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Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual
appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that
"delight is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an
intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual
appetite.
Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is
in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive
appetite.
Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational
animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we
have in common with irrational animals.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the
Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the
intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the
intellectual appetite.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), a certain delight
arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason
apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as
regards its application to some particular thing, but also the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in
the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called
joy, but not bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that
delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily
transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing
but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of
consent to the things we wish."
Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he
uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of
perception. For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is
attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the
intellect and contemplation." Or we may say that he is defining
delight of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion,
properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is
not thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to simple
movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one
simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier.,
that "the angels are not susceptible to our passible delight, but
rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption."
Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common
with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore
Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part
in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in
the sensitive appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but
also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the
angels.
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