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Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not subject to Himself.
For Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Council of Ephesus
(Part I, ch. xxvi) received: "Christ is neither servant nor
master of Himself. It is foolish, or rather impious, to think or
say this." And Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. iii,
21): "The one Being, Christ, cannot be the servant or master
of Himself." Now Christ is said to be the servant of the Father
inasmuch as He is subject to Him. Hence Christ is not subject to
Himself.
Objection 2: Further, servant has reference to master. Now
nothing has a relation to itself, hence Hilary says (De Trin.
vii) that nothing is like or equal to itself. Hence Christ cannot be
said to be the servant of Himself, and consequently to be subject to
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, "as the rational soul and flesh are one
man; so God and man are one Christ," as Athanasius says (Symb.
Fid.). Now man is not said to be subject to himself or servant to
himself or greater than himself because his body is subject to his
soul. Therefore, Christ is not said to be subject to Himself
because His Manhood is subject to His Godhead.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Truth
shows in this way" (i.e. whereby the Father is greater than Christ
in human nature) "that the Son is less than Himself."
Further, as he argues (De Trin. i, 7), the form of a servant
was so taken by the Son of God that the form of God was not lost.
But because of the form of God, which is common to the Father and
the Son, the Father is greater than the Son in human nature.
Therefore the Son is greater than Himself in human nature.
Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of God the
Father, according to Jn. 20:17: "I ascend to My Father and
to your Father to My God and your God." Now whoever is the
servant of the Father is the servant of the Son; otherwise not
everything that belongs to the Father would belong to the Son.
Therefore Christ is His own servant and is subject to Himself.
I answer that, As was said above (Article 1, ad 2), to be
master or servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a
nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of
Himself, or that the Word of God is the Master of the Man
Christ, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that this is
understood to be said by reason of another hypostasis or person, as if
there was the person of the Word of God ruling and the person of the
man serving; and this is the heresy of Nestorius. Hence in the
condemnation of Nestorius it is said in the Council of Ephesus
(Part III, ch. i, anath. 6): "If anyone say that the Word
begotten of God the Father is the God or Lord of Christ, and does
not rather confess the same to be at once God and man as the Word made
flesh, according to the Scriptures, let him be anathema." And in
this sense it is denied by Cyril and Damascene (Objection 1); and
in the same sense must it be denied that Christ is less than Himself
or subject to Himself. Secondly, it may be understood of the
diversity of natures in the one person or hypostasis. And thus we may
say that in one of them, in which He agrees with the Father, He
presides and rules together with the Father; and in the other nature,
in which He agrees with us, He is subject and serves, and in this
sense Augustine says that "the Son is less than Himself."
Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name "Christ" is the
name of a Person, even as the name "Son," those things can be
predicated essentially and absolutely of Christ which belong to Him by
reason of the Person, Which is eternal; and especially those
relations which seem more properly to pertain to the Person or the
hypostasis. But whatever pertains to Him in His human nature is
rather to be attributed to Him with a qualification; so that we say
that Christ is simply greatest, Lord, Ruler, whereas to be subject
or servant or less is to be attributed to Him with the qualification,
in His human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Cyril and Damascene deny that Christ is the
head of Himself inasmuch as this implies a plurality of supposita,
which is required in order that anyone may be the master of another.
Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is necessary that the
master and the servant should be distinct; yet a certain notion of
mastership and subservience may be preserved inasmuch as the same one is
master of Himself in different respects.
Reply to Objection 3: On account of the divers parts of man, one
of which is superior and the other inferior, the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 11) that there is justice between a man and himself
inasmuch as the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence
this way a man may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as
regards His different parts.
To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what has been said.
For Augustine asserts that the Son is less than, or subject to,
Himself in His human nature, and not by a diversity of supposita.
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