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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to
be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which
it is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the
Father; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a
property of the Father.
Objection 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative,
or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not
begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not
begotten; neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten
belongs also to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father.
But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies
imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows
that the Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.
Objection 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify
relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies
substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But
the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in
substance. Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.
Objection 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone.
Since, then, there are more than one in God proceeding from
another, there is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being
from another. Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.
Objection 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person
begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his
opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be
unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be
unproceeding.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one
---that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten---namely, by
the property in each one respectively of innascibility and origin."
I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary
principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before
or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the
Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.
Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one
way as the first "principle," by reason of its having a relation to
what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a
"first" principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus
therefore the Father is known both by paternity and by common
spiration, as regards the persons proceeding from Himself. But as
the principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that He
is not from another; and this belongs to the property of
innascibility, signified by this word "begotten."
Reply to Objection 1: Some there are who say that innascibility,
signified by the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is
not a negative term only, but either that it means both these things
together---namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is
the principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or
also His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not
seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct
from paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is
included in the common. For source and authority signify in God
nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with
Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports the
negation of passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has
the same meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow that
"unbegotten" is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and
simple things are notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is
defined as what has no part.
Reply to Objection 2: "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a
negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy
Ghost is unbegotten," that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise
"unbegotten" may be taken in a kind of privation sense, but not as
implying any imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways;
in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another,
even though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance,
if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally
belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so
called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of
its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third
sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in
which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense,
"unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it
may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain person
of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the same
nature is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be
applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term
proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the
name "unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of
another person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus
of principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in
the term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from
another; and not only that He is not from another by way only of
generation. In this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at
all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a
subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine essence, of which
it may be said that it is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from
another---namely, from the Father.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 9), "unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as
"uncreated"; and thus it applies to the substance, for thereby does
the created substance differ from the uncreated. In another sense it
signifies what is not begotten, and in this sense it is a relative
term; just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as
"not man" is reduced to the genus of substance, and "not white" to
the genus of quality. Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in
God, "unbegotten" belongs also to relation. Thus it does not
follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from
the Son begotten; but only by relation; that is, as the relation of
Son is denied of the Father.
Reply to Objection 4: In every genus there must be something
first; so in the divine nature there must be some one principle which
is not from another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two
innascibles is to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine
natures. Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one
God, so there cannot be two innascibles." And this especially
because, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other,
and they would not be distinguished by relative opposition: therefore
they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature.
Reply to Objection 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is
not from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the
nativity of the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the
Holy Ghost; both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no
special name, as stated above (Question 27, Article 4, ad
3), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the
generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father that
He is begotten, although He is the principle of generation, it
follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession
of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of
generation, but proceeds from the person begotten.
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