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Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of
things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one.
But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Question
11, Article 4). Therefore He produces but one effect.
Objection 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its
exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said
above (Question 44, Article 3). Therefore, as God is one,
His effect is one only, and not diverse.
Objection 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But
the end of the creation is one---viz. the divine goodness, as was
shown above (Question 44, Article 4). Therefore the effect of
God is but one.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:4,7) that God "divided
the light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters."
Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.
I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many
causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by
itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the
ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter,
attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of
things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.
Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of
things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the
intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in
matter.
But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was
shown above (Question 44, Article 2), even matter itself was
created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from
matter to a higher cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of
the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of
things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of
things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary,
created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to
different forms.
Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents,
as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself,
produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its
own being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act,
as will appear later (Question 50, Article 3). And so the
first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause,
produced the second intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself
as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes
movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality it
produced the soul of the heavens.
But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it
was shown above (Question 45, Article 5) that to create belongs
to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is
produced by God alone---viz. all those things which are not subject
to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this
opinion, the universality of things would not proceed from the
intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active
causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by
chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists of
the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is
impossible.
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come
from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought
things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to
creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could
not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many
and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the
representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another.
For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is
manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates
the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any
single creature whatever.
And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of
things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word
of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read
in Gn. 1:3,4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He
divided the light from the darkness."
Reply to Objection 1: The natural agent acts by the form which
makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore
its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as
was shown above (Question 19, Article 4), acts by an
intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity
and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above
(Question 15, Article 2), it follows that, although He is
one, He can make many things.
Reply to Objection 2: This reason would apply to the representation
which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by
reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect,
is only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,
which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by
many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the
plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of
things.
Reply to Objection 3: In speculative things the medium of
demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one
only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when
operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the
end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to
its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is
necessary.
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