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Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man
makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb.
ii, 18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of
hope, like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes.
Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God
works virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et
Lib. Arb. xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits,
according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope
is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect
thing" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the
disposition of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it
hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three
daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and
charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6)
"the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its
work good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act,
it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured
and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say
that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper
measurement. But, as we stated above (Question 8, Article 3,
ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and
homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is remote and
excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is good, which
attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we
speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated (FS,
Question 40, Article 1), when we were treating of the passion of
hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to
obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by
ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii.
Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us
by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on
Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue,
since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends
on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of
virtue. Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man
cannot make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make
ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain
thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which
we speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall
show further on (Article 5; Question 18, Article 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as
regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness
by means of grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope.
The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does
not flow from our merits, but from grace alone.
Reply to Objection 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation
to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is
perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God,
on Whose help he leans.
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