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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to
the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form
exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are
accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter
before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the
soul is a substantial form.
Objection 2: Further, various forms of one species require various
parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible
without division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose
dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many
belonging to one species.
Objection 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is
corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its
power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means
of a power, which is an accident.
On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the
order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says,
Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that
any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the
substantial form.
I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a
motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain
dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary,
they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required
the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain
aptitude to be moved by the soul.
If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the
substantial form, as we have already said above (Article 1), it is
impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and
the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter.
The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of
acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must
be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts
is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be
apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But
matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to
exist absolutely, as we have said above (Article 4). Wherefore it
is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter
before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: As appears from what has been already said
(Article 4), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever
belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the
same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of
perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a
body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to
every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter
is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood
as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence
are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are
understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects,
but as regards the subsequent effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents
consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter.
Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be
understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of
different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For
although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various
degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered
as different when brought under the observation of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a
body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the
intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form;
and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.
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