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Objection 1: It seems that in this sacrament the dimensive quantity
of the bread or wine is not the subject of the other accidents. For
accident is not the subject of accident; because no form can be a
subject, since to be a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive
quantity is an accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the
subject of the other accidents.
Objection 2: Further, just as quantity is individuated by
substance, so also are the other accidents. If, then, the dimensive
quantity of the bread or wine remains individuated according to the
being it had before, in which it is preserved, for like reason the
other accidents remain individuated according to the existence which
they had before in the substance. Therefore they are not in dimensive
quantity as in a subject, since every accident is individuated by its
own subject.
Objection 3: Further, among the other accidents that remain, of
the bread and wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which
cannot be in dimensive quantity existing outside matter; because a
thing is rare which has little matter under great dimensions. while a
thing is dense which has much matter under small dimensions, as is said
in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensive quantity can
be the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.
Objection 4: Further, quantity abstract from matter seems to be
mathematical quantity, which is not the subject of sensible qualities.
Since, then, the remaining accidents in this sacrament are sensible,
it seems that in this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the
dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains after
consecration.
On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that
is, by reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this
sacrament are divided by the division of dimensive quantity, as is
evident through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quantity is the
subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.
I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other accidents which
remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the
bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having
quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the
senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first
disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned
"great" and "small" as the first differences of matter
(Aristotle, Metaph. iv). And because the first subject is
matter, the consequence is that all other accidents are related to
their subject through the medium of dimensive quantity; just as the
first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some
have maintained that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is
said in Metaph. iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, the
accidents remain according to the being which they had before, it
follows that all accidents remain founded upon dimensive quantity.
Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation
of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject
of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it
is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several;
and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it
to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms,
subsisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves.
Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is
naturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which
is in this body. As to the first, matter is the principle of
individuation of all inherent forms, because, since these forms,
considered in themselves, are naturally in something as in a subject,
from the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which is not
in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thus existing
be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained that the
principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. For that something
is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that that other
is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But it is on
account of quantity that substance can be divided, as is said in
Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular
principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as
forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter. Hence
also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of individuation, so that
we can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in
position, which is included in the notion of this quantity; for it
belongs to dimension for it to be "quantity having position"
(Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quantity can be
the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way about.
Reply to Objection 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject
of another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an
accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of
the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another,
as the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God
makes an accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the
subject of another.
Reply to Objection 2: The other accidents, even as they were in
the substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive
quantity, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quantity is the
subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than
conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: Rarity and density are particular qualities
accompanying bodies, by reason of their having much or little matter
under dimensions; just as all other accidents likewise follow from the
principles of substance. And consequently, as the accidents are
preserved by Divine power when the substance is withdrawn, so, when
matter is withdrawn, the qualities which go with matter, such as
rarity and density, are preserved by Divine power.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical quantity abstracts not from
intelligible matter, but from sensible matter, as is said in Metaph.
vii. But matter is termed sensible because it underlies sensible
qualities. And therefore it is manifest that the dimensive quantity,
which remains in this sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical
quantity.
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