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Well, but take the unhappy man: must not increase of time
bring an increase of his unhappiness? Do not all troubles-
long-lasting pains, sorrows, and everything of that type- yield a
greater sum of misery in the longer time? And if thus in misery
the evil is augmented by time why should not time equally augment
happiness when all is well?
In the matter of sorrows and pains there is, no doubt, ground for
saying that time brings increase: for example, in a lingering
malady the evil hardens into a state, and as time goes on the
body is brought lower and lower. But if the constitution did not
deteriorate, if the mischief grew no worse, then, here too, there
would be no trouble but that of the present moment: we cannot
tell the past into the tale of unhappiness except in the sense
that it has gone to make up an actually existing state- in the
sense that, the evil in the sufferer's condition having been
extended over a longer time, the mischief has gained ground. The
increase of ill-being then is due to the aggravation of the
malady not to the extension of time.
It may be pointed out also that this greater length of time is
not a thing existent at any given moment; and surely a "more" is
not to be made out by adding to something actually present
something that has passed away.
No: true happiness is not vague and fluid: it is an unchanging
state.
If there is in this matter any increase besides that of mere
time, it is in the sense that a greater happiness is the reward
of a higher virtue: this is not counting up to the credit of
happiness the years of its continuance; it is simply noting the
high-water mark once for all attained.
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