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Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in
Greek is called philargyria, applies not only to silver or money, but
also to anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin
there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in
turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods,
as state above (FS, Question 71, Article 6, Objection 3).
Therefore covetousness is a general sin.
Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the
covetous [avarus] man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass
[avidus aeris]," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is
called philargyria, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which
stands for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can
be measured by money, as stated above (Question 117, Article
2, ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external
thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Rm. 7:7, "For I had not
known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now the law seems to forbid
especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written
(Ex. 20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods."
Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so
covetousness is a general sin.
On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special
sins (Rm. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all
iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness", etc.
I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated
above (FS, Question 72, Article 1). Now the object of a sin
is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where
there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a
special kind of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the
delightful good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful
good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man.
Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an
immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the
name of money, whence covetousness [avaritia] is denominated.
Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been
originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are
absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said
to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De
Praedicamentis), consequently the term "covetousness" has been
amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever.
Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that "covetousness is
a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge and high places,
when prominence is immoderately sought after." In this way
covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks
of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection.
Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: All those external things that are subject to
the uses of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch
as they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external
goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and
so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the
desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far
as it is a special vice.
Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate
concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that
if it is forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden
to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those
possessions.
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