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Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the
science of what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is
condivided with virtue, as appears in the Predicaments (vi).
Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there
is a virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5):
wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it
is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew
"to grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter]
all that there may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not
a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence
is immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4):
"Set bounds to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that
prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 55, Article
3; FS, Question 56, Article 1) when we were treating of
virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its possessor good,
and his work good likewise." Now good may be understood in a twofold
sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly,
formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good,
is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify the
consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the
appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct
man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good,
but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand
those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of
the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only
materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that
which is good under the aspect of good.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (Article 1, ad 3;
Article 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done
without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not
only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral
virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad
sense for any kind of right reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue
of art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite;
wherefore in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs
to have a virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has
nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a
particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet,
by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters
of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of
the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for
instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean
that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be
imposed on other things according to prudence.
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