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Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in
all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the
natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel."
But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rm.
10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural
law is not the same in all men.
Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are
said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the
same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to
change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not
the same in all men.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above (Articles 2,3), to the
natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to
his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different
things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of
honors, and other men to other things. Therefore there is not one
natural law for all.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law
is common to all nations."
I answer that, As stated above (Articles 2,3), to the natural
law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and
among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to
reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper,
as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is
differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For,
since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary
things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper
conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without
fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with
contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and
consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles,
the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we
encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is
the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions:
although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but
only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in
matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for
all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles:
and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not
equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles
whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is
the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper
conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all,
but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three
angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although
it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the
practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all,
nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is
right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this
principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to
another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the
majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would
be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in
trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting
against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the
more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were
to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a
guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number
of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the
principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to
restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are
conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same
for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to
knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to
rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to
generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some
obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted
by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus
formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural
law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar
relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not
that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the
natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but
that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.
Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is
contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of
example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would
be done by."
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of things that are naturally just, not as general
principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in
the majority of cases, but failing in a few.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the
other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other
powers must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is
universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be
directed according to reason.
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