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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth.
For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a
penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15): "Let him
refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain
the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack of
mirth.
Objection 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to
holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from
mirth; for it is written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not in the
assembly of jesters," and (Tobias 3:17): "Never have I
joined myself with them that play; neither have I made myself partaker
with them that walk in lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in
the lack of mirth.
Objection 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the
virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor
receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack
of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8)
reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.
I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin.
Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by
offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment.
Wherefore Seneca [Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae:
cap. De Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De
Continentia): "Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one
will think you rude, or despise you as a cad." Now a man who is
without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also
burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of
others. Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or
rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8).
Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and
pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are
not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as
stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less
sinful than excess thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 10): "We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure,
since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt
suffices for our meat."
Reply to Objection 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is
called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in
default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in
accordance with reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the
times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he
adds: "I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats."
The words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident
from his adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that
walk in lightness."
Reply to Objection 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude
all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate;
wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability, which the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls "friendliness," or
eutrapelia, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he names and defines it
thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs
to restrain pleasure.
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