|
Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse
than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist
the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful,
indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and
overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is
more difficult to resist desire than anger" [Ethic. ii. 3].
Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of
anger.
Objection 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the
passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as
in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that
is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than
one who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason
somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the
incontinent in desire.
Objection 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it
is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since
it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more
grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of
desire."
I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two
ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall
of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than
incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more
inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for
this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6:
First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason,
since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason
dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto
perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. on
the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with
sense and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the
movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the
quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one
who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry
than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent:
wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are
disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the
children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to
concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of
the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger
seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself
and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to
concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as
though forced by a certain previous displeasure.
Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the
evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus
incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because
it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure
perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for
the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its
impetuousness.
Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without
reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason,
but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this
reason it is more disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers incontinence with
regard to its result.
|
|