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Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as
God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under
desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite,
whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in
such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall
under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the
finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite.
Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God.
Objection 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without
sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature
naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God,
not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not
thereby sin.
Objection 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of
wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being
the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only
things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation.
Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.
On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Is.
14:13,14), "I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be
like the Most High." And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test.
cxiii) says that being "inflated with pride, he wished to be called
God."
I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as
God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality;
secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first
way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible:
and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion
fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by
failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And
even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural
desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire of
preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be
changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of a lower
order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an ass does
not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised, it would
cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for
one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher
grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of
the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he
could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident
that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in
degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is
impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a
higher; and still more to covet equality with God.
To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways.
In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be
likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be
Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in
proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he
would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way,
as of his own, and not of God's power. In another way one may
desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not natural to
one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is
proper to God; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this
way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to
resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he
would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature can exist
except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance
with God in this respect---by desiring, as his last end of
beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own
nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which
is attained by God's grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that
likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by
the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according
to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who
says [De casu diaboli, iv.] that "he sought that to which he would
have come had he stood fast." These two views in a manner coincide;
because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own
power, whereas this is proper to God alone.
Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of
another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have
dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto
God.
From this we have the answer to all the objections.
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