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Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be
attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.):
"Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes
the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But
action is one of the ten "genera." Therefore any action attributed
to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5)
that, "everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards
either His substance, or relation." But whatever belongs to the
substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever
belongs to the relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names
of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts
are not to be attributed to the persons.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause
passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are
notional acts to be placed in God.
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii)
says: "It is a property of the Father to beget the Son."
Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God.
I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on
origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts.
Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we
must attribute notional acts to the persons.
Reply to Objection 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In
God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature
proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so
those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding
of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of
origin in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore
the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional;
because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the
persons, as is clear from what was above explained (Question 32,
Article 2).
Reply to Objection 2: The notional acts differ from the relations
of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are
altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and
nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D,
xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing
from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be
changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some
cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of
movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object,
is called "passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning
from another and terminating in what is moved, is called "action."
Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than
order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or
principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God
no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person
is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the
principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions.
Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except
after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge,
and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement,
differ from the relations which result from action and passion, and
therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons
separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of
relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same,
differing only in their mode of signification.
Reply to Objection 3: Action, so far as it means origin of
movement, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not
attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from
a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of
speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the
Son "to be begotten."
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