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Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or
power is called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in
creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in
God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by
fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the
universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here
below, is God alone, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore
fate is in God, and not in creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a
substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied
according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems
to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in
God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a
disposition inherent to changeable things."
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above
(Question 22, Article 3; Question 103, Article 6),
Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can
therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly,
as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is
called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the
mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects,
thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is
served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature
itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the
stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the
demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is
forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (Article 1;
Question 104, Article 2; Question 110, Article 1;
Question 113; Question 114). It is therefore manifest that
fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the
production of their effects.
Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which
Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes,"
has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore
the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of
fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or "series,"
i.e. order, of second causes.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much
as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that
disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it
signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if
this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and
thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects,
or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the
poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
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