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Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the
true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special
virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its
possessor good." Therefore truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an
act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every
virtue, since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act.
Therefore truth is not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one
lives aright, and of which it is written (Is. 38:3): "I
beseech Thee . . . remember how I have walked before Thee in
truth, and with a perfect heart." Now one lives aright by any
virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above (FS,
Question 55, Article 4). Therefore truth is not a special
virtue.
Objection 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity,
since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special
virtue, since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in
every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues
(Ethic. ii, 7).
I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's
deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness
in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a
special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni
iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good
will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special
order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered
in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man
is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that
truth is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The true and the good are convertible as to
subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is
true. But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the
intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands
the will and many things besides, and the will desires things
pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the "true"
considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a
particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner
the "good" considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite
is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore
since virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth
to be a special virtue, just as the "true" is a special good; yet it
is not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather,
considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their
species from what is directly intended, and not from that which is
accidental and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which
concerns himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something
directly intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently
and beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.
Reply to Objection 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a
thing is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like
anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its
rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life
depends on conformity to that law. This truth or rectitude is common
to every virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition
to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since
this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a
man pretends one thing and intends another.
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