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Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at
variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated
above (Article 4). But erring reason is not derived from the
eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human
will. Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with
erring reason.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a
lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a
higher authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command
something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason
sometimes proposes what is against the command of a higher power,
namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an
erring reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it
be at variance with erring reason.
Objection 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species
of malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason
err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do
so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is
not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
On the contrary, As stated in the FP, Question 79, Article
13, conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to
some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will
is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But
every such will is evil; for it is written (Rm. 14:23):
"All that is not of faith"---i.e. all that is against
conscience---"is sin." Therefore the will is evil when it is at
variance with erring reason.
I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason
(for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the
FP, Question 19, Article 13), to inquire whether the will is
evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to
inquire "whether an erring conscience binds." On this matter, some
distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically;
some are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if
reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically,
there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not to do something
which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes
what is good and forbids what is evil. On the other hand if a man's
reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is
evil in itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then
his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man's reason or
conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance
to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, his
reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or
conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either by commanding
or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance
with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that when
reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in
forbidding what is good in itself and necessary for salvation, it does
not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with
erring reason or conscience is not evil.
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will
that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some
way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the
will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in
its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by
reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of
the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above
(Article 3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the
reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And
this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those
that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters
can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also
that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which
is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the
reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from
fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in
so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring
reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something
evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not
indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil
accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In
like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary
for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as
it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the
reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil:
not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally,
through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is
one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one
who does not follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that,
absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right
or erring, is always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is
not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment
as being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom
is all truth.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it
is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to
the command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the
command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning
the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor.
In like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating
something contrary to God's commandment, he would not be bound to
abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But
when erring reason proposes something as being commanded by God, then
to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as
evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as
being something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or
for some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that
species of malice.
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