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Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the
end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of
that which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii,
8. But conclusions follow of necessity from their principles.
Therefore man is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the
choice (of the means).
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article 1, ad 2),
choice follows the reason's judgment of what is to be done. But
reason judges of necessity about some things: on account of the
necessity of the premises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows
of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is
not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as
Plato says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either
side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal
distance, he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he
finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of
the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something
else cannot be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as
less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of
which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose
any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first
place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard
to something that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is
made necessarily.
On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation
to opposites.
I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And this is
because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now
the reason why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be
gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will,
act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or
that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the reason.
For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good.
Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to
will" or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to
act." Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an
aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect
of evil: and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such
goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which
is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as
lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity,
nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice
is not of the end, but of the means, as stated above (Article 3);
it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other
particular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but
freely.
Reply to Objection 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity
follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true
if the conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not
always necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means
are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if
they be such, they are not always considered in that light.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is
to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In
such matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles
that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally;
as, for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion."
Reply to Objection 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one
aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some
particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards
that one rather than towards the other.
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