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Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act is not
meritorious. For Chrysostom [Hom. i in Opus Imperfectum] says
in his commentary on Matthew: "Although marriage brings no
punishment to those who use it, it affords them no meed." Now merit
bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act is not
meritorious.
Objection 2: Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves
not praise. Yet virginity whereby one refrains from marriage is
praiseworthy. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence
granted him, avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not
merit by receiving a favor. Therefore the marriage act is not
meritorious.
Objection 4: Further, merit like virtue, consists in difficulty.
But the marriage act affords not difficulty but pleasure. Therefore
it is not meritorious.
Objection 5: Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin
is never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the
same time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act,
since even the first movement in such like pleasures is a venial sin.
Therefore the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.
On the contrary, Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is
meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act,
for it is said (1 Cor. 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt
to his wife." Therefore, etc.
Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act
is an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of a debt.
Therefore it is meritorious.
I answer that, Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is
indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40,
Question 1, Article 3; FS, Question 18, Article 9), the
marriage act is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a
state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage act be a virtue,
whether of justice that they may render the debt, or of religion, that
they may beget children for the worship of God, it is meritorious.
But if the motive be lust, yet not excluding the marriage blessings,
namely that he would by no means be willing to go to another woman, it
is a venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so as to
be disposed to act in like manner with any woman, it is a mortal sin.
And nature cannot move without being either directed by reason, and
thus it will be an act of virtue, or not so directed, and then it will
be an act of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: The root of merit, as regards the essential
reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the
reason for merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the
marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.
Reply to Objection 2: The difficulty required for merit of the
accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required
for the essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and
this is the difficulty in the marriage act.
Reply to Objection 3: First movements in so far as they are venial
sins are movements of the appetite to some inordinate object of
pleasure. This is not the case in the marriage act, and consequently
the argument does not prove.
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