|
Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's
happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine
wisdom "unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second
things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature
touches the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is
happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature,
as stated in FP, Question 111, Article 1, it seems that
man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
Objection 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in
relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for
its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm,
is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2),
as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the
whole universe of creatures.
Objection 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his
natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include
that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man
can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good
constitutes man's happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26):
"As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of
happiness: of Whom it is written: 'Happy is that people whose God
is the Lord' (Ps. 143:15)."
I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute
man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the
appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something
yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of
man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the
intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can
lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not
in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has
goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will
of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth
thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's
happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base
of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest
there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself
of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed,
as being the infinite and perfect good.
Reply to Objection 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained
to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole
itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which
man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained
to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the
good of the universe, but God himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Created good is not less than that good of
which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him:
but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object,
and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an
angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.
|
|