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Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific
passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by
their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something
delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of
concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11).
Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible
faculty.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu.
33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that
it is not distinct from love. But all specific passions are distinct
from one another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in
the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty
there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above
(Question 23, Article 4). But no specific passion of the
concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "good when desired gives rise
to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like manner, the
evil we apprehend makes us fear, the evil that is present makes us
sad": from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is
fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupiscible,
but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific
passion of the concupiscible faculty.
On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to
pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Hence it is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a
specific passion.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1; Question 23,
Article 1), the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the
common object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various
concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of
that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise from the very
nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active power. The
diversity, derived from the nature of the active object, causes a
material difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its
active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which
the passions differ specifically.
Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs
according as it is really present, or absent: because, according as
it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas,
according as it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards
it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch
as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it
causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty
to itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it
makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence
is a passion differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But
concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ "in number."
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasurable good is the object of
concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the
sensible, considered as past, is the object of memory. For these
particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of
the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particular things.
Reply to Objection 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not
essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but
an effect of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking
covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in
respect of good to come: so that it includes both love and hope.
Reply to Objection 3: The passion which is directly contrary to
concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as
concupiscence in regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards
the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope
is sometimes called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned
as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the
appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard
good and evil as arduous.
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