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Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of
charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part.
Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
Objection 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as
stated above (Question 23, Article 6). But the reason is the
subject of virtue. Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason
and not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according
to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity."
Now the principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems
that charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the
will.
On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also
the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its
subject.
I answer that, Since, as stated in the FP, Question 80,
Article 2, the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the
intellective which is called the will, the object of each is the good,
but in different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a
good apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective
appetite or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according
as it can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity
is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the
intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the
sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible is a part of the
sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in the FP,
Question 81, Article 2: wherefore the love which is in the
concupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concupiscible
reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible good; the will alone
can. Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima
iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not
excluded from the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is
regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's
wisdom, and transcends the rule of human reason, according to Eph.
3:19: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all
knowledge." Hence it is not in the reason, either as its subject,
like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice and temperance are,
but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the FP, Question 83,
Article 4, the free-will is not a distinct power from the will.
Yet charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act of
which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the end,
whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence
charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as residing
in the will rather than in the free-will.
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