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Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For
providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of
prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong
to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel.
Therefore providence cannot belong to God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But
providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing
things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.
Objection 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But
providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both
the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.
On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou,
Father, governest all things by providence."
I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For
all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was
shown above (Question 6, Article 4). In created things good is
found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their
order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said
above, is the divine goodness (Question 21, Article 4). This
good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God.
Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and
thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in
Him, as is clear from what has gone before (Question 19, Article
4), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards
their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things
ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is
the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are
directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of
the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the
understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the
future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether
in regard to oneself---as for instance, a man is said to be
prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in
regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in
which sense it is said (Mt. 24:45), "a faithful and wise
servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way
prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God
Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the
last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in
God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv,
6) that "Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the
Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may
refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to
the type of the order of parts in the whole.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that
'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged"
[FS, Question 57, Article 6]. Whence, though to take
counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an
inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command
as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which
He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. 148:6:
"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this
manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the
same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is
called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but
from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel
come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).
Reply to Objection 2: Two things pertain to the care of
providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called
providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is
termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is
temporal.
Reply to Objection 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but
presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about
things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence
presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if
Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this
would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and
intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above (Question
19).
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