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Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would
not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xix, 15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and
made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures;
not over men, but over cattle."
Objection 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin
would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made
subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman
(Gn. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power."
Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to
man.
Objection 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But
liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking
in the state of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's
good-will could desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state
of innocence.
On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was
not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the
angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of
"Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the
state of innocence that one man should be subject to another.
I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed
to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is
subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a
general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has
the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a
master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of
men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is
founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the
latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of
the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one
man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose
master he is, to his own---namely the master's use. And since
every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it
is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be
one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain
inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence
such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.
But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either
towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of
mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and
man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social
being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social
life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless
under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many,
as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one.
Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics,
that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one
at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in
knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these
gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pt.
4:10, "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same
one to another." Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the
service of counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The
natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man."
From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the
first-mentioned mode of mastership.
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