|
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus
is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says
(Praedic. x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are
genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature.
Objection 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species
is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of
morality; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as
liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Objection 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature.
But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as
contraries, as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that
between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a
return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Objection 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for
it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
Objection 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the
universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the
perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir.
10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of
all things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in
its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore
evil is a nature.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is
neither a being nor a good."
I answer that, One opposite is known through the other, as darkness
is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything
appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its
own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection
of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being,
or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil
is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying
that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as
such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the
opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature;
and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and
evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings
forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some
philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit
and privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one
contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in
relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way
good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to
contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so every
privation, as such, has the nature of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil are not constitutive
differences except in morals, which receive their species from the
end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality.
And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are
specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the
absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by
itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue
end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in
natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus,
therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a
certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end
proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of
reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence
evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the
good that is annexed.
Reply to Objection 3: This appears from the above. For the
Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in
that respect, between good and evil there is a medium, as good is
considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only
out of right order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish,
but not evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return
to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no
return to sight, although blindness is an evil.
Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense.
In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and
in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt
good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In
another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter
makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final
cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.
But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that
is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For
every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as
an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by
virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing
definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention."
Reply to Objection 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe
are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and
according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was
said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.
Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does
it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by
reason of some good joined to it.
|
|