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Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as
vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things:
wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But
magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue
rather than a vice.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2)
that "careful reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is
apparently praiseworthy, since man's good is to be in accordance with
reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore
meanness is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2)
that "a mean man is loth to spend money." But this belongs to
covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct
vice from the others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
special vice opposed to magnificence.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 1, Article 3;
FS, Question 18, Article 6), moral acts take their species
from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that
end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvificus] because he
intends to do something little [parvum]. Now according to the
Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little
are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do
something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of
work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as
regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense.
Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of
his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense,
which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that "the
magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent
result." On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to
spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
"he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of this he intends to
produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a
little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher
says that "the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the
good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is unwilling
to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe
the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now
the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in
accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to
the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated
in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little
things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great
or little things: hence meanness is a vice.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
5), "fear makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful
in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his
goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not
praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does
not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the
contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate
affections.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in
common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with
pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous
man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that
illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great
expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore
meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are
sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm
one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful."
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