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Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the
object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God
any end. Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite,
as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which
cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima
iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first
cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys.
viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 12:2): "That you
may prove what is the will of God."
I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since
will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual
existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by
its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its
natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when
it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural
perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual
natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible
form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to
seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every
intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there
is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is
intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is
His will.
Reply to Objection 1: Although nothing apart from God is His
end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by
Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as
shown above (Question 6, Article 3): for the end has the aspect
of good.
Reply to Objection 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part,
which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the
seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the
delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be
in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already
said, it is not distinct from His essence.
Reply to Objection 3: A will of which the principal object is a
good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the
divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since
the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than
itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and
willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he
said that the first mover moves itself.
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