|
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a
sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist.
xii), "it is the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault
where there is none." Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience
to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.
Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than
another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be
praised. But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he
thinks he is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a
more grievous sin than one has.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it
be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess
it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he
has not committed.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession.
But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed.
Therefore he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells
an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since
every untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he
has not committed.
Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of
a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the
witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a
man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his
conscience.
I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his
state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something
other than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil,
does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore
his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his
words must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only
of what is on his conscience.
Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none,
may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of
the act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but
of an erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not
done. Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and
thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in
any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his
part. thus it is written (Job 9:28): "I feared all my
works." Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man
should accuse himself in words of this fear which he holds in his
thoughts.
From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since
a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he
had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in
those things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more
grievously.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be
mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt,
because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while
doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess
that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however,
affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the
verdict to the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is
leprosy and what is not.
Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making
satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone
confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he
mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he
does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession
thereof tally with his conscience.
|
|