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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not
multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one
intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in
number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial
substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown
above (Question 75, Article 5). Therefore there are not many
human souls in one species. But all men are of one species.
Therefore there is but one intellect in all men.
Objection 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is
also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to
the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the
number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be
but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with
the distinction of rewards and punishments.
Objection 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your
intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for
individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species.
Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to
the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would
be received individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which
is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.
Objection 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect
which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from
yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is
understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something
individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the
common intention will have to be abstracted from both; since from
things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted.
But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the
intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It
seems, therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men.
Objection 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the
master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge
in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form,
such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that
the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to
the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both.
Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and master is but
one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii)
says: "If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should
laugh at myself." But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of
the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the
relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of
particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul,
one in species, should belong to animals of different species.
Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should
belong to several individuals.
I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to
belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is
the intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato
are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by
something outside the essence of each. The distinction between
Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic
and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.
It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the
opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the
intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.
For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form,
as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the
principle of existence.
Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the
manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is
manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two
instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but
several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two
hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the
contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we
might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if
there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many
drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent,
and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as
when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one
stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or
coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all
the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey
the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two
men to have several intellects and one sense---for instance, if two
men had one eye---there would be several seers, but one sight. But
if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those
things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it
possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one
understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is
the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the
intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent
and one action: that is to say that all men are but one
"understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard,
that is, of one intelligible object.
However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action
form yours by the distinction of the phantasms---that is to say,
were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you---if
the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were
a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to
divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of
things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the
phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the
intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now
in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only
one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom
there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only
one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the
intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of
a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if
there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which
are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual
operation in this man and that man. It follows, therefore, that it
is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists
one intellect for all men.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an
angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of
a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore,
according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one
species; while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one
species.
Reply to Objection 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it
has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as
we judge of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by
virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet,
after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its
own being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion
to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the
bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being.
Reply to Objection 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or
of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the
understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are
subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not
understand universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the
species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For
as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent
acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is
according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it
is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of
the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if
the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material---that is,
not abstracted from material conditions---its likeness to the nature
of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and
multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so
that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible.
But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual
matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things
which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of
the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point,
whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were
but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the
species whereby it understands, an individual species.
Reply to Objection 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what
is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not
according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the
stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De
Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the
likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on
itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but
only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things,
according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And
since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower
to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be
known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for
several see the same color, according to different likenesses. In the
same way several intellects understand one object understood. But
there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle,
between the sense and the intelligence---that a thing is perceived by
the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul
---that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing
understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which
it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is
understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the
individuating principles; whereas such is not its mode of existence
outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing
understood exists outside the soul in the same condition as those under
which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things
exist separate from matter.
Reply to Objection 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and
another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on
(Question 117, Article 1).
Reply to Objection 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that
would involve a plurality of species.
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