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Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it
is written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a
man hath stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore
theft is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with
death. But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by
indemnity, according to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a
sheep . . . he shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep
for one sheep." Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in
great things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with
eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a
quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for
a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zach.
5:3, "This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the
earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written."
Therefore theft is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 59, Article 4;
FS, Question 72, Article 5), a mortal sin is one that is
contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity
consists principally in the love of God, and secondarily in the love
of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing him well.
But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings;
and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society would be
undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault
is in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve
through necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin,
as we shall show further on (Article 7). Hence the text
continues: "For he stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly,
theft is stated not to be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of
adultery, which is punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say
of the thief that "if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . .
but he that is an adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul."
Reply to Objection 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal
rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine
judgment which is pronounced against sinners "according to truth"
(Rm. 2:2). Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present
life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but
only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as
contain some horrible deformity. Hence according to the present
judgment the pain of death is not inflicted for theft which does not
inflict an irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave
circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a
sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as
Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping
which is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted
(Ex. 21:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is
little: so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little
matters: and the person who takes such things can presume that this is
not against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very
little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet
if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a
mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be
through consent in a mere thought.
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