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Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable
precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every
respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit.
i, 2). But that which is a man's property should be his always.
Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2)
that slaves should "go out free" in the seventh year.
Objection 2: Further, a slave is his master's property, just as
an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Dt.
22:1-3) with regard to animals, that they should be brought back
to the owner if they be found going astray. Therefore it was
unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:15): "Thou shalt not deliver to
his master the servant that is fled to thee."
Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more
even than the human law. But according to human laws those who
ill-treat their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and
the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death.
Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20,21) that
"he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die
under his hands . . . if the party remain alive a day . . . he
shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his money."
Objection 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave
differs from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But
the dominion of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his
servant or maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to
allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex.
21:7).
Objection 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who
has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses.
Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 21:18, seqq.)
that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for
punishment.
Objection 6: Further, the Lord forbade them (Dt. 7:3,
seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and commanded the
dissolution of such as had been contracted (1 Esdras 10).
Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from
strange nations (Dt. 21:10, seqq.).
Objection 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within
certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev.
18. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt. 25:5) that if
any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife.
Objection 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between
man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is
impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was
unfitting for the Lord to allow (Dt. 24:1-4) a man to put his
wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could
not take her again to wife.
Objection 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her
husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father.
But the Law did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to
investigate the injury done by a servant to his master, or by a son to
his father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law
to prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order to investigate a
wife's adultery (Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it seems
that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members
of the household.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The
judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves."
I answer that, The mutual relations of the members of a household
regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the
Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of
man's life may be considered from two points of view. First, from
the point of view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves
his individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life,
considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external
goods, by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing and
other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need of
servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of
the species, by means of generation, for which purpose man needs a
wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual
relations of the members of a household admit of a threefold
combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and
wife, and those of father and son: and in respect of all these
relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with
regard to servants, it commanded them to be treated with
moderation---both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be
burdened with excessive labor, wherefore the Lord commanded (Dt.
5:14) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy
maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also as to the
infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their
servants, to set them free (Ex. 21:26,27). Similar
provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone
(Ex. 21:7, seqq.). Moreover, with regard to those servants
in particular who were taken from among the people, the Law prescribed
that they should go out free in the seventh year taking whatever they
brought with them, even their clothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and
furthermore it was commanded (Dt. 15:13) that they should be
given provision for the journey.
With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those
who were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that they should marry
a wife from their own tribe (Num. 36:6): and this lest
confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a
man should marry the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died
without issue, as prescribed in Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order
that he who could not have successors according to carnal origin, might
at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased
might not be entirely forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain
women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear of their losing
their faith; and those of their near kindred, on account of the
natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what way
wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that they should not
be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it ordered punishment to
be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime (Dt.
22:13, seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his wife should
not be detrimental to his son (Dt. 21:15, seqq.). Again,
that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but
rather that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away (Dt.
24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the
very outset, it was prescribed that no public duties should be laid on
a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with his
wife.
With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by
instructing them in the faith: hence it is written (Ex. 12:26,
seqq.): "When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning
of this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim of the
passage of the Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them
the rules of right conduct: wherefore it is written (Dt.
21:20) that the parents had to say: "He slighteth hearing our
admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery."
Reply to Objection 1: As the children of Israel had been delivered
by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the
service of God, He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity.
Hence it is written (Lev. 25:39, seqq.): "If thy
brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not
oppress him with the service of bondservants: but he shall be as a
hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My servants, and I
brought them out of the land of Egypt: let them not be sold as
bondmen": and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely
but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of time they were set free.
Reply to Objection 2: This commandment is to be understood as
referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in
committing some sin.
Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the ill-treatment of
servants, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it
was certain or not: since if it were certain, the Law fixed a
penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who
was ordered to be given his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment
was that of a murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his
master. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only probable,
the Law did not impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant:
for instance if the servant did not die at once after being struck, but
after some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result
of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free man, yet so
that he did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his
staff," he that struck him was quit of murder, even though afterwards
he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred
by the victim of his assault. But this was not the case if a man
killed his own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his
very person, was the property of his master. Hence the reason for his
not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because
it is his money."
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own
a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a
hireling for a fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that
through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This
is shown by the very words of the Law, where we read: "If any man
sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as bondwomen
are wont to go out." Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only
his son, but even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave,
according to Lev. 25:39,40: "If thy brother, constrained
by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the
service of bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a
sojourner."
Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
9), the paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but not
that of coercion, whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be
compelled. Hence in this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to
be punished by the rulers of the city.
Reply to Objection 6: The Lord forbade them to marry strange women
on account of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray
into idolatry. And specially did this prohibition apply with respect
to those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that
they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman
was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent of the Law,
it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom
Booz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth
1:16): "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God."
Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she
first shaved her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment
wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father and mother, in token
that she renounced idolatry for ever.
Reply to Objection 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super
Matth.), "because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who
did everything with a view to the present life, it was ordained that
children should be born to the dead man through his brother: thus
affording a certain mitigation to his death. It was not, however,
ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should marry
the wife of the deceased, because" the offspring of this union "would
not be looked upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger
would not be under the obligation to support the household of the
deceased, as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice
on account of his relationship." Hence it is evident that in marrying
the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother's place.
Reply to Objection 8: The Law permitted a wife to be divorced,
not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the
Jews' hardness of heart, as Our Lord declared (Mt. 19:8).
Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on
Matrimony (SP, Question 67).
Reply to Objection 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by
adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since
"the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness" (Job 24:15).
But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a
servant in respect of his master: because the latter infidelity is not
the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it
remain hidden like the infidelity of an adulterous woman.
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