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Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For
those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a
like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of
animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath
nothing more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles.
3:19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, "the death of
man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the
souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the human
soul is corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to
nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But
as it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which
is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as
is concluded in the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we
had not been," even as to our soul.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation.
But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a
phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands
nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body
as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul
cannot survive the dissolution of the body.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls
owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they
have "an incorruptible substantial life."
I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which
we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted
in two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible
for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is,
by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and
corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which
is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever
has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per
se'; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and
material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or
corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (Articles
2,3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the
human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their
bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted
unless it were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible,
not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything
subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to
a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence
belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore
matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is
corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is
impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is
impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.
Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some
pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is
incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is
contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and
into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no
matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no
contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the
manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without
contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves
contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it
is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we
may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires
to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have
knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not
know existence, except under the conditions of "here" and "now,"
whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all
time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always
to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every
intellectual substance is incorruptible.
Reply to Objection 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the
foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the
saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true
of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not
true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power
of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify
this it is written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth
the living soul" (Gn. 1:24): while of man it is written
(Gn. 2:7) that "He breathed into his face the breath of
life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is
concluded: "(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it
was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process
of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written
(Eccles. 3:19): "All things breathe alike," and (Wis.
2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process
is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are
not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than
beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to
the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of
a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the
Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say
that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature
a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of
ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible
because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence.
Reply to Objection 3: To understand through a phantasm is the
proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body.
After separation from the body it will have another mode of
understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as
will appear later on (Question 89, Article 1).
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