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Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by
saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal
law." Because "Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act;
whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above (Article 5).
Therefore this definition does not include every sin.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii):
"Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now
will is comprised under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of
the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire
contrary to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or
"deed."
Objection 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion
from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to
the end as explained above (Question 1, Article 3; Question
18, Articles 4,6; Question 20, Articles 2,3):
wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to
the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal
things, and seek after temporal things": and again he says (Qq.
lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what
we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use." Now the
definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due
end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.
Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it
is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being
forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore
sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.
Objection 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was
explained above (Article 1). Now man's evil is to be against
reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would
have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it
is contrary to the eternal law.
On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra
Faust. xxii, 27).
I answer that, As was shown above (Article 1), sin is nothing
else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to
its being voluntary, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1),
whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will
or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior
actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through
lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a
thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is
incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is
proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the
first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to
speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27)
includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the
substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of
sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; the other,
pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were,
of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal law."
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one
same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are
reduced to the genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin.
v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said
and what is not said, what is done and what is not done.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which
commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and
hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the
will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of
sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in
defining sin to include something referring to external action.
Reply to Objection 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs
man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in
regard to things which are directed to the end: hence when he says,
"contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and
all other forms of inordinateness.
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil
through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by
positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the
natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but
secondarily in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is
evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law,
precisely because it is inordinate.
Reply to Objection 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an
offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary
to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being
"contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to
its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs
us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of
faith.
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