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Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight
is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i,
11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose
in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore
pleasure is in time.
Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same
genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight
is too.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no
one takes pleasure according to time."
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by
itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it
were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those
things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or
something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement,
repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are
said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves,
to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to
something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially
something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a
movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human
being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is
in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in
time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the
term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change,
the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be
altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time,
either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement
is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of
something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is
successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something
perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand,
to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This
movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or
morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a
good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the
movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it
belongs more to delight not to be in time.
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