|
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity,
to love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 8) that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his
friendly relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its
effect. Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than
his friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself
more than God.
Objection 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's
own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the
thing itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles
which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man
loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does
not love God more than himself.
Objection 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy
God. But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God;
since this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore
man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22):
"If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the
sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man
take offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the
cause of a thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to
love God more than himself.
I answer that, The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of
nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods
bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of
which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves
God above all things and more than himself, but also every single
creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or
by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as
stones do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge,
because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than
its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since
the principal inclination of each part is towards common action
conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic
virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own
property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much
more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which is
based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.
Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the
common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as
in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a
share of that happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly
relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object
of friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly
relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
Reply to Objection 2: The part does indeed love the good of the
whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the
whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.
Reply to Objection 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to
that love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God
with the love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence,
because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good
in enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more
than himself.
|
|