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Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will
depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Mt.
12:35, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart
bringeth forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as
much good as he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only
to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated
above (Article 7). Therefore the goodness of a man's will is
according to the goodness of his intention.
Objection 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the
effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good
will. Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is
good.
Objection 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to
his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same
reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good
intended.
On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the
will less good.
I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the
end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the
object, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater;
the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man
wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view
of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not
depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external
act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is
ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for
instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his
intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to
the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for
instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles,
which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the
interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the
interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external
actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not
proportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that tends to that
object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet
because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will,
inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that
the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the
will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good for
an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is
not proportionate to that good.
But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,
according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the
intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the
will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of
form, as is clear from what has been said above (Question 12,
Article 4; Question 18, Article 6). And yet considered
materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior
act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a
man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to
regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health
intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition
of medicine.
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or
exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when
a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And
yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the
quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on
the quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is
that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall
show later on (Question 20, Article 4; Question 114,
Article 4).
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the
estimation of God, Who considers principally the intention of the
end. Wherefore another gloss says on the same passage that "the
treasure of the heart is the intention, according to which God judges
our works." For the goodness of the intention, as stated above,
redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes
even the external act to be meritorious in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 2: The goodness of the intention is not the
whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to
make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the
intention is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness,
as stated above (ad 2).
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