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Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise
from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above
(Article 5, ad 2). But envy is a distinct vice from lust.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A
double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does
not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a
daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.
Objection 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some
defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than
carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices
rather than from carnal vices.
On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the
aforesaid vices arise from lust.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5)
"pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly
sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible
delight. Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual
virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore,
since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the
practical reason, as stated above (Articles 2,5), it follows
that they arise chiefly from lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing
away the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by
destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through
anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is
incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all."
Reply to Objection 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from
lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand
fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says
(Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise
to peace and truce."
Reply to Objection 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason
so much the more as they lead us away from reason.
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