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Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than
the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more
lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even
than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues:
and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore
they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its
possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral
virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in
respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means.
But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right
intention of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the
means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence,
which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.
On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is
rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the
essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now
rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation.
Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.
I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two
ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders
something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches,"
and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want"
[Aristotle, Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to
consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue
takes its species from its object, as explained above (Question
54, Article 2; Question 60, Article 1). Hence, speaking
simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent
object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more
excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends
things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things
themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular.
Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which
perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which
perfect the appetite.
But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue,
which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other
powers to act, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1), is more
excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of
action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the
nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue,
though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply
speaking.
Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the
intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining
to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of
the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting
than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters
of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life,
proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively.
Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that
they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred
to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we
have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the
knowledge of truth, as stated above (Question 3, Article 6).
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why man is said to be good
simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual
virtue, is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts,
as stated above (Question 56, Article 3). Wherefore this
argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only
in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the
end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to
that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of
prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.
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