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In the solution of these objections we must keep in mind
the manner in which God moves toward the physical act of
sin.[1115] These points should be carefully noted.
1. We presuppose that there is in God an eternal
positive and effective decree with regard to the entity of
sin, and a permissive decree with regard to the defect of
sin proceeding solely from the deficient cause. Hence
from eternity there was a twofold decree with regard to the
sin of Christ's enemies at some determined hour.
2. The divine motion is previous, since God is the
cause of the act of sin and not only of the sin as being.
The cause always precedes the effect, at least by nature
and causality; the will needs to be moved so that it can
act, because the will is not its own action just as it is
not its own being.
3. This divine motion is predeterminative, but not in
the same way as the divine motion by which we are moved to
a good act; in the case of evil the divine motion is
predeterminative as executing the divine will, but for an
evil act there is a twofold decree instead of a single
decree: the positive decree with regard to the entity of
the sin and the permissive decree with regard to the lack
of moral rectitude, or with regard to the malice.
4. This divine motion in its execution follows upon, at
least by nature if not in time, the moral or objectively
defective motion, which as such is not from God but from
the devil, from an evil man, or from concupiscence. On
the other hand, the moral motion which is a prerequisite
to a good act is from God, at least as from the first
cause, because it is good.
Once this defective moral motion is posited and after the
intervention of some inconsideration on the part of man,
the physical influx of God begins to flow into the will
itself and effects the entity of the act of the will, but
it prescinds from the malice; the freedom remains as in
other acts because God moves not only toward the act but
also that the act be free.
5. God does not determine the material part of the sin
before the creature has in some way determined itself to
the formal part of the sin. As the universal provider,
God moves only that will to sin which is in itself evilly
disposed and which thus disposed needs to be moved. Thus
Christ said to Judas: "That which thou dost, do
quickly."[1116] That which on the part of God
precedes the determination of the will to the formal part
of sin is only the permission to sin, which is a penalty,
not for the first sin but for the other sins.
6. The inconsideration, which is the beginning of the
sin, is voluntary and culpable, at least virtually,
inasmuch as a rational agent can and should consider the
rule of right reason in his action, and if he does not
consider it, he is culpable; this is the beginning of the
sin. Finally, since the will is naturally inclined to
the good, it does not turn to the evil or the apparent
good without first virtually turning itself away from the
true good, at least by not considering the law when it
could and should. This predetermination to the act of sin
is not something primary in Thomism; it is secondary,
something consequent and merely philosophical.
First objection. (The second objection in the
article.) This objection, which attempts to show that
God is the direct, although not the immediate, cause of
sin, is stated as follows: The effect of a second cause
is referred to the first cause. But the evil of guilt is
sometimes the effect of a second cause. Therefore the
evil of guilt is referred to the first cause.
Reply. I distinguish the major: with regard to the
entity and perfection, I concede; with regard to the
effect, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as a
defect, I concede; as being, I deny; for example,
whatever there is of motion in lameness is caused by the
motive power, but whatever there is of deformity is not of
the motive power but from the curvature of the bone. That
is to say, the divine motion prescinds from malice.
I insist. But God moves the will to the act as it
issues from the will itself. But the act of sin as it
issues from the will does not prescind from malice.
Therefore God in moving to this act does not prescind
from malice.
Reply. I distinguish the major: as the act issues
effectively from the will, I concede; defectively, I
deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as it issues from
the will defectively, I concede; effectively, I deny.
I insist. The cause of anything is also the cause of
that which essentially belongs to it. But some physical
acts are essentially evil in a moral sense, as hatred of
God. Therefore in moving toward these acts God cannot
prescind from their malice.
Reply. I distinguish the major: the cause of anything
in the physical order is also the cause of that which
essentially belongs to it in the same order, I concede;
in the moral order and outside the adequate object of its
causality, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and
the malice is in the physical order and is within the
adequate object of the divine omnipotence, I deny; and
the malice is in the moral order and outside the adequate
object of the divine omnipotence, I concede.
Thomists commonly point out that nothing is more clearly
delimited than the causality of a potency or power, which
is so completely concerned with its object that it touches
on nothing else, no matter how closely anything else may
be conjoined to its object. Thus in the same apple three
things, color, taste, and smell, are intimately
connected, and yet sight takes in the color but not the
taste and smell. Sight cannot see sounds. Indeed, a
distinction of reason is sufficient to delimit a potency;
thus the good and true are distinguished only by reason,
for example, in the true goodness of virtue, and yet the
true is known and the good is loved. The intellect
touches the good under the aspect of truth but not under
the aspect of the good. Similarly, in God the paternity
is distinguished from the divine nature only by reason,
and the divine nature alone is communicated to the Son,
without the communication of the paternity. In sin,
however, the act taken physically and the moral malice are
much more distinct from each other; these things pertain
to two different orders, and the malice is outside the
adequate object of the divine omnipotence, for every agent
acts in a manner at least analogically similar to itself,
and between God and the malice of guilt there is not even
an analogical similarity. Hence, even if God willed to
be the cause of sin, He could not, just as a man who
willed to see sound could not.
I insist. But the formal constituent of a sin of
commission is a positive element, according to St.
Thomas and many Thomists. But God causes whatever is
positive in sin. Therefore God causes the formal
constituent of a sin of commission.
Reply. I distinguish the major: it is a positive
element under the aspect of defectible being, or as
forming the basis of the inordination, I concede; under
the aspect of effectible being, I deny. I
contradistinguish the minor: God causes whatever is
positive under the aspect of effectible being, I
concede; under the aspect of defectible being, I deny.
Thus, as defectible being the sin does not come within
the adequate object of the divine omnipotence.
I insist. Whatever causes a form, "per
accidens" produces the annexed privation. But the
privation of moral rectitude is annexed to the act of sin.
Therefore God, causing the act of sin, "per
accidens" produces the privation of rectitude.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if this privation
follows from the very nature of this form, I concede; in
this way God is the cause "per accidens" of the
physical evil of penalty or of the death of an animal
because He wills the life of the lion; but if the
privation proceeds from a defective principle, I deny.
In this latter instance the privation is not even
"per accidens" from an indefectible principle.
Thus we say that the sinner himself is "per
accidens" the cause of the malice of his act,
inasmuch as he tends "per se" to some unworthy
good; but God is not even "per accidens" the
cause of this malice, because this malice is outside the
adequate object of omnipotence.
Other objections attempt to prove that God is at least
indirectly the cause of sin.[1117]
The same pilot is the cause of the safety of the ship and
of the shipwreck. But God is the cause of the safety of
all things. Therefore God is the cause of moral
shipwreck, or sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major: inasmuch as the pilot
is defective, or does not guide the ship when he can and
should, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I
contradistinguish the minor: and God is deficient in
doing what is necessary for salvation, I deny; and God
is still indefectible, I concede.
I insist. But he who does not prevent a sin when he can
do so is still the indirect cause of the sin. But God
does not prevent sin when He is able. Therefore God is
the indirect cause of sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major: when he can and
should, I concede; when he can and is not obliged to do
so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: God is
able not to prevent, or permit, that a defectible agent
fails, or sins, because of a greater good which is
occasioned by a sin.[1118] Thus God is not obliged
to prevent sin.
I insist. St. Thomas says:[1119] "If
affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the
cause of negation, as Aristotle says; for example, the
rising of the sun is the cause of the day, and the
non-rising of the sun is the cause of darkness. But the
conferring of grace is the cause of a salutary act.
Therefore the non-conferring of grace, included in the
permission of even the first sin, is the cause of the
omission of the salutary act."
We see that St. Thomas was not ignorant of this
objection with which Thomists have been always confronted
in almost the same terms.
Reply. I distinguish the major: if we are dealing with
one cause alone, as the sun rising or not rising, or the
pilot watching or not watching, I concede; but if we are
dealing with two causes of which one is indefectible and
the other defectible, I deny. I contradistinguish the
minor: and the omission of the salutary act proceeds from
one and the same cause as that which confers grace, I
deny; from another defectible and deficient cause, I
concede.[1120]
I insist. He who denies grace apart from antecedent
guilt is the indirect cause of sin. But God, by
permitting the beginning of the first sin (for example,
in a baptized person), denies grace apart from antecedent
guilt. Therefore God is the indirect cause of the
beginning of the first sin.
Reply. The reply is contained in St. Thomas' words
concerning the principle, "mutual causes are causes in
different genera," which is applied inversely in
justification and the loss of grace by sin. I distinguish
the major: apart from guilt antecedent by a priority of
nature, I concede; by a priority of time, I deny. I
contradistinguish the minor: apart from guilt antecedent
by a priority of time, I concede; by a priority of
nature, I deny.
Explanation. The denial of grace is indeed a penalty,
which can be inflicted only for guilt. Thus the denial of
grace implies more than the simple divine permission of
sin, which simply antecedes sin as a condition "sine
qua non". It is true that the permission of the
second sin is a penalty for the first sin, as St.
Thomas says,[1121] but the permission of the first
sin, for example, in the angels, or in the innocent
Adam, or in a baptized person, does not have the nature
of penalty.
God does not deny grace except for some antecedent guilt,
but this guilt can be antecedent by a priority not of time
but of nature only, in the genus of material cause, or of
a defectible and deficient cause.
This is illustrated by the principle proposed by St.
Thomas,[1122] mutual causes are causes in different
genera, without there being a vicious circle. Thus in
the same instant, on the part of the sun, illumination is
prior to the removal of darkness, but on the part of the
atmosphere to be illuminated the removal of darkness is
first in the order of nature, although the two things are
simultaneous. Since the infusion of grace and the
remission of guilt are considered on the part of God as
justifying, the infusion of grace is prior to remission of
guilt in the order of nature. But if these things are
considered on the part of man who is justified, the
converse is true: liberation from guilt (we do not say
remission of guilt) is prior in the order of nature to the
attainment of justifying grace (we do not say infusion of
grace because this expression views the matter from the
viewpoint of God and not from the viewpoint of man, who
is justified).
Speaking absolutely, the infusion of grace is prior to
the remission of guilt, because these things are
predicated on the part of God.
On the other hand, the loss of grace and the commission
of sin are predicated of man sinning, and absolutely
speaking from the viewpoint of the material cause, or of
man losing grace, it is true that the beginning of the
first sin is prior to the denial of divine grace, that is
at least initial guilt is absolutely prior to penalty.
The only thing that precedes this beginning of the first
sin is the divine permission, which is a condition
"sine qua non" of the sin. The denial of grace
implies more than the simple permission of sin, which is
not a penalty especially in the case of the first sin.
I insist. The Council of Trent declared: "God does
not desert by His grace those who are once justified
unless He is first deserted by them."[1123]
Reply. This statement was made by St. Augustine, who
nevertheless solved the problem of evil.[1124] The
statement means that God does not withdraw habitual grace
except for some antecedent sin. In the case of actual
grace, however, there is a desertion properly so called,
which is the denial of actual grace by God. But this is
not true of the simple divine permission for the beginning
of the first sin, because God is not bound to preserve
even the just man from sin by a special and efficacious
help which is not due to man. But God does not refuse
sufficient grace by which, if man does not resist it, he
can attain to good; but if man resists sufficient grace,
God can justly deny him efficacious grace.
I insist. As the best friend, God should always give
man efficacious grace to avoid sin. But God is the best
friend of every man. Therefore God should always give
all men efficacious grace to avoid sin.
Reply. I ask you to prove the major, namely, that God
as Adam's best friend was bound to offer him at all times
not only sufficient grace but also efficacious grace, that
is, by preventing Adam's resistance to sufficient
grace.
I insist. But sufficient grace is required for the
fulfillment of the commandments. And God because of the
abundance of His goodness owes it to Himself to give us
more help than is required to make the commandments
possible of fulfillment.[1125] Therefore because of
the abundance of His goodness God owes it to Himself to
give us more than sufficient grace, namely, efficacious
grace.
Reply. I distinguish the minor: frequently for the
human race and also for the just man, I concede; always
unto the end, this I ask you to prove.
I insist. God owes it to Himself at all times to unite
mercy and justice in all His works.
Reply. I distinguish: by abundant sufficient graces,
by sermons, good examples, let it pass; by graces that
are always efficacious, this I ask you to prove. Even
when God punishes, His mercy is united to justice,
because even in hell the punishment is less than condign.
I insist. He who does not preserve a man in good is the
indirect cause of the sin of a man who needs this
preservation. But, by permitting the beginning of the
first sin, God does not preserve a man in good.
Therefore God is the indirect cause of sin.
Reply. I distinguish the major: he who does not
preserve a man in good when he is able and obliged to do
so, I concede; when he is able but not obliged to do
so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. God is not
obliged to preserve all defectible things in good,
otherwise defectible things would never fail, and
preservation from sin would not have been a most special
privilege for the Blessed Virgin, but it would be
something most common. God actually gives more than
justice demands because of the superabundance of His
goodness;[1126] He does this even for each person
frequently, but not always to the end, that is, He does
not conduct each person to his last end.
If it is said that man needs to be preserved in good so
that he might remain in the good, the reply is: that man
requires and has a right to be preserved in good and that
God owes it to Himself to preserve man in good, this I
deny; that man requires this preservation without having
the right to it, I concede. In himself man is
defectible and from this it follows that he sometimes
fails; he fails sometimes physically and without guilt,
like the agents inferior to him, and sometimes he fails
morally and voluntarily with guilt, and God is not
obliged to prevent this guilt. If God were so bound, no
sin would ever be committed and defectible things would
never fail. To no one, not even to the elect, is owing
the efficacious election to glory, otherwise all men would
be saved.
St. Thomas expresses this thought in these
words:[1127] "It happens that God does not extend
to some that help to avoid sin which, if it were
extended, would prevent them from sinning. But God does
all this according to the order of justice and wisdom,
since He Himself is justice and wisdom. Hence it cannot
be imputed to God that someone sins, as if He were the
cause of sin, just as the pilot is not the cause of the
shipwreck because of the fact that he does not steer the
ship unless when he withdraws his guidance he could and
should be steering the ship." The pilot is blamed only
for negligence, and divine negligence is a contradiction
in terms. This objection is indeed difficult, but it is
not cogent.
I insist. St. Thomas says: "Out of the abundance of
His goodness God dispenses those things that are owing to
some creature more generously than the importance of the
thing demands."[1128]
Reply. This is often true, but God does not always
lead every man to the last end, preserving him and
elevating him above sin. We are here face to face with a
profound mystery, indeed the mystery of iniquity is more
obscure than the mystery of grace since it is obscure not
only with regard to us but also in itself. But the
apparent contradiction will be obviated if we keep clearly
in mind the following two most certain principles:
1. "God does not command the impossible, but when He
commands He admonishes you to do what you are able and to
ask for what you cannot do."[1129] This principle
was invoked against the Protestants by the Council of
Trent.[1130]
2. In the article, "Whether God loves all things
equally,"[1131] St. Thomas formulated this
principle: "Since the love of God is the cause of the
goodness of things, one thing would not be better than
another if God had not willed a greater good for one thing
than for another." This is the principle of predilection
as found in revelation: "For it is God who worketh in
you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His
good will,"[1132] "For who distinguisheth thee?
Or what hast thou that thou hast not
received?"[1133]
These two principles were promulgated by the Council of
Carisiac in the words of St. Prosper: "The
omnipotent God wills all men without exception to be
saved, even though all are not saved. The fact that some
are saved is owing to the gift of Him who saves them; the
fact that some are lost is owing to
themselves."[1134]
Taken separately, these two principles are most certain
according to revelation; even in the natural order they
are evident. But their intimate reconciliation remains
obscure, and no created intelligence by its own powers can
make this reconciliation, because it would be necessary to
see how the infinite mercy, the infinite justice, and
supreme liberty are intimately reconciled in God. No one
can see God in this way except in the light of glory. In
the words of Bossuet: "In this state of captivity we
must humble our intelligence before the divine mystery and
admit these two graces, one that leaves our will
inexcusable before God, the other that prevents us from
glorying in ourselves."[1135]
Hence St. Paul says: "He that glorieth, may glory
in the Lord";[1136] "For by grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the
gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory. For
we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good
works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in
them."[1137]
An article could be written comparing false evidence with
the obscurity of true faith to illustrate why so often,
especially in this question of evil, the objections at
first sight seem clearer than the replies. This matter
might at least be considered in a chapter on faith as
illumined by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The principal
reason is that the objections are taken from the
superficial appearances of reality, whereas the replies
are taken from that highest reality which is with God and
which is so profound for us because of our defectibility
and therefore remains so obscure.
Indeed in this present problem there are two obscurities
opposed to each other: the higher obscurity of the divine
reality which is translucent and the lower obscurity of sin
itself, which is itself the privation of light, truth,
and goodness. Between these two opposing obscurities is
the true clarity of these certain principles: "God does
not command the impossible," and "no one would be better
than another if he were not loved more by God." The
reconciliation of these principles is a mystery, but the
evidence of the principles themselves indicates that the
objections are superficial and false. In the objections
we always find some sophistic falsehood, and none of the
objections is either cogent or necessary.
These objections are useful because they arouse in the
just a desire to contemplate the mystery of the Deity on a
plane above every distinct idea. Such contemplation when
it proceeds from faith illumined by the supernatural gifts
with a certain experimental knowledge of God remains
obscure with a translucent obscurity of which St. John
of the Cross spoke so eloquently.[1138]
Second conclusion. God wills and causes "per
accidens" physical evil and the evil of penalty.
An agent that by its power "per se" produces
some form as a consequence and quasi- "per
accidens" causes the privation of the opposite form.
But God wills and causes "per se" and
principally the good of the universe, which requires
defectible things that are sometimes deficient, and God
wills and causes the order of justice, which requires that
penalty be inflicted on sinners. Therefore God wills and
causes as a consequence and quasi- "per
accidens" physical evil and the evil of penalty.
It should be noted that St. Thomas bases this proof not
only on efficient causality but also on the divine
intellect and will, because whatever God causes "per
accidens" He also wills in the same manner; from
eternity God willed and foresaw whatever He would do even
"per accidens" in these or other circumstances.
We, however, sometimes produce "per accidens"
certain evils which we do not will or foresee. Such is
not the case with God.
St. Thomas returns to the proof which he had already
given above in the article, "Whether the will of God is
concerned with evil," where he says: "God wills the
evil of natural defect or the evil of penalty by willing
some good to which such evil is joined."[1139] But
God can in no way will the evil of guilt, which negates
the order to the divine good willed by God above all
things.
Doubt. Is the following proposition true: "While
evils are not good, nevertheless it is good that there be
evils, because those things that are evil in themselves
are ordered to some good"? If this proposition is true,
then the following is also true: "It is good that there
are sins."
St. Thomas replies in the negative: "Some say that,
although God does not will evils, nevertheless He wills
that evils should be and should come into being.....
But this is not a correct statement, because evil is not
"per se" ordered to good but only "per
accidens". The fact that some good ensues from a sin
is beyond the intention of the sinner, just as it is
beyond the intention of tyrants that the patience of
martyrs is glorified in persecution."[1140] Hence
we should say that "per accidens" and as a
consequence God wills physical evil and the evil of
penalty, and that He wills to permit sin by not
preventing them and occasionally deriving some good from
them. Only in this sense do we say, "O blessed fault
which merited so great a Redeemer.!"
This entire article can be reduced to the following
synopsis. God in no way wills or causes the evil of
guilt, neither on the part of the end, because sin
negates the order to the divine good loved by God above
all things; nor on the part of the efficient cause,
because sin is from a deficient voluntary agent, at least
by inconsideration, and this defect cannot be predicated
of the indefectible God. God wills physical evil and
penalty "per accidens", on the part of the end,
because He wills the good of the universe and justice,
and from this evils sometimes follow; on the part of the
efficient cause, because these evils proceed from the
power of the agent producing a form which entails the
privation of the opposite form.
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