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Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly
does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as
already stated (Article 3), for the justification of the ungodly,
there is required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the
free-will is choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as
stated above (Question 13, Article 1). Hence, since
deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this implies
succession, the justification of the ungodly would seem to be
successive.
Objection 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without
actual consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things
actually and at once, as stated above (FP, Question 85,
Article 4). Hence, since for the justification of the ungodly
there is required a movement of the free-will towards several things,
viz. towards God and towards sin, it would seem impossible for the
justification of the ungodly to be in an instant.
Objection 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g.
blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now
grace may be greater or less, as stated above (Question 112,
Article 4). Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject.
Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is required for the
justification of the ungodly, it would seem that the justification of
the ungodly cannot be in an instant.
Objection 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates
in justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from
grace, without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on
(Question 114, Article 2). Now a thing receives its form
before operating by this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then
the free-will is moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence
justification is not all at once.
Objection 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there
must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin
is forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it
cannot be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same
simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between
which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi,
1). Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all
at once, but successively.
On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is caused by the
justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to
men's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly
there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which
the gloss says that "the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy
efforts." Hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive,
but instantaneous.
I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to
its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that
free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace
takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of
this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it
is either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent
needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the
matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form
accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is
disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body
actually luminous. Now it was stated (Question 112, Article
2) that God, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no
disposition, save what He Himself has made. And sometimes this
sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He makes suddenly,
sometimes gradually and successively, as stated above (Question
112, Article 2, ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent
cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a
resistant which has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and
hence we see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the
matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it
can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more
man's free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous.
Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an
instant.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the free-will, which
concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest
sin, and to draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly.
Sometimes, indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this
is not of the substance of justification, but a way of justification;
as local movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to
generation.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (FP, Question 85,
Article 5), there is nothing to prevent two things being understood
at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we understand the
subject and predicate together, inasmuch as they are united in the
order of one affirmation. And in the same manner can the free-will be
moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other.
Now the free-will's movement towards sin is ordained to the
free-will's movement towards God, since a man detests sin, as
contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the
justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin
and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and withdraws
from another simultaneously.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why a form is not received
instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or
less; for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air,
which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on
the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the
thing begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is
generated moves upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it
would be terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to
will---the movements of the free-will---are not successive, but
instantaneous. Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be
successive.
Reply to Objection 5: The succession of opposites in the same
subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to
time and in those that are above time. For in those that are in time,
there is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the
subject; but there is the last time, and the first instant that the
subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the
reason, that in time we are not to consider one instant, since neither
do instants succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a
line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time is terminated by an
instant. Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is
moving towards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the
last instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent
time, it has the form which is the term of the movement.
But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be
any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in
the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but
by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as
stated above (FP, Question 53, Articles 2,3). In these,
therefore, there is a last instant in which the preceding is, and a
first instant in which the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in
between, since there is no continuity of time, which this would
necessitate.
Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time,
but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with
continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it
considers the intelligible species, as stated above (FP, Question
85, Articles 1,2). We must, therefore, decide from this
about its change as regards the condition of temporal movements, i.e.
we must say that there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last
time; whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all
the time previous sin inhered.
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