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We have examined the proposed "ten genera": we have discussed
also the theory which gathers the total of things into one genus
and to this subordinates what may be thought of as its four
species. The next step is, naturally, to expound our own views
and to try to show the agreement of our conclusions with those of
Plato.
Now if we were obliged to consider Being as a unity, the
following questions would be unnecessary:
Is there one genus embracing everything, or are there genera
which cannot be subsumed under such a unity? Are there
first-principles? Are first-principles to be identified with
genera, or genera with first-principles? Or is it perhaps rather
the case that while not all genera are first-principles, all
first-principles are at the same time genera? Or is the converse
true? Or again, do both classes overlap, some principles being
also genera, and some genera also principles? And do both the
sets of categories we have been examining imply that only some
principles are genera and some genera principles? or does one of
them presuppose that all that belongs to the class of genera
belongs also to the class of principles?
Since, however, we affirm that Being is not a unity- the reason
for this affirmation is stated by Plato and others- these
questions become imperative, once we are satisfied as to the
number of genera to be posited and the grounds for our choice.
The subject of our enquiry, then, is the Existent or Existents,
and it presents immediately two problems demanding separate
analysis:
What do we mean by the Existent? This is naturally the first
question to be examined.
What is that which, often taken for Being [for the Existent], is
in our view Becoming and never really Being? Note however that
these concepts are not to be taken as distinguished from each
other in the sense of belonging to a genus, Something, divided
into Being and Becoming; and we must not suppose that Plato took
this view. It would be absurd to assign Being to the same genus
as non-Being: this would be to make one genus of Socrates and his
portrait. The division here [between what has Being and what is
in Becoming] means a definite marking-off, a setting asunder,
leading to the assertion that what takes the appearance of Being
is not Being and implying that the nature of True Being has been
quite misapprehended. Being, we are taught, must have the
attribute of eternity, must be so constituted as never to belie
its own nature.
This, then, is the Being of which we shall treat, and in our
investigation we shall assume that it is not a unity:
subsequently we ask leave to say something on the nature of
Becoming and on what it is that comes to be, that is, on the
nature of the world of Sense.
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