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Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the
Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7)
of the Son of God, that He was "in habit found as a man." But
habit is accidentally associated with that to which it pertains,
whether habit be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species
of quality. Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son
of God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in
being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can
come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came
to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore
it came to Him accidentally.
Objection 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or
the essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a
substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the
Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not
take place in the nature, as was said above (Article 1). Hence
the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.
Objection 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the
human nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of
Christ is the instrument of the Godhead." Therefore it seems that
the human nature was united to the Son of God accidentally.
On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates,
not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of
being. If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we
say Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or
quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the
Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later.
iii): "Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what
foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a
substance?"
I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two
heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two
natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and
Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so
that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were
distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the
distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second
was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who
separated the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God
to be distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were
mutually united: first, "by indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of
God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, "by unity of
intention," inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement
with the will of the Word of God; thirdly, "by operation,"
inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of God;
fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor shown to
the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of
His union with the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation,"
i.e. communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God
and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an
accidental union.
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies,
through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in
Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that
a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his
conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion
set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous
of keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not
united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and
were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons
might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the
Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the
first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in
Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above
(Article 3). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we
must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on
account of the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council
(Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema
against such a one as holds "one person in dignity, honor and
adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote." But the
other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an
accidental union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word
of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple
(as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is
the third opinion; rather it says something worse than
Nestorius---to wit, that the soul and body are not united.
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid
positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in
the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway,
in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council
(Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the
unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of
Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came
together" (i.e. destroying both natures), "confess a union by
mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining
division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of
God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union
of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in
subsistence." Therefore it is plain that the second of the three
opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which
holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion,
but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which
holds two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union,
are not to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in
Councils.
Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
26): "Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for
what is wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially
in Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar
example in the Theology," i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and
in the Dispensation," i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence
the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment,
not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is
seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch
as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of
him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account
of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of
God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine
says (Qq. 83, qu. 73).
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the
being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the
complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul
which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto
the same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but
it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than
the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from
all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time
the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one
being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to
the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the
hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally
united to the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now
substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways:
first, for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or
hypostasis---hence the union having taken place in the hypostasis,
is enough to show that it is not an accidental union, although the
union did not take place in the nature.
Reply to Objection 4: Not everything that is assumed as an
instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is
plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is
assumed into the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument,
even as the body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the
human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not
into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede
that the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence
Cyril says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does
not affirm that this Emmanuel," i.e. Christ, "was assumed for
the office of an instrument, but as God truly humanized," i.e.
made man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an
instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.
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