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Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the
virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and
the publican (Lk. 18), says [Eclog. hom. vii de Humil.
Animi.] that "if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered
by sin that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride,
whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand
among the angels by the judgment seat of God." Hence it is clear
that humility is set above justice. Now justice is either the most
exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest
of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.,
Serm. S. 10, C1): "Are you thinking of raising the great
fabric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of
humility." Now this would seem to imply that humility is the
foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently it is greater than the
other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater
reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that
humbleth himself shall be exalted" (Lk. 14:11). Therefore
humility is the greatest of virtues.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
16), "Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct
through the human nature which He assumed." Now He especially
proposed His humility for our example, saying (Mt. 11:29):
"Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart." Moreover,
Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the "lesson proposed to us in
the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God." Therefore
humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.
On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to
Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity."
Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.
I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of
reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:
wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the
last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered in
reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as
to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by
participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this
ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now
humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all
matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special
matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the
intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after
justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.
Reply to Objection 1: Humility is not set before justice, but
before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a
virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through
humility: for it is said of the publican (Lk. 18:14) that
through the merit of his humility "he went down into his house
justified." Hence Chrysostom says [De incompr. Nat. Dei,
Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one
harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and you
will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but
by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by
the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is,
by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that
which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the
foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now
the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way
of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,
inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man
submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence
it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and
giveth grace to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the
foundation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among
virtues directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the
first step towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6,
"He that cometh to God must believe." In this sense faith is the
foundation in a more excellent way than humility.
Reply to Objection 3: To him that despises earthly things,
heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to
those who despise earthly riches, according to Mt. 6:19,20,
"Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to
yourselves treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations are
promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to Mt. 4:5,
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." In the
same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility
alone merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly
uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [Serm.
cccli]): "Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever
abased, for it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not
imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily
uplifting."
Reply to Objection 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed
humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to
man's spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and
spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great
in earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to
our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that
outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were,
a disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine
goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so
charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are
greater than humility.
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