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Objection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as
the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is
natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the
jurist [Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the
right of nations is that which is in use among all nations."
Therefore the right of nations is the natural right.
Objection 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are
naturally slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2).
Now "slavery belongs to the right of nations," as Isidore states
(Etym. v, 4). Therefore the right of nations is a natural
right.
Objection 3: Further, right as stated above (Article 2) is
divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations is not a
positive right, since all nations never agreed to decree anything by
common agreement. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is
either natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the
right of nations is distinct from natural right.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), the natural right or
just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate
with another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first,
according as it is considered absolutely: thus a male by its very
nature is commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a
parent is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a
thing is naturally commensurate with another person, not according as
it is considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from
it, for instance the possession of property. For if a particular
piece of land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it
should belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered
in respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use
of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one
and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii,
2).
Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a
thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is common
to us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration.
But the right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense,
as the jurist [Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says because
"the latter is common to all animals, while the former is common to
men only." On the other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with
what results from it, is proper to reason, wherefore this same is
natural to man in respect of natural reason which dictates it. Hence
the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i,
9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all men, is observed by
all equally, and is called the right of nations." This suffices for
the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this
particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based,
not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is
useful to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be
helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2).
Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in
the second way, but not in the first.
Reply to Objection 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which
are according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate
equality, it follows that they need no special institution, for they
are instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority
quoted above
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