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It may be objected that our will towards living and towards
expressive activity is constant, and that each attainment of such
expression is an increase in Happiness.
But in the first place, by this reckoning every to-morrow's
well-being will be greater than to-day's, every later instalment
successively larger that an earlier; at once time supplants moral
excellence as the measure of felicity.
Then again the Gods to-day must be happier than of old: and their
bliss, too, is not perfect, will never be perfect. Further, when
the will attains what it was seeking, it attains something
present: the quest is always for something to be actually present
until a standing felicity is definitely achieved. The will to
life which is will to Existence aims at something present, since
Existence must be a stably present thing. Even when the act of
the will is directed towards the future, and the furthest future,
its object is an actually present having and being: there is no
concern about what is passed or to come: the future state a man
seeks is to be a now to him; he does not care about the forever:
he asks that an actual present be actually present.
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