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Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin.
For Jerome in commenting on Mt. 18:3, "Unless you be
converted, and become as little children," says that "a child
persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in
seeing a beautiful woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance.
Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
Objection 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now
"in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is
not a childish sin.
Objection 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished:
whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is
concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col.
3:5, "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are .
. . concupiscence", etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish
sin.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"we apply the term intemperance to childish faults."
I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons.
First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does
not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense.
Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of
intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is
one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three
ways. First, as rewards that which they both desire, for like a
child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in
human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with
reason. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the
heading "Comeliness is twofold," that "the beautiful is that which
is in keeping with man's excellence in so far as his nature differs
from other animals." Now a child does not attend to the order of
reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does not listen to
reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike
as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more
self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse
not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become
headstrong." So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers
strength: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust
served became a custom, and custom not resisted became necessity."
Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is
corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov.
23:13,14): "Withhold not correction from a child . . .
Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell."
In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to
the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says
(Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual
things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e.
carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually
weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not
wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it."
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child
ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
concupiscible to accord with reason."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as
denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that
the sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of
likeness, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two
ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and
intemperance are about natural desires, since they are about desires of
food and sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature.
Secondly, a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of
the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this
way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural
desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and
there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in
excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur
with regard to natural desires, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 11).
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity
[Question 167], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of
food, or the adornment of women. And though children do not affect
these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the
reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: That which regards nature should be nourished
and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason
in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
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