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Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained
under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of
perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult
matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to
fortitude rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where
jealousy and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil
work." But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy
pertains not to imprudence but to envy.
Objection 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails
to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of
"incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or
"squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii,
1. Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.
On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to
the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to
imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs
to imprudence.
I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good
purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a
man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account
of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal
completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in
rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist
the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its
own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived;
hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the
reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in
some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to
imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs
to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act
of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so
inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is
stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has
been counselled and judged.
Reply to Objection 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the
moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all
moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a
greater impulse to the contrary.
Reply to Objection 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of
contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which
power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in
the appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man
suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous
sorrows (which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but
reason stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and
in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and
perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason;
and to this power inconstancy pertains also.
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