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Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred.
For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor
fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy.
Therefore anger is more grievous than hatred.
Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for
it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented
if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not
satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved
thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore,
anger is more grievous than hatred.
Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm
according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the
more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused
by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above (Article
1): whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more
grievous than hatred.
On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a
beam," but anger to "a mote."
I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its
object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object
of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates,
so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But
there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his
enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he
is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that
is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of
vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above (Article 2) that
hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes
application of good to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under
the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to
someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice,
may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with
the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not
obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently it is
evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.
Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be
considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the
desire. As to the thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred
has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is
satisfied with no particular measure of evil: because those things that
are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the
Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard
to riches. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy
. . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with
blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under the aspect
of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted
goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of the
angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils
befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than
hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through
the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who
can bear the violence of one provoked?"
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to
someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now
vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature
of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and
inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this,
that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and
know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the
other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since
he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, that an
evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence,
although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve those in whom
they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is
more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one
cause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting
cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the
soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a
disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he
hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is
more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting
than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this
disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that
"hatred is more incurable than anger."
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