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Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in
God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is
not in God.
Objection 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are
mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not
attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love
attributed to Him.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
"Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place
in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.
On the contrary, It is written: "God is love" (Jn.
4:16).
I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love:
because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive
faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive
faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and
since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the
appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly,
as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil;
thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because
what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through
another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less
so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in
the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are
certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some
special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and
possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed.
Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not.
Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for
which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their
root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in
anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of
hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear
that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as
to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and
appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all
that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in
God (Question 19, Article 1), and hence we must attribute love
to Him.
Reply to Objection 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except
through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the
universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as
stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual
appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the
sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the
proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore
always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change
affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De
part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in
animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they
have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas
acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and
delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective
appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they
are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God
rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same
reason He loves without passion.
Reply to Objection 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite
there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the
bodily change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part
of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima
iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the
blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge.
Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain
imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have
not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies
also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions,
however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore
none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has
been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side
imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and
from likeness of effects, as already show (Question 3, Article
2, ad 2; Question 19, Article 11). Whereas, those that do
not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly
predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as
said before (Question 19, Article 11).
Reply to Objection 3: An act of love always tends towards two
things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one
wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence,
inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as
possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force,
even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He
wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His
essence, as above shown (Question 6, Articles 1,3). And by
the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus
he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards
the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding
force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good
to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force,
inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in
God.
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