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Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin
distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is
apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to
reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
Objection 2: Further, no man is derided except for something
reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they
be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if
privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore
derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices.
Objection 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the
injury they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a
man by derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is
detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin
distinct from the foregoing.
On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described
as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in
jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 72, Article 2),
sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker,
wherefore these sins are differentiated according to the various
intentions of those who speak against another. Now just as the railer
intends to injure the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to
depreciate a good name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so
too the derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since this
end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is
distinct from the foregoing sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to
the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the
"mouth," i.e. by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is
done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He
that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them": and such a distinction
does not differentiate the species. Yet they both differ from
reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be
ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as Damascene states (De Fide
Orth. ii, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both
respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the
glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our
glory is this, the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the
other hand, for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man
forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others---and for this
purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of another person---while
in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his conscience through being
confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds being imputed to
him---and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is
accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to
the matter but differs as to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great
good, according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a
continual feast." Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by
confounding him inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a
special kind of sin.
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