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Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of
man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite.
Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires
his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts
5:3, says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil
"fills men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is
directly the cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2)
that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter
of evil." But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the
devil is directly the cause of our sins.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the
Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic
principle of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good
things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to
take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him
to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that
"nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his
desire." Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except
through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but
man's own will alone.
I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the
cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an
action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper
principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the
will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be
directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.
Now the will, as stated above (Question 9, Articles
3,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object,
inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite:
secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this
is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown above
(Question 9, Articles 3,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause
of sin, as stated above (Question 79, Article 1). Therefore
it follows that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the
cause of his sin.
As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in
three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will:
thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that
proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will
that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a
fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or
apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible
things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In
the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to
sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by
persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be
the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved
by any object except the last end, as stated above (Question 10,
Articles 1,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from
without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the
sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a
cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by
persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: All these, and other like authorities, if
we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil
induces man to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by
offering him objects of appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: This comparison is true in so far as the
devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain
way the cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of
causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will
inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.
Reply to Objection 3: God is the universal principle of all inward
movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil
counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as
persuading or offering the object of appetite.
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