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Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to
find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the
end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral
virtues, as shown above (Article 6). Therefore it does not find
the mean in them.
Objection 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem
to have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is
said to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean"
belongs to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its
definition, as shown above (Article 5, Objection 1). Therefore
prudence does not cause the mean in moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason.
But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature,
because, as Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53),
"virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason."
Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to moral virtues.
On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue
(Article 5, Objection 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean
appointed by reason . . . even as a wise man decides."
I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely
in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man
should not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences;
fortitude, that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason
through fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man
according to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to each one
that he should act according to reason.
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
directed to the end.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong
to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations,
and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature
intends to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not
found in all matters after the same manner, it follows that the
inclination of nature which ever works in the same manner, does not
suffice for this purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
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