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Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not
differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more
simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its
form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is
the angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he
subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore
the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through
an intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs
to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his
nature or his intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true,
while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true
differ, not really but only logically [Question 16, Article
4]. Therefore will and intellect are not really different.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not
differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives
color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually
related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to
wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the
good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.
On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only,
while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know
both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their
intellect.
I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,
which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not
their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a
thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to
anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural
bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything
superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being
before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being
when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic
comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place
comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make
something like itself comes from the active qualities.
Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there
alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within
the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills
nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This
cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite
foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the
will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as
its essence.
In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect
of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object
known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself
to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside
it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will
goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it
tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one
faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to
another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect
and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is
not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the
universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by
its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by
something additional, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any
material difference of their objects, but according to their formal
distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such.
Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true
suffices for the difference of intellect from will.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the good and the true are really
convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect
as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something
good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for
diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
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