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Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of
soul and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a
human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in
Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But
this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal.
Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the
hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to Articles 2,3.
Objection 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the
nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iii, 3), that "we must not conceive a common species in the Lord
Jesus Christ." Therefore there was no union of soul and body in
Him.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole
purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened
by the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of
life. Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.
On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its
union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated,
as the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be
born of a Virgin" [Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii,
Lauds]. Therefore in Christ there was a union of soul and body.
I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as
being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil.
2:7), "being made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs
essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body,
for the form does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it
becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation
through which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that
in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is
heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ's humanity.
Reply to Objection 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of
weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ,
viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or
hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body
in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because
the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But
in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something
higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from
the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person
does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already
existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the
union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for
its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue
and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the
species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so
in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because
of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational
soul, as has been said above (Article 2, ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two
ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one
individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only
inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and
considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all
individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it
exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He
would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that
human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of
man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have
assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Lk. 24:39), "A
spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have." Neither can
it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all
the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed
all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De
Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature "in atomo,"
i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is
a suppositum or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son
of God.
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to
human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature
(viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the
two natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a
third something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would
become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he
adds: "For there was not generated, neither will there ever be
generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and
in the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man."
Reply to Objection 3: There are two principles of corporeal life:
one the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the
principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for
since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says
(De Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form,
so likewise the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not
live by the Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
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