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We assert, then, a plurality of Existents, but a plurality not
fortuitous and therefore a plurality deriving from a unity.
But even admitting this derivation from a unity- a unity however
not predicated of them in respect of their essential being- there
is, surely, no reason why each of these Existents, distinct in
character from every other, should not in itself stand as a
separate genus.
Is, then, this unity external to the genera thus produced, this
unity which is their source though it cannot be predicated of
them in respect of their essence? it is indeed external; the One
is beyond; it cannot, therefore, be included among the genera: it
is the [transcendent] source, while they stand side by side as
genera. Yet surely the one must somehow be included [among the
genera]? No: it is the Existents we are investigating, not that
which is beyond Existence.
We pass on, then, to consider that which is included, and find to
our surprise the cause included with the things it causes: it is
surely strange that causes and effects should be brought into the
same genus.
But if the cause is included with its effects only in the sense
in which a genus is included with its subordinates, the
subordinates being of a different order, so that it cannot be
predicated of them whether as their genus or in any other
relation, these subordinates are obviously themselves genera with
subordinates of their own: you may, for example, be the cause of
the operation of walking, but the walking is not subordinate to
you in the relation of species to genus; and if walking had
nothing prior to it as its genus, but had posteriors, then it
would be a [primary] genus and rank among the Existents.
Perhaps, however, it must be utterly denied that unity is even
the cause of other things; they should be considered rather as
its parts or elements- if the terms may be allowed,- their
totality constituting a single entity which our thinking divides.
All unity though it be, it goes by a wonderful power out into
everything; it appears as many and becomes many when there is a
motion; the fecundity of its nature causes the One to be no
longer one, and we, displaying what we call its parts, consider
them each as a unity and make them into "genera," unaware of our
failure to see the whole at once. We display it, then, in parts,
though, unable to restrain their natural tendency to coalesce, we
bring these parts together again, resign them to the whole and
allow them to become a unity, or rather to be a unity.
All this will become clearer in the light of further
consideration- when, that is to say, we have ascertained the
number of the genera; for thus we shall also discover their
causes. It is not enough to deny; we must advance by dint of
thought and comprehension. The way is clear:
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