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Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than
to what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the
will depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will
is good, and none bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore
the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other.
But, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness
of action is the end, but goodness of making is never the end":
because the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its
end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend on
any object.
Objection 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a
thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the
goodness of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the
will. Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the
object.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that
justice is that habit "from which men wish for just things": and
accordingly, virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things.
But a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore
the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is
good.
I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences of the act of
the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just
as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided
essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an
opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will
are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is
according to objects, as stated above (Question 18, Article
5). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived
properly from the objects.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is not always directed to what is
truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some
measure of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be
desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but
sometimes evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an action can, in a certain way,
be man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the
will, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1, ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Good is presented to the will as its object
by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters
the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will:
because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated
above (Question 18, Article 5).
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