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Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue.
For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But
it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be
great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for
he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a
special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the
same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
something great, as stated above (Question 129, Articles
1,2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something
great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from
magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness,
for it is written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent in holiness,"
and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence in His
sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above
(Question 81, Article 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently
the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct
from the others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special
virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something
great, as its name implies. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways,
in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to
work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or
something of the kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed to
denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn
or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will.
Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it
is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in
the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of
goodness, namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is
something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is
what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.
If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing
something great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad
sense, it is not a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do
something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be
taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is
proper to magnificence.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to
something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either
by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards
the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be
perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention, not to
something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the
greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness
of the virtue.
On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something
great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also
to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and
administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and
noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention,
and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just
as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that
magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in
external matter [factibili].
Reply to Objection 3: The intention of magnificence is the
production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an
end: and no end of human works is so great as the honor of God:
wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the
Divine honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2)
that "the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to
Divine sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence.
For this reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its
chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.
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