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Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of God
took the form of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who
assumed, yet both are Man by reason of the man assumed." Now
"both" may only be said when there are two. Therefore Christ is
two.
Objection 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there
are two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv): "Being in the form of God . . . He took
the form of a servant . . . being both in one; but He was one of
these as Word, and the other as man." Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a
mere man, He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than
man, and thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore
Christ is two.
Objection 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is,
and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing
and another. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are
three Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation
there are two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of
the Nature, notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father
and Son are one, according to Jn. 10:30: "I and the Father
are one." Therefore, notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ
is two on account of the duality of nature.
Objection 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text.
18) that "one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now
Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise
[alterum] so does substantial form make another thing [aliud] as
Porphyry says (Praedic.). Now in Christ there are two
substantial natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is
one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "Whatever
is, inasmuch as it is, is one." But we confess that Christ is.
Therefore Christ is one.
I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the
abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person,
except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "whereby it is" do not
differ, as stated in the FP, Question 29, Article 4, ad 1.
But in Christ, since there are two natures, viz. the Divine and
the human, one of them, viz. the Divine, may be predicated of Him
both in the abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of
God, Who is signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature
and is God. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in
the abstract, but only in the concrete, i.e. as it is signified by
the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that "Christ is human
nature," because human nature is not naturally predicated of its
suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is
God. Now God signifies one having the Godhead, and man signifies
one having manhood. Yet one having manhood is differently signified by
the word "man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter." For this
word "man" implies one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word
"God" implies indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word
"Peter" or "Jesus" implies one having manhood distinctly, i.e.
with its determinate individual properties, as "Son of God" implies
one having the Godhead under a determinate personal property. Now the
dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Hence,
if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ, it
would follow that Christ is two. But because the two natures are not
predicated of Christ, except as they are signified in the suppositum,
it must be by reason of the suppositum that "one" or "two" be
predicated of Christ.
Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in
their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final
completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they
said that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one
Person, they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the
neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the
masculine signifies something formed and perfect. on the other hand,
the Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that
Christ is two not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But
since we maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear
from Question 2, Articles 2,3, it follows that we say that
Christ is one not merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken
as if "both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is
both; but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand
for two supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the
concrete. For I can say that "both, viz. God and Man, are
God" on account of God Who assumes; and "both, viz. God and
Man," are Man on account of the man assumed.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that "Christ is one thing
and another," this saying is to be explained in this
sense---"having this nature and another." And it is in this way
that Augustine explains it (Contra Felic. xi), where, after
saying, "In the mediator of God and man, the Son of God is one
thing, and the Son of Man another," he adds: "I say another
thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not another thing
by reason of the unity of person." Hence Gregory Nazianzen says
(Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "If we must speak briefly, that of which
the Saviour is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is not
the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the same as
what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from it; for
both these are one."
Reply to Objection 3: This is false, "Christ is only man";
because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature,
since terms placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if
anything is added whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a
true proposition---for instance, "Christ is only that which is
man." Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is "any other
thing than man," because "another thing," inasmuch as it refers to
a diversity of substance, properly refers to the suppositum. even as
all relative things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow:
"Therefore He has another nature."
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said, "Christ is something that
the Father is"; "something" signifies the Divine Nature, which
is predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when
it is said: "Christ is something that is not the Father";
"something" signifies, not the human nature as it is in the
abstract, but as it is in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct,
but in an indistinct suppositum, i.e. inasmuch as it underlies the
nature and not the individuating properties. Hence it does not follow
that Christ is one thing and another, or that He is two, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ, which is the Person of the
Son of God, does not reckon numerically with the Divine Nature,
which is predicated of the Father and Son.
Reply to Objection 5: In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the
Divine Nature is predicated, even in the abstract of the three
Persons; hence it may be said simply that the three Persons are one.
But in the mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated
in the abstract of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ
is two.
Reply to Objection 6: Two signifies what has duality, not in
another, but in the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now
what is predicated is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the
word "Christ." Hence, although Christ has duality of nature,
yet, because He has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that
Christ is two.
Reply to Objection 7: Otherwise implies diversity of accident.
Hence diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called
"otherwise" simply. But "another thing" implies diversity of
substance. Now not merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said
to be a substance, as is said Metaph. v, text. 15. Hence
diversity of nature does not suffice for anything to be called "another
thing" simply, unless there is diversity of suppositum. But
diversity of nature makes "another thing" relatively, i.e. in
nature, if there is no diversity of suppositum.
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