|
State of the question. The meaning of the title is:
whether the multitude and distinction of things is from
God, not in any way whatsoever, but as intended by
Him. This is the great problem of the origin of
multitude. In the fourth proof for the existence of God
it was easy enough to ascend from the multitude of things,
which we know from experience, to the one supreme being,
because the multitude does not itself give an adequate
reason for the unity of similitude and composition which we
find in it. Hence we must posit unity prior to every
multitude. Such was Plato's dialectic ascent which
attained to the idea of the supreme good; and in similar
language Aristotle says that every truth and every being
presupposes the greatest truth, which is the greatest
being.[892]
But if it is easy to ascend from the multitude of things
to the supreme unity, it is very difficult to descend from
the one supreme being to the multitude, that is, to
explain how the one supreme being can be the cause of the
multitude. For us who have from revelation the idea of
free creation this is easy, but for those who do not
possess this idea or reject it, as do the modern
evolutionists, the problem is insoluble.
In ancient times Parmenides began with the idea of being
and unity and concluded that multitude was unintelligible.
Why? Because he could not understand how anything could
be added to being to diversify it.[893] In other
words, being is being and it cannot be diversified except
by something other than being. But that something other
than being is non-being, which is nothing. Therefore
being cannot be diversified; from eternity it is one, and
always remains one and immutable. It is God. Hence
Parmenides concluded that multitude is an illusion of the
senses.
In the same way, Zeno's arguments (for example, that
Achilles could never catch the tortoise) were intended to
show the absurdity of the theory of plurality. Indeed,
if the continuum were composed of indivisible points and
not of divisible parts, Zeno's arguments would be
irrefutable.
In the beginning of this article St. Thomas presents
similar difficulties, but on the part of God. The first
and second objections are: every agent acts similar to
himself, inasmuch as he determines according to his own
proper determination. But God is the greatest unity.
Therefore God's effect is one only and not multiple.
The third objection: so also the end of creatures is
one, the manifestation of the divine goodness. In our
day the evolutionists are trying to explain how the
multitude of beings arises from some homogeneous primitive
being.
In the "Contra Gentes" St. Thomas considers
these difficulties at great length from chapter 39 to
chapter 45 of the second book: that the distinction in
things is not by chance, against Democritus (chap.
39); that prime matter is not the first cause of the
distinction of things, against the dualism of Plato and
many others (chap. 40); that the distinction of
things does not arise from a diversity or contrariety of
agents, against Avicenna (chap. 41); that the first
cause of the distinction of things is not the order among
secondary agents (chap. 42); that the distinction of
things is not by an angel inducing diverse forms into
matter (chap. 43); nor does this distinction proceed
from the diversity of merits and demerits, against Origen
(chap. 44), but this distinction is intended
"per se" by God, the most free Creator, so
that the likeness of the Creator may be found in creatures
to the extent that creatures can be assimilated to
God.[894]
This problem of the origin of multitude, discussed by
Plato in the dialogue entitled Parmenides, reappears in
modern evolution in the following form: How did the
distinction of things, mineral, vegetative, animal, and
human, arise from the primitive, homogeneous being? How
did vegetative life, sensation, and intellection arise?
The evolutionists try to conceal the difficulty by saying
that the distinction of things appeared only slowly and
progressively. But metaphysically speaking it makes
little difference whether these distinctions appeared
slowly or suddenly, whether they appeared only after a
thousand years, or six days, or suddenly. This question
of time, as also with regard to creation, is of minor
consequence. The important question, abstracting from
time, is how a multitude can originate from the primitive
unity. This question is similar to that other important
question asked in the next article: If God is infinitely
good and the cause of all things, what is the cause of
evil?
Reply. St. Thomas shows that this problem of the
origin of the multitude of things is insoluble without the
idea of free creation. His reply is that the distinction
of things and multitude are from the intention of the first
agent, who is God.
Proof from authority. "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. . . . And He divided the light from
the darkness. . . . And God made a firmament, and
divided the waters that were under the firmament, from
those that were above the firmament."[895] This is
a popular expression of the truth, accommodated to the
intelligence of the Israelites, who thought of the
heavens as a solid firmament. But when it is revealed
that the heavens (which you think of as a solid
firmament) are created by God, it is not revealed that
the heavens are a solid firmament, for in the revealed
proposition the verb "is" refers to "created" (the
heavens are created) and not to "solid." Hence it may
be that some error is mingled in the subject of the
proposition without making the proposition erroneous in its
formal meaning, that is, with regard to the verb "is"
and those things to which "is" refers. On other
occasions it is more clearly stated that God created
visible and invisible beings[896] and that God
"ordered all things in measure and number and
weight."[897]
In the body of the article St. Thomas presents and then
refutes two theories: the ascending evolution of the
materialists and the descending evolution of
Avicenna.[898]
The theory of the ancient materialists was that the
distinction of things arises by chance according to the
movement of matter. This opinion was held by Democritus
and later by Epicurus. Modern materialists with their
theory of evolution were unable to add anything to this
ancient theory; they were unable to explain how the first
nebulae, the incandescendent stars, the habitable earth
could come from primitive homogeneous matter except by
chance or by the activity of some unknown forces, and the
appearance of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual
life remained for them an insoluble enigma. They would be
forced to admit that more proceeds from less and that the
perfect proceeds from the imperfect, and they find
themselves at a loss how to explain the multitude and
diversity of organisms except by chance. But to say that
these things are by chance is no explanation, but rather
an absence of explanation, for chance is a cause "per
accidens" which presupposes a cause ordered "per
se" to one effect, and if there is no cause "per
se" there can be no cause "per accidens".
A man digging a grave could not accidentally find a
treasure if he were not "per se" digging in the
earth and if some one else had not buried the treasure.
St. Thomas points out that Anaxagoras approached a
solution of this problem when he admitted an intelligent
cause that orders the universe, but at the same time
Anaxagoras thought that a distinction pre-existed in
eternal matter, that is in the homeomeriae.
Reply. In his reply to the materialists St. Thomas
presents two arguments which apply equally to the ascending
evolutionism of modern materialists.
1. If there is any distinction from matter, this
distinction should be referred to some higher cause.
Why? Because matter is created by God, as we have said
above, for matter is not a being in itself. Matter is
moved and perfected and therefore it is moved and perfected
by another; matter does not move or perfect itself, it
does not confer on itself vegetative, sensitive, or
intellectual life; it is not its own action or its own
being. Matter is always in potency to other
determinations and it is not related to being, the
ultimate actuality of all things, as A is to a. This
argument also applies to Plato's dualism.
2. Matter is because of the form, and the form is not
because of the matter. But the distinction of things
takes place through the specific forms. Therefore the
distinction is not on account of matter but conversely
matter is on account of the distinction of things. Matter
is the principle of individuation and is ordered to the
multitude of species.
This second argument applies also to evolutionism, for
there can be no evolution with a tendency to something
definite and congruous without some finality. Otherwise
the direction of such a tendency would be without any
reason, and no tendency would ever attain to the
constitution of any of our organs, the heart, the head,
the eye, etc. John of St. Thomas restates these two
arguments against materialism as follows:
1. Act is simply prior to potency, and therefore
matter, which is the potency to a higher act, is not
uncreated, nor is it therefore the first cause for the
distinction of things, for example, the distinctions of
vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life, which
matter cannot produce because it is inferior to them.
Matter is merely the real capacity for receiving a
perfection.
2. Potency is referred to act and is because of act, or
matter is because of the form and on account of the diverse
forms, and therefore it is not the cause of the specific
distinction of the forms. Matter is because of the
distinction of these forms.
The first conclusion therefore is that the specific
distinction of things cannot be explained by a material
cause.
2. The second theory refuted by St. Thomas might be
called descending evolutionism. It calls to mind
Plotinus' emanatism. This second theory was advanced by
Avicenna, who tried to explain the specific distinction
of things by efficient causes. Avicenna declared that
God in understanding Himself produced the first
intelligence (Plotinus' "logos", the second
"hypostasis"); then, when the
first intelligence understood itself, it produced the soul
of the world (Plotinus' third
"hypostasis", the god of the
Stoics).
Modern pantheists, who support a descending evolution
rather than an ascending evolution, try to explain the
distinction of things in almost the same way. Spinoza
tried to derive two infinite attributes from the divine
substance: cogitation and infinite extension, besides the
finite modes of cogitation and extension. But because he
rejected free creation he was unable to derive the finite
modes from an infinite substance, and therefore he simply
stated without proof that these finite modes come into
being successively from eternity in some necessary way.
In trying to explain the distinction of things Schelling
began with the Absolute, but because he rejected the
revealed truth of free creation he spoke of a fall of the
Absolute by which the Absolute became the world in some
kind of descent. Hegel, who supported an ascending
evolution, ridiculed Schelling's dream of the fall of
the Absolute, but Hegel's position is no less
ridiculous, for according to Hegel God is becoming in
the world but He does not yet exist and will never
properly be, as Renan said.
Reply. To this second theory of the emanatists, St.
Thomas replied that creation belongs to God alone and the
total being of anything cannot be produced except by
creation from nothing, and creation is not emanation, for
in creation God is the sole efficient and final cause,
but in no sense the material cause. Hence God does not
become the world nor is the world made from God.
Avicenna's second "hypostasis", therefore, if
it is created, cannot create a third, and the third
cannot create something inferior to itself.
Furthermore, St. Thomas replies, according to
Avicenna the totality and distinction of things would not
derive from the intention of the first agent but from a
concourse of many active causes. This concourse of
causes, however, must come about by chance if it does not
come from the intention of the first cause. But chance,
since it is a cause "per accidens", presupposes
a cause ordered "per se" to its effect and
therefore it cannot be the first cause of the specific
distinction of things. Manifestly the distinction between
vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life in the world
does not come from chance. In other words, there would
be no finality in the world, and natural agents would tend
to something determined and fitting without any reason,
the order in things would be derived from an absence of
order, more would come from the less, and the more
perfect would come from the imperfect. Nor can it be said
that the distinction in things comes from the form of
secondary causes, for these forms do not exist of
themselves and they themselves are distinct from one
another and thus their own distinction must be explained.
Nor can it be said that the cause of the distinction in
things is God inasmuch as He operates by a necessity of
His nature. This argument was answered in the reply to
the first difficulty and was refuted above: "It is of
the nature of a natural agent that it produces one effect,
because a nature (determined to one thing) operates in
one and the same way unless it is impeded (for example,
the vital principle in a plant operates in the same way in
the same circumstances). This is because a natural agent
acts according to its specific being, and as long as it is
such a being it acts only in this one way. Since the
divine being is infinite. . ., it cannot be that it
acts by a necessity of nature unless it were to cause
something infinite in being, which is impossible. The
divine being, therefore, does not act by a necessity of
nature, but the effects determined by its infinite
perfection proceed according to the determination of its
will and intellect."[899]
The second conclusion, therefore, is that the
distinction of things does not come from God as acting by
a necessity of nature.
Until this point St. Thomas has not considered the
opinion that the distinction of things comes from God as
operating by a necessity of wisdom, an opinion espoused by
the absolute optimism of Plato and by Leibnitz in modern
times. Here is an attempt to explain the distinction of
things, which is assumed to be necessary, by a final
cause. In this instance the necessity of the distinction
of things is not metaphysical or physical but moral. St.
Thomas says: "Plato supposed that it was due to the
goodness of God as understood and loved by God Himself
that He should produce the most perfect of worlds. This
could, of course, be true if we consider only those
things that are and not those things that could be. This
universe is the best of those that are, and the fact that
it is the best is due to the goodness of God. But the
goodness of God is not obligated to this universe in such
a way that God could not make a better or worse
universe."[900] "Whenever the end is proportionate
to the things that are made on account of that end, the
wisdom of the maker is limited to some determined order.
But the divine goodness is an end disproportionately
exceeding created things. Therefore the divine wisdom is
not determined to some order of things."[901]
The third conclusion, therefore, is that the distinction
of things does not come from God operating by a necessity
of wisdom.
By eliminating the material cause, natural efficient
causes, and the final cause that implies the necessity of
the production of things, we come to the positive
conclusion: the distinction of things arises from the free
intention of God the Creator.
The proof may be somewhat easier if we join this last
section of the article with the reply to the first
difficulty, in which the divine liberty is affirmed.
A free agent can produce distinct effects according to
whatever distinct forms he understands. But God, as a
free agent, wished to manifest His goodness through
diverse creatures. Therefore the distinction of things is
explained by the intention of God the free Creator. and
this distinction can have no other cause.
Explanation of the major. An agent that acts by its
nature acts by the form by which it is, and this form is
only one for each agent. Therefore such an agent acts
only in one way. A free agent, however, acts according
to a form received in the intellect.
Explanation of the minor. God is a voluntary and free
agent.[902] It does not conflict with God's unity
and simplicity that He understands many things, for the
multitude of things understood by God do not effect a real
distinction in Him.[903] Since God can understand
many things, He can also make many things.
God, however, wished freely to manifest His goodness by
diverse creatures. Why? St. Thomas explains in the
last section: "Because by one creature the divine
goodness cannot be adequately represented, God made many
different things so that whatever is lacking in one to
represent the divine goodness will be supplied by
another."[904]
The validity of this solution. This solution is of
faith. From the philosophical viewpoint it is necessary,
for the ascending evolution of the materialists and even of
Hegel is repugnant both to the principle of causality
(more cannot be produced by the less) and to the
principle of finality (every agent acts according to the
end to which it is ordered) and, moreover, ascending
evolution does not explain the distinction of things.
Similarly, descending evolution fails to explain the
distinction of things for, if God operates by a necessity
of nature, He will necessarily produce only one effect.
Similarly the absolute optimism of Plato and Leibnitz
does not take into account the disproportion between any
created universe and the divine goodness, which is to be
manifested. We must, therefore, have recourse to the
liberty of God the Creator, or we must, with
Parmenides, deny all multitude and all distinction in
things. In the end the solution is that the most eminent
unity of God virtually contains the infinite multitude of
possible things, from which God freely chose the things
He wished to create.
The higher unity differs from the lower unity in the fact
that it virtually contains the multitude; the higher the
unity the richer its content, for, as Dionysius said,
"those things that are divided in inferior beings are
united in the higher beings." This is especially clear
when we ascend from one order to another; the vital
principle of the plant virtually contains all the acts of
agents lower than itself. Similarly, the faculty of
vision, which in itself is simple, extends itself to a
spreading panorama; the central sense in the common sense
unites the objects of the particular senses; the intellect
knows the universal, which virtually contains the
individual. Great musicians, like Mozart, hear the
melody they are composing completely at one time and they
often express the whole theme virtually in the prelude of
the composition. Great philosophers reduce the whole of
philosophy to a few sublime principles. When the saints
arrive at the unitive way they unite in this unity various
virtues. In a still higher plane, the unity and
simplicity of God virtually contain the infinite multitude
of possible beings, and from this multitude God chooses
those that He wishes to create. By the divine liberty,
then, we are able to solve the problem of how a multitude
proceeds from the supreme and most simple principle.
Plato and Aristotle were not able to offer a solution
because they had not attained to the idea of free
creation.
|
|