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Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary
to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor.
7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance
steadfast unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher
reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to
Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If
therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other
contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the
object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think
of certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure
of contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can
be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x,
4. But the work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways,
either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult.
Therefore in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the
pleasure.
Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of
sorrow. But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) "much study
is an affliction of the flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of
sorrow contrary to its pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her,"
i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any
tediousness; but joy and gladness." Now the conversation and company
of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two
ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the
object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but
in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something
harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and
pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in
this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in
the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of
Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is
contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the
Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3).
This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly
speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of itself contrary to
pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to
sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the object of
contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are
not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other. Wherefore,
properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily
pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances;
thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with
thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of
drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not
caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that
contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming"
but a perfect operation, as stated above (Question 31, Article
1).
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of
an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as
regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a
bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the
normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and
the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though
agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above (Question
33, Article 2), the result being that an apprehension which at
first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur
directly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no
corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above
that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor
"tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation,
makes use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts
weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is
indirectly mingled with contemplation.
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony
with it, as is evident from what has been said above (Article 4):
while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the
same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is
evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of
contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God,"
is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by
something which the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind
considers as contrary to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature
are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that
are contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought;
indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence
one and the same science considers contraries.
Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil,
since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the
good of the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e.
in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the
contemplation of a more noble object; or on the part of the object
contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.
Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to
contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but
is in harmony with it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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