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Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the
properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For
that to which something is added, may be understood when the addition
is taken away; as man is something added to animal which can be
understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to
hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of
dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a
person, the hypostasis remains.
Objection 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is
someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by
paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow
that the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be
"someone." So when paternity is mentally abstracted from the
Father, He still remains "someone"---that is, a hypostasis.
Therefore, if property be removed from person, the hypostasis
remains.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6):
"Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father had not
begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him being called
unbegotten." But if He had not begotten the Son, there would be no
paternity in Him. Therefore, if paternity be removed, there still
remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has
nothing else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore,
if filiation be removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and
the same holds as regards the other persons.
I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the
universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a
circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in
the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which
the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of
rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the
intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the
form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the
intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from
brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both
of a circle, and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor
particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless,
as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of
these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 6) that "substance is common and hypostasis is particular."
So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the
particular, the common universal essence remains in the intellect if
the properties are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father,
which is, as it were, a particular.
But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the
non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases
and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's
being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father,
the Father's hypostasis or person remains.
If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea
of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are
not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is
added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own
"supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons;
thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies
something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual
substance. So, as relation distinguishes and constitutes the
hypostases, as above explained (Article 2), it follows that if the
personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer
remain. Some, however, think, as above noted, that the divine
hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin;
so that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son
is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent
relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute
the notion of a person, and are thus called "personal properties."
Hence, if these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis,
but not the persons, remain.
But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the
relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above
(Article 2); secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational
nature is a person, as appears from the definition of Boethius (De
Duab. Nat.) that, "person is the individual substance of a
rational nature." Hence, to have hypostasis and not person, it
would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not
the property from the person.
Reply to Objection 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a
distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of
dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this
distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is
understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the
distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no
longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the
nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual
substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs
essentially to both.
Reply to Objection 2: By paternity the Father is not only
Father, but is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It
does not follow, however, that the Son is not "someone" or a
hypostasis; just as it does not follow that He is not a person.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the
hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity
were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the
hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being
unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he
himself says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not
every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed,
the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished
from the other persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as
the Jews understand it.
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