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Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were
less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the
mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we
are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence.
Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace
is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.
Objection 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for
merit; for it is written (2 Tm. 2:5): "He . . . is not
crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the difficult and the good."
But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is
greater efficacy for merit.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv)
that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he
does merit now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more
meritorious than in the primitive state.
On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after
sinning.
I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways.
First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured
corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the
enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions
proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the
degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This
degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put
two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree
than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate
degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more
in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit
corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for
created good.
We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were
more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the
degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more
copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like
manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because,
as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater
works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason
for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a
small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty
than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.
Reply to Objection 1: After sin man requires grace for more things
than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man
even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the
chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace
also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.
Reply to Objection 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree
of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as
above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving
after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is
caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person
performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an
arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to
him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the
deed to satisfy for sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The first man would not have gained merit in
resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he
did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have
not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in
the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our
present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist
temptation even without grace.
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