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Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For
the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end.
But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2).
Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since
it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and
therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
Objection 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things:
and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the
subject of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate
term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would
ever ensue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that
"since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of
things."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), concupiscence is
twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural
concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which
nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed.
Hence man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just
as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind
of concupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance,
after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of
anything else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when
obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to
the woman of Samaria (Jn. 4:13): "Whosever drinketh of this
water, shall thirst again."
But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as
stated above (Article 3), it follows from the reason, and it
belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires
riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be
simply as rich as possible.
Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher
(Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and
another infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always
infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g. health:
and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just
as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which is more
white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means
is not infinite, because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable
proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in
riches have an infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who
desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite
measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the
concupiscence of any other things.
Reply to Objection 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as
something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being
once actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it
cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from
which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be
taken" (Phys. iii, 6).
Reply to Objection 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power,
in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely,
as appears in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the
infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In
fact the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a
sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of
singulars.
Reply to Objection 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is
no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the
realization of each object of his concupiscence.
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