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Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of
hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore
evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of
something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.
Objection 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (2
Macc 3:1) some are praised for that "the laws were very well
kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the
hatred of their souls had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil
be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is
commendable: and this is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both
good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different
subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of
love is good, as stated above (Question 26, Article 1;
Question 27, Article 1). Therefore the object of hatred is
evil.
I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of
apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as
the natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination
of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which
does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above
(Question 26, Article 1). Now, with regard to the natural
appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned
and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural
love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and
destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the
animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain
harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable;
while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is
apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is
suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is
repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just
as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.
Reply to Objection 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of
repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all
things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an
aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one
being is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but
by comparison with something else.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good,
when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil,
whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither
hatred of evil nor love of good is good.
Reply to Objection 3: To different things the same thing may be
lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one
and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally
unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to
water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the
same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
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