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Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species
drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some
likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing
existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the
likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so
that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person
understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or
else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of
existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone.
Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind
understands, to be derived from things.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light
of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active
intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the
light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible
things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel
understands through species drawn from things.
Objection 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent
to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from
sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by
species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to
things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no
purpose.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the
"angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or
sensible."
I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not
drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe
that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of
spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal
substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality
which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the
potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but
receives from some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion
also the lower intellectual substances ---that is to say, human
souls---have a power of understanding which is not naturally
complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing
intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual
substances---that is, the angels---the power of understanding is
naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such
species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they
can know naturally.
The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances.
The lower spiritual substances---that is, souls---have a nature
akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and
consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek
their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies;
otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other
hand, the higher substances---that is, the angels---are utterly
free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own
intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible
perfection through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received
from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual
nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The
other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they
first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and
then in their own nature."
Reply to Objection 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's
mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the
cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first
exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As
the type, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the
Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge
of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is
afterwards the very fashioning of the creature."
Reply to Objection 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is
necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the
imagination, which form is without matter but not without material
conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in
matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by
abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently,
however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce
material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to
reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible,
since the angel has no imagination, as was said above (Question
54, Article 5). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible
species from material things, yet he would not do so; because he would
not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent
as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not
purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the
purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
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