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Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from
entering religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not
lawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which is
optional. Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation of
the precept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex.
20:12); wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): "If
any widow have children or grandchildren, let her learn first to govern
her own house, and to make a return of duty to her parents." But the
entrance to religion is optional. Therefore it would seem that one
ought not to omit deference to one's parents for the sake of entering
religion.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his
father is greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is
natural, while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from
Gn. 9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master
in order to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the
Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore
can a son set aside the deference due to his father in order to enter
religion.
Objection 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to
those to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone
cannot enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5)
that "those who are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into
a monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they
withdraw from public business" (Dist. liii, can. Legem.).
Therefore seemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of
their duty to their parents.
On the contrary, It is related (Mt. 4:22) that James and
John "left their nets and father, and followed our Lord." By
this, says Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), "we learn that we who
intend to follow Christ are not bound by the cares of the secular
life, and by the ties of home."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 101, Article 2, ad
2) when we were treating of piety, parents as such have the character
of a principle, wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the
care of their children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having
children to enter religion so as altogether to set aside the care for
their children, namely without providing for their education. For it
is written (1 Tim. 5:8) that "if any man have not care of his
own . . . he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."
Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by
their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a condition
of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their parents are in
such need that they cannot fittingly be supported otherwise than by the
help of their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion in
despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the parents'
necessity be not such as to stand in great need of their children's
assistance, the latter may, in despite of the duty they owe their
parents, enter religion even against their parents' command, because
after the age of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom in things
concerning the ordering of his state of life, especially in such as
belong to the service of God, and "we should more obey the Father of
spirits that we may live," as says the Apostle (Heb. 12:9),
than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Mt. 8:22; Lk.
9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to follow
him forthwith on account of his father's burial: for there were others
who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks [Hom. xxvii in
Matth.].
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment of honoring our parents
extends not only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the
paying of deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil
the commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by
revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those
who live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits
their condition.
Reply to Objection 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of
sin, it follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise
he would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person,
for "a slave belongs wholly to his master" [Aristotle, Polit. i,
2]. On the other hand, the son, through being subject to his
father, is not hindered from freely disposing of his person by
transferring himself to the service of God; which is most conducive to
man's good.
Reply to Objection 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation
cannot lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it.
Wherefore if a person is under an obligation to give an account to
someone or to pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this
obligation in order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of
money, and has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he
can, namely by surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to
civil law [Cod. IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays
an obligation not on the person of a freeman, but on his property,
because the person of a freeman "is above all pecuniary consideration"
[Dig. L, xvii, de div. reg. Jur. ant. 106,176].
Hence, after surrendering his property, he may lawfully enter
religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in order to earn the
means of paying the debt.
On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except
as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.
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