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Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are
unsuitably enumerated Tully [De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six,
viz. "religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth."
Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby
revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Question
61, Article 4). Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
virtues annexed to justice.
Objection 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8)
reckons seven, viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety,
religion, affection, humanity," several of which are omitted by
Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz.
"obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with
regard to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and
"truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is
mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated
insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.
Objection 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [De
Affectibus] reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality,
kindliness, revenge, commonsense, [eugnomosyne] piety, gratitude,
holiness, just exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it
is evident that Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he
would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration.
Objection 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions
epieikeia as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not
included in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues
annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated.
I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed
to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something
in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some
respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly
since justice is of one man to another as stated above (Question
58, Article 2), all the virtues that are directed to another
person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now
the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his
due according to equality, as stated above (Question 58, Article
11). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person
fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of
the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of
due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but
are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered
to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12,
"What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath
rendered to me?" In this respect "religion" is annexed to justice
since, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in
offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to "some superior
nature that men call divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make
to one's parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus "piety" is
annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii,
53), a man "renders service and constant deference to his kindred
and the well-wishers of his country." Thirdly, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed
for virtue, and thus "observance" is annexed to justice, consisting
according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and
honor rendered to those who excel in worth."
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is
that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and
this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal
virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is
bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies
necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so
necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this
has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered
from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to
this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is,
both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed "truth,"
whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and
future things are told without perversion. It may also be considered
from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing
the reward he receives with what he has done---sometimes in good
things; and then annexed to justice we have "gratitude" which
"consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by
others, and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De
invent. ii, 53)---and sometimes in evil things, and then to
justice is annexed "revenge," whereby, as Tully states (De
invent. ii, 53), "we resist force, injury or anything obscure by
taking vengeance or by self-defense."
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to
greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This
due is the concern of "liberality," "affability" or
"friendship," or the like, all of which Tully omits in the
aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything
due in them.
Reply to Objection 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public
power, in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative
justice: whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative,
though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a
judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.
Reply to Objection 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two
integral parts of justice, namely, "declining from evil," to which
"innocence" belongs, and "doing good," to which the six others
belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals,
namely, "friendship" in the external conduct and "concord"
internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely,
"piety" to parents, and "religion" to God; while two regard our
relations towards inferiors, namely, "condescension," in so far as
their good pleases us, and "humanity," whereby we help them in their
needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be
"humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this
gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another." In this
sense "friendship" is understood as directing our external conduct
towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it
in Ethic. iv, 6. "Friendship" may also be taken as regarding
properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in
Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to
friendship, namely, "benevolence" which is here called
"affection"; "concord," and "beneficence" which is here called
"humanity." These three, however, are omitted by Tully,
because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.
Reply to Objection 3: "Obedience" is included in observance,
which Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are
due to persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree
with his words" [Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7],
is contained in "truthfulness" as to the observance of one's
promises: yet "truthfulness" covers a wider ground, as we shall
state further on (Question 109, Articles 1,3).
"Discipline" is not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no
obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an
obligation to watch over his inferiors, according to Mt. 24:45,
"A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his
family": and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may,
however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity
under epieikeia or under "friendship."
Reply to Objection 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to
true justice. To particular justice belongs "justice of exchange,"
which he describes as "the habit of observing equality in
commutations." To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by
all, he ascribes "legislative justice," which he describes as "the
science of political commutations relating to the community." As
regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the
general laws, he mentions "common sense" or "good judgment," which
is our guide in such like matters, as stated above (Question 51,
Article 4) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is
a "voluntary justification," because by his own free will man
observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the
written law. These two are ascribed to prudence as their director,
and to justice as their executor. Eusebeia [piety] means "good
worship" and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says
that it is the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the
manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences')
[Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and "holiness" comes to the
same, as we shall state further on (Question 81, Article 8).
Eucharistia (gratitude) means "good thanksgiving," and is
mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a
kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of
gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that "kindliness is a habit
of voluntary beneficence." "Liberality" would seem to pertain to
"humanity."
Reply to Objection 5: Epieikeia is annexed, not to particular but
to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the
name of eugnomosyne [common sense].
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