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Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness
of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason,
on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases
the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment
of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take
counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger,
friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a
moral act.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God,
the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye
followers of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy
angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with
misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like deeds without
than with a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to
reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by
passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins
deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without
passion, than he who does with passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that
"the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed
without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the
penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens
the moral good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral
good.
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the
goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good
altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if
by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we
give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on
reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according
as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one
questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good,
that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of
reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as
stated above (Question 17, Article 7), it belongs to the
perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also
should be controlled by reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do
it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of
moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of
his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to
Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living
God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual
appetite, and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a
twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and
thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness
of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for
it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of
reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place,
consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance:
because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved
to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the
passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a
sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral
goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the
judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to
work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite.
And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive
appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not
depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it
does in us.
Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes
the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in
either of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates
the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
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