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PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: An ATHENIAN STRANGER; CLEINIAS, a
Cretan; MEGILLUS, a Lacedaemonian
Athenian Stranger. Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed
to be the author of your laws?
Cleinias. A God, Stranger; in very truth a, God: among us Cretans he
is said to have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon, whence our friend here
comes, I believe they would say that Apollo is their lawgiver: would
they not, Megillus?
Megillus. Certainly.
Ath. And do you, Cleinias, believe, as Homer tells, that every ninth
year Minos went to converse with his Olympian sire, and was inspired
by him to make laws for your cities?
Cle. Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhadamanthus, a
brother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he is reputed to
have been the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he
earned this reputation from his righteous administration of justice
when he was alive.
Ath. Yes, and a noble reputation it was, worthy of a son of Zeus. As
you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions, I dare say
that you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government
and laws; on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in about them,
for I am told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple
of Zeus is considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under
the lofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun.
Being no longer young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and get
over the whole journey without difficulty, beguiling the time by
conversation.
Cle. Yes, Stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves
of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green
meadows, in which we may repose and converse.
Ath. Very good.
Cle. Very good, indeed; and still better when we see them; let us
move on cheerily.
Ath. I am willing-And first, I want to know why the law has ordained
that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear
arms.
Cle. I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily
intelligible to any one. Look at the character of our country: Crete
is not like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have
horsemen in Thessaly, and we have runners-the inequality of the ground
in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you
have runners you must have light arms-no one can carry a heavy
weight when running, and bows and arrows are convenient because they
are light. Now all these regulations have been made with a view to
war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to this in all
his arrangements:-the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were
instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they
are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the case
compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual
protection. He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not
understanding that all are always at war with one another; and if in
war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly
appointed under others to protect an army, they should be continued in
peace. For what men in general term peace would be said by him to be
only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with
every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if
you look closely, you will find that this was the intention of the
Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were
arranged by him with a view to war; in giving them he was under the
impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him
who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of the conquered
pass into the hands of the conquerors.
Ath. You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained
in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will
you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of
government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a well
governed state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states
in war: am I right in supposing this to be your meaning?
Cle. Certainly; and our Lacedaemonian friend, if I am not
mistaken, will agree with me.
Meg. Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything
else?
Ath. And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to
villages?
Cle. To both alike.
Ath. The case is the same?
Cle. Yes.
Ath. And in the village will there be the same war of family against
family, and of individual against individual?
Cle. The same.
Ath. And should each man conceive himself to be his own
enemy:-what shall we say?
Cle. O Athenian Stranger-inhabitant of Attica I will not call you,
for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess
herself, because you go back to first principles you have thrown a
light upon the argument, and will now be better able to understand
what I was just saying-that all men are publicly one another's
enemies, and each man privately his own.
(Ath. My good sir, what do you mean?)--
Cle..... Moreover, there is a victory and defeat-the first and
best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats-which each man
gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this
shows that there is a war against ourselves going on within every
one of us.
Ath. Let us now reverse the order of the argument: Seeing that every
individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we
say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and
the state?
Cle. You mean that in each of them there is a principle of
superiority or inferiority to self?
Ath. Yes.
Cle. You are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly
is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which
the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior
classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be
justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the
opposite case.
Ath. Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a
question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for
the present. But I now quite understand your meaning when you say that
citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may
unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may
overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state
may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when
they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good.
Cle. Your remark, Stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly
deny it.
Ath. Here is another case for consideration;-in a family there may
be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very
possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in
a minority.
Cle. Very possibly.
Ath. And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to
whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when
they conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not now
considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of
speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and
wrong in laws.
Cle. What you say, Stranger, is most true.
Meg. Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone.
Ath. Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of
whom we were speaking?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Now, which would be the better judge-one who destroyed the
bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while
allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them
voluntarily submit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence
might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not
only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one another for
ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was
able to keep them friends.
Cle. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.
Ath. And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the
reverse of war.
Cle. Very true.
Ath. And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of
man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called
civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring
in his own state; and when occurring, every one would wish to be
quit of as soon as possible?
Cle. He would have the latter chiefly in view.
Ath. And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by
the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the
other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established, and
that, being reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign
enemies?
Cle. Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state.
Ath. And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the
best?
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the
need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and
good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be
regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as
well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by
medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which
needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman,
whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks
only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a
sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for
the sake of peace.
Cle. I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of
yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim
and object of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian.
Ath. I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel
with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning
them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest. Please
follow me and the argument closely:-And first I will put forward
Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth, but also a Spartan citizen, who of all
men was most eager about war: Well, he says, "I sing not, I care
not, about any man, even if he were the richest of men, and
possessed every good (and then he gives a whole list of them), if he
be not at all times a brave warrior." I imagine that you, too, must
have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard more
than enough of them.
Meg. Very true.
Cle. And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.
Ath. Come now and let us all join in asking this question of
Tyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise
which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently
proves that you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias
of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely agree with you. But we should
like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us,
then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of
war; or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would
have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds
one which is universally called civil war, and is as we were just
now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all
admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a
different race, is a far milder form of warfare.
Cle. Certainly, far milder.
Ath. Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-flown
strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are
you referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to
judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate
those
Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near
and strike at their enemies.
And we shall naturally go on to say to him-You, Tyrtaeus, as it seems,
praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war;
and he must admit this.
Cle. Evidently.
Ath. They are good; but we say that there are still better men whose
virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. And we too have
a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in
Sicily:
Cyrnus, he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight in
gold and silver.
And such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a
more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and
temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than
courage only; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife
without having all virtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks,
many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at
his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception
insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings.
You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I
maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is
worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making
laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis,
is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect
justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well
enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place
and dignity may be said to be only fourth rate.
Cle. Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank
which is far beneath him.
Ath. Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we
imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon
and Crete mainly with a view to war.
Cle. What ought we to say then?
Ath. What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not
mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence;-at the
legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and
this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised
classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in
which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only
investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has
a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about
assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters. But we
maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we
have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition; for you
were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was
the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong
when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and
the least part of virtue, and this called forth my subsequent remarks.
Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have
heard you expound the matter?
Cle. By all means.
Ath. You ought to have said, Stranger-The Cretan laws are with
reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of
laws, which is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every
sort of good. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there
are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state
which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not
having the greater, has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is
health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness
in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not
the blind god [Pluto], but one who is keen of sight, if only he has
wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine
dass of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of
these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of
virtue is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other
goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place
them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on
the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine,
and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some of his ordinances
will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another,
and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and
female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his
citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give
them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their
intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and
pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he
should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by
the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and
terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of
misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings,
and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or
poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should
determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of
each. In the next place, the legislator has to be careful how the
citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have
an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts,
whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all
this, and consider where justice as well as injustice is found or is
wanting in their several dealings with one another; and honour those
who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey,
until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for
the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead.
And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside
over these things-some who walk by intelligence, others by true
opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances
and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not
with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I
was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want
to know the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in
the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian
Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is
discovered to his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by
study or habit, although they are far from being self-evident to the
rest of mankind like ourselves.
Cle. How shall we proceed, Stranger?
Ath. I think that we must begin again as before, and first
consider the habit of courage; and then we will go on and discuss
another and then another form of virtue, if you please. In this way we
shall have a model of the whole; and with these and similar discourses
we will beguile the way. And when we have gone through all the
virtues, we will show, by the grace of God, that the institutions of
which I was speaking look to virtue.
Meg. Very good; and suppose that you first criticize this praiser of
Zeus and the laws of Crete.
Ath. I will try to criticize you and myself, as well as him, for the
argument is a common concern. Tell me-were not first the syssitia, and
secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war?
Meg. Yes.
Ath. And what comes third, and what fourth? For that, I think, is
the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the remaining
parts of virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their
name is, provided the meaning is clear.
Meg. Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is
third in order.
Ath. Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.
Meg. I think that I can get as far as the fouth head, which is the
frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us Spartans in certain
hand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a
good beating; there is, too, the so-called Crypteia, or secret
service, in which wonderful endurance is shown-our people wander
over the whole country by day and by night, and even in winter have
not a shoe to their foot, and are without beds to lie upon, and have
to attend upon themselves. Marvellous, too, is the endurance which our
citizens show in their naked exercises, contending against the violent
summer heat; and there are many similar practices, to speak of which
in detail would be endless.
Ath. Excellent, O Lacedaemonian Stranger. But how ought we to define
courage? Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and
pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against
flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the
hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax?
Meg. I should say the latter.
Ath. In what preceded, as you will remember, our Cnosian friend
was speaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves:-Were you
not, Cleinias?
Cle. I was.
Ath. Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is
overcome by pleasure or by pain?
Cle. I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men
deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other
who is overcome by pain.
Ath. But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not
legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet
attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious
flatteries which come from the right?
Cle. Able to meet both, I should say.
Ath. Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either
of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid
them any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the
midst of them, and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to
get the better of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar
to that about pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is
of this nature among you:-What is there which makes your citizen
equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to
conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and
nearest home?
Meg. I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed
against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or
obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with
pleasure; there are some lesser provisions, however, which I might
mention.
Cle. Neither can I show anything of that sort which is at all
equally prominent in the Cretan laws.
Ath. No wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our
search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws
of the others, we must not be offended, but take kindly what another
says.
Cle. You are quite right, Athenian Stranger, and we will do as you
say.
Ath. At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feeling of
irritation.
Cle. Certainly not.
Ath. I will not at present determine whether he who censures the
Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. But I believe that
I can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For
assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them
will be the law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them
are right or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all
agree that the laws are all good, for they came from God; and any
one who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who
remarks any defect in your laws may communicate his observation to a
ruler or to an equal in years when no young man is present.
Cle. Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not there at
the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the
legislator, and to say what is most true.
Ath. As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given
old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing
these very matters now that we are alone.
Cle. True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your
censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is
wrong; he who receives what is said in a generous and friendly
spirit will be all the better for it.
Ath. Very good; however, I am not going to say anything against your
laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am
going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only people known to
us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to
eschew all great pleasures and amusements and never to touch them;
whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have just been
discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided
pains and fears and sorrows, when they were compelled to face them
would run away from those who were hardened in them, and would
become their subjects. Now the legislator ought to have considered
that this was equally true of pleasure; he should have said to
himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted
with the greatest pleasures, and unused to endure amid the temptations
of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things
evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear
would overcome the former class; and in another, and even a worse
manner, they will be the slaves of those who are able to endure amid
pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being
often the worst of mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave,
the other half free; and they will not be worthy to be called in the
true sense men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words?
Cle. On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but
to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters
would be very childish and simple.
Ath. Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue
which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after
courage comes temperance), what institutions shall we find relating to
temperance, either in Crete or Lacedaemon, which, like your military
institutions, differ from those of any ordinary state.
Meg. That is not an easy question to answer; still I should say that
the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised
for the promotion both of temperance and courage.
Ath. There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, with regard to
states, in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no
dispute about them. As in the human body, the regimen which does
good in one way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that any
one course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now
the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they
are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of the
Milesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these
institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient
and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of
the beasts. The charge may be fairly brought against your cities above
all others, and is true also of most other states which especially
cultivate gymnastics. Whether such matters are to be regarded
jestingly or seriously, I think that the pleasure is to be deemed
natural which arises out of the intercourse between men and women; but
that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is
contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was originally due to
unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of having invented
the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they wanted to justify
themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice
of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. Leaving
the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost
entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in individuals:
these are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws
from them where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and
this holds of men and animals-of individuals as well as states; and he
who indulges in them ignorantly and at the wrong time, is the
reverse of happy.
Meg. I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken, and I
hardly know what to say in answer to you; but still I think that the
Spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. Of the Cretan
laws, I shall leave the defence to my Cnosian friend. But the laws
of Sparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, appear to me to be
the best in the world; for that which leads mankind in general into
the wildest pleasure and licence, and every other folly, the law has
clean driven out; and neither in the country nor in towns which are
under the control of Sparta, will you find revelries and the many
incitements of every kind of pleasure which accompany them; and any
one who meets a drunken and disorderly person, will immediately have
him most severely punished, and will not let him off on any
pretence, not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival; although I
have remarked that this may happen at your performances "on the cart,"
as they are called; and among our Tarentine colonists I have seen
the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival; but nothing of the
sort happens among us.
Ath. O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy
where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they
are under no regulations. In order to retaliate, an Athenian has
only to point out the licence which exists among your women. To all
such accusations, whether they are brought against the Tarentines,
or us, or you, there is one answer which exonerates the practice in
question from impropriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the
singularity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer
him:-Wonder not, O stranger; this is our custom, and you may very
likely have some other custom about the same things. Now we are
speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but about the merits
and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let us then discourse a
little more at length about intoxication, which is a very important
subject, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legislator.
I am not speaking of drinking, or not drinking, wine at all, but of
intoxication. Are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and
Persians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, and Thracians,
who are all warlike nations, or that of your countrymen, for they,
as you say, altogether abstain? But the Scythians and Thracians,
both men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they pour on their
garments, and this they think a happy and glorious institution. The
Persians, again, are much given to other practices of luxury which you
reject, but they have more moderation in them than the Thracians and
Scythians.
Meg. O best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and we
send all these nations flying before us.
Ath. Nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as there
always will be, flights and pursuits of which no account can be given,
and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle affords
more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions.
For when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the
Syracusans have done the Locrians, who appear to be the
best-governed people in their part of the world, or as the Athenians
have done the Ceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the
same sort of thing), all this is not to the point; let us endeavour
rather to form a conclusion about each institution in itself and say
nothing, at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that
such and such a custom is honourable, and another not. And first
permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in
reference to these very matters.
Meg. How do you mean?
Ath. All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or
censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to
proceed in a wrong way. Let me give you an illustration of what I
mean:-You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind
of food, whereupon another person instantly blames wheat, without ever
enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or
with what, or in what state and how, wheat is to be given. And that is
just what we are doing in this discussion. At the very mention of
the word intoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the
other with their censures; which is absurd. For either side adduce
their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak with
authority because we have many witnesses; and others because they
see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this again is disputed
by us. Now I cannot say that I shall be satisfied, if we go on
discussing each of the remaining laws in the same way. And about
this very point of intoxication I should like to speak in another way,
which I hold to be the right one; for if number is to be the
criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to
dispute the point with you, who are only two cities?
Meg. I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right.
Ath. Let me put the matter thus:-Suppose a person to praise the
keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to
have, and then some one who had seen goats feeding without a
goatherd in cultivated spots, and doing mischief, were to censure a
goat or any other animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would
there be any sense or justice in such censure?
Meg. Certainly not.
Ath. Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order
to be a good captain, whether he is sea-sick or not? What do you say?
Meg. I say that he is not a good captain if, although he have
nautical skill, he is liable to sea-sickness.
Ath. And what would you say of the commander of an army? Will he
be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a
coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?
Meg. Impossible.
Ath. And what if besides being a coward he has no skill?
Meg. He is a miserable fellow, not fit to be a commander of men, but
only of old women.
Ath. And what would you say of some one who blames or praises any
sort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is
well enough when under his presidency? The critic, however, has
never seen the society meeting together at an orderly feast under
the control of a president, but always without a ruler or with a bad
one:-when observers of this class praise or blame such meetings, are
we to suppose that what they say is of any value?
Meg. Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at
such a meeting when rightly ordered.
Ath. Reflect; may not banqueters and banquets be said to
constitute a kind of meeting?
Meg. Of course.
Ath. And did any one ever see this sort of convivial meeting rightly
ordered? Of course you two will answer that you have never seen them
at all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country;
but I have come across many of them in many different places, and
moreover I have made enquiries about them wherever I went, as I may
say, and never did I see or hear of anything of the kind which was
carried on altogether rightly; in some few particulars they might be
right, but in general they were utterly wrong.
Cle. What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark? Explain; For we, as
you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely
not know, even if they came in our way, what was right or wrong in
such societies.
Ath. Likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor: You would
acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of man, kind, of
whatever sort, there ought to be a leader?
Cle. Certainly I should.
Ath. And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the
leader ought to be a brave man?
Cle. We were.
Ath. The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by
fears?
Cle. That again is true.
Ath. And if there were a possibility of having a general of an
army who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by
all means appoint him?
Cle. Assuredly.
Ath. Now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is to
command an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who
is to regulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in
time of peace.
Cle. True.
Ath. And that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is
apt to be unquiet.
Cle. Certainly; the reverse of quiet.
Ath. In the first place, then, the revellers as well as the soldiers
will require a ruler?
Cle. To be sure; no men more so.
Ath. And we ought, if possible, to provide them with a quiet ruler?
Cle. Of course.
Ath. And he should be a man who understands society; for his duty is
to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the
time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion.
Cle. Very true.
Ath. Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master
of the revels? For if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and
drunken, and not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will
he be saved from doing some great evil.
Cle. It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved.
Ath. Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way
possible in states, and that some one blames the very fact of their
existence-he may very likely be right. But if he blames a practice
which he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows in the first place
that he is not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that
everything done in this way will turn out to be wrong, because done
without the superintendence of a sober ruler. Do you not see that a
drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship,
chariot, army-anything, in short, of which he has the direction?
Cle. The last remark is very true, Stranger; and I see quite clearly
the advantage of an army having a good leader-he will give victory
in war to his followers, which is a very great advantage; and so of
other things. But I do not see any similar advantage which either
individuals or states gain from the good management of a feast; and
I want you to tell me what great good will be effected, supposing that
this drinking ordinance is duly established.
Ath. If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from
the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus-when the
question is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very
great in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of
education in general, the answer is easy-that education makes good
men, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle,
because they are good. Education certainly gives victory, although
victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education; for many have
grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has
engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been
and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is never suicidal.
Cle. You seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when
rightly ordered, are an important element of education.
Ath. Certainly I do.
Cle. And can you show that what you have been saying is true?
Ath. To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning
which there are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given
to man, Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I
think, especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion
concerning laws and constitutions.
Cle. Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now being
raised, is precisely what we want to hear.
Ath. Very good; I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning,
and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. But first
let me make an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all
the Hellenes to be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for
brevity, and the Cretans have more wit than words. Now I am afraid
of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small
materials. For drinking indeed may appear to be a slight matter, and
yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered according to nature,
without correct principles of music; these are necessary to any
clear or satisfactory treatment of the subject, and music again runs
up into education generally, and there is much to be said about all
this. What would you say then to leaving these matters for the
present, and passing on to some other question of law?
Meg. O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not
know, that our family is the proxenus of your state. I imagine that
from their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are
the proxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second
and this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from
the days of my boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed
the Athenians, they used to say to me-"See, Megillus, how ill or how
well," as the case might be, "has your state treated us"; and having
always had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you
assailed, I became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear
the Athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a
good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who
is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own
nature, and is not manufactured. Therefore be assured that I shall
like to hear you say whatever you have to say.
Cle. Yes, Stranger; and when you have heard me speak, say boldly
what is in your thoughts. Let me remind you of a tie which unites
you to Crete. You must have heard here the story of the prophet
Epimenides, who was of my family, and came to Athens ten years
before the Persian war, in accordance with the response of the Oracle,
and offered certain sacrifices which the God commanded. The
Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian invasion; and he
said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they
came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their
objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. At that
time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you; thus
ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for you.
Ath. You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ready to
perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will
nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define
the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our
argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.
Cle. Let us proceed, if you please.
Ath. Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education,
will you consider whether they satisfy you?
Cle. Let us hear.
Ath. According to my view, any one who would be good at anything
must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and
earnest, in its several branches: for example, he who is to be a
good builder, should play at building children's houses; he who is
to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; and those who have the
care of their education should provide them when young with mimic
tools. They should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will
afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter
should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future
warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise, for amusement,
and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations
and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in
life. The most important part of education is right training in the
nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the
love of that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood
he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or
ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame
about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and
another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes
very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain
of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in
this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from
youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection
of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey.
This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name;
that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth
or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and
justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called
education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a
word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold
good: to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become
good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the
first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which,
though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation.
And this work of reformation is the great business of every man
while he lives.
Cle. Very true; and we entirely agree with you.
Ath. And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to
rule themselves, and bad men who are not.
Cle. You are quite right.
Ath. Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a
little further by an illustration which I will offer you.
Cle. Proceed.
Ath. Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?
Cle. We do.
Ath. And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both
foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure,
and the other pain.
Cle. Exactly.
Ath. Also there are opinions about the future, which have the
general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when
the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and
further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this,
when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.
Cle. I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.
Meg. I am in the like case.
Ath. Let us look at the matter thus: May we not conceive each of
us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything
only, or created with a purpose-which of the two we cannot certainly
know? But we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and
strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite
actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice.
According to the argument there is one among these cords which every
man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all
the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called
by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and
of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several
other kinds. Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the
best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle,
and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help
the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the
moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and
the meaning of the expression "superior or inferior to a man's self"
will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason
in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live
according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some
god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in
a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other
states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished
by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other
institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular
that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps,
to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many
more words than were necessary.
Cle. Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy
of the length of discourse.
Ath. Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears
on our present object.
Cle. Proceed.
Ath. Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink-what will be the
effect on him?
Cle. Having what in view do you ask that question?
Ath. Nothing as yet; but I ask generally, when the puppet is brought
to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow. I will
endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am now asking
is this-Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures
and pains, and passions and loves?
Cle. Very greatly.
Ath. And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence,
heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man
if he becomes saturated with drink?
Cle. Yes, they entirely desert him.
Ath. Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when
a young child?
Cle. He does.
Ath. Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?
Cle. The least.
Ath. And will he not be in a most wretched plight?
Cle. Most wretched.
Ath. Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second
time a child?
Cle. Well said, Stranger.
Ath. Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to
encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to
avoid it?
Cle. I suppose that there is; you at any rate, were just now
saying that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.
Ath. True, I was; and I am ready still, seeing that you have both
declared that you are anxious to hear me.
Cle. To sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox,
which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into
utter degradation.
Ath. Are you speaking of the soul?
Cle. Yes.
Ath. And what would you say about the body, my friend? Are you not
surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself
deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and
takes medicine, is he not aware that soon, and for many days
afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather
than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those
who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of
weakness?
Cle. Yes, all that is well known.
Ath. Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the
subsequent benefit?
Cle. Very good.
Ath. And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other
practices?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking wine,
if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. If such convivialities should turn out to have any advantage
equal in importance to that of gymnastic, they are in their very
nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they
have no accompaniment of pain.
Cle. True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover
any such benefits to be derived from them.
Ath. That is just what we must endeavour to show. And let me ask you
a question:-Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very
different?
Cle. What are they?
Ath. There is the fear of expected evil.
Cle. Yes.
Ath. And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid
of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable
thing, which fear we and all men term shame.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is
the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the
greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures.
Cle. Very true.
Ath. And does not the legislator and every one who is good for
anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms
reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms
insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both
to individuals and to states.
Cle. True.
Ath. Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important
ways? What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war?
For there are two things which give victory-confidence before enemies,
and fear of disgrace before friends.
Cle. There are.
Ath. Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why we
should be either has now been determined.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring
him face to face with many fears.
Cle. Clearly.
Ath. And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not
introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms
against them, and to overcome them? Or does this principle apply to
courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against
and overcome his own natural character-since if he be unpractised
and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which
he might have been-and are we to suppose, that with temperance it is
otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and
unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered
them, in earnest and in play, by word, deed, and act, will still be
perfectly temperate?
Cle. A most unlikely supposition.
Ath. Suppose that some God had given a fear-potion to men, and
that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at
every draught as a child of misfortune, and that he feared
everything happening or about to happen to him; and that at last the
most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time,
and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence
of the draught.
Cle. But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known
among men?
Ath. No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have
been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go
and say to him, "O legislator, whether you are legislating for the
Cretan, or for any other state, would you not like to have a
touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?"
Cle. "I should," will be the answer of every one.
Ath. "And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no
risk and no great danger than the reverse?"
Cle. In that proposition every one may safely agree.
Ath. "And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them
amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of
fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless,
exhorting and admonishing them; and also honouring them, but
dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all
respects such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well
and manfully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would
inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain from using the
potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?"
Cle. He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.
Ath. This would be a mode of testing and training which would be
wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be
applied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number;
and he would do well who provided himself with the potion only, rather
than with any number of other things, whether he preferred to be by
himself in solitude, and there contend with his fears, because he
was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or
trusting to the force of his own nature and habits, and believing that
he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to
train himself in company with any number of others, and display his
power in conquering the irresistible change effected by the
draught-his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into
any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he
arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be
overcome by the potion.
Cle. Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show
his self-control.
Ath. Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:-"Well, lawgiver,
there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either received
from the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at
our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test of
overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?
Cle. I suppose that he will say, Yes-meaning that wine is such a
potion.
Ath. Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of
the other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased
with himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of
brave hopes, and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his
tongue is loosened, and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over
with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to
do or say anything.
Cle. I think that every one will admit the truth of your
description.
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two
things which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest
courage; secondly, the greatest fear-
Cle. Which you said to be characteristic of reverence, if I am not
mistaken.
Ath. Thank you for reminding me. But now, as the habit of courage
and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider
whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among
opposites.
Cle. That is probably the case.
Ath. There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than
commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these
occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as
possible, and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is
base.
Cle. True.
Ath. Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and
shameless such as these?-when we are under the influence of anger,
love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty,
strength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us?
What is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first
place to test, and in the second place to train the character of a
man, if care be taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more
innocent? For do but consider which is the greater risk:-Would you
rather test a man of a morose and savage nature, which is the source
of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains with him at a
risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the festival of
Dionysus? Or would you, if you wanted to apply a touchstone to a man
who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to
him, perilling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the
condition of his soul? I might mention numberless cases, in which
the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in
sport, and without paying dearly for experience. And I do not
believe that either a Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a
test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other.
Cle. That is certainly true.
Ath. And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls
will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of
them; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.
Cle. Exactly so.
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