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Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue.
Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which
is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination
belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But
there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz.
prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all
moral acts their respective inclinations.
Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their
material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects.
Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed,
is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore,
seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.
Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by
their end, as stated above (Question 1, Article 3). Now there
is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the
proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral
virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that
there is but one.
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated
above (Question 56, Article 2). But the subject of the moral
virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into
several powers, as stated in the FP, Question 80, Article 2;
FP, Question 81, Article 2. Therefore there cannot be only
one moral virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 58, Articles
1,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty.
Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of
their objects, as stated above (Question 54, Article 2).
Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing,
depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we
must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold
relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the
agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as
happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one
specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically
one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the
species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form
from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as
is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is
generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are
not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the
matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that
owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are
produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of
matter.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of
commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and
moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason
univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by
participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made
appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species,
according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that
moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in
all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is
but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to
direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the
object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in
kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing
power.
Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on
account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on
account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained
above.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species
from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although
they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
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