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Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act.
For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the
habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore
habit can be caused by one act.
Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication
so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it
can be the generating cause of a habit.
Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it
happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore
one act can cause a habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither
does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a
short time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an
operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i,
7,10,13). Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same
reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.
I answer that, As we have said already (Article 2), habit is
caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active
principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is
passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive.
Whence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the
combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels
contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming it entirely, it may
impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle
which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one
act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many
things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed
in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the
appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined
like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which
inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of
virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two
passive principles: one is the "possible" [FP, Question 79,
ARTICLE 2. ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the
intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls
"passive," and is the "particular reason," that is the cogitative
power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former
passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to
entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle:
thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it
gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition
cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by
many acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible"
intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of
the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But
with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be
repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory.
And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that
"meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be
caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power:
sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at
once.
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
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