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Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its
subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above
(Question 17, Article 1; FS, Question 40, Article 1).
Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the
irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add
another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which
is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the
will.
Objection 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts
at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power:
so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards
the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine
declares (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological
virtue having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in
the memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive
faculty, it follows that it is in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above (FP, Question 87, Article
2), habits are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a
movement of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good. And,
since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which
is divided into irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective
appetite, called the will, as stated in the FP, Question 82,
Article 5, those movements which occur in the lower appetite, are
with passion, while those in the higher appetite are without passion,
as shown above (FP, Question 87, Article 2, ad 1; FS,
Question 22, Article 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of
hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is
the principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine
good. Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will,
and not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of
charity are mutually related, as was shown above (Question 17,
Article 8). Hence there is no reason why both movements should not
belong at the same time to the same power: even as the intellect can
understand many things at the same time if they be related to one
another, as stated in the FP, Question 85, Article 4.
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