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Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For
Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is
faith that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is
a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined.
But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit
grace, since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and
"it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously,"
etc. Therefore grace is virtue.
Objection 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not
in the "fourth" species of quality; viz. "form" which is the
"abiding figure of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor
is it in the "third," since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like
quality," which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in
Physic. viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in
the "second" species, which is "natural power" or "impotence";
since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does
natural power. Therefore it must be in the "first" species which is
"habit" or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues;
since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above
(Question 57, Articles 1,2). Therefore grace is the same as
virtue.
On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to
be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith
nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it
charity, since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his
book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi).
Therefore grace is not virtue.
I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in
essence, and differed only logically---in the sense that we speak of
grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given
gratuitously---and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act
rightly. And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D
27).
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot
hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text.
17), "virtue is disposition of what is perfect---and I call
perfect what is disposed according to its nature." Now from this it
is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing
nature, from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to
what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired
by human acts of which we spoke above (Question 55, seqq.) are
dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the
nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a
higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to
some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the
Divine Nature, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: "He hath given us
most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made
partakers of the Divine Nature." And it is in respect of receiving
this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the
acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also
the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is
something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are
ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8):
"For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk
then as children of the light." For as the acquired virtues enable a
man to walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the
infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by
charity" grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity
is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue
with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential
or participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner,
but as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of
quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain
disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their
principle and root.
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