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Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a
sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a
circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof.
Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.
Objection 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it
is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not
evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise
aggravates a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its
turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part
of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the
sin's malice.
On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he
who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven
(Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a
circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin
more grievous.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of
virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be
increased by that which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is
caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man
departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due
circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is
natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances.
This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws
a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of
a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the
circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn
to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps
another's property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous
sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not
by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of
sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom
he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than
if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very
reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver
which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox.
iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for
he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom
he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic."
Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity
which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking
another's property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to this be
added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the
sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less
has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
Reply to Objection 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act,
as stated above (Question 18, Article 10). Nevertheless a
circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin;
because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in
reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the
malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that
act, but also according to a circumstance.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either
way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the
sin's species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the
same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may
aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason should direct the action not only as
regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore
one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any
single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought
not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason
suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of
reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought
to be united by right reason.
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