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Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For
Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing
perfected according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by
his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by
man in a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can
lose Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the
intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can
be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from
the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be
happy.
Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But
man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy.
Therefore it seems that it has an end.
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46) of the righteous
that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as
above stated (Article 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now
what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be
had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of
contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for
instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be
changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that
happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain
unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in
so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away
altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man
bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness
of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to
the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state
(Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply,
but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3),
following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become
unhappy after the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from
the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect
and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and
exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that
he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of
necessity be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of
knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true
Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good
that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never
will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that
he should have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the
intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi,
2. Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in
him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above (Question 3, Article 8)
that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine
Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one
possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient,
something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some
inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome.
But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good
things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is
written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory
shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like
manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her
conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness."
It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his
own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God
taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness
is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge,
except for some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault,
since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that vision as
was shown above (Question 4, Article 4). Nor again can it be
withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God
is raised above all other things: and consequently no other agent can
sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that
as time goes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice
versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such
things as are subject to time and movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has
happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine
power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which
transcends all change.
Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in
things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural
necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is
unable not to wish to be happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the
condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the
condition of the good, the participation of which makes man happy.
Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is
from another.
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