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Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to
fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated
above (Question 123, Articles 4,5). But the sin of fear is
not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps.
127:1, "Blessed are all they that fear the Lord," says that
"it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to
lose worldly goods." Again a gloss on Mt. 27:44, "He prayed
the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that "evil fear is
threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt."
Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for
fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now
sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or
shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in
order not to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore
the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being
opposed thereto.
Objection 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair
is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Question
20, Article 1; FS, Question 40, Article 4). Neither
therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7)
states that timidity is opposed to fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 19, Article 3;
FS, Question 43, Article 1), all fear arises from love;
since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now
love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but
ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man
loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included
in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire.
Hence in like manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus
the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss
of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which
has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in Ethic.
iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to
fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is
said to be antonomastically opposed to fortitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear
in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with
reference to the end, as stated above (FS, Question 1, Article
3; FS, Question 18, Article 6): and it belongs to a brave
man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a
man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from
slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to
fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that
"to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable
is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a
mark of effeminacy."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (FS, Question 45,
Article 2), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the
beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs
daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair
proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that
any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from
fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is
referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear
that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the
argument does not prove.
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