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Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary
according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to
its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin.
Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various
objects.
Objection 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its
malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to
which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that
which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary
according to their various objects.
Objection 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of
different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with
one another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq.
Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the
difference of objects.
On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was
shown above (Question 72, Article 1). But some sins are graver
than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than
theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their
objects.
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Question 71,
Article 5), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one
sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health
consists in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an
animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain
commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now
it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder of which causes
the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a
sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, which is the
principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous.
Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the graver, as the disorder
occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in
matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end:
wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the
graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above
(Question 72, Article 3, ad 2); and consequently the
difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is
clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man
is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about
the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which
is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin
committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and the
like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than
another according as it is about a higher or lower principle. And
forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference
of gravity which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as
resulting from the species.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the object is the matter about which
an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as
the intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (Question
72, Article 3, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on
the end, as was shown above (Question 72, Article 6; Question
18, Article 6).
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to
some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable
Good, which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various
degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those
things to which man turns.
Reply to Objection 3: All the objects of human acts are related to
one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so
far as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents
all sins from being compared with one another.
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