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Objection 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be
feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of
fear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated above (Article
2). But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape.
Therefore such things are not feared at all.
Objection 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death:
since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death
to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not
feared most, for which there is no remedy.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6)
that "a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but
one day: nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is
not everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things that
cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the
point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not
therefore any worse or more to be feared.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
"those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put
right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy."
I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever
tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is
increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of
circumstances, as stated above (Question 18, Article 3). And
of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness,
seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because
things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the
duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a
certain length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be
suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer
the same thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. for ever,
implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which,
after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not
easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for
which reason they inspire the greatest fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by
which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be
removed, there is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore
we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one
by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we
speak now.
Reply to Objection 2: Although death be an evil without remedy,
yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated
above (Article 2).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher is speaking there of things
that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like
good is no better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on
its very nature.
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