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Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For
whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (FS,
Question 65, Article 1). But one may have the other virtues
without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 2) that "not every liberal man is magnificent." Therefore
magnificence is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to
Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the
mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and
"little" are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is
"equal," as stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not
the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural
inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above
(Question 108, Article 2; Question 117, Article 1,
Objection 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is
opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself.
Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
4) "act is right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence
is about things to be made, as its very name denotes. Therefore it is
an act rather than a virtue.
On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power.
But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to
Ps. 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the
clouds." Therefore magnificence is a virtue.
I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of
virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as
regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess,
the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do
something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly
to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as
regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform
magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of
magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition
thereto, as explained above (Question 129, Article 3, ad
2), as also (FS, Question 65, Article 1) when we were
treating of the connection of virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that magnificence observes the
extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it
observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither
falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity
(Question 129, Article 3, ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something
great. But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison
with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the
community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend
principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his
own good, but because to do so is not something great. Yet if
anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man
accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done
once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting
nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a
suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.
Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5)
"there must needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue,
whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act:
and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a
virtue.
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