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Passion is a word with various meanings. It is used in regard to the
body, anti refers to diseases and wounds, and again, it is used in
reference to the soul, and means desire anti anger. But to speak
broadly and generally, passion is an animal affection which is
succeeded by pleasure anti pain. For pain succeeds passion, but is
not the same thing as passion. For passion is an affection of things
without sense, but not so pain. Pain then is not passion, but the
sensation of passion: and it must be considerable, that is to say, it
must be great enough to come within the scope of sense.
Again, the definition of passions of the soul is this: Passion is a
sensible activity of the appetitive faculty, depending on the
presentation to the mind of something good or bad. Or in other words,
passion is an irrational activity of the soul, resulting from the
notion of something good or bad. For the notion of something good
results in desire, and the notion of something bad results in anger.
But passion considered as a class, that is, passion in general, is
defined as a movement in one thing caused by another. Energy, on the
other hand, is a drastic movement, and by "drastic" is meant that
which is moved of itself. Thus, anger is the energy manifested by the
part of the soul where anger resides, whereas passion involves the two
divisions of the soul, and in addition the whole body when it is
forcibly impelled to action by anger. For there has been caused
movement in one thing caused by another, and this is called passion.
But in another sense energy is spoken of as passion. For energy is a
movement in harmony with nature, whereas passion is a movement at
variance with nature. According, then, to this view, energy may be
spoken of as passion when it does not act in accord with nature,
whether its movement is due to itself or to some other thing. Thus,
in connection with the heart, its natural pulsation is energy, whereas
its palpitation, which is an excessive and unnatural movement, is
passion and not energy.
But it is not every activity of the passionate part of the soul that is
called passion, but only the more violent ones, and such as are
capable of causing sensation: for the minor and unperceived movements
are certainly not passions. For to constitute passion there is
necessary a considerable degree of force, and thus it is on this
account that we add to the definition of passion that it is a sensible
activity. For the lesser activities escape the notice of the senses,
and do not cause passion.
Observe also that our soul possesses twofold faculties, those of
knowledge, and those of life. The faculties of knowledge are mind,
thought, notion, presentation, sensation: and the vital or
appetitive faculties are will and choice. Now, to make what has been
said clearer, let us consider these things more closely, and first let
us take the faculties of knowledge.
Presentation and sensation then have already been sufficiently
discussed above. It is sensation that causes a passion, which is
called presentation, to arise in the soul, and from presentation comes
notion. Thereafter thought, weighing the truth or falseness of the
notion, determines what is true: and this explains the Greek word for
thought, dianoia, which is derived from
dianoeia, meaning to think and discriminate.
That, however, which is judged and determined to be true, is spoken
of as mind.
Or to put it otherwise: The primary activity of the mind, observe,
is intelligence, but intelligence applied to any object is called a
thought, and when this persists and makes on the mind an impression of
the object of thought, it is named reflection, and when reflection
dwells on the same object and puts itself to the test, and closely
examines the relation of the thought to the soul, it gets the name
prudence. Further, prudence, when it extends its area forms the
power of reasoning, and is called conception, and this is defined as
the fullest activity of the soul, arising in that part where reason
resides, and being devoid of outward expression: and from it proceeds
the uttered word spoken by the tongue. And now that we have discussed
the faculties of knowledge, let us turn to the vital or appetitive
faculties.
It should be understood that there is implanted in the soul by nature a
faculty of desiring that which is in harmony with its nature, and of
maintaining in close union all that belongs essentially to its nature:
and this power is called will or qelhsis. For
the essence both of existence and of living yearns after activity both
as regards mind and sense, and in this it merely longs to realise its
own natural and perfect being. And so this definition also is given of
this natural will: will is an appetite, both rational and vital,
depending only on what is natural. So that will is nothing else than
the natural and vital and rational appetite of all things that go to
constitute nature, that is, just the simple faculty. For the
appetite of creatures without reason, since it is irrational, is not
called will.
Again boulhsis or wish is a sort of natural
will, that is to say, a natural and rational appetite for some
definite thing. For there is seated in the soul of man a faculty of
rational desire. When, then, this rational desire directs itself
naturally to some definite object it is called wish. For wish is
rational desire and longing for some definite thing.
Wish, however, is used both in connection with what is within our
power, and in connection with what is outside our power, that is,
both with regard to the possible and the impossible. For we wish often
to indulge lust or to be temperate, or to sleep and the like, and
these are within our power to accomplish, and possible. But we wish
also to be kings, and this is not within our power, or we wish
perchance never to die, and this is an impossibility.
The wish, then, has reference to the end alone, and not to the means
by which the end is attained. The end is the object of our wish, for
instance, to be a king or to enjoy good health: but the means by which
the end is attained, that is to say, the manner in which we ought to
enjoy good health, or reach the rank of king, are the objects of
deliberation. Then after wish follow inquiry and speculation
(zhthsis and
skiYis), and after these, if the object is
anything within our power, comes counsel or deliberation
(boulh or bouleusis):
counsel is an appetite for investigating lines of action lying within
our own power. For one deliberates, whether one ought to prosecute
any matter or not, and next, one decides which is the better, and
this is called judgment (krisis).
Thereafter, one becomes disposed to and forms a liking for that in
favour of which deliberation gave judgment, and this is called
inclination (gnwmh). For should one form a
judgment and not be disposed to or form a liking for the object of that
judgment, it is not called inclination. Then, again, after one has
become so disposed, choice or selection
(proairesis and
epilogh) comes into play. For choice consists
in the choosing and selecting of one of two possibilities in preference
to the other. Then one is impelled to action, and this is called
impulse (ormh): and thereafter it is brought
into employment, and this is called use
(crhsis). The last stage after we have
enjoyed the use is cessation from desire.
In the case, however, of creatures without reason, as soon as
appetite is roused for any-tiring, straightway arises impulse to
action. For the appetite of creatures without reason is irrational,
and they are ruled by their natural appetite. Hence, neither the
names of will or wish are applicable to the appetite of creatures
without reason. For will is rational, free and natural desire, and
in the case of man, endowed with reason as he is, the natural appetite
is ruled rather than rules For his actions are free, and depend upon
reason, since the faculties of knowledge and life are bound up together
in man. He is free in desire, free in wish, free in examination and
investigation, free in deliberation, free in judgment, free in
inclination, free in choice, free in impulse, and free in action
where thai is in accordance with nature.
But in the case of God, it is to be remembered, we speak of wish,
but it is not correct to speak of choice. For God does not
deliberate, since that is a mark of ignorance, and no one deliberates
about what he knows. But if counsel is a mark of ignorance, surely
choice must also be so. God, then, since He has absolute knowledge
of everything, does not deliberate.
Nor in the case of the soul of the Lord do we speak of counsel or
choice, seeing that He had no part in ignorance. For, although He
was of a nature that is not cognisant of the future, yet because of
His oneness in subsistence with God the Word, He had knowledge of
all things, and that not by grace, but, as we have said, because He
was one in subsistence. For He Himself was both God and Man, and
hence He did not possess the will that acts by opinion or disposition.
While He did possess the natural and simple will which is to be
observed equally in all the personalities of men, His holy soul had
not opinion (or, disposition) that is to say, no inclination opposed
to His divine will, nor aught else contrary to His divine will. For
opinion (or, disposition) differs as persons differ, except m the
case of the holy and simple and uncompound and indivisible Godhead.
There, indeed, since the subsistences are in nowise divided or
separated, neither is the object of will divided. And there, since
there is but one nature, there is also but one natural will. And
again, since the subsistences are unseparated, the three subsistences
have also one object of will, and one activity. In the case of men,
however, seeing that their nature is one, their natural will is also
one, but since their subsistences are separated and divided from each
other, alike in place and time, and disposition to things, and in
many other respects, for this reason their acts of will and their
opinions are different. But in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ,
since He possesses different natures, His natural wills, that is,
His volitional faculties belonging to Him as God and as Man are also
different. But since the subsistence is one, and He Who exercises
the will is one, the object of the will the gnomic will, is also one,
His human will evidently following His divine will, and willing that
which the divine will willed it to will.
Further note, that will (qelhsis) and wish
(boulhsis) are two different things: also the
object of will (to
qelhton) and the capacity for will
(qelhtikon), and the subject that exercises
will (o qelwn), are
all different. For will is just the simple faculty of willing,
whereas wish is will directed to some definite object. Again, the
object of will is the matter underlying the will, that is to say, the
thing that we will: for instance, when appetite is roused for food.
The appetite pure and simple, however, is a rational will. The
capacity for will, moreover, means that which possesses the volitional
faculty, for example, man. Further, the subject that exercises will
is the actual person who makes use of will.
The word to qelhma, it
is well to note, sometimes denotes the will, that is, the volitional
faculty, and in this sense we speak of natural will: and sometimes it
denotes the object of will, and we speak of will
(qelhma gnwmikon)
depending on inclination.
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