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Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made
to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Is.
3:8): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
Objection 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do
not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against
God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
Objection 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the
Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some
things rebel against the order of the Divine government.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is
nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It
is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth
all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.
I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two
ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of
all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular
cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the
Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the
fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to
good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good
only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above
(Article 1, ad 3; Article 5, ad 2), every inclination of
anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of
impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow
towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the
archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to
its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this
reason God is said "to order all things sweetly."
Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act
against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine
government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain
good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to
their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
Reply to Objection 2:is clear from the above.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that one thing opposes
another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a
particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal
cause of all things.
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