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Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give
evidence. Augustine say (Questions. Gn. 1:26) [Contra
Faust. xxii, 33,34], that when Abraham said of his wife
(Gn. 20:2), "She is my sister," he wished the truth to be
concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by hiding the truth a man
abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man is not bound to give
evidence.
Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it
is written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully
revealeth secrets, but he that is faithful concealeth the thing
committed to him by his friend." Therefore a man is not always bound
to give evidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by
a friend.
Objection 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are
bound to those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics
and priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for
his life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give
evidence.
On the contrary, Augustine [Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3,
cap. Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says:
"Both he who conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty,
the former because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he
desires to hurt."
I answer that, We must make a distinction in the matter of giving
evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary,
and sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject
to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to
obey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which
are required of him in accordance with the order of justice, for
instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If
however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance
secret matters, and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is
not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be
required by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must
make a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to
deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from false
defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give evidence.
Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do what he can to
declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby. For it is written
(Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy from the
hand of the sinner"; and (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that
are led to death"; and (Rm. 1:32): "They are worthy of
death, not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them
that do them," on which words a gloss says: "To be silent when one
can disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's
condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is
constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice;
since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular injury
is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the accuser, it
matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord: whereas it is
different with the accused, who incurs the danger against his will.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the
truth in a case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority
to declare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially
injurious to any person.
Reply to Objection 2: A man should by no means give evidence on
matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such
things, not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more
binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to
man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction.
Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them
known as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they
conduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or to
some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is
bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it.
Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that the
matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the faith
he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes they are such as one
is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation not to
do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy. In
such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if the
superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural right,
and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural right.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar
to slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above
(Question 64, Article 4); hence according to the order of
justice they cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial
for his life.
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