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Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal
virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But
temperance is about those things that are furthest removed from reason,
namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a
principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is
it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to
be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For
it is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury
when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of
one provoked?" Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes
precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (FS,
Question 25, Article 4). But humility controls the presumption
of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal
virtue rather than temperance which controls concupiscence.
On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal
virtues (Moral. ii, 49).
I answer that, As stated above (Question 123, Article 11;
Question 61, Article 3), a principal or cardinal virtue is so
called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of
those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general.
Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise
principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned,
both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more
difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them,
and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as
stated above (Article 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a
principal or cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the
greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the
very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that
are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.
This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an
accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes,
although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness
of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause,
wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its
control regards a more principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object
of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the
irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the
appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
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