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Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as
four is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of
straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore love
and dilection denote the same thing.
Objection 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by
reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the
same. Therefore these are the same.
Objection 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that
it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love
to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses
both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love
and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and
another to speak of dilection."
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy
men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection
does."
I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same
thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ,
however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and
"dilection" are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity"
can be taken either way.
Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a
wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity
is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition
to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word
denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power,
but only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity
denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far
as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself
implies.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection,
in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is
the same as dilection.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is more general than the
object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of
good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is
the same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks
of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that
"a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is
ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is
concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some
assigned the difference spoken of.
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why some held that, even when
applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more
Godlike than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion,
especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas
dilection presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for
man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him,
more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which
pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above. And
consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
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