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Objection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any
goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom
says (Hom. xix in Mt.): "It is the will that is rewarded for
doing good, or punished for doing evil." Now works are the witnesses
of the will. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account,
in order to know how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all
may understand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated
according to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of
man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that
of the interior act.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and
external acts are one and the same, as stated above (Article 3).
But increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the
external action does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior
act.
Objection 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does
not add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived
therefrom. But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is
derived from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes
conversely, as stated above (Articles 1,2). Therefore neither
of them adds to the goodness or malice of the other.
On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil.
If therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be
added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will,
does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is
unreasonable.
I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the external action
derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action adds
nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is
made better in good things, or worse in evil things. This,
seemingly, may happen in three ways. First in point of number; if,
for instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end
in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it,
the act of his will is doubled and a double good, or a double evil is
the result. Secondly, in point of extension: when, for instance, a
man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and is hindered
by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the movement of the
will until he accomplish it in deed; it is evident that the will of the
latter is more lasting in good or evil, and in this respect, is better
or worse. Thirdly, in point of intensity: for these are certain
external actions, which, in so far as they are pleasurable, or
painful, are such as naturally to make the will more intense or more
remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the will tends to
good or evil, the better or worse it is.
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external
action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands in
relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to
the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or
movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term.
Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the
opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove
impossible, as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the
operation if it could; the lack of perfection derived from the external
action, is simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves
neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil
deeds, so neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man
through simple involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a
man's will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save
through the impossibility of achievement.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to that goodness which
the external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But
the goodness which the external action takes from its matter and
circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end;
but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed,
to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as stated
above (Articles 1,2).
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
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