|
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (Questions. 83,
qu. 63): "There is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he
seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be
natural. Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned
more than pleasure is sought.
Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity
and intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and
harder," as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the
shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow;
whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety,
but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore
sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought.
Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists
according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more
virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of
shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists
the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly
praised." Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager
than the movement of seeking pleasure.
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the
good which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account
of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the
shunning of sorrow.
I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than
the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of
pleasure is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an
unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable
without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to
be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure
can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial.
Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of
sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object of
pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the
object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and
that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by
reason of something else. Moreover we find a confirmation of this in
natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the
end, when a thing approaches the term that is suitable to its nature,
than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to
its nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is
suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore the
inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in
tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than
he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of
the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
12), "love is felt more keenly, when we lack that which we
love." Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is
caused either by the loss of some loved good, or by the presence of
some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved,
for it rests in possession of it. Since then love is the cause of
pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned, according as love
is the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it.
Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is
repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take
pleasure. For we love the natural well-being of the body more than
the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of
eating and the like, from fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other
such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body.
Thirdly, on the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow
hinders not only one pleasure, but all.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is
shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not
simply. And this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see
that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by
fear of pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above
all.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within
and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is
suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we
remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from
without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing
strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at
its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and
slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty
is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object.
Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is
to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from
without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the
more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then too,
accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and
pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.
Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in
accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or
pain whatever, but because he is not overcome by that which is
concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more
shunned, than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are
sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life
is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is
praised for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not
shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic.
iii, 11.
|
|