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Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue
are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that
one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one
pay one's debts, according to Rm. 13:7, "Render . . . to
all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to
injure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly
expressed.
Objection 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery,
stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be
inflicted on one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been
specified above (Questions 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that
the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways.
First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The
desire [concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting
kingdom": secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in
James 4:1, "From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are
they not . . . from your concupiscences which war in your members?"
Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept
of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as
they would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the
concupiscence of the will forbidden, since it is included in every
sin. Therefore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to
include some that forbid concupiscence.
Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery
or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.
Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire
of theft and of adultery.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which
is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some
special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which
is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining
to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth
precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his
parents---which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any
special reason---it was necessary in due sequence to give certain
precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all
indifferently what is due to them.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general
to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid
the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor,
had to be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of
the decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor
are paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not
behoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the
precepts of the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our
neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts,
as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.
For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are
understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with
one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of
damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with
theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as
detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden
together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly
opposed to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not
include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do
not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of
their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed
or pleasure.
Reply to Objection 4: Murder in itself is an object not of
concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of
good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of
good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of
good, i.e. of something useful: and good of its very nature has the
aspect of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft
and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the
concupiscence of murder.
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