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Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no
sin that is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita
Contempl. iii, 2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever
will be possible." Therefore pride is a general sin.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may
withdraw man from wickedness," says that "a man prides himself when
he transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose
[De Parad. viii], "every sin is a transgression of the Divine
law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore
every sin is pride.
Objection 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special
virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says
(Moral. xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the
destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers
of the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts
the whole body"; and Isidore says (Etym.; De Summo Bono ii,
38) that it is "the downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is
not a special sin.
Objection 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now
pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23)
that "one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is
elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly
virtues." Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix):
"If he look into the question carefully, he will find that,
according to God's law, pride is a very different sin from other
vices." Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore
pride is not a general but a special sin.
I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways.
First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect
of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it
has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's own
excellence, as stated (Article 1, ad 2). Secondly, it may be
considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this
way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may
arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins
being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to
which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired.
Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing
an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which
hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, "Thou hast
broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will
not serve."
It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride
admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes,
but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For
though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin,
through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break
the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through
ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are
done amiss which are not done through pride."
Reply to Objection 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into
his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of
someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the
assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride.
We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as
referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the
commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of
pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not
always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes
through weakness, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin
effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays
his father, is a parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he
did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is
said to pride himself against God, effectively always, but not always
affectively.
Reply to Objection 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In
one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not
corrupt every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin
destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto.
In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that
virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an
occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else
pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a
general sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its
object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is
inordinate love of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in
various things.
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