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Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does
not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is
opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (Article 1):
whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative
justice. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial
sentences.
Objection 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a
sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing
penalties, since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures
the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others.
Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial
sentences.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In
judging be merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply
respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences
respect of persons is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not
good to accept the person in judgment."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 60, Article 1),
judgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the
equality of justice, those things which may cause an opposite
inequality. Now respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in
so far as something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to
him in which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident
that judgment is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
Reply to Objection 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways.
First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is
common to commutative and distributive justice: because it may be
decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among
many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has taken
from him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of
judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes
from one and gives to another, and this belongs to distributive
justice. In this way respect of persons may take place in any
judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: When a person is more severely punished on
account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no
respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in
that case, a diversity of things, as stated above (Question 58,
Article 10, ad 3; Question 61, Article 2, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor
the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else
the saying of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a
poor man in judgment."
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