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Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For
as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice.
Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore,
can there be sin without action.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii,
18) [De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is
voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now
nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore
every sin implies an act.
Objection 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow
that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who
never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what
he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and
this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . .
. who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin."
Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without
act.
I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to
the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions.
For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either
interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not to go to
church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the
very hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies
himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in
a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing
that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to go
without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him,
that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is bound
to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the
other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not necessarily
suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do
is a sin.
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of
omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin
consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act,
as when a man wills "not to go to church": while sometimes it will be
without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man,
at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going
or not going to church.
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes,
or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of
necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless
we omit what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to
do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or
occasion, either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if
this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as
when anyone omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the
cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and
such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include
some act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes
bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to
church," because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act,
of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of
any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since
voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of
the will bears directly on something else which hinders man from doing
what he ought, whether this something else be united with the
omission, as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to
church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up
late at night, the result being that he does not go to church in the
morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental
to the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and
that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys.
ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of
omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but
that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper
to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is
truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial
acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.
Reply to Objection 1: More things are required for good than for
evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil
results from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by
his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man
do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit
without act, whereas there can be sin without act.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to
that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that
which we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii,
5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man
has it in his power to will, and not to will.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an
affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence,
by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the
affirmative precept binds him to act.
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