|
Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less
than another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides
of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides
denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently
one cannot be greater than another.
Objection 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a
maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in
a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher
states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De
Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no
one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue
cannot be greater or less than another.
Objection 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the
power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from
God Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one
virtue cannot be greater than another.
On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater
abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater
abundance and increase: for it is written (Mt. 5:20):
"Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and
Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven": and
(Prov. 15:5): "In abundant justice there is the greatest
strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater
or less than another.
I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater
than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as
applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear
that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more
excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the
cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said
(Question 18, Article 5; Question 61, Article 2) that the
cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which
perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues
which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of
reason. And among these, one is better than another, according as it
approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in
the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is
in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the
concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 6.
The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of
the same species. In this way, according to what was said above
(Question 52, Article 1), when we were treating of the
intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two
ways: first, in itself; secondly with regard to the subject that
partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater
or little, according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever
has a virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever
temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art:
for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And
in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his
Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less,
as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a
maximum.
If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may
then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in
different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to
attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and
this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural
disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a
greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the
measure of the giving of Christ," as stated in Eph. 4:9. And
here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed
virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue.
Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the
mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the
Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is
reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be
seen when several arches aim at a fixed target.
Reply to Objection 1: This equality is not one of absolute
quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man
proportionately, as we shall see further on (Article 2).
Reply to Objection 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can
have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways
explained above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.
Reply to Objection 3: God does not work by necessity of nature,
but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men
various measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: "To every
one of you is given grace according to the measure of the giving of
Christ."
|
|