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Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills
necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God
wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be
mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself,
inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own
goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself
necessarily.
Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is
necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle
of all necessity, as above shown (Question 2, Article 3). But
it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God
there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph.
v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that
is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore,
God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible
for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what
He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or
the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is
imperfect and mutable.
Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to
one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined
to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator
[Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is
indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination
to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to
Himself.
Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily.
But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will.
Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who
worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what
we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will
necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He
wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing
to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he
is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting.
Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He
wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that
He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine
goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own
goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily,
and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and
principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to
it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so
far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in
willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it,
unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as,
we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to
cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the
end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on
foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to
other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can
exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him
from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is
not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it,
as His will cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity
whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own
goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of
His goodness; for it can exist without other things.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of
those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is
not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a
non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the
effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a
non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing
to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not
necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not
necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result
from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the
nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God
can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.
Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be
determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by
its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it
has no necessary relation.
Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of
itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine
knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine
will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of
things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things
as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have
necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist
in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He
wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
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