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In asserting that Being is not a unity, we do not mean to
imply a definite number of existences; the number may well be
infinite: we mean simply that it is many as well as one, that it
is, so to speak, a diversified unity, a plurality in unity.
It follows that either the unity so regarded is a unity of genus
under which the Existents, involving as they do plurality as well
as unity, stand as species; or that while there are more genera
than one, yet all are subordinate to a unity; or there may be
more genera than one, though no one genus is subordinate to any
other, but all with their own subordinates- whether these be
lesser genera, or species with individuals for their
subordinates- all are elements in one entity, and from their
totality the Intellectual realm- that which we know as Being-
derives its constitution.
If this last is the truth, we have here not merely genera, but
genera which are at the same time principles of Being. They are
genera because they have subordinates- other genera, and
successively species and individuals; they are also principles,
since from this plurality Being takes its rise, constituted in
its entirety from these its elements.
Suppose, however, a greater number of origins which by their mere
totality comprised, without possessing any subordinates, the
whole of Being; these would be first-principles but not genera:
it would be as if one constructed the sensible world from the
four elements- fire and the others; these elements would be first
principles, but they would not be genera, unless the term "genus"
is to be used equivocally.
But does this assertion of certain genera which are at the same
time first-principles imply that by combining the genera, each
with its subordinates, we find the whole of Being in the
resultant combination? But then, taken separately, their
existence will not be actual but only potential, and they will
not be found in isolation.
Suppose, on the other hand, we ignore the genera and combine the
particulars: what then becomes of the ignored genera? They will,
surely, exist in the purity of their own isolation, and the
mixtures will not destroy them. The question of how this result
is achieved may be postponed.
For the moment we take it as agreed that there are genera as
distinct from principles of Being and that, on another plane,
principles [elements] are opposed to compounds. We are thus
obliged to show in what relation we speak of genera and why we
distinguish them instead of summing them under a unity; for
otherwise we imply that their coalescence into a unity is
fortuitous, whereas it would be more plausible to dispense with
their separate existence.
If all the genera could be species of Being, all individuals
without exception being immediately subordinate to these species,
then such a unification becomes feasible. But that supposition
bespeaks annihilation for the genera: the species will no longer
be species; plurality will no longer be subordinated to unity;
everything must be the unity, unless there exist some thing or
things outside the unity. The One never becomes many- as the
existence of species demands- unless there is something distinct
from it: it cannot of itself assume plurality, unless we are to
think of it as being broken into pieces like some extended body:
but even so, the force which breaks it up must be distinct from
it: if it is itself to effect the breaking up- or whatever form
the division may take- then it is itself previously divided.
For these and many other reasons we must abstain from positing a
single genus, and especially because neither Being nor Substance
can be the predicate of any given thing. If we do predicate
Being, it is only as an accidental attribute; just as when we
predicate whiteness of a substance, we are not predicating the
Absolute Whiteness.
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