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If then we do not propose to divide Quality in this
[fourfold] manner, what basis of division have we?
We must examine whether qualities may not prove to be divisible
on the principle that some belong to the body and others to the
soul. Those of the body would be subdivided according to the
senses, some being attributed to sight, others to hearing and
taste, others to smell and touch. Those of the soul would
presumably be allotted to appetite, emotion, reason; though,
again, they may be distinguished by the differences of the
activities they condition, in so far as activities are engendered
by these qualities; or according as they are beneficial or
injurious, the benefits and injuries being duly classified. This
last is applicable also to the classification of bodily
qualities, which also produce differences of benefit and injury:
these differences must be regarded as distinctively qualitative;
for either the benefit and injury are held to be derived from
Quality and the quale, or else some other explanation must be
found for them.
A point for consideration is how the quale, as conditioned by
Quality, can belong to the same category: obviously there can be
no single genus embracing both.
Further, if "boxer" is in the category of Quality, why not
"agent" as well? And with agent goes "active." Thus "active" need
not go into the category of Relation; nor again need "passive,"
if "patient" is a quale. Moreover, agent" is perhaps better
assigned to the category of Quality for the reason that the term
implies power, and power is Quality. But if power as such were
determined by Substance [and not by Quality], the agent, though
ceasing to be a quale, would not necessarily become a relative.
Besides, "active" is not like "greater": the greater, to be the
greater, demands a less, whereas "active" stands complete by the
mere possession of its specific character.
It may however be urged that while the possession of that
character makes it a quale, it is a relative in so far as it
directs upon an external object the power indicated by its name.
Why, then, is not "boxer" a relative, and "boxing" as well?
Boxing is entirely related to an external object; its whole
theory pre-supposes this external. And in the case of the other
arts- or most of them- investigation would probably warrant the
assertion that in so far as they affect the soul they are
qualities, while in so far as they look outward they are active
and as being directed to an external object are relatives. They
are relatives in the other sense also that they are thought of as
habits.
Can it then be held that there is any distinct reality implied in
activity, seeing that the active is something distinct only
according as it is a quale? It may perhaps be held that the
tendency towards action of living beings, and especially of those
having freewill, implies a reality of activity [as well as a
reality of Quality].
But what is the function of the active in connection with those
non-living powers which we have classed as qualities? Doubtless
to recruit any object it encounters, making the object a
participant in its content.
But if one same object both acts and is acted upon, how do we
then explain the active? Observe also that the greater- in itself
perhaps a fixed three yards' length- will present itself as both
greater and less according to its external contacts.
It will be objected that greater and less are due to
participation in greatness and smallness; and it might be
inferred that a thing is active or passive by participation in
activity or passivity.
This is the place for enquiring also whether the qualities of the
Sensible and Intellectual realms can be included under one head-
a question intended only for those who ascribe qualities to the
higher realm as well as the lower. And even if Ideal Forms of
qualities are not posited, yet once the term "habit" is used in
reference to Intellect, the question arises whether there is
anything common to that habit and the habit we know in the lower.
Wisdom too is generally admitted to exist There. Obviously, if it
shares only its name with our wisdom, it is not to be reckoned
among things of this sphere; if, however, the import is in both
cases the same, then Quality is common to both realms- unless, of
course, it be maintained that everything There, including even
intellection, is Substance.
This question, however, applies to all the categories: are the
two spheres irreconcilable, or can they be co-ordinated with a
unity?
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