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Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of
prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part
of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding
and prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above
(Question 8, Articles 1,8). But prudence is a virtue other
than faith, as is clear from what has been said above (Question 4,
Article 8; FS, Question 62, Article 2). Therefore
understanding does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action
(Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of
universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore
understanding is not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Tully [De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [In Somn.
Scip. i, 8] mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.
I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual
power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is
taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first
principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds
from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every
process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding.
Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole
process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence
it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in
a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated
above (Question 47, Articles 3,6), it applies the knowledge
of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from
a universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of
prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is
cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is
an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative
principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One
should do evil to no man," as shown above (Question 47, Article
6). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is
cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent
practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be
singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (Question
47, Articles 3,6). Now this primary singular is some singular
end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which
is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end.
Reply to Objection 2: The understanding which is a gift of the
Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above
(Question 8, Articles 1,2). It is in another sense that it is
accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The right estimate about a particular end is
called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle,
and "sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what
the Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such
things we need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But
this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense
whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby
we judge of a particular.
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