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Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the
external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
(Mt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit,
neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to
the gloss, the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works.
Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be
good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that
there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the
will, there will be none in the external action. And so the whole
goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.
Objection 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking
now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an
essential division in a genus, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore an act is moral from being
voluntary, it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from
the will alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that
"there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can
make good."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), we may consider a
twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of
due matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the
end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends
entirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or
circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the
goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
Now it must be observed, as was noted above (Question 19,
Article 6, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect
suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for it
to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If
therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its
end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be
good from its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the
external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its
intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that
the external action is evil.
Reply to Objection 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good
will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act
willed and from the end intended.
Reply to Objection 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he
wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the
interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as
they proceed from the will and the reason. Consequently the difference
of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
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