|
Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by
their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is
specified by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not
specified by their end.
Objection 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should
exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards.
Therefore a human act does not derive its species from the end.
Objection 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one
species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various
ends. Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich.
ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so
are our deeds worthy of blame or praise."
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and
not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and
form are established in their respective species by their own forms.
And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since
movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of
these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act
which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the
terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is
nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while
heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and
it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either way,
human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions,
receive their species from the end. For human acts can be considered
in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now
it has been stated above (Article 1) that acts are called human,
inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the
will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle
of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like
manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which
the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the
thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since,
as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) "morality is said properly
of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the
end, for moral acts are the same as human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the
act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and
thus it just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from
something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something,
considered as passion.
Reply to Objection 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the
intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (Article 1, ad
1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral
act.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same act, in so far as it
proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end,
from which it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote
ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible,
however, that an act which is one in respect of its natural species,
be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a
man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be
ordained, as to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the
satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts
in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act
of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement does not
receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but
only from that which is its "per se" terminus. Now moral ends are
accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural
end is accidental to morality. Consequently there is no reason why
acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not
be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely.
|
|