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Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of
perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not
seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for
salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound [religamur] to the
one almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55),
or because it takes its name from "our returning [religimus] to God
Whom we had lost by neglecting Him" [Question 81, Article
1], according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore
it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent.
Rhet. ii, 53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the
Divine nature." Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God
would seem to pertain to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the
diversity of states, as stated above (Question 40, Article 2;
Question 183, Article 3). Therefore it would seem that
religion does not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the
state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also
some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does
not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance;
for it is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc
nequaquam): "The holy synod orders that any man who has been
degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of
repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate." Now a
place of repentance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence
Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places penitents in the lowest place,
namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it would seem
that religion is not the state of perfection.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i,
7) abbot Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that
we have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil,
privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these
degrees to mount to the perfection of charity." Now things pertaining
to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the
end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection.
Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are
called servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and
subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 141, Article 2)
that which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed
antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way of
excellence. Thus the name of "fortitude" is claimed by the virtue
which preserves the firmness of the mind in regard to most difficult
things, and the name of "temperance," by that virtue which tempers
the greatest pleasures. Now religion as stated above (Question
81, Article 2; Article 3, ad 2) is a virtue whereby a man
offers something to the service and worship of God. Wherefore those
are called religious antonomastically, who give themselves up entirely
to the divine service, as offering a holocaust to God. Hence
Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "Some there are who keep
nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their tongue,
their senses, their life, and the property they possess." Now the
perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated above
(Question 184, Article 2), and in this sense religion denotes
the state of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: To offer something to the worship of God is
necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's
possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 81, Article
1, ad 1; Article 4, ad 1,2; Question 85, Article 3)
when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion has reference
not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like things that are
proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which in so
far as these are referred to God's service and honor become acts of
religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole life to the divine
service, his whole life belongs to religion, and thus by reason of the
religious life that they lead, those who are in the state of perfection
are called religious.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question 184,
Articles 4,6) religion denotes the state of perfection by reason of
the end intended. Hence it does not follow that whoever is in the
state of perfection is already perfect, but that he tends to
perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Mt. 19:21, "If thou
wilt be perfect," etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.) that "he
who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become perfect does not
become perfect at the very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but
from that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him to all
the virtues." Thus all are not perfect in religion, but some are
beginners, some proficient.
Reply to Objection 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly
that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby
the obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the
obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut
off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs
to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious
state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu.
ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to
enter a monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather
than to do public penance while remaining in the world.
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