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Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason
but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna
says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by
disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs to
the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above
(Question 9, Article 1). Therefore command is an act of the
will.
Objection 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which
is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most
free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore
to command belongs to the will.
Objection 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the
act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges
that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore
command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xvi.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the
appetite obeys reason." Therefore command is an act of the reason.
I answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing,
however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note
that, since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to
bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing,
and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason
precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of
the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens
sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in
itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in
reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of
the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the
will.
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the
commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of
intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring
is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare
something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is
expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to
another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, the
reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this
intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is
said to someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the powers
of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above
(Question 9, Article 1). Since therefore the second mover does
not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very
fact that the reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the
will. Consequently it follows that command is an act of the reason,
presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its
command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act.
Reply to Objection 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by
intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The root of liberty is the will as the
subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can
tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can
have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the
free-will as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying
that reason is the root of liberty.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that command is an act
of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
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