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Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by
being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now
truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from
the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses
nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is
meant by judgment.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now
it is related to the praise of some that they punished sins without
having authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in
slaying the Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of
Eleazar in slaying Zambri the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14),
and "it was reputed to him unto justice" (Ps. 105:31).
Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal.
Now prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters
concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not
unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order
to judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown
above (Article 1, ad 1,3; Article 2). But a judgment is not
described as unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the
knowledge of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge
by usurpation, i.e. without authority.
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou
that judgest another man's servant?"
I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
written law, as stated above (Article 5), he that pronounces
judgment, interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying
it to some particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority
to interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by
public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the
community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force
another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, so
too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that
is pronounced by other than the public authority.
Reply to Objection 1: When the truth is declared there is no
obligation to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as
he wishes. On the other hand judgment implies an obligation,
wherefore it is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public
authority.
Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by
authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to
follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the
Egyptian . . . he thought that his brethren understood that God by
his hand would save Israel." Or it may be replied that Moses slew
the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,
without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward off
a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the
striker"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply
with Augustine (Questions. Exod. qu. 2) [Contra Faust.
xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by
producing useless herbs before the useful seeds have grown, so this
deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility,"
in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he was to
deliver his people.
With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for
God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet
high-priest, he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this
judgment was his concern as of the other judges, to whom this was
commanded [Ex. 22:20; Lev. 20; Dt. 13,17].
Reply to Objection 3: The secular power is subject to the
spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the
judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those
temporal matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which
have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.
Reply to Objection 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are
perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not
make a judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority
which gives a judgment its coercive force.
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