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Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they
not see, who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all
things. Therefore those who see God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is
reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth
in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself.
Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also
all possible things.
Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can
understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God
does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever
understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.
Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to
know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all
things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing
God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he
who sees God knows all things.
On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not
know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii),
"the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior
angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of
secret thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore
whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest
that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things
are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all
things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is
clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects
can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as
one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge
of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for
he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect
can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in
the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created
intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above (Article 7).
Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God
does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of
what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more
perfectly it sees God.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being
sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and
shows forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God
knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a
mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance
comprehends the mirror itself.
Reply to Objection 3: Although it is more to see God than to see
all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all
things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all
things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has
been shown in this article that the more things are known in God
according as He is seen more or less perfectly.
Reply to Objection 4: The natural desire of the rational creature
is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect,
namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and
these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to
know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to
the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go
out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things
that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if
God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and
of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that
nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely
beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man
who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not
Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And
whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for
Thee alone."
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