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Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For
the capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the
daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10)
that "those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore
envy is not a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than
the other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral.
xxxi, 45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the
deceived mind under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them
provoke the soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with
their wild outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for
Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that
is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man,
yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges
the bane of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy
is not a capital sin.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly
assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy
arise "hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's
misfortunes, and grief for his prosperity." For joy at our
neighbor's misfortunes and grief for his prosperity seem to be the same
as envy, as appears from what has been said above (Article 3).
Therefore these should not be assigned as daughters of envy.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
45) who states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid
daughters thereto.
I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good,
so envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated
above (Question 35, Article 4) that sloth is a capital vice for
the reason that it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose
either of avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy
is accounted a capital vice for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45),
"the capital vices are so closely akin to one another that one springs
from the other. For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which
by corrupting the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves
for the power of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should
acquire that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does
not exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it
should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of several
kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises
from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by
Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob.
v, 1).
Reply to Objection 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted
that envy is the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to
envy, he is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his
heart, for as quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy of
the devil, death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24).
There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most
grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is
a sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our
neighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy
Ghost, because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost
Himself, Who is glorified in His works.
Reply to Objection 3: The number of envy's daughters may be
understood for the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is
something by way of beginning, something by way of middle, and
something by way of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower
another's reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have
"tale-bearing," or openly, and then we have "detraction." The
middle consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another,
he is either able to do so, and then we have "joy at another's
misfortune," or he is unable, and then we have "grief at another's
prosperity." The term is hatred itself, because just as good which
delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above
(Question 34, Article 6). Grief at another's prosperity is in
one way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over
another's prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a good name,
but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so far as the envious
man sees his neighbor prosper notwithstanding his efforts to prevent
it. On the other hand, "joy at another's misfortune" is not
directly the same as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief over
our neighbor's good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.
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