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Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the
world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought.
But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself;
thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in
him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not
outside, but within the things themselves.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1):
"Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced
by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe
outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing
extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.
Objection 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in
order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a
multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world
is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the
government of the world is not an extrinsic good.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord
hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire
order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something
extrinsic to them.
I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning,
it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their
beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something
outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been
expounded above (Question 44, Articles 1,2), that we must
conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can
be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an
end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some
particular good; while the universal end of all things is the
Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its
Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular
good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole
created universe there is not a good which is not such by
participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole
universe must be a good outside the universe.
Reply to Objection 1: We may acquire some good in many ways:
first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge;
secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by
building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by
us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into
possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe
being the good to which it is directed.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of
various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation
itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end
of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder
is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may
happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also
as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say
that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him.
Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the
end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and
represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to
an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
Reply to Objection 3: A good existing in the universe, namely,
the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not
its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end:
thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in
Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
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