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The first enquiry involved in the consideration of free-will, that
is, of what is in our own power, is whether anything is in our power:
for there are many who deny this. The second is, what are the things
that are in our power, and over what things do we have authority? The
third is, what is the reason for which God Who created us endued us
with free-will? So then we shall take up the first question, and
firstly we shall prove that of those things which even our opponents
grant, some are within our power. And let us proceed thus.
Of all the things that happen, the cause is said to be either God,
or necessity, or fate, or nature, or chance, or accident. But
God's function has to do with essence and providence: necessity deals
with the movement of things that ever keep to the same course: fate
with the necessary accomplishment of the things it brings to pass (for
fate itself implies necessity): nature with birth, growth,
destruction, plants and animals; chance with what is rare and
unexpected. For chance is defined as the meeting and concurrence of
two causes, originating in choice but bringing to pass something other
than what is natural: for example, if a man finds a treasure while
digging a ditch: for the man who hid the treasure did not do so that
the other might find it, nor did the finder dig with the purpose of
finding the treasure: but the former hid it that he might take it away
when he wished, and the other's aim was to dig the ditch: whereas
something happened quite different from what both had in view.
Accident again deals with casual occurrences that take place among
lifeless or irrational things, apart from nature and art. This then
is their doctrine. Under which, then, of these categories are we to
bring what happens through the agency of man, if indeed man is not the
cause and beginning of action? for it would not be right to ascribe to
God actions that are sometimes base and unjust: nor may we ascribe
these to necessity, for they are not such as ever continue the same:
nor to fate, for fate implies not possibility only but necessity: nor
to nature, for nature's province is animals and plants: nor to
chance, for the actions of men are not rare and unexpected: nor to
accident, for that is used in reference to the casual occurrences that
take place in the world of lifeless and irrational things. We are left
then with this fact, that the man who acts and makes is himself the
author of his own works, and is a creature endowed with free-will.
Further, if man is the author of no action, the faculty of
deliberation is quite superfluous for to what purpose could deliberation
be put if man is the master of none of his actions? for all
deliberation is for the sake of action. But to prove that the fairest
and most precious of man's endowments is quite superfluous would be the
height of absurdity. If then man deliberates, he deliberates with a
view to action. For all deliberation is with a view to and on account
of action.
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