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Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not
in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power,
as stated above (Question 15, Article 1): whereas the reason is
an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not
in the higher reason.
Objection 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on
contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states
[De Trin. xii, 7]. But sometimes consent is given to an act,
without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think
about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the
sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.
Objection 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions
according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures
or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to
fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states
(De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should
also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
Objection 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower,
so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds
to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without
any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he
moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason
may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If
the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the
bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible,
to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has
offered the forbidden fruit to her husband."
I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which
consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and
delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical
reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we
must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final
sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in
speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is
delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as
there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted
to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence
not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be
regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the
created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the
rule of the Divine law, as stated above (Question 19, Article
4). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher
rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is
finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the
eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several
points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in
human acts, the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is
the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the
consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the
preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower
reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher
reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to
the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the
higher court, but not conversely.
Reply to Objection 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power,
not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and
judging, as stated above (Question 15, Article 3). Because
the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact
that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its
judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from
the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the
Divine law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it
thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it
neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful
act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide
on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields
its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining
them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed."
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason, by considering the
eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as
it can direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before
the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while
deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes
approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation
belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the
eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent
will then belong to the higher reason.
Reply to Objection 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination
is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the
higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the
lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the
higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its
deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by
imputed to it.
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