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Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral
virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about
things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in
the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source,
viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or
sorrow, as we stated above (Question 25, Articles 1,2,4;
Question 27, Article 4). Therefore there is but one moral
virtue about all the passions.
Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about
different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral
virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is
one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about
fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore
there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.
Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of
different species, as stated above (Question 23, Article 4).
Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance.
Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different
passions.
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance
about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii,
6,10; iv, 5.
I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue
about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Question 23, Article
1).
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions
necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because
some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy
and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are
thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue.
Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in
contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the
natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between
black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions
contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that
which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in
accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the
concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because
their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being
directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some good or
the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from
desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite
passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to
sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one
order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are
about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult
good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has
wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like
passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible passions;
fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and
despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common
principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this
does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same
principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the
other; and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common
ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue,
which, like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same
object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the
same virtue.
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