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Objection 1: It would seem that an eternal punishment is not
inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not
exceed the fault: "According to the measure of the sin shall the
measure also of the stripes be" (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is
temporal. Therefore the punishment should not be eternal.
Objection 2: Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the
other. and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the
other. But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it
is infinite. Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin;
and if it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not
infinitely distant from one another.
Objection 3: Further, a just judge does not punish except in order
to correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that
"punishments are a kind of medicine." Now, to punish the wicked
eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to that of others,
since then there will be no one in future who can be corrected thereby.
Therefore eternal punishment is not inflicted for sins according to
Divine justice.
Objection 4: Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for
its own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not
wish punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments.
Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment,
it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.
Objection 5: Further, "nothing accidental lasts for ever" (De
Coelo et Mundo i). But punishment is one of those things that
happen accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it
cannot be everlasting.
Objection 6: Further, the justice of God would seem to require
that sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of
ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits. and among other
benefits of God there is "being" itself. Therefore it would seem
just that the sinner who has been ungrateful to God should lose his
being. But if sinners be brought to naught, their punishment cannot
be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keeping with Divine
justice that sinners should be punished for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:46): "These,"
namely the wicked, "shall go into everlasting punishment."
Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now,
according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal
merit: "Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath life
everlasting." Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting
punishment is due to temporal guilt.
Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5),
punishment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned
against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a
greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins
mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose
honor he gives another, by placing his end in some one other than
God. But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins
mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just
that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever.
I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely
according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of
time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault,
as regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person
sins the more grievously is he punished: "As much as she hath
glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow
give ye to her" (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment
does not, however, correspond with the duration of the fault, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), for adultery which is
committed in a short space of time is not punished with a momentary
penalty even according to human laws [FS, Question 87, Article
3, ad 1]. But the duration of punishment regards the disposition
of the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offense in a city
is rendered by his very offense worthy of being cut off entirely from
the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by
death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being cut off
entirely from the fellowship of the citizens. wherefore in order that
he may become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is
prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his amendment,
so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful manner. So
too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be
altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's city, and this is the
effect of every sin committed against charity, which is the bond
uniting this same city together. Consequently, for mortal sin which
is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship
of the saints and condemned to everlasting punishment, because as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "as men are cut off
from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are
they excluded from that imperishable city by the punishment of the
second death." That the punishment inflicted by the earthly state is
not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because man endures not
for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end. Wherefore if
man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which is
pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the other
hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be
entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who
sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or longer
according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin
clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of
this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.
We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly
condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because
they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is
mentioned by Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): "He is
become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which
could be eternal." Another reason is because man sinned in his own
eternity [FS, Question 87, Article 3, ad 1]; wherefore
Gregory says (Dial. iv), it belongs to the great justice of the
judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life
never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who sin
mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these
accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eternal punishment, it must
be replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is
made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own
will puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, except God
help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he
is willing to remain in sin for ever. For man is "a wind that
goeth," namely to sin, "and returneth not by his own power" (Ps.
77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he
could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain
there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another
and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal
sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of life is
directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs
the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin
forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says
on Job 41:23, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old"
(Moral. xxxiv): "The wicked only put an end to sinning because
their life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for
ever, that they might continue in sin for ever for they desire rather
to sin than to live." Still another reason may be given why the
punishment of mortal sin is eternal: because thereby one offends God
Who is infinite. Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite in
intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality,
it must needs be infinite at least in duration. And again there is a
fourth reason for the same: because guilt remains for ever, since it
cannot be remitted without grace, and men cannot receive grace after
death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt remains.
Reply to Objection 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to
the amount of duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws.
We may also reply with Gregory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is
temporal in act, it is eternal in will.
Reply to Objection 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment
corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins
unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but
equal in duration.
Reply to Objection 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are
not altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are
intended for their correction: whereas those punishments, whereby
certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their
fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they
may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who
remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for
the correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are
intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but
also when they are decreed.
Reply to Objection 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will
not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes.
First, because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is
acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial.
iv): "Almighty God on account of His loving kindness delights not
in the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is
for ever unappeased by the punishment of the wicked." Secondly, they
are useful, because the elect rejoice therein, when they see God's
justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is
written (Ps. 57:12): "The just shall rejoice when he shall
see the revenge," etc., and (Is. 66:24): "They,"
namely the wicked, "shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh," namely
to the saints, as a gloss says. Gregory expresses himself in the same
sense (Dial. iv): "The wicked are all condemned to eternal
punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will
burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God the
joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have
escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the
debtors of Divine grace the more that they will see how the evils which
they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally."
Reply to Objection 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul
accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt.
And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also
will be everlasting.
Reply to Objection 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly
speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of
the dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a
punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin.
Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact
that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view
of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to
him, since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being
lost or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin [FS, Question 85,
Article 1]: and consequently privation of being cannot be the
punishment due to any sin.
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