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Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially.
Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which
is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in
Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." But man
can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an
angel can commit a venial sin also.
Objection 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an
angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning
mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God
inordinately, by sinning venially.
Objection 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are
venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like
frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal
sin to be venial as stated above (Article 3), unless there is a
special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an
angel can sin venially.
On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of
man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the
primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the FP,
Question 58, Article 3; FP, Question 79, Article 8, is
not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to
conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do.
Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion,
it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters
of appetite, as we have often stated (Question 8, Article 2;
Question 10, Article 1; Question 72, Article 5), ends are
like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an
angel's mind is not directed to the means, except as they stand under
the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can
have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time
they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal
sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in
subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts
are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the
other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination
to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in
everything that they do of their own will. This does not apply to the
appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in
them (FP, Question 63, Article 4; Question 64, Article
2, ad 5).
Reply to Objection 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the
mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel could not love a creature less than
God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the
last end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 3: The demons incite man to all such things
which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him
on to mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally,
on account of the end they have in view.
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