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Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to
another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and
contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the
good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is
contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii;
it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another.
Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is
proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this
is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give
pleasure. But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a
difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is
no contrariety between one pleasure and another.
On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are
contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But
some pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another.
I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to
repose in natural bodies, as stated above (Question 23, Article
4). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are
in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to
repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in
the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because
one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be
contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one
good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which
the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to
water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That
this is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the
fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one
thing---i.e. the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is
likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something
suitable and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent
repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite,
just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural
appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the
same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys.
v, 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and
to sadness.
Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since
they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also
a formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different.
Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in
acts and passions, as stated above (Question 23, Articles
1,4; Question 30, Article 2).
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