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Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to
the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to
forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods.
Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.
Objection 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But
human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law
is directed to some particular good.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the
law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law."
But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common
good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore the
law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private
good of an individual.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are
enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the
citizens."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the law belongs to
that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and
measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason
itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the
rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be
referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the
object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of
human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Question 2,
Article 7; Question 3, Article 1). Consequently the law must
needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover,
since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect;
and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must
needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.
Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters
mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic.
v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to
produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic":
since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle
of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to
that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause
of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they
have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained
to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual
work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as
it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the
common good.
Reply to Objection 1: A command denotes an application of a law to
matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at
which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way
commands are given even concerning particular matters.
Reply to Objection 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular
matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common
good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final
cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to
the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first
indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the
practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the
common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the
nature of a law.
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