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Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not
depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not
regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the
soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of
temperance does not depend on the needs of the body.
Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if
the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin
against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required
by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore
if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no
sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for
the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need
of the body is not the rule of temperance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In
both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule
forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them
desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of
those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a
lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and
of his station."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1; Question 109,
Article 2; Question 123, Article 12), the good of moral
virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because "man's good
is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom.
iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs
certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists
chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end
is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the
pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to some
necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the
need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it
makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life
requires.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is
regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed
that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes
the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of
temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it
makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for
life is subordinate.
Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two
ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term
"necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food
is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not
only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man
desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a
sound condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for
this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance
to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But
others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping
with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant
things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound
condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these
things."
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need
according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the
requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external
things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements
of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11)
that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not
only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition,
but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. good
conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man
considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his
station."
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