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Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: "The body
of Christ is made out of bread." For everything out of which another
is made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we
say that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white
thing is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black
still we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is
shown in Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ's body is
made out of bread, it will be true to say that bread is made the body
of Christ. But this seems to be false, because the bread is not the
subject of the making, but rather its term. Therefore, it is not
said truly that Christ's body is made out of bread.
Objection 2: Further, the term of "becoming" is something that
is, or something that is "made." But this proposition is never
true: "The bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made
the body of Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of
Christ." Therefore it seems that not even this is true: "The body
of Christ is made out of bread."
Objection 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is
converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems
to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ,"
because such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of
the world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into
being. Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false:
"The body of Christ is made out of bread."
Objection 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be
that thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body
of Christ." Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of
Christ is made out of bread."
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the
consecration takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the
bread."
I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has
something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and
in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is
common to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another
(for, in creation there is being after non-being; in this
sacrament, Christ's body after the substance of bread; in natural
transmutation white after black, or fire after air); and that the
aforesaid terms are not coexistent.
Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with
creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging
to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every
natural transmutation.
Again, this conversion has something in common with natural
transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion.
First of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the
other, as bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas
non-being is not converted into being. But this comes to pass
differently on the one side and on the other; for in this sacrament the
whole substance of the bread passes into the whole body of Christ;
whereas in natural transmutation the matter of the one receives the form
of the other, the previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they
have this in common, that on both sides something remains the same;
whereas this does not happen in creation: yet differently; for the
same matter or subject remains in natural transmutation; whereas in
this sacrament the same accidents remain.
From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in
such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things
are the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme
be predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present
tense: for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is
the body of Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is
black." Yet because of the relationship of the extremes in all of
them we can use the preposition "ex" [out of], which denotes
order; for we can truly and properly say that "being is made out of
non-being," and "out of bread, the body of Christ," and "out of
air, fire," and "out of white, black." But because in creation
one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot use the
word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is
converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this
sacrament, just as in natural transmutation. But since in this
sacrament the whole substance is converted into the whole substance, on
that account this conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.
Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which
are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be
granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is
evident that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason
whereof we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can
be fire"; although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the
subject of whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is
the whole substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part
thereof; whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence
when it is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by
reason of the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in
creation, because there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme
can be the other, as that "non-being can be being," or that "bread
can be the body of Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be
properly said that "being is made of [de] non-being," or that
"the body of Christ is made of bread," because this preposition
"of" [de] denotes a consubstantial cause, which consubstantiality
of the extremes in natural transmutations is considered according to
something common in the subject. And for the same reason it is not
granted that "bread will be the body of Christ," or that it "may
become the body of Christ," just as it is not granted in creation
that "non-being will be being," or that "non-being may become
being," because this manner of speaking is verified in natural
transmutations by reason of the subject: for instance, when we say
that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white thing will be
black."
Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something
remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above
(Article 5), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of
similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or,
"bread will be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made
of bread"; provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the
substance of bread, but in general "that which is contained under the
species of bread," under which species there is first contained the
substance of bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: That out of which something else is made,
sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the
transmutation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a
white one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the
extreme, as when it is said---"out of morning comes the day."
And so it is not granted that the latter becomes the former, that is,
"that morning becomes the day." So likewise in the matter in hand,
although it may be said properly that "the body of Christ is made out
of bread," yet it is not said properly that "bread becomes the body
of Christ," except by similitude, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: That out of which another is made, will
sometimes be that other because of the subject which is implied. And
therefore, since there is no subject of this change, the comparison
does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: In this change there are many more
difficulties than in creation, in which there is but this one
difficulty, that something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to
the proper mode of production of the first cause, which presupposes
nothing else. But in this conversion not only is it difficult for this
whole to be changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may
remain (which does not belong to the common mode of production of a
cause), but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents
remain while the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of
which we shall treat hereafter (Question 77). Nevertheless the
word "conversion" is admitted in this sacrament, but not in
creation, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: As was observed above, potentiality belongs
to the subject, whereas there is no subject in this conversion. And
therefore it is not granted that bread can be the body of Christ: for
this conversion does not come about by the passive potentiality of the
creature, but solely by the active power of the Creator.
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