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Objection 1: It seems that bread cannot be converted into the body
of Christ. For conversion is a kind of change. But in every change
there must be some subject, which from being previously in potentiality
is now in act. because as is said in Phys. iii: "motion is the act
of a thing existing in potentiality." But no subject can be assigned
for the substance of the bread and of the body of Christ, because it
is of the very nature of substance for it "not to be in a subject,"
as it is said in Praedic. iii. Therefore it is not possible for the
whole substance of the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the form of the thing into which another is
converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter of the thing converted
into it: as when air is changed into fire not already existing, the
form of fire begins anew to be in the matter of the air; and in like
manner when food is converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of
the man begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, if
bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of Christ's body
must necessarily begin to be in the matter of the bread, which is
false. Consequently, the bread is not changed into the substance of
Christ's body.
Objection 3: Further, when two things are diverse, one never
becomes the other, as whiteness never becomes blackness, as is stated
in Phys. i. But since two contrary forms are of themselves diverse,
as being the principles of formal difference, so two signate matters
are of themselves diverse, as being the principles of material
distinction. Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of
bread to become this matter whereby Christ's body is individuated,
and so it is not possible for this substance of bread to be changed into
the substance of Christ's body.
On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: "To thee it ought
neither to be a novelty nor an impossibility that earthly and mortal
things be changed into the substance of Christ."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), since Christ's
true body is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin to be there
by local motion, nor is it contained therein as in a place, as is
evident from what was stated above (Article 1, ad 2), it must be
said then that it begins to be there by conversion of the substance of
bread into itself.
Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely
supernatural, and effected by God's power alone. Hence Ambrose
says (De Sacram. iv): "See how Christ's word changes nature's
laws, as He wills: a man is not wont to be born save of man and
woman: see therefore that against the established law and order a man
is born of a Virgin": and (De Myster. iv): "It is clear that
a Virgin begot beyond the order of nature: and what we make is the
body from the Virgin. Why, then, do you look for nature's order in
Christ's body, since the Lord Jesus was Himself brought forth of a
Virgin beyond nature?" Chrysostom likewise (Hom. xlvii),
commenting on Jn. 6:64: "The words which I have spoken to
you," namely, of this sacrament, "are spirit and life," says:
i.e. "spiritual, having nothing carnal, nor natural consequence;
but they are rent from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and
from the laws here established."
For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is in act.
But every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a
determinate genus and species: and consequently the action of every
created agent bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination
of every thing in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently,
no natural or created agent can act except by changing the form in
something; and on this account every change made according to nature's
laws is a formal change. But God is infinite act, as stated in the
FP, Question 7, Article 1; Question 26, Article 2; hence
His action extends to the whole nature of being. Therefore He can
work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms succeed each
other in the same subject; but also the change of all being, so that,
to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed into the whole
substance of another. And this is done by Divine power in this
sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into the
whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the wine
into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a
formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural
movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called
"transubstantiation."
Reply to Objection 1: This objection holds good in respect of
formal change, because it belongs to a form to be in matter or in a
subject; but it does not hold good in respect of the change of the
entire substance. Hence, since this substantial change implies a
certain order of substances, one of which is changed into the other,
it is in both substances as in a subject, just as order and number.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument also is true of formal
conversion or change, because, as stated above (ad 1), a form must
be in some matter or subject. But this is not so in a change of the
entire substance; for in this case no subject is possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter
into matter by the power of any finite agent. Such a change,
however, can be made by the power of an infinite agent, which has
control over all being, because the nature of being is common to both
forms and to both matters; and whatever there is of being in the one,
the author of being can change into whatever there is of being in the
other, withdrawing that whereby it was distinguished from the other.
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