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Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is
unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular,"
"straight," and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation
pertains exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I
go into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is
opposed to rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life
should not be described as movements.
Objection 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains
to the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius
describes these movements as being different in the angels from what
they are in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
"circular" movement in the angel is "according to his enlightenment
by the beautiful and the good." On the other hand, he assigns the
circular movement of the soul to several things: the first of which is
the "withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals"; the second
is "a certain concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free
of error and of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with
those things that are above it." Again, he describes differently
their respective straight movements. For he says that the straight
movement of the angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those
things that are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the
straight movement of the soul as being twofold: first, "its progress
towards things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from
external things to simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a
different oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique
movement of the angels to the fact that "while providing for those who
have less they remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he
assigns the oblique movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is
enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing."
Therefore it would seem that the operations of contemplation are
unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned above.
Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl.
i, 5) mentions many other different movements in likeness to the
birds of the air. "For some of these rise at one time to a great
height, at another swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly;
others fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others
go forwards or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle now more
now less extended; and others remain suspended almost immovably in one
place." Therefore it would seem that there are only three movements
of contemplation.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv).
I answer that, As stated above (Question 119, Article 1, ad
3), the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation
essentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as movement is
the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima
iii, 1). Since, however, it is through sensible objects that we
come to the knowledge of intelligible things, and since sensible
operations do not take place without movement, the result is that even
intelligible operations are described as movements, and are
differentiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bodily
movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as
proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible
operations are described by being likened to them. These movements are
of three kinds; for there is the "circular" movement, by which a
thing moves uniformly round one point as center, another is the
"straight" movement, by which a thing goes from one point to
another; the third is "oblique," being composed as it were of both
the others. Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is
simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible
operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to
the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites
something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared to
the oblique movement.
Reply to Objection 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the
quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward
occupations: but the movements of intellectual operations belong to the
quiet of contemplation.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is like the angels in intellect
generically, but the intellective power is much higher in the angel
than in man. Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls
and angels in different ways, according as they are differently related
to uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two
respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the
truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple
intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a
certain discoursing of the reason.
Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to
the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having
neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither
beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the
part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack
of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the
variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing
from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the
circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself
from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity
requires to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the
discoursing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul's
operations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and
this is indicated by his saying in the second place that "the soul's
intellectual powers must be uniformly concentrated," in other words
that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the
contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul
there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the
understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.
Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the
uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things being
laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God alone.
This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform
unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers, it is
conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement
of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by
considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to
the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through the
angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: "The
angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of
things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are
direct," i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order.
Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the
soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of
intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he
describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements,
inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with
their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul
he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far
as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.
Reply to Objection 3: These varieties of movement that are taken
from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards
and backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under
either straight and oblique movement, because they all denote
discursions of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the
species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains,
from above to below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from
right to left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards
and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at
hand or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of
reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to the
order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it
be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the
oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he
describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.
Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
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