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Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in
the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu
et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself
sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and
irascibility."
Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural
properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong;
and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are
in it even after death.
Objection 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not
weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says
(De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young
man, he would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the
road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted
when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.
Objection 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as
the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory
remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton
whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things
during thy lifetime" (Lk. 16:25). Therefore memory remains
in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the
sensitive part.
Objection 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible
part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that
separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they
receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate
soul.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite
dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the
soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a power
of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part
remains in the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.
On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two
substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the
body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive
powers do not remain.
I answer that, As we have said already (Articles 5,6,7), all
the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle.
But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the
intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul,
after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in
the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts.
Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject.
Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain
actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle
or root.
So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul
even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as
they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul;
because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.
Reply to Objection 1: That book has no authority, and so what is
there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said;
although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not
actually but virtually.
Reply to Objection 2: These powers, which we say do not actually
remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone,
but of the composite.
Reply to Objection 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when
the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is
the virtual principle of these powers.
Reply to Objection 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be
taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7)
places memory in the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.
Reply to Objection 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not
in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.
Reply to Objection 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as
inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which
he had said there (Retrac. ii, 24).
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