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Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz.
"laziness, shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above
(FS, Question 41, Article 4), and which are not mentioned in
the division in question. Therefore this division of fear seems
unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil.
But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally
good, since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The
devils . . . believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in
Christ, according to Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be
heavy." Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from
that of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to
master. Now filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with
his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the
servant in comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which
seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to
be distinguished from all these other fears.
Objection 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do
initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made
between them.
Objection 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so
is fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is
the desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence
of the flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure.
Therefore "worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods,
is distinct from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own
person.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii,
D, 34).
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us
turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object
of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes,
on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to
Him. This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and
evil of fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear
of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child
to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of
both, it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As
to whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has
been treated above (FS, Question 42, Article 3) when we were
considering the passion of fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the
soul: whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to
God, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to
God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him:
wherefore all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral
good. Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so
it is not numbered among these kinds of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The relation of servant to master is based on
the power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to
whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste
fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes
our Father, according to Rm. 8:15, "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and
by this same charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor.
11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present
you as a chaste virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no
connection with these, since it does not include charity in its
definition.
Reply to Objection 4: These three fears regard punishment but in
different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which
turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict
or threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment
whereby men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by
God. Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial
fear regards it secondarily.
Reply to Objection 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away
from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
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