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Objection 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made
to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful
to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man
himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken
from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword.
Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a
thing has been taken.
Objection 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he
does not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully
that which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and
receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always
necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken
something.
Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible.
Now it is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from
whom a thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he
is too far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore
restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has
been taken.
Objection 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we
have received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors
from others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or
depositor. Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person
rather than make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.
Objection 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which
reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has
unjustly taken something from the Church and makes restitution to the
Church, it reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the
Church's property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church
from whom he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to
the person from whom something has been taken away
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 13:7): "Render . .
. to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to
whom custom."
I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equality of
commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing
to thing, as stated above (Article 2; Question 58, Article
10). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that
has less than his due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to
be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has
been taken.
Reply to Objection 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be
grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to
some other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because
restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made,
since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who
retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either
reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over
to another to keep it more securely.
Reply to Objection 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two
ways. First through the giving itself being illicit and against the
law, as is the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man
deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made
to him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving,
he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object.
Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful
purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman
receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has
received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or
deceit, she would be bound to restitution.
Reply to Objection 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is
unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for
instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be
dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry
about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead,
restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with
him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to
him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: else
it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the
owner should be advised of the fact.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to
succor his parents, or those from whom he has received greater
benefits; but he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what
belongs to others; and he would be doing this if he were to compensate
one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of
extreme need, for then he could and should even take what belongs to
another in order to succor a parent.
Reply to Objection 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can
rob the Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church
property which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance,
if a bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case
it is clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to
those who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another
person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church property
committed to himself: in which case he must make restitution to the
Church, and have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his
successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property,
merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold
it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must
make restitution by renouncing his intention.
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