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Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is,
before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an
operation. Since, therefore, Christ's soul began to exist in the
first instant of His conception, as was made clear above (Question
33, Article 2), it seems impossible that He should have the use
of free-will in the first instant of His conception.
Objection 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice.
But choice presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that choice is "the desire of what
has been previously the object of deliberation." Therefore it seems
impossible that Christ should have had the use of free-will in the
first instant of His conception.
Objection 3: Further, the free-will is "a faculty of the will and
reason," as stated in the FP, Question 83, Article 2,
Objection 2: consequently the use of free-will is an act of the will
and the reason or intellect. But the act of the intellect presupposes
an act of the senses; and this cannot exist without proper disposition
of the organs---a condition which would seem impossible in the first
instant of Christ's conception. Therefore it seems that Christ
could not have the use of free-will at the first instant of His
conception.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Trinity
(Gregory: Regist. ix, Ep. 61): "As soon as the Word
entered the womb, while retaining the reality of His Nature, He was
made flesh, and a perfect man." But a perfect man has the use of
free-will. Therefore Christ had the use of free-will in the first
instant of His conception.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), spiritual perfection
was becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection
He attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very
first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit,
but in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5)
that operation is a "second act." We must, therefore, say that in
the first instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the
soul which can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the
will and intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the
operation of the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much
more, indeed, than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to
will, and to feel, are not movements that may be described as "acts
of an imperfect being," which attains perfection successively, but
are "the acts of an already perfect being," as is said, De Anima
iii, text. 28. We must therefore say that Christ had the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception.
Reply to Objection 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not
in time; but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and
begins to act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is
generated, begins to give heat and light. The action of heating,
however, is not terminated in an instant, but continues for a time;
whereas the action of giving light is perfected in an instant. And
such an operation is the use of free-will, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended,
there may be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel,
as soon as this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen:
and consequently they choose at once. From this it is clear that the
deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for
the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the
first instant of His conception, had the fulness of sanctifying
grace, and in like manner the fulness of known truth; according to
Jn. 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." Wherefore, as being
possessed of certainty about all things, He could choose at once in an
instant.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's intellect, in regard to His
infused knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as
stated above (Question 11, Article 2). Consequently His
intellect and will could act without any action of the senses.
Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His
conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the
sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before
it has received the rational soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal.
ii, 3,4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the
first instant of His conception, through His body being already
fashioned and endowed with sensible organs, much more was it possible
for Him to exercise the sense of touch in that same instant.
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