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Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to
their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when
sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are
infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the
same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since
temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to
mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the
gravity of the fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the
measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be."
Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can
they be said to belong to the same species.
Objection 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their
species ["ex genere"], as murder and adultery; and some are venial
in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive
laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to
its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the
reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end
of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as
stated above (Article 1, ad 1). Therefore they are also
specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.
On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to
the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin
as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically
according to the debt of punishment.
I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold
difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to
be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and
"irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference
is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it
may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be
found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are
consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this
difference is found within the one species of man.
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal
sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment,
cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is
accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the
agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it
is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner,
wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner.
Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz.
the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to
the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the
debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of
sins, but cannot constitute it.
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the
diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin.
For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of
order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order,
implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus,
in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital
principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while,
on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder
in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle
of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same
relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to
matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul
is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God,
to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is
disordered without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For
even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the
destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to
nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the
vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the
soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince
one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the
principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the
principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning,
turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin,
falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve
eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from
God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired,
because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is
said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to
deserve to be punished eternally.
Reply to Objection 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart
as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they
"turn to," viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing
hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for
instance, in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial
sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may
even be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by
reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it
follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of
sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be
found even in things of the same species, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or
acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner,
but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison
fails.
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