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Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to
choose. For choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an
end," as stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3. But irrational animals
desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and
from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, the very word "electio" [choice] seems to
signify the taking of something in preference to others. But
irrational animals take something in preference to others: thus we can
easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse
another. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, "it is
from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means." But prudence
is found in irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of
Metaph. i, 1 that "those animals which, like bees, cannot hear
sounds, are prudent by instinct." We see this plainly, in wonderful
cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as
bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming
to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first
or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there,
being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent;
as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag
must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and
there is no other road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are
able to choose.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxxiii.] says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but
not from choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference
to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can
be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether
determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference
between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above
(Question 1, Article 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is
determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature;
whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz.
the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless
indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Consequently choice
belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which
is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are
not competent to choose.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of
an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one
thing from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be
moved to several things.
Reply to Objection 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in
preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to
that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or
by its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is
naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any
choice. Just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its
making any choice.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Phys. iii, 3 "movement is
the act of the movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of
the mover appears in the movement of that which it moves.
Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of reason which
moves them is evident, although the things themselves are without
reason: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight
towards the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its
course. The same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all
engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are
in comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to
the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in things moved
by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys.
ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational animals we notice
certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination
to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being
ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals
are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or
exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all
that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
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