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Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For
whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of
something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more
distant from non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in
things.
Objection 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If
therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing,
which is contrary to what has been said (Article 1).
Objection 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most
white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore
also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes
always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things
made by God there is no evil.
On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and
penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
I answer that, As was said above (Question 47, Articles
1,2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be
inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized.
Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail.
Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in
goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some
things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible
things, while some there are which can lose it, as things
corruptible.
As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there
should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings;
so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some
which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they
do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact
that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found
in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and
from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure
negation, but a privation.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text
14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying
the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and
in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a
being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being
conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and
attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense
being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we
speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In
this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this
distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is
said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in
itself.
Reply to Objection 3: God and nature and any other agent make what
is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part,
except in order to the whole, as was said above (Question 47,
Article 2). And the whole itself, which is the universe of
creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can
fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this.
This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not to
destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes
fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11),
"God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence
many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to
exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor
would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed.
Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be
praised if there were no injustice.
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