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Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those
who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet.
ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the
better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man
is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
him.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected
who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by
those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to
Rhet. ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does
himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most
closely connected with him.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6)
that "men take more shame from those who retail their information to
many, such as jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more
closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one
should not take shame chiefly from them.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6)
that "men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they
have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the
first time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these
are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most
ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.
On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made
most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."
I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence
which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is
shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially
that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's
attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person
ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more
weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its
effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations
for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement,
as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous
of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame.
Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by
reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his
knowledge of the matter attested, because "everyone judges well of
what is known to him" [Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more
liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are
better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons
entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us
with no shame at all.
An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous
of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more
liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm.
And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected
with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their
society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the
harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
Reply to Objection 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for
the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us;
because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight
since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their
judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those
among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our
concerns in detail.
Reply to Objection 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are
connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that
they look upon our defect as disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of
the harm they do by making many think ill of us.
Reply to Objection 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong,
make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow,
because, to wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us:
and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their
opposition seems greater, so that when a man notices something
disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the
more disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of
whom we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to
be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in
our request, or by failing to become their friends.
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