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Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For
Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word
'habit' is derived from the verb 'to have.'" But "to have"
belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we
speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and money and other like
things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
Objection 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the
predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments
(Categor. vi). But one predicament is not contained under
another. Therefore habit is not a quality.
Objection 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is
stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now
disposition is "the order of that which has parts," as stated in
Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament
Position. Therefore habit is not a quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to
change."
I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from
"habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two
ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to
"have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has
a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to
something else.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in
regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various
predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the
"post-predicaments," so called because they result from the various
predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity,
and such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this
distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between
the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no
medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are
some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for
instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And,
further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an
action or passion, but something after the manner of action or
passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and
something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says
(Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it
were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as
is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And
therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are
comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between
clothing and the man who is clothed."
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in
regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a
quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and
of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit
is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or
ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another:
thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now.
Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "to have" in the
general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have
said.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in
which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which
is had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an
order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the
Philosopher goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25):
namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species."
"In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the
Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions,
when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament
"Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says
'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course
of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as
inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,'
he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as
perfected science and virtue.
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