|
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For
as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things
intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things
sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive.
Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things
intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is
active, but only that it is passive.
Objection 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is
something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required
for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous;
for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the
operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be
brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active
intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into
the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive
intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature
suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is
intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial.
Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species
actually intelligible.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5),
"As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it
becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things."
Therefore we must admit an active intellect.
I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need
for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible;
but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as
will be explained farther on (Article 4). For Plato supposed that
the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and
consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is actually
intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called
such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he
said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals
might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and
that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have
knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle
did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and
as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows
that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are
not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to
act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is
actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the
intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by
abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the
necessity for an active intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the
soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is
clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in
the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part,
there is something active and something passive.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of
light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to
make colors actually visible. And according to this the active
intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the
same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of
others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become
actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually
luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to
this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is
verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is
light required for seeing; but not for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen
that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account
of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the
disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now
the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we
consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from
matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial
nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence
of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way
of abstraction.
|
|