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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know
material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is
known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual
soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal
types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but
is "united to God as to the unknown," as Dionysius says (Myst.
Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal
types.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rm. 1:20) that "the
invisible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that
are made." But among the invisible things of God are the eternal
types. Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not
the converse.
Objection 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but
ideas, for Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 46) that
"ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind." If
therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the
eternal types, we come back to the opinion of Plato who said that all
knowledge is derived from them.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we
both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say
is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in
you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable
truth which is above our minds." Now the unchangeable truth is
contained in the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows
all true things in the eternal types.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii,
11): "If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything
that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them
as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens
are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be
careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens."
Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of
the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with
faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to faith
he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (Article 4),
that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and
these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our
intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by
participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect,
by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since
it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside the
things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held,
asserting that "per se" life or "per se" wisdom are creative
substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore
Augustine (Questions. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended by
Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine
mind, according to which types all things are made in themselves, and
are known to the human soul.
When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know
all things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said
to be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself
known; as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected
therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot
see all things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and
all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types.
Secondly, on thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of
knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the
sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things
in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all
things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing
else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are
contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps.
4:6,7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which
question the Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O
Lord, is signed upon us," as though he were to say: By the seal of
the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us.
But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible
species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us
to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is
not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the
Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas
sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv,
16): "Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that
all things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able
to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of
animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this
information from the story of times and places?"
But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their
"eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the
eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says
(Questions. 83, qu. 46)---viz. that "not each and every
rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision," namely, of
the eternal types, "but only those that are holy and pure," such as
the souls of the blessed.
From what has been said the objections are easily solved.
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