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Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by
their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit
of science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and
the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects
specifically distinct.
Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits.
But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both
the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated
in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by
their objects.
Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is
the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue,
if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if
it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be
done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the
same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity
of habits does not follow diversity of objects.
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of
their objects, as stated above (Question 18, Article 5). But
habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are
distinguished according to the diversity of objects.
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the
specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which
forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction
which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from
one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles,
since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however,
imply order to something: and all things that imply order to
something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things
to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a
twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to
nature.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three
things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of
specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits,
we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal
aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus. And though the
distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they
are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other.
And consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of
cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by
one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by
means of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something
of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by
the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now
the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing
science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean.
And consequently various means are as so many active principles, in
respect of which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii,
text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters,
what the principle is in speculative matters. Consequently diversity
of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active
principles does. Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts,
with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from
what has been said (Question 18, Article 6; Question 19,
Article 2, ad 1; Question 34, Article 4).
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