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Objection 1: It would seem that by God's mercy all punishment of
the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written
(Wis. 11:24): "Thou hast mercy upon all, O Lord, because
Thou canst do all things." But among all things the demons also are
included, since they are God's creatures. Therefore also their
punishment will come to an end.
Objection 2: Further, "God hath concluded all in sin, that He
may have mercy on all" (Rm. 11:32). Now God has concluded
the demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be
concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on
the demons.
Objection 3: Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo ii),
"it is not just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature
which He made for happiness." Therefore, since every rational
creature was created for happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be
allowed to perish altogether.
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 25:41): "Depart from
Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the
devil and his angels." Therefore they will be punished eternally.
Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to
God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from
God. Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at
length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end,
which is inadmissible.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen
[FP, Question 64, Article 2] "erred in maintaining that the
demons will at length, through God's mercy, be delivered from their
punishment." But this error has been condemned by the Church for two
reasons. First because it is clearly contrary to the authority of
Holy Writ (Apoc. 20:9,10): "The devil who seduced them
was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and
the false prophets shall be tormented day and night for ever and
ever," which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly,
because this opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction and
depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for
the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked
angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that
the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length
from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls
of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the
unhappiness of this life.
Reply to Objection 1: God, for His own part, has mercy on all.
Since, however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the
result is that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves
unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are
obstinate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His
mercy finds a place, in so far as they are punished less than they
deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely delivered from
punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted the distribution (of the
predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the
statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had
mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or
every Jew.
Reply to Objection 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense
of becoming God's goodness, and is speaking of the creature
generically. For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole
genus of creature fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it
is unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no
reason why some men or some angels should perish for ever, because the
intention of the Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.
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