|
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue.
For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis.
8:7, "She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and
fortitude." Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together
with the species contained under the same "general." Therefore
justice is not a general virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue,
so are temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude
is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice
in any way be reckoned a general virtue.
Objection 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated
above (Article 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor
cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed
against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that
"justice is every virtue."
I answer that, Justice, as stated above (Article 2) directs man
in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways:
first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his
relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a
community, serves all those who are included in that community.
Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to
another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are
included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts
to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that
whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the
whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such
virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain
other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which
justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in
so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that
justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to
direct to the common good, as stated above (FS, Question 90,
Article 2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled
general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in
harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the
common good.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the
other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall
state further on (Articles 7,12).
Reply to Objection 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive
appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers
are appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are
cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the
intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good
as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence
justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to
another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal
justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a
general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general
sin; hence it is written (1 Jn. 3:4) that all "sin is
iniquity."
|
|