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Objection 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For
every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original
sin, for it is not contracted through origin nor is it actual sin, for
it may be altogether without act, as stated above (FS, Question
71, Article 5) when we were treating of sins in general.
Therefore omission is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission
sometimes is not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated
after taking a vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is
under an obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say
Mass, and is prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not
always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any
special sin begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission,
since one is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the
omission occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore
omission is not a special sin.
Objection 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special
virtue. But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which
omission is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be
omitted, and because justice to which it would seem more particularly
opposed, always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as
stated above (Article 1, ad 2), while omission may be altogether
without act. Therefore omission is not a special sin.
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . .
. who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin."
I answer that, omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not
indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the
aspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the
thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the
due is something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the
same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above (Question
58, Articles 6,7), omission is a special sin distinct from the
sins which are opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good,
which is the opposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice,
distinct from avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too
is omission distinct from transgression.
Reply to Objection 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not
as though it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the
negation of an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense
non-action is a kind of action, as stated above (FS, Question
71, Article 6, ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such
good as is due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the
impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what
he cannot. Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is
guilty of an omission, not through not having virginity, but through
not repenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to
fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound to
say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be
lacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound
to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and
cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does what
he can. The same applies to other similar cases.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed
to negative precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of
omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of
good. Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed
time, and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen
that then one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is
without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated
above (ad 2; FS, Question 71, Article 5). On the other
hand if this inability is due to some previous fault of his (for
instance, if a man gets drunk at night, and cannot get up for matins,
as he ought to), some say that the sin of omission begins when he
engages in an action that is illicit and incompatible with the act to
which he is bound. But this does not seem to be true, for supposing
one were to rouse him by violence and that he went to matins, he would
not omit to go, so that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not
an omission, but the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say
that the omission begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time
comes for the action; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause
by reason of which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as
stated above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but
only under the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is
required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be
sinful and demeritorious, because "good results from an entire cause,
whereas evil arises from each single defect" [Dionysius, De Div.
Nom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas
an omission does not.
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