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Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.
Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily
pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the
soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption."
Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but
rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni
xx) that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but
rather to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
viii, 14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel
no pain in being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not
a passion of the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain
among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi,
733): "hence wild desires and grovelling fears/And human
laughter, human tears."
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure;
namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so
also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some
evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and
perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have
not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is
conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure
or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the appetite.
Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the
appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to
apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since
the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an
apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension
of another, as stated in the FP, Question 103, Articles
1,3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or
apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like
pleasure, is in the intellective or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above (Question 22, Articles 1,3): and especially
those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it
is in the sensitive appetite, is most properly called a passion of the
soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the
body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8) reckons pain
especially as being a kind of ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of
pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body.
But the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body
cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super
Psalm 87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as
though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses
are required for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness
of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but
because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being
perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive
appetite.
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