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Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather
than the person. For Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad
Petrum): "The eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and
born of human nature, except in a true human nature." Consequently
it becomes the Divine Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the
human nature. Much more, therefore, does it regard human nature
itself.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
v), "nature" is so denominated from "nativity." But things are
denominated from one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it
seems that nativity regards the nature rather than the person.
Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins
to exist by nativity. But Christ's Person did not begin to exist by
His nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that
the nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii):
"Nativity regards the hypostasis, not the nature."
I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways:
first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that
is born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly
speaking, is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is
to be generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is
a thing born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking,
belongs to that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is
said to be only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or
hypostasis designates something as subsisting, nature designates form,
whereby something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to
the person or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but
not to the nature.
But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the
terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature
designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be "the
road to nature," as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the
purpose of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species.
Reply to Objection 1: On account of the identity of nature and
hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put instead of person or
hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature
was conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was
conceived and born in the human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: No movement or change is denominated from the
subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the
subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated
from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of
nativity.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin
to exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature.
Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something
is; whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.
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