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Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation
of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the
multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and
to others." And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that
"all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil."
Objection 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord
said of the Jews (Jn. 8:44): "You are of your father the
devil." But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's
instigation. Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.
Objection 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so
demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to
the suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne
to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the
instigation of the devil.
On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix):
"Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes
they arise from the movement of our free-will."
I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways;
directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a
disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and
indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who
dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must
admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was
who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a
proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must
take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.
But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its
action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the
cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's
instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of
the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there
were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such
like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless
those desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the
corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to
curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need
for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins
which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the
same blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De
Summo Bono ii).
Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: When man commits sin without being thereto
instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil
thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but
he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is
borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels
take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to
the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which
is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.
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