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Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from
Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is
not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
Himself.
Objection 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the
appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If,
therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be
moved by another; which is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he
seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and
completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything
apart from Himself.
Objection 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to
the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and
things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is
manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But
this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from
Himself.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This
is the will of God, your sanctification."
I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart
from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
(Article 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not
only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed,
and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their
own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every
agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It
pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far
as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this
pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in
some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they
are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it
appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to
others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to
be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things
as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that
other things should be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence
essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different
ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what
has already been said (Question 13, Article 4). For when we
say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as
we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is
not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end,
the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that
moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the
sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so
wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for
the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow
that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own
essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices
the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
essence knows other things.
Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing
the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and
simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through
its own goodness.
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