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State of the question. Why cannot the highest angel
create a grain of sand? Avicenna said that God created
the first separated substance, and this substance created
the soul of the world. In the difficulties presented at
the beginning of the article, St. Thomas says: 1.
It seems that one angel can produce another just as man
produces a man. But the angel cannot be produced except
by creation. 2. A creature can make something from its
contrary, for example, hot from cold. A fortiori
therefore the creature can make something out of nothing
because there is more resistance from the contrary than
from nothing. 3. Since created being is finite, no
infinite power is required for its production. Peter
Lombard affirmed that a creature can create
instrumentally.[821]
Reply. Creation belongs to God alone to such an extent
that no creature can create, whether by its own power or
instrumentally.
Proof from authority. It is a dogma of faith that
"de facto" God alone created the universe. We
read in the Scriptures, "He that created all things is
God."[822] The same teaching is found in the
Apostles' Creed and in the Council of the Lateran
under Innocent IV.[823]
The Fathers wrote in the same sense. Here St.
Augustine is quoted as saying, "Neither the good angels
or the bad angels can be the creators of any
thing."[824]
Proof from reason. First we prove the first part of the
conclusion: no creature can create by its own power.
Being taken absolutely, not as this specific being, is
an effect proper to God. But to create is to produce
being absolutely, not as this specific being.[825]
Therefore to create is an act proper to God, that is,
no creature can create by its own power.
Proof of the major. The more universal effects are to be
reduced to the more universal and primary causes as
belonging to them. But absolute being is the most
universal effect. Therefore absolute being is the proper
effect of the most universal cause, which is God.
St. Thomas confirms this teaching by the authority of
Proclus, the author of the book De causis. He offers a
benign explanation of Proclus' text. Proclus, himself
a Neoplatonist, seems to be talking about the second
"hypostasis" which Plotinus posited
beneath the One Good, namely, the intelligence in which
duality of subject and object appears (the intelligence
and the intelligible thing), as if the One were above
being and intelligibility and intelligence.
What is the sense of the second major? Cajetan said the
sense is that the more universal effects (in predication)
are to be reduced to the more universal causes (according
to perfection in being and causing), that is, these
effects depend on such causes "per se",
necessarily and immediately. This principle is mentioned
by Aristotle,[826] at least in the order to the
universal cause. For example, Polycletus is the proper
cause of this statue, and the sculptor is the proper cause
of the statue as such a statue. Aristotle also applies
this principle to the most universal extrinsic causes and
says that pure act attracts all things to
itself.[827] St. Thomas applies this principle
explicitly to the first most universal efficient cause.
Hence he was able to state against Averroes that the
dogma of creation is not contrary to the mind of
Aristotle, that is, not contrary to his principles, and
that it is virtually contained in them. Therefore being
as being, or a being inasmuch as it is a being, is the
proper effect of God, as passive illumination is the
proper effect of light and heat is the proper effect of
fire. God produces being as light produces illumination,
as fire produces heat, except that God does this most
freely.
Scotus admitted the conclusion of the article but he
attacked the method of the proof. His objection is as
follows: God's proper effect is from Him alone. But
the being of a cow that is generated is not from God alone
but also from the generating cow. Therefore the being of
the cow that is generated, as being, is not the proper
effect of God.
Reply. With Cajetan I distinguish the major: God's
proper effect is from Him alone as from the proper cause,
from which the effect depends primarily and "per
se", I concede; as from a unique cause, that is,
the only cause, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor:
the being of the cow generated is not from God alone as
the unique cause, I concede; as from a proper cause, I
deny.
Scotus' insistence is as follows: What is in imperfect
effects can be from an imperfect cause. But the most
universal effect (being) is in imperfect effects.
Therefore this most universal effect can come from an
imperfect cause.
Reply. (According to Cajetan.) I distinguish the
major: from an imperfect cause "per accidens"
which produces by reason of another, I concede; from a
proper cause from which the effect depends primarily and
"per se", or necessarily or immediately, I
deny. I concede the minor and distinguish the
conclusion: this effect is from an imperfect cause as from
a cause "per accidens", I concede; as from the
proper cause, I deny.
Manifestly this cow generating this cow is the proper
cause of this particular cow, not as the proper cause of
the bovinity, or of the cow as cow, nor is it the proper
cause of this cow as being. If bovinity and entity
depended necessarily and immediately on this cow, it would
be its own cause and the reason for its own being. The
owner of this cow would then be the possessor of the whole
bovine race on earth. Hence St. Thomas says: "It is
manifest that where there are two of the same species, one
cannot per se be the cause of the form of the other
inasmuch as it is such a specific form (for example, the
bovine form), because then it would be the cause of its
own form since both have the same nature. But one
individual can be the cause of this form as it is in
matter, that is, inasmuch as matter acquires this form.
This is being a cause according to becoming and not the
proper cause of the very being of the thing that is
produced."[828]
Scotus' final objection. If God is the proper cause of
being as such, creation is mixed in every operation of
nature. But St. Thomas says the opposite. Therefore
God is not the proper cause of being as such.
Reply. (According to Cajetan.) I distinguish the
major: if God is the proper cause of being by an action
at all times totally new, I concede; otherwise, I
deny. I concede the minor, and distinguish the
conclusion: by an action at all times totally new, I
deny; otherwise, I concede.
Explanation. When in the beginning God created heaven
and earth the action was totally new; now when a cow is
generated, the being as being depends primarily per se on
God but not by an action that is totally new, for this
generation of a cow presupposes the matter preserved by
God and not produced anew.
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The proper cause of the generating cow
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- as being is essential being
- as cow is the divine idea of cow, or bovinity
- as this cow is another generating cow
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Thus the cow when it generates a cow actually and
necessarily depends on universal causes, on the sun,
without which there would be no animal life on earth, and
on God the author of nature, the first being and the
first living being. And there cannot be an infinite
process through causes that are "per se"
subordinate. On the other hand there is no repugnance in
an infinite process through causes that are "per
accidens" subordinate. For example, this cow
generating here and now, in this generative act does not
depend "per se" on its sire, who is perhaps
dead, or on its grandsire. This cow generates here and
now not as the offspring of another but inasmuch as it has
a bovine nature.
But by revelation we hold that creation is not from
eternity and that the world had a beginning. Hence St.
Thomas' argument is valid; it is a most simple argument
based on the relation between a proper effect and a proper
cause. This proper effect is a quasi-property "ad
extra" of this proper cause because it depends
necessarily and immediately on the cause as the property of
the circle depends on the essence of the circle. Examples
of proper causes are: the singer sings, the killer
kills, the doctor cures, light illuminates, fire heats,
God produces and preserves the being of things and is the
efficient cause of their being and He alone
creates.[829]
St. Thomas' first argument is confirmed by the solution
of the objections against the first conclusion of the
article.
First reply. Why cannot an angel make a being like
himself and create another angel? Because the angel, who
is a pure spirit, cannot be produced except by creation,
and if an angel created another angel, he would be the
proper cause of the whole being of the second angel, and
he would also be his own cause, since both have the same
nature of being. Thus if a cow were the cause "per
se" of the whole bovine race, namely, the divine
idea of cow, it would be its own cause.[830]
Second reply. The second objection, which is a
difficult sophism, may be presented in the following
form. More power is required to make something from an
opposite than from nothing. But a created cause makes
something from an opposite. Therefore a created cause can
make something from nothing.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if the thing is made
from an opposite "per se", I concede; if it is
made "per accidens" from an opposite, I deny.
I contradistinguish the minor: "per accidens",
I concede; "per se", I deny. The reason is
that a thing is made "per se" not from an
opposite but from a passive potency; and the opposite
offers resistance inasmuch as it impedes the actuation of
the potency or binds the potency. But it is more
difficult to make something from no potency at all than
from a bound potency.
Third reply. The third objection is that the power of
the maker is judged according to the measure of what is
made. But created being is finite and it can be very
small, as a grain of sand. Therefore for its production
the infinite power of God is not necessary.
Durandus and the nominalists seem to think that this
argument cannot be answered apodictically, and that the
archangel Michael could create, if not the universe, at
least a grain of sand.
St. Thomas replies apodictically: I distinguish the
major: the power of the maker is judged according to the
measure of what is made and by that alone, I deny; and
also by the method of the making, I concede. I concede
the minor and distinguish the conclusion: if we consider
only what is made, I concede; if we consider the method
of the making out of nothing, I deny.
At the end of this third reply, St. Thomas adds a
confirmation of the first argument of the article: "If
so much more power is required in an agent when the potency
is far removed from the act, it is fitting that the power
of the agent who acts with no presupposed potency, as does
a creative agent, should be infinite." For example,
the more arid the earth is the more the farmer must
cultivate, etc.; but if the earth is not only arid but
non-existing, the farmer will need an active infinite
power to produce. When pupils are less intelligent and
less industrious, more effort is required in the
teachers, as is evident in the education of abnormal,
deaf, dumb, or blind children. Great Christian charity
is needed in these cases; but if the subject were
nonexistent infinite active power would be needed.
These observations show vividly that the argument in the
body of the article is apodictical, in spite of what
Durandus says. To understand this it is sufficient to
recall how the effect of creation, namely, the entire
being of a thing, even of a grain of sand, differs from
the effect of any other production, of generation for
example.
To produce the smallest grain of sand from nothing
requires the same infinite power as far as the method of
operation is concerned as to produce the universe and all
the angels. If the highest angel could create a grain of
sand from nothing, he would be able to produce the most
universal effect, namely, being as being, and he would
therefore be able to produce all contingent beings inasmuch
as they are beings, and thus he would be his own cause,
which is repugnant.
Second part of the article: a creature cannot create even
instrumentally.
St. Thomas recalls that Avicenna and Peter Lombard
thought this to be possible. Avicenna explained that the
first separated substance created by God creates another
substance either instrumentally or by its own power (the
text is not clear on this point). This second created
substance is lower than the first. This substance itself
creates a still lower substance somewhat in the manner of
Plotinus' emanatism. Peter Lombard spoke rather of the
possibility of creation through an instrument than of the
fact. Durandus and a few others followed Peter
Lombard.
St. Thomas' conclusion is admitted at least as probable
by almost all later theologians, even by Scotus,
although all do not adopt the same method of proof. In
his commentary on the "Sentences",[831]
St. Thomas held that Lombard's opinion was probable,
but now he rejects it.
It should be noted that the fact of creation by an
instrument with regard to the first production of things
cannot be admitted without danger to the faith, for the
Fourth Lateran Council declared: "God by His
omnipotent power at the beginning of time established from
nothing both the spiritual and the mundane
creature."[832]
The Fathers defended the dogma, "God alone is the
creator of all things," against the Arians, who taught
that God the Father directly created the Son and that
the Son ministerially created other things. St.
Augustine[833] refuted certain Platonists, who said
that God created separate intelligences, which created
the inferior beings. Estius held that it was not of faith
that God now creates souls without an instrument.
Among theologians there is no dispute about the fact but
only about the possibility of creation by an instrument,
and almost all theologians, with St. Thomas, deny the
possibility.
St. Thomas' argument can be reduced to the
following.[834] An instrumental cause does not
participate in the action of the principal agent unless it
operates dispositively toward that effect by something
proper to itself. But no creature can operate
dispositively toward the effect of the Creator because
there is no subject to be disposed. Therefore no creature
can create instrumentally.
St. Thomas proves the major in two ways: by a reduction
to absurdity and by induction.
By a reduction to absurdity as follows: If the
instrument did nothing that was proper to it, it would be
futile to use the instrument, nor would there be any
reason to have particular instruments for particular
actions. I would then be able to write with a lute.
Inductively it is clear that instruments have a proper
effect, for example, a saw cuts wood, and by cutting the
saw disposes toward the effect of the workman, that is,
to make a bench. And this proper effect of the instrument
has a certain priority with regard to the effect of the
principal agent toward which it disposes; it is at least a
priority of dispositive causality.
The minor is proved as follows: Creation is from no
presupposed subject. Hence there is no subject to be
disposed. Moreover, the effect of God creating is the
whole being of a thing, which presupposes no other
effect.
We note that St. Thomas says, "the instrument must
operate dispositively toward the effect of the principal
agent." He does not say that the instrument must effect
the disposition for the effect. Man has certain
instruments which effect the disposition, for instance, a
pen which leaves the ink on the paper. Other
instruments, however, operate only dispositively, as the
trumpet in the transmission of sound by preventing the
dispersion of the sound but not by producing any special
disposition in the ears of the listeners.
Nevertheless in the instrument the instrumental movement
is always an accident and the instrumental action is
formally transitive, proceeding from the instrument as
from a subordinate agent and existing terminatively in a
pre-existing subject. In creation, however, there is
no pre-existing subject to be disposed. Hence creation
can proceed from God alone, whose action "ad
extra" is not an accident but is formally immanent and
only virtually transitive inasmuch as it produces an effect
"ad extra" without any of the imperfections of a
formally transitive action.
Let us consider Suarez' objections to this argument.
Suarez says that St. Thomas' major is true of the
instruments which created agents use, since created agents
need apt instruments, for example, a man cannot write
with a lute or make music with a pen. But God does not
need an apt instrument; He can produce the baptismal
grace not with water but with fire. It is sufficient that
the instrument God uses have obediential potency.
Therefore St. Thomas' major is not certainly verified
in God the Creator.
To this objection the Thomists generally reply as
follows: When God makes use of instruments, for
example, to produce baptismal grace, it is not because
He needs the instrument. But if "de facto"
God uses a physical instrument, St. Thomas' major is
verified, that is, the instrument, to be a true
instrument, operates dispositively toward the effect of
the principal agent. Otherwise the true notion of an
instrument would not be verified and what is called an
instrument would be only a means of transmission, as the
air is a means for transmitting sound, and not an
instrument, as the trumpet which transmits sound.
More briefly we can reply to Suarez' argument as
follows: It is conceded that St. Thomas' major is
true of the instruments which a created agent needs
inasmuch as they are instruments; it is denied that the
major is true only inasmuch as the created agent needs the
instruments. The minor is conceded. With regard to the
conclusion, it is conceded that no creature can create
instrumentally if the major is true by reason of the need
of the principal agent; it is denied if the major is true
by reason of the instrument itself.
Suarez insists. The difficulty remains because St.
Thomas' argument is not proved by the nature of the
instrument itself. For the nature of the instrument it is
not necessary that it effect the disposition in the
subject; it is sufficient if it operate dispositively, as
a trumpet, strengthening the voice, does not produce a
previous disposition in the ears of the hearers, or as the
water of baptism in the soul of the one to be baptized.
But an instrument can operate dispositively without a
preexisting subject.
Reply. I distinguish the major: it is sufficient for
the nature of the instrument that it operate dispositively
by an immanent action, I deny; by a transitive action,
I concede. I contradistinguish the minor: the
instrument can operate dispositively without a subject in
an immanent action, let it pass; by a formally transitive
action, I deny, because this action is an accident that
proceeds from the instrumental agent and it ought to be
terminatively in the patient. This is required for the
nature of a physical instrument in which the instrumental
motion is received as traveling accident, and therefore
the instrument cannot operate except in a pre-existing
subject.
I insist. But the immanent acts of Christ are physical
instruments for producing grace and they produce grace by
an action only virtually transitive.
Reply. These acts are indeed immanent but the
instrumental motion in them is an accident which must be
terminatively in the patient, for example, in the just
man in whom the grace is produced.
It is clear that the supernatural instrumental motion
educed from the obediential potency of that thing which is
an instrument is a kind of "accidens viale", a
transient thing, like the light in the air that is
illuminated in passing. But this motion, if it is an
accident, is not only from the agent but must be
terminatively in the patient or in the preexisting subject
to be disposed. In other words, this instrumental motion
precedes the effect of the principal agent, as becoming
precedes the actual making, and therefore the instrumental
motion requires a pre-existing subject. Therefore there
can be a physical instrument of God to produce
transubstantiation inasmuch as the body of Christ comes
from bread,[835] but there cannot be a physical
instrument in creation.
In another article,[836] the idea of creation is
illustrated by comparison with natural transmutation and
transubstantiation. An instrument can be present in the
production of grace from the obediential potency of the
soul since grace as an accident depends on the soul as its
subject.[837] Considering the method of operation
out of nothing, creation is a greater work than
justification, but considering the effect produced,
justification is a greater work than the creation of heaven
and earth.
Last insistence. Why cannot there be an instrument in
the creation of the soul since matter pre-exists as a
subject?
The Thomists reply that matter does exist, but they deny
that it exists as the subject ex quo. In the daily
creation of souls there is no real terminus "a
quo" and therefore no subject, for the spiritual soul
is not educed from the potency of matter. The terminus
"a quo" is nothing, and the human soul is
produced from no presupposed subject. On the other hand,
in transubstantiation there is a certain real terminus
"a quo" inasmuch as it is true to say that the
body of Christ is produced from bread, that is, by the
conversion of the entire substance of bread (namely, the
matter and form of bread) into the body of Christ. It
is evident, therefore, that there can be no instrument in
creation. Therefore only God can create, and the
creature cannot create even instrumentally.
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