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Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the
intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated
above (Article 1). But the operations of man are common to soul
and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are
habits. But the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii,
text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according
to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without
matter, is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has
potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same
time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only
in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is
form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the
same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in
the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which is composed of
soul and body.
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or
ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text.
25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of
the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it
is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with
soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are
not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is
the act of some part of the body.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts
science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first
principles, in the intellective part of the soul.
I answer that, concerning intellective habits there have been various
opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible"
[FP, Question 79, Article 2, ad 2] intellect for all men,
were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect
itself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that
men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of
knowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to
all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect
of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one
another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject,
but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in various
men.
Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of
Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are
rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic.
i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which
are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by
its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in
the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii,
text. 8,18) that when the "possible" intellect "is thus
identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in
respect of singulars by the intelligible species, "then it is said to
be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when
the intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even
then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way as
before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible"
intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the
intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to
consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to the
truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power
to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to consider
is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby
one considers is properly in the intellect itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his
Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man
is to a certain extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is
in the soul only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows
that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as
ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For
habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a
disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be
in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is
compared to the power as its object.
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and
body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima,
text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object
to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence
it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the
intellect itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common
to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible"
intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many:
and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect.
Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual
habits.
Reply to Objection 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to
corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the
"possible" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the
"possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and
perfect act.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly
prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore
it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good
disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to
understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in
these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect.
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