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Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause
of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some
are loved for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a
passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some
because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every
friendship based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause
of love.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1):
"When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but
half-heartedly or not at all, even if we see how beautiful it is."
Therefore hope too is a cause of love.
On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by
love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not
presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion
of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in
something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in
something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in
this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other
passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it
may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular
love: just as one good is the cause of another.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it
affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure
is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes
pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love
for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another
thing's being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason
loves him from whom he receives it.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by
reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of
desire, because hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so
intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope
itself is of a good that is loved.
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