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Objection 1: It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not
be greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing
approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it
participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated
from the body than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is
greater before being reunited to the body than after.
Objection 2: Further, power is more effective when it is united
than when divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the
body than when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater
power for operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of
happiness, since this consists in action [FS, Question 3,
Article 2].
Objection 3: Further, beatitude consists in an act of the
speculative intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use
of a bodily organ; and consequently by being reunited to the body the
soul does not become capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore
the soul's happiness is not greater after than before the judgment.
Objection 4: Further, nothing can be greater than the infinite,
and so the addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in
something greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul
before its reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the
infinite good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it
will rejoice in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and
this is a finite good. Therefore their joy after the resumption of the
body will not be greater than before.
On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. 6:9, "I saw under the altar
the souls of them that were slain," says: "At present the souls of
the saints are under the altar, i.e. less exalted than they will
be." Therefore their happiness will be greater after the resurrection
than after their death.
Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is
unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked
after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they
will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore
the happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of
the body than before.
I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will
increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will
then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the
soul's happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul
will rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body.
We may also say that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity.
For man's body may be considered in two ways: first, as being
dependent on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing
something that hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not
perfectly completing the body. As regards the first way of considering
the body, its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the
soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole;
wherefore the whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the
soul is more perfect in its natural being, when it is in the
whole---namely, man who results from the union of soul and
body---than when it is a separate part. But as regards the second
consideration the union of the body hampers the perfection of the soul,
wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15) that "the corruptible body
is a load upon the soul." If, then, there be removed from the body
all those things wherein it hampers the soul's action, the soul will
be simply more perfect while existing in such a body than when separated
therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the more
perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the operation of the soul
united to such a body will be more perfect than the operation of the
separated soul. But the glorified body will be a body of this
description, being altogether subject to the spirit. Therefore,
since beatitude consists in an operation [FS, Question 3,
Article 2, seqq.], the soul's happiness after its reunion with
the body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul
separated from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than
when united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body,
its operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now
every imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul
naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of this desire
which proceeds from the soul's imperfection its operation whereby it is
borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) that "on account of the
body's desire it is held back from tending with all its might to that
sovereign good."
Reply to Objection 1: The soul united to a glorified body is more
like to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it
has more perfect being. For the more perfect a thing is the more it is
like to God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists
in movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at
rest, although God is never moved.
Reply to Objection 2: A power which by its own nature is capable of
being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when
separated from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate
from matter is more effective.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in the act of understanding the soul
does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat
conduce to the perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as
through being united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect
in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation, and
accordingly the good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as
it were, to the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the
Philosopher asserts (Ethic. i, 8,10) that external goods
conduce instrumentally to the happiness of life.
Reply to Objection 4: Although finite added to infinite does not
make a greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite
are two things, while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the
greater extent of joy regards not a greater thing but more things.
Wherefore joy is increased in extent, through referring to God and to
the body's glory, in comparison with the joy which referred to God.
Moreover, the body's glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy
that refers to God, in so far as it will conduce to the more perfect
operation whereby the soul tends to God: since the more perfect is a
becoming operation, the greater the delight [FS, Question 32,
Article 1], as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
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