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Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin.
For Chrysostom says [Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is
more repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a
ruthless face, and most of all than a cruel soul.". Therefore anger
is the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it
would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion
xii), "a thing is said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is
most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is
master of himself; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.)
that "anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it
lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon."
Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
Objection 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to
their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a
most grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the
beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger
grow into hatred and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not
the most grievous sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles 1,2), the
inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with
regard to an undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being
angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem
to be the least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for
some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on
the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those
sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred;
but while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the
envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory,
the angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge.
Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and
envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as
a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory,
than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the
good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger
concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this
respect again, absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently
less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of
justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable
or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the
incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in
anger."
On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on
account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to
Prov. 27:4, "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh
forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence
Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks
of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles
itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to
recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but
there is no sense in its utterance."
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness
of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the inordinate
movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less
than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers
the aspect of justice, as stated above.
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