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Objection 1: It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to
the truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is
changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the
ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever
belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the
ox or of other animals will also rise again: which is inadmissible.
Objection 2: Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human
nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again
not in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since
she was made from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the
truth of human nature will not all rise again in him.
Objection 3: Further, it is impossible for the same thing from
different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in
different men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a
man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into his
substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever
belonged in him to the truth of human nature.
Objection 4: Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken
of belongs to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it
may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other---on the
contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially
seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of
nothing but human flesh were to beget children that which his child
derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by
his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the
Philosopher proves (De Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs
to the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of
human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.
Objection 5: Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed
was not that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of
the men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human
nature---on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed
entirely on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs
to the truth of human nature since whatever is in them is derived from
the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that
which belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos---and
after these have received a rational soul, the resurrection applies to
them---must needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child
begotten of that seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise again in
two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth
of human nature in both to rise again in both of them.
On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was
perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by
the rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection.
Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise
again in each one.
Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man
be taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man.
Now all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection,
especially in the elect, to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18)
that not a hair of their head should perish. Therefore whatever
belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him.
I answer that, "Everything is related to truth in the same way as to
being" (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it
appears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna
(Metaph. ii) says that "the truth of anything is a property of the
being immutably attached thereto." Accordingly a thing is said to
belong to the truth of human nature, because it belongs properly to the
being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human
nature, just as true gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold
derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is that
belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have
been three opinions on the question. For some have maintained that
nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature and that
whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all of it belonged to
the truth of human nature when this was created; and that this
multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed whereof the
child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that
again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches
perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the whole
human race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion, whatever
is produced by nourishment. although it seem to have the appearance of
flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human nature.
Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by
the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we
consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of
which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we
consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the
preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is
directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human
nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they
assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in
the radical humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which
the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from
food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth
of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and
that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human
nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former.
For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled
with something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the
begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others
maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical
humor in another.
The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to
the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction
in the human body does not require that any signate material part must
needs remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may
take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what
belongs to the species in it, albeit as regards what is material
therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not
distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be
called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced
by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be
called radical when it reaches the term of generation by the act of the
generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not
yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment.
These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the
Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need
for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is
concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this question requires
different answers according to these opinions.
For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of
multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human
nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the
due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which
is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of
resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural
heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting.
Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be
restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy
the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from
food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which
belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this
reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being
detached and multiplied.
The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food
is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the
multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that
something of this product from food shall rise again: not all,
however, but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of
human nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that
all that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man
who was begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the
truth of human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives
from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for
the perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not
belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature
requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this
nutrimental humor is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be
effected in this order, that what first belonged to the substance of a
man's body, will all be restored, and of that which was added
secondly, thirdly, and so on, as much as is required to restore
quantity. This is proved by two reasons. First, because that which
was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it
does not belong principally to the truth of human nature to the same
extent as that which came first. Secondly, because the addition of
extraneous humor to the first radical humors results in the whole
mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the
first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example (De Gener.
i) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of
the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so that although
the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does not share
the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to the wine.
Even so that which is secondly changed from food into flesh does not so
perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed
first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth
of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that
this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of
human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what
belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.
The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects
agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under
the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature,
because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his
whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily
to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing,
that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account of the
perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the
species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the
parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated belong
to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the
species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of
matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we
are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as
in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from
the population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the
parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain
formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions
from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said
to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on
the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position,
all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to
their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.
On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because
it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection
of the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently
the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the
second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it
holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again,
not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that
which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more
perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things
that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two
opinions agree.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its
matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter
which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man
under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an
ox rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that
the clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The
second opinion, however, grants this argument.
Reply to Objection 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of
the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the
species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as
the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to
reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged
to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the
truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will
rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second
and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he
approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the
species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in
that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the
resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if
there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth
of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise
again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the
first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second
its place is taken either by something of that which was the product
from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human
flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the
perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the
perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as
neither does the ebb and flow of parts.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the first opinion this argument
is easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from
the surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed
whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions
we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to
be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed
is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of
food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs
to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in
the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to
the rule already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the
seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; while the
remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the
product.
Reply to Objection 5: The embryo is not concerned with the
resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state
much has been added to the seminal substance from the substance of
food, since the child is nourished in the mother's womb.
Consequently on the supposition that a man partook of such food, and
that some one were begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in
the seminal substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that
seed; unless it contain something that would have belonged to the
seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was
produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the
second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into
seed, will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power supplying
deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this
objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus
food: but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the
Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; FP, Question 119,
Article 2).
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