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Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special
matter. Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14, "The fourth river is
Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it
stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all
the parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice
had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special
power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu.
61) that "the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it
lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and
justice;" and he says that "the fourth is justice, which pervades
all the virtues." Therefore particular justice, which is one of the
four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.
Objection 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters
relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters
relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and
not special.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2)
particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to
social life.
I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of
moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can
rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external
actions, and also those external things of which man can make use.
And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by
means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation
of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of
internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself.
Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about
the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and
things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one
man is related to another through them.
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially
to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this
is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul;
and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not
directly but by a kind of diffusion.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (FS, Question 61,
Articles 3,4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways:
first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly,
as certain general modes of virtue. In this latter sense Augustine
speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that "prudence is knowledge
of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust
for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with
passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which
pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of
the entire order between one man and another."
Reply to Objection 3: A man's internal passions which are a part
of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which
belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e.
external actions, are capable of being directed to another man.
Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
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