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Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is
necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is
voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of
necessity.
Objection 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But
the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii,
9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to
opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of
necessity.
Objection 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own
actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity.
Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all
desire happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but
contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the
will desires something of necessity.
I answer that, The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For
that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong
to it by an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say
that everything composed of contraries is of necessity
corruptible---or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the
three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this
is "natural" and "absolute necessity." In another way, that a
thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which
is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when
without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for
instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is
necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and
sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing must
be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do
the contrary. This is called "necessity of coercion."
Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will.
For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing.
But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something.
Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the
inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is
according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is
impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so
it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and
voluntary.
But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot
be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea,
arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.
In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.
Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to
the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last
end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what
the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing
naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else
appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in
everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood
of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take
away the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei
v, 10).
Reply to Objection 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing
naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural
principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things.
Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational
power.
Reply to Objection 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason
of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the
end, but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard
those actions of which we are masters.
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