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Objection 1: It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his
wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of
pleasure, he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome
(Comment. in Eph. 5:25), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv,
D, 31), "the pleasure taken in the embraces of a wanton is
damnable in a husband." Now nothing but mortal sin is said to be
damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of
one's wife for mere pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as
stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever
knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure.
Therefore he sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature
to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses
his wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore
he sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a
mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man
who knows his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the
Church, as though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man
sins mortally.
On the contrary, As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24),
according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord.
xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.), carnal intercourse of this kind is
one of the daily sins, for which we say the "Our Father." Now
these are not mortal sins. Therefore, etc.
Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure.
Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to use his
wife merely to satisfy his desire.
I answer that, Some say that whenever pleasure is the chief motive
for the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that when it is an indirect
motive it is a venial sin; and that when it spurns the pleasure
altogether and is displeasing, it is wholly void of venial sin; so
that it would be a mortal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial
sin to take the pleasure when offered, but that perfection requires one
to detest it. But this is impossible, since according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. x, 3,4) the same judgment applies to
pleasure as to action, because pleasure in a good action is good, and
in an evil action, evil; wherefore, as the marriage act is not evil
in itself, neither will it be always a mortal sin to seek pleasure
therein. Consequently the right answer to this question is that if
pleasure be sought in such a way as to exclude the honesty of marriage,
so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats
his wife, and that he is ready to use her in the same way if she were
not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be
too ardent a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from
the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the
bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his
wife, it is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: A man seeks wanton pleasure in his wife when
he sees no more in her that he would in a wanton.
Reply to Objection 2: Consent to the pleasure of the intercourse
that is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but such is not the
consent to the marriage act.
Reply to Objection 3: Although he does not actually refer the
pleasure to God, he does not place his will's last end therein;
otherwise he would seek it anywhere indifferently. Hence it does not
follow that he enjoys a creature; but he uses a creature actually for
his own sake, and himself habitually, though not actually, for
God's sake.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason for this statement is not that man
deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, but because he renders
himself unfit for spiritual things, since in that act, he becomes
flesh and nothing more.
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