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Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in
any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as
stated above (Question 95, Article 2). But the natural law
endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without
any change.
Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the
measure of human acts, as stated above (Question 90, Articles
1,2). Therefore it should remain without change.
Objection 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and
right, as stated above (Question 95, Article 2). But that
which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law
once, should be always law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A
temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of
time."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 91, Article 3),
human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed.
Thus there may be two causes for the just change of human law: one on
the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are
regulated by law. The cause on the part of reason is that it seems
natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the
perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of
the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards
perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters:
for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the
human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into
consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many
ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made
institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of
the common weal.
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be
rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom
different things are expedient according to the difference of his
condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
i, 6): "If the people have a sense of moderation and
responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it
is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own
magistrates for the government of the commonwealth. But if, as time
goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and
entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of
appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people,
and the choice devolves to a few good men."
Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is a participation of the
eternal law, as stated above (Question 91, Article 2), and
therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and
perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of nature. But the
reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject
to change. Moreover the natural law contains certain universal
precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain
particular precepts, according to various emergencies.
Reply to Objection 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible.
But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject
to change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 3: In corporal things, right is predicated
absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always
remains right. But right is predicated of law with reference to the
common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as
stated above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.
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