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Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath,"
"ill-will" and "rancor." For no genus derives its specific
differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect
of an accident: because "the beginning of the movement of anger is
called wrath cholos, if anger continue it is called ill-will menis;
while rancor kotos is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance."
Therefore these are not different species of anger.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv,
9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call
thymosis, and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides
intermittently"; while according to Damascene thymosis, is the same
as the Greek kotos [rancor]. Therefore kotos does not bide its time
for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three
degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with
utterance, and anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the
three degrees mentioned by Our Lord (Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever
is angry with his brother", and then, "whosoever shall say to his
brother, 'Raca'", and lastly, "whosoever shall say 'Thou
fool'". Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since it
takes no account of utterance.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.
Hom. xxi.].
I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory
of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger.
This happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement
itself, and he calls this kind of anger cholos [bile] because it
quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes
anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to menis
[ill-will] which is derived from menein [to dwell]. Thirdly, on
the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this
pertains to kotos [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged
[Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation .
. . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 5) calls some angry persons akrocholoi [choleric], because
they are easily angered; some he calls pikroi [bitter], because they
retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls chalepoi
[ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have retaliated
[SS, Question 158, Article 5].
Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind
of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently
nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems
to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain
quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no
reason why the Greek thymosis, which is denoted by the Latin
"furor," should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of
purpose in being avenged.
Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to
various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in
the very movement of anger.
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