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Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend
on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly
it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin
is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes
weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that
is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not
derive its gravity from its cause.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin;
wherefore a gloss on Rm. 7:7, "For I had not known
concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now the greater the
concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin.
Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its
cause.
Objection 3: Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a
virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin.
Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin:
so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused
from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously.
Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its
cause.
On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is
increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous
the sin.
I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two
causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of
sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as
a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Mt. 7:18, "A good
tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is,
the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin,
the more grievously does man sin.
The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being
those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must
make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord
with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper
object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more
grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to
sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will
to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural
inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment
of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason
(e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will,
(e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the
gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much
so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer
sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving
cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause
diminishes the sin, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the
movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence,
there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a
passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a
greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the
movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins,
being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more
grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other
hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of
reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence,
the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is
redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the cause which
renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of
sin, as stated.
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