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Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue.
For a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now
hope has for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope
to obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between
two vices, as stated above (FS, Question 64, Article 4).
But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is
not a theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation,
it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous.
But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to
the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological
virtue.
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with
faith and charity, which are theological virtues.
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature,
divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place
hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above (Article 1) that hope has the
character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of
human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause,
in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause,
in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it
is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one
that has God for its object, as stated above (FS, Question 62,
Article 1), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it
hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first
efficient cause, as stated above (Article 4).
Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean
consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the
rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is
deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing
as a mean or extremes. Now a moral virtue is concerned with things
ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore it
is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On
the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule
not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object.
Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to
its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it
accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its principal
object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of
trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too
much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean
and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods.
So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal
object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine
assistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those
things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above
his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the
definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which
belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine
assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the
hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its
proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope,
as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above (Article 1).
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