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Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in
our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its
own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves.
But universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is
first which does not involve the existence of its correlative"
(Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as
regards our intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in
relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they
are known secondarily by us.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1),
that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its
definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the
less universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man."
Therefore the universals are secondarily known by us.
Objection 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their
effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are
secondarily known by us.
On the contrary, "We must proceed from the universal to the singular
and individual" (Phys. i, 1)
I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be
considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises
from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and
individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for
its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before
our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our
intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of
actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to
actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between
potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The
perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is
distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is
imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it
were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in
act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher says
(Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us
at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its
principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object
that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing
contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can
have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts
potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be
known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know
distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less
common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal";
whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as "rational" or
"irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore
our intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same reason
holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.
Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality
to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by
sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference
both to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen
afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and
to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before
it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards
time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he
distinguishes this man from that, and therefore "children at first
call men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others"
(Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is clear: because he who knows
a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its
principle of distinction; as he who knows "genus" is in a state of
potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is evident that
indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act.
We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and
individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the
universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge.
But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common
precedes the knowledge of the less common.
Reply to Objection 1: The universal can be considered in two ways.
First, the universal nature may be considered together with the
intention of universality. And since the intention of
universality---viz. the relation of one and the same to many---is
due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a
secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that
the "universal animal is either nothing or something secondary." But
according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the
universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the
latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent
universals which he called ideas.
Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature
itself---for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the
individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one,
by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential
come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of
nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for
"the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De
Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection
or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely
is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect:
thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man
comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the
generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.
Reply to Objection 2: The more common universal may be compared to
the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole,
considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only
the less universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is
contained not only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering
that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, but
also more; as "man" contains not only "animal" but also
"rational." Therefore "animal" in itself comes into our knowledge
before "man"; but "man" comes before "animal" considered as part
of the same idea.
Reply to Objection 3: A part can be known in two ways. First,
absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts
being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is
known. Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must
needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely
before we know its different parts. So likewise principles of
definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the
thing defined would not be known at all. But as parts of the
definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before
we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature.
Reply to Objection 4: The universal, as understood with the
intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of
knowledge, in so far as the intention of universality results from the
mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle
of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato
thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and
substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered,
according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of
existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did.
vi, 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself
as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a
formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the
result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the
generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the
fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken
from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is
taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken
from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the
intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is
to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the
form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the
form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any
cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible
causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes
conversely.
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