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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the
angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no
choice with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something
after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as
stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the
result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason.
Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to
alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there
is no such indifference; because, as was observed already (Question
58, Article 5), their intellect is not deceived as to things
which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the
part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
Objection 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong
to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher
angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But
the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no
free-will in them.
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the
angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will
is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any
previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others;
just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act
from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as
irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of
judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment
is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed
with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as
it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this
or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is
intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as
there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a
higher degree of perfection than in man.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as
it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from
an angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the
other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is
choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of
counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As was observed already (Article 2),
knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower.
Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what
it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect
in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth
which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty
comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside.
Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it
is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it.
Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not
determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue
imperfection in him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the
higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of
the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal
of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased
directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the
addition of some qualification.
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