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Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the
wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an
undoing of his very being." Now he that injures himself sins more
grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to
himself, to whom will he be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more
grievous sin than covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of
those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to
accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied
by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe
prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin
than covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues,
as stated above (Question 56, Article 1, ad 1; FS,
Question 61, Article 2, ad 1). Now prodigality is more
opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written (Prov.
21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the
dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool
to give too much and receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a
more grievous sin than covetousness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that
"the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man."
I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous
sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,
wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving
or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because
the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the
covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For
not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to
prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much
useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in
giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account
of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not
easily cured, for the reason given above (Question 118, Article
5, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: The difference between the prodigal and the
covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter
against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending
that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by
spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the
clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to
the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like
manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in
giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending:
wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God
hath given riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat
thereof." Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he
injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the
covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even
use his own goods for his own profit.
Reply to Objection 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of
them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to
prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard
to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too
much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional
sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from
taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call
for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls
for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be
forced to give to others.
Reply to Objection 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as
all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to
prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
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