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Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all.
For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are
unable to do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to
the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give
to the good, and receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners.
Therefore we need not do good to all.
Objection 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1
Cor. 13:4). Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for
instance if one were to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if
one were to do good to an excommunicated person, since, by doing so,
he would be holding communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence
is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we
have time, let us work good to all men."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, ad 1), beneficence
is an effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over
the inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among
angels, because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is
superior in one respect, is or may be inferior in another.
Therefore, since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also
should extend to all, but according as time and place require: because
all acts of virtue must be modified with a view to their due
circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do
good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one
may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity
binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in
mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a
good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all
in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for
the faithful.
Reply to Objection 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt
and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to
the maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this
would be to do evil rather than good.
Reply to Objection 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the
common weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents
them from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of
succor lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they
be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like
distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.
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