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Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied
to God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common
precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal
name, belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential
sense it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father"
to the whole Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an
essential name before its personal sense.
Objection 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same
there is no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem
to be of the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of
the Son, and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's;
since, according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is
common to the creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God
is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally.
Objection 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which
have not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by
reason of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15:
"Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every
creature." Therefore paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior
to, but has the same concept as, paternity taken essentially.
On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is
the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the
creature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal
sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the
creature.
I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly
contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which
only partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of
a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the
signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from
perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied first to the
animal containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so
called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's
nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said
by way of similitude.
Now it is manifest from the foregoing (Question 27, Article 2;
Question 28, Article 4), that the perfect idea of paternity and
filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son,
because one is the nature and glory of the Father and the Son. But
in the creature, filiation is found in relation to God, not in a
perfect manner, since the Creator and the creature have not the same
nature; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more perfect
the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is
called the Father of some creatures, by reason only of a trace, for
instance of irrational creatures, according to Job 38:28: "Who
is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" Of some,
namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by reason of the
likeness of His image, according to Dt. 32:6: "Is He not thy
Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee?" And of others
He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called
adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift
of grace which they have received, according to Rm. 8:16,17:
"The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the
sons of God; and if sons, heirs also." Lastly, He is the Father
of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained
possession of the heritage of glory, according to Rm. 5:2: "We
glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore it is
plain that "paternity" is applied to God first, as importing regard
of one Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God
to creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order
of our intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are
included in the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely.
For in the concept of the person of the Father, God is understood;
but not conversely. But common terms which import relation to the
creature come after proper terms which import personal relations;
because the person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the
production of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the
artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing
designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the
artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the
creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates
in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words of Rm.
8:29: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable
to the image of His Son."
Reply to Objection 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the
creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a
certain remote similitude whereby He is called the First Born of
creatures. Hence the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be
the First Born among many brethren," after saying that some were
conformed to the image of the Son of God. But the Son of God
possesses a position of singularity above others, in having by nature
what He receives, as Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide);
hence He is called the only begotten (Jn. 1:18): "The only
begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto
us."
From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.
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