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Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be
framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made
good thereby, as stated above (Question 92, Article 1). But
men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of
admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore
there was no need to frame laws.
Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
4), "men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But
animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which contained in
laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice
to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in
addition.
Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of
human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above
(Question 90, Articles 1,2). But since human actions are
about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to
the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient
consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them.
Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by
the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore
there was no need of human laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were
made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that
innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the
dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But
these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary
that human laws should be made.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 63, Article 1;
Question 94, Article 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue;
but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some
kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in
his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain
beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his
hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to
whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is
difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this
training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in
withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is
inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being
trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from
another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to
those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good
natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God,
paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some
are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable
to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force
and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from
evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by
being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what
hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind
of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the
discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and
virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of
animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he
be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason
to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other
animals are unable to do.
Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly
to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are
evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1),
"it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be
decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it
is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to
find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single
case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand
what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be
pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what
is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by
considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in
the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of
things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or
some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every
man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary,
whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very
few matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be
covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as
the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning
something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
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