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Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by
habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [Lib. Sentent.
Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Rm. 14:23, "All that is not of
faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin:
and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of
the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved
people." Now faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is
caused in us by God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are
saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by
habituation.
Objection 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they
are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of
God, according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not
otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can
any virtues be caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of
God.
Objection 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the
perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its
cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede
it.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is
more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil
acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good
acts.
I answer that, We have spoken above (Question 51, Articles
2,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and
speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we
must take note that, as stated above (Question 55, Articles
3,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since
the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as
Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight,
and measure," as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good must
needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is
twofold, as stated above (Question 19, Articles 3,4), viz.
human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher
rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human
reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not
hold.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined
according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts:
inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the
aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which
directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human
reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is
reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence
Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the
words, "which God works in us without us" (Super Ps. 118,
Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection
holds good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely
infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state.
But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired
virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as
stated above (Question 49, Article 3): and one sinful act does
not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a
habit, that is directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man
cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally,
yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may
abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most
opposed to reason. There are also certain mortal sins which man can
nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed
to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace.
This, however, will be more fully explained later (Question
109, Article 4).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Article 1; Question
51, Article 1), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue
pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent than
the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of
speculative principles is more excellent than the science of
conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent
than the rectification of the appetite which results through the
appetite partaking of reason, which rectification belongs to moral
virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher
principles, can cause acquired human virtues.
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