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Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all
things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But
God needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an
end.
Objection 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the
thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text
70), because the end of generation is the form of the thing
generated. But God is the first agent producing all things.
Therefore He is not the final cause of all things.
Objection 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things
do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is
not the end of all things.
Objection 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes.
If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it
follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has
made all things for Himself."
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing
would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless
it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient
considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively.
For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the
patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things,
however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are
imperfect agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while
acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the
First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some
end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His
goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection,
which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore
the divine goodness is the end of all things.
Reply to Objection 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect
agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does
not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly
liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only
for His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The form of the thing generated is not the
end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of
the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness;
otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the
generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: All things desire God as their end, when
they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or
sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is
good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness
to God.
Reply to Objection 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar
and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from
Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in
reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many
things in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.
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