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Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The
Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be
natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [FS, Question 57,
Article 6] and the like, but not those which are connected with
speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the
same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.
Objection 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature.
Now prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In
the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore
prudence is natural.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature
than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain
natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De
Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that
"intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it
therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an
intellectual virtue, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore
prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.
I answer that, As shown above (Article 3), prudence includes
knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to
which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as
regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence
as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of
either are known naturally, as shown above (Article 6): except
that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for
as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is
according to the speculative reason is better than that which is
according to man": whereas the secondary universal principles,
whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not
inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through
experience, or through teaching.
On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are
the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this
matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the
right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural
inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above
(FS, Question 51, Article 1; FS, Question 63, Article
1) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues
whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also
have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.
But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed,
are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and
affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to
something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man
naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man
has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it
happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since
then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated
above (Article 6; FS, Question 57, Article 5), it follows
that prudence is not from nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things
relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends.
Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that "they are
the principles of the ou heneka", namely, the end; and so he does
not mention euboulia among them, because it takes counsel about the
means.
Reply to Objection 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only
because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive
passions, but also because of their long experience.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of
obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same
species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account
of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently
extends to an infinity of singulars.
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