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Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary
to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which
it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in
respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right
reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is
not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be
made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is
prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has
become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become
virtuous.
Objection 2: Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good
counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only
from his own, but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man
does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough
that he follow the counsels of prudent men.
Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one
always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem
to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in
taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about
things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written
(Wis. 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and
our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence should not
be reckoned an intellectual virtue.
On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for
human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom:
"She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude,
which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in
life."
I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life.
For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good
deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it;
to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or
passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end,
rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and
something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably
directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the
appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to
that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly
disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which
are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason.
Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to
perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things
ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently
prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.
Reply to Objection 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in
the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right
reason about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes
into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the
thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is
concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of
prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection:
for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above
(Article 4). Consequently art does not require of the craftsman
that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would
it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife
should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper
to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have
not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art,
not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art,
and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is necessary to man,
that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good
man.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own
counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite
perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in
moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well
simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good
life.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not
the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because
the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the
intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly
in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary
matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an
intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On
the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on
conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in
necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only
in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be
matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence
it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is
assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to
be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.
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