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Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth.
For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is
compatible with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be
false, lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii).
Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
Objection 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words
but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in
one's life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says
(Contra Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by
words." Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to
the virtue of truth.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii)
that the "liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not
opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore
lying is not opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one
doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive.
Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a
manifest lie." But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is
opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its
own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and
stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to
formal, as stated above (FS, Question 18, Articles 6,7).
Now it has been said above (Question 109, Article 1, ad 3)
that the virtue of truth---and consequently the opposite
vices---regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this
manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the
thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison,
which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals
manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but
they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the
result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it
must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will.
Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or
the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things:
one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the
proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be
deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what
is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
deceive, then there is falsehood---materially, since what is said
is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal
falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is
false; wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from
its being in opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what
is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not
formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker
so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's
intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific
difference. If, on the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally,
through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet
inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness
essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of
a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires
its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be
lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force,
lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form.
Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to
the virtue of truth.
Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in
it formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it
materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth,
considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of
telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of
telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is
said that "a lie is a false signification by words," the term
"words" denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended
to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused
from lying.
Reply to Objection 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the
perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any
effect belong to the species of its cause.
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