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Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future
contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary
effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as
said above (Article 8). Since therefore that knowledge is
necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the
knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
Objection 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the
antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are
to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary
conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a
true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be,
it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now
the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it
is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the
consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God
knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent
things.
Objection 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily
be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and,
of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But
no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no
contingent future thing is known by God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath
made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their
works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being
subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
I answer that, Since as was shown above (Article 9), God knows
all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and
creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.
In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in
act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as
present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference)
to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this
it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to
the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause;
and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing
not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation
to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject
to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in
its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God
knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but
also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although
contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows
contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as
we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is
measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being
simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question
10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to
God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things
present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried
from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.
Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by
God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their
presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to
their own causes.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the
effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause;
just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the
proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is
the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are
contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of
God, which is the first cause, is necessary.
Reply to Objection 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew
this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent;
because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the
future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever
has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future
sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and
contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white
man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew
this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the
matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition.
Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or
contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it
may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said
Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and
contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely
necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is
absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the
consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But
this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its
antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent
effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass
will grow."
Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains
anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken
not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of
a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the
soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is
immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is
in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If
God knew anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as
it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its
presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent:
"For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as
the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.
Reply to Objection 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by
us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which
is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we
know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who
goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he
who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by
the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is
in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by
us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the
mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already
stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence
also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily
be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or
to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false;
for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If
understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is,
"This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is
necessary."
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good
with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I
said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false
as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a
thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a
white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are
inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for
instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both
senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the
thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection,
however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any
disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of
the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself
(even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far
as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is
attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch
as it is known.
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