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Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its
essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in
living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of
action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that
life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards
is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences
of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes
before "to understand," since "to live" comes first to living
things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De
Anima ii, 4). Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active
and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation
consists rather in rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I
enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Therefore it
would seem that life is unfittingly divided into active and
contemplative.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.):
"There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His
holy word, the active life and the contemplative."
I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live
whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which
is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is
most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives
proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to
which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist
in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and
movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting
according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would
seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most
intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with his friends"
(Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external
actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active
and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it
actually "to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation.
Hence "to live" is, in living things, "to be," because living
things through having "being" from their form, act in such and such a
way.
Reply to Objection 2: Life in general is not divided into active
and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from
having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect
and human life.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest
from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a
movement of the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as
a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
7) that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so
far as movement is defined "the act of a perfect thing." In this way
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in
contemplation, namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique"
[Question 180, Article 6].
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