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Objection 1: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of
the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure
in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they
have any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge
they had heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.
Objection 2: Further, the damned suffer greater pains than any
pains of this world. Now in this world, when one is in very great
pain, it is impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions,
through being distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less
therefore can one do so in hell.
Objection 3: Further, the damned are subject to time. But
"length of time is the cause of forgetfulness" (Phys. lib. iv,
13). Therefore the damned will forget what they knew here.
On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned (Lk.
16:25): "Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy
lifetime," etc. Therefore they will consider about the things they
knew here.
Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as
stated above (Question 70, Article 2, ad 3; FP, Question
89, Articles 5,6). Therefore, if they could not use them,
these would remain in them to no purpose.
I answer that, Even as in the saints on account of the perfection of
their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy so there
will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow;
nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their
unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things
known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things
known, because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because
it is fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both
on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous
nature, and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its
imperfection; for instance a person may consider his defective
knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire to know
perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will be actual
consideration of the things they knew heretofore as matters of sorrow,
but not as a cause of pleasure. For they will consider both the evil
they have done, and for which they were damned, and the delightful
goods they have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments.
Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that the knowledge
they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that they missed its
highest degree of perfection which they might have acquired.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the consideration of knowledge is
delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: In this world the soul is united to a
corruptible body, wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by
the suffering of the body. On the other hand, in the future life the
soul will not be so drawn by the body, but however much the body may
suffer, the soul will have a most clear view of those things that can
be a cause of anguish to it.
Reply to Objection 3: Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in
so far as the movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of
change. But after the judgment day there will be no movement of the
heavens; wherefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to
result from any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day,
however, the separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the
heavenly movement.
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