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Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no
passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against
the spirit" (Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state
of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no
passions of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But
his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by
the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect.
Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that
"in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other
passions of the soul.
I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite,
the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the
soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is
evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was
neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a
good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its
object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions
in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning
concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy
and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as
desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of
innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For
our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely
subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder
reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment,
accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But
in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to
reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as
consequent upon the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the
rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the
state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The human body was impassible in the state of
innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of
nature, as will be explained later on (Question 97, Article
2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which
impede the free use of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly
take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man
desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated
in Ethic. iii, 11.
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