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Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could
have been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that
"the woman being seduced was in the transgression."
Objection 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi)
that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because
she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God."
But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.
Objection 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything
is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes
is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the
state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size
of what he saw, just as he is deceived now.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2)
that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were
the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have
eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have
been deceived, adhering to images as to realities.
Objection 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of
other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated
above (Article 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about
these things, he would have been deceived.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18):
"To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created;
but is a punishment of man condemned."
I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may mean two
things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is
false, as though it were true, but without the assent of
belief---or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could
not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which
his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge
did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in
the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief.
This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to
entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does
not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed.
Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of
the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without
struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is
clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its
evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as
long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the
human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as
some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members
of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be
in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.
This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by
virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower
faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to
their action. And from what has preceded (Question 85, Article
6), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is
ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever
deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the
imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of
judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it
is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the
rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the
intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the woman was deceived before she
sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by
interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that
"the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she
not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a
presumption of self-conceit."
Reply to Objection 2: The woman thought that the serpent had
received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by
virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow
the Master of the Sentences in this point.
Reply to Objection 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or
sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things,
he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him
to judge the truth.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs
during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein
consists man's proper action.
Reply to Objection 5: If anyone had said something untrue as
regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in
the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might
have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been
to entertain a false opinion.
It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from
above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did
not extend.
If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted,
though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had
already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the
Divine aid.
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