|
Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to
God. For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above
(Question 12, Articles 2,3). But an offense against God is
infinite, since it is measured by the person against whom it is
committed, for it is a greater offense to strike a prince than anyone
else. Therefore, as no action of man can be infinite, it seems that
he cannot make satisfaction to God.
Objection 2: Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt,
since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of
God, and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as
satisfaction is compensation for a past offense, it seems that we
cannot offer it to God.
Objection 3: Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one
debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he
can do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for
the blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (Is. 40:16)
that "the wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering
." Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for the debt
resulting from the offense committed.
Objection 4: Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the
service of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore,
as Seneca observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time
is a very grievous matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to
God, and the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 5: Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than
original sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were
both God and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual
sin.
On the contrary, Jerome [Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum]
says: "Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible
to man, let him be anathema." But satisfaction is commanded (Lk.
3:8): "Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance."
Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.
Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to
make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make
satisfaction to God.
Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the
fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion," as the
Pythagoreans said [Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; SS, Question
61, Article 4]. Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained
in a sin committed. Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.
I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by
reason of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and
just as thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors
received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in
giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the
Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay
them measure for measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he
can, for friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is
possible. Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to
proportion, for as the debt due to God is, in comparison with God,
so is what man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in another
way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same as regards
satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make satisfaction to God if
"satis" [enough] denotes quantitative equality; but he can, if it
denote proportionate equality, as explained above, and as this
suffices for justice, so does it suffice for satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the offense derived a certain
infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction
derive a certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far
as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay
becomes acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is
infinite as regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned
gratuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in
which respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is
not to the point, since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as
this is an offense against God, which is a matter, not of turning to
a creature but of turning away from God. Others again say that even
as regards the aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in
virtue of Christ's merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this
comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is given to
believers through faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to
give grace otherwise, satisfaction would suffice in the way explained
above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man, who was made to God's image, has a
certain share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions
through his free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he
can make satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so
far as it was bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on
him, that he might be his own master, which cannot be said of a
slave.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that it is impossible to
make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to
make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all
that he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation
that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it
is impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put
forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be
heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain
measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above
which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Though man cannot recover the time that is
past, he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he
should have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from
him the fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).
Reply to Objection 5: Though original sin has less of the nature of
sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is
an infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it
could not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
|
|