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Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God is man."
For every affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this
proposition, "God is man," is on remote matter, since the forms
signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart.
Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would
seem to be false.
Objection 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater
mutual agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the
mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another;
for we do not say that the Father is the Son, or conversely.
Therefore it seems that the human nature ought not to be predicated of
God by saying that God is man.
Objection 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) that,
"as the soul and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one
Christ." But this is false: "The soul is the body." Therefore
this also is false: "God is man."
Objection 4: Further, it was said in the FP, Question 39,
Article 4. that what is predicated of God not relatively but
absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons.
But this word "man" is not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it
is predicated of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each
of the Persons is man; and this is clearly false.
On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:6,7): "Who being
in the form of God . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a
servant, being made in the likeness of man, and in habit found as a
man"; and thus He Who is in the form of God is man. Now He Who
is in the form of God is God. Therefore God is man.
I answer that, This proposition "God is man," is admitted by all
Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the
proposition, but not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the
Manicheans say the Word of God is man, not indeed true, but
fictitious man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed an
imaginary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is
called man if it has the figure of a man. So, too, those who held
that Christ's body and soul were not united, could not say that God
is true man, but that He is figuratively called man by reason of the
parts. Now both these opinions were disproved above (Question 2,
Article 5; Question 5, Article 1).
Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny
the reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is
God and man, is God not naturally, but by participation, i.e. by
grace; even as all other holy men are called gods---Christ being
more excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant
grace. And thus, when it is said that "God is man," God does not
stand for the true and natural God. And this is the heresy of
Photinus, which was disproved above (Question 2, Articles
10,11). But some admit this proposition, together with the
reality of both terms, holding that Christ is true God and true man;
yet they do not preserve the truth of the predication. For they say
that man is predicated of God by reason of a certain conjunction either
of dignity, or of authority, or of affection or indwelling. It was
thus that Nestorius held God to be man---nothing further being
meant than that God is joined to man by such a conjunction that man is
dwelt in by God, and united to Him in affection, and in a share of
the Divine authority and honor. And into the same error fall those
who suppose two supposita or hypostases in Christ, since it is
impossible to understand how, of two things distinct in suppositum or
hypostasis, one can be properly predicated of the other: unless merely
by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they are united in something,
as if we were to say that Peter is John because they are somehow
mutually joined together. And these opinions also were disproved above
(Question 2, Articles 3,6).
Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true
Divine Nature is united with true human nature not only in person,
but also in suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is
true and proper, "God is man"---not only by the truth of its
terms, i.e. because Christ is true God and true man, but by the
truth of the predication. For a word signifying the common nature in
the concrete may stand for all contained in the common nature, as this
word "man" may stand for any individual man. And thus this word
"God," from its very mode of signification, may stand for the
Person of the Son of God, as was said in the FP, Question 39,
Article 4. Now of every suppositum of any nature we may truly and
properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the concrete, as
"man" may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato.
Hence, since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word
"God" stands, is a suppositum of human nature this word man may be
truly and properly predicated of this word "God," as it stands for
the Person of the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 1: When different forms cannot come together in
one suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the
subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two
forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote,
but natural or contingent, as when I say: "Something white is
musical." Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely
apart, nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation in
one suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both]
essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in
contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of God
accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its
hypostasis---not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this
word "God," but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis
of human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one
Nature, and are distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not
predicated one of another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the
natures, being distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the
abstract. For the Divine Nature is not the human nature. But
because they agree in suppositum, they are predicated of each other in
the concrete.
Reply to Objection 3: "Soul" and "flesh" are taken in the
abstract, even as Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say
"animate" and "carnal" or "corporeal," as, on the other hand,
"God" and "man." Hence in both cases the abstract is not
predicated of the abstract, but only the concrete of the concrete.
Reply to Objection 4: This word "man" is predicated of God,
because of the union in person, and this union implies a relation.
Hence it does not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely
predicated of God from eternity.
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