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Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by
the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the
strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion,
which is weak and soon passes away.
Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or
the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is
really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;
and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really,
it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears
to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion
never influences the reason against its knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from
its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment
about a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a
particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction,
e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions
contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in
Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in
general, were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case,
he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is
impossible.
Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the
particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is
sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster.
i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that
"no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to
contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act
of fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the
particular.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm.
i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens
that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has
chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has
knowledge, even in particular.
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its
universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal
knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see
another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and
captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law that is in the members
is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since
then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the
reason counter to its knowledge.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the
opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by
passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and
every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right,
because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good,
it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good
in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to
evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is
written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil."
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge
that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according
to the words of Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will
of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many
stripes," and of James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to
do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was
not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is
directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and
particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude
of the will and of the deed, as stated above (Question 76,
Article 1). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in
general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not
know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be
done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal
knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing
prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered
actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge
not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his
knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a
man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a
man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually,
may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who
knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of geometrical
conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes
man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of
some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some
bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of
passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in
so far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders
him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above
(Article 1). Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion
often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general.
Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that
the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely;
even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the
body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the
passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are
very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have
gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this
way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the
knowledge which it has in general.
Reply to Objection 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain,
does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular
knowledge, since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not
astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to
universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be
lacking.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that something appears good in
particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a
passion: and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal
knowledge of the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual
knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition,
and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative
proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true
habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and
actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is
directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.
Reply to Objection 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is
hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that
universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another
universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and
draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four
propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the
reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion,
e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason,
and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition;
so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under
the second.
Reply to Objection 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives
utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is
incompetent to judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who
is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to
do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated
in Ethic. vii, 3.
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