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Objection 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's
members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less
concerned in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was
in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other
parts of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted
in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever
was materially in the other members will all rise again.
Objection 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected
as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter.
But the human body is directed to the resurrection through being
perfected by a rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species
but also the parts of matter will all rise again.
Objection 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same
cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into
parts belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is
quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is
ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all
the parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise
again: which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body
but ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all
the parts of matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again,
either the body of one who rises again will be very dense, or it will
be immoderate in quantity.
Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can
all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake
of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to
rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which
belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.
I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the
resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human
nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the
human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the
truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but
not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter
that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would
surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states,
which opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the
whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of
the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order
of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality
of matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this
distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the
species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both
state what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we
speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first
opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was
engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something but not
all, thereof will rise again, as stated above (Article 4).
Reply to Objection 1: Just as all that is in the other parts of the
body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but
not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the
other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and
this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species,
since it occupies another place and position in the body, and is under
other parts of dimension: and there accrues something which does not
cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this
is not reckoned as another part of the whole considered in relation to
the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the
body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away:
although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of
matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is
speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the
body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the
quantity of hair, lest it should be immoderate, but it will rise again
in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he
refers to the case when something will be lacking to the other parts,
for then it will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of
hair.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the third opinion parts of
species are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not
make this distinction (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish
different parts, but in order to show that the same parts may be
considered both in respect of species, as to what belongs to the form
and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is
under the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the
flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so far as it is
under such a form, and consequently by reason thereof it is directed to
the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a
distinction between parts of species and parts of matter say that
although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect
parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, wherefore they
are not equally directed to the resurrection.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of things subject to generation
and corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions
before the reception of the substantial form. Consequently division
which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter.
But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the
substantial form; wherefore division that is made in reference to
definite quantity regards the species especially when definite position
of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the human body.
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