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Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not
commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind
commands the mind to will, and yet it does not." But to will is the
act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can
understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command;
for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to
understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the
same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are
commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the
will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above (Article
1); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will
be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But
to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will
is not commanded.
On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our
command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power;
since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are
voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), command is nothing
else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion,
something to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act
of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something,
so it can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident
that an act of the will can be commanded.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9)
when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it
wills: but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the
fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from
the fact that the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not
to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to
command perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as each of the members of the body works
not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole
body that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the
intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers;
and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too.
Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will,
commands the act of the will for himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act
is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will
is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of
nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Question 9,
Article 4). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
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