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Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is
not subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that
Daniel sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false
witness. But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they
were judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that
is not subject to his jurisdiction.
Objection 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He
was "King of kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet
He submitted to the judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man
may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.
Objection 3: Further, according to the law [Cap. Licet
ratione, de Foro Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court
according to his kind of offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not
the subject of the man whose business it is to judge in that particular
place, for instance when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is
exempt. Therefore it seems that a man may judge one that is not his
subject.
On the contrary, Gregory [Regist. xi, epist. 64] in
commenting on Dt. 23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's
corn," etc. says: "Thou mayest not put the sickle of judgment to
the corn that is entrusted to another."
I answer that, A judge's sentence is like a particular law regarding
some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law should have
coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too
the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby either
party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else the
judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not exercised in
human affairs, save by those who hold public authority: and those who
have this authority are accounted the superiors of those over whom they
preside whether by ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is
evident that no man can judge others than his subjects and this in
virtue either of delegated or of ordinary authority.
Reply to Objection 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised
an authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated
where it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the .
. . spirit of a young boy."
Reply to Objection 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own
accord to the judgment of others although these be not his superiors,
an example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by
arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be
upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising
authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion.
Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human
judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [Leo IV] submit to the
judgment of the emperor [Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii,
qu. 7].
Reply to Objection 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese
becomes the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even
though he be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter
exempt from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the
property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a
theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the
ordinary.
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