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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the
soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the
same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the
essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and
spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence."
Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are
not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul.
Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the
soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but
they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11)
places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and
intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power
thereof.
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the
Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels."
But angels are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the
mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul
itself.
Objection 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that
it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence.
Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its
essence.
On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as
a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
I answer that, In accordance with what has been already shown
(Question 54, Article 3; Question 77, Article 1) it is
necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the
very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which
operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself
is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the
essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is
His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His
essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is
power.
Reply to Objection 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and
sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name
from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the
intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief
power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is
a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is
spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are
different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different
formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly
with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of
operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite
follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the
mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: In the angels there is no other power besides
the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for
this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because
his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers,
such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent
substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has
the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect
is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
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