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Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it
is said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and
be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all
things are life in Him.
Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model.
But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not
all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are
life in God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not
live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are
life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than
themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they
exist actually, but in God potentially.
Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time
are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make,
but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God,
inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things
that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this
appears inadmissible.
On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was
made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God.
Therefore all things are life in God.
I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated
(Article 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the
act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God
as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore,
since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things
understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life
itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold
sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by
the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are
in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist
in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of
the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since
our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In
another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows
them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas,
which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things
as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine
essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in
God in this manner are not movement, but life.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model
according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form
has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the
thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the
architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that
exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas
of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine
mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to
natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more
truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves.
For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was
the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by
participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural
things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine
mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an
uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this
particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more
truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to
human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind,
it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind
than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than
the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the
latter only potential.
Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God's
knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not
in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their
type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good
things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God.
Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far
as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood
by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.
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