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Objection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the
moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it
is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the
fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor.
13:4, seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore
it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.
Objection 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs
the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their
own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit"
(Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal
sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are
these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake
of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and
yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede
says (on Lk. 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account
of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they
have. Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of
necessity that he has all the moral virtues.
On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it
is written (Rm. 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath
fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole
Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains
precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2.
Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover,
Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [Serm. xxxix and xlvi
de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.
I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with
charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly
in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of
nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain
works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus
animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that
their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity,
inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the
good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral
virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is
through them that man performs each different kind of good work.
It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected,
not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and,
again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the
infused moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: In order that the act of a lower power be
perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in
the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed,
perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well
disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things
referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to
the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is
referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief
and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the
end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with
charity.
Reply to Objection 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a
habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and
consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account
of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit
of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or
unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience
difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions
remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in
respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which
they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain
virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those
virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all
the virtues.
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