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Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the
irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from
anger. Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief
characteristic" (cf. Article 2, Objection 1), it seems that
anger precedes and surpasses hope.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is
something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a
contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to
daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to
strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to
strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore
anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than
hope. And consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.
Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the
movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and
despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply
approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope
and daring.
On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it
precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of
the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the
irascible faculty.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1) all irascible passions
imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible
faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere
aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or
hatred, those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to
sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no
passion in the irascible, as stated above (Question 23, Articles
3,4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude
to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of
all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of
generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty,
which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil,
those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally
precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that
hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such,
which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly;
whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is
consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else,
wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like
manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring.
And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident
from this---that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding
evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because
daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the
despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one
is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as
Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it
is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of
generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions,
as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred;
desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes
daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has
been stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other
passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from
anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power
takes its name.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that
is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which
regards good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring
or even anger regards something more arduous.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially
and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its
movement from evil results from this. For the movement of the
appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the
intention of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal
of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining
the end.
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