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Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to
the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in
its observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion
fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an
absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than
the other moral virtues.
Objection 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the
more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in
greater need: wherefore it is written (Is. 57:7): "Deal thy
bread to the hungry." But God needs nothing that we can offer Him,
according to Ps. 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for
Thou hast no need of my goods." Therefore religion would seem less
praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
Objection 3: Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing,
the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16,
"If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth
upon me." Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of
paying it. Since, then, what is paid to God by man is in the
highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less
praiseworthy than the other human virtues.
On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given
precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the
order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the
precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is
the chief of the moral virtues.
I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from
being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the
better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (Article 5;
Question 4, Article 7), are about matters that are ordered to
God as their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than the
other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and
immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among
the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not
because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality
which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue
deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of
his will.
Reply to Objection 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of
its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the
offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God
not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His
glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.
Reply to Objection 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it
loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue,
provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
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