|
Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the
same specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and
prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2)
that "virtue is the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now
political prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is
architectonic, as it were. Since then prudence is a virtue of a good
man, it seems that prudence and political prudence are the same habit.
Objection 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or
essence by things which are subordinate to one another. But the
particular good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is
subordinate to the common good, which belongs to political prudence.
Therefore prudence and political prudence differ neither specifically
nor essentially.
On the contrary, "Political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things
as relate to the common good of the household or family, and "monastic
economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good of one
person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are
different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of
matter.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 5; Question 54,
Article 2, ad 1), the species of habits differ according to the
difference of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal
aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from the end
itself, as shown above (FS, Prolog.; FS, Question 102,
Article 1), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation
to different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the
family, and the good of the city and kingdom are different ends.
Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence
corresponding to these different ends, so that one is "prudence"
simply so called, which is directed to one's own good; another,
"domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of the home;
and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the common
good of the state or kingdom.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher means, not that political
prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but
that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common
good. This is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of
prudence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is
called "political," as being directed to the common good.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii,
2), "it belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey
well," wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good
ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs
specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by
the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Even different ends, one of which is
subordinate to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for
instance, habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life,
differ specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another.
In like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to
the good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making
the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is
directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
|
|