|
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For
hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost
among the virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is
the chief of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the
inclinations of our passions, according to Rm. 7:5: "The
passions of sins . . . did work in our members to bring forth fruit
unto death." Now all other passions of the soul seem to arise from
love and hatred, as was shown above (FS, Question 25, Articles
1,2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital
sins.
Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards
evil more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred
should be reckoned a capital sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred
among the seven capital sins.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 84, Articles
3,4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most
frequently. Now vice is contrary to man's nature, in as much as he
is a rational animal: and when a thing acts contrary to its nature,
that which is natural to it is corrupted little by little.
Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is less in
accordance with its nature, and last of all in that which is most in
accordance with its nature, since what is first in construction is last
in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural
to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the
Divine good, and of his neighbor's good. Wherefore hatred, which
is opposed to this love, is not the first but the last thing in the
downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and therefore it is not a
capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18,
"the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in
accordance with its nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the
virtues must be first and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity
is reckoned the foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred
cannot be first among the vices, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of
an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for
the reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the
hatred of such an evil may have priority over the other passions.
There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent
evil, which, namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is
reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of
such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the
former is not.
|
|