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Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his
beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious
act. But the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly.
Therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him.
Objection 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural
operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God.
Therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude,
he did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before
whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he
would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case
a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and
the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not
admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the
"measure of the angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of
a man." Therefore the same is the case with the angel.
I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him.
Beatitude, however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its
end. Now everything attains its last end by its operation. Such
operation leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such
end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the
healing art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the
end, when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to
attain it; wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now
it is evident from what has gone before (Articles 1,2; Question
12, Articles 4,5), ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic
and the human nature. It remains, then, that both man and angel
merited their beatitude.
And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no
merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited
beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way
before he had glory.
But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude;
which conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as
even the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have
to be said, as some others have maintained, that the angels merit
beatitude by their present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is
quite contrary, again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys
the idea of a means to an end; while what is already in its end
cannot, properly speaking, be moved towards such end; and so no one
merits to produce what he already enjoys. Or else it will have to be
said that one and the same act of turning to God, so far as it comes
of free-will, is meritorious; and so far as it attains the end, is
the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will not stand, because
free-will is not the sufficient cause of merit; and, consequently,
an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so
far as it is informed by grace; but it cannot at the same time be
informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and
by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does
not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the
same time to merit it.
Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel's difficulty of working
righteously does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural
powers; but from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural
capacity.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural
movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of
grace.
The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
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