|
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a
passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rm.
7:19): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I
will not, that I do": and this is said by reason of concupiscence,
which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a
passion.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according
as a man is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's
power to cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's
power not to will that to which the passion inclines him.
Objection 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a
particular effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore
the universal reason does not move save by means of a particular
estimation, as stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal
reason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive
appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something
particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the
sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a
passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): "Thy lust shall
be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore
man's will is moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 9, Article 2), the
passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will
is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being
disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be
fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the
passion. Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways.
First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use
of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or
concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some
other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place
without some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said as
of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of
their passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor,
consequently, of will.
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the
passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,
its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain
degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not
subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains,
does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.
Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man,
and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the
will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement
of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil
which I will not, that I do---i.e. I desire"; yet it is in
the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to
concupiscence. And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of
concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature,
intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in
respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly
subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is
entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes,
although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason
remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the
passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led
away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously
disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to
him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a
passion.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal
good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.
Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a
passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those
cases wherein reason resists passion.
|
|