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Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about
great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as
stated above (Article 1). But great and little are accidental to
honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great
honors.
Objection 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is
meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about
either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to
magnanimity to be about great honor.
Objection 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor
than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to
dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also.
Therefore it is not only about great honors.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
magnanimity is about great honors.
I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17,
18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the
perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that
power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a
power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such
operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however
imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it
is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act
of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the
point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and
establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this
difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also
of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which
may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which
moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards
chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because
the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv,
4).
Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of
this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the
passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects
of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of
resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite,
which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason.
Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only
that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very
great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the
greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger.
On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to
reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects
of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor.
And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that
which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is
ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little,
are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with
regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary
or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large
sums of money, namely "magnificence."
In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
which are philotimia, i.e. love of honor, and aphilotimia, i.e.
without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving
honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as
both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great
honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the
proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man
tends to such things as are deserving of honor.
Reply to Objection 1: Great and little are accidental to honor
considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their
relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of
honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in
little honors.
Reply to Objection 2: In anger and other matters only that which is
greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there
any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are
things existing outside the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: He that makes good use of great things is
much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the
magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is
worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to
wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored
by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does
not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more
such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by
dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not
deserve it.
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