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Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine
providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then
everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And
thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.
Objection 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil,
as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many
evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is
not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.
Objection 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not
require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason
of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice."
Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be
subject to providence.
Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be
subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to
themselves by God in accordance with the words: "God made man from
the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"
(Ecclus. 15:14). And particularly in reference to the
wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart"
(Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to
divine providence.
Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9):
"God doth not care for oxen": and we may say the same of other
irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of
divine providence.
On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from
end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis.
8:1).
I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of
providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the
world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only
were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their
individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this
respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job
22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider
our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi
Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things
corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they
possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he
adhered to the opinion of the others.
We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine
providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an
end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the
causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the
effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards
the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside
the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the
first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent
principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles;
not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible.
Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily
directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those
things that are of God are well ordered" (Rm. 13:1). Since,
therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of
the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily
follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence,
must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown
(Question 14, Articles 6,11) that God knows all things,
both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be
compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the
objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering;
as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a difference between universal and
particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular
cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes
the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and
hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may
be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all
particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not
be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal
cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular
cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause;
but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can
happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting
of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance,
has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet
at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the
other.
Reply to Objection 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a
particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a
particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his
care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows
some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be
hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to
be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to
the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption
of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a
species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally
for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects
in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be
hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent
from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no
slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there
were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion
2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His
works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even
from evil." It would appear that it was on account of these two
arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to
consider corruptible things---e.g. casual and evil things---as
removed from the care of divine providence.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses
natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human
providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from
necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who
withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence,
attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
others of the ancients.
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that God left man to
himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence;
but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only
the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted
upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of
themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like
rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is
significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since
the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it
necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free
will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is
included under the providence of God, as a particular under a
universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just
in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He
prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation.
For "to them that love God, all things work together unto good"
(Rm. 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the
wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He
altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would
return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His
providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who
withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning
which we take counsel.
Reply to Objection 5: Since a rational creature has, through its
free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Question
19, Article 10), it is subject to divine providence in an
especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as
a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of
punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from
the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures
escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi
Moses.
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