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Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well
of what he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the
cognitive faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by
prudence. Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to
justice, which is in the will, as stated above (Question 58,
Article 4).
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15):
"The spiritual man judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual
chiefly by the virtue of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts
by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rm. 5:5). Therefore
judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of
its proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure
in everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4).
Therefore judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the
other moral virtues.
Objection 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to
judges. But the act of justice is to be found in every just man.
Since then judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is
not the proper act of justice.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until
justice be turned into judgment."
I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such.
Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus
dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above
(Question 57, Article 1). Consequently the original meaning of
the word "judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right.
Now to decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly
speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides
rightly about matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which
denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs properly to
justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4)
that "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification
of justice."
Reply to Objection 1: The word "judgment," from its original
meaning of a right decision about what is just, has been extended to
signify a right decision in any matter whether speculative or
practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things.
The first is the virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this
way, judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to
pronounce or define. The other is the disposition of the one who
judges, on which depends his aptness for judging aright. In this
way, in matters of justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as
in matters of fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly
judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge
aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment:
wherefore synesis (judging well according to common law) which belongs
to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as stated above (Question
51, Article 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of
charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to
the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he
pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man
pronounces judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the
ruling of the law.
Reply to Objection 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself,
whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown
above (Question 58, Article 2). Now man is master in things
concerning himself, but not in matters relating to others.
Consequently where the other virtues are in question, there is no need
for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its
broader sense, as explained above (ad 1). But in matters of
justice, there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is
"able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both" [Job
9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than
to any other virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a
master-virtue [Question 58, Article 6], commanding and
prescribing what is just; while it is in the subjects as an executive
and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which denotes a decision
of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing chiefly in
one who has authority.
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