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Objection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening
knowledge are one. For it is said (Gn. 1:5): "There was
evening and morning, one day." But by the expression "day" the
knowledge of the angels is to be understood, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and evening
knowledge of the angels are one and the same.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two
operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their
morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in
God, according to Mt. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening
knowledge were different from the morning, the angel could never
exercise his evening knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10):
"When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall
be done away." But, if the evening knowledge be different from the
morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect.
Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning
knowledge.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24):
"There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the
Word of God, and as it is in its own nature; so that the former
belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening."
I answer that, As was observed (Article 6), the evening
knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper
nature. This cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from
the proper nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the
form of a principle; because, as has been already stated (Question
55, Article 2), the angels do not draw their knowledge from
things. It follows, then, that when we say "in their proper
nature" we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an
object of knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in
the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things
have in their own nature.
Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate
ideas, or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by
beholding the Word, they know not merely the being of things as
existing in the Word, but the being as possessed by the things
themselves; as God by contemplating Himself sees that being which
things have in their own nature. It, therefore, it be called evening
knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know
the being which things have in their proper nature, then the morning
and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only
differ as to the things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in
so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have in
their own natures, then the morning and the evening knowledge differ.
Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns one as inferior
to the other.
Reply to Objection 1: The six days, as Augustine understands
them, are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels; so
that the day's unit is taken according to the unit of the thing
understood; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways
of knowing it.
Reply to Objection 2: There can be two operations of the same
faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is
evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to
the end; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and
conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired
knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the
evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels;
hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the
angels.
Reply to Objection 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the
opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things
that are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the
imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection
of the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not
opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any
inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is
more perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a
demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion.
In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated
Word, and through an innate idea.
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