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Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified
by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first
place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than
to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as
Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both
existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing
things alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
Objection 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea.
But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has
the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable;
for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had
not been born" (Mt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is
prior to being.
Objection 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that
existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal
appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to
being.
On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the
first of created things is being."
I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the
thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is
prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is
prior to goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names
(Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for
we name God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its
effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies
the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among
causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an
agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause
of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the
end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine
causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the
Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from
privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more
extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in
goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not
participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being.
Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence"
(Div. Nom. v).
Reply to Objection 2: The same solution is applied to this
objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and
non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but
so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we
understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which
are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the
end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also
towards which tend even those things which are not actual, but merely
potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only,
either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to
those things which are actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but
only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which
can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of
an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a
thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and
non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of
which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be
spoken of as relatively good.
Reply to Objection 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable
only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort
of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being;
and consequently nothing is good except being.
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