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Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a
wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having
committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as
stated above (Article 2). Therefore it seems that a man ought not
to forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has
committed a sin.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than
corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from
administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account
of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on
account of a sin, a man is hindered from reproving his brother, there
will be none to reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is
unreasonable: therefore the former is also.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He
that is subject to vice should not correct the vices of others."
Again it is written (Rm. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest
another, thou condemnest thyself. For thou dost the same things which
thou judgest."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3, ad 2), to correct a
wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with
right judgment. Now sin, as stated above (FS, Question 85,
Articles 1,2), does not destroy the good of nature so as to
deprive the sinner's reason of all right judgment, and in this respect
he may be competent to find fault with others for committing sin.
Nevertheless a previous sin proves somewhat of a hindrance to this
correction, for three reasons. First because this previous sin
renders a man unworthy to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy
to correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has committed a
greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, "Why seest thou the
mote?" etc. (Mt. 7:3): "He is speaking of those who, while
they are themselves guilty of mortal sin, have no patience with the
lesser sins of their brethren."
Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the
scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,
because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more
for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Mt. 7:4, "How
sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom
[Hom. xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] thus: "That is---'With what object?' Out of
charity, think you, that you may save your neighbor?" No,
"because you would look after your own salvation first. What you want
is, not to save others, but to hide your evil deeds with good
teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for your knowledge."
Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a
man thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets
himself above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh
severity, as though he himself were just man. Hence Augustine says
(De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of
others is the duty of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes
anyone, his rebuke is the latter's acquittal." And so, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "When we
have to find fault with anyone, we should think whether we were never
guilty of his sin; and then we must remember that we are men, and
might have been guilty of it; or that we once had it on our
conscience, but have it no longer: and then we should bethink
ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our reproof may be the
outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we find that we are
guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan with him,
and invite him to repent with us." It follows from this that, if a
sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not sin, nor does he
bring a further condemnation on himself, although thereby he proves
himself deserving of condemnation, either in his brother's or in his
own conscience, on account of his previous sin.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
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