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Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body.
For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that
whereby we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to
the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in
the body.
Objection 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change.
But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily
disposition can be a habit.
Objection 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to
change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which
is divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments
(De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are
called habits.
I answer that, As we have said above (Question 49, Articles 2
seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of
potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore in so far as
habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the
body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either
from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body.
Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature,
the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are
determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said
(Question 49, Article 4) that it is when the subject is in
potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required.
As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body,
they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now
habits are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts
like habits are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the
dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they
can be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is
disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the
soul.
If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form,
thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the
soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty
and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the
nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very
nature, are easily changeable.
On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the
Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions
of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species
of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle
mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as
though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of
example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be
easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first
species, which are called habits and dispositions. But this is
clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks
in the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of virtue and
science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly
mentions beauty and health among habits.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as
a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are
from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from
the soul, and the principle of which is the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult
to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But
they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject,
because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be
removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to
other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to
change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And
therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a
habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read in the Greek
[isos hexin (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities
of the soul are called habits simply.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first
species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the
third species, in this, that the qualities of the third species
consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they
are called passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained
to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then
passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his
Commentary disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in
the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas
Aristotle puts heat in the third.
Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says
that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ
in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing
receives heat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be
able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or
passion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought
to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a
disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become
difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition
would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and
habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves of
this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the
part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse participation
thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the
species of quality. And therefore we must say otherwise that, as was
explained above (Question 49, Article 2, ad 1), the
adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to
their suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and
so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities,
which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change
as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like
habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves.
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