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Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through
certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain
malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov.
14:22): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins
through certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to
denote the intention of doing evil in sinning, because an act is not
denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore
no one sins through malice.
Objection 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice
is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin
indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it
were on purpose have revolted from God, and would not understand all
His ways." Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin
purposely or through certain malice.
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for
the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to
corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is
thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the
principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both
rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin
occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as
when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in
the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too
does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will.
Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good.
Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to
suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one
loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a
limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when
an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or
pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine
charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer
the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of
some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good;
and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply,
whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a
temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on
purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple
knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin
through ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a
particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins
through passion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a
particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a
particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it
is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own
sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or
obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would
choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering
loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a
pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to
choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's anger,
to being deprived of the pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be
taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as
a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin
through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may
also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself
of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as
he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean
some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when
anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this
imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause
of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not
indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous
sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above
(Question 75, Article 4, ad 3).
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