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Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply.
For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the
time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will.
But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes
involuntariness simply.
Objection 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such,
whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it
remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is
done through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with
the addition of fear, it is involuntary.
Objection 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition,
is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any
condition, is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a
condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary
absolutely, is necessary simply. But that which is done through
fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a
condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided.
Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxx.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things
as are done through fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary."
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise
Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxx), such things are done through fear "are of a mixed character,"
being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done
through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes
voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the
evil feared.
But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary
rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but
involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply,
according as it is in act; but according as it is only in
apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that
which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For,
since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such,
is here and now; that which is done is in act, in so far as it is here
and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that which is
done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that
is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a
greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the
sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the danger:
wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is
that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary, because its
principle is within. But if we consider what is done through fear, as
outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the
will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently
what is done through fear is involuntary, considered in that respect,
that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
Reply to Objection 1: Things done through fear and compulsion
differ not only according to present and future time, but also in
this, that the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to
that which is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through
fear, becomes voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit
not for its own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in
order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a
voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else
voluntary: since the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own
sake, as an end, but also what we wish for the sake of something
else, as an end. It is clear therefore that in what is done from
compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done
through fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of
Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] says, in order to
exclude things done through fear, a violent action is defined as not
only one, "the principal whereof is from without," but with the
addition, "in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all";
because the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat in that
which he does through fear.
Reply to Objection 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain
such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a
white thing: but things that are such relatively, vary according as
they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison
with one thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is
said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were
absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were
relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not
voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when
compared with another.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is done through fear, is
voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is
actually done: but it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that
is to say, if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this
argument proves rather the opposite.
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