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Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin.
For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now
ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance
does not diminish sin.
Objection 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater
sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (Article 2).
Therefore it does not diminish a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and
diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting
on Rm. 2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth
thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest
not." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
Objection 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin,
this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which
removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does
not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken
man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven,
diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim.
1:13: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it
ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.
I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish
sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not
render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is
evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through
making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does
away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not
the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it,
neither diminishes nor increases the sin.
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such
as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from
the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance
is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely
ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems
rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is
through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt
of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes,
however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is
not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man
is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is
ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result
being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance
diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when
a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to
the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case
there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is
ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something
resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: One sin is added to another makes more sins,
but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two
sins do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first
diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity
as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if
committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk,
although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness
diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity
implies.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as
referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a
species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that
man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be
an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the
foundation of the spiritual edifice.
Reply to Objection 4: The drunken man deserves a "double
punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and
the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on
account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting
sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies,
as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted
refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered
drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having
an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to
expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as
the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).
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