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Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always
belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and
perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth" [oion tois akmaiois he
hora--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x,
4). But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the
act does not belong only to the higher reason.
Objection 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be
voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts.
Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
Objection 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent
on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an
act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account of
some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong
to the higher reason alone.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is
impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that
mental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members to,
or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its
slave."
I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the
highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as
long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final
decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the
higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge
of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we
judge according to Divine principles, which is the function of the
higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he
resists or not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the
reason can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the
final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore
consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in
which the reason includes the will, as stated above (Article 1, ad
1).
Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs
to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to
delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower
reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an
action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far
as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it
belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something
else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is
ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the
master or principal art.
Reply to Objection 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the
fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act
of each power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above
(Article 1, ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only
because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but
also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
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