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Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause
of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this
opinion," which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and
division, the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and
pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is
of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal
cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is
the cause of multitude.
Objection 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If
therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation
would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation
of whatever is superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction
of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity,
since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity.
Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than
the craving for separation, as causing sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23),
that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how
their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For
what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or
corruption?"
I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is
reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love,
be accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing
consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in
itself, the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the
Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is.
Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires
goodness: and therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of
sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect
goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends.
Hence neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or
sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the
Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for
instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further
pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is
repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow
is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that
unity in which the perfection of nature consists.
Reply to Objection 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because
it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it
has some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its
object.
Reply to Objection 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive
is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due.
Wherefore the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of
sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is.
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