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Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to
that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so
does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five,
than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil,
and to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv,
7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is
less rather than to that which is greater.
Objection 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme
rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean
is nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is
nearer to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer
to one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.
Objection 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less
seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract
therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to
amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant
to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible
with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition.
Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater
rather than to that which is less.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by
this virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less."
I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that
which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the
whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so
forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is
contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what
is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this
seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For
those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a
source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass
others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source
of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their moderation.
Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): "Though I should
have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the
truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that
which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me."
Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say
that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this
virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood.
And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as
regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of
prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since
it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is
more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has what one has
not, than to think or say that one has not what one has.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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