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Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts
of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above
(Article 2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes
this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Question
120, Article 2). Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences;
whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger
and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4):
"A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in
cruelty." Now this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then
an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and
meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that
"clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking
revenge." Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons
clemency a part of temperance.
I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so
far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence
the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and
name of justice consist in a certain "equality," those of fortitude
in a certain "strength of mind," those of temperance in a certain
"restraint," inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness
likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates
punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above
(Articles 1,2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed
to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be
parts thereof.
Reply to Objection 1: Two points must be considered in the
mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in
accordance with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to
the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The
other point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so
that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This
belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia
ii, 3) that "it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of
taking revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain
sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may
be painful to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii,
3) that "clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on
the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in
one who fears not to pain others.
Reply to Objection 2: The annexation of secondary to principal
virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind
of form of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and
clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they
agree not in matter.
Reply to Objection 3: "Unsoundness" is corruption of
"soundness." Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body
lapsing from the condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of
mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human
species. This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man
loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as
when a man loses that humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally
friendly towards all other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The
unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to
prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of
others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this
account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to
clemency.
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