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Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in
mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since
He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all."
But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters
of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or
demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is
done away.
Objection 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by
divine providence, as was said above (Question 22, Articles
1,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God.
Therefore neither are men.
Objection 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well
as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them
there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as
Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to
take pity [miserendi]" [Question 22, Article 3]. Therefore
men are not predestined.
Objection 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are
revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit
of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the
things that are given us from God." Therefore if man were
predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his
predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is
clearly false.
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 8:30): "Whom He
predestined, them He also called."
I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For
all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above
(Question 22, Article 2). Now it belongs to providence to
direct things towards their end, as was also said (Question 22,
Articles 1,2). The end towards which created things are directed
by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of
created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above
(Question 12, Article 4). The other end, however, is
proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain
according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to
something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by
another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark.
Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal
life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason
of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the
order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be
providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be
done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done.
Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature
towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to
destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination,
as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition
of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are
predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He
does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence
predestination is not excluded by Him.
Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that
end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be
properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used
in respect of any other end.
Reply to Objection 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it
does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does
not take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term
"whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or
red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of
predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state
of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of
good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously
(Question 21, Articles 3,4).
Reply to Objection 4: Even if by a special privilege their
predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should
be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not
predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the
predestined.
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