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Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that
which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil
in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence
and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure
is greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest
of all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in
Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on
Matthew [Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of
conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not
vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty."
Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure
is evil.
Objection 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the
man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be
avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a
kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1
Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But
children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure:
whereas the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures
are evil in themselves and should be avoided.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the
difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained
to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not something good.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the
Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it
seems that not every pleasure is evil.
I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,3 some have maintained
that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they
took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more
manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did
not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between
intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all
bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being
prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by
abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this
opinion. Because, since none can live without some sensible and
bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are
found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to
pleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening to
the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions,
wherein experience is of great weight, example moves more than words.
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are
evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved
good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold
reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in
which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral
order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above
(Question 18, Article 5): just as in the order of nature, a
thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural,
if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a
certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with
its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and
again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which
disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so,
in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or
lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an
evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant
from reason and the law of God.
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of
which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to
actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede
them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions
are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of
good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question 33, Article
3), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that
hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such
as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason,
as stated above (Question 33, Article 3), either by contrariety
of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which
makes the pleasure morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in
conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason,
yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily
change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither
is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be
taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of
reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that although
this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal
intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither a mortal nor a
venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from
the sin of our first parent; because, as stated in the FP,
Question 98, Article 2. the case was different in the state of
innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperate man does not shun all
pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason.
The fact that children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove
that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural
appetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Reply to Objection 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good,
but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on
(Question 57, Article 3). But actions and passions, which are
within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art.
Nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of
cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii,
12.
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