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Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every
moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean
but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself
worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore
magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as
stated above (FS, Question 65, Article 1). But one may have
a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy of little things and
deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not
magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind,"
as stated above (FS, Question 55, Article 4). But
magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man that his
gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore
magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems
himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to
Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are
praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for
blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of
favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he
employs irony [Question 113] towards many; fourthly, he is
unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the
barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore
magnanimity is not a virtue.
On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc.
15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions,
and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they
fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword."
Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore
magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding
the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.
Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others,
as stated above (Article 1; FS, Question 11, Article 2,
Objection 3). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of
reason in great honors, is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic.
iv, 3), "the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes,"
in so far as he tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of
becomingness, he follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest
things according to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance
with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass
his deserts.
Reply to Objection 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not
apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the
acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not
becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other
hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace,
all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together
in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition
thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is
not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is
disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to
his state.
Reply to Objection 3: The movements of the body are differentiated
according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And
so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents
by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a
man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish,
whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few
and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.
Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who
are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the
magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these
dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man
according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are
naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.
Reply to Objection 4: There is in man something great which he
possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which
accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity
makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the
gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great
virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the
same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or
external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think
little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and
magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from
God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do
anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and
esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's
gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps.
14:4): "In his sight a vile person is contemned," which
indicates the contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear
the Lord," which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It
is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to
one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions,
because they proceed according to different considerations.
Reply to Objection 5: These properties in so far as they belong to
a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For
in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful
of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that
he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay
them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of
gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts
of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is
remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes
him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but
only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said,
in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so
as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of
himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose
all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are
beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of
dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class." In
the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others:
this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because
he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness
of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little,
according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said,
fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but
good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to
the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to
supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
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