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Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have
assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the
assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all
men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is
"the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful." But nature
as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the
Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from
all individuals.
Objection 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be
attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best.
Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing [per
se] man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted
from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed
this.
Objection 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of
God in the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said
above (Article 3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it
is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said (Article
3). Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is
separated from individuals.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11):
"God the Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure
thought; for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and
fictitious Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or
abstracted from individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since
it does not exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 11). Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature,
as it is separated from individuals.
I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing,
beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two
ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the
Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human
or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher
proves (Metaph. vii, 26,27,29,51), because sensible
matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is placed
in its definition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence
human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if
human nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that
it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, because this
assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature
of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly,
because to a common nature can only be attributed common and universal
operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits,
whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in order that the
Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us.
Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but
intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to
show Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch 3:38:
"Afterwards He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men."
Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other
than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would
be in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son
of God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this
would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human
nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a
false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be
anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11).
Reply to Objection 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common
Saviour of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is
attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, but by a
community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal
cause of human salvation.
Reply to Objection 2: Self-existing [per se] man is not to be
found in nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the
Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate
man was only in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary
for it to be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from
eternity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the
concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption,
nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as
to be in an individual.
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