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Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto
Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those
which are called participation gods. Therefore still less can other
creatures be said to be like God.
Objection 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can
be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore
neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness
is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God:
since God is no "genus," as shown above (Question 3, Article
5). Therefore no creature is like God.
Objection 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree
in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God
alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be
like to God.
Objection 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness;
for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God,
God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by
Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" (Is. 40:18).
On the contrary, It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gn. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall
be like to Him" (1 Jn. 3:2).
I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or
communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of
communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which
communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and
according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like,
but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be
alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another
way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to
the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but
according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like
another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third
way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same
form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in
non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far
as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its
form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If
therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect,
there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which
is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man
reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not
contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not
according to the formality of the same species; as things generated by
the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as
though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but
in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained
in any "genus," its effect will still more distantly reproduce the
form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness
of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic
formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is
common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they are
beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all
being.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix),
when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean
to deny all likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and
unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He,
Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as
they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and
remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is
more white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or
generically.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every
"genus," and as the principle of all "genera."
Reply to Objection 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed
on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures
are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is
like creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix):
"A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but
not between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a
statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be
spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a
creature.
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