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Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural
law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like
human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the
failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for
dispensation, as stated above (Question 96, Article 6;
Question 97, Article 4). Therefore a dispensation can be
granted in the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law
as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of
a law made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are
ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our
superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2
Cor. 2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned
anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ."
Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one
forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in
this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of
human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain.
Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
Objection 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by
a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this
precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they
determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight
against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."
Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are
reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken
the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to
the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue
cannot be changed by dispensation.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 96, Article 6;
Question 97, Article 4), precepts admit of dispensation, when
there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be
observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the
intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common
good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the
common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by any
precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the
very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention
of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if
in some community a law were enacted, such as this---that no man
should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the
state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or
evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other
precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining
certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit
of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain
cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the
intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of
the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some
men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be
dispensed from this on account of some greater utility.
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which
direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final
good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain
the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be
done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this
sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently
the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the
natural law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a
never-failing principle that "justice should be preserved." But he
is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice,
which fail to apply in certain cases.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13),
"God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would
deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order of His own
justice, since He is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense
a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or
not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men
are directed to one another.
Reply to Objection 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the
decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for
in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human
law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not
undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence
this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a
killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine
observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's
property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this
is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took
away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was
due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented
to slay his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due
to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death:
for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both
godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a
man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be
no murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto
himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty
either of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto himself one
who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution
of marriage.
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the
essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any
determination by application to individual actions---for instance,
that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this
point they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone,
namely, in such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as
marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in
such matters as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect
men stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects.
Reply to Objection 4: This determination was an interpretation
rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the
Sabbath, if he does something necessary for human welfare; as Our
Lord proves (Mt. 12:3, seqq.).
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