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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand
the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it
be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is
not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct.
Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the
object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect.
Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object
of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the
intellect.
Objection 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's
affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known;
nor by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now
it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of
things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses
thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such
affections of the soul as the acts of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I
understand that I will."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 59, Article 1), the
act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form
understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent
on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it
according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination
resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the
sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the
intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the
intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper
subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima
iii, 9)---that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever is
intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject.
Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both
inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the
nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle
which is the habit or power.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold good if the will and
the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers;
for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But
as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is
in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in
the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The "good" and the "true" which are the
objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is
contained in the other, as we have said above (Question 82,
Article 4, ad 1; Question 16, Article 4, ad 1); for the
true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will
fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the
will.
Reply to Objection 3: The affections of the soul are in the
intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in
their subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its
principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so
Augustine says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain
notions.
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