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Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
subject to God, as stated above (Article 3). Now it belongs to a
theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance
or modesty.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas
humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is
opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore
apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
Objection 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same
object, as stated above (Article 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is
reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above
(Question 129, Article 5). Therefore it would seem that
humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If
thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the
philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as what
they called metriotes, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this
evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a
part of modesty or temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 137, Article 2, ad
1; Question 157, Article 3, ad 2), in assigning parts to a
virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of
the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its
praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a
passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions
which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of
temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so
does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a
spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is
accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in
proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a
man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above
(Question 160, Article 2), among the various parts of
temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as
understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as
humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is
written (1 Pt. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and
meek spirit."
Reply to Objection 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our
last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the
causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is
caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of
modesty or temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by
reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode,
as stated above (Question 137, Article 2, ad 1; Question
157, Article 3, ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in
the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or
temperance by reason of its mode.
Reply to Objection 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to
matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is
reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
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