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Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits
from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God
in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which
we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.
Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to
commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic.
5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an
act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct
from other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite
for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with
all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved.
Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay
favors received, is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice
(De Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 60, Article
3), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to
various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always
includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and
chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods:
secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate
principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the
person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed;
fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received
particular and private favors, on account of which we are under
particular obligation to him.
Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person
excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from
whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after
religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we
worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons
excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we
give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing
virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes,
as falling short thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so
is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to
God was reckoned above (Question 83, Article 17) among things
pertaining to religion.
Reply to Objection 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to
commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance
when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the
repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude
answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence
thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De
Beneficiis iii).
Reply to Objection 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue,
whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to
friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to
friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of
favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of
gratitude.
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