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Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to
God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says
(De Trin. vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the
Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for
person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son."
Objection 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to
essence. But, as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who
bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy
Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three
persons." Therefore person signifies essence.
Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the
meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of "person"
is this: "The individual substance of the rational nature," as
above stated. Therefore "person" signifies substance.
Objection 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify
relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified
relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in
angels.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that
refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to
person more strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore
this word "person" signifies relation.
I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this
word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally
of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the
essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which
express relation.
Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses
absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word
"Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by
conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and
especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing
adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," or, "one is the
person of the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however,
in the singular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does
not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word
"person," by force of its own signification, expresses the divine
essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of "three
persons," so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still
more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word
"person" in God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some
of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation
indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it were "by itself one"
[per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is "by
itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to
exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son. Others,
however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly;
and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of "person"
the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the
truth.
To determine the question, we must consider that something may be
included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in
the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of
"man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one
thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its
meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to
ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask
the meaning of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in
general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The
individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others.
Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that
nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones,
and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and
which, though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do
belong to the meaning of a particular human person.
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above
(Question 28, Articles 2,3), while relation in God is not as
an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it
is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the
Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a
divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as
subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and
such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature,
although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine
nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name "person"
signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not,
however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a
hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and
indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the
hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by
the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of
the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the
word "person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by
heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as any other
absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as
it lent itself to that signification, so that this word "person"
means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first
opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
Reply to Objection 1: This word "person" is said in respect to
itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as
such, but by way of a substance---which is a hypostasis. In that
sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in
God essence is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He
is, and whereby He is are the same.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the
nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and
we answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the
"suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer,
A fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three
persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual---i.e. distinct
and incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as
above explained.
Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term
does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and
an ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree
univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies
to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained
in the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or
of a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense.
Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said
univocally of God and creatures (Question 13, Article 5).
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