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Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity.
For security, as stated above (Question 128, ad 6), denotes
freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most
effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude.
But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is
the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is
said to be secure because he is without care." But this seems to be
contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according
to 2 Tim. 2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved
unto God." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which
does great things in all the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security
is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18,
"If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand .
. . being buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does
not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to
magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to
fortune." But a man's security consists in this. Therefore
security belongs to magnanimity.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear
makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid
what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this
care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect
freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of
hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly
regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to
magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring,
so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating
of the passion (FS, Question 45, Article 2). Wherefore as
confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use
of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as
it banishes despair.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because
it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a
firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is
not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only
when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should
not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness
to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (FS,
Question 5, Articles 3,7). Hence nothing hinders a certain
security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security
belongs to virtue's reward.
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