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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us.
Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that
by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But
nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in
necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.
Objection 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to
the end, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2). But the
directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is
the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their
natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will.
Therefore no law is natural to man.
Objection 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under
the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his
free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since
therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is
man subject to a natural law.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 2:14: "When the Gentiles,
who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law,"
comments as follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they
have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of,
what is good and what is evil."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 90, Article 1, ad
1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways:
in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in
that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured,
in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all
things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the
eternal law, as was stated above (Article 1); it is evident that
all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely,
from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective
inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the
rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent
way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being
provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of
the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its
proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after
saying (Ps. 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as
though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many
say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he
says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon
us": thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we
discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the
natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine
light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else
than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law
were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing
but a participation thereof, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based
on that which is according to nature, as stated above (Question
10, Article 1): for every act of reasoning is based on principles
that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the
means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end.
Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be
in virtue of the natural law.
Reply to Objection 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own
way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But
because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and
rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something
pertaining to reason, as stated above (Question 90, Article
1). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a
rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law
in them, except by way of similitude.
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