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Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of
passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot
thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now
passion is a cause of sin, as stated (Article 5). Therefore the
more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does
not diminish sin, but increases it.
Objection 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to
merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases
merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by
a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also
increases rather than diminishes a sin.
Objection 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously,
according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that
impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act.
Therefore passion aggravates a sin.
On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation
of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man,
the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv,
12).
I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will,
which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement
of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related
to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently,
according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the
reason or will, as stated above (Articles 1,2; Question 10,
Article 3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the
higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the
will to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused
in the sensitive appetite.
Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must
needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is
voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our
control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the
reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the
impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control.
In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its
voluntariness.
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but
increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to
wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and
so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with
which anyone sins, the greater the sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of
that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured
on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally
from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his
intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its
accidental cause, but of its direct cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of
reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to
do well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason,
such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his
action.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the movement of the will incited by
the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own
movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.
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