|
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because
the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a
mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one
another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be
vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
Objection 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for
another's ills, as stated above (Question 35, Article 8).
Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a
virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore
a passion may be a moral virtue.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are
neither virtues nor vices."
I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for
three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the
sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3):
whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the
movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. Secondly, because
passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil
is something in reference to reason: wherefore the passions,
considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as
much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this
sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as
stated above (Question 55, Article 3). Thirdly, because,
granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only,
or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion,
begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite
tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of
virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the
appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the
definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a
habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would
appoint it."
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by
reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to
wit, it establishes the mean between passions.
Reply to Objection 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing
evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is
taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion
from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act
of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in
accordance with reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act
of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to
reason"; viz. "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as
when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit
perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders
pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to
similar passions.
|
|