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Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For
"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic.
x, 4,6,8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts
after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in
his act.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22,
"But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that
deeds of virtue are called "fruits because they refresh man's mind
with a holy and pure delight." Now the brave man performs acts of
virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.
Objection 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now
the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his
own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the
delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and
consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that
"the brave man seems to have no delight in his act."
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 31, Articles
3,4,5) where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is
twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other is
spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the
latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we
consider the good of reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to
endure, not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by
the soul---for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the
virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being
necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with them---but
also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as
wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something
that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the
act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand,
he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his
life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that
Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well
content to suffer these things because I fear Thee."
Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual
delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's grace,
which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which
it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed
Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he
felt as though he were walking on roses.
Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely
overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual
sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the
body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave
man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him
not to be sad."
Reply to Objection 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one
power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his
senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its
proper operation.
Reply to Objection 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on
account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and
this is principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does
not happen in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."
Reply to Objection 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome
by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and
the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that
spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in
the presence of great bodily pain.
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