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Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For
species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division.
But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since,
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a
virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by
containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and
contain oneself from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is
lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal.
5:23, "Faith, modesty," etc., says that by continence a man
refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not
a virtue.
On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue.
Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [De Affectibus] that
"continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore
continence is a virtue.
I answer that, The word "continence" is taken by various people in
two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all
venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity
(Gal. 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in
the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same
applies to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have
stated above (Question 152, Article 3) to be a virtue.
Others, however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a
man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense
the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also
it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii,
10,11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a
virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to
the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to
the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive
appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to
reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "continence is not a virtue but a
mixture," inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls
short of virtue.
If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of
commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the
same division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of
virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is
according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds
[tenet se] to that which is in accord with reason, he is said to
contain himself. Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not
according to reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who
stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that
which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed
to right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason.
Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right
reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to
perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter
should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the
first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely
from unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are
lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect
goods.
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