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Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the
passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral
virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and
sorrow are passions, as stated above (Question 23, Article 4;
Question 31, Article 1; Question 35, Articles 1, 2).
Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
Objection 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty
which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul,
as stated above (Question 22, Article 3). Therefore every
moral virtue is about the passions.
Objection 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral
virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But
some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the
passions.
On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the
passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul
by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by
reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently
there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's
direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions
of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective
appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as
stated above (Question 22, Article 3). Therefore not all the
moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some
about operations.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures
and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something
resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in
acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the
Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about
actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by
pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and
sorrows," viz. as about something that results from virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the
subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the
will, where there are no passions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper
matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for
all cases.
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