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The claim of Motion to be established as a genus will depend
upon three conditions: first, that it cannot rightly be referred
to any other genus; second, that nothing higher than itself can
be predicated of it in respect of its essence; third, that by
assuming differences it will produce species. These conditions
satisfied, we may consider the nature of the genus to which we
shall refer it.
Clearly it cannot be identified with either the Substance or the
Quality of the things which possess it. It cannot, further, be
consigned to Action, for Passivity also comprises a variety of
motions; nor again to Passivity itself, because many motions are
actions: on the contrary, actions and passions are to be referred
to Motion.
Furthermore, it cannot lay claim to the category of Relation on
the mere ground that it has an attributive and not a self-centred
existence: on this ground, Quality too would find itself in that
same category; for Quality is an attribute and contained in an
external: and the same is true of Quantity.
If we are agreed that Quality and Quantity, though attributive,
are real entities, and on the basis of this reality
distinguishable as Quality and Quantity respectively: then, on
the same principle, since Motion, though an attribute has a
reality prior to its attribution, it is incumbent upon us to
discover the intrinsic nature of this reality. We must never be
content to regard as a relative something which exists prior to
its attribution, but only that which is engendered by Relation
and has no existence apart from the relation to which it owes its
name: the double, strictly so called, takes birth and actuality
in juxtaposition with a yard's length, and by this very process
of being juxtaposed with a correlative acquires the name and
exhibits the fact of being double.
What, then, is that entity, called Motion, which, though
attributive, has an independent reality, which makes its
attribution possible- the entity corresponding to Quality,
Quantity and Substance?
But first, perhaps, we should make sure that there is nothing
prior to Motion and predicated of it as its genus.
Change may be suggested as a prior. But, in the first place,
either it is identical with Motion, or else, if change be claimed
as a genus, it will stand distinct from the genera so far
considered: secondly, Motion will evidently take rank as a
species and have some other species opposed to it- becoming, say-
which will be regarded as a change but not as a motion.
What, then, is the ground for denying that becoming is a motion?
The fact, perhaps, that what comes to be does not yet exist,
whereas Motion has no dealings with the non-existent. But, on
that ground, becoming will not be a change either. If however it
be alleged that becoming is merely a type of alteration or growth
since it takes place when things alter and grow, the antecedents
of becoming are being confused with becoming itself. Yet
becoming, entailing as it does these antecedents, must
necessarily be a distinct species; for the event and process of
becoming cannot be identified with merely passive alteration,
like turning hot or white: it is possible for the antecedents to
take place without becoming as such being accomplished, except in
so far as the actual alteration [implied in the antecedents] has
"come to be"; where, however, an animal or a vegetal life is
concerned, becoming [or birth] takes place only upon its
acquisition of a Form.
The contrary might be maintained: that change is more plausibly
ranked as a species than is Motion, because change signifies
merely the substitution of one thing for another, whereas Motion
involves also the removal of a thing from the place to which it
belongs, as is shown by locomotion. Even rejecting this
distinction, we must accept as types of Motion knowledge and
musical performance- in short, changes of condition: thus,
alteration will come to be regarded as a species of Motion-
namely, motion displacing.
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