|
Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a
substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially
true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of
its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number.
But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows
(Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains.
But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore
God is not in any genus.
I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either
absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as
being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a
point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its
principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the
genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He
cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First,
because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that
from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is
always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is
related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature,
by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive
nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from
intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an
intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as
actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other
things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality,
it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species.
Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were
in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus
is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But
the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a
genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic
essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for
non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in
a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or
essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but
they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse
is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every
member of a genus, existence and quiddity---i.e. essence---must
differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding
article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He
were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor
difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save
through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is
from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a
definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its
principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus
does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of
continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But
God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in
any genus as its principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The word substance signifies not only what
exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as
shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence
that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing
of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is
clear that God is not in the genus of substance.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection turns upon proportionate
measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is
not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the
measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only
according as it resembles Him.
|
|