|
Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to
the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9):
"Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an
inheritance." But instruction is in contradistinction to the law of
nature; since the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by
natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the
natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human
law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to
those that belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact
that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral
institutions are various for various people. Much more reason
therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law of
nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals.
Objection 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals
in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal.
5:6) that faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included
in the law of nature; since that which is of faith is above nature.
Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the
law of nature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 2:14) that "the
Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are
of the Law": which must be understood of things pertaining to good
morals. Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law
of nature.
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and
judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to
good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to
reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are
called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which
are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative
reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so
every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known
naturally, as stated above (Question 94, Articles 2,4): from
which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various
matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so
evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to
approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first
principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment
without much consideration of the various circumstances, which all are
not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it
is not possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of
sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly
there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by
Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters
which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in
accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must
needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of
necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature;
but not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the
natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to
be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy
mother," and "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and
these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain
things which, after a more careful consideration, wise men deem
obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need
to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g. "Rise up
before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and the
like. And there are some things, to judge of which, human reason
needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of
God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the
likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy
God in vain."
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
|
|