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Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we
observe and seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is
honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue
deserves praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore
temperance is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the
virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of
touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a
greater virtue than justice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the
more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of
death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these
occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than
fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than
fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the
"greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for
which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the
good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the
individual," wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the
many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of
the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations
between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle
which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates
only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is
evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than
temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more
excellent still.
Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to
temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to
temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from
which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the
lower animals.
Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the
good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of
good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult,
wherein temperance excels.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the
many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is
general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former
way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply,
although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not
only than fortitude but also than justice.
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