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Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
reckoned a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (FS, Question 84,
Articles 3,4), those vices are called capital which have principal
ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does
not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an
end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in Ethic.
i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that
"covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For
there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for
their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there
are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed
for other people's property." Therefore covetousness arises from
other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among
the capital vices.
I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice
is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because
when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire
thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the
most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of
human life, as stated above (FS, Question 1, Articles
4,7,8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the
conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the
conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would
not set man's appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches
give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De
Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking
possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles.
10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness,
which is desire for money, is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with
reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the
sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong
chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that
principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although
liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the
principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice,
because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among
sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.
On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of
reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a
prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave."
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that money is directed to
something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining
all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually.
Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the
Article.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Question 36,
Article 4, ad 1; FS, Question 84, Article 4), provided
that itself be frequently the source of others.
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