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Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his
subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia),
"no man should exercise the priestly office, unless he be free from
those things which he condemns in others." But a priest might happen
to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a
woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he cannot always use
the power of the keys on his subjects.
Objection 2: Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of
all his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached
to it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from
which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he
cannot use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things
in the above manner.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was
foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according
to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases,
and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Ex. 24:14:
"If any question shall arise" among you, "you shall refer it to
them." It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his
subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his superior.
On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of
the accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the
Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins
is subordinate [Question 17, Article 2, ad 1]. Therefore,
as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his
subject from any sins whatever.
Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest
dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the
power of the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.
I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to
the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of
this power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their
superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to
himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior;
otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any
sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his
penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be
imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the
sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when
the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being
excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that
an irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he
has to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of
arson. The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more
heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear,
because custom in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.
Reply to Objection 1: In this case the priest should not hear the
confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but
must refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask
permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if
he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less
shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid:
because when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same
sin, he is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to
the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: Penance delivers man from all defects of
guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing
penance for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can
absolve from a crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must
refer the penitent to the superior, except in the case of
excommunication, absolution from which should precede absolution from
sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any
sacrament of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers those cases in which
superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.
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