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Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For
some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate
concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by
fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in
the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
Objection 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions
which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude
with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of
innocence, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore neither did
those virtues exist then.
Objection 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin
committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But
in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed.
Therefore neither did those virtues exist.
Objection 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam
possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he
possessed not every virtue.
Objection 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in
the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which
seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra
Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the
slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty,
restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."
I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense
possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes.
For it was shown above (Article 1) that such was the rectitude of
the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower
powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections
whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated
according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the
Treatise on the Virtues (FS, Question 63, Article 2).
Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should
in a sense possess every virtue.
It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do
not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these
virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and
in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply
imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If
such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive
state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith,
which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet
possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the
vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the
enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the
primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which
implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive
state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act;
for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy,
which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and
unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive
state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but
not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if
there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his
neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in
accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards
what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only
conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did
wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9).
Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude
to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject
which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are
'per se' competent to moderate the passions.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions which have evil for their object
were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that
evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow.
But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with
the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate
the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the
virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive
state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions
which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions
only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in
habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other
virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to
others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but
also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also
to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the
primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner,
fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow
and fear.
Reply to Objection 3: appears from what has been said above.
Reply to Objection 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in
one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man
makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed
perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of
virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in
which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.
Reply to Objection 5: appears from what has been said above.
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