|
Objection 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of
dominion" should not be distinguished as special species. For it
belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose
states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice,
as stated above (Article 1). Therefore right belongs to each one
equally; and we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and
masters as distinct species.
Objection 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as
stated above (Article 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the common
good of a city or kingdom, as stated above (FS, Question 90,
Article 2), but not to the private good of an individual or even of
one household. Therefore there is no need for a special right of
dominion or paternal right, since the master and the father pertain to
a household, as stated in Polit. i, 2.
Objection 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees
among men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are
princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to
them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes
right of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from
civil right.
I answer that, Right or just depends on commensuration with another
person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may
denote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether
distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the
other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and
between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is
the "just" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from
something else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that
something else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son
belongs to his father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in
Ethic. viii, 12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is
his instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 2 [Ethic. viii, 11].
Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so
between them there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called
"paternal." In like manner neither is there the just simply,
between master and servant, but that which is called "dominative."
A wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, since she
stands related to him as to her own body, as the Apostle declares
(Eph. 5:28), is nevertheless more distinct from her husband,
than a son from his father, or a slave from his master: for she is
received into a kind of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope
for justice between husband and wife than between father and son, or
master and slave, because, as husband and wife have an immediate
relation to the community of the household, as stated in Polit. i,
2,5, it follows that between them there is "domestic justice"
rather than "civic."
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one
his right, the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for
if a man gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just."
And since what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs
to the slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there
is not justice of father to son, or of master to slave.
Reply to Objection 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and
a slave, as such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a
man, is something having separate existence and distinct from others.
Hence in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards
them in a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws
regulating the relations of father to his son, and of a master to his
slave; but in so far as each is something belonging to another, the
perfect idea of "right" or "just" is wanting to them.
Reply to Objection 3: All other differences between one person and
another in a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the
state and to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the
perfect sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished
according to various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or
"magisterial," or "priestly" right, it is not as though such
rights fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal"
right, or right of "dominion," but for the reason that something
proper is due to each class of person in respect of his particular
office.
|
|