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We have to ascertain whether there is not to every quality a
contrary. In the case of virtue and vice, even the mean appears
to be contrary to the extremes.
But when we turn to colours, we do not find the intermediates so
related. If we regard the intermediates as blendings of the
extremes, we must not posit any contrariety other than that
between black and white, but must show that all other colours are
combinations of these two. Contrariety however demands that there
be some one distinct quality in the intermediates, though this
quality may be seen to arise from a combination.
It may further be suggested that contraries not only differ from
each other, but also entail the greatest possible difference. But
"the greatest possible difference" would seem to presuppose that
intermediates have already been established: eliminate the
series, and how will you define "the greatest possible"? Sight,
we may be told, will reveal to us that grey is nearer than black
to white; and taste may be our judge when we have hot, cold and
no intermediate.
That we are accustomed to act upon these assumptions is obvious
enough; but the following considerations may perhaps commend
themselves:
White and yellow are entirely different from each other- a
statement which applies to any colour whatsoever as compared with
any other; they are accordingly contrary qualities. Their
contrariety is independent of the presence of intermediates:
between health and disease no intermediate intrudes, and yet they
are contraries.
It may be urged that the products of a contrariety exhibit the
greatest diversity. But "the greatest diversity" is clearly
meaningless, unless we can point to lower degrees of diversity in
the means. Thus, we cannot speak of "the greatest diversity" in
reference to health and disease. This definition of contrariety
is therefore inadmissible.
Suppose that we say "great diversity" instead of "the greatest":
if "great" is equivalent to greater and implies a less, immediate
contraries will again escape us; if, on the other hand, we mean
strictly "great" and assume that every quality shows a great
divergence from every other, we must not suppose that the
divergence can be measured by a comparative.
Nonetheless, we must endeavour to find a meaning for the term
"contrary." Can we accept the principle that when things have a
certain similarity which is not generic nor in any sense due to
admixture, but a similarity residing in their forms- if the term
be permitted- they differ in degree but are not contraries;
contraries being rather those things which have no specific
identity? It would be necessary to stipulate that they belong to
the same genus, Quality, in order to cover those immediate
contraries which [apparently] have nothing conducing to
similarity, inasmuch as there are no intermediates looking both
ways, as it were, and having a mutual similarity to each other;
some contraries are precluded by their isolation from similarity.
If these observations be sound, colours which have a common
ground will not be contraries. But there will be nothing to
prevent, not indeed every colour from being contrary to every
other, but any one colour from being contrary to any other; and
similarly with tastes. This will serve as a statement of the
problem.
As for Degree [subsisting in Quality], it was given as our
opinion that it exists in the objects participating in Quality,
though whether it enters into qualities as such- into health and
justice- was left open to question. If indeed these qualities
possess an extension quite apart from their participants, we must
actually ascribe to them degrees: but in truth they belong to a
sphere where each entity is the whole and does not admit of
degree.
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