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Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called
from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things
are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4).
Therefore desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a
"uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the
thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure
is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
(Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and
consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that
all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the
beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy."
Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of
good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are
naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is to
say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good
is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently
the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the
order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of
execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in
the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends
to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that
end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is
moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having
attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to
good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards
good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes
pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because
the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the
enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just
as the good itself is, as stated above (Question 11, Article 3,
ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for
"words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri
Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect.
But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is
pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence:
and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more
sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of
all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for
this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold.
There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the
other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire.
There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or
proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having
an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and
love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of
desire.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it
precedes love in the order of intention.
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