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Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now
it is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is
written (Rm. 10:14,15): "How shall they believe Him, of
whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?
And how shall they preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not
bound to believe anything explicitly.
Objection 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so
are we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of
charity, and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is
evidenced by the precept of Our Lord (Mt. 5:39): "If one
strike thee on one cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others
of the same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe
anything explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe
whatever God proposes to be believed.
Objection 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience,
according to Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all
nations." Now the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep
certain fixed precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to
obey, according to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not
troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments." Therefore it seems
enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe whatever
God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them
that seek Him."
I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to
fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining
salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (FS, Question
60, Article 5) depends on the relation of the habit to its
object. Again two things may be considered in the object of any
virtue; namely, that which is the proper and direct object of that
virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object
properly so called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the
object of fortitude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at
the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet
that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another with his
sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of fortitude, but
indirectly.
Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of
a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in
its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment
of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in
those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the
proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and
at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of
faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above
(Question 1, Article 8): while the indirect and secondary object
comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for
instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of
Jesse, and so forth.
Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to
other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly,
but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he
is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine
Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things
explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the
doctrine of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: If we understand those things alone to be in
a man's power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are
bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing
grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe
the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for
this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully
given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a
punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as
Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [Ep. cxc; De
Praed. Sanct. viii.]).
Reply to Objection 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable
things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely,
God and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of
charity which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly
speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to
authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper
and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
or consequent to that proper and direct object.
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