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Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of
things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown
above (Article 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of
the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
Objection 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction
from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore
the knowledge of God is not speculative.
On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to
God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical
knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.
Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical
only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in
three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not
operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or
divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as,
for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing,
and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider
operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically
operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and
not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal
principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical
intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is
ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end of the speculative
intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should
consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of
operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a
speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an
operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of
the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is
speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative
and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is
simply practical.
In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of
Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not
operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and
practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the
mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and
dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.
Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He
has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called
practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He
makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although
they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical
knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or
directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of
the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not
indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of
some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and
He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can
make, and which nevertheless are never made.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from
things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but
only accidentally in so far as it is human.
In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that
perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are
known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge
of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by
Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are
speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His
speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than
Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in
the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative
and practical knowledge of all other things.
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