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Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be
indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain
an individual. But an action can be indifferent in its species, as
stated above (Article 8). Therefore an individual action can be
indifferent.
Objection 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even
temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident
that they are not good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they
are indifferent in respect of a habit. Therefore some individual
actions are indifferent.
Objection 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral
evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to
ordain a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end.
Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An
idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the
motive of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an
evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the day
of judgment" (Mt. 12:36): while if it does not lack the
motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore
every word is either good or bad. For the same reason every other
action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is
indifferent.
I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in
its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And
the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above
(Article 3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence
it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of
his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his
species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance
that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the
end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that
proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is,
by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of
evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with
reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be
either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human
action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the
individual, must be good or bad.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from
some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves
his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or
human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be
indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Reply to Objection 1: For an action to be indifferent in its
species can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that
its species demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection
proceeds along this line. But no action can be specifically
indifferent thus: since no object of human action is such that it
cannot be directed to good or evil, either through its end or through a
circumstance. Secondly, specific indifference of an action may be due
to the fact that as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good
nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else.
Thus man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither white nor
black; nor is it a condition of his species that he should not be black
or white; but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other
principles than those of his species.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil,
properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly,
because he hurts none save himself. And the same applies to all others
who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in
general, is all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense
every individual action is either good or bad, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate
reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil
of some vice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or
repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue,
provided he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same
clearly applies to other actions.
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