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Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For
whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now
just as the words of Gn. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in
"paradise, thou shalt eat," indicate a precept of the natural law,
in reference to the preservation of the individual, so also the words
of Gn. 1:28, "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,"
express a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation
of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from
all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of the
individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of
procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species.
Objection 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is
apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and
abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from
all is loutish and insensible." Therefore virginity is something
sinful.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now
in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as
Valerius Maximus asserts [Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence
according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to
have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for his
perpetual continency as though it were a sin." Therefore virginity is
a sin.
On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But
virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor.
7:25): "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord:
but I give counsel." Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.
I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against
right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end
should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's
good is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in
external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily
goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the
goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the
active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our
Lord declared (Lk. 10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better
part." Of these goods those that are external are directed to those
which belong to the body, and those which belong to the body are
directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which
belong to the active life are directed to those which belong to the life
of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use
external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like
manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing
certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for
the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of truth, this
is not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like manner if a
man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to give himself
to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude
of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in
order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): "The unmarried woman and the
virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in
both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the
things of the world, how she may please her husband." Therefore it
follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above
(Question 122, Article 1). Now there are two kinds of duty.
There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty
of this kind cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be
fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is
not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many
obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are
fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that.
Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man to eat must
needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot
be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards
the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body,
but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is
made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal
procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves to the
contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the
whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others
are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these
things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by
one person.
Reply to Objection 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right
reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above.
Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of
the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes
to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean."
Reply to Objection 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone
refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation
of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not
through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because
he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen," as
Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).
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