|
Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise
again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a
punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now
the lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other
bodily deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore
these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that
they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.
Objection 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final
happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now
when the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can
pertain to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect
or unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the
resurrection. But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible
body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not
be taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their
bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will
their deformity be taken away.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "The dead
shall rise again incorruptible"; where a gloss says: "The dead,
i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall rise again
incorruptible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs." Therefore the
wicked will rise again without their deformities.
Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of
pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of
sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from
affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without
these defects.
I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One
arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is
deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole.
Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the
bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will
rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition
of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or
place---which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due
proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like
defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in
deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion
xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern
masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. For some say
that such like deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the
damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced
to utmost unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But
this would seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the rising
body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous
condition: wherefore those who die under perfect age will rise again in
the stature of youth, as stated above (Question 81, Article
1). Consequently those who had natural defects in the body, or
deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without those defects
or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent;
and so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, this
will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to
the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is about to be damned may be
burdened with less grievous sins and yet have deformities and defects
which one who is about to be damned has not, while burdened with more
grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life rise
again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and
therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them, though
deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the punishment would not
correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it would seem that a man is
more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world;
which is absurd.
Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will
wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore
whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or
weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever,
purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the
resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the
natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness,
passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while
they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the
resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is
inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the
punishments which in this temporal life are inflicted for some
particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend not beyond the term
of this life. Hence although the damned are not pardoned their sins,
it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments as
they have in this world: but the Divine justice demands that there
they shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the good and the
wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether
evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they
should be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final
unhappiness of the wicked will not exclude all good, because "if a
thing be wholly evil it destroys itself," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 5). Hence it is necessary for the good of their
nature to underlie the unhappiness of the damned, which good is the
work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same nature to
the perfection of its species.
Reply to Objection 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects
which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but
deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.
|
|