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Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man
who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine
justice. Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser.
Therefore it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a
man even though there be no accuser.
Objection 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure
in order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the
crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation;
for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the
judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a
man without there being an accuser.
Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in
Holy Writ, as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same
time the accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13).
Therefore it is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as
judge while being at the same time his accuser.
On the contrary, Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2,
expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a
judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not
banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused."
I answer that, A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a
judge as to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as
stated above (Question 58, Article 2), justice is not between a
man and himself but between one man and another. Hence a judge must
needs judge between two parties, which is the case when one is the
prosecutor, and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases
the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an accuser,
according to Acts 25:16: "It is not the custom of the Romans
to condemn any man, before that he who is accused have his accusers
present, and have liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the
crimes" of which he is accused.
Reply to Objection 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's
conscience as his accuser, according to Rm. 2:15, "Their
thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another";
or again, He takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed
itself, according to Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's
blood crieth to Me from the earth."
Reply to Objection 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an
accuser. Hence a gloss on Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy
brother's blood," etc. says: "There is no need of an accuser when
the crime committed is notorious." In a case of denunciation, as
stated above (Question 33, Article 7), the amendment, not the
punishment, of the sinner is intended: wherefore when a man is
denounced for a sin, nothing is done against him, but for him, so
that no accuser is required. The punishment that is inflicted is on
account of his rebellion against the Church, and since this rebellion
is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that the judge
himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize him to proceed to pass
sentence, except according to the order of judicial procedure.
Reply to Objection 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own
knowledge of the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above
(Article 2). Hence a man cannot be accuser, witness and judge at
the same time, as God is. Daniel was at once accuser and judge,
because he was the executor of the sentence of God, by whose instinct
he was moved, as stated above (Article 1, ad 1).
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