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Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real
mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now
moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit
which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore
justice observes the rational and not the real mean.
Objection 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is
neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean;
as is clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii,
6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in
Ethic. v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.
Objection 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to
observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case
the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much
for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is
also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive
the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore
justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4)
that the mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical"
proportion, so that it is the real mean.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 9; FS, Question
59, Article 4), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned
with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a
comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in
so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due
circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by
the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with
the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which
is fixed by reason in our regard.
On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists
in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the
external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and
less, as stated in Metaph. x [Didot ed., ix, 5; Ethic. v,
4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.
Reply to Objection 1: This real mean is also the rational mean,
wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in
two ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues
are good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are
good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply
through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may
become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in
the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as
regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that
justice is about things that are good simply.
Reply to Objection 3: The injury inflicted bears a different
proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person:
wherefore each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a
different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational
diversity.
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