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Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at
first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by
fear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above (Article 1;
Question 44, Article 3). But the daring sometimes tremble at
first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3).
Therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of
danger.
Objection 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its
object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more
lovable. But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore
the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is
more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that
daring is greatest.
Objection 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of
wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 5) that "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the
midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring
are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the
midst of dangers they stand aloof."
I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite,
follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive
faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into
circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens
sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of
all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the
movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to
experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he
expected, and so gives way.
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a
situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to
the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the
danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are
in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but
sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated;
wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they
face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding
object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men
of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to
hope and banishing fear, as stated above (Article 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on
account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of
the body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of
daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are
afraid, it withdraws to the inferior parts.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore
if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of
daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring
towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If,
therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes
hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the
movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is
the daring considered to be.
Reply to Objection 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there
be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on (Question 46,
Article 1). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all
hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that if
anger does ensue, there will be greater daring.
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