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Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure.
Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow,
since, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from
anger, acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5)
that "vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure
for pain": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure
from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the
advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an
effect united with pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is
conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in
Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the
saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste"
(Iliad, xviii, 109).
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14),
pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against
sorrow: and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more
sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the
case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear
from what has been said (Question 47, Articles 1,3), that the
movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for
which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as
vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater
according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really
present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that
the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present,
it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope;
because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above
(Question 46, Article 1); in another way, by thinking of it
continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to
dwell on the thought of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of
dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in
thinking much about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not
perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger.
Reply to Objection 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at
the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure
in the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger
as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure
caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger
altogether.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from
ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt
in taking vengeance follows from anger.
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