|
Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of
charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot
benefit God, according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give
Him? or what shall He receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence
is not an act of charity.
Objection 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making
gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an
act of liberality and not of charity.
Objection 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being
due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to
justice while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in
this respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is
either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an
act of charity.
On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
(Question 23, Article 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among
the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e.
being beneficent, "to one's friends." Therefore it is an act of
charity to do good to others.
I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This
good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above
(Question 23, Article 1; Question 27, Article 2). Now
the will carries into effect if possible, the things it wills, so
that, consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man is
beneficent to his friend. Therefore beneficence in its general
acceptation is an act of friendship or charity.
But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special
character and will belong to some special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv), "love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship:
it turns the inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves
the superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect
beneficence is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit
God, but to honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of
His love, to bestow good things on us.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal
of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the
inward passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to
liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence
belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract
from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend
something he would like to I keep for himself; rather does this prove
the perfection of his friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
distress or defect.
|
|