|
Objection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called
the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For
everything which begins to exist, is a possible being before it
exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If
therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it
began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in
potentiality to existence, which results from a form, and to
non-existence, which results from privation of form. If therefore
the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world.
But matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of the world
with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it
began to exist: which is impossible.
Objection 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always,
sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a
thing extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has
power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate
time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is
not: but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some
time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But
there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial
bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not
begin to exist.
Objection 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But
the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is
unbegotten, and also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the
heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
Objection 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but
there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no
body where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there,
otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there
was a vacuum; which is impossible.
Objection 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except
through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was
before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved.
Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.
Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved
always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
Objection 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary.
But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For
nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change
precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing,
there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there
before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off doing
what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change,
at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house
tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, but
is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow
to come; and this cannot be without change, because time is the
measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new
movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same conclusion
follows as before.
Objection 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and
always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins
is not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time
always is in its beginning and end, because there is no time except
"now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future.
Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can
movement, the measure of what is time.
Objection 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order
of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if
God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in
duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the
world, which is impossible.
Objection 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an
effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the
sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of
His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the
efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above
(Question 44, Articles 2,3,4). Since therefore God is
eternal, the world is also eternal.
Objection 1:: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal
effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal.
Therefore the world is eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 17:5), "Glorify Me, O
Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world
was"; and (Prov. 8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the
beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning."
I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this
statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above
(Question 19, Article 4) that the will of God is the cause of
things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary
for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the
necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown
above (Question 19, Article 3), that, absolutely speaking, it
is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is
not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always
exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since
the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause.
It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it
cannot be proved by demonstration.
Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but
relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons
of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in
some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly,
because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he
premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and
Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because
wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the
ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one
persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says
(Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which
we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether the world is
eternal."
Reply to Objection 1: Before the world existed it was possible for
the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is
matter, but according to the active power of God; and also,
according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to
any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not
repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed to
impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text
17).
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the
fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be;
but before it received that power, it did not exist.
Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text
120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to
exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things
generated and corruptible begin.
Reply to Objection 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves
that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from
which to derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text
20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no
contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no
conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not
begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we
say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as
appears above (Question 44, Article 1, ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which
is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in
which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv,
text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before
the world was.
Reply to Objection 5: The first mover was always in the same
state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began
to be whereas hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through
change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above
(Question 45, Article 2, as 2). Hence it is evident that
this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against
those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not
eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and
Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things
began to exist movement also existed.
Reply to Objection 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And
although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did
not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to
be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must
take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that
presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal
agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the
form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it
introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it
is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not
into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is
not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together:
whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to
the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time
just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as
acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an
imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who
produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting
now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time
succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He
must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He
willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power.
For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine
creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been;
since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas
this is not so manifest of what always was.
Reply to Objection 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99),
"before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in
movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same
way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is
necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of
movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same
applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the
instant "now," as being always the beginning and end of time,
presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings
forward this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who
asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.
Reply to Objection 8: God is prior to the world by priority of
duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but
of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary
time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above
heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary
place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond
those of the heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 9: As the effect follows from the cause that
acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it
follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived
and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above
(Question 19, Article 4; Question 41, Article 2).
Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the
world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except
as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being
after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.
Reply to Objection 1:: Given the action, the effect follows
according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of
action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and
preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of
action. Therefore from the eternal action of God an eternal effect
did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to
wit, which has being after not being.
|
|