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Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before
vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x,
4). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore
delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is
desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on
account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted
delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of
the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such
operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the
operation of the intellect, which is vision.
Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight
or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith,
as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or
enjoyment ranks before vision.
On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision
is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic.
x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter
carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs
rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the
will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on
account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If
therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is
caused by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek good
for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the
end, which has been disproved above (Question 1, Article 1, ad
2; Question 3, Article 4): but it seeks to be at rest in the
operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is
evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the
resting of the will therein.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4)
"delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a
result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon
vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own
species.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not
attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is
delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite
which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight.
But the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of
which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good
rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which
is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of
the operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply
according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according
to the order of the intellectual appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for
the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights
in the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to
charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made
present to charity.
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