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Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted
to the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given
to the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et
Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of
Innocent III: "Even as a greater good is preferred to a lesser,
so the common profit takes precedence of private profit: and in this
case teaching is rightly preferred to silence, responsibility to
contemplation, work to rest." Now the religious order which is
directed to the greater good is better. Therefore it would seem that
those religious orders that are directed to the active life are more
excellent than those which are directed to the contemplative life.
Objection 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the
perfection of charity, as stated above (Articles 1,2). Now a
gloss on Heb. 12:4, "For you have not yet resisted unto
blood," says: "In this life there is no more perfect love than that
to which the holy martyrs attained, who fought against sin unto
blood." Now to fight unto blood is becoming those religious who are
directed to military service, and yet this pertains to the active
life. Therefore it would seem that religious orders of this kind are
the most excellent.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is,
the more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious
orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter observance
than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore they are more
excellent.
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42) that the "best
part" was Mary's, by whom the contemplative life is signified.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the difference
between one religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and
secondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be
more excellent than another save in respect of that in which it differs
therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious order over
another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on their
respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is
considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the
end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas the
comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise is
sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a
religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end
that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good or
because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the
same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends
secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of
the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as preferring
discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings,
watchings, and all such observances.
Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold.
one proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and
preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the
words of Ps. 144:7, "They shall publish the memory of . . .
Thy sweetness," refer "to perfect men returning from their
contemplation." And this work is more excellent than simple
contemplation. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to
shine, so is it better to give to others the fruits of one's
contemplation than merely to contemplate. The other work of the active
life consists entirely in outward occupation, for instance almsgiving,
receiving guests, and the like, which are less excellent than the
works of contemplation, except in cases of necessity, as stated above
(Question 182, Article 1). Accordingly the highest place in
religious orders is held by those which are directed to teaching and
preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the episcopal perfection,
even as in other things "the end of that which is first is in
conjunction with the beginning of that which is second," as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place belongs to those which
are directed to contemplation, and the third to those which are
occupied with external actions.
Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious
order excels another through being directed to higher action in the same
genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to ransom
captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the
contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel
another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or if
it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.
Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as
directed to the salvation of souls.
Reply to Objection 2: Those religious orders that are established
for the purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the
enemy's blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more
properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of
this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in certain
cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious; even as
in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of
contemplation.
Reply to Objection 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed
Antony remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is
not the chief object of commendation in a religious order; and it is
written (Is. 58:5): "Is this such a fast as I have chosen,
for a man to afflict his soul for a day?" Nevertheless it is adopted
in religious life as being necessary for taming the flesh, "which if
done without discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether," as
the Blessed Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is not more
excellent through having stricter observances, but because its
observances are directed by greater discretion to the end of religion.
Thus the taming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to
continence by means of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to
hunger and thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains
to cold and nakedness, or by bodily labor.
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