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Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says
in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it
from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to
be derived from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though
things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one
who decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor
chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be
neither luck nor chance in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But
Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a
disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence
connects each one with its proper order."
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or
chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to
some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two
servants are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the
two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to
the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully
(De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said
above about Providence (Question 22, Article 2).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in
human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not
hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above
(Question 115, Article 4) that human actions are not subject to
the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now
the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by
fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what
takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally:
for it has been said (Question 115, Article 6) that what is
accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But
every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is
impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an
active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its
proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace finds a treasure.
Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a
natural principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural.
It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be
the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by
chance.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise
the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave
found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can
it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure
is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave
there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident,
by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts
by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone
can change the will, as shown above (Question 105, Article
4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of
which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were
"fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the
holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who
twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the
stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone
ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of
God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue." For this
reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first
objection's solution is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by
luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if
compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in
the world," as Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 24).
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