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Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin
mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis,
serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if
drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and
drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would
always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to
be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, the Master says (Sentent. ii, D,
24) that delectation, if morose [Question 74, Article 6],
is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin.
Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a
venial sin to be mortal.
Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and
mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance
makes a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for
vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be
mortal.
On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity
cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,
because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an
act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason
of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the
quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said
(Question 72, Article 5, ad 1; Question 87, Article 5,
ad 1).
I answer that, As stated above (Question 7, Article 1;
Question 18, Article 5, ad 4; Articles 10,11), when we
were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an
accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be
taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its
nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act.
This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another
genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife,
the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be
another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to
justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and
accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as
adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin
become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For
it has been stated above (Article 1) that the deformity of a venial
sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the
end, whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about
the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot
make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance,
but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as
it were, the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that
draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except
perhaps by something accidental supervening. For an action does not
acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by
chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change
its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is
a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the
angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such
as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and
if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the
act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas,
if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the
consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the
angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a
man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in
jest that would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin,
however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if
it were to give rise to great scandal or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the
mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he
is directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly
contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of
ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the
wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting
drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a
sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk
frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will
seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to refrain from
excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except
in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters,
if the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through
imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad
1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be
morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be
evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated
above (Question 18, Article 5, ad 4).
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