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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue
to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as
health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul.
But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in
reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the
Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always,
while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time.
Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in
rational beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to
act, but also to being.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text.
17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which
is best." Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by
virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl.
3,6, 14) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to
Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in
reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in
reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that
"virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good."
I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies
some perfection of power, as we have said above (Article 1).
Wherefore, since power is of two kinds, namely, power in reference
to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of
these is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part
of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to
act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action,
since everything acts in so far as it is in act.
Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the
soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other
animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to
the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul,
namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore,
human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the
body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore
human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.
Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of
the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore,
since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must
needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding
disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore
virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to
wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another,
and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a
suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are
suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue
from being a principle of operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not
proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of
reason, which are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 3: As God's substance is His act, the
highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation.
Wherefore, as we have said above (Question 3, Article 2),
happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to
God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.
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