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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a
demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is
made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved
demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed
this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can
be demonstratively proved that the world began.
Objection 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was
made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from
something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter
of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the
arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was
ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from
nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must
have begun.
Objection 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works
from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God
acts by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world,
therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
Objection 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have
developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been
always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.
Objection 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to
God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in
duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always
exist.
Objection 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is
that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to
pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have
arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
Objection 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also
was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys.
ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an
infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
Objection 8: Further, if the world and generation always were,
there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is
immortal: therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually
now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with
certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved
demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not"
(Heb. 11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world:
hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I
believe in one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in
Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth": in which words the newness
of the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known
only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration
can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said
above of the mystery of the Trinity (Question 32, Article 1).
The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be
demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of
demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to
its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said
that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be
demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient
cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be
investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must
will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among
these, as was said above (Question 19, Article 3). But the
divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests.
Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of
demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest
anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring
forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to
unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things
that are of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi,
4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the
world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was
not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is
refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the
world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the
world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a
certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. "And they try to
explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if
the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a
footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also
the world always was, because its Maker always existed." To
understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts
by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the
effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the
principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not
successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing
made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they
say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of
the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because
creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive
change, as was said above (Question 45, Article 2).
Reply to Objection 2: Those who would say that the world was
eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not
that it was made after nothing, according to what we understand by the
word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also
some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna
(Metaph. ix, text 4).
Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as
quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a
necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in
order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such
is the human intellect, but not the divine intellect (Question 14,
Articles 7,12).
Reply to Objection 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold
that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being
uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise
they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and
accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay.
Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such
particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole
world.
Reply to Objection 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it
would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De
Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being
simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
Reply to Objection 6: Passage is always understood as being from
term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present
day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The
objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an
infinite number of mean terms.
Reply to Objection 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to
proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite
number of causes that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for
instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand,
and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity
"accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the
causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by
means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be
broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts
after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this
particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he
generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men
generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a
particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be
generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if
the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary
body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
Reply to Objection 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world
evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible
for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the
Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental
infinity. But this was disproved above (Question 7, Article
4). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some
say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine
says [Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres.
46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit
of souls, viz. that souls separated from their bodies return again
thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters
will be given later (Question 75, Article 2; Question 118,
Article 6). But be it noted that this argument considers only a
particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or
least some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are
considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can
exist from eternity.
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