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Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not
divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For
the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as
sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De
Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since,
then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the
irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible
and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is
suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the
concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite
differing from the concupiscible.
Objection 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome
says on Mt. 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the
irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the
concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the
same powers.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura
Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two
parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.
I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is
called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are
species of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the
concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in
natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to
the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is
harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary
agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable,
and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural
inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is
unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but
also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore,
since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive
apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the
natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive
powers---one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what
is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is
hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby
an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and
inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that
its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome
and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one
principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant
things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in
order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may
fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible
appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since
the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger
being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear
also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and
defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the
acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or
against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And
for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the
passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for
instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance,
terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are
about things concupiscible---namely, food and sex, as the
Philosopher says [De Animal. Histor. viii.].
Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is
suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power
is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the
sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those
things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above
(Question 78, Article 2); so also in the sensitive appetite
there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as
suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful
to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible
appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may
belong to the irascible appetite.
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