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Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away
to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the
power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to
that which is above nature" [De Veritate xiii, 1]. Now it is in
accordance with man's nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for
Augustine says at the beginning of his Confessions: "Thou madest
us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in
Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that
"God's justice is seen in this that He treats all things according
to their mode and dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's
mode and worth that he be raised above what he is according to nature.
Therefore it would seem that man's soul is not carried away to things
divine.
Objection 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But
God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [De Fide
Orth. ii, 30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to
things divine.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know
a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which
words a gloss says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to
nature."
I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above
(Objection 3); and "the violent is that which has its principle
without, and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all"
(Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it
tends in accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or
natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent,
must be carried to something different from that to which his
inclination tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way
from the end of the inclination---for instance a stone, which is
naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in
another way from the manner of tending---for instance a stone may be
thrown downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural
movement.
Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold
manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as
regards the term of transport---as when it is carried away to
punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, "Lest He snatch you
away, and there be none to deliver you"; in another way, as regards
the manner connatural to man, which is that he should understand the
truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the
apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though
he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided
this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep
which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called
rapture, properly speaking.
This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold
cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer
abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power
of the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power
of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a
man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and
withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, "The spirit
lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the
vision of God into Jerusalem."
It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be
carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but
also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending,
as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is
to use the expression in a less proper signification.
Reply to Objection 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things
through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rm.
1:20, "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made." But the mode, whereby
a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is
not natural to man.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he
be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to
God's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the
faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine
assistance which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it
is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's
mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God.
Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those
things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are
beyond the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a
stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if
we consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to
which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.
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