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Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act cannot be
altogether excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. For whoever allows
himself to lose a greater good for the sake of a lesser good sins
because he allows it inordinately. Now the good of reason which is
prejudiced in the marriage act is greater than these three marriage
goods. Therefore the aforesaid goods do not suffice to excuse marriage
intercourse.
Objection 2: Further, if a moral good be added to a moral evil the
sum total is evil and not good, since one evil circumstance makes an
action evil, whereas one good circumstance does not make it good. Now
the marriage act is evil in itself, else it would need no excuse.
Therefore the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the act good.
Objection 3: Further, wherever there is immoderate passion there is
moral vice. Now the marriage goods cannot prevent the pleasure in that
act from being immoderate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being
a sin.
Objection 4: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15), shame is only caused by a disgraceful deed. Now the
marriage goods do not deprive that deed of its shame. Therefore they
cannot excuse it from sin.
On the contrary, The marriage act differs not from fornication except
by the marriage goods. If therefore these were not sufficient to
excuse it marriage would be always unlawful; and this is contrary to
what was stated above (Question 41, Article 3).
Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its due
circumstances, as stated above (Article 1, ad 4). Now the like
circumstances are sufficient to prevent an action from being evil.
Therefore these goods can excuse marriage so that it is nowise a sin.
I answer that, An act is said to be excused in two ways. First, on
the part of the agent, so that although it be evil it is not imputed as
sin to the agent, or at least not as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is
said to excuse a sin wholly or partly. Secondly, an act is said to be
excused on its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus
that the aforesaid goods are said to excuse the marriage act. Now it
is from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, and that it is
good, since there is no such thing as an indifferent act, as was
stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40; FS, Question
18, Article 9). Now a human act is said to be good in two ways.
In one way by goodness of virtue, and thus an act derives its goodness
from those things which place it in the mean. This is what "faith"
and "offspring" do in the marriage act, as stated above (Article
2). In another way, by goodness of the "sacrament," in which way
an act is said to be not only good, but also holy, and the marriage
act derives this goodness from the indissolubility of the union, in
respect of which it signifies the union of Christ with the Church.
Thus it is clear that the aforesaid goods sufficiently excuse the
marriage act.
Reply to Objection 1: By the marriage act man does not incur harm
to his reason as to habit, but only as to act. Nor is it unfitting
that a certain act which is generically better be sometimes interrupted
for some less good act; for it is possible to do this without sin, as
in the case of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order
meanwhile to devote himself to action.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would avail if the evil that is
inseparable from carnal intercourse were an evil of sin. But in this
case it is an evil not of sin but of punishment alone, consisting in
the rebellion of concupiscence against reason; and consequently the
conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: The excess of passion that amounts to a sin
does not refer to the passion's quantitative intensity, but to its
proportion to reason; wherefore it is only when a passion goes beyond
the bounds of reason that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now the
pleasure attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in
point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previously appointed
by reason before the commencement of the act, although reason is unable
to regulate them during the pleasure itself.
Reply to Objection 4: The turpitude that always accompanies the
marriage act and always causes shame is the turpitude of punishment,
not of sin, for man is naturally ashamed of any defect.
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