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Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge
except the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be
known thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things.
Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.
Objection 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater.
But all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of
God is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in
Christ no other knowledge except the Divine.
Objection 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the
Divine took place in the Person, as is clear from Question 2,
Article 2. Now, according to some there is in Christ a certain
"knowledge of the union," whereby Christ knew what belongs to the
mystery of the Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since
the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that there are
not two knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both
natures.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God
assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon
Himself the sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh."
But created knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in
Christ there was created knowledge.
I answer that, As said above (Question 5), the Son of God
assumed an entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a
soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And
therefore it behooved Him to have created knowledge, for three
reasons. First, on account of the soul's perfection. For the
soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to knowing intelligible
things. since it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written," and
yet it may be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it
may become all things, as is said De Anima iii, 18. Now what is
in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. But it was fitting
that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect
human nature, since the whole human race was to be brought back to
perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be
perfected by a knowledge, which would be its proper perfection. And
therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in
Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ
would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men.
Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its operation,
as stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an intellective
soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and this pertains
to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created knowledge
pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby we
naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge for
any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting
to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated above
(Question 5). And hence the Sixth Council [Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the opinion of those who denied
that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine
knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God;
since God's understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher
proves (Metaph. xii, text. 39). Hence this act could not
belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another
nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul
of Christ, it would have known nothing; and thus it would have been
assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of its
operation.
Reply to Objection 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the
same order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the
sun dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of
illuminants. But if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the
class of illuminants and the other in the class of illuminated, the
lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened,
as the light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this manner
the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the
soul of Christ by the light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the
true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,"
as is written Jn. 1:9.
Reply to Objection 3: On the part of what are united we hold there
is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human
nature; so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one
hypostasis of God and man, the things of God are attributed to man,
and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above
(Question 3, Articles 1,6). But on the part of the union
itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ. For this union is in
personal being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a
nature.
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