|
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the
natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above
(Article 2). Now through the eternal law "all things are most
orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6).
Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human
affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.
Objection 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as
stated above (Question 90, Article 1). But human reason is not
a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text.
5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.
Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated
in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in
matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: "The
thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain."
Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes
two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls
human.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 90, Article 1, ad
2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be
observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the
speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions,
as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude
that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known
indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various
sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but
acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of
the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that
the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination
of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human
reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions
of law be observed, as stated above (Question 90, Articles
2,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain
things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these
things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were
sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."
Reply to Objection 1: The human reason cannot have a full
participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to
its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the
speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom,
there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not
proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the
Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has
a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain
general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of
individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law.
Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by
law.
Reply to Objection 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of
things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general
rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the
natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure
of things that are from nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The practical reason is concerned with
practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with
necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned.
Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the
demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every
measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is
possible in its own particular genus.
|
|