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Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate
restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative
precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making
restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a man
is not bound to immediate restitution.
Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible.
But it is sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore
no man is bound to immediate restitution.
Objection 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of
justice. Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous
acts. Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts
of virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence,
it seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a
man be bound to restore at once.
On the contrary, All matters of restitution seem to come under one
head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not
delay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of
him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the
morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of
restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.
I answer that, Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's
property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the
property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the
use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear
that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is
bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus. 21:2,
"Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one is
bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a respite
from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the thing.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the precept about the making of
restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept
forbidding us to withhold another's property.
Reply to Objection 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this
very inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person
is altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable
to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another
to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission
or a respite.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is
contrary to virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as
determinate, and we are bound to observe it: and since delay of
restitution involves a sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just
detention, it stands to reason that the time is determinate in the
point of restitution being immediate.
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