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Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts
them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is
reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas
temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a
part of temperance.
Objection 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger.
But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of
touch, as stated above (Question 141, Article 4). Therefore
mildness is not a part of temperance.
Objection 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore
the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to
all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated
above (Question 58, Article 8). Therefore modesty is a part of
justice rather than of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8)
reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance
results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty,
moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says
[De Affectibus] that "the companions of temperance are gravity,
continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method,
contentment." Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned
the parts of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (Questions 48,128), a
cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral,
subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the
conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in
this respect there are two integral parts of temperance,
"shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is
contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one loves the beauty
of temperance. For, as stated above (Question 141, Article
2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a
certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in
disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a
virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter
or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of
two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as
regards meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly
there is "sobriety." Other pleasures are directed to the power of
procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act
itself of procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures
incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing,
touching, or fondling, we have "purity."
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary
virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some
principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein
moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to
moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate.
Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or
other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something,
may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the
soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body;
thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of
concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in
the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first
place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of
passion: and this movement is restrained by "continence," the effect
of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his
will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards
something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and
this is moderated or restrained by "humility." The third movement is
that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by
"meekness" or "mildness."
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has
three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and
what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in
what we do: this he assigns to "method." The second is that a man
observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to
"refinement." The third has to do with the conversation or any other
intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called
"gravity."
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be
observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius
assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we
must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius
ascribes "moderation," Andronicus "simplicity."
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that continence differs from
virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state
further on (Question 165, Article 1); and in this sense it is
condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance
both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to
mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned
as a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of
temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree
as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of external action justice
considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but
only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice
but of temperance.
Reply to Objection 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever
pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as
well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to
humility.
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