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Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith,
hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to
religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for
its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us
to God alone, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore religion is
a theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (FS,
Questions 57,58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not
an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the
consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists
properly in observing the mean between too much and too little. for one
cannot worship God too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33,
"Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above
all praise." Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral
virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 4) religion pays due
worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion:
first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way
of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is
offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts
whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we
believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was
stated (Question 1, Articles 1,2,4) that God is the object
of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we
believe God.
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby
God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth,
are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is
related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and
consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the
last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to
the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with
an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals
with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues,
faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their
proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of
religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so
Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Religion directs man to God not as its
object but as its end.
Reply to Objection 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an
intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and
observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to
God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say
"equality," I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not
possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in
consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance.
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the
Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as
regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it
is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other
circumstance.
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