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But if these considerations are sound, why has Quality more
than one species? What is the ground for distinguishing between
habit and disposition, seeing that no differentia of Quality is
involved in permanence and non-permanence? A disposition of any
kind is sufficient to constitute a quality; permanence is a mere
external addition. It might however be urged that dispositions
are but incomplete "forms"- if the term may pass- habits being
complete ones. But incomplete, they are not qualities; if already
qualities, the permanence is an external addition.
How do physical powers form a distinct species? If they are
classed as qualities in virtue of being powers, power, we have
seen, is not a necessary concomitant of qualities. If, however,
we hold that the natural boxer owes his quality to a particular
disposition, power is something added and does not contribute to
the quality, since power is found in habits also.
Another point: why is natural ability to be distinguished from
that acquired by learning? Surely, if both are qualities, they
cannot be differentiae of Quality: gained by practice or given in
nature, it is the same ability; the differentia will be external
to Quality; it cannot be deduced from the Ideal Form of boxing.
Whether some qualities as distinguished from others are derived
from experience is immaterial; the source of the quality makes no
difference- none, I mean, pointing to variations and differences
of Quality.
A further question would seem to be involved: If certain
qualities are derived from experience but here is a discrepancy
in the manner and source of the experience, how are they to be
included in the same species? And again, if some create the
experience, others are created by it, the term Quality as applied
to both classes will be equivocal.
And what part is played by the individual form? If it constitutes
the individual's specific character, it is not a quality; if,
however, it is what makes an object beautiful or ugly after the
specific form has been determined, then it involves a
Reason-Principle.
Rough and smooth, tenuous and dense may rightly be classed as
qualities. It is true that they are not determined by distances
and approximations, or in general by even or uneven dispositions,
of parts; though, were they so determined, they might well even
then be qualities.
Knowledge of the meaning of "light" and "heavy" will reveal their
place in the classification. An ambiguity will however be latent
in the term "light," unless it be determined by comparative
weight: it would then implicate leanness and fineness, and
involve another species distinct from the four [of Aristotle].
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