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Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually
bound, under the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the
marriage debt. For no one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on
account of fulfilling a precept. Yet he who has had intercourse with
his wife cannot partake of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome
[Serm. de Esu Agni viii] quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D,
32). Therefore the payment of the debt does not come under the
obligation of a precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what
is hurtful to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person to
pay the debt when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because
they have already paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse
the one who asks.
Objection 3: Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to
fulfill an obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the
debt comes under the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to
render oneself unfit for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise
weakening the body: but apparently this is untrue.
Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 12), marriage is directed to the begetting and rearing of
children, as well as to the community of life. Now leprosy is opposed
to both these ends of marriage, for since it is a contagious disease,
the wife is not bound to cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides
this disease is often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore it would
seem that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.
On the contrary, As the slave is in the power of his master, so is
one spouse in the power of the other (1 Cor. 7:4). But a slave
is bound by an obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his
service according to Rm. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men
their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due," etc. Therefore husband
and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt.
Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (1
Cor. 7:2). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the
one were not bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is
troubled with concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an
obligation of precept.
I answer that, Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an
office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be
observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the
generative power that alone which is in excess of what is required for
the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that
a thing should be first perfected in itself, and that afterwards it
should communicate of its perfection to others: and this is also the
order of charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife
has power over her husband only in relation to the generative power and
not in relation to things directed to the preservation of the
individual, the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, in
matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due regard
however to his own welfare.
Reply to Objection 1: It is possible through fulfilling a precept
to render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge
becomes irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who
pays the marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit
for the exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is
sinful, but on account of its carnal nature. And so, according to
the Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the
ministers of the Church, and not of others who should be left to use
their own discretion, because without sin they may either abstain out
of reverence or receive Christ's body out of devotion.
Reply to Objection 2: The wife has no power over her husband's
body, except as is consistent with the welfare of his person, as
stated above. Wherefore if she go beyond this in her demands, it is
not a request for the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this
reason the husband is not bound to satisfy her.
Reply to Objection 3: If the husband be rendered incapable of
paying the debt through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance
through having already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the
wife has no right to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot
rather than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some
other cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not bound, and she
cannot ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his
wife's sin, should she fall into fornication on this account, is
somewhat imputable to him. Hence he should endeavor to do his best
that his wife may remain continent.
Reply to Objection 4: Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a
marriage. Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous
husband. But she is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not
so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual
cohabitation. And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it
is better to be thus than not at all.
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