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Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by
Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the
simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life."
For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only
belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity.
Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought
not to be found.
Objection 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of
duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore
the word "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity;
but rather the word "existence."
Objection 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is
alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to
be "whole."
Objection 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times
exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the
plural, for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning,
from the days of eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said,
"According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity"
(Rm. 16:25). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
Objection 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same
thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is
superfluously described as "perfect."
Objection 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But
eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way
of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by
"before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every
movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon
before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is
nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a
thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before
or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of
before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the
uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of
eternity.
Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is
eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that
is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no
succession, being simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of
negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not
to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because
our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to
the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
Reply to Objection 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being,
but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of
being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation
rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has
parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
Reply to Objection 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in
Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though
simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
Reply to Objection 5: Two things are to be considered in time:
time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is
imperfect. Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to
remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude
the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and
quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of
eternity, we use the word "possession."
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