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Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything
from love. For love is a passion, as stated above (Question 26,
Article 2). But man does not do everything from passion: but some
things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated
in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done
from love.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and
action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If,
therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions
of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time
by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore
all things are not done from love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all
things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above
(Question 1, Article 2). Now the end is the good desired and
loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever
it be, does every action from love of some kind.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes love as a passion
existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love
in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational,
animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius
speaks of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Article 5; Question
27, Article 4) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently
all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every
act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first
cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not
superfluous.
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall
state further on (Question 29, Article 2).
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