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Objection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from
the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when
a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its
species from its object, as stated above (Articles 2,6). But it
is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if
this species be not contained under the proper species of that thing;
because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are
not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is taken
from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from the
object.
Objection 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the
most specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems
to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end
is something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is
contained under the species derived from the object, as its most
specific species.
Objection 3: Further, the more formal a difference is compared to
genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is
more formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above
(Article 6). Therefore the species derived from the end is
contained under the species derived from the object, as the most
specific species is contained under the subaltern genus.
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an
action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to
an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived
from the end is not contained under the species derived from the
object, as under its genus.
I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold
relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory;
secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what
belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now
the differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that
genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12),
divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the
division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided
into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with
wings, and animals without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless"
are not essential determinations of the irrational being. But the
following division would be correct: "Some animals have feet, some
have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some
four, some many": because the latter division is an essential
determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of
itself ordained to the end, the specific difference derived from the
object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the
end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is
not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under two
species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he
that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a twofold
malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself
ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential
determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be
contained under the other.
It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the
other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that
the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the
more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an
agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the
more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it
corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the
end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of
this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers.
From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the
end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object
which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in
relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is
the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the
soul, the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular
acts.
Reply to Objection 1: One and the same thing, considered in its
substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate
to the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to
the substance, one thing can be contained under different species.
Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one
species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the
species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as
to its substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to
the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species,
as stated above (Question 1, Article 3, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The end is last in execution; but first in
the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive
their species.
Reply to Objection 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to
matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the
genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is
something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts
of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated
in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of
the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.
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