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Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides
the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
1), that "the soul is the act of a physical body which has life
potentially." Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter.
But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore
some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul.
Objection 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now
everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one
moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the
other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter
cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only
potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in
man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by
which the body is constituted.
Objection 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation
to primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to
some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other
substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere
immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the
most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.
Objection 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now
mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have
mere corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a
mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human
body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.
On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being.
But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one
thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the
substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in
man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.
I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united
to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists
maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another
substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as
movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to
the body as its substantial form, as we have said above (Article
1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the
intellectual soul to be found in man.
In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial
form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form
does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat
does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by
the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or
generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular
condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a
thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the
substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is
said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted
simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that
primary matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air,
or something of that sort---maintained that nothing is generated
simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is
nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore,
if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another
substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual
being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and
consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent
of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal
simple corruption, all of which is clearly false.
Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in
man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually
contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually
contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the
imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the
sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants,
and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.
Reply to Objection 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the
act of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has
life potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the
soul." Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the
soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is
hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were
two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light.
In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc.,
because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life
potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the
second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not
reject"---that is, does not exclude---the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul does not move the body by its
essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of
which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so
that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the
animate body is the part moved.
Reply to Objection 3: We observe in matter various degrees of
perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now
what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives
matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while
that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so
on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.
Reply to Objection 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of
the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is
made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an
average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the
elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the
distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter
cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be
found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same
place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be
distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture
which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to
sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.
Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their
imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms,
and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they
are modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from
them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial
being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every
addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated
in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is
impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less."
Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance
and accident.
Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De
Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed
body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the
elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the
elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper
disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance,
the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.
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