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Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ
generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some
generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be
generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated
above (Question 18, Article 2). Now either mortal or venial
sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can
love any mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial
sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and
mortal sin do not differ generically.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article 1; Question
72, Article 5; Question 87, Article 3), a sin is called
mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now
irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which,
according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to
sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible.
Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice
differs from sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in
this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above
(Question 77, Article 8, ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal
sin do not differ generically.
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above (Question 74,
Article 3, ad 3; Article 10) that sudden movements both of the
sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements
occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial.
On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De
Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and
certain generic mortal sins.
I answer that, Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has
been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin
venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, a
sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either
partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as
when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin
committed through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial
"from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the
last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting
punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now.
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no
determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can
have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically,
and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an
act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a
thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to
his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of
God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love
of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like:
wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes,
however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain
inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and
one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so
forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and
malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of
the agent, as stated above (Question 18, Articles 4,6), it
happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of
its object, becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he
fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that
is a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle
word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on
the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal because venial,
by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by
reason, which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said
above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief.
Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something
that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the
love of God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves
God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of
themselves contrary to charity, that something is loved more than
God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are
venial from their cause.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are
venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
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