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Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of
human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
substances, as stated above (Question 110, Article 3), they
act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual
substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can
cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
Objection 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform
principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it
seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly
bodies, as to their principles.
Objection 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth
concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the
intellect and will are the principles. But they could not do this by
means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human
actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that
"the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act
on bodies, as stated above (Article 3). They can act directly
indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal
organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs
be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed
cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers
affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that
intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that
the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would
also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as
other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are
affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue
of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would
therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have
determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is
manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed,
however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly
bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both
intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are
affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are
differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from
the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative,
cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the
intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the
contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the
inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and
concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless
the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing
them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of
which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the
will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the
intellect.
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from
sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men,
as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey
xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and
will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly
bodies be the cause of human actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual substances, that move the
heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the
heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by
enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as
stated above (Question 111, Article 2).
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal
movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to
its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect
and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine
intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions,
which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of
the heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist
these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the
truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not
in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by
his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say
that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [Ptolemy,
Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his
passions.
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