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Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names
cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot
God." For, as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what
it stands for." But this name "God" seems to be a singular term,
for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained
(Article 3). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it
stands for essence, and not for person.
Objection 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a
term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the
sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates,"
this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God
begot," this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional
predicate, stand for person.
Objection 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because
the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does
not beget," because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God
who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows
that there are two Gods.
Objection 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either
God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget
God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i,
1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God;
as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, "God begot
God."
Objection 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either
God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who
is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is
not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father:
which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God."
On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by
reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person.
This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity,
which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is
possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is
signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we
consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of
signification must be considered no less than the thing signified.
Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him
Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a
subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its
mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person,
as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for
the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate
is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified---that
is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for
only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we
say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the
King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1
Tim. 1:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although this name "God" agrees with
singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied;
nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form
signified is to be found in several "supposita." So it need not
always stand for the essence it signifies.
Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that
the word "God" does not naturally stand for person.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a
different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the
form signified by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is
really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for
the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the
person---that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of
the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the
consideration of the mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for
the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we
say, "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name
"God"---that is, the divine essence---is really one and
common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some
adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when
we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional act this name
"God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we say,
"God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name
to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation
is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added
belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance,
"God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not
follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not
generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons;
as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the
generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does
not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are
one God, as was said above (Article 3).
Reply to Objection 4: This is false, "the Father begot God,
that is Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal
term, refers to the same "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what
Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot
another self [alterum se]," forasmuch as the word "se" is either
in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from
Himself," or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to
identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an
emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot
another most like to Himself." Likewise also it is false to say,
"He begot another God," because although the Son is another than
the Father, as above explained (Question 31, Article 2),
nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch
as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the
substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another
God" is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a
substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it.
This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided,
for fear of giving occasion to error.
Reply to Objection 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the
Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed
in apposition to "God," the word "God" is restricted to the
person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot God, Who
is Himself the Father"; and then the Father would be spoken of as
begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition
is true, "He begot God Who is not God the Father." If
however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and
require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative
proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning
would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a
rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say
simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is
true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative
are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative
proposition can be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the
negative it denotes both the thing signified and the "suppositum."
Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the
Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative
sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the
Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however,
appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri
Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
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