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Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what
follows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to
reason, as is clear from what has been said above (Question 9,
Article 1). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on
reason.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2)
that the goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in
conformity with right desire." But right desire is a good will.
Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness
of the will, rather than conversely.
Objection 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is
moved, but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other
powers, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1). Therefore the
goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly
will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the
goodness of the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles 1,2), the goodness of
the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is
proposed to it by reason. Because the good understood is the
proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is
proportionate not to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the
will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas
the sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended
by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on
reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.
Reply to Objection 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as
appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But
considered as true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect
of goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a
good that is not previously apprehended by reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical
intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for
in this respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the
means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the
desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end
presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the
reason moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as
stated above (Question 9, Article 1).
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