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Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through
forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is
more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action.
But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is
prudence.
Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3)
"the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt
virtue." Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is
made up "of many memories," as he states at the beginning of his
Metaphysics (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to
memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
Objection 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of
universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through
forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."
I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one
can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because
they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge
alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above
(Article 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man
applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and
operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by
forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow
pervert the estimate of prudence": wherefore it is written (Dan.
13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted
thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou take bribes
which blind even the prudent."
Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.
Reply to Objection 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the
comparison fails, as stated above [FS, Question 53, Article
1].
Reply to Objection 2: The experience required by prudence results
not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding
aright.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the
knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated
above (Article 3). Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of
universals does not destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders
it somewhat, as stated above.
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