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Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is
greater than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated
in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same
authority (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have
perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore
perseverance is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one
should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in
Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the
fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose."
Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of
every virtue.
On the contrary, Andronicus [Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says
that "perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to
stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that
are indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well,
or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a
virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3),
"virtue is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a
special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue.
Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.
First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect
of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time,
since to persist long in something difficult involves a special
difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is
accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring
in connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult
in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in
enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as
necessity requires.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance
there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most
difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good,
but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part
are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away:
wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief
title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are
opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the
necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which at
times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these
things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor
delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate
man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most
difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things,
through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions.
Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect
virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other
hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind
of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect
virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he
persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance
may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of
good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same
name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is
to believe without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of
virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of
magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a
person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not
accomplish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but
does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term
"perseverance" is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one
chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering: and
sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and
begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes
not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is
twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human
life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the
end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the
end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be
accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must
endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and
charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man.
Wherefore as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of
perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this
sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate
act of perseverance.
Reply to Objection 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a
virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is
proper to that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time
until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which
intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation
of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is
consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality
difficult to change."
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