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Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more
eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make
five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created
truth is eternal.
Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But
universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So
therefore is truth, which is the most universal.
Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the
present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition
regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition
regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is
eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end;
for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was
true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so
that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted
that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to
be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
eternal.
On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before
(Question 10, Article 3).
I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth
of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of
itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on
account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a
subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it
but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it
has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the
intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it
alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything
else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is
God Himself, as shown already (Article 5).
Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that
two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can
be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power
of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be
everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be
everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place
and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are
eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it
(actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be.
Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not
future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not
follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so
far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is
such a cause.
Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal,
neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us,
eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth
existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by
reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But
it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is
true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not
by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning
not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as
our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did
not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its
being.
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