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Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of
the damned. For pity proceeds from charity [SS, Question 30];
and charity will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will
most especially pity the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking
pity as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions,
wherefore He is said to be merciful.
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his
unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness.
Therefore they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.
I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways:
first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed
there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the
reason's choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them,
except by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the
reason's choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled:
wherefore in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not
wish to be dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as
sinners are in this world they are in such a state that without
prejudice to the Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of
unhappiness and sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is
possible to have compassion on them both by the choice of the
will---in which sense God, the angels and the blessed are said to
pity them by desiring their salvation---and by passion, in which way
they are pitied by the good men who are in the state of wayfarers. But
in the future state it will be impossible for them to be taken away from
their unhappiness: and consequently it will not be possible to pity
their sufferings according to right reason. Therefore the blessed in
glory will have no pity on the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is
possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's
unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since
it would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He
succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their afflictions
in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as though He
pitied the damned except perhaps in punishing them less than they
deserve.
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