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Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what
is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future.
Therefore memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of
contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to Prov.
13:12: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore
hope does not cause pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in
regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not
be assigned as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 12:12): "Rejoicing in
hope"; and (Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was
delighted."
I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good,
in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is
present to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according
as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in
reality---i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any
kind with another, either actually or potentially. And since real
conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the
conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than
potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which
arises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible
object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein
there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension,
but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable
object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has
only the conjunction of apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which,
absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion,
present, i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to
apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in
different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch
as it implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure;
whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes
affliction.
Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure.
For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love
is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like
manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires,
since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as
implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is
not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in
preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to
memory, which is of that which has already passed away.
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