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Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than
desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal.
But "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states
(Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire,
in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man.
Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since
those things that act according to reason, are not said to act
according to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but
desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire
is more natural than anger.
Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while
desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to
the touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures.
But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore
desire is more natural than anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"anger is more natural than desire."
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by
nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to
whether a particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided
without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a
passion, as stated above (Question 36, Article 2), may be
considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly,
on the part of the subject. If then we consider the cause of anger and
of desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of
pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural than
anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than
vengeance.
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the
subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a
manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual
man may be considered either as to the generic, or as to the specific
nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual.
If then we consider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man
considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger;
because it is from this very generic nature that man is inclined to
desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the
species and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific
nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then anger
is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason
more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man
than meekness": for it is natural to everything to rise up against
things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the
individual, in respect of his particular temperament, thus anger is
more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue
from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other
passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which
tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because
disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the
humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently
he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with
anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed
with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from
parent to child, than a disposition to desire.
Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural
temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of
the bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not
naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on
account of the moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for
as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches
to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of
passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in
fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural
to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason
somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger;
and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not
listen perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above (Article
4, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man:
wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it
follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the
part of the object.
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