|
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all.
Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
(Article 3). Now all are not equally prone to acts of
concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of
the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body.
But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject
to degrees.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i,
23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act
of generation may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore
original sin may be greater in one than in another.
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above
(Question 81, Article 1). But nature is equally in all.
Therefore original sin is too.
I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the
privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this
privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted
to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has
no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely;
and privations that remove something entirely, such as death and
darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (Question 73,
Article 2). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the
second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our
corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of
guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is
evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being
broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain
order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and
the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of
the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account
of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more
prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in
all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves
equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the
same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever
be caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or
less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the
cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not
comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits
original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no
inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit
original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the
sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of
original justice. This lust is equally in all.
|
|