|
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher
reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of
a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed
with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the
eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without
mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason
as such.
Objection 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power,
there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every
inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is
a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as
such.
Objection 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes
us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,
through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher
good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when
the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act,
considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more
grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is
contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse
to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement
that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent
deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore
there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But
it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a
venial sin in the higher reason as such.
I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise
than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher
reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers,
except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it
does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate
consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin;
and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of
the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple
"intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again
consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of
simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine
things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And
although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden
movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin
unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one
of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under
some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is
consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance,
when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as
impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus
apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that
this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine law.
If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this
deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements,
the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object,
even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in
giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower
powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in
their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin which is against the eternal law,
though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on
account of the incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition
of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the
reason, as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative
matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form
propositions: consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of
different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus
the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known
by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation,
which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object
of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is
reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that
which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin
in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a
higher consideration, as was explained above.
|
|