|
According to St. Thomas the devil sinned because of
lack of consideration of a higher rule. But the devil can
now give that consideration especially since he has learned
through his misery. Therefore the devil can change his
judgment.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the devil sinned from
lack of consideration that was voluntary, I concede; he
sinned from a lack of consideration arising out of
ignorance, I deny.
The devil was not ignorant that in thus proudly refusing
supernatural happiness he would bring on himself
damnation. He was certainly more certain than we
theologians that turning away from his final supernatural
end was for him an unforgivable mortal sin which implied
indirectly an aversion from his final natural end.
I insist. But it seems incredible that any intelligence
would refuse supernatural happiness, especially when such
refusal brought with it future damnation.
Reply. Nevertheless this is a characteristic of
unbounded pride: to cling to one's own individual good
and pride one's self on it rather than accept supernatural
happiness from the goodness of another and to possess that
happiness in common with men. The devil closed the eyes
of his mind to the light of grace and haughtily refused to
follow that light. Doellinger wished to defend the
Church, but he wished to defend it in his own way and not
under the direction of the Supreme Pontiff.
I insist. But the devil foresaw his damnation only
speculatively; now he knows damnation experimentally and
therefore because of this new experience he can change his
judgment.
Reply. If the devil now practically understands his
crime of pride as a moral evil that must be rejected, I
concede; if he only speculatively understands this pride
as an evil, I deny.
In order that the devil could practically understand his
crime of pride as an evil that should be rejected he should
also incline to humility, to obedience, and to prayer for
mercy. But the devil's pride "ascends continually,"
not intensively, but by always producing new effects.
The damned do not ask for pardon. For them there could
be but one way to retract their judgment, namely, the way
of humility and obedience, and they do not will to follow
this way.
We find a similar state of mind in some of the apostates,
in Lamennais and Loisy. They strove for an object that
was apparently the object of magnanimity; they strove for
excellence but they strove for it in the spirit of pride.
Magnanimity is the well-ordered love of excellence;
pride is the inordinate love of one's own excellence
without subjection to God.
Objection. According to St. Thomas some remorse of
conscience remains in the damned because of synteresis,
and therefore it seems that they are able to change their
judgment.
Reply. Such remorse of conscience does remain because of
synteresis, but it is without the least attrition or
hope, indeed it is the remorse of desperation, without
the least veleity of true repentance.[1230]
For the damned, sin is a bitter thing but not because of
any repentance. Although they still have synteresis and
remorse of conscience, they do not have infused faith,
hope, prudence, or fear of sin; their minds are
overwhelmed by pride, of which it is said that it
"ascendeth continually." The damned do not repent of
their evil deeds because of the guilt; they rue their
deeds only because of the punishment. More than this,
they wish all others to be damned, because they are filled
with unbounded hatred for all good things, and they are
grieved by every good, by every deed done according to
God's will, and especially by the happiness of the
blessed.
I insist. But the damned still have a desire for
happiness, at least for natural happiness, which they do
not possess, because they are turned away not only from
their final supernatural end but also from their natural
end. Therefore because of this desire for happiness they
are able to change their judgment.
Reply. In order to change their judgment practically
they would have to follow the way of humility and
obedience, but because of their unremitting pride they do
not will to follow this road. They are therefore
confirmed in evil. In the damned the desire for the
happiness they have lost is filled with envy; indeed this
is part of damnation. The damned persevere in the hatred
of God, for although the devil naturally loves God as
the author of his nature in its physical aspect, he hates
God as the author of the law that commands obedience, he
hates God as the judge, as the author of grace, because
under these three aspects God commands something that
displeases the devil.
Practically then the devil does not apprehend his crime of
pride as a moral evil that must be rejected; only
speculatively does he apprehend it as evil. At the same
time pride rules him completely and in this pride the devil
loves himself above all things with the bitterness of
desperation and hatred of God.[1231]
How is man's obstinacy explained? Can we say with
Cajetan that man is made immovable in good or evil by a
meritorious or demeritorious act elicited in the first
moment of non-being ("in primo non esse
viae"), that is, in the first instant of the
separation of the soul from the body? Some Thomists
reject this idea, since it would not be man but a
separated soul that would be meriting. Our Lord said,
"The night cometh, when no man can work."[1232]
In the final chapters of "Contra Gentes" St.
Thomas explains that after the separation from the body
the soul is no longer on the road to salvation (in via),
since the body is for the perfection of the soul that the
soul may reach its end, and the separated soul therefore
is no longer on the road to its perfection, and that final
merit or demerit is rendered definitive by the soul's
separation from the body.[1233]
|
|