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Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be
corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be
corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the
contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be
the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically.
Therefore they will be corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be
corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to
glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same
nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack
these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the
greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of
unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should
not be withdrawn from the damned, since they are in the highest degree
of unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days
men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to
die, and death shall fly from them."
Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment
both in soul and body (Mt. 25:46): "These shall go into
everlasting punishment." But this would not be possible if their
bodies were corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be
incorruptible.
I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a
principle of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a
movable in two ways: first through absence of a principle of movement,
secondly through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now
corruption is a kind of change: and consequently a body which is
corruptible on account of the nature of its principles may be rendered
incorruptible in two ways. First by the total removal of the principle
which leads to corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned
will be incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of
alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary
agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows
that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any
agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural
property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the
heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the
human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like
generation, is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned
will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine
justice, since living for ever they will be punished for ever. This
is in keeping with the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state
further on (Article 3), even as now the corruptibility of bodies
serves the purpose of Divine providence, by which through the
corruption of one thing another is generated.
Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being
hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because
the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the
grace of innocence from conducing to the body's dissolution: and much
more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be
wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the
two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the
bodies of the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: The contraries of which bodies are composed
are conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first
active principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the
movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of
contraries to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it:
whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which
a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in
accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were
ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they
held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in
accordance with nature.
Reply to Objection 2: This incorruptibility will result from
nature, not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the
bodies of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active
principle of corruption, as shown above.
Reply to Objection 3: Although death is simply the greatest of
punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain
respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal
of death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), "Life is pleasant to all,
for all desire to be . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or
corrupt life, nor one passed in sorrow." Accordingly just as life is
simply pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too
death, which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the
greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary
good, namely being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so
far as it deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in
sorrow, it is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and
consequently the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of
punishments by making them everlasting. If however we say that death
is penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel, without
doubt the damned will continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore
they are said to be in "everlasting death," according to the Psalm
(48:15): "Death shall feed upon them."
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