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Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our
first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called
a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates
it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the
fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is
included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment
of our first parents' sin.
Objection 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly
found in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles.
3:19, "The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition
of them both equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of
sin. Therefore neither is it so in men.
Objection 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of
particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature.
Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first
parents' sin.
Objection 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first
parents. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents'
sin, it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure.
But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more
painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the
first sin.
Objection 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as
stated above (FP, Question 48, Article 6; FP, Question
49, Article 2). But death, apparently, is not from God: for
it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made not death." Therefore
death is not the punishment of the first sin.
Objection 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious,
since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now
death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death.
Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.
Objection 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But
death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he
is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death
is not a punishment of sin.
Objection 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would
have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first
parents lived a long time after their sin (Gn. 5:5).
Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 5:12): "By one man
sin entered into this world, and by sin death."
I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of
a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of
that fault. Now as we stated in the FP, Question 95, Article
1; FP, Question 97, Article 1, God bestowed this favor on
man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to
God, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to his rational
mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through sin man's
mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither were
his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence there followed so
great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason: nor was
the body wholly subject to the soul; whence arose death and other
bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body
being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its
perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and
all defects of the body are due to the lack of the body's subjection to
the soul.
It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite
against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also
are death and all defects of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds
from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature
are form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is,
of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part
of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of
contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in
this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to
the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it
was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and
consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible,
were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (De
Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached
to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible,
since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be
incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being
suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit
for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of
such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice; for, if the
craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not
rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore
when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt
from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which favor,
however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents.
Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching
to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor
preserving man from death [FS, Question 85, Article 6].
Reply to Objection 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards
a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of
contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is
immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.
Reply to Objection 3: Our first parents were made by God not only
as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human
nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the
Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the
entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity,
incurred death.
Reply to Objection 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by
way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be
equal in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is
that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance,
that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed,
should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to
the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot
foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for
the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the
withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of
human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this
withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life.
Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the
first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all
future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties
are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on
account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen
held [Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of
Rm. 9:11, "When they . . . had not done any good or evil";
and also contrary to statements made in the FP, Question 90,
Article 4; FP, Question 118, Article 3, namely that the
soul is not created before the body: but either in punishment of their
parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the
father, wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or
again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the
person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned
away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he
may be crowned for his patience.
Reply to Objection 5: Death may be considered in two ways.
First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but
is a defect befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an
aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from
God. Wherefore Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is
not the author of death, except in so far as it is a punishment.
Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii,
5), "just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things,
so do the righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil
things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law,
though the law is good, while good men die well, although death is an
evil." Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their
death is to them meritorious.
Reply to Objection 7: Death may be considered in two ways.
First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt,
since it is the privation of sense and life. In this way it involves
not pain of sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as
denoting the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we
may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way
as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which
life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has
no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including
the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in
motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while
in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death
may be painful.
Reply to Objection 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit.
[De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 16; Gen. ad lit. ii.
32]), "although our first parents lived thereafter many years,
they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree,
condemning them to decline to old age."
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