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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers
of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there
is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the
powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore
there is no order among them.
Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their
objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not
order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects
are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no
order among the powers of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find
that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the
action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for
sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore
there is no order among the powers of the soul.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the
parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order
among themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.
I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and
since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain
order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul.
Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which
correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third
is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one
power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of
nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to
imperfect things; and according to the order of generation and time;
forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect.
Thus, according to the first kind of order among the powers, the
intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they
direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior
in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.
In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the
powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the
powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the
body. The same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to
the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive
powers are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and
smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common
to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is
naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the
result.
Reply to Objection 1: The species of a given genus are to one
another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered
in their nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous,
according as they receive the predication of the common genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This order among the powers of the soul is
both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its
essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order)
and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the
acts, as we have said above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is verified as regards those
powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among
which the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one
depends on another.
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