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Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7),
"perseverance is about pains of touch." But these belong to
temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than
of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no
one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues.
Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a
principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is
not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons
perseverance as a part of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 123, Article 2;
FS, Question 61, Articles 3,4), a principal virtue is one
to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise
of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own
matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance
with this it has been stated (Question 123, Article 2) that
fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in
matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers
of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which
has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must
be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the
endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work
gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to
endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to
fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The annexing of secondary to principal
virtues depends not only on the matter [Question 136, Article
4, ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of
more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter,
perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with
fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in
the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of
time.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher
speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but
consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But
perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions,
namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence
this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as
denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the
end, according to Mt. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the
end, he shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like
perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the
end.
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