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Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love.
For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it
happens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He
that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would
be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4)
that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems
that evil is the cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not
"the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3):
"Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the
cause of love.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 26, Article 1),
Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty.
Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its
movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's
object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as
stated above (Question 26, Articles 1,2), love implies a
certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing
beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and
proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper
cause of love.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect
of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and
is considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil,
in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is
in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of
iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or
such like.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are
beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for
it is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it
excludes insincerity or hypocrisy.
Reply to Objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and
they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the
notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the
beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known.
Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the
most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason;
for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in
reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the
expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and
beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a
relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which
simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something
pleasant to apprehend.
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