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Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes
man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is
threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul.
But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the
body, as shown above (Articles 4,5). Therefore it consists in
goods of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more
than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we
desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man
desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more
than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which
is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and
desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself:
not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the
soul.
Objection 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that
which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore
happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something
belonging to the body, as shown above (Article 5). Therefore it
is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of
the soul.
On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved
for its own sake." But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but
whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore
happiness consists in no good of the soul.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 1, Article 8), the
end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain,
and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing.
If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's
last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because
the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in
potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially
knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now
since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that
which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore
the soul itself cannot be its own last end.
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power,
habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect
good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will,
is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a
participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none
of them can be man's last end.
But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession
thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an
end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to
his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore
the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes
happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is
called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is
something outside the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods
that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power,
habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something
outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what
constitutes happiness is a good of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: As far as the proposed objection is
concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas
a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too,
man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in
both cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with
the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat
of Charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection
of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which
constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something
outside his soul, as stated above.
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