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Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends
does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary
effects. Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many
rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are
kindled and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner,
when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.
Objection 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as
Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend
is pained at the sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes.
Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend
in sorrow, a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled
his sorrow seems to increase.
Objection 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a
friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's
other self" (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil.
Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of
the friend with whom he sympathizes.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that
those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with
them.
I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy
of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher
indicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is
because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight
whereof we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others
saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the
burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight;
wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like
what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better
reason is because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that
he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated above
(Question 32, Article 5). Consequently, since every pleasure
assuages sorrow, as stated above (Article 1), it follows that
sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
Reply to Objection 1: In either case there is a proof of
friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he
sorrows with the sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of
pleasure by reason of its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause
of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise
rather to pleasure.
And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
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