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With Quality we have undertaken to group the dependent
qualia, in so far as Quality is bound up with them; we shall not
however introduce into this category the qualified objects [qua
objects], that we may not be dealing with two categories at once;
we shall pass over the objects to that which gives them their
[specific] name.
But how are we to classify such terms as "not white"? If "not
white" signifies some other colour, it is a quality. But if it is
merely a negation of an enumeration of things not white, it will
be either a meaningless sound, or else a name or definition of
something actual: if a sound, it is a kind of motion; if a name
or definition, it is a relative, inasmuch as names and
definitions are significant. But if not only the things
enumerated are in some one genus, but also the propositions and
terms in question must be each of them significative of some
genus, then we shall assert that negative propositions and terms
posit certain things within a restricted field and deny others.
Perhaps, however, it would be better, in view of their composite
nature, not to include the negations in the same genus as the
affirmations.
What view, then, shall we take of privations? If they are
privations of qualities, they will themselves be qualities:
"toothless" and "blind," for example, are qualities. "Naked" and
"dothed," on the other hand, are neither of them qualities but
states: they therefore comport a relation to something else.
[With regard to passive qualities:]
Passivity, while it lasts, is not a quality but a motion; when it
is a past experience remaining in one's possession, it is a
quality; if one ceases to possess the experience then regarded as
a finished occurrence, one is considered to have been moved- in
other words, to have been in Motion. But in none of these cases
is it necessary to conceive of anything but Motion; the idea of
time should be excluded; even present time has no right to be
introduced.
"Well" and similar adverbial expressions are to be referred to
the single generic notion [of Quality].
It remains to consider whether blushing should be referred to
Quality, even though the person blushing is not included in this
category. The fact of becoming flushed is rightly not referred to
Quality; for it involves passivity- in short, Motion. But if one
has ceased to become flushed and is actually red, this is surely
a case of Quality, which is independent of time. How indeed are
we to define Quality but by the aspect which a substance
presents? By predicating of a man redness, we clearly ascribe to
him a quality.
We shall accordingly maintain that states alone, and not
dispositions, constitute qualities: thus, "hot" is a quality but
not "growing hot," "ill" but not "turning ill."
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