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Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to
the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a
more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (Article 2;
Question 141, Article 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater
vice than intemperance.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted,
the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact
it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming
pleasures or pains." Now seemingly it is more difficult to control
pleasures than other passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3,
that "it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against
anger, which would seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore
intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin
than cowardice, which is overcome by fear.
Objection 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary.
Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man
desires to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of
death, which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more
grievous sin than intemperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice."
Therefore it is more sinful.
I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death,
to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving
life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire
of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as
stated above (Article 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about
certain annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or
pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous
the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than
cowardice, on the part of the object or motive matter.
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the
more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are
demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death,
stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of
intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver
it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice
has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done
through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent,
so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply
voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate
man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically.
For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by
individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the
most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the
consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters
relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes
itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his
shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary,
for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more
voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place,
is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more
voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is
easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are
of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers
of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to
encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
Reply to Objection 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison
with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with
regard to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is
directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this
point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance,
since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good.
Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult
to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever:
and from this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take
precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that
does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be
overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb
to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater vice.
Reply to Objection 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of
which one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any
pleasures whatever of food and sex which are directed to the
preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear
of dangers of death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and
sex: although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger,
sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.
Reply to Objection 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather
on a general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such
cases we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
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