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Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of
temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is
requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and
"good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists
in mode, species, and order." Therefore modesty is a general
virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of
praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty
its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of
its parts.
Objection 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction
of our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24,25, "The servant
of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . .
with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing
wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above
(Question 33, Article 1). Therefore seemingly modesty is a
part of justice rather than of temperance.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons
modesty as a part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 141, Article 4;
Question 157, Article 3), temperance brings moderation into
those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the
concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special
virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be
another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man
requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus
it was stated above (Question 134, Article 3, ad 1), that
while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in
addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure.
Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where
moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is
annexed to temperance as its principal.
Reply to Objection 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes
appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel
is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode
which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated
to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
Reply to Objection 2: Some things need tempering on account of
their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is
necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with
strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
Reply to Objection 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general
moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
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