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Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the
lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the
object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is
placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore
it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things
apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God
does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as
existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does
not love things other than Himself.
Objection 3: Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of
desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational
creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside
Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no
friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows
(Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou
hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time
hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest
all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast
made."
I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing
things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a
thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
possesses. Now it has been shown above (Question 19, Article
4) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be,
therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only
inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then,
God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else
than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves
everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will
is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by
its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the
cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or
imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should
preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and
to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and
creates goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made
to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the
beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for
his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On
behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He
Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and
goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all
existing things."
Reply to Objection 2: Although creatures have not existed from
eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from
eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and
for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things
within us, know things existing in themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards
rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and
communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who
may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and
happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised.
But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any
share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly
speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the
love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far
as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet
this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of
His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can
desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.
Reply to Objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being
loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves
sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence
and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not
existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from
God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
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