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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life,
but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive,
as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which
proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some
other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But
good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series
of ends.
Objection 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be
multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit.
For the same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given
any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of
the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it
seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the
will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times:
for I can will something, and will to will it, and so on
indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the
human will, and there is no last end of the human will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that
"to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good."
But the good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is
contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it
is necessary to fix one last end.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the
first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of
necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement,
because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first
mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends---the
order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these
orders there must be something first. For that which is first in the
order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the
appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be
nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in
execution is that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this
principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle
in the intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is
the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently,
on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no
last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its
term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there
is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would
begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would
continue indefinitely.
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.
Reply to Objection 1: The very nature of good is that something
flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since,
therefore, good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last
end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that
from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely
towards those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be
true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is
infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to
the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects
according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain
measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all
other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion
of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis.
11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and
measure."
Reply to Objection 2: In things which are of themselves, reason
begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some
term. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that
there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a
process of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection
with one another. But in those things which are accidentally
connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely.
Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that
quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things
nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process.
Reply to Objection 3: This multiplication of acts of the will
reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear
from the fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts
on itself indifferently once or several times.
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