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Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages
of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and
"minds." Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
Objection 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be
anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for
that which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident.
But "a simple form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De
Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is
contrary to what has been previously said (Question 50, Article
2).
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that
God made the angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made
primary matter "nigh unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the
angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to
God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an
angel his own power of intelligence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the
angels are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore
substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power
or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident
thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the
diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account
it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in
every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared
to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been
already said (Question 44, Article 1). Now the act to which
the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to
understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him,
nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the
angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence
of any creature its power of operation.
Reply to Objection 1: An angel is called "intellect" and
"mind," because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the
knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.
Reply to Objection 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the
subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as
potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is
Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own
existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the
subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the
species: for such accident belongs to the form---whereas an accident
which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole
species, results from the matter, which is the principle of
individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in
regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation
regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
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