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Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a
capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful
acts, as stated above (Question 34, Article 5). Now sloth
does not move one to action, but on the contrary withdraws one from
it. Therefore it should not be accounted a capital sin.
Objection 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are
assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters
to sloth, viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair,
sluggishness in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after
unlawful things." Now these do not seem in reality to arise from
sloth. For "spite" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises
from envy, as stated above (Question 34, Article 6);
"malice" is a genus which contains all vices, and, in like manner,
a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful things is to be found in
every vice; "sluggishness" about the commandments seems to be the
same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness" and "despair" may arise
from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from
the vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so
far as a man shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome,
it is sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is
sloth: and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite,
faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair," whereas he states that
from sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness,
uneasiness of the mind, restlessness of the body, instability,
loquacity, curiosity." Therefore it seems that either Gregory or
Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its
daughters.
On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states
that sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 84, Articles
3,4), a capital vice is one which easily gives rise to others as
being their final cause. Now just as we do many things on account of
pleasure, both in order to obtain it, and through being moved to do
something under the impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on
account of sorrow, either that we may avoid it, or through being
exasperated into doing something under pressure thereof. Wherefore,
since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated above (Article 2; FS,
Question 85, Article 8), it is fittingly reckoned a capital
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us
from doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind
to do certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow,
such as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of
sloth. For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
5,6) "no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and
unpleasant," it follows that something arises from sorrow in two
ways: first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that
he passes to other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find
no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the
avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from
unpleasant objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things
as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the
sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the
result of "despair," while avoidance of those goods which are the
means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the
counsels, is the effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of
common righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the
commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow
is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is
called "spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods
themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is
properly called "malice." In so far as a man has recourse to eternal
objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after
unlawful things." From this it is clear how to reply to the
objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not
denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be understood
as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with hatred, but
for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same applies to
the others.
Reply to Objection 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is
also given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But
Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of
sorrow, because, as stated above (Article 2), sorrow is not a
distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a distasteful and burdensome
work, or sorrows on account of any other cause whatever, but only in
so far as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow
belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as
it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons
to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by
Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of
sorrow, is an effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness"
are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle
and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with
negligence. All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth,
belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This
tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of
rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is called
"uneasiness of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative
power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is
called "loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a body that changes
place, it is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a
man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of
members of his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place
to another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may
denote changeableness of purpose.
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