|
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the
interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external
action. For the principle of the interior act is the interior
apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle of
the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now
where the principles of action are different, the actions themselves
are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of
goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different
subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the
same as that of the external action.
Objection 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it,
good, and renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But
the intellective virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the
moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i,
13. Therefore the goodness of the interior act, which belongs to
the commanding power, is distinct from the goodness of the external
action, which belongs to the power commanded.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect;
since nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act
is the cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as
stated above (Articles 1,2). Therefore it is not the same
goodness in each.
On the contrary, It was shown above (Question 18, Article 6)
that the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external
action. Now that which results from the material and formal element is
one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and
external act.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 17, Article 4), the
interior act of the will, and the external action, considered
morally, are one act. Now it happens sometimes that one and the same
individual act has several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes
that it has but one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or
malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external action,
and sometimes not. For as we have already said (Articles 1,2),
these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts,
are ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things that are
subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being
subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures
health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of
health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one and the
same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is
subordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself,
besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a
palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable
good, besides being conducive to health.
We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or
malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one and the
same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end,
and of the external action, which regards the end through the medium of
the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or
malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances,
then the goodness of the external action is distinct from the goodness
of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end
passes into the external action, and the goodness of the matter and
circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above
(Articles 1,2).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the internal and
external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as
they are in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral
order, as stated above (Question 17, Article 4).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral
virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as
it were, of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason,
is ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason various
virtues are necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a
virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so
far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from
another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same
in both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is
distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same
specifically. But when a thing is derived from one thing from
another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the
same in both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is
derived from the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as
applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the
body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine
the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external action
is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz.
according to the order of one to the other.
|
|