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Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue.
For passions are not acts of virtue, since "they bring us neither
praise nor blame" (Ethic. ii, 5). But sorrow is a passion. As
therefore contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as contrition is so called from its being a
crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is
not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of
virtue.
On the contrary, Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But
contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification of the
word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But
the question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but
to that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For
just as the inflation of one's own will unto wrong-doing implies, in
itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same
will implies something generically good, for this is to detest one's
own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which
signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of
that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the
act, to wit, of penance, as is evident from what was said above
(Sent. iv, D, 14, Question 1, Article 1; TP, Question
85, Articles 2,3).
Reply to Objection 1: Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for
sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not
belong essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its
effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment
on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God
through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict
on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid
sorrow, because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful
deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part
of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it
consists not only of internal but also of external acts and sensible
things. The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save
displeasure for some evil, for the emotions of the will are named after
the passions, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, Question
1, Article 5; FS, Question 22, Article 3, ad 3).
Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an
act of the virtue of penance.
Reply to Objection 2: Attrition denotes approach to perfect
contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be
attrite, when they are worn away to a certain extent, but not
altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when
all the parts are crushed [tritae] minutely. Wherefore, in
spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect
displeasure for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect
displeasure.
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