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Objection 1: It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and
wife ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce
under the New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium]
recognized by the Old Law (Mt. 5:31,32). Now in the
"repudium" husband and wife were not judged on a par with each other,
since the husband could put away his wife, but not "vice versa."
Therefore neither in divorce ought they to be judged on a par with each
other.
Objection 2: Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a
wife have several husbands than that a husband have several wives:
wherefore the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never.
Therefore the wife sins more grievously in adultery than the husband,
and consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
Objection 3: Further, where there is greater injury to one's
neighbor, there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a
greater injury to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his
wife, since a wife's adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring,
whereas the husband's adultery does not. Therefore the wife's sin is
the greater, and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each
other.
Objection 4: Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the
crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of
the wife (1 Cor. 11:3) to correct his wife, rather than "vice
versa." Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other
for the purpose of divorce, but the husband ought to have the
preference.
Objection 5: On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the
wife ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the
more is his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in
women than in men, for which reason Chrysostom [Hom. xl in Opus
Imperfectum] says that "lust is a passion proper to women," and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "properly speaking women
are not said to be continent on account of their being easily inclined
to concupiscence," for neither can dumb animals be continent, because
they have nothing to stand in the way of their desires. Therefore
women are rather to be spared in the punishment of divorce.
Objection 6: Further, the husband is placed as the head of the
woman in order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the
woman's and so he should be punished the more.
I answer that, In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a
par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or
unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par
with each other in reference to those things, since the reason for
divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is
sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a punishment of
adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods. Now as
regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally bound
towards each other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against
marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a
sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good of the
offspring the wife's adultery is a greater sin against marriage than
the husband's wherefore it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife
than in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but
not for equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is
sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there is in
two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them
may have sinned more grievously than the other.
Reply to Objection 1: The only reason why divorce was permitted,
was to avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men
than in women, the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill
of divorce, but not "vice versa."
Reply to Objection 2:and 3: These arguments are based on the fact
that in comparison with the good of the offspring there is more reason
for divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It
does not follow, however, that they are not judged on a par with each
other.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the husband is the head of the
wife, he is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is
his. Consequently in matters that have to be submitted to a judge,
the husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.
Reply to Objection 5: In adultery there is the same sinful
character as in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates
it, namely the lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that
which is common to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and
that of the wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds
to that which is exceeded, for in women the humors are more abundant,
wherefore they are more inclined to be led by their concupiscences,
whereas in man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence.
Simply speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins more
grievously in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of
the good of reason, which prevails over all movements of bodily
passions. But as regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to
fornication and for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the
woman sins more grievously than the man, as appears from what we have
said above. And since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it
follows that, simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins more
grievously than the adulterous husband, other things being equal.
Reply to Objection 6: Although the control which the husband
receives over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the
sin is yet more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to
another species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion
becomes a kind of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of
another's child.
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