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Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with
original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin
is a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (Question 88,
Article 3). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is
not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes
unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal
sins.
Objection 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less
connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But
an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin
without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin
without committing a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a
child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes
to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a
mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is
possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time,
however short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with
original sin alone and without mortal sin.
On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's
limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on
(SS, Question 69, Article 6): whereas men are punished in
hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place
where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original
sin.
I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with
original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is
because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years
hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore,
much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which
is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he
is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now
the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to
deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due
end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original
sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, and as
far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin
mortally, for through not doing that which is in his power to do.
Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without
mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him
through grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as
a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes
disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.
Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with
original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or
likeness, but on account of the lack of use of reason, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 3: The child that is beginning to have the use
of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not
free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as
soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has
discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to
himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the
intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's
affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zach.
1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."
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