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Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be changed,
whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by
human reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of
former times give place to others, if something better occurs.
Therefore the same should apply to human laws.
Objection 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for
the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found
possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have
ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore
it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs
to be enacted.
Objection 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of
man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters,
except by experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic.
ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for
something better to occur for legislation.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii,
5): "It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer
those traditions to be changed which we have received from the fathers
of old."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), human law is rightly
changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal.
But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself
prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the
observance of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general
custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave.
Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is
diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law
should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common
weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this
respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very great and
every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the
extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing
law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore
the jurist says [Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De
Constit. Princip.] that "in establishing new laws, there should
be evidence of the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law
which has long been considered just."
Reply to Objection 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason
alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule
followed hitherto should be changed. But "laws derive very great
force from custom," as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5):
consequently they should not be quickly changed.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be
changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great
benefit or in a case of great urgency, as stated above. This answer
applies also to the Third Objection.
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