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Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible
and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will.
For the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to
desire], and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. But
there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite,
but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence
of wisdom, of which it is said (Ws. 6:21): "The
concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is
also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but
only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice.
Wherefore Jerome commenting on Mt. 13:33 warns us "to have the
hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we should
distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul
as well as in the sensitive.
Objection 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the
concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in
the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but
intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible
power to the intellectual part.
Objection 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that
"the soul has these powers"---namely, the irascible,
concupiscible, and rational---"before it is united to the body."
But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to
the soul and body united, as we have said above (Question 78,
Articles 5,8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers
are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.)
says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the
desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9)
"that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul
are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus."
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was
said above (Question 59, Article 4; Question 79, Article
7), a power which is directed to an object according to some common
notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained
under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the
visible thing under the common notion of something colored, the visual
power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but
if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something
colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.
Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of
good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And
therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the
different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as
proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses
and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of
good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the
will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore
in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no
differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the
intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible
power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the
apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the
senses.
Reply to Objection 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be
understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as
passions---arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul.
And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only
in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another
way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion
of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense,
too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in
this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one
power, which is called the will.
Reply to Objection 2: The will itself may be said to irascible, as
far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a
passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the
will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good.
And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and
hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this
way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et
Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul
before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of
nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in
what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection is
clear.
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