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Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the
mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the
mean. Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness.
Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean.
Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the
appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue
consists in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological
virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above
(Question 62, Article 3). Therefore theological virtue also
observes the mean.
Objection 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a
mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle
course between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab.
Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in
Christ, we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who
maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy
of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore
theological virtue observes the mean.
On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to
sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by
excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it
is written (Ecclus. 43:33): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him
as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore
theological virtue does not observe the mean.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the mean of virtue
depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one
may exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological
virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue,
and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself:
because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity,
according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His
omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human
power: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be
loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less
therefore can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of
such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we
approach to the summit.
The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with
us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought,
yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving,
according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible
to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in
reference to us.
Reply to Objection 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues
consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be
exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue,
considered in itself, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our
intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule;
whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated
rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption
and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said
to be presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in
excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that
which according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be
no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is
infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary
heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom
we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes
a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above.
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