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Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one
virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way
of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the
same.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity
is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without
attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that
mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (Article 1,
ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue
by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of
deficiency, which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the
mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice
pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery,
namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5):
"Let there be love, but not that which enervates, let there be
severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly
savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency." Therefore
savagery is the same as cruelty.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man
who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him,
is not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."
I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For
animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not
for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason
alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies
to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the
person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's
torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under
bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and
resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt
nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not
only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the
mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or
brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in
Ethic. vii, 5.
Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore
directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness.
But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it
is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue,
which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or
"god-like," which according to us, would seem to pertain to the
gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is
directly opposed to the gift of piety.
Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply
savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as
regards the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is
not inclined to mitigate punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice,
except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be
punished on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the
other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore
remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
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