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Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given
in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine
[Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is
unsuitable---viz. that "satisfaction is to uproot the causes of
sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof." For the
cause of actual sin is the fomes. But we cannot remove the "fomes"
in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing the
causes of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin
itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore
can he remove the cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.
Objection 3: Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it
regards the past and not the future. Now "to give no opening to the
suggestions of sin" regards the future. Therefore it should not be
put in the definition of satisfaction.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no
mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is
unsuitable.
Objection 5: Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus
homo i): "Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor," wherein
no reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine
[Gennadius, Objection 1] in this definition. Therefore one or
the other is unsuitable.
Objection 6: Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God:
whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore
Anselm's definition is faulty.
I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already
existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding
equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 3) "punishments are medicinal." Wherefore
satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a
medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that
when one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for
the past, and takes heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may
be defined in two ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals
by making compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an
inflicted injury according to the equality of justice." The
definition of Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that
"satisfaction consists in giving God due honor"; where duty is
considered in respect of the sin committed. Secondly, satisfaction
may be defined, considered as preserving us from future sins; and as
Augustine (Objection 1) defines it. Now preservation from bodily
sickness is assured by removing the causes from which the sickness may
ensue, for if they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it
is not thus in spiritual diseases, for the free-will cannot be
forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they can,
though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be incurred even
when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things in the
definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to the
first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.
Reply to Objection 1: By "causes" we must understand the
proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of
sin through the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those
things which are called the remnants of past sin; and external
occasions of sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such
causes are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes,"
which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by
satisfaction in this life though it is weakened.
Reply to Objection 2: Since the cause of evil or of privation
(according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good,
and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows
that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to
remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good,
as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the
aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of
necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again
can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible
without charity, as we shall state further on (Question 14,
Article 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance was primarily instituted
and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it
regards the future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the
same applies to satisfaction.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine [Gennadius Massiliensis, De
Eccl. Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from
Whom, in reality, nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his
own part, takes something away. Consequently in such like
satisfaction, amendment for future time is of greater weight than
compensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfaction from
this point of view. And yet it is possible to gauge the compensation
for the past from the heed taken for the future, for the latter regards
the same object as the former, but in the opposite way: since when
looking at the past we detest the causes of sins on account of the sins
themselves, which are the starting-point of the movement of
detestation: whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin from the
causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins the more easily.
Reply to Objection 5: There is no reason why the same thing should
not be described in different ways according to the various things found
in it: and such is the case here, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 6: By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by
reason of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt,
as stated above (Article 2).
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