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Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a
heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced,
as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens,
as is proved in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and
multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not.
Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the
heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii,
4) "the lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements
of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced
to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too
were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers
foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move
man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that
"the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would
be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by
the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
bodies.
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the
heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is
to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through
being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the
sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the
human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as
to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the
"will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason."
Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ:
wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and
immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is
incorporeal, but rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and
immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any
corporeal things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly
body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason
Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that
intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the will of
men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on"
[Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they
understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since
they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the
heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts
they are.
But since it has been stated (Article 2) that the intellectual
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the
movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will;
in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the
sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiform movements of the human will are
reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect
and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior
immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its
cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The movements of the human body are reduced,
as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as
the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to
the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive
appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in
so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of
heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to
will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to
wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of
the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward
instigation.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Cf. FP, Question
84, Articles 6,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily
organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to
anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the
influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural
complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which
the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases
predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly
bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says
(Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a
though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will,
which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to
such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must
confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to
some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject
without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man,
it must be the work of the lying spirits."
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