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Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than
the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a
sin does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm
than quarreling, for it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My
people, they that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and
destroy the way of thy steps." Therefore flattery is a more grievous
sin than quarreling.
Objection 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of
deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks
another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he
contradicts openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore
flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
Objection 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be
a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous
sin than flattery.
On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1
Tim. 3:2,3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not
quarrelsome"; and (2 Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord
must not wrangle." Therefore quarreling seems to be a more grievous
sin than flattery.
I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In
one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a
vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is.
Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to
displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving
displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who
exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as
regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more
grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue
honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the
speaker to contempt.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by
deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing
openly. Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a
person openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore
robbery is a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Question
66, Article 9).
Reply to Objection 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not
always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in
his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh
enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more
grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner,
sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they
seem to arise from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of
the reason, although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes
from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by
deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding
from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards
the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a
more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more
ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more
grievous.
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