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Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for
counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a
hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion
disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason.
Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.
Objection 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and
deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all
thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De
Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to
counsel, but hinders it.
Objection 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order
to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas
fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be
obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope
is.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that
"fear makes men of counsel."
I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First,
from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes
men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust
ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil,
but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to
repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above
(Question 42, Article 2). Wherefore men seek for counsel
especially when they are afraid.
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good
counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of
counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to
him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he
loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more
dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every
passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good
counsel.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the
hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when
fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his
thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If,
however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take
counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it
easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing
carefulness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor:
because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes
counsel in matters he despairs of," nor about impossible things, as
he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than
hope does. Because hope is of good things, as being possible of
attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to
repel, so that fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope
does. And it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust
ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above.
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