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Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
own sake" [Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure
is desired for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why
he wishes to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x,
2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant.
Objection 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful
good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is
a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by
its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and
"that is money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it
is written (Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches [honestas]
are from God," and (Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden
upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable," i.e.
richer, "than himself." Therefore the honest differs not from the
useful.
Objection 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that
nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same
statement (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not
from the honest.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Question 83, qu. 30):
"The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful
implies reference to something else."
I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful
and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated
above (Article 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it
has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever
is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to
man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue
(Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a
thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to
reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which
perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially
honest, is referred to something else as its end namely happiness.
Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one
subject.
Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest
as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to
desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the
converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is
desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that
which is in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be
pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of
the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended
to be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (Article
1, ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing
incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it
follows that it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in
accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some
respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say
that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are
honest.
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