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Objection 1: It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage
is a consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [St. Augustine,
De Bono Viduit ix] says that "for those who have vowed virginity it
is wicked, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry." But it
would not be wicked unless it were contrary to virginity, and marriage
is not contrary to virginity except by reason of carnal intercourse.
Therefore the will's consent in marriage is a consent to carnal
intercourse.
Objection 2: Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband
and wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal
intercourse. But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage
between them. Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal
intercourse.
Objection 3: Further, if the woman say to the man: "I consent to
take thee provided however that you know me not," it is not a marriage
consent, because it contains something against the essence of that
consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage consent
were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to
the consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse.
Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the
consent is to carnal intercourse.
On the contrary, No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a
virgin in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after
consenting to marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore
he did not consent to carnal intercourse.
Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the
cause of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not essential to
marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a
consent to carnal intercourse.
I answer that, The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to
marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed.
Wherefore, according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to
marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to
carnal intercourse. Now, as stated above (Question 44, Article
1; Question 45, Articles 1,2), marriage is not essentially
the carnal union itself, but a certain joining together of husband and
wife ordained to carnal intercourse, and a further consequent union
between husband and wife, in so far as they each receive power over the
other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining together is
called the nuptial bond. Hence it is evident that they said well who
asserted that to consent to marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse
implicitly and not explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be
understood, except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause,
for the power to have carnal intercourse, which power is the object of
the consent, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power to
use one's own property is the cause of the use.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why consent to marriage after
taking the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a
power to do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave
another man the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and not
only by actually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of
the Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above (Sent. iv, D,
3; TP, Question 29, Article 2).
Reply to Objection 2: Between brother and sister there can be no
power of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as
neither can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently
the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Such an explicit condition is contrary not
only to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and
therefore it is contrary to marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: Marriage begun corresponds to marriage
consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is
operation.
The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given
explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.
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