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Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a
distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial
precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those
things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship
between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject
to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not
possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral
matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division,
except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial
precepts.
Objection 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the
ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing
some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law
contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore
it seems that they have no distinct division.
On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be
division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the
judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore
it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.
I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or
ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division
in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct
division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by
confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the
Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one
another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which
man is directed.
Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the
people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among
themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of
members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his
son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and
according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of
judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down
concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office,
and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial
precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to
his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling,
judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial
precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to
foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and
about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third
part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given
relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and
children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of
relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number:
yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the
different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first
place in the moral order, as stated above (Question 100, Article
3): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should
be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial
precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural
reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct
reason for distinguishing them.
Reply to Objection 3: The Law alludes to the division of the
judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by
the judicial precepts of the Law.
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