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Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in
Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as
contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is
plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now
Christ in His different wills wished contrary things. For in His
Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human
will, hence Athanasius says [De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos,
written against Apollinarius]: "When Christ says 'Father, if it
be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but
Thine be done,' and again, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but the
flesh weak,' He denotes two wills---the human, which through the
weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion---and His Divine will
eager for the passion." Hence there was contrariety of wills in
Christ.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the
flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."
Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there
is contrariety of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of
charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed
the passion, according to Is. 53:7: "He was offered because it
was His own will," yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion.
Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 22:43) that
"being in an agony, He prayed the longer." Now agony seems to
imply a certain struggle [Greek, agonia] in a soul drawn to contrary
things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.
On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council [Third
Council of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess
two natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics
assert, but following His human will, and neither withstanding nor
striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and
omnipotent will."
I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition
in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as
regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not
suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of
contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards
his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be
contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the
diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one
regards the doing of something with reference to some universal reason,
and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to
some particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will,
e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the
commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be
hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills;
unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish
to hinder the public good for the private good---in that case the
opposition of wills would regard the same.
Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be
in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational
appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there
is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to
change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case
something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would reach
the rational will.
And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive
will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there
was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the
natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which
the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the
passion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the
human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake
of something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise
extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor the
will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or
the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the
Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded
the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the
sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will,
and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of
sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature.
Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or
contrariety of wills.
Reply to Objection 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing
something else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine
will, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its
proper movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
15,18,19).
Reply to Objection 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded
or retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in
Christ. Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and
spirit, as in us.
Reply to Objection 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational
soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a
diversity of motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one,
wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the
contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is
unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in
Christ, since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will
regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His
passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the
sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18,23).
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