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Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good.
For it is written (Ecclus. 30:25): "Sadness hath killed
many, and there is no profit in it."
Objection 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end.
But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without
sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow"
(Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.
Objection 3: Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own
operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders
operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a
useful good.
On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But
according to Eccles. 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there
is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore
sorrow is useful.
I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a
present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the
present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because
that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement
arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the
saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for
something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for
which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be
avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for
instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man
to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): "I am
glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made
sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as
though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil;
either through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much, or
through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is
evident in the case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow
for temporal goods may be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: "It
is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of
feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all."
Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful,
since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil is
in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its
own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good.
Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more
earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.
Reply to Objection 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to
excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes
the soul, and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above
(Question 37, Article 2).
Reply to Objection 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less
eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is
still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect,
sorrow is useful.
Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that
action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it
more earnestly.
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