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Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For
mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no
mercy in Him.
Objection 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God
cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2
Tim. 2:13): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He
cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss
says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming
to God.
On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful
and gracious Lord."
I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen
in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which
it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful
[misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum
cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it
were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery
of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy.
To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God;
but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not
removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the
primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Question 6,
Article 4). It must, however, be considered that to bestow
perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to
His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects.
The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains
to goodness, as shown above (Question 6, Articles 1,4); in so
far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of
them belongs to justice, as has been already said (Article 1); in
so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on
account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as
perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to
mercy.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as
an affection of passion.
Reply to Objection 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going
against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a
man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only
one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence
committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a
gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it
is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the
fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above
judgement" (James 2:13).
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