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Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature
to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,
never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many
things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are
altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they
do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational animals.
Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action
to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not
belong to things that lack reason.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the
will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9).
Therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that
"not only mind but also nature acts for an end."
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For
if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be
removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the
first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that
matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an
agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an
agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the
agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do
one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a
determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some
certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this
determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational
appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is
caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural
appetite."
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to
the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end,
as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer
who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
"faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend
to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not
by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such,
and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained
to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in
comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated
above (FP, Question 22, Article 2, ad 4; FP, Question
103, Article 1, ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the
rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading
itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to
tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend
the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the
case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he
knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for
instance, when he acts at another's command, or when he is moved
under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know
the end. And it is thus with irrational creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that
which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end
belongs to that which is directed by another to an end. And this can
belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the will is the end and the
good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things
that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the
universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite,
determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular
causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city,
who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the
particular departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack
reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some
rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the
Divine will.
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