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Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and
bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
contraries, as was stated above (Article 2, Objection 1).
Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that,
since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific
difference, as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again,
evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate
any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good
and evil.
Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one
same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about
matters of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good
habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as
the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore,
habits are not divided into good and bad.
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue
to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad
habits.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), habits are
specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active
principles, but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens
in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness
to nature. In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a
bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable
to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an
act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human
nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are
discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it
is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of
good and bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the
fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower
nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher
nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting
human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which
disposes to an act befitting some higher nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so
far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does
it happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of
habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided
into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another
bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another
about something bad.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every
being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but
some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate,
viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a
difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate
repugnant to a determinate nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific
thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various
natures, as stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one
action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that
which is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same
matter are contrary to one virtue.
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