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Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power
of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those
things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But
appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire
good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the
appetite is not a special power of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects.
But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the
appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.
Objection 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper.
But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable
thing---namely its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to
this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign
some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive
power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii,
3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide
Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive
powers.
I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the
soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination
follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to
rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a
more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than
in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the
form is found to determine each thing only to its own being---that
is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a
natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in
those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own
natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is
nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example,
sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect,
of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all
things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have
knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all
things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a
higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be
in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is
called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to
the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to
desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by
its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power
to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Appetite is found in things which have
knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things,
as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul
a particular power.
Reply to Objection 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are
the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended
as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as
suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and
not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.
Reply to Objection 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature,
and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power
desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to
itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which
follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as
suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for
hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.
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