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Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is
his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the
active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect
is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and
from his Commentator [Averroes]. Therefore much more is the
angel's substance his action---that is, his act of understanding.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text
39) that "the action of the intellect is life." But "since in
living things to live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text
37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the
intellect is the essence of an angel who understands.
Objection 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does
not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the
middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are
the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence.
Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and
the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who
understands.
On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its
substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its
substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was
said above (Question 3, Article 4). Therefore neither the
action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.
I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of
any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance
or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a
pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own
actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God
alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as
His existence and His action.
Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it
would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting
in itself, nor from the substance of another angel.
Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could
then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this
comes about through the diverse participation of the act of
understanding.
Reply to Objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its
own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant,
because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as
lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the
passive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been
reduced to act.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation between "life" and "to live"
is not the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather
as that between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the
act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not
follow, if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence."
Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says
(De Trin. x), "Memory and understanding and will are one
essence, one life": yet it is not taken in this sense by the
Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life."
Reply to Objection 3: The action which is transient, passing to
some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the
subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the
agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but
only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the
union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is
brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who
understands it, as an effect which differs from both.
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