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Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end.
For in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the
rational nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals.
But nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved
in Phys. ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals
intend the end.
Objection 2: Further, just as intention is of the end, so is
enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above
(Question 11, Article 2). Therefore intention is too.
Objection 3: Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for
an end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something.
But irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either
to seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore irrational
animals intend an end.
On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordaining something to
an end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals
are void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), to intend is to tend
to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved.
According, therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is
said to intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being
moved to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in
this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved
to something by natural instinct. The other way of intending an end
belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of
something, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to
reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in
this way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated above
(Article 1).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of
being moved to an end.
Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one
thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
Reply to Objection 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not
as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement;
this belongs to one that intends; but through desiring the end by
natural instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by
another, like other things that are moved naturally.
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