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Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will.
For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species,
by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will
does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the
subject of habit.
Objection 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active
intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the
former is an active power. But the will is above all an active power,
because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above
(Question 9, Article 1). Therefore there is no habit in the
will.
Objection 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit,
because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one
thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to
the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the
will.
On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will;
for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just"
(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act,
needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the
will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And
therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it
is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of
habit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will;
inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated
above (Article 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species
which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every
appetitive power there must be something by which the power is inclined
to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a
certain inclination, as we have said above (Question 6, Article
4; Question 22, Article 2). And therefore in respect of those
things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the power
itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is
necessary, for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be
inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature
of the power, which has a relation to many and various things,
therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive
powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are
called habits.
Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is active only, and in
no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both
mover and moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the
comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit
belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality.
Reply to Objection 3: The will from the very nature of the power
inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in
many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to
some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more
promptly.
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