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Objection 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened
by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For it they knew any
truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know
separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their
unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as
that some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge
of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all
knowledge of truth.
Objection 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems
to be specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the
same is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness
of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes
from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the
sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of
Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they
are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore
neither can they know other things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 22), the proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely,
morning and evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge,
because they do not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening
knowledge, because this evening knowledge refers the things known to
the Creator's praise (hence, after "evening" comes "morning"
[Gn. 1]). Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.
Objection 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery
of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19;
De Civ. Dei xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge:
"for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord
of glory," as is said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same
reason, they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth.
Objection 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either
naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from someone
else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the things we
learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth by their
own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi,
33), the good angels are separated from them as light is from
darkness; and every manifestation is made through light, as is said
Eph. 5:13. In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor
by learning from the good angels: because "there is no fellowship of
light with darkness" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor can they learn by
long experience: because experience comes of the senses. Consequently
there is no knowledge of truth in them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain
gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been
changed at all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the
knowledge of truth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently
there is some knowledge of truth in them.
I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of
nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of
grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when
Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective,
and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the
gift of wisdom.
Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor
lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the
angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since
on account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn
from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural
powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or
of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
the natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural
knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however,
which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been
utterly taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine
secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is
done either by means of the angels, or "through some temporal workings
of Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21);
but not in the same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more
things are revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of
the third knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly
deprived.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness consists in self-application to
something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order
of nature; hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the
separated substances, although his perfect happiness consists in
knowing the first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural
for one separate substance to know another; as it is natural for us to
know sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in
knowing sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness
consist in knowing separated substances.
Reply to Objection 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden
from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely
because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine
substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but
even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own
nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his
intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man
can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons.
Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace,
nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the
knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with
the excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's
knowledge in its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the
evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the
light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of
things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the
Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine
light, and can be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred
to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening,
but "nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gn. 1:5 that
the darkness, which God separated from the light, "He called
night."
Reply to Objection 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the
very beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found
its completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they
were beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons
never had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it;
hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the
Incarnation, when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine
observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 21), "It was not manifested to
them as it was to the holy angels, who enjoy a participated eternity of
the Word; but it was made known by some temporal effects, so as to
strike terror into them." For had they fully and certainly known that
He was the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would
never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory.
Reply to Objection 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first
of all by the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened
by privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the
light of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the
holy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will,
they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual
nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by
others: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it
from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible
species is completed in individual things, they know some things as
present, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we
said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (Question 57,
Article 3, ad 3).
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