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Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true.
For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from
Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the
true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good
is logically prior to the true.
Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the
intellect composing and dividing as said above (Article 2). But
that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect.
Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear
from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality
of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.
On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the
true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in
mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.
I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this
manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears
from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to
being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and
immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being
is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is
evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite.
Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the
appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.
Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include
one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will
wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to
the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the
intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable,
good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas
in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the
fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good
is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior
absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is
prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being
itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and
thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being
is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though
good is in things.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not
truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man
shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied
to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills
in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it
has been said that truth exists in other things (Article 1).
Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his
duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from
these particular truths to truth in general.
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