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Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human
acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within
itself." as Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Natura Hom.
xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle
(Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle of human acts is not
in man himself, but outside him: since man's appetite is moved to
act, by the appetible object which is outside him, and is as a "mover
unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is nothing
voluntary in human acts.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves
that in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion
from without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.
Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and
therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
Objection 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of
himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn.
15:5): "Without Me you can do nothing." Therefore there is
nothing voluntary in human acts.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the
voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are
human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human
acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the
principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which
is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside.
For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is
outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle
of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved
by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since
every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated
above (Question 1, Article 2); those are perfectly moved by an
intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of
movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be
done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore,
whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has
some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act,
so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if
a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic
principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting
or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else,
by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that
thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action
towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not
said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things
which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because
there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for
an end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic
principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the
movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word
"voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are from their own
inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of
Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [See Objection
1], the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle
within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge." Therefore,
since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in
his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every principle is a first principle.
Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the
nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or
moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the
voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet
again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be
first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things
subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly
body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is
moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the
voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first
principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by
an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
Reply to Objection 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded
by a motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far
as by means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted
with something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the
appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming
towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so
far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's
body, as in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being
affected by the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which
is the power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it
happens that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused
to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of
voluntariness, as stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by
an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing
the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but
also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the
will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just
as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from
God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God
moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act,
that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God.
Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common,
that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within
the agent.
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