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Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to
perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more
than three speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and
"understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative
sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences.
Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake,
seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of
speculative sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all
men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it
is stated that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes.
Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
sciences.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now
everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality
to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration
of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration
of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the
wise man glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to
speculative sciences. Therefore man's final happiness does not
consist in the consideration of these.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2, ad 4), man's
happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by
perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true
notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not
attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness.
Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be
done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who
are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works
similar to works of prudence.
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science
is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the
Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i,
1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15).
Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot
extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final
happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the
knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something
lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.
Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is
lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the
form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain
likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the
intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by
something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man's
final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the
human intellect. But it has been shown (FP, Question 88,
Article 2), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect.
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible
forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the
consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true
and perfect happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher
treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as
stated above (Article 2, ad 4).
Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally
desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a
fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its
final and perfect act.
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