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Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For
the object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46)
of the envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining
spirit, which is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore
envy is not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but
rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as
are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in
reputation." Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore
those who are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above
(FS, Question 47, Article 3) when we were treating of the
passions. Now those who lack little, and who love honors, and who
are considered wise, are envious, according to the Philosopher
(Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.
Objection 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite
effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the
recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated
above (FS, Question 32, Article 3) it will not be a cause of
sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who have or have had things
that befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time."
Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy
a species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's
good."
I answer that, The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now
it may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil,
and in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens
in two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so
far as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man
grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some
harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as
the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).
Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil,
in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or
excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good:
and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name
consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from
being reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for
sorrow to be about good, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Since envy is about another's good name in
so far as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows
that a man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass
in reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed
from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors
to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a
commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom
he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed
from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near
him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our
will that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives
rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far
as it is in agreement with the will.
Reply to Objection 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters
where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses
him in such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it
seems to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation
surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be
honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are
envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may
befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in
something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth
the little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can
envy those only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves."
Reply to Objection 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we
have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them,
causes sorrow; and in so far as others have them, causes envy,
because that, above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those
who have spent much in order to get something, envy those who have got
it by spending little, because they grieve that they have lost their
goods, and that others have acquired goods.
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