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Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For
since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive
appetite. Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in
the reason, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [FS,
Question 74, Article 4]. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Question 36 Article 3. Obj. 2 Para.
1/1 OBJ 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants.
But envy can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I
myself have seen and known even a baby envious, it could not speak,
yet it turned pale and looked bitterly on its foster-brother."
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue.
But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to nemesis, which is a
passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore
envy is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the
little one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin.
Therefore envy is a mortal sin.
I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For
the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the
aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives
its spiritual life, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: "We know that we
have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now
the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above (Article 1).
Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its
genus.
Nevertheless, as stated above (Question 35, Article 4; FS,
Question 72, Article 5, ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we
find certain imperfect movements in the sensuality, which are venial
sins: such are the first movement of concupiscence, in the genus of
adultery, and the first movement of anger, in the genus of murder,
and so in the genus of envy we find sometimes even in perfect men
certain first movements, which are venial sins.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a
passion of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human
acts, the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind
is not a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children
who have not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second
Objection is manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
9), envy is contrary both to nemesis and to pity, but for different
reasons. For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects
being contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
contrary to nemesis on the part of the man whose good grieves the
envious man, for nemesis is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I
saw the prosperity of sinners", whereas the envious grieves over the
good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the
former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now pity is a
virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is contrary to
pity and charity.
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