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Objection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through
habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through
certain malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes
that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an
idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed
through certain malice.
Objection 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the
acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But
the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain
malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed
through certain malice.
Objection 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain
malice, he is glad after having done it, according to Prov.
2:14: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in
most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what
we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason
of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after
committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious
habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins
that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.
On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that
is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to
which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with
regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is
committed through certain malice.
I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one
who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not
necessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person
who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something we use
when we will," as stated above (Question 50, Article 1). And
thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break
forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason
altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being
that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it may
happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that
habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through
ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin
through certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever
is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of
something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to
him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very
thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something
that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a
spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in
respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice.
Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through
certain malice.
Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good,
consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil,
not simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit
thereof is not a simple but a relative evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like
species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they
differ from them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference
between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through
passion.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for
what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since
he is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by
means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen
that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through
the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his
sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of
his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.
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