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Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of
its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of
dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above
(Question 49, Article 2). But nature regards the essence of
the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its
essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form
thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence
and not in respect of its powers.
Objection 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident.
Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus
of accident, as we have said in the FP, Question 77, Article
1, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its
powers.
Objection 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the
subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it
is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore
habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various
habits in the various powers of the soul.
I answer that, As we have said above (Question 49, Articles
2,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or
to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation to
nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human
nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature;
so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be
found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the
soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a
higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2
Pt. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus
nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in
respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (Question 110,
Article 4).
On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it
is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the
soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many,
which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (Question
49, Article 4). And since the soul is the principle of operation
through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in
the soul in respect of its powers.
Reply to Objection 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human
nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something
further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of
accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain
order, the subject, according as it is under one accident, is
conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say
that one accident is the subject of another; as superficies is the
subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according
as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a
relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the
principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does
not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is
posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of
power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act
takes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to
potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and
time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
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