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Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no
virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural
inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and
yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of
a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the
lesser things." Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and
wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic.
i, 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it
seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says
of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor
to keep money, but to give it away."
Objection 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another.
But liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues:
since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to
give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise.
Therefore liberality is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel
contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated."
Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue.
Therefore liberality is a virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19),
"it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill."
Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within
us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those
that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us
for our livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use
these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de
Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is
granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a
good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to have few things.
Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on
himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves
in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in
the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in
temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself
and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic.
i): "It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if
you know them to be in want."
Reply to Objection 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to
give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the
wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is
acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the
liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to
certain people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our
Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to
dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed
the poor, that he might not be bound by any household cares." For
this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak
farther on (Question 184, Question 186, Article 3).
It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's
possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is
directed to happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1), "those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but
prodigal"; and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of
other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist
to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not to be
commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of
boasting rather than of pity." Wherefore those who lack other
virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not
liberal.
Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good
uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform
works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not
in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (FS, Question
65, Article 1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man
from being liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 1): "Liberality is proportionate to a man's
substance," i.e. his means, "for it consists, not in the quantity
given, but in the habit of the giver": and Ambrose says (De
Offic. i) that "it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and
gives things their value."
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