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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels.
For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The
will is in the reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but
something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the
angels, but something higher than the will.
Objection 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as
is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But
the appetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of
something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no
imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems
that there is no will in them.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii,
text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved
by the appetible object understood. Now the angels are immovable,
since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that
the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory,
understanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the
soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of
knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.
I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In
evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by
appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to
good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and
inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural
appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some
knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they
apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the
sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this
apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things,
again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby
they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect.
This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed,
as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good
only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular
good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as
inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed
"will." Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the
universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in
them.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way
from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense
according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of
particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore
there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which
appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards
particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and
reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect
knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of
discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion
reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the
universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty
on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same.
Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no
appetite higher than the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is
derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part
reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things;
thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot
[laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the
same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira];
though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as
hope, daring, and the rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is called a mover which is moved,
according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind;
and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in
the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as
stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.
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