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Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment
after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But
sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin
is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also.
Objection 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue.
Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward.
Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer
remains.
Objection 3: Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being
cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of
punishment does not remain.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Kgs. xii, 13,14):
"David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And
Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou
shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the
enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to
thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his
sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin
has been removed.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act,
and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins,
when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of
sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the
order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some
sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of
justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who
has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's
commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something
contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of
justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to
one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or
injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment.
But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident
that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul
being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him
that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain
consists, as stated above (Question 86, Article 1). Now man
is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be
removed from man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice,
that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself
the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which
God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for
satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat
of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be
against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely
speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case
and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is
voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have
explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (Question
6, Article 6). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of
sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not
indeed of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the
stain remains, as stated above (Question 86, Article 2), so
the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been
removed, the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment
simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue
demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or
man.
Reply to Objection 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin
is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in
order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so
disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be
remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment
is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove
the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the
sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of
David quoted above.
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