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Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For
justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist
in God: neither therefore does justice.
Objection 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases
does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says:
"God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will"
(Eph. 1:11). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.
Objection 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due.
But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to
God.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But
justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.):
"Good regards the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice
does not belong to God.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is
just, and hath loved justice."
I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4)
calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of
business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle
says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made
him?" (Rm. 11:35). The other consists in distribution, and
is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to
each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in
ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in
the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects
of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God.
Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs
see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing
things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the
nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to
it."
Reply to Objection 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned
with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with
fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above
(Question 20, Article 1), in God there are no passions; nor a
sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand,
certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending;
such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not
in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing
to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil
matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise
God for His political virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the
object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what
His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in
accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He
does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do
according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power,
God is a law unto Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now
that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master
owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its
own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain
exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a
twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one
created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole,
accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the
other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the
divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to
God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It
is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His
will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this
respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He
renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a
created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is
due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him.
Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is
due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived
from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as
ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in
this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor,
since He is not directed to other things, but rather other things to
Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the
fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of
merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog.
10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it
agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is
also just; since it befits Thy goodness."
Reply to Objection 4: Although justice regards act, this does not
prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the
essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not
always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect
to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this
reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the
just, as the general to the special.
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