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Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than
ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of
pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as
it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning
of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we
know, than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties
and hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises from an
operation which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13.
Therefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is
accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are
pleasant. But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says
(Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the
cause of pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that
wonder is the cause of pleasure.
I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated
above (Question 23, Article 4): and therefore the greater the
desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is
attained: indeed the very increase of desire brings with it an increase
of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that
which is loved, since it was stated above (Article 3, ad 3) that
desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a
kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees
an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his
knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause
of pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge
which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is
pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations
of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give
rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with
another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper and
connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv).
This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great
danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor.
i, 11.
Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it
implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning
the cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e.
that the cause is other than he had thought it to be.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the
good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since
it is more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the
unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing
than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the
second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing
accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for
greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance.
This is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning
things for the first time.
Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do,
inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that
are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge,
from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as
they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the
mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are
new," as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation
causes more perfect pleasure.
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