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Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor
more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
28): "One ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one
cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason
of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are
more closely united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be
loved more than another.
Objection 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for
loving several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is
one and the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason
is God, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27).
Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.
Objection 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as
the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors
we wish an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to
love all our neighbors equally.
On the contrary, One's obligation to love a person is proportionate
to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now
it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors,
than against the love of others. Hence the commandment (Lev.
10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him
die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.
Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.
I answer that, There have been two opinions on this Question for
some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our
neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the
outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood
as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who
are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and
not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all
including our enemies.
But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the
inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,
which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from
Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural
inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that
is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination
of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to
be beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is
the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions
which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection
of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave
with greater kindness.
We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought
to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the
principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be
that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to
one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above
(Article 1), wherever we find a principle, order depends on
relation to that principle.
Reply to Objection 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on
the part of the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all
men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic
good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be
greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought
not to love all equally.
Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two
ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As
regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we
cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to
be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more
than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter
inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of
beneficence.
Reply to Objection 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to
God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness,
and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are
not so near to Him.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the quantity of love
on the part of the good which we wish our friends.
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