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Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it
seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling
the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the
case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a
part of justice.
Objection 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas
justice is in the will, as stated above (Question 58, Article
4). Therefore truth is not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold,
namely, "truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of
doctrine." But none of these is a part of justice. For truth of
life comprises all virtues, as stated above (Article 2, ad 3):
truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its
parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual
virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth
among the parts of justice.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 80), a virtue is
annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having
something in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect
virtue thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with
justice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the
manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed
to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that
concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain
equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for
it equals signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless
it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of
debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice
considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity,
one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is
a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its
principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man is a social animal, one man
naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of
human society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together,
unless they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to
another. Hence the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard
something as being due.
Reply to Objection 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect.
But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members,
utters external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way
the manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of which we are speaking now
differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding Article
2, ad 3.
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according
to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice
differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man
lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes
the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man:
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth
of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another
way the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact
that, out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when
a man confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of
justice. This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not
pertain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, because,
to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is
to give another man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who
is truthful in his agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which
justice or injustice is questioned."
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth
whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
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