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Objection 1: It would seem that the character of Order necessarily
presupposes the character of Confirmation. For in things subordinate
to one another, as the middle presupposes the first, so does the last
presuppose the middle. Now the character of Confirmation presupposes
that of Baptism as being the first. Therefore the character of Order
presupposes that of Confirmation as being in the middle.
Objection 2: Further, those who are appointed to confirm should
themselves be most firm. Now those who receive the sacrament of Order
are appointed to confirm others. Therefore they especially should have
received the sacrament of Confirmation.
On the contrary, The apostles received the power of order before the
Ascension (Jn. 20:22), where it is said: "Receive the
Holy Ghost." But they were confirmed after the Ascension by the
coming of the Holy Ghost. Therefore order does not presuppose
Confirmation.
I answer that, For the reception of Orders something is prerequisite
for the validity of the sacrament, and something as congruous to the
sacrament. For the validity of the sacrament it is required that one
who presents himself for Orders should be capable of receiving them,
and this is competent to him through Baptism; wherefore the baptismal
character is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, so that
the sacrament of Order cannot be conferred without it. On the other
hand, as congruous to the sacrament a man is required to have every
perfection whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise of Orders, and
one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the character of
Order presupposes the character of Confirmation as congruous but not
as necessary.
Reply to Objection 1: In this case the middle does not stand in the
same relation to the last as the first to the middle, because the
character of Baptism enables a man to receive the sacrament of
Confirmation, whereas the character of Confirmation does not enable a
man to receive the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers aptness by way of
congruity.
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