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Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is
written (Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,"
and (Wis. 1:11): "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul."
Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul.
Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the
decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the
decalogue: "Thou shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every
lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
36): "Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he
wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does
not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his
faith is guilty of iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith
or "to be guilty of iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie
is a venial sin.
Objection 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a
mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being
exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii)
that "we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying
deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and
which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a
temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty."
Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives,
which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii)
that "it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but
not even to wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a
precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and
consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the
perfect would be worse off than others.
On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt
destroy," etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not
grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in
joking, or for the sake of our neighbor's good." But every mortal
sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal
sins.
I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is
contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as
stated above (Question 24, Article 12; Question 35,
Article 3). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways:
first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended;
thirdly, accidentally.
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false
signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to
the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie;
so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of
charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it
is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false
signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man's
good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to
moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's
neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is
contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and
consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion
engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of
no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's
neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent
particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind,
considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through
being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a
mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure
one's neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and
this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's
neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of
committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to
charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a
mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure
is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's
neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by
reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus
again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred
through scandal from lying publicly.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous
lie, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt
destroy all that speak a lie."
Reply to Objection 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are
directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above
(Question 44, Article 1, ad 3; FS, Question 100,
Article 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the
decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our
neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness
against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity"
in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice;
wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "Every sin is
iniquity." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
Reply to Objection 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in
two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the
Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous
disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due.
Wherefore Jerome (in his exposition of Is. 65:21, 'And they
shall build houses') explains that God "built them spiritual
houses." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to the external
act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal
reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which was not
inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was
inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this
sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they
merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had
already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection
understands the words to mean.
Reply to Objection 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a
mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance
causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to
another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin
to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to
that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot
apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a
jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps
accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the
saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of perfection not only not
to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although Augustine says
this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless
perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are
placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to
safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching,
and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it
does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.
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