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Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral
action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is
taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object.
Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to
the moral action, as stated above (Question 7, Article 1). But
an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance
does not constitute a species of good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But
one action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does
not place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral
action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a
holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral
action to be specifically good or bad.
I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted
by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted
by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said
above (Article 5). But since nature is determinate to one thing,
nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some
ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further
specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things,
that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference
constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to
one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further.
And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a
circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again
be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the
object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate
another's property is specified by reason of the property being
"another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of
theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or
time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the
reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that
the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as
being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to
be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has
an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place,
which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here
as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to
reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special
relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the
moral action whether good or bad.
Reply to Objection 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an
action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above,
and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a
circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere
accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object,
then it does specify the action.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not every circumstance that places the
moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every
circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently,
although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow
that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one
action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as
said above (Article 7, ad 1; Question 1, Article 3, ad
3).
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