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Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order.
For it was shown above (Question 50, Article 4), that all the
angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there
are not many angels in one order.
Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by
many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs
to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much
more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of
the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If,
therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated
above (Article 2), several angels in one order would be
superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the
angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance,
three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior
order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with
the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of
one order with the latter than with the former. Therefore there are
not many angels of one order.
On the contrary, It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one
another" (Is. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one
order of the Seraphim.
I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to
distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest
details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only
distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points.
Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their
orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order,
inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals
in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to
distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in
each of the other orders.
Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic
offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one
order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels
perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office
and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though
this be hidden from us.
Reply to Objection 1: All the angels of one order are in some way
equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order;
but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are
those who are first, middle, and last.
Reply to Objection 2: That special distinction of orders and
offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from
us.
Reply to Objection 3: As in a surface which is partly white and
partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more
akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are
less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two
orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin
to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for
similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.
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