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Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of
reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive
appetite. But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of
reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not
require an act of reason.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet
they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it
is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of
reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"anger listens to reason somewhat."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), anger is a desire
for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the
punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had
drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person, is
therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an
inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion,
requires an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may
follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the
reason in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows
reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another
way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus
anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem.
xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to
reason's command, but as a result of reason's denouncing the
injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason,
not immediately but through the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted
to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with
movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements,
as stated above (Question 40, Article 3).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger
listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury
inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe
the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore,
requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that
whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason,
do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry,
through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of
reason.
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