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Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a
part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is
required. Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares
(De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to
prudence which directs the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to
the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures
ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and
consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be
accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight.
Objection 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible.
But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore
caution does not belong to prudence.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how
you walk cautiously."
I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of
these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and
evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so
that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we
may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the
hindrance of acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to
avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is
different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although
they both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some
are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and
against them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided
altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that
occur rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in
number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take
precautions against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to
prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm
thereby.
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