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Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin:
because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a
non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance
is not a cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect
of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above
(Question 75, Article 1). Now ignorance seems to savor of
"turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a
cause of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the
will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is
the good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii)
"that some sin through ignorance."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27)
a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one
that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of
heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes
an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in
this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is
a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of
sin, in so far as it directs human acts.
Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance
with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in
conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the
conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an
operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion
of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular
proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except
through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is
restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong
to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence
ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the
universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular
circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that
not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which
removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently
if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the
act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance
about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is
concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through
ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
iii, 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of
anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of
an impediment.
Reply to Objection 2: As knowledge, which is removed by
ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too,
ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as
removing its impediment.
Reply to Objection 3: The will cannot turn to that which is
absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and
unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance
is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is
killing is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows
that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
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