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Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and
creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the
univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said
equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of
some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat,
although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems
that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an
univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is
predicated univocally.
Objection 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal
things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God,
according to the word of Genesis (Gn. 1:26), "Let us make
man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of
God and creatures univocally.
Objection 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing
measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore
God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied
univocally to God and to creatures.
On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the
same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But
no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures;
for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now
a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever
is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are
from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which
are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be
predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal
predication can be applied to them.
I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and
creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example
the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms
in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding
article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied,
pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection
is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea
from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise"
applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's
essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all
similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to
signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence.
Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree
circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not
the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified
as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name.
Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same
way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence
no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures
in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were
so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or
demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be
exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the
philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what
the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen
being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20).
Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and
creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things
are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of
medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,
of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according
as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of
medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the
animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and
creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely
univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (Article
1). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according
to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause,
wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this
mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple
univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in
univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in
equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies
various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to
urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
signifies the cause of the same health.
Reply to Objection 1: Although equivocal predications must be
reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must
precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the
universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the
cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not
the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would
be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is
a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species
by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole
species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before
the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not
univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could
not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an
analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first
non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the creature to God is
imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing
(Question 4, Article 3).
Reply to Objection 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things
measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be
in the same genus.
The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do
not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
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