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Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical
intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are
different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But
the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the
practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct
powers.
Objection 2: Further, the different nature of the object
differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect
is "truth," and of the practical is "good"; which differ in
nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct
powers.
Objection 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical
intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the
imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs
from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above
(Question 78, Article 4). Therefore also the speculative
intellect differs from the practical.
On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes
practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into
another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers.
I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above
(Question 77, Article 3), what is accidental to the nature of
the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is
accidental to a thing colored to be man, or to be great or small;
hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight.
Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental
whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the
speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative
intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to
the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which
directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative
differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its
end: the one speculative, the other practical---i.e. operative.
Reply to Objection 1: The practical intellect is a motive power,
not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this
belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth and good include one another; for
truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good
is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore
as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the
aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth;
so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the
operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect
knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth
to operation.
Reply to Objection 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive
powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have
said above (Article 7, ad 2; Question 77, Article 3, ad
4).
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