|
Objection 1: It would seem that marriage cannot result from one
person's consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but
one reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore
it cannot result from the intention of any other end than that for which
it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.
Objection 2: Further, the marriage union is from God, according
to Mt. 19:6, "What . . . God hath joined together let no
man put asunder." But a union that is made for immoral motives is not
from God. Therefore it is not a marriage.
Objection 3: Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of
the Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the
intention of the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed
to a base purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for a base
purpose, it will not be a valid marriage.
Objection 4: Further, according to Boethius (De Diff.,
Topic. ii) "a thing is good if its end be good." But matrimony is
always good. Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil
end.
Objection 5: Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with
the Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore
can marriage be contracted for a base motive.
On the contrary, He who baptizes another for the sake of gain
baptizes validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose
of gain it is a valid marriage.
Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities
quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).
I answer that, The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold,
namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is
the end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always
good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding of
fornication. But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the
contracting parties intend as the result of marriage. And since that
which is intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon
marriage, and since that which comes first is not altered by what comes
after, but conversely; marriage does not become good or evil by reason
of that cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the
essential end. And since accidental causes are infinite in number, it
follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes in
matrimony, some of which are good and some bad.
Reply to Objection 1: This is true of the essential and principal
cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have
several secondary essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental
ends.
Reply to Objection 2: The joining together can be taken for the
relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and
is good, whatever be its cause; or for the act of those who are being
joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God
simply. Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause
of which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is not from
that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from
God, although it is not from God simply.
Reply to Objection 3: The intention of the Church whereby she
intends to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that
if it be not observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of
the Church whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the
sacrament belongs to the well-being and not to the essence of a
sacrament; wherefore, if it be not observed, the sacrament is none
the less valid. Yet he who omits this intention sins; for instance if
in baptism one intend not the healing of the mind which the Church
intends. In like manner he who intends to marry, although he fail to
direct it to the end which the Church intends, nevertheless contracts
a valid marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: This evil which is intended is the end not of
marriage, but of the contracting parties.
Reply to Objection 5: The union itself, and not the action of
those who are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the
Church: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
|
|