|
Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to
their actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in
spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction
among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties
cannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts.
Objection 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ
according to their acts, as stated above (Question 179, Article
1). But the distinction of duties seems to be other than the
distinction of lives. Therefore duties do not differ according to
their acts.
Objection 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and
grades seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties
differ according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and
states differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are
divided into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore
duties do not differ according to their acts.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "officium
[duty] takes its name from 'efficere' [to effect], as though it
were instead of 'efficium,' by the change of one letter for the sake
of the sound." But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties
differ according to their acts.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), difference among the
members of the Church is directed to three things: perfection,
action, and beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a
threefold distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to
perfection, and thus we have the difference of states, in reference to
which some persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction
regards action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are
said to have various duties when they are appointed to various actions.
A third distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and
thus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or
duty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text
[The Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): "In her grades
shall God be known."
Reply to Objection 1: The material diversity of human acts is
infinite. It is not thus that duties differ, but by their formal
diversity which results from diverse species of acts, and in this way
human acts are not infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely:
wherefore diversity of acts which are becoming to man considered in
himself. But efficiency, whence we have the word "office" (as
stated above), denotes action tending to something else according to
Metaph. ix, text. 16 [Ed. Did. viii, 8]. Hence offices
differ properly in respect of acts that are referred to other persons;
thus a teacher is said to have an office, and so is a judge, and so
forth. Wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "to have an
office is to be officious," i.e. harmful "to no one, but to be
useful to all."
Reply to Objection 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are
taken from different things, as stated above (Article 1, ad 3).
Yet these three things may concur in the same subject: thus when a
person is appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office
and grade, and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on
account of the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The
ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to divine
offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): "There are various kinds
of offices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and
Divine things."
|
|