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Those ascribing Intellection to the First have not supposed
him to know the lesser, the emanant- though, indeed, some have
thought it impossible that he should not know everything. But
those denying his knowing of the lesser have still attributed
self-knowing to him, because they find nothing nobler; we are to
suppose that so he is the more august, as if Intellection were
something nobler than his own manner of being not something whose
value derives from him.
But we ask in what must his grandeur lie, in his Intellection or
in himself. If in the Intellection, he has no worth or the less
worth; if in himself, he is perfect before the Intellection, not
perfected by it. We may be told that he must have Intellection
because he is an Act, not a potentiality. Now if this means that
he is an essence eternally intellective, he is represented as a
duality- essence and Intellective Act- he ceases to be a simplex;
an external has been added: it is just as the eyes are not the
same as their sight, though the two are inseparable. If on the
other hand by this actualization it is meant that he is Act and
Intellection, then as being Intellection he does not exercise it,
just as movement is not itself in motion.
But do not we ourselves assert that the Beings There are essence
and Act?
The Beings, yes, but they are to us manifold and differentiated:
the First we make a simplex; to us Intellection begins with the
emanant in its seeking of its essence, of itself, of its author;
bent inward for this vision and having a present thing to know,
there is every reason why it should be a principle of
Intellection; but that which, never coming into being, has no
prior but is ever what it is, how could that have motive to
Intellection? As Plato rightly says, it is above Intellect.
An Intelligence not exercising Intellection would be
unintelligent; where the nature demands knowing, not to know is
to fail of intelligence; but where there is no function, why
import one and declare a defect because it is not performed? We
might as well complain because the Supreme does not act as a
physician. He has no task, we hold, because nothing can present
itself to him to be done; he is sufficient; he need seek nothing
beyond himself, he who is over all; to himself and to all he
suffices by simply being what he is.
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