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Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the
intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one
commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in
Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence
(Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in
states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself,
and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences,
it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct
man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect
thing to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17.
Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man
is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts,
whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue
than wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater
it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human
affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things,
which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by
Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are
incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26: "Behold God is
great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater
virtue than wisdom.
Objection 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent
than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from
indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of
understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is
a greater virtue than wisdom.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that
wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), the greatness of a
virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object
of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues:
because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated
at the beginning of the Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause
that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of
the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all
the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect
of them all.
Reply to Objection 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and
wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a
greater virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi,
7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must
say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does
not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man
judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (1 Cor.
2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which
are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to
wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or
political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it
leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the
king.
Reply to Objection 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring
happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz.
the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom
were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness
in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is
imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it
follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future
happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i,
text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because
it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain." Hence
if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater
which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less
certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which
is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great
thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be
based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part.
Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime
things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which
knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially
in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God
alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about God
which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable
principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know
what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole
is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and
non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to
being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are
constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the
proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom
makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of
understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other
sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by
vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that
wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.
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