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Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter.
But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Question
117, Article 2). Therefore magnificence is not about
expenditure.
Objection 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal"
(Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about
expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about
expenditure, but about gifts.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an
external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of
producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in
sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
magnificence.
Objection 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great
expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since
"the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are
sufficient for themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita
beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
"magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions
in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in
scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), it belongs to
magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a
great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works
cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to
magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be
accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 2) that "a magnificent man will produce a more
magnificent work with equal," i.e. proportionate, "expenditure."
Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be
hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the
matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself,
which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the
very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as
the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he
be hindered from spending much.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question 129, Article
2), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain
difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the
virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the
greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues,
concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards
the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that
which is great in the use of money.
Reply to Objection 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in
one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal
man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of
money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and
expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of
money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the
magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be
produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
Reply to Objection 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of
presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of
gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the
production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in
order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as
when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward
choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that
even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite
as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor
man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are
great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things
that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though
little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion
to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the
Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
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