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Objection 1: It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to
marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than
murder is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither
therefore is wife-murder.
Objection 2: Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's
mother than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's
mother, whereas it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But
matricide is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is
wife-murder.
Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another
man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch
as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But
he who kills another man's wife is not hindered from marrying.
Neither therefore is he who kills his own wife.
Objection 4: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is
removed. But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance.
Therefore the consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also:
and consequently it would seem that after he has done penance he is not
forbidden to marry.
On the contrary, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can.
Interfectores) says: "The slayers of their own wives must be
brought back to penance, and they are absolutely forbidden to marry."
Further, in whatsoever a man sins, in that same must he be punished.
But he who kills his wife sins against marriage. Therefore he must be
punished by being deprived of marriage.
I answer that, By the Church's decree wife-murder is an impediment
to marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage
without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on
account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be
fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the
Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also voids the
contract, as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom
he has committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit
to marry her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage is void.
He is not however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to
other women: wherefore if he should have married another, although he
sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, the marriage is
nevertheless not voided for this reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid
the contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in
regard to wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv,
Question 62, Article 2) in regard to adultery. We may also
reply that wife-murder is contrary to the substance of wedlock,
whereas adultery is contrary to the good of fidelity due to marriage.
Hence adultery is not more opposed to marriage than wife-murder, and
the argument is based on a false premiss.
Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to
kill one's mother than one's wife, as also more opposed to nature,
since a man reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less
inclined to matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to
repress this proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the
man who has murdered his wife.
Reply to Objection 3: Such a man does not sin against marriage as
he does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow that because guilt has
been remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced
by irregularity. For repentance does not restore a man to his former
dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as
stated above (Question 38, Article 1, ad 3).
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