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Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by
God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something
else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject.
Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.
Objection 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a
division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first
passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two
principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the
other.
Objection 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus,
since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only
in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is
against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two
"things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto
Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh unto
nothing"---viz. primary matter.
I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were
step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of
grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except
sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not
consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in
relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation.
And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was
uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes,
as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that
kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a
distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they
imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take
place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such transmutations they
attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle,
according to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to
Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted
by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a
certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a
determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of
these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some particular
aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned
particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were who
arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a
cause to things, not as "these," or as "such," but as
"beings."
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must
be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by
accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
created by the universal cause of things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62),
is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to
form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of
things according to their emanation from the universal principle of
being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it
is excluded from the former mode of being made.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is
reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the
first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
Reply to Objection 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter
is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though
everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is
necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all
that belongs to its being is created.
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