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Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of
the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider
human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil.
But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for
a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is
outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should
not take note of the circumstances of acts.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts.
But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science
considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry."
Therefore the theologian has not to consider circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to
the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is
not a theologian's business to consider circumstances.
On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be
involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24)
and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But
involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to
the theologian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by
the theologian.
I answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the
theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian
considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to
Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be
proportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end
by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due
circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the
circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts
according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and
this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on
(Question 18, Articles 10,11; Question 73, Article
7). Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the
aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for
this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed
to be voluntary or involuntary, according to knowledge or ignorance of
circumstances, as stated above (Question 6, Article 8).
Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Good directed to the end is said to be
useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus
'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing
is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the
thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be
seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and
"unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts
consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being
called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things
that are adjacent to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are
neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity.
But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because
circumstances although, as stated above (Article 1), they are
extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it,
by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
consideration of art.
Reply to Objection 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to
the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in
so far as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of
virtue in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the
orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or
blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because
where the orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian
this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him
all the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and
vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and
politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward
or punishment.
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