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Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a
concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild
concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin
has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a
concupiscible appetite in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while
anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the
Sacred Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to
the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the
irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and
temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude
are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore
there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part,
which does not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or
concupiscible appetite in the angels.
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into
irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so
divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are
distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by
the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an
object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of
faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained
under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of
sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight
distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas
if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the
faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of
seeing black.
Now it is quite evident from what has been said (Article 1;
Question 16, Article 1), that the object of the intellective
appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common
aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appetite except of what is
good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided
according to the distinction of some particular good things, as the
sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave for what is good
according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object.
Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an intellective
appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and
concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically
said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to
God;---on account of the resemblance in the effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are
passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they
express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part:
in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for
the will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none
of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).
Reply to Objection 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the
concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object of the
concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But
the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any
such kind. For the same reason it must be said that hope does not
exist in the irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible
appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which
the virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous
and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue,
deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the
concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and
fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance,
in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part,
and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in
this manner. For in them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor
of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But
temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display
their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise
attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine
will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or
concupiscible appetite.
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