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Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for
itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But
pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire,
as stated above (Question 23, Article 4; Question 25,
Article 2). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure
is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire.
Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But
pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the
object: since desire regards a good which is not yet possessed,
whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore
pleasure does not cause desire for itself.
Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But
pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever
drinketh of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to
Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the
body.
I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as
existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again
thirst, or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as
denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general,
as excluding distaste.
Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause
thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take
thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:
because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something
actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is
not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing
possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing
possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a
simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it
successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires
to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part
of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says
(Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures
cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because
pleasures of this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in
pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens
when a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not
possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little.
Thus in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us
delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge;
in which sense we may understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29:
"They that drink me shall yet thirst."
On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere
intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all
others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves.
Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing
an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even
when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the
table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in
bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another
kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the
natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of
perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight:
except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of
contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers,
which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may
understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me
shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God
perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written (1 Pt. 1:12)
that they "desire to look at Him."
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to
cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not
possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire,
tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is
possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed.
Consequently it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same
time.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire
in another, as stated above.
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