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Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the
individual good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now
sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas
gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church,
as stated above (Articles 1,4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler
than sanctifying grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act
upon another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater
is the brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of
that which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most
excellent of the virtues," since by it a man bears himself rightly
towards others. But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in
himself; whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of
others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than
what is common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is
nobler than to feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying
grace is common to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is
the proper gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence
gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having
enumerated the gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a
more excellent way"; and as the sequel proves he is speaking of
charity, which pertains to sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace
is more noble than gratuitous grace.
I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained,
the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than
the means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union
with his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is
preparatory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth,
men are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence
sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii,
text. 52), a multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first
is in the multitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is
separate from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader---and this
is better good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous
grace is ordained to the common good of the Church, which is
ecclesiastical order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the
separate common good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the
nobler.
Reply to Objection 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have
sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the
nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more
excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous
grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he
himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions
towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more
excellent, even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species
whereby it produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its
substantial form.
Reply to Objection 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an
end; and thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary;
for what is proper is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence
there is no comparison.
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