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Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything
from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph.
i): "To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is
to make something by bringing forth something from what was already."
Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is
considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to
good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But
creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all
actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather
from being to being.
Objection 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports
relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when
we say that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the
matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not
to make something from nothing.
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God
created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something
from nothing."
I answer that, As said above (Question 44, Article 2), we
must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a
particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the
universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the
name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not
presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not
before, but man is made from "not-man," and white from
"not-white." Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being
from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being
should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same
as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the
"not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the
emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is
"nothing."
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an
equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in
things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not,
however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described
above.
Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not
from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore
a change is more perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the
change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom,"
corresponding to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus
generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because
the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the
privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in
generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term
"wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and
excellent than generation and alteration, because the term "whereto"
is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the
term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.
Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from
nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material
cause, but only order; as when we say, "from morning comes
midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand
that this preposition "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied
when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken
in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation
between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the
negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the
sense is, "It is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from
anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing,"
because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both
ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in
the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has
been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material
cause, which is denied.
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