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Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something
corporal. For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue,
as may be gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now
showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of
fear, as stated above (Question 81, Article 2, ad 1).
Therefore honor is something spiritual.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
3), "honor is the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists
chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for
the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not
consist of corporal things.
Objection 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from
glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore
honor consists of things internal and spiritual.
On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3,
"Honor widows that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17),
"let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor"
etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.): "Honor here stands either for
almsgiving or for remuneration." Now both of these pertain to
spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of corporal things.
I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii,
8). Now witness is borne either before God or before man. Before
God, Who is the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience
suffices. wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist
of the mere internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man
acknowledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence
before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by
means of signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another's
excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing,
saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts,
erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs,
external and corporal.
Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on
the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as
one man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the
other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored
in order that he may be held in reverence by others.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human
and corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal
things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling
virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that
they may be made known, according to Mt. 5:15, "Neither do men
light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick,
that it may shine to all that are in the house." In this sense honor
is said to be the reward of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two
ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas
honor consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in
honor. Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness
to a person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him
we bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise
one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given
even to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already
arrived at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).
Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our
bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes
clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this,
for "glory" is the same as kleria, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on
Rm. 16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with
praise."
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