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Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not
of the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common
among all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read
of some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gn. 14:18), offering bread and
wine in sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and
others by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the
natural law.
Objection 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were
observed by all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered
sacrifice; nor that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written
(Wis. 10:2) that wisdom "brought him out of his sin."
Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not of the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x,
5,19) that sacrifices are offered in signification of something.
Now words which are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr.
Christ. ii, 3), "signify, not by nature but by convention,"
according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore
sacrifices are not of the natural law.
On the contrary, At all times and among all nations there has always
been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is
seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the
natural law.
I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a
higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself,
and in which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and
whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name
of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject
to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance
with man's natural inclination that he should tender submission and
honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the
mode befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order
to signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles.
Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain
sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor
due to Him, like those who make certain offerings to their lord in
recognition of his authority. Now this is what we mean by a
sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural
law.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (FS, Question 95,
Article 2), certain things belong generically to the natural law,
while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus the natural
law requires that evildoers should be punished; but that this or that
punishment should be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or
by man. In like manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically
to the natural law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but
the determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and
this is the reason for their difference.
Reply to Objection 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered
sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in which they lived,
according to Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden
times original sin was remitted through the offering of sacrifices.
Nor does Scripture mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only
those that have something special connected with them. Perhaps the
reason why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that,
as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification
ought not to be represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of
Christ, being himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need
that he should be represented as offering a sacrifice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by
signs, but the determination of those signs depends on man's
pleasure.
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