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Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to
disobey the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or
moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not
comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue,
since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the
more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is
not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that
"obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds
its own." But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more
it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and
choice, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a
special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a
superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are
degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues.
On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of
justice, as stated above (Question 80).
I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that
have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to
render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance
with the divinely established order of things, as shown above
(Article 1), and therefore it is a good, since good consists in
mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni
iii) [FP, Question 5, Article 5]. Again, this act has a
special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while
subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that
they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the
rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific
object is a command tacit or expreSS, because the superior's will,
however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience
seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls
the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object
from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress,
fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a
good end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his
lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers,
occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since
not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above
(FS, Question 96, Article 3). Moreover, certain things are
sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such
things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden.
Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering
formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special
virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is
requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some
other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for
disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the
other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance
of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the
omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience
will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for
its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior,
whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior,
indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly,
according to Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes,
and to obey at a word," etc.
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and
it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in
so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein
he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion
(Question 92, Article 2). We may also reply that as in
justice, excess is in the person who retains another's property, and
deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes the mean
between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his
superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency
on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience.
Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of
wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (Question 58,
Article 10).
Reply to Objection 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the
will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which
is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept,
and this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a
man's will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker,
namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed
by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in
agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and
seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his
own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own
sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as
happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is
not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds
its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will
seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept,
but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in
disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will
tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as
regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the
judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in
agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless
praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less
devotedly [Question 82, Article 2] to the fulfilment of the
precept.
Reply to Objection 4: Reverence regards directly the person that
excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account
of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one
species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
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