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Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a
species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral
virtue, as was shown in the SS, Question 62, Article 3. But
penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object,
for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles
the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of
justice.
Objection 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes
the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to
the extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make thee mourning as
for an only son, a bitter lamentation." Therefore penance is not a
species of justice.
Objection 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated
in Ethic. v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative." But
penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore
it seems that penance is not a species of justice.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, "Blessed are ye
that weep now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the
unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things."
But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of
prudence rather than of justice.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [De vera et
falsa Poenitentia]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful,
ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done." But to
take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv.
Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore
it seems that penance is a species of justice.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, ad 2) penance is a
special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since
charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves
for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against
God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed
against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is
necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses
committed against another, just as retribution does, only that
compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes
satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended
against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each
is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a
virtue, is a part of justice.
It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and
relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since
justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil
just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being
immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is
just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the
other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife
under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in
penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of
amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Ps. 122:2:
"Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters .
. . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on
us"; and as a son to his father, according to Lk. 15:21:
"Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and as a
wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast
prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith
the Lord."
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a
virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much
the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of
distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God,
but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is
as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is
not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.
Reply to Objection 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is
established between those between whom justice is, as stated in
Ethic. v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be
established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father
and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii,
14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must
do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only
according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is
meant by ascribing excess to penance.
Reply to Objection 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors,
when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is
there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an
offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his
will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own
accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the
sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge.
Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative
justice.
Reply to Objection 4: Although penance is directly a species of
justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the
virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it
must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the
object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in
Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for
pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as
it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all
the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not
only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to
temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause
pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause
terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative
justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from
pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships,
which belongs to fortitude.
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