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Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those
who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker.
Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none
are bound to restitution save the one who has taken.
Objection 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase
another's property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the
man who takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in
any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the
gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and
because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away
from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the
others are not bound to restitution.
Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger,
in order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would
expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or
withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not
betraying or withstanding a thief.
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 1:32): "They who do
such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but
also they that consent to them that do them." Therefore in like
manner they that consent are bound to restitution.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), a person is bound to
restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he has
taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is
cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two
ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another
to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking,
by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or
consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly,
on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of
assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part
in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a
man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and
bound to prevent him), either by omitting the command or counsel which
would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what
would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All
these are expressed as follows:
"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving,
by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not
denouncing."
It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the
cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of
command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is
bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent;
namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place.
Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a
receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the
case of participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the
booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is
bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to
safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their
neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in
payment of their preserving justice here below.
In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to
restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the
efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is
bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that
the unjust taking resulted from such causes.
Reply to Objection 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who
commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin,
whether by counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way
whatever.
Reply to Objection 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is
the principal in the deed; first of all, the "commander";
secondly, the "executor," and in due sequence, the others: yet so
that, if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make
restitution to the same person. Yet those who are principals in the
deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate
those who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust
taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its
end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been
unjustly injured.
Reply to Objection 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not
withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only
when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case
of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they
are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain
justice.
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