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Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a
man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine
law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded
(Ex. 32:27): "Let every man kill his brother, and friend,
and neighbor." Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill
a sinner.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article 2, ad 3),
man, on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful
for any private individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be
harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private
individual to kill a man who has sinned.
Objection 3: Further, a man, though a private individual,
deserves praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the
slaying of evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above
(Article 2). Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private
individuals kill evil-doers.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [Can.
Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without
exercising public authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged
guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a
power which God has not given him."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), it is lawful to kill
an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole
community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the
community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a
decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of
the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to
persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not
private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.
Reply to Objection 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done
really does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii).
Hence according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He
slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword
is merely the instrument to him that wields it." Wherefore those
who, at the Lord's command, slew their neighbors and friends, would
seem not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose
authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the
authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the
authority of the judge.
Reply to Objection 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man,
wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority
to kill it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority
is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss.
On the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from
good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him
to death for the common good.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do
anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be
harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the
judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken
from the parts for the welfare of the whole.
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