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Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a
better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation.
But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about
matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil
and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps.
75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob
vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this
above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only
about a better good.
Objection 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb.
11:32). Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his
vow (Judges 11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person
is not a better good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow
may be made not only about a better good, but also about something
unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the
person, or that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a
better good. Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or
fasts which tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about
indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a
vow is not always about a better good.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): "If thou wilt
not promise thou shalt be without sin."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), a vow is a promise
made to God. Now a promise is about something that one does
voluntarily for someone else: since it would be not a promise but a
threat to say that one would do something against someone. In like
manner it would be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to
him. Wherefore, as every sin is against God, and since no work is
acceptable to God unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing
unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the
matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while
necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary,
whether to be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it
would be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the
supposition of an end---for instance if salvation be unattainable
without it---it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done
voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.
But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the
supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most
properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in
comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.
Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better
good.
Reply to Objection 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the
faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these
things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for
salvation. The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may
also be explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his
God, by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not
bound, for instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned
further on in the same passage.
Reply to Objection 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their
result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely
speaking, the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result
may be; as those things which are sins in themselves, and these can
nowise be the matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves,
are good, and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an
evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with
the vow of Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30,31, "made
a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of
Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors
of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the
same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an
evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal
which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human
being. Hence Jerome says [1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in
Micheam vi, viii: Comment. in Jerem. vii.; Peter Comestor,
Hist. Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of
discretion, and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is
premised (Judges 11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came
upon him," because his faith and devotion, which moved him to make
that vow, were from the Holy Ghost; and for this reason he is
reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the victory which he
obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his sinful
deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something good.
Reply to Objection 3: The mortification of one's own body, for
instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so
far as it is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with
due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without
overburdening nature. on this condition such things may be the matter
of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rm. 12:1),
"Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God,"
adds, "your reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily
mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these
are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a
superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is
seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to
appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about
vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
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