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Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For
it is written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and
prudence, and justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue"
for "fortitude." Since then the term "virtue" is common to all
virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i):
"Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor
of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an
inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of
dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding
covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the same
further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to
any special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from
firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in
Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other
virtues.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 61, Articles
3,4), the term "fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as
simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a
general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue
to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to
denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it
is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers.
Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate
facing of dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fortitude is
reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo
i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power.
Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting
corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated
in Metaph. v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more
common, the term "virtue," as denoting the extreme limit of such a
power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is
nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the
extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more
specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to
which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as
denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds.
Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it
helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm
in things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in
consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first
sense.
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