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Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of
the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi,
7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts
in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of
these objects, as we have already explained (FP, Question 77,
Article 3). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their
material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now
the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the
conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should
not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of
conclusions.
Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides
in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason
employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it
employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is
the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual
virtue, so also should opinion be.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these
three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and
understanding.
I answer that, As already stated (Article 1), the virtues of the
speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect
for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a
truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself,
and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a
"principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore
the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such
truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles.
On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is
understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the
reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two
ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus;
secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge.
And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are
knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2,
3); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is
that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about
these is "wisdom," which considers the highest causes, as stated in
Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets
them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment
that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is
last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which
perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of
knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge;
whereas there is but one wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it
has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate
conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to
itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all,
not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first
principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.
Reply to Objection 2: When the formal aspect of the object is
referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction
of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material
object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color,
and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and
is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the
principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the
conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered
together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced
from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second
way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also: while
to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues
are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain
order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one
part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is
more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the
vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a
virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as
obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both
understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of
science, and of the principles on which they are based.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question 55, Articles
3,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise
referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and
falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called
intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never tell a
falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and
falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not
intellectual virtues.
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