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Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed
about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that
"negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague."
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a
simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely
simple form, as shown (Question 3): therefore He cannot be a
subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made
is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be
formed about God.
Objection 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a
thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any
composition as shown above (Question 3, Article 7). Therefore
since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it
follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.
On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some
affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and
One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative
propositions can be formed about God.
I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about
God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative
proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same
thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to
be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate,
and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest
that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in
idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is
another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since
the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same
"suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called
animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man;
hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to
"suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where
one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way
applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it
places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to
the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the
saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects
materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of
predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of
the thing by the composition itself.
God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and
simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because
it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it
understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the
same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the
plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea;
and the intellect represents the unity by composition.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about
God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous,"
inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of
signification.
Reply to Objection 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple
subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends
them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and
something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as
a subject, and attributes something else to it.
Reply to Objection 3: This proposition, "The intellect
understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken
in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the
word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the
part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing
understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any
intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is
false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our
intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that
He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to
the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of
the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing
in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands
material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it
understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of
understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple
things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode,
which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be
composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming
composition in its ideas concerning God.
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