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Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to
every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm
himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to
himself, to whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself,
since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore
thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.
Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace.
But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and
grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a
benefactor.
Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his
own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.
Therefore thanks are not due to them.
Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that
he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to
his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .
Objection 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do
equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the
benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to
be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that
the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would
not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be
a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man
is not always bound to repayment for favors received.
Objection 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is
inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that
repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid.
Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all
things give thanks."
I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to
Himself because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs
always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a
benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural
order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the
favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as
stated above with regard to a father (Question 31, Article 3;
Question 101, Article 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such,
honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of
principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he
need it.
Reply to Objection 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v),
"just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and
gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is
moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man
confers a favor on himself, he is but following the bent of his
nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is
profitable." Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is
no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself
a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly
spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation
to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v,
11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered
as though they were various persons.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see
good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor,
not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that
reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the
favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for,
as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay
discounts a favor."
Reply to Objection 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi),
"it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own
sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers
himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself,
seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther
on: "If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of
us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I
rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It
is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless
the giver has been the loser thereby."
Reply to Objection 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii),
"when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part
of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a
favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if
indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service."
Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his
duty.
Reply to Objection 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he
does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than
on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence
Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully,
has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors
received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in
his hearing but everywhere." From this it is evident that however
well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by
showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. viii, 14): "He that abounds should be repaid with
honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money": and Seneca
writes (De Benef. vi): "There are many ways of repaying those
who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good
advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without
flattery." Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness
or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because,
as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to desire this
in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire
it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!"
If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he
should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue
if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his
heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his
kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without
sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3).
Reply to Objection 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment
of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore
repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial.
If, however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove
detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him,
as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay,
and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment."
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