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Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in
man's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that "the
man is the image . . . of God." But man is not only mind.
Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gn. 1:27): "God
created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him;
male and female He created them." But the distinction of male and
female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the
body, and not only in the mind.
Objection 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the
shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image
of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal,"
"spiritual," or imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in
the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a
trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the
like reason there must be another trinity in the others.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): "Be
renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence
we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on
the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10):
"Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of
God, "according to the image of Him that created him," where the
renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the
image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the
mind only.
I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness
to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image"
as we have explained above (Articles 1,2); whereas in other
creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect
or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures;
wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature
except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational
creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace,"
as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the
rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason
of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in
which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents
something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace"
represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in
such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints
which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so
also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a
hostile army.
Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and
others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine
Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the
uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature,
rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the
representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only
in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained
(Article 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although
we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them,
if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity
is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and
of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Question 28,
Article 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find
a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love
in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a
certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however,
we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but
we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the
Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a
modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle;
while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as
the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order
points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to
a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the
architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image"
in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a
"trace."
Reply to Objection 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that
he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on
his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of
the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as
existing in every part of man.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5),
some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually,
but severally. They held that "the man represents the Person of the
Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the
woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so
proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is
manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy
Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of
the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the
image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should
not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the
offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had
said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and
female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came
through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to
both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual
distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes,
since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.
Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying,
"According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where
there is neither male nor female" [Gal. 3:28].
Reply to Objection 3: Although the image of God in man is not to
be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among
terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted
to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is
made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other
animals," as Augustine remarks (Questions. 83, qu. 51).
But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in
man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body
represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.
Reply to Objection 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary
vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi,
2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the
exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the
impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species;
thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to
rest on what is seen.
Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in
the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the
penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination,
informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the
will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of
the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic
to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though
not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both
cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and
co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too,
does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from
this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner
imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the
memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the
procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably
represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two
together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual
vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father
and the Son is not thus properly represented.
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