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Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For
it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who
knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But
God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all;
thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not
know His own essence.
Objection 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and
movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge
also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known
is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers,
or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin.
iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not
understand Himself.
Objection 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our
intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself,
only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii.
Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He
understands other things.
On the contrary, It is written: "The things that are of God no
man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11).
I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof
whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an
external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the
term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation,
resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the
operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii)
that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act
is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a
thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the
sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it
follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or
intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.
Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure
act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that
He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with
our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the
intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect,
as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the
intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus
God understands Himself through Himself.
Reply to Objection 1: Return to its own essence means only that a
thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by
giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it
returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore
those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of
organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses;
whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his
essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be
self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He
supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally,
according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or
passion, as stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a
movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to
another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something
perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible
object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect
which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a
state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and
assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the
likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected
thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the
divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by
the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own
perfection, and its own intelligible object.
Reply to Objection 3: Existence in nature does not belong to
primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act
by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to
intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is
in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter
is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised
concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands
itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for
it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands
also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the
intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of
existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He
understands Himself through Himself.
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