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Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than
interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause
repugnant to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas
interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since,
therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that,
according to what has been said above (Article 6), outward pain is
greater than interior sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness
does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some
contrary; whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of
a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward
pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain
than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is
shunned more than interior sorrow.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The
sadness of the heart is every wound, and the wickedness of a woman is
all evil." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses
all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart
surpasses every outward wound.
I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and
differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the
appetitive power, as stated above (Article 1). But they differ in
respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure;
namely, in respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil;
and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a
conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is
a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain
arises from an apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward
pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the
reason.
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both
these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly.
Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the
appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being
repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body. Now,
that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of
another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses
outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension:
because the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order
than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently inward pain
is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof
is that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward
pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior
appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of
inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by
inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is
not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since
whatever is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior
appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by
imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage
quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every
wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the
interior sorrows of the heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that
are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward
pain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause
pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is
compared to the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended
likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the
apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness
represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by
means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and
abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being
caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an
inward apprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused
by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a
corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the
sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more
material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more
material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above
(Question 22, Article 3; Question 31, Article 5), the
body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive
appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than from inward pain.
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