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Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned
is evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the
demons desire the good and the best, namely to be, to live, to
understand." Since, then, men who are damned are not worse off than
the demons, it would seem that they also can have a good will.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
"evil is altogether involuntary." Therefore if the damned will
anything, they will it as something good or apparently good. Now a
will that is directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the
damned can have a good will.
Objection 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this
world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who
had civic virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of
virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will
in some of the damned.
On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to
evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons
[FP, Question 64, Article 2]. Further, as the will of the
damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard
to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore
have the damned any good will.
I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned,
namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is
theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature
this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since
nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be
good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as
it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or
that. This will is in them always evil: and this because they are
completely turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a
will be good except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though
they will some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to
call their will good on that account.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of
the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular
good. And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their
wickedness, in so far as this good which they desire naturally is
desired by them under certain evil circumstances [FP, Question
64, Article 2, ad 5].
Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but
in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their
wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good.
Hence their will is evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in
the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic
life which will not remain after this life. Even though they
remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it
were, by the obstinacy of the mind.
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