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Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of
reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not
seem to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
Objection 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less
does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "an angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore
anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for
desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).
Objection 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident
by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more
clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases
anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are
more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable
men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore the same cause
increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore
anger does not hinder the judgment of reason.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger
"withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles
the mind."
I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily
organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers
for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered
when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any
disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is
clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated
(Article 2) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in
the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward
members. Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most
manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to Ps.
30:10: "My eye is troubled with wrath."
Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as
regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger.
But the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as
though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the
commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the
material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because
it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly,
without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason
being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what
done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the
dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect
of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his
friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the
other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many
cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and
voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those
things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of
vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of
anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary
with another facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as
it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or
wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both
on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen.
Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through
being received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in
proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is
increased also.
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