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Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of
death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that
"fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the sake of the
object beloved": and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the
love which dreads no hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude
is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions.
Objection 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be
reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue
reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear
of death, but also about other fears.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of
death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as
stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about
fear of death.
On the contrary, Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the
irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), it belongs to the
virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the
good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to
hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no
bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude
of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason
in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against
great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but
not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it
should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily
evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is shaken
by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be
stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and
destroyed." Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of
dangers of death.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner
of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing
any kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest
evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a
restricted sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that
moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the
fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of
money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the
same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's
own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue
modifying the fear of death.
Reply to Objection 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding
right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance
with reason is not contrary to virtue.
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