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Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly.
For injustice is inequality, as stated above (Article 2). Now a
man by injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring
another. Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to
another. But whoever does himself an injustice, does so
involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice
especially if it be inflicted by himself.
Objection 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except
for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly
punished according to the law of the state by being deprived of an
honorable burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11).
Therefore a man can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may
happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily.
Objection 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who
suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice
to one who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than
it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice
voluntarily.
On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore
on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys.
iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the
will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does
voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he
suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a
principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather
than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly
speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an
injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so
to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to
be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally),
or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to
another more than he owes him).
Reply to Objection 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another
that which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor
inequality. For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is
no disproportion if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either
by his own or by another's action.
Reply to Objection 2: An individual person may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an
injury on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of
sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice;
because injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another
person. Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to
the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature
and image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed
to himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished
in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle
declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any
man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."
Reply to Objection 3: Suffering is the effect of external action.
Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material
element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as
stated above (Article 2), and the formal and essential element is
on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above
(Article 2). Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by
one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another,
in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can
do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the
other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers
voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he
suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury
unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
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