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Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the
mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is
extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it
is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power."
Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.
Objection 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral
virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great
honors, and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the
mean.
Objection 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to
observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but
the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now
some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus
virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the
extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor
is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is
not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that
"moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean."
I answer that, As already explained (Question 55, Article
3), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now
moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul
in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the
appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But
the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity
with its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the
rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in
discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by
their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is
clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident
that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of
reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is
equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue
observes the mean.
Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule
of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If
therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that
which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz.
conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other
extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect
of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it
makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its
essence, is a mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed
on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the
'best' and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: In actions and passions the mean and the
extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders
something from being extreme in a particular virtue as to one
circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other
circumstances, through being in conformity with reason. This is the
case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute
quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it
an extreme and a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation
to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since
these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of
reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and for
an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this
maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not right, or for
an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend
thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one aught. This agrees with
the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the
"magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the mean in the
right mode of his action."
Reply to Objection 3: The same is to be said of virginity and
poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual
matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right
manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal
life. But if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful
superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if
it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it
is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows
of virginity or poverty.
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