SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN THE ARTICLE[1075]

First objection. Good is like a good tree. But a good tree cannot bear evil fruit. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

Reply. I distinguish the major: a good tree is a figure of the will that is morally good, I concede; of the natural will that is physically good, I deny. I distinguish the minor: the good tree, or the will that is morally good, cannot bear evil fruit, I concede; the natural will that is physically good cannot bear evil fruit, I subdistinguish: "per se", I concede; "per accidens", I deny. Hence good can be the cause of evil "per accidens".

Second objection. One of two contraries cannot be the cause of the other. But evil is contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

Reply. One of two contraries cannot "per se" be the cause of the other, I concede; "per accidens", I deny. Thus the goodness of fire can cause the evil of the wood's destruction or the burning of a house.

Third objection. An evil or deficient effect does not proceed except from a deficient cause. But a deficient cause is evil. Therefore evil comes only from evil.

Reply. I distinguish the major: in voluntary things, I concede; in physical things, I deny, because sometimes evil proceeds from the power of a contrary agent. Moreover, a deficient cause is not evil as cause but only as deficient.

In his reply to the third difficulty, St. Thomas points out that the defect of a voluntary action proceeds "from the fact that the will does not subject itself in act to its rule. This defect is not indeed a fault or guilt, but it is followed by guilt because the will operates with this defect or fault."

In his work, "De malo", St. Thomas says: "The fact that the will does not in act attend to such a rule considered in itself is not evil and it is neither guilt nor penalty, because the soul is not bound nor can it attend to a rule of this kind always in act. But it takes on the first aspect of guilt when without actual consideration of the rule it proceeds to a particular election..... Man sins by the fact that he does not have a rule, or does not attend to one, and thus proceeds to making a choice. For this reason St. Augustine said that the will is the cause of sin inasmuch as it is deficient."[1076] And the will is deficient inasmuch as it recedes from a worthy good under the influence or attraction of some delectable unworthy good. Thus even in moral matters the major of the first argument of this article is verified: "The fact that anything departs from its natural and due disposition comes only from some cause that draws the thing away from its proper disposition." Hence evil always has some cause "per accidens" in the good.[1077]

The fifteenth objection in "De malo". An accidental cause does not intend the effect that follows "per accidens". But evil has only an accidental cause. Therefore no one who does evil sins.

Reply. An intelligent cause does not contemplate the accidental effect that rarely follows, I concede; the accidental effect that is always joined to the principal effect, I deny.

The seventeenth objection. Whatever follows accidentally happens in rare instances. But evil follows in many instances, as we read, "The number of fools is infinite."[1078] Therefore the cause of evil is "per se" and not "per accidens".

Reply. A thing is said to follow "per accidens" not only if it follows in rare instances but because it follows, though not intended "per se", even if it follows in the majority of instances. St. Thomas says: "The accidental thing does not always take place in rare cases, sometimes it follows in all cases or most cases, for example, the adulterer intends a certain sensible good to which an evil is always joined and he always falls into that evil..... The evil of guilt happens so often in the human race (and in it alone) because there are so many more ways to deviate from the middle than holding the middle path, as we read, 'the sensible goods are better known by many than the goods of the mind.'"[1079]

On a higher plane and with clearer distinction St. Thomas proposes this doctrine in a manner that seems to oppose the theory of optimism: "The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature occurs in most instances, and the defect from this good occurs in fewer instances. But the good that is above the common state of nature is found in fewer instances..... It is evident that many men have sufficient knowledge to govern their own lives....: but very few men attain to a profound knowledge of intelligible things."[1080]

This limitation of optimism is owing to the human composite and to original sin.

1. The lowest kind of intelligence has for its object the lowest of intelligible things, namely, the intelligible thing in sensible things, and thus this intelligence must be united with sensible things. First, therefore, we know sensible things and we live according to the senses, and many men are attracted rather to the good of the senses than to the good according to right reason.

2. "Some signs of original sin probably appear in the human race. Since God takes cognizance of human acts in such a way that He fixes a reward for good acts and penalties for evil acts,....we can certify the guilt from the penalty. It is evident that the human race suffers various kinds of penalties, both corporal and spiritual..... Among the spiritual penalties the greatest is the weakness of reason, and because of this penalty man has difficulty in knowing the truth, he easily falls into error, he cannot entirely overcome his bestial appetites, and he is often overwhelmed by these lower impulses. Someone might say that these defects are not penal, but natural defects arising necessarily from matter..... But if we study the matter carefully, we can conclude with sufficient probability that divine providence, which has conjoined congruous perfectibles to the particular perfections, united the higher nature (the soul) to the lower (the body) so that the soul would be dominant, and if any impediment should arise against this dominion from the defect of nature, God would have removed it by a special and supernatural act of beneficence."[1081]

Pascal said: "Without this mystery man would be more incomprehensible than this mystery is incomprehensible to man." The doctrine of original sin offers the solution to the puzzling problem of the coexistence in man of such great weakness and misery and such strong aspirations to the sublime.[1082] But, as St. Thomas says, "God permitted evil to happen that something better might come of it."[1083] Hence we read, "And where sin abounded, grace did more abound,"[1084] and in blessing the paschal candle we chant, "O happy fault that merited so great a Redeemer!"

Indeed, according to revelation: "For if by one man's offense death reigned through one; much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ."[1085] Thus the motive of the Incarnation was formally a motive of mercy, for the reason behind mercy is the alleviation of misery.[1086] God predestined Christ to the glory of the Redeemer and permitted Adam's sin that Christ might be the Redeemer of the human race.

But while we clearly see the sensible existence of evil in the world, the existence of the concupiscence of the flesh and of the eyes, and the pride of life, we do not clearly understand the spiritual heights and the infinite value of the mystery of the redemptive Incarnation, and we do not appreciate the price of all the graces that flow invisibly from this mystery to the souls of all generations. "We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency may be of the power of God, and not of us,....that the life also of Jesus may be made manifest in our mortal flesh."[1087]

The solution of this problem, that God permits evil only for some greater good, is at once clear and obscure; it is clear in the abstract and in general but obscure in the concrete and in particular, because only in heaven shall we see this greater good because of which God permits evil. We are loved by God much more than we think, just as St. Anne, the mother of the Blessed Virgin Mary, did not understand the greatness of the blessing which her daughter had received. Grace is the seed of glory, and our trials and tribulations can obtain for us the eternal reward of glory.

But this solution of the problem of evil will not bring peace and quiet to anxious souls in this life without the influence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost and without the special inspiration of the gifts of understanding and wisdom, from which we obtain a quasi-experimental knowledge of the good things promised to those who believe. Hence St. Thomas says that these gifts are necessary for salvation.[1088]

It is true, therefore, that good is the efficient cause of evil only "per accidens". And if this occurs frequently, it is only so in the human race because of the union of the soul with the body and because of original sin. Such is not the case with the angels. St. Thomas says that the multitude of angels is very great,[1089] like the multitude of the stars,[1090] and that more angels remained constant than sinned. In the angels there is only the intellectual nature; there is no attraction to sensible things, and there is no original sin in them. St. Thomas wrote these words in explanation of the passage, "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him."[1091] Thus the number of all the elect, if the angels are included, is greater, according to St. Thomas, than the number of the damned.