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Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over
all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must
be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that
he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his
subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence
over all things.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things
to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good.
But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good;
wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence.
If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things,
all secondary causes would be withdrawn.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that,
"It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for
example, vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph.
xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God.
Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.
On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath
He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which
He made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20):
"Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."
I answer that, Two things belong to providence---namely, the type
of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution
of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of
these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has
in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and
whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the
power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has
beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second,
there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs
things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His
power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the
dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's
opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii,
3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one
which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has
provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as
regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second
providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated
and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the
heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal
things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human
affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed
between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei,
1, 2: viii, 14).
Reply to Objection 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have
ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the
plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in
himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it
considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.
Reply to Objection 2: God's immediate provision over everything
does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the
executors of His order, as was said above (Question 19, Articles
5,8).
Reply to Objection 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile
things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is
better and higher; for we cannot understand many things
simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will
towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything
simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the
direction of evil.
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