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Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be
said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should
ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden
Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the
oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old
or New Testament. Therefore "person" is not to be applied to
God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.):
"The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented
men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through
[personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the
cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called
prosopa, as they were placed on the face and covered the features
before the eyes." This, however, can apply to God only in a
metaphorical sense. Therefore the word "person" is only applied to
God metaphorically.
Objection 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word
"hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De
Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which
do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that,
"in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the
word "person" should not be said of God.
Objection 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the
thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person,"
as given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a
discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above
(Question 14, Article 12); and thus God cannot be said to
have "a rational nature." And also because God cannot be called an
individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter;
while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as
to be called a substance. Therefore the word "person" ought not to
be attributed to God.
On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the
person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy
Ghost."
I answer that, "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all
nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.
Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God,
forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name
"person" is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is
applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names
also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God;
as we showed above when treating of the names of God (Question 13,
Article 2).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the word "person" is not found
applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament,
nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in
many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting
being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of
God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow
that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of
the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it
necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about God.
Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means
profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture.
The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (1
Tim. 6:20).
Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "person" may not belong
to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently
belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were
represented in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to
signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank
in the Church came to be called "persons." Thence by some the
definition of person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of
dignity." And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high
dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a
"person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other
dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to
God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie
accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is
imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in
this word," forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the
Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make
people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases,
inasmuch as the word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in
Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.
Reply to Objection 4: It may be said that God has a rational
"nature," if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but
in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called
an "individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from
matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability.
"Substance" can be applied to God in the sense of signifying
self-subsistence. There are some, however, who say that the
definition of Boethius, quoted above (Article 1), is not a
definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in
God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by
adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable existence of the
divine nature."
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