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Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at
once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But
the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part
of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an
angel can be in several places at once.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes;
and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear
that he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts
there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in
various places.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"where the angel operates, there he is." But occasionally he
operates in several places at one time, as is evident from the angel
destroying Sodom (Gn. 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in
several places at the one time.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while
the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth."
I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the
Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,
is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things,
and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now
since the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things,
but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power
must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since
all being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is
one particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence,
since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the
place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places,
but in only one place.
Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were
unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the
indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently
they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.
But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something
indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is
indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation.
Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one
indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible
or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own
free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the
entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one
place to him.
Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to
be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to
what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in
which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east:
hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power
of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly,
because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all
the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.
So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite
differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a
place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place.
An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he
is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a
place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither
circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.
From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because
the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied,
is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
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