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Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than
science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to
certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain,
through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less
it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also
wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the believer
may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of
faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the intellectual
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But
"faith is through hearing" according to Rm. 10:17; whereas
understanding, science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual
sight. Therefore science and understanding are more certain than
faith.
Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the
more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since
faith is the way to understanding, according to another version [The
Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you shall
not understand": and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that
"faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it seems that science
or understanding is more certain than faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When
you had received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . .
. "you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed,
the word of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of
God. Therefore science is not more certain than faith; nor is
anything else.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 57, Article
4, ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent
matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is preferable in point
of certitude, by reason of its matter, since it is about eternal
things, which never change, whereas the other three intellectual
virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding, are about necessary
things, as stated above (FS, Question 57, Article 5, ad
3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and understanding
may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts
of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must
note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part
of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is
itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than those
three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the
aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly,
certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the
more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is.
In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are
above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three
virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with
regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on
the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more certain simply,
while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise
if these three be taken as gifts received in this present life, they
are related to faith as to their principle which they presuppose: so
that again, in this way, faith is more certain.
Reply to Objection 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of
faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of
faith with our intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal sight is more
certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom
we hear greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more
certain than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about
what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what
is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man
certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than
about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.
Reply to Objection 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are
more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater
clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the
whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of
conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far as
science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are
based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the
certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
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