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Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
"the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our
neighbor with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since
their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to
the love of God and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the
fulfilling of the Law" (Rm. 13:10). Therefore it would seem
that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to
the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
that "the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of
its Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of
heart, which is a result of moral virtue [Question 8, Article
7]. For it is written (Mt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of
heart, for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14):
"Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall
see God." Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to
the contemplative life.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
"the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is
signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gn. 29:17) that she
was "of a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul
consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says
(De Offic. i, 43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the
moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions.
Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Article
1, Objection 3]) that it belongs to the contemplative life "to
rest from external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not
pertain to the contemplative life.
I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong
to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which
pertains to the consideration of truth, "has little influence on the
moral virtues": wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the
moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness.
On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the
contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the
impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from
intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the
moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the
disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong
dispositively to the contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Article 1), the
contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections,
and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to
the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the
essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not
follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative
life.
Reply to Objection 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by
the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity
of the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about
operations, according to Is. 32:17, "The work of justice
shall be peace": since he who refrains from wronging others lessens
the occasions of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues
dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of
heart.
Reply to Objection 3: Beauty, as stated above (Question 145,
Article 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now
each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the light
that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among
things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists
in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and
essence; wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation
of wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty."
On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation,
in so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is
it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially
darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity
most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures
most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says
(Soliloq. i, 10).
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