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Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of
universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the
senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an
object of universal hatred.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where
there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of
universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the
object of universal hatred.
Objection 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is
in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since
therefore the universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the
universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a
universal object.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that
"anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also
directed to a thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the
backbiter."
I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the universal:
first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as
considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing
to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man.
If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no
sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain
the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from
individual matter, on which every sensitive power is based.
Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of
appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the
object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is
cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is
cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this
particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred
in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this
thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an
individual, is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in
regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the
other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because
it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions
proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something
singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general."
But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises
from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the
universal in both ways.
Reply to Objection 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal,
as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of
universality is given by abstraction.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is common to all cannot be a
reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to
many, and at variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the universal under
the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the
sensitive apprehension or appetite.
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