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Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent.
For penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the
innocent have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.
Objection 2: Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia]
implies punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve
punishment. Therefore penance is not in them.
Objection 3: Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice.
But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive
justice. Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none
in the innocent.
On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. But penance
is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the
innocent at Baptism, penance is infused with them.
Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in
body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been sick
spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of
sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure
without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the
disease of sin, has the habit of penance.
I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the
removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not
conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the
power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because
removal of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can
be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a
virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the
reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its
act---thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not
the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the
matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the innocent have committed no sin,
nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of
penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps
with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the
habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a
perfection of the natural power.
Reply to Objection 2: Although they deserve no punishment
actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they
would deserve to be punished.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as the power to sin remains, there
would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to
the act, if there were no actual sins.
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