|
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For
the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now
the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know
singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii),
"reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things."
Therefore God does not know singular things.
Objection 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the
singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material
conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted
from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.
Objection 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium
of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as
they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of
singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is
altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know
singular things.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways
of a man are open to His eyes."
I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found
in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
foregoing (Question 4, Article 2). Now to know singular things
is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things.
Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by
us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues
(De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if
He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among
inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although
by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we
know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His
simple intellect.
Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows
singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any
singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They
give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements
of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come.
This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal
causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be
joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter.
Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the
son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not
know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to
the aforesaid mode, God would not know
singular things in their singularity.
On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by
the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this
will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless
he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the
reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of
singular things.
Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of
things by His knowledge, as stated above (Article 8), His
knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the
active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of
universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on
(Question 44, Article 2), the knowledge of God must extend to
singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He
knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness
of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the
sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the
universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the
knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing,
and not only of the form.
Reply to Objection 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible
species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible
species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual
principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the
singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which
is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of
itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the
composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles
of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also
singular things.
Reply to Objection 2: Although as regards the species in the divine
intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received
in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial
and material things.
Reply to Objection 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality
recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in
this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
|
|