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Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so
are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the
good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative
justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue
for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other
virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude
or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every
special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to
vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part
of justice.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1),
aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is
in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident
that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully
says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force,
or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure" "(i.e.
derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it." Therefore
vengeance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from
the bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of
gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern
of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as
it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a
wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
Reply to Objection 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing
an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as
denoting the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance,
in so far as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor,
because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of
virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory
(Hom. xxvii in Ev.), "there are no green leaves on the bough of
good works, unless charity be the root."
Reply to Objection 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by
way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds
the measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of
deficiency and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is
written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his
son." But the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due
measure of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.
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