|
Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than
Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (Article 5),
God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in
Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and
universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal
cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge.
Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by
proper knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the
divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created
essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created
essence, as said above (Question 12/Article 2). Therefore
neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus
as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know
what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is,"
which is to have proper knowledge of it.
Objection 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only
through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His
essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper
ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a
general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper
ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them
not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now
God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches
"even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also
and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the
heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb.
4:12,13).
I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows
things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so
far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the
principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in
so far as they are beings.
But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in
particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal
and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular;
as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from
Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other
than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that
His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither
would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above
(Question 4, Article 1). We must therefore hold that God knows
things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far
as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from
the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show
that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as,
for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines
that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know
all colors.
Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as
regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect,
that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle,
not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as
regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is
not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the
diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of
the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this
kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by
proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it
is otherwise. For it was shown above (Question 4, Article 2)
that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and
is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is
common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection,
but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and
understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished
from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent.
Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own
species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not
only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what
distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains
all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all
other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is
to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating)
lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man
to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers
contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect
acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge;
thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper
knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three
also by proper knowledge.
As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection
contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can
know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature
proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the
divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself
perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can
be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being
perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest
that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction
from each other.
Reply to Objection 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower,
may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports
the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense
it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known
according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not
know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the
image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone
according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a
knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it
has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its
(mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a
stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect,
inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows
what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be
understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the
knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of
the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the
thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of
knowledge.
We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in
Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in
their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each
one is in Him.
Reply to Objection 2: The created essence is compared to the
essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the
created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the
divine essence, but rather the converse.
Reply to Objection 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal
manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels
all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each
thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures
participate in, and imitate it.
|
|