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Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume
two human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the
Incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine
Person, as is plain from what has been stated above (Question 2,
Articles 3,6). Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume
two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the
same species; which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the
nature of one species is only multiplied by distinct supposita.
Objection 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that
the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not
have one human nature; neither could it be said that there were
several, for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case
there would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis
is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole
Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e. to every
part of it, for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete
God and complete man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
7). But two human natures cannot be wholly united together,
inasmuch as the soul of one would be united to the body of the other;
and, again, two bodies would be together, which would give rise to
confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possibly for one Divine
Person to assume two human natures.
On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son
do. But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human
nature distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is
the power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the
Son. Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can
assume another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.
I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a
power limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite,
nor can it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said
that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to
assume another. For it would seem to follow from this that the
Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human
nature as to be unable to assume another to its Personality; and this
is impossible, for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any
creature. Hence it is plain that, whether we consider the Divine
Person in regard to His power, which is the principle of the union,
or in regard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it
has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the human
nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct human
nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A created nature is completed in its
essentials by its form, which is multiplied according to the division
of matter. And hence, if the composition of matter and form
constitutes a new suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is
multiplied by the multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of
the Incarnation the union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and
body, does not constitute a new suppositum, as was said above
(Article 6). Hence there can be a numerical multitude on the part
of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without
distinction of supposita.
Reply to Objection 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such
a hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the
two natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be
called one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said
above (Article 6, ad 1). But this does not seem to be true;
because we must use words according to the purpose of their
signification, which is in relation to our surroundings.
Consequently, in order to judge of a word's signification or
co-signification, we must consider the things which are around us, in
which a word derived from some form is never used in the plural unless
there are several supposita. For a man who has on two garments is not
said to be "two persons clothed," but "one clothed with two
garments"; and whoever has two qualities is designated in the singular
as "such by reason of the two qualities." Now the assumed nature
is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit at
all points, as has been said above (Question 2, Article 6, ad
1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human
natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum,
one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be one
people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on
account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine
Persons were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said
to be one man, as stated (Article 6, ad 1), not from the unity
of suppositum, but because they have some one thing in common.
Reply to Objection 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the
same relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is
related first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from
eternity; and afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine
Person, inasmuch as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not
indeed that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God
subsists in human nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but
is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the human nature may be
assumed by the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a
personal union with the whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts.
Now in the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the
Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it would not
be necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other,
i.e. all the parts of one with all the parts of the other.
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