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Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor
an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas,
seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while
satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is not an act
of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But
sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for something against his
will, as when anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against
another. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13): "Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue." But
satisfaction is not an act of choice but regards chiefly external
works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
On the contrary, Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a
virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.
Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out
sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction
destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways.
First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or
defect of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because
virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk, to
speak, and so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue
formally, because its very name implies the form and nature of virtue;
thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal
element in every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore
every act that implies the observance of a mean is formally an act of
virtue. And since equality is the mean implied in the name of
satisfaction (for a thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal
proportion to something), it is evident that satisfaction also is
formally an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Although to make satisfaction is due in
itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who
offers satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the
agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes
merit through being necessary and consequently against the will, so
that if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is not
forfeited.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in
the patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since
he on whom the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent
as regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be
voluntary not in him but in the judge as agent.
Reply to Objection 3: The chief element of virtue can be understood
in two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue,
and thus the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the
nature of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other
internal acts hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief
element of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds the first
place in such and such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to
that which gives its determination. Now the interior act, in certain
virtues, is determined by some external act, since choice, which is
common to all virtues, becomes proper to such and such a virtue through
being directed to such and such an act. Thus it is that external acts
hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the case with
satisfaction.
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