|
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
themselves, and not by the relation.
Objection 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to
its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality.
But "hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Objection 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is
relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary
distinction. Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the
relations.
Objection 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be
the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes
distinction, which comes into its definition; for a relation is
essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive
principle in God cannot be relation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone
multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons."
I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found
something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence,
we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the
divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although
these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of
signification; for "origin" is signified by way of act, as
"generation"; and "relation" by way of the form, as
"paternity."
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said
that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may
say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the
former begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the
relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the
hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the
properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions
are caused by the material principles.
This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly,
because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to
both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their
form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic,
but means the way from something, or to something; as generation
signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the
generator. Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the
generator should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the
generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes
them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is
nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence,
since the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the
persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly:
because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood
as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence
remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must
constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the
properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,
inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is
the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract
and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin
that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an
active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it
presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as
"nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet
constituting the person.
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in
both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of
understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations;
whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also
the hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting"
signifies property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies
the relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis;
and this term "Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which
is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis.
Reply to Objection 1: The persons are the subsisting relations
themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine
persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.
Reply to Objection 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as
regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but
only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their
distinction.
Reply to Objection 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer
it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible
distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which
distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.
Reply to Objection 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the
subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is
subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction.
For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another,
the word "another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but
simultaneous in the order of nature.
|
|