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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that
it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense.
But there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56:
"The virtue of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a
good habit.
Objection 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is
not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5:
"Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at
drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor.
12:9): "Virtue is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity
is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also
to evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No
one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes
its possessor good, and his work good likewise."
I answer that, As we have said above (Article 1), virtue implies
a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the
limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must
needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says
(Div. Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this
reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good.
Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit,
productive of good works.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to
be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect
thief or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher
explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue
is applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be
law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so
as to attain to the limit of its possibility.
Reply to Objection 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink,
consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens
that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is
perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in
direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But
the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling
away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more
perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the
weakness of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human
virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in
infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the
lower powers.
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