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Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or
demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of
merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in
matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not
all related to another person, for some are related to the person of
the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is
meritorious or demeritorious.
Objection 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for
doing as he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man
destroys what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had
destroyed what belongs to another. But man is master of his own
actions. Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through
putting his action to a good or evil purpose.
Objection 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he
does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and
the same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good
and perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil.
Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does
a good or an evil deed.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): "Say to
the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his
doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands
shall be given him."
I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to
retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution
according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done
something to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be
observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a
part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil,
done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus,
who hurts the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does
good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit
or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to
him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in
respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now
when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole
society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the
whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas
when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage,
then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects
the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society: although
retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or
harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent: unless,
perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance,
in so far as man is said to be just to himself.
It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or
blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right
or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit
or demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards
another.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not
ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless
ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in
so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he
forms part, he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions
well or ill: just as if he were to dispense well or ill other
belongings of his, in respect of which he is bound to serve the
community.
Reply to Objection 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to
himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
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