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Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are
natural to us and are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his
sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse,
if it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on Mt.
4:23, "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them
natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man
possesses naturally."
Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with
reason, as was clearly shown above (Question 55, Article 4, ad
2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since
reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in man by
nature.
Objection 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be
natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written
(Job 31:18): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it
came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man
by nature.
On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men,
and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts
remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not
in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by
nature.
I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been
maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for
instance, who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [Anaxagoras;
FP, Question 45, Article 8; Question 65, Article 4].
Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for
instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some
separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from
within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly
from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent.
In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that
they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would
pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science
and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body,
are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being
polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that
they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active
intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and
virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but
not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in
which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his
specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And,
since each thing derives its species from its form, and its
individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his
rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him
in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his
specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the
particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his
individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his
body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a
way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this
particular soul.
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so
in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to
be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both
knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral
virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for
good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the
individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the
body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues:
because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of
the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped
or hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the
rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In
this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for
fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both
intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude,
inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one,
while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular
mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the various
matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and
according to various circumstances.
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature,
according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection,
except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch
as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the
sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from
birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately,
another for some other virtue.
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