|
Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice
sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is
sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever
they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial
matter." Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins
mortally.
Objection 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter,
departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant
and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an
injustice sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues"
[Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being
contrary thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins
contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it
always a mortal sin to do an injustice.
On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on
(Question 64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins
mortally.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 12, Article
5), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin
is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now
every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to
charity, which moves us to will the good of another. And so since
injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it
is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its
genus.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls
"ignorance of particular circumstances" [Ethic. iii, 1], and
which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not
excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no
injustice except accidentally, as stated above (Article 2)
Reply to Objection 2: He who does an injustice in small matters
falls short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he
does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is
not hurt or displeased.
Reply to Objection 3: The sins which are contrary to the other
virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
|
|