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Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three
parts of prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and
"foresight." Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the
opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence six parts, namely,
"reasoning," "understanding," "circumspection," "foresight,"
"docility" and "caution." Aristotle says (Ethic. vi,
9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome"
belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions
"conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And
another Greek philosopher [Andronicus; Question 80, Objection
4] says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good
counsel," "shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative
[Regnativa]," "military," "political" and "domestic
prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore
it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or
deficient.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from
science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are
sciences. Therefore they are not parts of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the
intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility,
belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits.
Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.
Objection 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding
are acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above
(FS, Question 16, Article 1). Therefore, just as
"eubulia" which refers to counsel, is connected with prudence, and
"synesis" and "gnome" which refer to judgment, so also ought
something to have been assigned corresponding to use.
Objection 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated
above (Question 47, Article 9). Therefore solicitude also
should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, "integral," as
wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; "subjective," as
ox and lion are parts of animal; and "potential," as the nutritive
and sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be
assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral
parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a
virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all
the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence,
namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of a
seventh, viz. "memory" mentioned by Tully; and eustochia or
"shrewdness" mentioned by Aristotle. For the "sense" of prudence
is also called "understanding": wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the sense,
and this is understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence
as a cognitive virtue, namely, "memory," "reasoning,"
"understanding," "docility" and "shrewdness": while the three
others belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action,
namely, "foresight," "circumspection" and "caution." The
reason of their difference is seen from the fact that three things may
be observed in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge
itself, which, if it be of the past, is called "memory," if of the
present, whether contingent or necessary, is called "understanding"
or "intelligence." Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is
caused either by teaching, to which pertains "docility," or by
"discovery," and to this belongs to eustochia, i.e. "a happy
conjecture," of which "shrewdness" is a part, which is a "quick
conjecture of the middle term," as stated in Poster. i, 9.
Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things
known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to
"reasoning." And the reason, in order to command aright, requires
to have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the
end, and this belongs to "foresight"; secondly, to attend to the
circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to
"circumspection"; thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to
"caution."
The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence
whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a
multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Question 47,
Article 11). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is
governed, is divided into various species according to the various
kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which is united together
for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to
fight, and the prudence that governs this is called "military."
There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of
life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is ruled by
"domestic prudence": and such again is the multitude of a city or
kingdom, the ruling principle of which is "regnative prudence" in the
ruler, and "political prudence," simply so called, in the
subjects.
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above (Question 47, Article 2,
ad 2) then its parts include "dialectics," "rhetoric" and
"physics," according to three methods of prudence in the sciences.
The first of these is the attaining of science by demonstration, which
belongs to "physics" (if physics be understood to comprise all
demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion
through probable premises, and this belongs to "dialectics." The
third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain
suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to "rhetoric."
It may be said, however, that these three belong also to prudence
properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises,
sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having,
as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the
parts of prudence are "good counsel," which concerns counsel,
"synesis," which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary
occurrence, and "gnome," which concerns judgment in matters of
exception to the law: while "prudence" is about the chief act, viz.
that of commanding.
Reply to Objection 1: The various enumerations differ, either
because different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection"
under "foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and
"shrewdness" under "understanding."
Reply to Objection 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to
be taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other
three, the reply may be gathered from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things are reckoned parts of
prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are
connected with things pertaining to prudence.
Reply to Objection 4: Right command and right use always go
together, because the reason's command is followed by obedience on the
part of the lower powers, which pertain to use.
Reply to Objection 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
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