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Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to
liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Mt. 5:6, "Blessed
are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in
Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the
other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher
says the same (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not
opposed to liberality.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
justice and not to liberality.
Objection 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i,
7; iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore
covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous
man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall
have no fruits from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to
love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean
in the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to
liberality.
I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to
riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition
and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his
due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to
justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech.
22:27): "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves
ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through
covetousness." Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior
affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires
riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be
unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to
liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above
(Question 117, Article 2, ad 3, Article 3, ad 3,
Article 6). In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor.
9:5): "That they would . . . prepare this blessing before
promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness,"
where a gloss observes: "Lest they should regret what they had
given, and give but little."
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking
of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is
called illiberality [aneleutheria] by the Philosopher.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the
measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view
of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's
property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally
in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and
keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these
proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the
point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter
depends on the rule of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no
opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought
according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one
ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as
opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
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