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Objection 1: It seems that it will be impossible for every one to
read all that is in another's conscience. For the knowledge of those
who rise again will not be clearer than that of the angels, equality
with whom is promised us after the resurrection (Mt. 22:30).
Now angels cannot read one another's thoughts in matters dependent on
the free-will, wherefore they need to speak in order to notify such
things to one another [FP, Question 107]. Therefore after
rising again we shall be unable to read what is contained in another's
conscience.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known either in itself,
or in its cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or demerits
contained in a person's conscience cannot be known by another in
themselves, because God alone enters the heart and reads its secrets.
Neither will it be possible for them to be known in their cause, since
all will not see God Who alone can act on the will, whence merits and
demerits proceed. Nor again will it be possible to know them from
their effect, since there will be many demerits, which through being
wholly blotted out by repentance will leave no effect remaining.
Therefore it will not be possible for every one to know all that is in
another's conscience.
Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi in Ep. ad
Hebr.), as we have quoted before (Sent. iv, D, 17): "If
thou remember thy sins now, and frequently confess them before Cod and
beg pardon for them, thou wilt very soon blot them out; but if thou
forget them, thou wilt then remember them unwillingly, when they will
be made public, and declared before all thy friends and foes, and in
the presence of the holy angels." Hence it follows that this
publication will be the punishment of man's neglect in omitting to
confess his sins. Therefore the sins which a man has confessed will
not be made known to others.
Objection 4: Further, it is a relief to know that one has had many
associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof. If therefore
every one were to know the sin of another, each sinner's shame would
be much diminished, which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not
know the sins of all.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, "will . . . bring
to light the hidden things of darkness," says: "Deeds and thoughts
both good and evil will then be revealed and made known to all."
Further, the past sins of all the good will be equally blotted out.
Yet we know the sins of some saints, for instance of Magdalen,
Peter, and David. Therefore in like manner the sins of the other
elect will be known, and much more those of the damned.
I answer that, At the last and general judgment it behooves the
Divine justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to appear evidently
to all. Now the sentence of one who condemns or rewards cannot be
just, unless it be delivered according to merits and demerits.
Therefore just as it behooves both judge and jury to know the merits of
a case, in order to deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in
order that the sentence appear to be just, that all who know the
sentence should be acquainted with the merits. Hence, since every one
will know of his reward or condemnation, so will every one else know of
it, and consequently as each one will recall his own merits or
demerits, so will he be cognizant of those of others. This is the
more probable and more common opinion, although the Master (Sent.
iv, D, 43) says the contrary, namely that a man's sins blotted
out by repentance will not be made known to others at the judgment.
But it would follow from this that neither would his repentance for
these sins be perfectly known, which would detract considerably from
the glory of the saints and the praise due to God for having so
mercifully delivered them.
Reply to Objection 1: All the preceding merits or demerits will
come to a certain amount in the glory or unhappiness of each one rising
again. Consequently through eternal things being seen, all things in
their consciences will be visible, especially as the Divine power will
conduce to this so that the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.
Reply to Objection 2: It will be possible for a man's merits or
demerits to be made known by their effects as stated above (Article
1, ad 1), or by the power of God, although the power of the
created intellect is not sufficient for this.
Reply to Objection 3: The manifestation of his sins to the
confusion of the sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to
confess them. But that the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be to
their confusion or shame, as neither does it bring confusion to Mary
Magdalen that her sins are publicly recalled in the Church, because
shame is "fear of disgrace," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii), and this will be impossible in the blessed. But this
manifestation will bring them great glory on account of the penance they
did, even as the confessor hails a man who courageously confesses great
crimes. Sins are said to be blotted out because God sees them not for
the purpose of punishing them.
Reply to Objection 4: The sinner's confusion will not be
diminished, but on the contrary increased, through his seeing the sins
of others, for in seeing that others are blameworthy he will all the
more acknowledge himself to be blamed. For that confusion be
diminished by a cause of this kind is owing to the fact that shame
regards the esteem of men, who esteem more lightly that which is
customary. But then confusion will regard the esteem of God, which
weighs every sin according to the truth, whether it be the sin of one
man or of many.
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