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Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created
substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
immutable does not belong to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end.
What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in
motion. But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate
end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are
immovable.
Objection 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable.
But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that
"form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore
it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God
alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from
nothing, are mutable."
I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is
eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce
them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into
existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His
will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them
otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away
His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as
appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it
was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in
themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist
in themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the
power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch
as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible
from existence to non-existence.
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus
also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has
a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive
which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards
their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation
of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with
"not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to
not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the
essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an
accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be
changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow
cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not
consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole
potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as
to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is
consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand
incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with
respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not
consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is
consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form.
Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so
these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their
existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from
every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards
their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a
mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says
(De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by
their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot
be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown
above (Question 8, Article 2).
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in
none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
such movement.
Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, besides their natural
endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election
by divine power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as
regards place.
Reply to Objection 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as
they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
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