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Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9)
that "shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who
do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For
thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face."
Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are
ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, "He that
shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be
ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful
action.
Objection 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a
disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the
action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more
ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most
grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in
malice?" Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful
action.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and
Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that
"shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful
deed done."
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 41, Article
2; FS, Question 42, Article 3), when we were treating of
the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely,
that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the
disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a
voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of
an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not
appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is not
apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in
the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards
first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is
properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that
shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of
those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man
refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a
man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of
reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person
"blushing," in the latter we say that he is "ashamed." Hence he
says that "the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes
fears to be disgraced."
Reply to Objection 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as
due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of
which he is the cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to
which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve
it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3).
Thus we find it said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they
(the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that
they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus."
It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed
of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more
virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good
or evil. Wherefore it is written (Is. 51:7): "Fear ye not
the reproach of men."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 63, Article
3), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it
regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for
though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's
opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of
poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds
as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them
either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human
opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or
hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less
shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins
in comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain
abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of
cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a
semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.
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