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Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the
divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in
quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in
the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic
quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity,
which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of
discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore
equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
Objection 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we
have said (Question 39, Article 2). Now essence is signified
by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not
to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine
persons, but not of equality.
Objection 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found
equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But
the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers
perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal
to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the
image." But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father
is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among
the divine persons.
Objection 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is
common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of
the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine
persons.
On the contrary, Athanasius says that "the three persons are
co-eternal and co-equal to one another."
I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine
persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text
15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or
less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine
persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): "They must needs
admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase
or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by
distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality."
Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same
quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence.
Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine
persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three
persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore
admit equality among the divine persons.
Reply to Objection 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of
"bulk" or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal
things, and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also
quantity of "virtue," which is measured according to the perfection
of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we
speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is
more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured
firstly by its source---that is, by the perfection of that form or
nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of
great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are
great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more
perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is
measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is
being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second
effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form.
Consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and
in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more
perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action,
forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act.
And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says:
"We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost,
inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in
greatness, or surpasses in power."
Reply to Objection 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual
quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it
excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to
be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just
as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said
to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than
another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and
Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not
only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the
error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to
exclude the error of Arius.
Reply to Objection 3: Equality and likeness in God may be
designated in two ways---namely, by nouns and by verbs. When
designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so
is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and
conversely. This is because the divine essence is not more the
Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the
greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so
the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to
the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual." For effects
are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of
their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally in the
cause, and secondarily in the effect.
But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is
not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore,
the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal
to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the
Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely.
Reply to Objection 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us
to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations
in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both ---namely,
distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself;
and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to
one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it
is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation.
Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further
relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation,
opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation.
For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely.
Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real
relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it
includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the
unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D,
xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative."
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