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Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of
its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in
Evang.): "What is palpable must needs be corruptible." But the
glorified body is incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles
it. But that which can be in the same place with another does not
resist it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with
another body, it will not be palpable.
Objection 3: Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every
tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the
one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible
qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of
equality, it would seem that they are impalpable.
On the contrary, our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet
His body was palpable, as appears from Lk. 24:39: "Handle,
and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones." Therefore the
glorified bodies also will be palpable.
Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of
Constantinople, as Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said
that in the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.
I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely.
For every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of
touch has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and
the like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to
this, resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that
which passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible
indeed but not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said
to be palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible
qualities, and on account of its resisting that which touches it, so
as to hinder it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are
hot and cold and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light
bodies, which through being contrary to one another are therefore
corruptible, it follows that the heavenly bodies, which by their
nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible,
and therefore neither are they palpable. This is what Gregory means
when he says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "whatever is palpable must
needs be corruptible." Accordingly the glorified body has by its
nature those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the
touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it
is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like
manner it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body,
so that the latter cannot be in the same place together with it:
although, according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine
power that it occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer
no resistance to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the
glorified body is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable
to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says
(Hom. xxv in Evang.) that "our Lord offered His flesh to be
handled, which He had brought in through the closed doors, so as to
afford a complete proof that after His resurrection His body was
unchanged in nature though changed in glory."
Reply to Objection 1: The incorruptibility of a glorified body does
not result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account
of that nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated
above. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: Although in a way it is possible for a
glorified body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless
the glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one
touching it, and thus it is palpable.
Reply to Objection 3: In the glorified bodies the tangible
qualities are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to
equal distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean,
according as is most becoming to the human complexion in each part.
Wherefore the touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a
power always delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.
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