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Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to
dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed
from keeping it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev.
27:9,10, "A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if
anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a
better for a worse, nor a worse for a better." Much less,
therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
Objection 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters
concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially
those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of
God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a
vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine
law, as shown above (Article 3), and belongs to the precepts of
the First Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do
not admit of dispensation.
Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the
fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above (Article 3).
But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. Neither,
therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from a vow.
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has
apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its
force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore
it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same
sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as
stated above (FS, Question 96, Article 6; FS, Question
97, Article 4), a law is made with an eye to that which is good
in the majority of instances. But since, in certain cases this is not
good, there is need for someone to decide that in that particular case
the law is not to be observed. This is properly speaking to dispense
in the law: for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate
distribution or application of some common thing to those that are
contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense
food to a household.
In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it
were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the
majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular
case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater
good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a
vow, as is clear from what has been said above (Article 2).
Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is
not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular
vow is not to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that
vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was
to have been observed, the vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it
is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however,
are in the power of the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed
was deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow,
being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this
reason it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange
for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be
already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand,
an animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful
matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law
requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has
intervened.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and
Divine precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the
same heads to obey the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when
he is dispensed from keeping a human law, this does not involve
disobedience to that human law, for this would be contrary to the
natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to this---that
what was law is not law in this particular case. Even so, when a
superior grants a dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is
by his authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that
in this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow.
Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a
vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or
of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a
man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to
consider every circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require
that we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which
would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from
that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not
contrary to the fidelity due to God.
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