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Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For
the Lord says (Mt. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on
which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due
to God." Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God.
But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and
this is proper to God.
Objection 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only
inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge
in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce
his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge
is an active quality just as heat is.
Objection 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light,
and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either
of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause
knowledge in another man.
Objection 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a
disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify
something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone
so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For
these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does
not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are
proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not
acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does
not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were
to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing
thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by
teaching him.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tm. 2:7): "Whereunto
I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the
Gentiles in faith and truth."
I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions.
For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men
have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Question
76, Article 2). From this it follows that the same intelligible
species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not
cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has
himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has
himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so
that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This
opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master,
if we consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective
truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all
men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species,
differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as
stated above (Question 76, Article 2).
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that
our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through
the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Question 84,
Articles 3,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union
with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it
knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh
knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he
knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In
the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to
receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate
substances. But against this we have proved above (Question 79,
Article 2; Question 84, Article 3) that the passive intellect
of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species),
as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4).
In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects
proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior
principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by
art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior
principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused
in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the
medical art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed
by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be
noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as
nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter
that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that
the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as
helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which
is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it
with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes
use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature,
and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the
intended end.
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as
is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an
exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction).
For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the
light of the active intellect, through which certain universal
principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as
proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal
principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of
which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research
advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what
he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple
from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously
unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i,
1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous
knowledge."
Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the
unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain
helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the
acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain
less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able
to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some
sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or
something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led
to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by
strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some
active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Question
106, Article 1; Question 111, Article 1) of the angelic
enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the
natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of
principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient
collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles.
Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration
is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator
causes his hearer to know.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings
exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior
nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of
the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these
are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all
thy diseases" (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He
that teacheth man knowledge" (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as "the
light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), through
which light all things are shown to us.
Reply to Objection 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not
cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active
cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the
principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the
principle by which one is directed in working.
Reply to Objection 3: The master does not cause the intellectual
light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species
directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter,
by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs
of which are proposed to him from without.
Reply to Objection 4: The signs proposed by the master to the
disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not
known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires
knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to
have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him,
such as is required in a master.
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