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Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through
killing someone by chance. For we read (Gn. 4:23,24) that
Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast, and that he was
accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder
through killing a man by chance.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If .
. . one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . .
if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet
this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore
one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance.
Objection 3: Further, the Decretals [Dist. 1] contain several
canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty
is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance,
incurs the guilt of murder.
On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii):
"When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we
unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed
to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as
a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person
who did it is not accounted guilty.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6)
"chance is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance
happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary.
And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera
Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not
sins.
Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly
voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally,
according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental
cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide
results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of
voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes
another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he
ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care.
Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and
take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is
not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with
something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due
care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results
in someone's death.
Reply to Objection 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid
taking a man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of
homicide.
Reply to Objection 2: He that strikes a woman with child does
something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the
woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide,
especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the canons a penalty, is
inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing
something unlawful, or failing to take sufficient care.
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