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Objection 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same
man that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De
Gener. ii): "Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible
substance are not repeated identically." Now such is man's substance
in his present state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the
self-same man cannot be repeated .
Objection 2: Further, where there is a distinction of human nature
there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are
two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature.
Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which
he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor
can be proved in two ways. First, because human nature which is the
form of the whole is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is
a form only. Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity,
and consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human
nature results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as
that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is
opposed to identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity
implies unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But
resurrection is a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same,
and consequently there is not the same human nature nor the same man.
Objection 3: Further, one same man is not several animals:
wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the same identical
man. Now where sense is not the same, there is not the same animal,
since animal is defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But
sense, as it does not remain in the separated soul (as some
maintain), cannot be resumed in identity. Therefore the man who
rises again will not be the same identical animal, and consequently he
will not be the same man.
Objection 4: Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the
statue than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things
belong to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural
things by reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher
(Phys. ii, 1), and again from the Commentator (De Anima
ii). But if a statue is remade from the same brass, it will not be
the same identically. Therefore much less will it be identically the
same man if he be reformed from the same ashes.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:27): "Whom I
myself shall see . . . and not another," and he is speaking of the
vision after the resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will
rise again.
Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that "to rise
again is naught else but to live again." Now unless the same
identical man that died return to life, he would not be said to live
again. Therefore he would not rise again, which is contrary to
faith.
I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from
this---that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for
this cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the
separated soul, as stated above (Question 75, Articles 1,2):
otherwise man would have been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain
the end for which he was made. And since it behooves the end to be
obtained by the selfsame thing that was made for that end, lest it
appear to be made without purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man
to rise again; and this is effected by the selfsame soul being united
to the selfsame body. For otherwise there would be no resurrection
properly speaking, if the same man were not reformed. Hence to
maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame man is heretical,
since it is contrary to the truth of Scripture which proclaims the
resurrection.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by
movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the
recurrence that occurs in generation and corruption and that which is
observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven
by local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it
has a moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things
subject to generation and corruption return by generation to specific
but not numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from
blood seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man,
but the man specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from
air water, from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the
selfsame fire, but the same in species. Hence it is clear that the
argument, so far as the meaning of the Philosopher is concerned, is
not to the point.
We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation
and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain
after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational
soul. For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the
being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to
share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and
the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another,
otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently
there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as
would make it impossible for the self-same man to return on account of
an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are
corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their
form remains not, and their matter remains under another being.
Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural
generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the
whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct,
and consequently his soul and the whole man.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about humanity and
about any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and
the form of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called
the form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form
of the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom.
According to this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the
rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed,
there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after
death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, because the composite
does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity.
The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's,
according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only,
nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole
resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both
within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or
quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there will be the selfsame
body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity,
the same humanity.
The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity
was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form
supervening form and matter; which is false.
The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because
union implies action or passion, and though there be a different
union, this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the
action and passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence
of humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a
distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and
resurrection are not the self-same movement. Yet the identity of the
rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and
in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if we take
union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential
to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those
forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as are the
forms of things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct
composition there is another distinct form of a house.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument affords a very good proof
against those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational
souls in man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not
be incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently
in the resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and
consequently neither the same animal nor the same man.
But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both
rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this
question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive
soul as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the
sensitive power, we know its definition as from an accidental form
"that contributes more than another to our knowledge of the quiddity"
(De Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there remains the
sensitive soul, even as the rational soul, according to its
substance: whereas the sensitive powers, according to some, do not
remain. And since these powers are accidental properties, diversity
on their part cannot prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even
of the animal's parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts
of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire.
Reply to Objection 4: A statue may be considered in two ways,
either as a particular substance, or as something artificial. And
since it is placed in the genus of substance by reason of its matter,
it follows that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the
selfsame statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other
hand, it is placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it has
an accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away
also. Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can
the statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the
soul, remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison
fails.
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