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Objection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the
Apostle says of certain ones (Rm. 1:28): "God delivered them
up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right," and
a gloss comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts,
by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to
evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a
will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): "The
creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the
souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to
sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was
established in the FP, Question 44, Article 1, it seems that
God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.
Objection 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the
effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the
cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.
Objection 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is
not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of
punishment; since of this evil it is written (Is. 45:7) that
God creates evil, and (Amos 3:6): "Shall there be evil in the
city which God hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with
God's goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:25): "Thou . .
. hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates
sin, according to Wis. 14:9: "To God the wicked and his
wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin.
I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of
another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or
another's will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not
preventing someone from sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is
said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt
surely die' . . . I will require his blood at thy hand." Now
God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in
another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God
as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as
to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that
it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the
cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He
cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He
cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the
assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to
give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the
order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and
Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though
He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause
the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he
cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident
that God is nowise a cause of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the
solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a
reprobate sense, it follows that they already had a reprobate sense,
so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver
them up to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them
from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a
person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine
(De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken)
to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is
to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to
good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated
above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said the "creatures of God are
turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men,"
the preposition "to" does not denote causality but sequel; for God
did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; this was
the result of man's folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a
snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use
creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made.
Reply to Objection 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle
cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced
to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause,
according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not
reduced to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to
his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he
were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will
commits against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as
being its cause.
Reply to Objection 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the
person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but
fault is opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is
directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no
comparison between fault and punishment.
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