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Objection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can
be both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the
same" (Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both
good and bad: for instance, a man may go to church continuously,
intending at first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God.
Therefore one and the same action can be both good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii,
3), action and passion are one act. But the passion may be good,
as Christ's was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews.
Therefore one and the same act can be both good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it
were, of his master, the servant's action is his master's, just as
the action of a tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that
the servant's action result from his master's good will, and is
therefore good: and from the evil will of the servant, and is
therefore evil. Therefore the same action can be both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries.
But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
both good and evil.
I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as
it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to
another genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the
genus of quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus
of color, if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly,
nothing hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural
order; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and vice
versa, as we have stated above (Article 3, ad 1; Question 18,
Article 7, ad 1). For continuous walking is one action,
considered in the natural order: but it may resolve itself into many
actions, considered in the moral order, if a change take place in the
walker's will, for the will is the principle of moral actions. If
therefore we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible
for it to be morally both good and evil. Whereas if it be one as to
natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This continual movement which proceeds from
various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not
one in the point of moral unity.
Reply to Objection 2: Action and passion belong to the moral
order, in so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as
they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two
distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the
other.
Reply to Objection 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it
proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action:
but only in so far as it proceeds from the master's command.
Wherefore the evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in
this respect.
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