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Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by
Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a
person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing
singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies
something singular. Therefore person is improperly defined.
Objection 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition
of person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is
the former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first
substance is individual substance; if it stands for second substance,
the word "individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms;
since second substances are the "genera" or "species." Therefore
this definition is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in
the definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of
animal" would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a
thing, and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since
person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a
rational nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional name
comes improperly into the definition.
Objection 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and
rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not
accidentally," as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists
in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the
word "nature" ought not to enter into the definition of person, but
the word should rather be "essence."
Objection 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance
of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is
not properly defined as above.
I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because
it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and
the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion
over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like
others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to
singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have
a special name even among other substances; and this name is
"person."
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in
rational substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Although this or that singular may not be
definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be
defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De
substantia) gives a definition of first substance; and in this way
Boethius defines person.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, the term
"substance" in the definition of person stands for first substance,
which is the hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously
added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the
idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that
man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only
a part. But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility
is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a
person, since it is assumed by a greater---that is, by the Word of
God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in
a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when
"individual" is added, it is restricted to first substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us,
or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental
differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say
that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are
the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise,
terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used
to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is
placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence
which belongs to particular substances.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v,
5), the word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of
living things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of
generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to
signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense
he defines "nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of
principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are
commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by
the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is
commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense.
Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the
specific difference giving its form to each thing," for the specific
difference completes the definition, and is derived from the special
form of a thing. So in the definition of "person," which means the
singular in a determined "genus," it is more correct to use the term
"nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from being,
which is most common.
Reply to Objection 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and
so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever
retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual
substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can
the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the
name of person belongs to it.
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