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Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above (Article 1). But a part should not be
reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should
not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by
their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same
as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as
regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence
distinct from regnative prudence.
Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now
each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence
commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of
prudence called political.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of
the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals."
I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate
beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion,
since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own
actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their
power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who
are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of
others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will;
wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so
that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this
belongs that species of prudence which is called political.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most
perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which
falls short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political
prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the
essence of a thing retains the name of "proper."
Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies
the species of a habit, as stated above (Question 47, Article
5). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a
more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one
king in various departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to
this political prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to
handicraft.
Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so
called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of
which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
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