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Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry.
For Jerome in his exposition on Mt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry
with his brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without
cause.' However, in the genuine codices the sentence is
unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether." Therefore it is
nowise lawful to be angry.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv)
"The soul's evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always
without reason: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"anger does not listen perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says
(Moral. v, 45) that "when anger sunders the tranquil surface of
the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot"; and Cassian says
(De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever cause it arises,
the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind."
Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
Objection 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance"
[Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev.
19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." Now it
would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to
God, according to Dt. 32:35, "Revenge is Mine."
Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.
Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to
God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God,
since God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18.
Therefore to be angry is always an evil.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum]
says: "He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he
that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger,
teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked."
Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.
I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
(FS, Question 46, Article 1) when we were treating of the
passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be
observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason
of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's
object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil,
since it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in
itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks
(Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something
evil." Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for
revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly,
evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that
is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found
in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason
demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's
anger is deserving of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the
other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and
accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as
stated above (FS, Question 24, Article 2) when we were
treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers
anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one's
neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong.---But, according
to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ.
Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements
of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according
to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to
reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from
its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly,
consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is
directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is
good, and is called "zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says
(Moral. v, 45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an
instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its
mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its
handmaid, to obey." This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat
the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy
the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45)
that "zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger
blinds it." Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation
of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has
deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were
to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered
as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to
desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice;
and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved
thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the
order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to
punish "is God's minister," as stated in Rm. 13:4.
Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the
desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the
mode of our desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as
in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory
says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in
withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason."
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