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Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice.
For the jurist Celsus says [Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure
1] that "right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is
not the object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue.
Therefore right is not the object of justice.
Objection 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym.
v, 3), "is a kind of right." Now law is the object not of
justice but of prudence, wherefore the Philosopher [Ethic. vi,
8] reckons "legislative" as one of the parts of prudence.
Therefore right is not the object of justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God:
for Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love
serving God alone, and consequently governing aright all things
subject to man." Now right [jus] does not pertain to Divine
things, but only to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v,
2) that "'fas' is the Divine law, and 'jus,' the human law."
Therefore right is not the object of justice.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "'jus'
[right] is so called because it is just." Now the "just" is the
object of justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1)
that "all are agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which
makes men capable of doing just actions."
I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with the other
virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it
denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are
wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for
equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand
the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in
relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of
the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to
its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas
the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is
set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work is said to be
just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality,
for instance the payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And
so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice,
when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account
the way in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues
nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by
the agent. For this reason justice has its own special proper object
over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just,
which is the same as "right." Hence it is evident that right is the
object of justice.
Reply to Objection 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from
their original signification so as to mean something else: thus the
word "medicine" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing
a sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this
is done. In like manner the word "jus" [right] was first of all
used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred
to designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to
denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to
appear "in jure", and yet further, we say even that a man, who has
the office of exercising justice, administers the jus even if his
sentence be unjust.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the
craftsman an expression of the things to be made externally by his
craft, which expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there
pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which
the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If
this rule be expressed in writing it is called a "law," which
according to Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and
so law is not the same as right, but an expression of right.
Reply to Objection 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we
cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him
a perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not
properly called "jus" but "fas," because, to wit, God is
satisfied if we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to
make man repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him
entirely.
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