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Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those
which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial
precepts take their name from "judgment." But there are many things
that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to
judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which
directed man in his relations to his neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the
moral precepts, as stated above (Question 99, Article 4). But
there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as
is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table.
Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as
to his neighbor.
Objection 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God,
so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above
(Question 99, Article 4; Question 101, Article 1). But
among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself,
such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have
already spoken (Question 102, Article 6, ad 1,6).
Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as
to his neighbor.
On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other
works of a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment
between man and man." But judicial precepts are so called from
"judgment." Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those
which directed the relations between man and man.
I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above
(Question 95, Article 2; Question 99, Article 4), in
every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of
reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to
be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since
human morals are based on reason. At the same time there are other
precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of
reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an
obligation of something due or undue); but from some institution,
Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral
precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine
institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they
are called "ceremonial" precepts: but when they refer to man's
relations to other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence
there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz.
first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly,
that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in
virtue of their institution.
Reply to Objection 1: Judgments emanate through the official
pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in
whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at
the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also
voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and
whatever matters concern the community at large and the government
thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which
concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the
ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject
to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in respect of those
precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive
their binding force from the mere dictate of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to
God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when
it is quickened by faith; such as that God is to be loved and
worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding
force except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is
concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but
also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices
to Him and worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their
end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of
ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine
worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to
his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his
neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, since
a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher
says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts
ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the
reason, which is the principal in moral matters, holds the same
position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince
or judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that,
since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason
than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man
is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is
directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial
than judicial precepts in the Law.
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