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Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by
vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind,
it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason.
But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen.
Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to
anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves
by vow to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot
be annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or
girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian
(20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or
girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.
Objection 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict
[Ch. 58] and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is
granted to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the
obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year
of probation, for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.
On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without
being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even
before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled
by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella).
Therefore even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and
validly be bound by a vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above
(Article 7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And
since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow
consists in a spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the
ministry of the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's
dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the
deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under an
obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may happen in two
ways. First, through defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles,
who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of
madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being
subject to another's power, as stated above (Article 8). Now
these two circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty,
because in most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are
naturally under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of
their parents: wherefore in both events their vows are without force.
It happens, however, through a natural disposition which is not
subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some,
albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile: and
yet they are not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of
their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into
account that which is of most frequent occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the
years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise bind
themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of
reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own
part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their
parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of
the Church's decree [Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et
transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But
after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves
by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their
parents.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of children
who have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are
invalid, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of persons subject to another's
power contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled
by the superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be
fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn
vows which are taken in profession.
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