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Now this Animate might be merely the body as having life: it
might be the Couplement of Soul and body: it might be a third and
different entity formed from both.
The Soul in turn- apart from the nature of the Animate- must be
either impassive, merely causing Sense-Perception in its
yoke-fellow, or sympathetic; and, if sympathetic, it may have
identical experiences with its fellow or merely correspondent
experiences: desire for example in the Animate may be something
quite distinct from the accompanying movement or state in the
desiring faculty.
The body, the live-body as we know it, we will consider later.
Let us take first the Couplement of body and Soul. How could
suffering, for example, be seated in this Couplement?
It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body
produces a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in
turn merges into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin
of the sensation unexplained.
Another suggestion might be that all is due to an opinion or
judgement: some evil seems to have befallen the man or his
belongings and this conviction sets up a state of trouble in the
body and in the entire Animate. But this account leaves still a
question as to the source and seat of the judgement: does it
belong to the Soul or to the Couplement? Besides, the judgement
that evil is present does not involve the feeling of grief: the
judgement might very well arise and the grief by no means follow:
one may think oneself slighted and yet not be angry; and the
appetite is not necessarily excited by the thought of a pleasure.
We are, thus, no nearer than before to any warrant for assigning
these affections to the Couplement.
Is it any explanation to say that desire is vested in a
Faculty-of-desire and anger in the Irascible-Faculty and,
collectively, that all tendency is seated in the
Appetitive-Faculty? Such a statement of the facts does not help
towards making the affections common to the Couplement; they
might still be seated either in the Soul alone or in the body
alone. On the one hand if the appetite is to be stirred, as in
the carnal passion, there must be a heating of the blood and the
bile, a well-defined state of the body; on the other hand, the
impulse towards The Good cannot be a joint affection, but, like
certain others too, it would belong necessarily to the Soul
alone.
Reason, then, does not permit us to assign all the affections to
the Couplement.
In the case of carnal desire, it will certainly be the Man that
desires, and yet, on the other hand, there must be desire in the
Desiring-Faculty as well. How can this be? Are we to suppose
that, when the man originates the desire, the Desiring-Faculty
moves to the order? How could the Man have come to desire at all
unless through a prior activity in the Desiring-Faculty? Then it
is the Desiring-Faculty that takes the lead? Yet how, unless the
body be first in the appropriate condition?
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