|
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial power does not
correspond to voluntary poverty. For it was promised to none but the
twelve apostles (Mt. 19:28): "You shall sit on twelve
seats, judging," etc. Since then those who are voluntarily poor are
not all apostles, it would seem that the judicial power is not
competent to all.
Objection 2: Further, to offer sacrifice to God of one's own body
is more than to do so of outward things. Now martyrs and also virgins
offer sacrifice to God of their own body. whereas the voluntarily poor
offer sacrifice of outward things. Therefore the sublimity of the
judicial power is more in keeping with martyrs and virgins than with
those who are voluntarily poor.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:45): "There
is one that accuseth you, Moses in whom you trust---because you
believe not his voice," according to a gloss, and (Jn.
12:48): "The word that I have spoken shall judge him in the
last day." Therefore the fact that a man propounds a law, or exhorts
men by word to lead a good life, gives him the right to judge those who
scorn his utterances. But this belongs to doctors. Therefore it is
more competent to doctors than to those who are poor voluntarily.
Objection 4: Further, Christ through being judged unjustly merited
as man to be judge of all in His human nature [TP, Question 59,
Article 6], according to Jn. 5:27, "He hath given Him
power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man." Now those who
suffer persecution for justice' sake are judged unjustly. Therefore
the judicial power is competent to them rather than to the voluntarily
poor.
Objection 5: Further, a superior is not judged by his inferior.
Now many who will have made lawful use of riches will have greater
merit than many of the voluntarily poor. Therefore the voluntarily
poor will not judge where those are to be judged.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:6): "He saveth not
the wicked, and He giveth judgment to the poor."
Further, a gloss on Mt. 19:28, "You who have left all
things' " says: "Those who left all things and followed God will
be the judges; those who made right use of what they had lawfully will
be judged," and thus the same conclusion follows as before.
I answer that, The judicial power is due especially to poverty on
three counts. First, by reason of congruity, since voluntary poverty
belongs to those who despise all the things of the world and cleave to
Christ alone. Consequently there is nothing in them to turn away
their judgment from justice, so that they are rendered competent to be
judges as loving the truth of justice above all things. Secondly, by
reason of merit, since exaltation corresponds by way of merit to
humility. Now of all the things that make man contemptible in this
world humility is the chief: and for this reason the excellence of
judicial power is promised to the poor, so that he who humbles himself
for Christ's sake shall be exalted. Thirdly, because poverty
disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For the reason why
one of the saints will be said to judge as stated above [Article
1], is that he will have the heart instructed in all Divine truth
which he will be thus able to make known to others. Now in the
advancement to perfection, the first thing that occurs to be renounced
is external wealth, because this is the last thing of all to be
acquired. And that which is last in the order of generation is the
first in the order of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes
whereby we advance to perfection, the first place is given to poverty.
Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, in so far as this is the
disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Hence also it is that this
same power is not promised to all who are voluntarily poor, but to
those who leave all and follow Christ in accordance with the perfection
of life.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xx), "we must not imagine that because He says that they will sit on
twelve seats only twelve men will judge with Him. else since we read
that Matthias was appointed apostle in the place of the traitor
Judas, Paul who worked more than the rest will have nowhere to sit as
judge." Hence "the number twelve," as he states (De Civ. Dei
xx), "signifies the whole multitude of those who will judge, because
the two parts of seven, namely three and four, being multiplied
together make twelve." Moreover twelve is a perfect number, being
the double of six, which is a perfect number.
Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles in whose
person he made this promise to all who follow them.
Reply to Objection 2: Virginity and martyrdom do not dispose man to
retain the precepts of Divine justice in his heart in the same degree
as poverty does: even so, on the other hand, outward riches choke the
word of God by the cares which they entail (Lk. 8:14). Or we
may reply that poverty does not suffice alone to merit judicial power,
but is the fundamental part of that perfection to which the judicial
power corresponds. Wherefore among those things regarding perfection
which follow after poverty we may reckon both virginity and martyrdom
and all the works of perfection: yet they do not rank as high as
poverty, since the beginning of a thing is its chief part.
Reply to Objection 3: He who propounded the law or urged men to
good will judge, in the causal (Cf. Article 1) sense, because
others will be judged in reference to the words he has uttered or
propounded. Hence the judicial power does not properly correspond to
preaching or teaching. or we may reply that, as some say, three
things are requisite for the judicial power; first, that one renounce
temporal cares, lest the mind be hindered from the contemplation of
wisdom; secondly that one possess Divine justice by way of habit both
as to knowledge and as to observance; thirdly that one should have
taught others this same justice; and this teaching will be the
perfection whereby a man merits to have judicial power.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ humbled Himself in that He was
judged unjustly; for "He was offered because it was His own will"
(Is. 53:7): and by His humility He merited His exaltation to
judicial power, since all things are made subject to Him (Phil.
2:8,9). Hence, judicial power is more due to them who humble
themselves of their own will by renouncing temporal goods, on account
of which men are honored by worldlings, than to those who are humbled
by others.
Reply to Objection 5: An inferior cannot judge a superior by his
own authority, but he can do so by the authority of a superior, as in
the case of a judge-delegate. Hence it is not unfitting that it be
granted to the poor as an accidental reward to judge others, even those
who have higher merit in respect of the essential reward.
|
|