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Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided
into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between
moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the
intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by
all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we
shall show further on (Question 61, Article 1). Therefore
virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though
there were no mean between them.
Objection 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are
not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are
consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not
adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Objection 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet
they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these,
viz. science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated
above (Question 57, Articles 2,3,5). Neither are they
moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the
chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately
divided into intellectual and moral.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that
"virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral."
I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his
doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human
actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are
the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii,
text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a
perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects
man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be
good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his
appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every
human virtue is either intellectual or moral.
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual
virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in
common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to
be done, as stated above (Question 57, Article 4). It is in
this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Contingency and perseverance are not
perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact
that passions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would
not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit
making it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are,
however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the
passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being
virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself
well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the
end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles,
i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting
in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action
proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be
perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however
perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce
an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also.
Hence if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational
faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be,
the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle
of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason,
contingency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst
of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the
Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).
Reply to Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman
virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
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