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Since, then, Christ has two natures, we hold that He has also two
natural wills and two natural energies. But since His two natures
have one subsistence, we hold that it is one and the same person who
wills and energises naturally in both natures, of which, and in
which, and also which is Christ our Lord: and moreover that He
wills and energises without separation but as a united whole. For He
wills and energises in either form in close communion with the other.
For things that have the same essence have also the same will and
energy, while things that are different in essence are different in
will and energy; and vice versa, things that have the same will anti
energy have the same essence, while things that are different in will
and energy are different in essence.
Wherefore in the case of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit we
recognise, from their sameness in will and energy, their sameness in
nature. But in the case of the divine dispensation we recognise from
their difference in will and energy the difference of the two natures,
and as we perceive the difference of the two natures we confess that the
wills and energies also are different. For just as the number of the
natures of one and the same Christ, when considered and spoken of with
piety, do not cause a division of the one Christ but merely bring out
the fact that the difference between the natures is maintained even in
the union, so it is with the number of wills and energies that belong
essentially to His natures. (For He was endowed with the powers of
willing and energising in both natures, for the sake of our salvation)
It does not introduce division: God forbid! but merely brings out
the fact that the differences between them are safeguarded and preserved
even in the union. For we hold that wills and energies are faculties
belonging to nature, not to subsistence; I mean those faculties of
will and energy by which He Who wills and energises does so. For if
we allow that they belong to subsistence, we will be forced to say that
the three subsistences of the Holy Trinity have different wills and
different energies.
For it is to be noted s that willing and the manner of willing are not
the same thing. For to will is a faculty of nature, just as seeing
is, for all men possess it; but the manner of willing does not depend
on nature but on our judgment, just as does also the manner of seeing,
whether well or ill. For all men do not will in the same way, nor do
they all see in the same way. And this also we will grant in
connection with energies. For the manner of willing, or seeing, or
energising, is the mode of using the faculties of will and sight and
energy, belonging only to him who uses them, and marking him off from
others by the generally accepted difference.
Simple willing then is spoken of as volition or the faculty of will,
being a rational propension and natural will; but in a particular way
willing, or that which underlies volition, is the object of will, and
will dependent on judgment. Further that which has innate in it the
faculty of volition is spoken of as capable of willing: as for instance
the divine is capable of willing, and the human in like manner. But
he who exercises volition, that is to say the subsistence, for
instance Peter, is spoken of as willing.
Since, then, Christ is one and His subsistence is one, He also
Who wills both as God and as man is one and the same. And since He
has two natures endowed with volition, inasmuch as they are rational
(for whatever is rational is endowed with volition and free-will),
we shall postulate two volitions or natural wills in Him. For He in
His own person is capable of volition in accordance with both His
natures. For He assumed that faculty of volition which belongs
naturally to us. And since Christ, Who in His own person wills
according to either nature, is one, we shall postulate the same object
of will in His case, not as though He wills only those things which
He willed naturally as God (for it is no part of Godhead to will to
eat or drink and so forth), but as willing also those things which
human nature requires for its support, and this without involving any
opposition in judgment, but simply as the result of the individuality
of the natures. For then it was that He thus willed naturally, when
His divine volition so willed and permitted the flesh to suffer and do
that which was proper to it.
But that volition is implanted in man by nature is manifest from this.
Excluding the divine life, there are three forms of life: the
vegetative, the sentient, and the intellectual. The properties of
the vegetative life are the functions of nourishment, and growth, and
production: that of the sentient life is impulse: and that of the
rational and intellectual life is freedom of will. If, then,
nourishment belongs by nature to the vegetative life and impulse to the
sentient, freedom of will by nature belongs to the rational and
intellectual life. But freedom of will is nothing else than volition.
The Word, therefore, having become flesh, endowed with life and
mind and free-will, became also endowed with volition.
Further, that which is natural is not the result of training: for no
one learns how to think, or live, or hunger, or thirst, or sleep.
Nor do we learn how to will: so that willing is natural.
And again: if in the case of creatures devoid of reason nature rules,
while nature is ruled in man who is moved of his own free-will and
volition, it follows, then, that man is by nature endowed with
volition.
And again: if man has been made after the image of the blessed and
super-essential Godhead, and if the divine nature is by nature
endowed with free-will and volition, it follows that man, as its
image, is free by nature and volitive. For the fathers defined
freedom as volition.
And further: if to will is a part of the nature of every man and not
present in some and absent in others, and if that which is seen to be
common to all is a characteristic feature of the nature that belongs to
the individuals of the class, surely, then, man is by nature endowed
with volition.
And once more: if the nature receives neither more nor less, but all
are equally endowed with volition and not some more than others, then
by nature man is endowed with volition. So that since man is by nature
endowed with volition, the Lord also must be by nature endowed with
volition, not only because He is God, but also because He became
man. For just as He assumed our nature, so also He has assumed
naturally our will. And in this way the Fathers said that He formed
our will in Himself.
If the will is not natural, it must be either hypostatic or
unnatural. But if it is hypostatic, the Son must thus, forsooth,
have a different will from what the Father has: for that which is
hypostatic is characteristic of subsistence only. And if it is
unnatural, will must be a defection from nature: for what is unnatural
is destructive of what is natural.
The God and Father of all things wills either as Father or as God.
Now if as Father, His will will be different from that of the Son,
for the Son is not the Father. But if as God, the Son is God and
likewise the Holy Spirit is God, and so volition is part of His
nature, that is, it is natural.
Besides, if according to the view of the Fathers, those who have one
and the same will have also one and the same essence, and if the
divinity and humanity of Christ have one and the same will, then
assuredly these have also one and the same essence.
And again: if according to the view of the Fathers the distinction
between the natures is not seen in the single will, we mast either,
when we speak of the one will, cease to speak of the different natures
in Christ or, when we speak of the different natures of Christ,
cease to speak of the one will.
And further, the divine Gospel says, The Lord came into the
borders of Tyre and Sidon and entered into a house, and would have no
man know it; but He could not be hid. If, then, His divine will
is omnipotent, but yet, though He would, He could not be hid,
surely it was as man that He would and could not, and so as man He
must be endowed with volition.
And once again, the Gospel tells us that, He, having come into the
place, said 'I thirst': and they gave Him same vinegar mixed with
gall, and when He had tasted it fare would not drink. If, then, on
the one hand it was as God that tie suffered thirst and when He had
tasted would not drink, surely He must be subject to passion s also as
God, for thirst and taste are passions. But if it was not as God
but altogether as man that He was athirst, likewise as man He must be
endowed with volition.
Moreover, the blessed Paul the Apostle says, He became obedient
unto death, even the death of the cross. But obedience is subjection
of the real will, not of the unreal will. For that which is
irrational is not said to be obedient or disobedient. But the Lord
having become obedient to the Father, became so not as God but as
man. For as God He is not said to be obedient or disobedient. For
these things are of the things that are trader one's band, as the
inspired Gregorius said. Wherefore, then, Christ is endowed with
volition as man.
While, however, we assert that will is natural, we hold not that it
is dominated by necessity, but that it is free. For if it is
rational, it must be absolutely free. For it is not only the divine
and uncreated nature that is free from the bonds of necessity, but also
the intellectual and created nature. And this is manifest: for God,
being by nature good and being by nature the Creator and by nature
God, is not all this of necessity. For who is there to introduce
this necessity?
It is to be observed further, that freedom of will is used in several
senses, one in connection with God, another in connection with
angels, and a third in connection with men. For used in reference to
God it is to be understood in a superessential manner, and in
reference to angels it is to be taken in the sense that the election is
concomitant with the state, and admits of the interposition of no
interval of time at all: for while the angel possesses free-will by
nature, he uses it without let or hindrance, having neither antipathy
on the part of the body to overcome nor any assailant. Again, used in
reference to men, it is to be taken in the sense that the state is
considered to be anterior in time to the election. For than is free
and has free-will by nature, but he has also the assault of the devil
to impede him and the motion of the body: and thus through the assault
and the weight of the batty, election comes to be later than the
state.
If, then, Adam obeyed of his own will and ate of his own will,
surely in us the will is the first part to suffer. And if the will is
the first to suffer, and the Word Incarnate did not assume this with
the rest of our nature, it follows that we have not been freed from
sin.
Moreover, if the faculty of free-will which is in nature is His work
and yet He did not assume it, He either condemned His own
workmanship as not good, or grudged us the comfort it brought, and so
deprived us of the full benefit, and shewed that He was Himself
subject to passion since He was not willing or not able to work out our
perfect salvation.
Moreover, one cannot speak of one compound thing made of two wills in
the same way as a subsistence is a composition of two natures. Firstly
because the compositions are of things in subsistence (hypotasis),
not of things viewed in a different category, not in one proper to
them: and secondly, because if we speak of composition of wills and
energies, we will be obliged to speak of composition of the other
natural properties, such as the uncreated and the created, the
invisible and the visible, and so on. And what will be the name of
the will that is compounded out of two wills? For the compound cannot
be called by the name of the elements that make it up. For otherwise
we should call that which is compounded of natures nature and not
subsistence. And further, if we say that there is one compound will
in Christ, we separate Him in will from the Father, for the
Father's will is not compound. It remains, therefore, to say that
the subsistence of Christ atone is compound and common, as in the case
of the natures so also in that of the natural properties.
And we cannot, if we wish to be accurate, speak of Christ as having
judgment (gnwmh) and preference. For
judgment is a disposition with reference to the decision arrived at
after investigation and deliberation concerning something unknown, that
is to say, after counsel and decision. And after judgment comes
preference, which chooses out and selects the one rather than the
other. But the Lord being not mere man but also God, and knowing
all things, had no need of inquiry. and investigation, and counsel,
and decision, and by nature made whatever is good His own and whatever
is bad foreign to Him. For thus says Isaiah the prophet, Before
the child shall know to prefer the evil, he shall choose the good;
because before the child knows good or evil, he refuses wickedness by
choosing the good. For the word "before" proves that it is not with
investigation and deliberation, as is the way with us, but as God and
as subsisting in a divine manner in the flesh, that is to say, being
united in subsistence to the flesh, and because of His very existence
and all-embracing knowledge, that He is possessed of good in His own
nature. For the virtues are natural qualities, and are implanted in
all by nature and in equal measure, even if we do not all in equal
measure employ our natural energies. By the transgression we were
driven from the natural to the unnatural. But the Lord led us back
from the unnatural into the natural. For this is what is the meaning
of in our image, after our likeness. And the discipline and trouble
of this life were not designed as a means for our attaining virtue which
was foreign to our nature, but to enable us to cast aside the evil that
was foreign and contrary to our nature: just as on laboriously removing
from steel the rust which is not natural to it but acquired through
neglect, we reveal the natural brightness of the steel.
Observe further that the word judgment
(gnwmh) is used in many ways and in many
senses. Sometimes it signifies exhortation: as when the divine
apostle says, Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the
Lord; yet I give my judgment: sometimes it means counsel, as when
the prophet David says, They have taken crafty counsel against Thy
people: sometimes it means a decree, as when we read in Daniel,
Concerning whom (or, what) went this shameless decree forth? At
other times it is used in the sense of belief, or opinion, or
purpose, and, to put it shortly, the word judgment has twenty-eight
different meanings.
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