|
Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same
as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or
"suppositum," there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as
is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things
which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from
the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is
clear from what is above expounded (Question 28, Article 3;
Question 30, Article 2). Therefore essence is not the same as
person.
Objection 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the
same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and
negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct,
whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the
same.
Objection 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But
person is subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or
"hypostasis." Therefore person is not the same as essence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we
say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of
the Father."
I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we
consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Question
3, Article 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God
essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances
is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the
fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence
nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De
Trin. i), "relation multiplies the Trinity of persons," some
have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they
held the relations to be "adjacent"; considering only in the
relations the idea of "reference to another," and not the relations
as realities. But as it was shown above (Question 28, Article
2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are
the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is
not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really
distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated
(Question 29, Article 4), signifies relation as subsisting in
the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not
differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as
referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue
of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
Reply to Objection 1: There cannot be a distinction of
"suppositum" in creatures by means of relations, but only by
essential principles; because in creatures relations are not
subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of
the opposition between them they distinguish the "supposita"; and yet
the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are
not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the
essence.
Reply to Objection 2: As essence and person in God differ in our
way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and
affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we
need not suppose the other.
Reply to Objection 3: Divine things are named by us after the way
of created things, as above explained (Question 13, Articles
1,3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which
is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are
called "subjects," "supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine
persons are named "supposita" or "hypostases," but not as if there
really existed any real "supposition" or "subjection."
|
|