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Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for
an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very
name, implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a
cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action;
since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality.
Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for
an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do
everything for an end.
Objection 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when
he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one
moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on
something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the
principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore
it belongs to man to do everything for an end.
I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called
"human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from
irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.
Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man
is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and
will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and
will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human
which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are
found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not
properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man.
Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused
by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the
object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human
actions must be for an end.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the end be last in the order of
execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention.
And it is this way that it is a cause.
Reply to Objection 2: If any human action be the last end, it must
be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an
action is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded
by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is
elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is
impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end.
For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is
color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of
seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object;
so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of
willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last
end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some
action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end.
Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an
end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like actions are not properly human
actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason,
which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have
indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
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