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Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God
and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do
we owe Him fear, according Dt. 10:12: "And now Israel,
what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . .
. and love Him?" Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is
called human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear God,
and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from what has been
stated above (Question 10, Article 2). Therefore also the love
with which we love God, is distinct from the love with which we love
our neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8)
that "to be loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God,
which is known as "latria," is distinct from the honor due to a
creature, and known as "dulia." Therefore again the love wherewith
we love God, is distinct from that with which we love our neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on
Mt. 1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to
hope in man, according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man." Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to
extend to our neighbor.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): "This
commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also
his brother."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 17, Article 6;
Question 19, Article 3; FS, Question 54, Article 3)
habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different
species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same habit.
Now since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered
under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is
specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and
that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the
same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color
under the aspect of light.
Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God,
since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God.
Hence it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love
God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of
charity extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of
our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may
love him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper
to him, as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or
loves him by reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such
like human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies
to love. Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he
has of God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its
exercising the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and
love it for its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from
fear of God, as neither is such like love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor
regards the honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in
recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated
specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various
persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas
honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,
in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is
God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to
each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor
of latria on account of His singular virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were
the principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping
us ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man
loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he
loved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
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