|
Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived
by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by
participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance,
that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the
intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding,
participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in
act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in
its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual
soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually
understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the
intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by
some separate forms.
Objection 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the
sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the
senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which
exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species,
by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually
intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing
else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms
of our intellect are derived from some separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act
by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in
potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be
caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a
separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we
actually understand, are caused by some separate substances.
On the contrary, If this were true we should not need the senses in
order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from
the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any
knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.
I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our
intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And
this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (Article 1), held
that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter;
for instance, the form of a man which he called "per se" man, and
the form or idea of a horse which is called "per se" horse, and so
forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our
soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge
thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that,
just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes
an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of
a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea
takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a
model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible
forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as
certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our
intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this
reason, as we have said above (Article 1), he referred sciences
and definitions to those ideas.
But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their
forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways
(Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion
aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible things,
instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist
immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first of which, said
he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last
separate intellect which he called the "active intelligence," from
which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls,
and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees
with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are
derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist
of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the "active
intelligence." They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna
held that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after
it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to
the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. Consequently he
does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held
that the participated ideas remain immovably in the soul.
But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul
being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual
soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is
form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the
moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem
necessary to the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation
which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend
on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude
for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain
separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it
would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose
would it be united to the body.
But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to
understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the
consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it
receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient
explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul,
except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists
expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body:
and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except
for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters
through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union
of the soul with the body still remains to be sought.
And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the
soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active
intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a
sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to
understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it
follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the
senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination
of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the
effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding
sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have
knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore
conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands,
are not derived from separate forms.
Reply to Objection 1: The intelligible species which are
participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to
a first principle which is by its essence intelligible---namely,
God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible
forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).
Reply to Objection 2: Material things, as to the being which they
have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually
intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and
intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from
potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active
intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said (Question
79, Article 4); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate
cause, although perchance as remote cause.
|
|