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Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be
the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.):
"If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul,
thou shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic.
i): "If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous,
truth-loving, and far removed from deception." Therefore
magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says
that a magnanimous man is not philokindynos, that is, a lover of
danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger.
Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be
called a part thereof.
Objection 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be
hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared
or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore
magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is
not a part thereof.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus
reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 61, Article
3), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a
general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general
modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is
necessary in every virtue," according to Ethic. ii. And this is
chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in
which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more
difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more
principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the
greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as
man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of
death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity
agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult
matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about
a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is
reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as
secondary to principal.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1,3), "to lack evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to
be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked
upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former
belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense
fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since,
however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of
either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking
magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a
distinct virtue from fortitude.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes
himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who
thinks "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature
of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger
for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things
that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself
to danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even
as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not mikrokindynos,
i.e. endangering himself for small things, but megalokindynos,
i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De
Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither
seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For
nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked
life."
Reply to Objection 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one
has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to
suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be
desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to
wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it.
Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that
which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is
always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good
things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue
of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil,
evil is of more import in this particular respect.
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