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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and
falsehood are in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same,
as is shown above (Question 79, Article 1). Therefore
falsehood may be in the mind.
Objection 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the
intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be
in the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin
involves falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov.
14:22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 32),
that "everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that
wherein he is deceived." And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
10), that "the intellect is always true."
I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares
intellect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its
proper object, as sight in regard to color; has accidentally through
some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ---for example, the
taste of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter,
through his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may
be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure;
when, for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter,
whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense
deceived concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that
vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of
this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is "per se" directed
to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same.
Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own
proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect is
the "quiddity" of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking,
the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it may
go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or
quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or
division, or also in the process of reasoning. Therefore, also in
regard to those propositions, which are understood, the intellect
cannot err, as in the case of first principles from which arises
infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions.
The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity
of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect
is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the
composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the
definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the
definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is
false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible;
as, for instance, to describe anything as "a rational winged
animal." Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite
definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand
nothing whatever about them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii,
10.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in
the intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer
applies to the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and
to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs
in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute
consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which are
known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are to
be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite
conclusion.
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