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Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as
regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
22) that there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which
is called thelesis, and the rational will which is called boulesis.
Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection
of human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by
the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the
difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and
intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's
apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of
which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one
intellectual and the other rational.
Objection 3: Further, some [Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat.
Volunt. Christ.] ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can
only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of
reason there are several wills.
On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But the
will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one
man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of
reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only
one human will.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, ad 3), the will is
sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if
the will is taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills,
i.e. two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the
reason. For the will, as was said in the FS, Question 8,
Articles 2,3, regards both the end and the means; and is affected
differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and
absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means
it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means
depends on something else. Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it
is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called
by Damascene thelesis---i.e. simple will, and by the masters
"will as nature," is different from the act of the will as it is
drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as
to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls
boulesis---i.e. counseling will, and the masters, "will as
reason." But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power,
since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is
goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of
the will, in Christ there is but one human will, essentially so
called and not by participation; but if we are speaking of the will as
an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is
called thelesis, and a will as reason, which is called boulesis.
Reply to Objection 1: These two wills do not diversify the power
but only the act, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct
powers, as was said in the FP, Question 79, Article 8.
Reply to Objection 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be
distinct from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks
from another's evil, absolutely considered.
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