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Objection 1: It would seem that euboulia (deliberating well) is
not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18,19) "no man makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil
use of euboulia (deliberating well) or good counsel, either through
devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through
committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those who
rob that they may give alms. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well)
is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys.
vii. But euboulia (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel,
which implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection.
Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as
stated above (FS, Question 65). Now euboulia (deliberating
well) is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take
good-counsel, and many godly men are slow in taking counsel.
Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9)
euboulia (deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the
perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore euboulia
(deliberating well) is a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 47, Article 4) the
nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now
among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this
denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and
whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as
stated in Ethic. x. But euboulia (deliberating well) signifies
goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the eu, good, and boule,
counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take
good counsel." Hence it is evident that euboulia (deliberating
well) is a human virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no good counsel either in
deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for
attaining a good end, even as in speculative matters, there is no good
reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a
true conclusion from false premisses through employing an unsuitable
middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to
euboulia (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
vi, 9).
Reply to Objection 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection,
it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his
parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which
counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive
appetite, which are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
are contingent.
Reply to Objection 3: In no sinner as such is euboulia
(deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking
good counsel. For good counsel requires not only the discovery or
devising of fit means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such
are suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in
taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in
the counsel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners
fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man
takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the end of
virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other
particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or
the like.
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