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Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by
God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity.
But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite;
wherefore it is written (Rm. 9:19): "Who resisteth His
will?" Therefore God moves the will of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it
wills naturally, as stated above (Article 2, ad 3). But
"whatever God does in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will wills of necessity
everything to which God moves it.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible
follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from
the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves
it: because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual.
Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which
God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made
man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel."
Therefore He does not of necessity move man's will.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs
to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of
things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their
conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion,
effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects
follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active
principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent
relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine
it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and
not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine will extends not only to the
doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being
done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And
therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the
will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature;
than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
Reply to Objection 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so
works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something
becoming to a thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now
He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to
them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He
does wish to be natural to each thing---that it be subject to the
Divine power.
Reply to Objection 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is
incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved
thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not
follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.
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