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Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being
confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in
you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the
perfection of that day will be eternal happiness. Therefore one man
may hope for another's eternal happiness.
Objection 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain
from Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness,
according to James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be
saved." Therefore we can hope for another's eternal happiness.
Objection 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object.
Now it is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else
Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom.,
Serm. lxxi) that we should not despair of anyone so long as he
lives. Therefore one can also hope for another's eternal salvation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is
only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for
them."
I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and
pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good.
Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly
regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him
as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term
which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards
directly one's own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet
if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and
desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly,
he can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to
him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man
loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue
of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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