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Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince
is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit.
iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government.
But no species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of
government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called
"timocracy" [Ethic. viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and
"democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be
ascribed to a kingdom.
Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but
also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people,
according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore
it is not becoming to substitute regnative prudence in its place.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that
"prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a
special kind of prudence is regnative.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 47, Articles
8,10), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that
wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and
command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident
that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to
govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or
kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according as it is
more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end.
Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a
king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which
reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue
belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord
with prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as
stated above (Question 47, Article 5, ad 1; FS, Question
58, Article 2, ad 4). For this reason also the execution of
justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part
of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two
virtues---prudence and justice---belong most properly to a king,
according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and shall be wise,
and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since,
however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his
subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is
directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as
stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence
should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend
under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not
perverse forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly,
do not pertain to prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence
after the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although
this applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far
as they have a share of kingly government.
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