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Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational
animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring
them to something else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be
found in irrational animals, as stated above (Question 11,
Article 2). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to
use.
Objection 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use
them. But irrational animals apply their members to action; for
instance, their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore
it is possible for irrational animals to use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 30):
"None but a rational animal can make use of a thing."
I answer that, as stated above (Article 1), to use is to apply an
active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive
movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Question 15,
Articles 1,2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing,
can apply it to something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows
how to refer it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And
therefore none but a rational animal consents and uses.
Reply to Objection 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the
appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the
appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we
compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is
better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better
than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But
if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes
them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to
direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend
something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Animals by means of their members do
something from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of
their members to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking,
they do not apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
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