|
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to
covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject.
But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore
prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end,
as stated above (FS, Question 62, Article 3). Now
prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the
sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially is it
directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Lk. 15:13) of
the prodigal son that he "wasted his substance living riotously."
Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance and
insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1)
that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which
we give here the name of covetousness.
I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to
virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and
prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency.
Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by
loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by
being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external
action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in
retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes
deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it
is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the
same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more
from what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which
observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving
and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality
regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said
to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in
giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a
man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same
time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of
necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of
his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to
covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he
gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares
not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous
in different respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of
money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving
for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but
sometimes through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and
sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, he
inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on
other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to
which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through
taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of
the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many
a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate."
|
|