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Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by
anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or
work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of
the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge
of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.
Objection 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved
towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed,
but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
Objection 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own
nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle
of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain
necessity determined to something particular in their actions and
movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou,
O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius
says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by
mandate eternal."
I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of
the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an
opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by
observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things
happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the
case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an
end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in
things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a
well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it
in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting
Aristotle [Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a
consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above
(Question 44, Article 4; Question 65, Article 2), was
the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it
belongs to the best to produce the best," it is not fitting that the
supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their
perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the
attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness,
as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and
this is to govern.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two
ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational
creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the
means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an
end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow
directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the
arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the
unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows
clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
Reply to Objection 2: In all created things there is a stable
element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to
movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need
governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is
created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained
by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Question 104,
Article 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The natural necessity inherent in those
beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of
impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity
whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an
impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a
difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their
nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to
their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity
in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the
natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine
Providence.
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