|
Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that
exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For
Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it
is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should
exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23):
"Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the
universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of
all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein
even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed,
commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and
praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that
appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is
what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God
wills evil.
Objection 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not
exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil
should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's
will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil
should exist.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man
is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men
in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming
worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to
will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes
worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse.
Therefore God wills not evil things.
I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility,
as said before (Question 5, Article 1), and since evil is
opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be
sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the
intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be
sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in
each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some
other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the
corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is
food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means.
Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the
deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that
accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never
therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless
the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of
which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He
wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another.
Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of
right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or
of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils
are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to
be naturally corrupted.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not
will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because,
although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be
done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to
some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words
"that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct;
since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it
is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from
his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of
the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot
therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the
statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since
nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but
by that which belongs to it essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection
and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad
1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the
perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an
absurdity.
Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil exists, and that
evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements
that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not
so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills
evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil
to be done; and this is a good.
|
|