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Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is
to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of
these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (Article
1). Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of
temperance or fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in
the same way in both distributive and commutative justice.
Objection 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in
observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason.
Since, then, one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for
both should be the same.
Objection 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive
justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a
person's deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for
instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished
more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is
observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that
the mean in distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical
proportion," whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical
proportion."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), in distributive
justice something is given to a private individual, in so far as what
belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is
proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect
of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives
all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more
prominent position in the community. This prominence in an
aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy
according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in
various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in
distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality
between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and
persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so
that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to
another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the
mean in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," wherein
equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say
that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion
equals 1-1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser
plus its half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity,
because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.
On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on
account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen
chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found
primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so
that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has
become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of
this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which is
gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean
between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the
former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5,
and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one
that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with
4: and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean,
1 being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for
then both will have 5 which is the mean.
Reply to Objection 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not
the real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean;
wherefore the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.
Reply to Objection 2: Equality is the general form of justice,
wherein distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find
equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find
equality of arithmetical proportion.
Reply to Objection 3: In actions and passions a person's station
affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a
prince than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a
person's station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative
justice it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.
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