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Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the
virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine
goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who
giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5).
Therefore liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi,
8), "in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is
to be best." Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to
liberality, since "the good is self-communicative," according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.
i) that "justice reclines to severity, liberality to goodness."
Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.
Objection 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of
virtue. Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above
all makes a man famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1) that "among the virtuous the liberal are the most beloved."
Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems
to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more
pleasing." The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave
and just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are
liberal."
I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the
greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now
liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and
of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of
its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards
the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which
moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes
precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in
a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the
other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues
which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses
all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good
surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good of
the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things.
Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way
it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not
being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of it,
whether for himself. Or for the good of others, or for God's
glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many
ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that
which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature,
rather than according to that which pertains to them consequently, it
remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for
those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He
gives, wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of
virtues, rather than to liberality.
Reply to Objection 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by
giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are
better than money which liberality gives forth.
Reply to Objection 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is
beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better
than others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more
useful in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others.
For the same reason he becomes famous.
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