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Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin
against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that
which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the
division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for
it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's
law," as stated above (Question 66, Article 6). Therefore
sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Objection 2: Further, every division should consist of things in
opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not
opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins
against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly
divided into these three.
Objection 3: Further, specification is not taken from things
external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore
sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and
consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.
On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the
division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself,
against God, and against his neighbor."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 71, Articles
1,6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold
order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all
our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of
reason: another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law,
whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature
a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is
naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2,
hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation
to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second
contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised
under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God
Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God,
which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things
due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance,
by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In
like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it,
because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our
neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason.
Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to
ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man
sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen
in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in
matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his
neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things
whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are
diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their
objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and
consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different
species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed,
differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from
what has been said (Question 62, Articles 1,2,3) that by the
theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and
fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: To sin against God is common to all sins,
in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so
far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God
is a special kind of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When several things, of which one includes
another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood
to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which
one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers
and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure
not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that
in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers
three and four.
Reply to Objection 3: Although God and our neighbor are external
to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but
are related to it as to its object.
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