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Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue
from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But
diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since
there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore
prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should
be reckoned a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the
speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters
that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now
some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore,
should prudence be called an art.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good
counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain
arts also, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of
warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not
distinct from art.
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art
(Ethic. vi, 5).
I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a
different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above (Article 1;
Question 56, Article 3) that some habits have the nature of
virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some
habits are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good
work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the mere
aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas
prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use:
for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude
thereof.
The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of
things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason of things
to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in
Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing
into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth;
whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to
see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the
same relation to such like human actions, consisting in the use of
powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the
perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But
perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on
the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above
(Article 2, ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes
understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts
the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which
is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with
regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite.
Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, which
rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art
is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things
themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the
appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman
who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it
is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since
rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art.
Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
Reply to Objection 1: The various kinds of things made by art are
all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of
virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves:
hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a
speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for
they are both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that
may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues,
then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear
from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters
regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some
arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those
arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in
matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or
pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give
good counsel about all the concerns of life.
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