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Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels.
For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii),
says: "It is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual
(i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the
angels) after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were
in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to
them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no
habits in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv):
"The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above
all other things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself
[per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another
[per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of
themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of
habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in
the same passage adds: "For if this were the case, surely their
essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as
possible deified of itself."
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text.
25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order
of that which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple
substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in
them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the
angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and
Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike
nature of their habits."
I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the
angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially.
Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says:
"Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are
essential, through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius
says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which
is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is
its substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and
exists in itself."
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is
manifest from what we have said (Question 49, Article 4) that
only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the
above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial
substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on
that account, excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet
since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is
still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God
alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so
far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of
matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the
same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the
Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not
like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and
immaterial images which it contains in itself."
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in
the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible
things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and
therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit.
But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of
intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this
belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality:
and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore,
as we said in the FP, Question 55, Article 1, so far as it is
in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means
of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation: but so far
as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some
things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its
substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the
more perfectly will it understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to
God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some
habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act.
Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are
"godlike," that is to say, that by them they are made like to God.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in
angels, since they are immaterial.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of
material habits and accidents.
Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their
essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings
of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness,
therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without,
so far do they need to have habits.
Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but
there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by
several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several
things.
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