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Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers
derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we
have shown above (Question 18, Article 4). Therefore the act
also of the will derives goodness not only from the object but also from
the end.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only
from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above
(Question 18, Article 3). But according to the diversity of
circumstances there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act
of the will: for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he
ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he
ought not. Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only on the
object, but also on the circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of
the will, as stated above (Question 6, Article 8). But it
would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on
the circumstances. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will
depend on the circumstances, and not only on the object.
On the contrary, An action does not take its species from the
circumstances as such, as stated above (Question 18, Article
10, ad 2). But good and evil are specific differences of the act
of the will, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the goodness
and malice of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the
object alone.
I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more
simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first
things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one
principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human
actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness
and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not
something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:
because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to
its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on
that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and
that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are
accidents, as it were, of the act.
Reply to Objection 1: The end is the object of the will, but not
of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the
goodness derived from the object, does not differ from that which is
derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers;
except perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another,
and one act of the will on another.
Reply to Objection 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on
some good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when
it is said that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought
not, this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this
circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the
will is not fixed on something good: since to will to do something when
it ought not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so
that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it
is impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one
ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in
so far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from
willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that
time. And then evil results, not from his willing that particular
good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the
other circumstances.
Reply to Objection 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of
the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that
is to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act
which he wills.
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