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Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward
movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual
beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of
the king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the
conscience." Now the movements of the body are not within, but
without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements
are in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and
some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of
outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of
this kind.
Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions
directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as
temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not
directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no
virtue is connected with them.
Objection 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of
virtue, as stated above (Question 166, Article 1, Objection
1; Article 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the
ordering of one's outward movements: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of
authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print of
tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but
natural and artless movement." Therefore seemingly there is no virtue
about the style of outward movements.
On the contrary, The beauty of honesty [Question 145, Article
1] pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains
to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
18): "The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are
distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless, or
coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her reflection is
gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty." Therefore there is a
virtue about the style of outward movement.
I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man
being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward
movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are
set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there
is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.
Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold
standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person;
secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons,
business, or place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18):
"Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others,
according to their sex and person," and this regards the first. As
to the second, he adds: "This is the best way to order our
behavior, this is the polish becoming to every action."
Hence Andronicus [De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these
outward movements: namely "taste" [ornatus] which regards what is
becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of
what is becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness"
[bona ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in
hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the
practical knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of
"acts."
Reply to Objection 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward
disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the
body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show
what he is"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the
habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body," and that "the
body's movement is an index of the soul."
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is from natural disposition that
a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement,
nevertheless what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of
reason. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature
guide the movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort
will supply the defect."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are
indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the
passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
18) that "from these things," i.e. the outward movements, "the
man that lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous,
or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure,
and free from blemish." It is moreover from our outward movements
that other men form their judgment about us, according to Ecclus.
19:26, "A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou
meetest him, is known by his countenance." Hence moderation of
outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to
the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your
movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only
that which is becoming to the holiness of your state." Wherefore the
moderation of outward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which
the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far as
by outward movements we are directed to other persons, the moderation
of our outward movements belongs to "friendliness or affability"
[Question 114, Article 1]. This regards pleasure or pain
which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a
man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward movements are signs
of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of
truthfulness [Question 9], whereby a man, by word and deed, shows
himself to be such as he is inwardly.
Reply to Objection 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's
outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that
they do not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it
behooves one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate,
this may be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18):
"Let them be without artifice, but not without correction."
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