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The above considerations- to which others, doubtless, might be
added- suffice to show that these five are primary genera. But
that they are the only primary genera, that there are no others,
how can we be confident of this? Why do we not add unity to them?
Quantity? Quality? Relation, and all else included by our various
forerunners?
As for unity: If the term is to mean a unity in which nothing
else is present, neither Soul nor Intellect nor anything else,
this can be predicated of nothing, and therefore cannot be a
genus. If it denotes the unity present in Being, in which case we
predicate Being of unity, this unity is not primal.
Besides, unity, containing no differences, cannot produce
species, and not producing species, cannot be a genus. You cannot
so much as divide unity: to divide it would be to make it many.
Unity, aspiring to be a genus, becomes a plurality and annuls
itself.
Again, you must add to it to divide it into species; for there
can be no differentiae in unity as there are in Substance. The
mind accepts differences of Being, but differences within unity
there cannot be. Every differentia introduces a duality
destroying the unity; for the addition of any one thing always
does away with the previous quantity.
It may be contended that the unity which is implicit in Being and
in Motion is common to all other things, and that therefore Being
and unity are inseparable. But we rejected the idea that Being is
a genus comprising all things, on the ground that these things
are not beings in the sense of the Absolute Being, but beings in
another mode: in the same way, we assert, unity is not a genus,
the Primary Unity having a character distinct from all other
unities.
Admitted that not everything suffices to produce a genus, it may
yet be urged that there is an Absolute or Primary Unity
corresponding to the other primaries. But if Being and unity are
identified, then since Being has already been included among the
genera, it is but a name that is introduced in unity: if,
however, they are both unity, some principle is implied: if there
is anything in addition [to this principle], unity is predicated
of this added thing; if there is nothing added, the reference is
again to that unity predicated of nothing. If however the unity
referred to is that which accompanies Being, we have already
decided that it is not unity in the primary sense.
But is there any reason why this less complete unity should not
still possess Primary Being, seeing that even its posterior we
rank as Being, and "Being" in the sense of the Primary Being? The
reason is that the prior of this Being cannot itself be Being- or
else, if the prior is Being, this is not Primary Being: but the
prior is unity; [therefore unity is not Being].
Furthermore, unity, abstracted from Being, has no differentiae.
Again, even taking it as bound up with Being: If it is a
consequent of Being, then it is a consequent of everything, and
therefore the latest of things: but the genus takes priority. If
it is simultaneous with Being, it is simultaneous with
everything: but a genus is not thus simultaneous. If it is prior
to Being, it is of the nature of a Principle, and therefore will
belong only to Being; but if it serves as Principle to Being, it
is not its genus: if it is not genus to Being, it is equally not
a genus of anything else; for that would make Being a genus of
all other things.
In sum, the unity exhibited in Being on the one hand approximates
to Unity-Absolute and on the other tends to identify itself with
Being: Being is a unity in relation to the Absolute, is Being by
virtue of its sequence upon that Absolute: it is indeed
potentially a plurality, and yet it remains a unity and rejecting
division refuses thereby to become a genus.
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