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Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God.
For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as
previously stated (Article 2). But movement does not belong to
God. Neither therefore does life.
Objection 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose
some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De
Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the
living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be
attributed to Him.
Objection 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things
that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in
corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal
things.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my
flesh have rejoiced in the living God."
I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In
proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live
in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the
more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the
life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold
order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the
principal agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it
does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own
form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the
action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in
respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in
respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act,
and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their
nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to
their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of
growth and decay.
Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not
only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the
form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of
themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of
movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through
sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is
their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch,
as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction;
and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as
have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only
connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move
themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals
of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle
of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to
themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been
implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to
any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals
as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are
superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect;
whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the
means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect
degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of
self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one
and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers;
and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the
arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of
navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn
rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the
ship.
But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt;
and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with
respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things
it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of
understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally
possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most
perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life.
From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after
showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and
eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is
twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat
or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to
understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is
this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that
moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the
perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the
thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of
the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as
movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the
act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that
is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of
the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima
iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is
movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is
in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in
the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: As God is His own very existence and
understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives
that He has not principle of life.
Reply to Objection 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a
corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and
nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not
found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
good with incorruptible natures.
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