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Objection 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its
species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate
contraries, according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii).
Therefore there is not such thing as an action that is indifferent in
its species, as though it were between good and evil.
Objection 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their
end or object, as stated above (Article 6; Question 1, Article
3). But every end and every object is either good or bad.
Therefore every human action is good or evil according to its species.
None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above (Article 1), an action
is said to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and
evil, when it lacks that complement. But every action must needs
either have the entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some
respect. Therefore every action must needs be either good or bad in
its species, and none is indifferent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
18) that "there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be
done with a good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a
judgment." Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their
species.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles 2,5), every action
takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called
moral, takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle
of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an
action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will
be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms
to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something
repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to
its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what
belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action
does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for
instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields,
and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their
species.
Reply to Objection 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation "as
a result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all
away: thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light;
and death, life. Between this privation and the contrary habit,
there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is
privation "in process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of
health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a
kind of road to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And
since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the
immediate contrary of the opposite habit. In this way evil is a
privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the
Categories: because it does not take away all good, but leaves some.
Consequently there can be something between good and evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Every object or end has some goodness or
malice, at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness
or malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated
above. And it is of this that we are here treating.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs
also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature
may not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its
goodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it
specifically good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither
virtuous nor wicked.
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