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State of the question. The question is proposed in the
form of three difficulties. 1. It appears that there
are no processions in God because a procession implies
motion without; but in God there is no motion, since He
is the prime immovable mover and pure act. 2. He who
proceeds differs from Him from whom He proceeds, but in
God there can be no such difference. 3. To proceed
from another is to depend upon another, but this is
repugnant to the idea of a first principle. If the Son
depends upon the Father, He is not God. Such are the
principal difficulties.[156]
Reply. In God the processions are not by local motion,
nor by transitive action, but by the intellectual
emanation of an intelligible word from Him who
enunciates. At the end of the body of the article, St.
Thomas says, "And thus Catholic faith holds that there
is a procession in God." From this last line it is
evident that we are concerned here with an explanation of
faith and not with a deduction of a theological
conclusion.
Proof. It is clear from the Scriptures that it is of
faith that there are processions in God. In his argument
St. Thomas quotes the words of our Lord," or from
God I proceeded" (John 8:42). In the
"Contra Gentes" St. Thomas quotes other
texts: Jesus said, "The Spirit of truth, who
proceedeth from the Father" (John 15:26).
Besides this, in the Scriptures the Son of God is
called "His own Son, " that is, of God the Father
(Rom. 8:32), and "the only-begotten Son who is
in the bosom of the Father" (John 1:18). It is
the Son who is truly "His own" who proceeds from the
Father and not the son who is only adopted. Again we
read, "The Father loveth the Son: and He hath given
all things into His hands" (John 3:35), and the
only-begotten Son of the Father is called "the Word,
" by whom "all things were made,... and without Him
was made nothing that was made" (John 1:3; Heb.
1:1). From this it is clear that the Son proceeds
from the Father from all eternity.
This truth is explicitly contained in the creeds. In the
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed we read: "Begotten
of the Father, God of God, light of light, true God
of true God"; and of the Holy Ghost: "who proceeds
from the Father." In the Athanasian Creed: "The
Son is from the Father alone, not made, not created,
but begotten; the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the
Son, not made, not created, not begotten, but
proceeding."
Procession ("ekporeusis, probole") is the
origin of one from another, as light proceeds from the sun
and a son from his father.
St. Athanasius[157] and St. Augustine[158]
explained that the imperfections inherent in human
generation are not found in the divine processions. In
the divine processions, for example, there is no
diversity of nature (the nature remains numerically the
same) but only a diversity of persons according to the
opposition of relation.
In the body of the article, St. Thomas intended only
to explain this truth of faith by a conceptual analysis of
the word "procession, " discarding at the same time any
false interpretations. His process, therefore, is not
illative but explicative. This is clear from the first
words of the paragraph, in which he explains the idea of
procession, as used by the Scriptures, and from the
following article, in which St. Thomas explains the
idea of generation.
The body of the article has three parts.
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1. Against Arius, it is shown that in God there is no
procession of effect from cause, otherwise it would
follow, against the Scriptures, that neither the Son
nor the Holy Ghost would be God. The Scriptures
declare of the Son," his is the true God, " (I
John 5:20), and the same is said of the Holy Ghost
in I Cor. 6:19.
2. Against Sabellius, it is shown that in God
procession is not understood as though there were different
effects flowing from one and the same person of the
Father: as though the Father were called the Son as
incarnate and the Holy Ghost in the sanctification of
souls. This would be contrary to the Scriptures which
make it clear that the Son is not the Father, for
example, "The Son cannot do anything of Himself"
(John 5:19). Furthermore, no one begets himself.
3. St. Thomas explains the root of these two errors:
these heretics erred because they understood procession as
being "ad extra". He then explains that in God
procession is ad intra. As often occurs in the body of
the article, the major is given after the minor. If the
major were given before the minor, this explicative
process would be somewhat as follows:
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Since God is above all things, those things which are
predicated of God are to be understood in their
resemblance to intellectual and not corporeal substances.
But in corporeal substances procession is in the manner of
action "ad extra", whereas in intellectual
substances it is after the manner of action ad intra, as
the concept of a thing or the mental word proceeds from the
intellect. Therefore the procession predicated of God is
procession ad intra, like that of the intelligible word in
him who enunciates. "And in this manner Catholic faith
understands procession in God" as opposed to Arius and
Sabellius.
This process therefore only explains the true idea of
procession in God as it is found in the Scriptures,
excluding any false interpretations and giving the analogy
of the word which is indicated in the prologue of St.
John's Gospel and explained at great length by St.
Augustine.[159]
We should note that many commentators, such as
Billuart, prove from Question 33, article 4 ad 4,
that there are processions in God from the fact that it is
of faith that there are several really distinct persons in
God. Such was also the method of the Greek Fathers.
The article should be read.
1. The doctrine is confirmed by the divine fecundity
which, since it IS a perfection without imperfection,
cannot be denied to God. ("Shall not I that make
others to bring forth children, Myself bring forth,
saith the Lord? Shall I, that give generation to
others, be barren, saith the Lord thy God?" Isa.
66:9.)
2. The reply is also confirmed by the solution of the
objections.
Reply to first objection. Procession would imply motion
in God if it were after the manner of transitive action,
but not if it is immanent action, which is in the
predicament of quality and not of action.
Reply to second objection. Similarly there would be
numerical diversity if the procession were "ad
extra", as when by human generation the son proceeds
from the father with consequent multiplication of human
nature. But such is not the case with procession "ad
intra". As St. Thomas explains: "That which
proceeds "ad intra" by an intelligible process
need not be diverse; indeed the more perfect the
procession the more that which proceeds will be one with
that from which it proceeds. It is clear that the more
profoundly a thing is understood the more intimate the
intellectual concept will be to him who understands and so
much greater will also be the union of both. For the
intellect inasmuch as it understands in act will be united
with what it understands. Therefore, since the divine
intellection is the acme of perfection, as we said above
in Question 14, a. 2, it follows necessarily that
the divine Word is perfectly united with Him from whom
He proceeds, without any diversity, " that is, without
any numerical diversity so that there is only a distinction
of persons.[160]
This teaching is developed in the second chapter of the
fourth book of the "Contra Gentes", in which
St. Thomas illustrates this principle: The higher any
particular nature is the more anything that emanates from
it will be intimate with it. Thus St. Thomas preserves
under another form Dionysius' principle, so frequently
enunciated by Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure:
"Good is essentially diffusive of itself, and the higher
the nature is the more fully and intimately it will be
so." Good, however, is primarily predicated of a final
cause; but the Father is not properly the end or the
efficient cause of the Son. Therefore St. Thomas'
formula is more acceptable because it rises above both
final and efficient causality, although the formula about
the diffusion of good could be understood as referring to
things above the order of causality.[161] This
principle, however, is arrived at inductively.
Thus fire is generated from fire, a plant by another
plant, an animal from another animal in the manner of
action "ad extra" and the numerical
multiplication of nature. But in the higher spheres,
life is more and more immanent, for sensation remains in
the subject, intellection in the one who understands, as
does also the mental word. Human intellection, however,
has its beginning from without, that is, from sensible
things. In a still higher sphere, "The intellection of
the angels does not proceed from something exterior, but
knows itself through itself. But the life of the angels
does not attain to the ultimate perfection for, whereas
the angelic intellection is entirely intrinsic to the
subject, the intellectual concept or intention is not
identical with the subject's substance because
intellection and being are not the same." In order to
know himself, the angel requires an accidental mental word
because the angel's substance is intelligible of itself in
act although it is not actually understood of itself in
act. And further, the substance of the angel as it is
understood in act and represented in the accidental word is
not the angel's substance according to its physical being
but only according to the angel's intentional or
representative being. The mental word of Michael is not
Michael himself because it is an accident and not his
substance.
On the other hand, as we read in this chapter of the
"Contra Gentes", "Since in God being and
intellection are the same," He does not require an
accidental word to know Himself. But if from the divine
superabundance there is a Word, as we learn from
revelation alone, then "the being of the Word,
interiorly conceived, is the same as the divine
intellection," God's being itself, not only according
to His intellectual being but according to His physical
being. Thus the divine Word is not only God as
understood, but "true God," as we-learn from the
Creed: "true God of true God." Contrariwise the
accidental word by which Michael the archangel knows
himself is indeed Michael according to his intellectual
being but not the actual Michael according to his physical
being, because it is an accident and not a
substance[162]
Intellectual generation, therefore, when it is most
perfect produces not only an accidental mental word but
also a substantial word, and it is therefore true
generation, because it communicates the entire nature of
the generator, as we shall see in article 2.
Our mental word can be called the offspring of our minds
only metaphorically. Such is the solution of the second
objection: in God He who proceeds is not different in
nature from Him from whom He proceeds, but has a nature
numerically the same.
Reply to third objection. The third objection was that
to proceed from another was repugnant to God as the first
principle. In reply we distinguish "proceed" as above,
namely, to proceed as something extraneous and diverse,
I concede; to proceed as something within and without
numerical diversity of nature, I deny. Thus the Son of
God is God of God, light of light; He is in some
manner like the word in the mind of the artificer with
relation to some external artifact.
First doubt. Is it not at least virtually revealed and
theologically certain that in God procession is after the
manner of an intelligible concept uttered by an
enunciator, and that the procession is intellectual?
We are not asking whether the Son of God is rightly
called the Word of God, for we know from the Prologue
of St. John's Gospel, written under divine and
infallible inspiration, that it is of faith that the Son
of God is the Word, and that the Word is consubstantial
with the Father, as was explicitly defined by the Nicene
Council. But we are asking whether these words of the
Prologue formally reveal, or at least virtually reveal,
the formal manner of the first procession, that is, by
intellectual enunciation.
Durandus did not admit this but contended that the Son
proceeded from the Father's nature as pre-understood,
antecedent to any consideration of intellect and will.
The reply is in the affirmative. It is at least
virtually revealed and theologically certain that the
Word, or the Son, proceeds from the Father by
intellectual generation, from the intellect of the
Father. Indeed many recent theologians hold that this
proposition is proximately definable.[163] D'Ales
gives this proposition as proximately of faith: "The
Son proceeds from the Father according to intellectual
generation," and he gives the following proposition as
common doctrine: "The Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father and the Son according to mutual love." And this
seems to be true.
Proof. In the Scriptures, He who is called the Word
is also called the Son. But this is not a question of a
word enunciated exteriorly but of an immanent word, as is
clear from the context. An immanent word, however, is
conceived by the intellect, it is the concept expressed by
the intellect, as the Fathers taught.[164]
This doctrine is confirmed by the fact that in the
Scriptures the Son of God is called not only the Word,
but Wisdom, the image of the Father, and the splendor
of His glory and the figure of His substance.[165]
In the reply it was stated that this doctrine is
theologically certain because it is at least virtually
revealed, but it is more probable that it is implied in a
formal revelation, for the required process is explicative
rather than discursive when we have a clear understanding
of the idea of a mental word. This will become clearer
below.
Second doubt. In the body of the article, does St.
Thomas intend to say that a word is produced in every
intellection?
The reply is in the negative, for manifestly St.
Thomas holds that the Son and the Holy Ghost understand
and still do not produce a word. The three divine persons
understand by the same numerically one essential
intellect, but only the Father enunciates, just as in a
classroom both the teacher and the pupils understand but
only the teacher enunciates. Moreover, St. Thomas
holds that in heaven the blessed, seeing God
immediately, do not express an accidental word, which
would be intelligible by participation and would not be
able to represent God as He is in Himself since He is
essentially subsisting intelligence itself.[166]
St. Thomas did not intend to exclude these instances
when in the body of the article he states: "Whenever
anyone understands, by the very fact that he understands
he produces something within himself, which is the concept
of the thing which is understood." But such is the case
in every created intelligence of the natural order, as
when a man or an angel understands himself and other things
besides himself. We still have sufficient analogy here to
conceive what the divine Word is as mentioned in the
prologue of St. John's Gospel. It is still true to
say, therefore, that whoever understands, by the fact
that he is an intellectual nature, produces a word in some
intellectual act. The analogy offered by St. Thomas is
based on the fact that it is a property of an intellectual
nature to produce a word. Further, it is a perfection
that can be purged of imperfections and can be attributed
to God as the highest intelligence.
Objection. In the created intellect a word is required
to know an object which is not understood of itself in
act. But God is subsisting intelligence itself and
therefore He is not only intelligible of Himself in act,
but actually understood in act. Therefore no word is
required in God.
Reply. I distinguish the major: that an accidental word
because of a natural indigence is so required, I
concede; that a substantial word is required, I deny.
I concede the minor and distinguish the conclusion:
therefore in God an accidental word because of a natural
indigence is not required, I concede; that a substantial
Word because of the divine fecundity is not required, I
deny.
I insist. Now the analogy between an accidental word
produced because of a natural indigence and the substantial
word produced from divine fecundity or superabundance is
destroyed.
Reply. . Although the comparison is not univocal, the
analogy remains for in creatures the accidental word is not
required only because of a natural indigence (inasmuch as
the thinking subject is not of itself understood in actu
secundo) but because it pertains to the fecundity and
perfection of the created intellect to speak vitally and
interiorly by expressing a concept. Thus the philosopher
rejoices when after a long and difficult search he finally
gives birth to the word that solves his difficulty; now he
can die for he has found the truth.
I insist. But why do not the Son and the Holy Ghost
produce a word by their intellection?
Reply. This is part of the mystery and cannot be
explained entirely. But we can say and should say, as do
the Thomists, one intellection will have one word when
that word is adequate. But in God intellection is
infinite, and also the same for the three divine persons.
Therefore in God there is one, infinite, and adequate
word and no other word need be produced. The three
persons understand but only the Father enunciates because
He enunciates adequately, or because the Word already
enunciated is perfect and without any imperfection.
Nothing more need be enunciated in God nor would anything
more be needed in the case of men if the teacher would be
able adequately to say all that pertained to the matter
under discussion. At first sight this distinction between
intellection and enunciation may seem too subtle, but it
is not without some foundation. Many men, even after
years of laborious study, cannot express interiorly and
exteriorly the solution of some difficult problem; but
when some great genius discovers the solution and gives
birth to the word or notion interiorly and expresses it
exteriorly others are able often to understand without
difficulty. They may not be able to enunciate the
solution but they are able to understand without much
difficulty. Indeed, if some great mind were to discover
the perfect and adequate solution of a question, he would
express it in a definitive statement that would need no
further emendation or amplification, whereas we are
continually obliged to perfect our imperfect and inadequate
statements of solutions.
Finally, it is often remarked that loquacious people use
innumerable words without reason, whereas wise people,
especially in their later years, use few words, words
that are effective and almost adequate, like the confident
and clear statements of the saints and great doctors,
which others are generally able to understand although they
would never have been able to discover them. In this way
we can understand analogically and without too much
subtlety that in the Trinity the three persons
understand, but the Father alone enunciates because the
Word is adequate. We, on the other hand, make use of
many inadequate words.
Objection. In his reply to the second objection, St.
Thomas says: "The divine Word is perfectly one with
Him from whom He proceeds and without any diversity";
and in the "Contra Gentes"[167] he says:
"The being of the Word is the intellect of God
itself." But then the Word would not proceed as a
distinct person. Therefore the analogy is not valid.
Reply. I deny the minor and the consequent. St.
Thomas denies numerical diversity of nature between the
Father and the Word, but the diversity of persons as
revealed still remains. This diversity is only relative
and inasmuch as it is real arises from the procession, for
procession, inasmuch as it is real, requires extremes
that are really distinct, at least with regard to their
mode of being. Such is the reasoning of many Thomists,
among them Billuart. Thus the word in our minds is
diverse from our intellect both knowing and known, not
indeed according to intelligible and intentional being but
according to real and entitative being, for the word in us
is an accident of our intellects.
I insist. If the Word is a distinct person as a
person, if not as a nature, He still depends on the
Father. But God cannot depend on another; this is an
obvious imperfection. Therefore the Word is not a divine
person or God.
Reply. I distinguish the major: He would depend on the
Father if He proceeded as from a cause and freely, I
concede; if He proceeds from the Father solely as from a
principle because of the necessary and infinite fecundity
of the divine nature, I deny. Thus, the Father in
His intellection is not able not to produce the Word.
We have here a communication of nature without efficient
causality; this communication is the transmission of
something pre-existent without losing it. In the
equilateral triangle the first angle constructed does not
cause but communicates its own surface area to the other
two equal angles, and these two angles are not less
perfect than the first. Indeed, the geometrical figure
can be inverted so that one of the two angles at the base
is placed on top.
I insist. But the necessary and intimate dependence
still remains.
Reply. I deny the consequent, because for true
dependence it is required that only one of the two in
question depend upon the other. But the Father cannot be
more without the Son than the Son is without the
Father, and yet the Father is not said to depend on the
Son. Thus in the equilateral triangle all the angles are
equal, and one angle cannot exist without the other.
On the other hand, a human son depends on his father, as
from a cause; and the man who is a father is able to be
without the son, because he is able not to be a father,
since he freely begets. But God the Father is not able
to be without being the Father and He is not able to be
without the Son.
Wherefore, in order that anything depend on another it is
not enough that it cannot be without the other. God the
Father is not able to be without the Son and yet He does
not depend on the Son, nor is omnipotence able to exist
without the possibility of creatures and still it does not
depend on this possibility. It follows therefore that,
although the Son cannot be without the Father, He does
not depend on the Father, since the Father is not the
cause but only the principle of origin. It is repugnant
to God to derive from another as from a cause, this I
concede; that it is repugnant to derive as from a
principle of origin, this I ask you to disprove. The
possibility of the mystery, therefore, is not disproved
or proved; it is merely presented as plausible.
I insist. But the Son receives from the Father,
therefore He is passive and in some need.
Reply. I distinguish the consequent: if at any time the
Son lacked or could lack anything He has, I concede;
otherwise, I deny. Whereas a creature is able not to
be, the Son of God is not able not to be, nor is He
able to lack the divine perfections.
I insist. Each of the divine persons is the first
principle; therefore each excludes the principle of
origin.
Reply. I distinguish the antecedent: each of the divine
persons is the first principle "ad extra", I
concede; ad intra, I deny. Thus the Father alone is
not from a principle of origin. As St. Thomas says,
"To oppose the things that are said against faith,
either by showing that it is false or by showing that it is
not necessary," it is sufficient to show that the
impossibility of the mystery is not definitively proved,
for example, the dependence of the Word of God with
respect to the Father is not definitively proved. At
least these objections are not cogent and therefore they do
not destroy faith. The impossibility of the procession of
the Word, who is "true God of true God," cannot be
proved.
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