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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being
be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be
understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
God.
Objection 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order
to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because
whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are
from God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be
demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not
made by the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher
(Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as
from their efficient cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Rm. 11:36): "Of Him, and
by Him, and in Him are all things."
I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing
is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation,
must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron
becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Question 3,
Article 4) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the
essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (Question
11, Articles 3,4) that subsisting being must be one; as, if
whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is
multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are
not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it
must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse
participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused
by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before
multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever
is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being
and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the
cause of all heat.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part
of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a
consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact
that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused.
Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot
be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused
does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it
possible for us to find a being uncaused.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection has led some to say that what
is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is
manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary
principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore
Aristotle says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some
necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason
why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is
not necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause were
not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent
and consequent be possible or impossible.
Reply to Objection 3: The science of mathematics treats its object
as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not
abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have
an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the
object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to
that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration
of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object
from its efficient cause.
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