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Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good
are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a
good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the
whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be
reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away
from evil and do good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away
from evil, "avoids sin, the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves
the life and the palm." But any part of a virtue deserves the life
and the palm. Therefore to decline from evil is not a part of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies
the other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now
declining from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil
and good at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing
good are not parts of justice.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares
that "declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the
law.
I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs
to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they
cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the
sense of "all virtue" [Question 58, Article 5]. And yet even
if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of
good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.
On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good
as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special
justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid
the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's
neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to
the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.
Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of
special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of
justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our
relations with others, as shown above (Question 58, Article
2): and it pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve
that which it has established. Now a person establishes the equality
of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and
he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining
from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil are here considered under a
special aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason
why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of
good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral
virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions
wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to
avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come
to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand
justice is concerned with operations and external things, wherein to
establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality
established is another.
Reply to Objection 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part
of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz."not to do evil";
for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment.
But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very
term "decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person
resists against an instigation to do evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice,
and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is
a more imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it
is a. material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition
of the formal and completive part.
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