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Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of
necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said
of the devil (Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that
can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he
dwells on the earth.
Objection 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in
respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are
represented to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from
the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima
iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's
imagination, as stated above (Article 2); and also the external
senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this
evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends
gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to
shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every
flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4)
that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit."
Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other
passions, in the way explained above (Article 2). Therefore he
can induce man to sin of necessity.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 5:8): "Your
adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he
may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were
true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil.
Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity.
Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): "Be subject .
. . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you,"
which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able
to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it
be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do.
Therefore he does not compel to sin.
I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained
by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a
sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is
evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to
sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to
impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive
appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the
reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to
him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered,
then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above
(Question 77, Article 7). It is consequently evident that the
devil can nowise compel man to sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every power that is greater than man,
can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above
(Question 9, Article 6).
Reply to Objection 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or
the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man
has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit,
when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for
the exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the
devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of
sinning.
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