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Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of
whom we read (Lk. 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded
man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rm. 13:3, "Wilt thou
not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt
have praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always
evil.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is
not evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to
man to fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods,
whereby the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly
fear is not always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 10:28): "Fear ye not
them that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing
but what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is
evil.
I answer that, As shown above (FS, Question 1, Article 3;
FS, Question 18, Article 1; FS, Question 54, Article
2) moral acts and habits take their name and species from their
objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement is the
final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement is
both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were to
describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account of
covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the covetous
man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks is
wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the desire or
the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly love is,
properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world as his
end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of love,
since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq.
lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways.
First in so far as there is in them something divine, for instance,
the good of grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of
God: and in this way those are blamed who have no regard for man.
Secondly, one may have regard for men as being in opposition to God,
and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we
read of Elias or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he
feared not the prince."
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rm. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger
to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power
in this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial
fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from
detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake
justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things,
viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do
such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever.
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