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It can be demonstrated that soul must, necessarily, be of just
this nature and that there can be no other soul than such a
being, one neither wholly partible but both at once.
If it had the nature of body it would consist of isolated members
each unaware of the conditions of every other; there would be a
particular soul- say a soul of the finger- answering as a
distinct and independent entity to every local experience; in
general terms, there would be a multiplicity of souls
administering each individual; and, moreover, the universe would
be governed not by one soul but by an incalculable number, each
standing apart to itself. But, without a dominant unity,
continuity is meaningless.
The theory that "Impressions reach the leading-principle by
progressive stages" must be dismissed as mere illusion.
In the first place, it affirms without investigation a "leading"
phase of the soul.
What can justify this assigning of parts to the soul, the
distinguishing one part from another? What quantity, or what
difference of quality, can apply to a thing defined as a
self-consistent whole of unbroken unity?
Again, would perception be vested in that leading principle
alone, or in the other phases as well?
If a given experience bears only on that "leading principle," it
would not be felt as lodged in any particular members of the
organism; if, on the other hand, it fastens on some other phase
of the soul- one not constituted for sensation- that phase cannot
transmit any experience to the leading principle, and there can
be no sensation.
Again, suppose sensation vested in the "leading-principle"
itself: then, a first alternative, it will be felt in some one
part of that [some specifically sensitive phase], the other part
excluding a perception which could serve no purpose; or, in the
second alternative, there will be many distinct sensitive phases,
an infinite number, with difference from one to another. In that
second case, one sensitive phase will declare "I had this
sensation primarily"; others will have to say "I felt the
sensation that rose elsewhere"; but either the site of the
experience will be a matter of doubt to every phase except the
first, or each of the parts of the soul will be deceived into
allocating the occurrence within its own particular sphere.
If, on the contrary, the sensation is vested not merely in the
"leading principle," but in any and every part of the soul, what
special function raises the one rather than the other into that
leading rank, or why is the sensation to be referred to it rather
than elsewhere? And how, at this, account for the unity of the
knowledge brought in by diverse senses, by eyes, by ears?
On the other hand, if the soul is a perfect unity- utterly
strange to part, a self-gathered whole- if it continuously eludes
all touch of multiplicity and divisibility- then, no whole taken
up into it can ever be ensouled; soul will stand as circle-centre
to every object [remote on the circumference], and the entire
mass of a living being is soulless still.
There is, therefore, no escape: soul is, in the degree indicated,
one and many, parted and impartible. We cannot question the
possibility of a thing being at once a unity and multi-present,
since to deny this would be to abolish the principle which
sustains and administers the universe; there must be a Kind which
encircles and supports all and conducts all with wisdom, a
principle which is multiple since existence is multiple, and yet
is one soul always since a container must be a unity: by the
multiple unity of its nature, it will furnish life to the
multiplicity of the series of an all; by its impartible unity, it
will conduct a total to wise ends.
In the case of things not endowed with intelligence, the
"leading-principle" is their mere unity- a lower reproduction of
the soul's efficiency.
This is the deeper meaning of the profound passage [in the
Timaeus], where we read "By blending the impartible, eternally
unchanging essence with that in division among bodies, he
produced a third form of essence partaking of both qualities."
Soul, therefore, is, in this definite sense, one and many; the
Ideal-Form resident in body is many and one; bodies themselves
are exclusively many; the Supreme is exclusively one.
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