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Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not
continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of
this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8,
"Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or
knowledge shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative life is
made void.
Objection 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation
by snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says
(Confess. x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted
affection in my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet
through my grievous weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory
commenting on the words of Job 4:15, "When a spirit passed
before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does not remain
long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is
recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the
light." Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.
Objection 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be
continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to
man." Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath
chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," since
as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the contemplative life
begins here so that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."
I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways:
first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is
evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for
two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable
things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i,
13. But even in our regard contemplative life is
continuous---both because it is competent to us in respect of the
incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can
endure after this life---and because in the works of the
contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more
able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. x, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same
here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by
reason of charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end.
Gregory speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The
contemplative life begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly
home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with
a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love."
Reply to Objection 2: No action can last long at its highest
pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the
uniformity of Divine contemplation, according to Dionysius [Coel.
Hier. iii], and as we have stated above (Article 6, ad 2).
Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can
be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative
life to be above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us
something divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is
incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure
longer.
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