|
Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are
distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7),
that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and
not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers.
Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.
Objection 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower
reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it.
Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1)
that "the scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows
necessary things, is another principle, and another part from the
"opinionative" and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent
things. And he proves this from the principle that for those things
which are "generically different, generically different parts of the
soul are ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically
different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore,
necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent,
it seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must
be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De
Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of
things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls the
"reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason,
which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the disposal of
temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than
the lower.
Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the
truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's
(mind) "is derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore
the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment
and true decision." Therefore the opinionative power, which is the
lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we
may understand the higher reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the
higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions."
Therefore they are not two powers.
I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood
by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says
that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation
and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it
sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of
action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent
on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two---namely,
eternal and temporal ---are related to our knowledge in this way,
that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of
discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of
things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (Rm.
1:20), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment,
from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and
according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.
But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong
to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to
the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from
them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the
principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for
example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both
medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it
were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable
thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the
higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to
Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions,
and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the
higher reason, science to the lower.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing
is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various
acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because
they are different powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the
higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by
the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the
higher reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The "scientific" part, of which the
Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for
necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural
science and mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and
"ratiocinative" part is more limited than the lower reason; for it
regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any
qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary
things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things:
because it knows both under the same objective aspect---namely,
under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows
necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates
to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper
accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but
imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth.
Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but
they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the
principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the
Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul---namely, the
"scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not because they are two
powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude
for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he
inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to
their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being,
which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared
as perfect and imperfect.
Reply to Objection 4: That distinction given by Damascene is
according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of
powers. For "opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans
to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to
"judge" or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect,
applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is
taken the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to
adhere to the formed judgment with approval.
|
|