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Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a
power, by way of systole"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous
of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in
Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the
presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of
something future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii,
12). Therefore fear is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of
the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the
senses. But sense apprehends, not the future but the present.
Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a
passion of the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.)
reckons fear among the other passions of the soul.
I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow,
fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above
(Question 22), the notion of passion implies first of all a
movement of a passive power---i.e. of a power whose object is
compared to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of
an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are
passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of
the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an
appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being
accompanied by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly
those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration.
Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the
appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. Moreover,
it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a
certain transmutation---i.e. contraction---as Damascene says
(Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as
overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it has most
properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which
regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is
not so strong a motive as present evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action:
wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive
faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues.
But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due
to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due
to the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor
really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really
future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but
from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct
to hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.
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