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Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to
all. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the
things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God."
But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore
it is unknown to all save God alone.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i,
6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things
should be most orderly." But all do not know how all things are most
orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi)
that "the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But
according to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows."
Therefore the eternal law is not known to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that
"knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us."
I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself;
secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is
found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it
by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in
itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every
rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For
every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of
the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain
extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and
as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more,
some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the
eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1: We cannot know the things that are of God,
as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their
effects, according to Rm. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made."
Reply to Objection 2: Although each one knows the eternal law
according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none
can comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its
effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the
eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of
things, whereby they are most orderly.
Reply to Objection 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two
ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object,
according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and
the palate of him that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of
judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can
judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is
put forward is true. In another way we speak of a superior judging of
a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should
be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
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