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Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful,
in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of
nature" (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but
things engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are
produced according to art and reason imitate those that are produced
according to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not
sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil.
Objection 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in
nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not
attained. But the goodness or malice of a human action depends,
before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement.
Therefore it seems that the malice of an action does not make it
sinful.
Objection 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful,
it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is
false: since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil.
Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
On the contrary, As shown above (Question 19, Article 4),
the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal
Law: and consequently its malice consists in its being in disaccord
with the Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a word,
deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law." Therefore a
human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good
than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain
end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end
is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature,
this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When
therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right:
since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not
swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an
action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.
Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is
the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When,
therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of
reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when
it turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now
it is evident from what has been said (Question 19, Articles
3,4) that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of
reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action
is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that
a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they
result from a sin in nature's action.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the
proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in
respect of the last end, which is the perfection of the thing
generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end
whatever; since when nature works it forms something. In like
manner, the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end
intended, because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to
happiness, which is the last end: and yet it does not fail in respect
of some proximate end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore
also, since the very intention of this end is ordained to the last
end, this same intention may be right or sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its
action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order
to the end, consists properly in an action. On the other hand,
punishment regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the
FP, Question 48, Article 5, ad 4; Article 6, ad 3.
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