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Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For
Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is
not distraught by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by
sickness"---i.e. sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of
empty joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the
other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a
general passion.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2)
that "pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and
denial are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the
intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to many.
Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But
fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a
special passion.
Objection 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be
chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible:
since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of
sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that
fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Question 23, Article
4). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to
different powers.
On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other passions of the
soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
12,15).
I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species from
their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special
object. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the
object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so
the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.
Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one
source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By
reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions
of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear,
but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though
avoidance be something common, yet fear is a special passion.
Reply to Objection 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it
regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to
be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the
passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as
stated above (Question 25, Article 1); hence it is that what
belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called
sorrow, in so far as the object of fear causes sorrow when present:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises
"from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or
painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear,
because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises
from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire
of good, as is evident from what has been said above (Question 25,
Article 2; Question 29, Article 2; Question 36, Article
2).
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