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Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by
defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by
healing a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if
he can defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals
a desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but
ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.
Objection 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing
a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief
(Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an
advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause, when once he has
undertaken its defense.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an
advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by
producing false witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an
unjust cause, since the former is a sin against the form, the latter
against the matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an
advocate to make use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for
a soldier to lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an
advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause.
On the contrary, It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou
helpest the ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . .
the wrath of the Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust
cause, helps the ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of
the Lord.
I answer that, It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by
counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or
assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says
(Rm. 1:32) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only
they that do" a sin, "but they also that consent to them that do"
it. Hence it was stated above (Question 62, Article 7), that
all such are bound to restitution. Now it is evident that an advocate
provides both assistance and counsel to the party for whom he pleads.
Wherefore, if knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he
sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss unjustly
incurred by the other party by reason of the assistance he has
provided. If, however, he defends an unjust cause unknowingly,
thinking it just, he is to be excused according to the measure in which
ignorance is excusable.
Reply to Objection 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking
to heal a desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in
an unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads
unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to
deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by
reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil
end.
Reply to Objection 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that
the cause is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is
proceeding that it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in
such a way as to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of
his client to the other party. But he can and must give up the case,
or induce his client to give way, or make some compromise without
prejudice to the opposing party.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question 40, Article
3), it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a
just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by
means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a
foe, as Tully says (De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful
for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal whatever
might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any
kind of falsehood.
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