|
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing
to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For
the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [Ed Did. ia,
1]) that "the end of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains
wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the
contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom.
xix in Ezech.) that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the
principle', signifies the contemplative life." Now the vision of a
principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the
contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
it belongs to the contemplative life, "to rest from external
action." Now the affective or appetitive power inclines to external
actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has
nothing to do with the appetitive power.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now
desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated
above (FS, Question 25, Article 2; FS, Question 26,
Article 2). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to
do with the affective or appetitive power.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 179, Article 1)
theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the
contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as
stated above (FS, Question 12, Article 1), because intention
is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the
contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to
the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that
action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even
the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (FP, Question
82, Article 4; FS, Question 9, Article 1).
Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
because, as it is written (Mt. 6:21), "where thy treasure
is, there is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very
knowledge that one acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes
the contemplative life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as
through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since
everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the
contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the
affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of
contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable
and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive
power.
Reply to Objection 2: We are urged to the vision of the first
principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life tramples on all
cares and longs to see the face of its Creator."
Reply to Objection 3: The appetitive power moves not only the
bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to
practice the act of contemplation, as stated above.
|
|