a need but because of
superabundance. Thus this argument is only an argument of
congruity and not demonstrative.
3. Nor from the fact that our intellect enunciates a
mental word does it follow necessarily that the Word is in
God. Intellect is not found in God and in us
univocally, and we have seen above that God, who is
subsisting intelligence itself, does not need an
accidental word for intellection.[357] Hence, if
the Word is in God, it is not accidental but
substantial; moreover the Word is not because of need but
because of superabundance, and this can be known only by
revelation.
Hence, according to St. Thomas, reason of itself
alone did not discover these congruities, but after
revelation it could propose such arguments. This mystery
is properly speaking essentially supernatural,
transcending the spheres of demonstration and
demonstrability. In this essentially supernatural order
we cannot penetrate farther than to those things that are
formally or virtually revealed; beyond that we are in the
realm of probability.
Fourth doubt. Whether, after revelation, these
arguments of congruity can explain with some probability
the divine processions as they are in themselves, or are
they only convenient and useful representations without any
foundation in the divine reality.
Reply. Perhaps many would reply by taking the stand that
many modern critics take with regard to physical science:
that these theories do not intend to explain how things are
in reality, that they are only convenient representations
useful in classifying known phenomena which are subject to
change when other phenomena are discovered, as, for
instance, in the case of radioactivity.
Following St. Thomas, we reply that these arguments of
congruity with respect to the Trinity are not only
convenient representations, but they explain reality with
some probability, or rather they explain what is not in
God. Such explanations are the more valid the more they
are based on revelation. Indeed it appears that the
formal mode of the first procession by intellectual
diction, if not formally revealed by the fact that the
Son of God is called the Word, is at least certain as a
virtually revealed theological conclusion. But many of
the other conclusions remain only probable.
Fifth doubt. Whether these arguments of congruity about
the Trinity are simply superior or inferior to the
demonstrations given in the treatise on the one God.
Reply. With regard to us, that is with regard to the
mode and certitude of our knowledge, they are inferior;
but in themselves they are superior with regard to the
dignity of the object, because they are not beneath but
above the sphere of demonstrability, and in the
essentially supernatural order we cannot ascend higher than
those things that are either formally or virtually revealed
except in the sphere of probability.
Hence it is that semirationalists, like Guenther and
Rosmini, who wish to transform these arguments of
congruity into demonstrations really weaken rather than
elevate them. This is clear from Rosmini's condemned
proposition: "By these arguments the truth of the
Trinity is brought within the scope of
philosophy."[358]
Against this view St. Thomas remarks: "It is useful
for the human mind to exercise itself in arguments of this
kind, however weak they may be, as long as there is no
presumption of comprehending or understanding, because it
is a great satisfaction to behold these sublime matters
even if our consideration is slight and weak."[359]
Thus our natural and inefficacious desire of seeing God
in His essence is not a demonstration but it forcefully
insinuates the possibility and congruity of eternal life,
of the beatific vision, of the light of glory, and of
inchoate and consummated grace. This possibility cannot
be demonstrated because it is the possibility of something
that is essentially supernatural, of a mystery in the
strict sense, which transcends reason and
demonstrability.[360]
These arguments of congruity are related to evidence and
certitude in the same way that a polygon is related to the
circumference of a circle. The sides of the polygon can
be multiplied to infinity, but the polygon will never be
identified with the circumference because it will never be
as small as a point. In geometry we say that the polygon
will be the circumference at the limit of multiplication,
but multiplication is indefinite. Great theologians and
the angels, by their natural cognition, can penetrate
deeper and deeper into the arguments of congruity about the
Trinity and never attain to evidence, because the
evidence which-is beyond the limit of this progressive
penetration is not the natural evidence of demonstration
but the supernatural evidence of the beatific vision.
These arguments are like the element of cogitation in
faith, if we define the act of faith as, "No believe is
to think with assent."[361] Such thinking in this
life never reaches evidence; only in heaven, where faith
ceases because it cannot exist alongside vision.[362]
Recapitulation of the solution of the principal objections
against the Trinity.[363]
According to the rationalists the dogma of the Trinity is
a violation of the principles of contradiction and
causality.
The first objection often proposed by the rationalists is
the following. Those things which are the same as a third
are identical. This is a form of the principle of
contradiction or identity and is called the principle of
comparative identity, on which the validity of the
demonstrative syllogism is based. But the three persons
are identified with the divine essence (since each one is
God). Therefore the three persons cannot be really
distinct from one another.
Reply. I distinguish the major: those things which are
the same as a third in fact and in reason are identical,
I concede; which are the same as a third in fact but not
in reason, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: but
the three persons are the same as the divine essence in
fact and in reason, I deny; the three persons are the
same in fact but not in reason, I concede. I deny the
consequent and the consequence.
I insist. Those things which are the same as a third in
fact but not in reason are then identical in fact but not
in reason. Thus the persons are distinct from each other
only in reason but not in reality.
Reply. I distinguish the major: those things which are
the same as a third in fact but not in reason are identical
in fact but not in reason if they are no more opposed to
each other than to the same third, I concede;
otherwise, I deny. They are indeed opposed to each
other by relative opposition. Just as the three angles of
the triangle, although they have the same triangular
surface, with which they are identified, nevertheless are
really distinguished from each other because between them
there is opposition of relation.
I insist. But it seems to be repugnant that the same
thing (the essence) should in reality be identical with
relations that are distinct from each other and opposed to
each other.
Reply. An evident contradiction would exist if the
extremes which are opposed to each other were absolutes,
because each of the extremes would in itself imply an
absolute reality which would be lacking in its opposite.
But the contradiction does not appear when the extremes,
as in God, are relative. We have seen that the divine
persons are constituted by subsisting relations that are
opposed to one another; but these relations have one
"esse in" and are opposed only with regard to
their real "esse ad".
This reply is based on the application of that principle,
admitted by the Greeks and the Latins, which illuminates
this entire tract, namely, in God all things are one and
the same except where there is opposition of
relation.[364] Indeed those things that are the same
as a third are identical if they are no more opposed to
each other than to the third, I concede; otherwise, I
deny. I contradistinguish the minor, as follows: but
the three persons are the same as the essence and besides
this they are opposed to each other by the opposition of
relation, this I concede; otherwise, I deny.
Therefore I deny the consequent and the consequence.
As in the natural order, "While transitive action is
the same as motion and the reception of motion (passio),
it does not follow that motion and its reception (actio
and passio) are the same, " because they are mutually
opposed by the opposition of relation, for transitive
action, at least terminatively taken, is motion as from
the mover, whereas passio (the reception of motion) is
motion as in the one moved. In the words of St.
Thomas," assio and actio imply opposite references."
Similarly, paternity and filiation, although they are in
reality the same as the divine essence, "My their proper
natures imply opposite references."[365]
A second objection frequently made is the following. The
dogma of the Trinity is a violation of the principle of
efficient causality, according to which nothing produces
its own being. But in this dogma the person who
produces, the Father, and the person produced, the
Son, have the same divine essence. Otherwise the Son
would not be God.
To put it more briefly: Nothing produces its own being.
But the Father in begetting the Son would be producing
His own being since it is the same as that of the Son.
Therefore the Father cannot beget the Son. This
objection is made by many rationalists, by the Unitarians
and the Socinians.
Reply. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor:
if the divine being were caused in the Son, I concede;
if it is communicated to the Son, I deny. The
conclusion is distinguished in the same way. Thus
begetting in God is not a change from non-being to
being, but implies the origin of one living being from a
living principle conjoined to it. This principle is not a
cause.[366] Aristotle pointed out that a principle
is more general than a cause.[367] Thus the point is
the principle of the line, but not its cause; the aurora
is the principle of the day, but not its cause. So in
God the principle does not signify priority, but origin,
and the Father does not produce His own being; He
communicates it only.
The term "communicate" transcends efficient and final
causality. Thus in God to beget is not more perfect than
to be begotten because in God begetting is not causing.
That which is caused does not exist before in act,
whereas that which is communicated exists before in act.
For example, the first angle of the triangle communicates
its surface, already existing in act, to the other two
angles.
The third objection (by way of insistence) states that
this dogma distorts the notion of person. For personality
renders a nature incommunicable to another suppositum.
But the nature which is in the person of the Father is
communicated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
Therefore this dogma distorts the very idea of
personality.
Reply. I distinguish the major: absolute personality
renders the nature incommunicable, I concede; relative
personality renders the divine nature incommunicable, I
subdistinguish: nature in itself, I deny; nature as
personified, I concede. I contradistinguish the minor:
the nature which is in the Father is communicated as
nature in itself, I concede; as personified, namely,
the divine nature in the mode of the Father, I deny.
Thus there cannot be two Fathers or two Sons in the
Trinity. Similarly in an equilateral triangle the first
angle constructed renders the area of the triangle
incommunicable inasmuch as it belongs to that first angle;
nevertheless this same area remains communicable and is
communicated to the other two angles.
I insist. But the person renders incommunicable a nature
that is numerically the same even considered in itself.
But this would not be true in God. Therefore.
Reply. A person absolutely renders a finite nature
incommunicable which, since it is finite, is filled by
the one personality. On the other hand, a relative
personality, for example, the person of the Father,
does not render an infinite nature incommunicable to other
persons. The divine nature, being infinite and
infinitely fecund, is not adequately filled by one
relative personality; or, I say please prove the
contrary. Personality in God differs from human
personality inasmuch as it is not something absolute but
something relative, and it is of the nature of relative
things that they have a correlative. The Father cannot
be without the Son, to whom He communicates His
nature, not by causality but by the principle of
origin.[368]
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