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Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into
pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all
creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own
existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault.
Therefore evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
Objection 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither
fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect,
which are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
Objection 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a
fault; for "temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but
an occasion for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2
Cor. 12; not is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault,
and the pain follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently
divided into pain and fault.
Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that this division is
superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing
is evil "because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore
every evil comes under pain.
I answer that, Evil, as was said above (Article 3) is the
privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection
and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and second. The first
act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its
operation. Therefore evil also is twofold. In one way it occurs by
the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity
of the thing, as blindness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be
wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the
withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not exist, or
because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself
is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of good, is
found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will.
Therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and
integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on
the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and
justice, as was shown above (Question 22, Article 2); for it
is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But the evil
which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary
things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a
fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the
will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as
a pain or a fault.
Reply to Objection 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and
not a mere negation, as was said above (Article 3), therefore not
every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is
naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but
it is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone
to see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be
preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation
come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an
evil as regards a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely
considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
Reply to Objection 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to
evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one
tempted it is not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the
temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus
is the action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is
changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault.
Reply to Objection 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must
be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the
agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury
to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as
including the idea of injury.
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