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Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are
prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above (Question
90, Article 2) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the
common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good
of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of
temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject of
natural law.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act.
If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it
seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies
to certain special sins.
Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature
are common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a
thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all
acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that
"virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of
the natural law.
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first,
under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts
considered in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of
virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the
natural law. For it has been stated (Article 2) that to the
natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to
his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that
is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give
heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man,
there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason:
and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered
thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each
one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we
speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their
proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the
natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does
not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have
been found by men to be conducive to well-living.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural
concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed
ordained to the natural common good, just as other matters of law are
ordained to the moral common good.
Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which
is proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against
reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide
Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man
and other animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to
be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is
natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the
special name of the unnatural crime.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves.
For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts
are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them,
while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
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