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Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the
name of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex.
20:7: "Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature,"
so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the
words of Dt. 5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . .
thy God in vain, " adds, i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood
or stone," as though they forbade a false confession of faith,
which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes
superstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept
should have preceded the first, whereby superstition is forbidden.
Objection 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes
---for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and
generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to
Col. 3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . .
do ye in the name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the
taking of God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the
precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the
precept, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in
vain," namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would
seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without
judgment. But false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust
swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous.
Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them.
Objection 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an
insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy
and other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
Objection 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should
not have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of .
. . thy God in vain."
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is
necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him
in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two
ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to
religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains
to superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence,
when, to wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of
irreligion, as stated above (Question 97, in the preamble, and in
the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders religion by
preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when
a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same
time give due worship to God, according to Is. 28:20, "The
bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i.e. either the true
God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, "and a short
covering cannot cover both." On the other hand, irreligion hinders
religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has acknowledged
Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to
worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.
For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before
the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal
explanation is that which is given Dt. 5:11: "Thou shalt not
take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on
that which is not."
Reply to Objection 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of
the name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in
confirmation of a man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont
to take God's name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may
understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name
is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to
take the explanation quoted in the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that
which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly
called perjury, as stated above (Question 98, Article 1, ad
3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is
vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. on the other
hand, when a man swears without judgment, through levity, if he swear
to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but
only on the part of the swearer.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some
science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even
so the Law, which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the
precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave
expression, by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of
most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts
of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more
frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often
into the latter sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the
part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the
signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the
singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in
vain": since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is
committed.
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