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Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of the
virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its
cause. Now the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears
from the definition given above (Article 1). Therefore it seems
that it is an act of hope and not of penance.
Objection 2: Further, shame is a part of temperance. But
confession arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above
(Article 1, Objection 4). Therefore it is an act of temperance
and not of penance.
Objection 3: Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy.
But confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth
which is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 4: Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the
Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the
origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which
is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon.
Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man
shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he
goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue
which is called truth, and not of penance.
On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin.
Now confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of
penance.
I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when
a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the
object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the
expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the
ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality,
as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to the
confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth
absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness,
begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a confession made in a court of justice
belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In like manner
the confession of God's favors in praise of God, belongs not to
truth, but to religion: and so too the confession of sins, in order
to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of
truth, as some say, but of the virtue of penance. It may, however,
be the commanded act of many virtues, in so far as the act of
confession can be directed to the end of many virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope is the cause of confession, not as
eliciting but as commanding.
Reply to Objection 2: In that definition shame is not mentioned as
the cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act
of confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from
punishment (because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the
keys of the Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same
effect.
Reply to Objection 3: By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance
can be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may
correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for
evil---confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation
of the truth---and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it
entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and
renders the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be
said of Penance as a whole, as of contrition.
Reply to Objection 4: Since confession results from hope rather
than from fear, as stated above (Article 1, ad 2), it is based
on the article about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on
the article about the Judgment, which fear considers; although
penance, in its aspect of contrition, is the opposite.
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has
been said.
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