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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin
through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses
from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one
who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion;
since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of
ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is
ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end,
which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more
excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins
through passion.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less
grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown
headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins
through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is
stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less
grievous than to sin through passion.
Objection 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin
through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses
evil. Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through
certain malice.
On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very
reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26:
"He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it
were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not
increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated
through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.
I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a
sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because,
as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other
things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the
movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is
committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the
will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin
is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by
something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the
very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the
more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being
committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is
stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to
sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon
returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man
sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice,
abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a
sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the
incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers
intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice
is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle
in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the
case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good
end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion,
for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect of
principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice
is more grievous than one committed through passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection
refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above
(Question 76, Article 4). Therefore neither does a greater
ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.
Reply to Objection 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it
were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a
habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and
another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion,
sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is
not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through
the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the
passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice,
chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained
(Articles 2,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full
control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said
to sin "through" choosing.
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