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Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is
"good"; as we said above (Question 5, Article 1). But every
being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph.
iv); therefore every being is good essentially.
Objection 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since
being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its
good. But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is
good essentially.
Objection 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness.
Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is
necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore
its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by
some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also;
therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness
which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things
but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good
essentially.
I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is
called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection
of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is
existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to
others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful,
wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (Question
3, Article 6); and He is not directed to anything else as to an
end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest
that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence;
therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.
Reply to Objection 1: "One" does not include the idea of
perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything
according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are
undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds
are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one
essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although everything is good in that it has
being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore
it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.
Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very
essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or
some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness
itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason
is it called being because by it something has being, not because it
itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is it
called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself
has some other goodness whereby it is good.
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