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Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of
pleasure. Because, as stated above (Question 31, Article 1),
the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of
pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that
pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a
thing already in existence. Now that which is being moved towards
something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in
its regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every
movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a
cause of pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and
fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and
fatiguing are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not
a cause of pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which
is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to,
are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11).
Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What
means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to
Thyself, and some things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee?
What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows
alternately displeased and reconciled?" From these words we gather
that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and
therefore movement seems to cause pleasure.
I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e.
the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him;
and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of
these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel
pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is
changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time
is not suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable
to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the
pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the
continued action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a
person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now
the natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore
when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of
one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes
pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes
pleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect:
when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole,
change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and
another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine
says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables
stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the whole.
And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not
exist together, all would please collectively more than they do
severally, if all could be perceived collectively."
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of
any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its
delight at once---to such a one change will afford no delight. And
the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of
being continual.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet
perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to
have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has
something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of
pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it
exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure,
but by removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so
far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature.
But the movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from
custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural
mode of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus
from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become
pleasant.
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