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Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without
charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to
be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused
moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith
and hope be without charity.
Objection 2: Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine
says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a
perfection thereof, as stated above (Question 62, Article 3).
Therefore faith cannot be without charity.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that
"there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is
of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without
charity.
On the contrary, A gloss on Mt. 1:2 says that "faith begets
hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten,
and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and
hope, without charity.
I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be
considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as
complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good
works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a
perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good,
but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not
well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the
habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character
of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is
good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it
well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence;
for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.
Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without
charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without
charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and
since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to
will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as
one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since
every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be
without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and
fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because
the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act
is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this
cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits
which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future
time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity.
Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without
charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature
of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but
also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not
even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity;
for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle,
viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such,
do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be
without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of faith considered as
a perfect virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope
whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have
already; and this is not without charity.
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