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Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed
from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something,
this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from
something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what
is generated, it follows that something different from the Father
exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary
(De Trin. vii) that, "In them nothing diverse or different
exists." If the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again
that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent,
receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say,
"The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he
is made white---it follows that either the Father does not remain
after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is
false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something,
but from nothing.
Objection 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the
principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the
Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or
nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a
material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and
therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is
the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence
generates, which was disproved above (Question 39, Article 5).
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that
the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is
not another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not
another thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not
from the Father's essence.
Objection 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in
Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus.
24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the
mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures": and
further on (Ecclus. 24:14) it is said as uttered by the same
Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world was I
created." Therefore the Son was not begotten from something, but
from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by
reason of what is said (Zach. 12:1): "Thus saith the Lord
Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the
earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos
4:13) according to another version [The Septuagint]: "I Who
form the earth, and create the spirit."
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i,
1) says: "God the Father, of His nature, without beginning,
begot the Son equal to Himself."
I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the
Father's substance. For it was explained above (Question 27,
Article 2; Question 33, Articles 2,3) that paternity,
filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is
the difference between true "generation," whereby one proceeds from
another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes something out
of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas
a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a
thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will be
shown later on (Question 45, Article 1), not as if this nothing
were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole
substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever
presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of
nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what the thing made is
to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not
apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son of God
proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and
truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1 Jn.
5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ."
Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made,
but begotten.
That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of
God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain
likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as
He is the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only
begotten," according to Jn. 1:18, "The only begotten Son,
Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so
as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him,
He is called the "first begotten," according to Rm. 8:29:
"Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to
the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many
brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of
the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part
of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the
one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it
necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not
transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to
Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above
(Question 40, Article 2).
Reply to Objection 1: When we say that the Son was born of the
Father, the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating
principle, but not a material principle. For that which is produced
from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is
produced. But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not
susceptive of another form.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the
essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains
(Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude of a kind of active
principle, and as he expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence
of the Father"---that is, of the Father Who is essence; and so
Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I say of the
Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly,
of the essence of the Father."
This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the
words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence;
but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them
otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always
denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de]
the builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say,
however, that something is "of" another, if this is its
consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it
be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or
a material principle, as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal
principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting,
and not accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is "of"
an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is
begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of
the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the
essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction.
But when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence,
there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the
preposition, so there is no parity of argument.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this
may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of
created wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He
created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured
her out over all His works" (Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it
inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten
and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of participation of
the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created
nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the
beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I was
foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both
created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine
generation; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of
the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the
Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the
Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and
begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of
the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature
in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of
this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do
not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes
called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes
also the soul, or any other invisible substance.
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