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Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends
not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not
several species of unbelief, according to the various points which the
unbeliever disbelieves.
Objection 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of
faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species
of unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem
to follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our
consideration.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different
species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different
points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a
diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species
of unbelief.
On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue,
because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according
to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are
opposed to it.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 55, Article
4; FS, Question 64, Article 1), every virtue consists in
following some rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity to
a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach of the rule
happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one virtue.
The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be
considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different
relations to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species
of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is
opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the
virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be
considered in respect of the corruption of the various conditions
required for that virtue. In this way an infinite number of vices are
opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to
the infinite number of ways in which the various circumstances of a
virtue may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken.
For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.
Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to
faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number.
For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this
may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the
Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this
either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the
very manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics.
Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of
unbelief.
If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to
the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
Reply to Objection 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered
in two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in
which case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of
his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly,
it may be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is
forsaken is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive
its species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We
must therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its
various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres
to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice
opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by
turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various
inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through
adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of
unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the various species
of unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.
Reply to Objection 3: Since faith is one because it believes in
many things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in
many things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one.
Yet nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of
unbelief, even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to
various bodily diseases.
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