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Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who
have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow
from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another,
according to Ex. 20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous,
visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third
and fourth generation." Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan
was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants
were struck with leprosy (4 Kgs. 5). Again the blood of Christ
lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they
said (Mt. 27:25): "His blood be upon us and upon our
children." Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel
were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan,
and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on account
of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kgs. 4). Therefore a person
is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a
man's power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his
power; thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on
account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an
episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people.
Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now
vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the
people of Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished
with their parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and
Abiron their children were swallowed up together with them (Num
16). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were
commanded to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1
Kgs. 15). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who
have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness.
But a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being
compelled by fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes
taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in
which Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm
in the security of his own merits, was in distress about those of
others." But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a
person is sometimes punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is
voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract.
i). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have
deserved it voluntarily.
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First,
under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due
save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is
restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his
own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore,
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated
above (FS, Question 81, Article 1), it follows that no one
is punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily.
Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only
healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or
conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes punished
without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never
blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is
harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater
consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest
consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a
person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own.
Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life
for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual
goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future
life, because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result
of spiritual condemnation.
Reply to Objection 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects
the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But
sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the
sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man
may be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their
master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another,
either by "imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents,
and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater
daring; or by way of "merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful
superior, according to Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a
hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of
Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2
Kgs. 24). This may also happen through some kind of "consent"
or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good are punished in
temporal matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned
their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly,
in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is
bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to
inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects
all, as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of
the sin of Achan (Questions. sup. Josue viii). The saying of
the Lord, "Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children
unto the third and fourth generation," seems to belong to mercy rather
than to severity, since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but
waits for some future time, in order that the descendants at least may
mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the descendants
increase, it becomes almost necessary to take vengeance on them.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states (Questions. sup.
Josue viii), human judgment should conform to the divine judgment,
when this is manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own
sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden
judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons in temporal matters
without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons
of these judgments so as to know what is expedient for each individual.
Wherefore according to human judgment a man should never be condemned
without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death,
mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to
human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault
on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance
through the sin of his parent.
Reply to Objection 3: By the judgment of God children are punished
in temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are
a possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also
in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they
be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus
deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on
dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way
their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
Reply to Objection 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above (FS, Question 6, Articles 5,6).
Reply to Objection 5: The other apostles were distressed about the
sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin
of one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply Objection
1,2).
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