|
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given
to us men to enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot
enjoy.
Objection 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But
irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for
them to enjoy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the
intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the
sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive
appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the
natural appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter
cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot
enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational
animals.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 30):
"It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and
any bodily pleasure."
I answer that, As was stated above (Article 1) to enjoy is not
the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the
power that commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to
the appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of
achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body has
a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet
the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some
higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in
things endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to
their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge,
although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is
only for those that are endowed with knowledge.
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect
knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is
the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and
the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On
the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the
good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational
animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend.
Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect
degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not
at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect
enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end
simply; but of that which each one chooses for his last end.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite follows some
knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of
knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect
enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that
"it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as
it would be, if one were to say that they "use."
|
|