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Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue.
For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve
for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the
good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy
emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7,8,9): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6)
that charity "rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth." Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is
sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from
charity.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter,
because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their
objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is
past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary.
But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins,
and consequently is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as
stated above (Question 84, Articles 5,7).
I answer that, As stated in the FS, Question 54, Article 1,
ad 1, Article 2, habits are specifically distinguished according to
the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason
for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it
is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of
penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as
an offense against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We
must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: An act springs from charity in two ways:
first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no
other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice
therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act
springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and
thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs
them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to
another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we
consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity
immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the
intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special
virtue subordinate to charity.
Reply to Objection 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a
general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under
a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in
co-operating with God for his justification.
Reply to Objection 3: Every special virtue removes formally the
habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from
the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch
as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are
pardonable through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith.
Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue.
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