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Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not
diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in
respect of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a
species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species
of sins.
Objection 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due
to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative
matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the
species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the
reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by
straying more or less from the rectitude of reason.
Objection 3: Further, "one species cannot be made out of two,"
as Porphyry declares [Isagog.; Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess
and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal
and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and
prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not
diversify the species of sins.
On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety
is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text.
13,14. Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency
are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness.
Therefore they differ specifically.
I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act
itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the
order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered,
not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention,
as stated above (Article 1), but one the contrary, from the act
itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is
directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining
the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now
it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not
the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact,
they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of
intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin
of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only
differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Although "more" and "less" do not cause
diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific
difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form;
thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no
different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree,
were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to
fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as
they result from different motives.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart
from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one
kind through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other
hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth,
wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or
less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the
intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to
tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of
falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds in telling
untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than
the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also
explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard
to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [SS,
Question 119, Article 1, ad 1] in taking what one ought not:
and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in
different respects.
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