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Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the
judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his
deeds, according to Mt. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you
shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured
to you again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation.
Objection 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given
to someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice
this equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend
chiefly on what a person has done for the good of the community; while
in commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has
suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation
in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the
just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
Objection 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is
based on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for
he who does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now
voluntary and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not
diversify the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not
depend on us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the
same as retaliation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the
just is not always the same as retaliation.
I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion
repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to
injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his
neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This
kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): "He
shall render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to
take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows
that secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes
loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss
is also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox
or a sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox
and four sheep for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to
voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides,
although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated
above (Question 59, Article 3).
In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of
equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely
that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not
always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action.
Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one
who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species
that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only
struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when
a man despoils another of his property against the latter's will, the
action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing,
because the man who caused another's loss, himself would lose
nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several times
over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but also
the common weal, the security of whose protection he has infringed.
Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary
commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another
man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much
greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize passion
and action in commutations according to a certain proportionate
commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence
retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no
place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive justice
we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between
passion and action (whence the expression 'contrapassum'), but
according to proportion between things and persons, as stated above
(Article 2).
Reply to Objection 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in
accordance with the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as
rewards are apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man who has served the community is
paid for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not
distributive, justice. Because distributive justice considers the
equality, not between the thing received and the thing done, but
between the thing received by one person and the thing received by
another according to the respective conditions of those persons.
Reply to Objection 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the
injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing.
Hence it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a
difference, not on part, but on the part of the thing.
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