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Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit
by sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither
do we incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated
above (FS, Question 46, Article 1) in the treatise on the
passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some
mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good,
but to a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine asserts [De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot
avoid anger, for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin
not," says: "The movement of anger is not in our power." Again,
the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the angry man acts
with displeasure." Now displeasure is contrary to the will.
Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to
Damascene [De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary
to man's nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power,
namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [Ep. xii ad
Anton. Monach.] that "to be angry is the property of man."
Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all
indignation and anger . . . be put away from you."
I answer that, Anger, as stated above (Article 1), is properly
the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in
so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the
order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger,
may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to
the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge.
Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the
order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called
"zealous anger" [Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand,
if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to
the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one
who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to
the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the
maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire
of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in
relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger
should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally;
and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even
though just vengeance be desired.
Reply to Objection 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not
regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely
does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame.
But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and
deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by
reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a
certain way, that is praised or blamed."
Reply to Objection 2: The angry man desires the evil of another,
not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his
appetite turns as to a mutable good.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is master of his actions through the
judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall
that judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole,
i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check
each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of
anger is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such
movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it
is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the
Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that
he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which
he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to
seek vengeance.
Reply to Objection 4: The irascible power in man is naturally
subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far
as it is in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason,
it is contrary to man's nature.
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