|
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love.
For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is
the cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that
"among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with one another."
Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that
"a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he
loves an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not
be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a
man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would
like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
Objection 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if
he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves
riches. But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike
them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of
love.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4)
that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those
who retain their friendship for the dead." But all are not such.
Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every
beast loveth its like."
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love.
But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One
kind of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality
actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness
are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing
having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other
has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its
proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper
place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its
act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality
itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or
well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it
were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form:
thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white
men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to
the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to
himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of
concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure:
because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its
act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and
cognitive being.
Now it has been stated above (Question 26, Article 4), that in
the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves
himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself
more than another: because he is one with himself substantially,
whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form.
Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the
participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he
loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for
hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel
among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why
"there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one
another in attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he
loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion:
because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the
former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good
singer love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion,
inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect of his
art.
Reply to Objection 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a
likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its
act, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the same likeness of
potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is
liberal, in so far as he expects from him something which he desires.
The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as
compared to one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems
to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not all men
have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according
to certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which
principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being
in conformity with his own natural reason.
|
|