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Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not
exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii)
that in the angels there is "life which understands and feels."
Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the
angels have learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of
many remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they
have likewise a power of memory.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
there is a sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy
belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the
imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the
angels, since they are of the same nature.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man
senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."
I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations
are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts
of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are
some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through
bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts
of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them,
as is manifest from what has been said already (Question 51,
Article 1). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can
belong to them.
The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that
the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it
is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest
intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as
is our soul. For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and
"minds," as was said above (Article 3, ad 1).
A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First,
it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the
opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies
naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in
his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De
Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for much
labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like
are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a
sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage
of speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we
"sense it." And hence it is that we use the word "sentence."
Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of
the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing
them. We have experience when we know single objects through the
senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show
(Question 57, Article 2), yet not through the senses. But
memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De
Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in
so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a
perverted phantasy' is attributed to demons, since they have a false
practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us
comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold fast to
images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in
sleepers and lunatics.
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