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Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice.
For, as stated above (Question 58, Article 7), justice is
twofold, particular and legal. Now "epikeia" is not a part of
particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal
justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice,
since its operation is beside that which is established by law.
Therefore it seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice.
Objection 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as
the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue,
as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now
"epikeia" seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as
implied by its name: for it is derived from epi, i.e. "above,"
and dikaion, i.e. "just." Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as
modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your
modesty be known to all men," the Greek has epieikeia [to
epieikes]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii),
modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore "epikeia" is not a part
of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that
"epikeia is a kind of justice."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 48), a virtue has
three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A
subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially,
and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For
sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as
animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many
according to priority and posteriority, as "being" of substance and
accident.
Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general
sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a
subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with
priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is
subject to the direction of "epikeia." Hence "epikeia" is by way
of being a higher rule of human actions.
Reply to Objection 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal
justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way
exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the
law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the
intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then "epikeia"
is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice
denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the
letter, then "epikeia" is a part not of legal justice but of justice
in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as
exceeding it.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
10), "epikeia is better than a certain," namely, legal,
"justice," which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is
itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate
something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But
modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's
outward life---for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like.
Possibly also the term epieikeia is applied in Greek by a similitude
to all kinds of moderation.
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