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Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is
not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rm. 7:15): "For I do
not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that
man lusts, although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of
the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is
not subject to our command.
Objection 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the
effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the FP, Question
65, Article 4; FP, Question 91, Article 2; FP,
Question 110, Article 2. But the act of the sensitive appetite
is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in
heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not
subject to man's command.
Objection 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive
appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination.
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our
command.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xvi.] says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible
and the irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite.
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command
of reason.
I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is
in our power, as stated above (Article 5). Consequently in order
to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is
subject to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is
in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite
differs from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in
the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ,
whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a
corporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on
the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends
on the power of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which
condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act
of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but
also on the disposition of the body.
Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows
apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a
particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason,
which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a
universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the
sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other
hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the
command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of
the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the
command of reason.
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive
appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the
imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the
command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it
foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the
reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic
supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a
"politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who
are not wholly subject to command.
Reply to Objection 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to
lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive
appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of
reason. Hence the Apostle adds (Rm. 7:15): "I see another
law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may
also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold
relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding
it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of
his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it:
thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that
precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it is due
either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at
once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of
reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart, which
has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive
appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for
the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend
anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence
of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man
can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle
on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the
imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the
strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable
to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they
cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the
weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.
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