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Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about
Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that
"knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is
about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as
stated above (Question 1, Article 1). Therefore the gift of
knowledge also is about Divine things.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more
therefore is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Rm. 1:20, "the invisible
things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made." If therefore there is knowledge about created
things, it seems that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The
knowledge of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the
knowledge of human affairs may properly receive the name of
knowledge."
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its
cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order
of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so
ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first
cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other
cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause,
is the first and most perfect judgment.
Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of
the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect
thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible
terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special
name of "definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of
this, retain the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as
stated above (Article 1), if this certitude of the judgment is
derived from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name,
which is wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who
knows the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge
of all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one
who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence
the knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the
knowledge of human things is called "knowledge," this being the
common name denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the
judgment which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we
take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of
wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created
things.
Reply to Objection 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and
eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the
believer. Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the
gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we
believe, by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom.
Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites
man's mind to God.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
created things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question 1, Article
1), every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which
things are known, and materially, the things that are known through
the mean. And since that which is formal, is of most account, it
follows that those sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter
from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the
mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in
common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in
Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly,
since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to
"knowledge," to which it belongs formally, rather than to
"wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and, conversely, when we
judge of creatures according to Divine things, this pertains to
"wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
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