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Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept
his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by
justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really
so or not?
Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is
mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?
Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted
that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.
You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that
he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is
mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an
arithmetician or grammarian at the me when he is making the mistake,
in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or
arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way
of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other
person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his
name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and
then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs
at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly
said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be
perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we
should say that the ruler, in so far as he is the ruler, is
unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his
own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and
therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the
interest of the stronger.
Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an
informer?
Certainly, he replied.
And you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of
injuring you in the argument?
Nay, he replied, 'suppose' is not the word --I know it; but you will
be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.
I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any
misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what
sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you
were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior
should execute --is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense
of the term?
In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play
the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never
will be able, never.
And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and
cheat, Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.
Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.
Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should
ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of
which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money?
And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.
A healer of the sick, he replied.
And the pilot --that is to say, the true pilot --is he a captain
of sailors or a mere sailor?
A captain of sailors.
The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into
account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by
which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is
significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.
Very true, he said.
Now, I said, every art has an interest?
Certainly.
For which the art has to consider and provide?
Yes, that is the aim of art.
And the interest of any art is the perfection of it --this and
nothing else?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the
body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or
has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the
body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests
to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and
intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?
Quite right, he replied.
But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in
any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight
or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to
provide for the interests of seeing and hearing --has art in itself, I
say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art
require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and
that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only
after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves
or of another? --having no faults or defects, they have no need to
correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other;
they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For
every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true --that is to
say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise
sense, and tell me whether I am not right."
Yes, clearly.
Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the
interest of the body?
True, he said.
Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art
of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any
other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only
for that which is the subject of their art?
True, he said.
But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of
their own subjects?
To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.
Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of
the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and
weaker?
He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally
acquiesced.
Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician,
considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his
patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human
body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been
admitted?
Yes.
And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a
ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?
That has been admitted.
And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the
interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the
ruler's interest?
He gave a reluctant 'Yes.'
Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so
far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own
interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or
suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers
in everything which he says and does.
When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw
that the definition of justice had been completely upset,
Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have
you got a nurse?
Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to
be answering?
Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has
not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.
What makes you say that? I replied.
Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens of tends the
sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of
himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of
states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as
sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and
night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about
the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just
are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of the
ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and
injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple
and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his
interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from
being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the
just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in
private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just
you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust
man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings
with the State: when there is an income tax, the just man will pay
more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when
there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other
much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the
just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses,
and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he
is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in
unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man.
I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the
advantage of the unjust is more apparent; and my meaning will be
most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in
which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or
those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable --that is to
say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of
others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one,
things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts
of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly,
he would be punished and incur great disgrace --they who do such wrong
in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers
and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides
taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then,
instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed,
not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved
the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice,
fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink
from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice,
when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and
mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest
of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.
Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bathman,
deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the
company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and
defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that
he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how
suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before
you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the
attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your
eyes --to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the
greatest advantage?
And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the
enquiry?
You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us,
Thrasymachus --whether we live better or worse from not knowing what
you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend,
do not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and
any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my
own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not
believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if
uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there
may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud
or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of
injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament
with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should
convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.
And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already
convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you?
Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?
Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if
you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must
remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said,
that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact
sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the
shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the
sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or
banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a
trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the
art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects;
he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of
the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are
satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler.
I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in
a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or
subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is
to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.
Think! Nay, I am sure of it.
Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them
willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they govern
for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a
question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their
each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do
say what you think, that we may make a little progress.
Yes, that is the difference, he replied.
And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one
--medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea,
and so on?
Yes, he said.
And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but
we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the
pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health
of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be
inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at
least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?
Certainly not.
Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would
not say that the art of payment is medicine?
I should say not.
Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay
because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?
Certainly not.
And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially
confined to the art?
Yes.
Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is
to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?
True, he replied.
And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is
gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art
professed by him?
He gave a reluctant assent to this.
Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their
respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine
gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art
attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing
their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but
would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were
paid as well?
I suppose not.
But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?
Certainly, he confers a benefit.
Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither
arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we
were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their
subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger --to their good
they attend and not to the good of the superior.
And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now
saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in
hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without
remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his
orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest,
but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers
may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of
payment: money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing.
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