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Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing
follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
Objection 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative.
Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative. But choice
implies two relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the
end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it
is preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore
use precedes choice.
Objection 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as
it removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above
(Question 9, Article 3). Therefore it uses itself, by applying
itself to act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is
use in consent. But consent precedes choice as stated above
(Question 15, Article 3, ad 3). Therefore use does also.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and
afterwards it uses (the powers)." Therefore use follows choice.
I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed.
One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing
subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed.
Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus
is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to
perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite
tend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly.
This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And
the last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the
means, is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by
willing the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the
second relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the
realization of the thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use
follows choice; provided that by use we mean the will's use of the
executive power in moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves
the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as
consisting in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the
means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The motion of the will to the execution of
the work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use
belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and
execution.
Reply to Objection 2: What is essentially relative is after the
absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come
after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the
effects to which it has relation.
Reply to Objection 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to
the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding
the choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one
another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice
and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and
consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And
such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
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