|
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without
charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii,
that "every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad."
But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same
book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.
Objection 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of
human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot
be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Rm. 5:5: "The
charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who
is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues
without charity.
Objection 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together,
through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on
prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Eph.
3:19: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all
knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with
charity, and can be without it.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He that
loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected
by the virtues, since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life,"
as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore
they cannot be without the love of charity.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 63, Article 2), it
is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far
as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing
the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be
without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in
so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last
end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and
cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like
moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above
(Article 1; Question 58, Articles 4,5) that the other moral
virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without
the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to
certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of
prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more
necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is
the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of
other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in
speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first
indemonstrable principle, that "contradictories cannot both be true at
the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused
prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral
virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.
It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused
virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since
they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues,
those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense,
but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in
some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end
simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [Lib. Sentent. Prosperi
cvi.] on the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (Rm.
14:23), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no
true virtue, even if his conduct be good."
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes
imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state,
"it makes its possessor good," and consequently cannot be in the
wicked.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the
sense of acquired virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity surpasses science and
prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and
consequently so do all the infused moral virtues.
|
|