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Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is
higher, so to speak, than the rest."
Objection 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and
good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is
the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than
his possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is
this that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue:
whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external
things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i):
"Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to
a good man."
Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19):
"Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to
others." Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude.
Therefore it is a greater virtue.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things
that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good":
wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is
man's good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence,
since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while
justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the
order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues
safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they
lead man away from reason's good. As to the order of the latter,
fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has
the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason: and
after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel
all others in hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing
essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before
safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the
cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude
third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other
virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is
useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life.
Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat
of fortitude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is
applicable both to warlike and to civil matters."
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather
than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured
according to its goodness rather than its difficulty.
Reply to Objection 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers
of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise
awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says
(De Offic. i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of
injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress
the weaker."
The Fourth argument is granted.
Reply to Objection 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain
particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to
fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most
beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace."
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