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Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or
evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil
depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so
that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore,
nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from
their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil,
according to its species, it would follow that those passions the
object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire
and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are
specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly
false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to
be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore
no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that
"pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore
some passions are good or evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has
been said in regard to acts (Question 18, Articles 5,6;
Question 20, Article 1)---viz. that the species of a
passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points
of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good
and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.
Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary
and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong
to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion
tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is
clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of "envy"
which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the
same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their
natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in
itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good
and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the
appetite, but essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like
manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other
hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite
does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a
kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the
Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in
regard to the soul's passions.
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