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Objection 1: It would seem that synesis is not a virtue. Virtues
are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But synesis
(judging well according to common law) is natural to some, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore synesis
(judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), synesis
(judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of
judging." But judgment without command can be even in the wicked.
Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that synesis (judging
well according to common law) is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless
there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of
action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore
synesis (judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue
directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other
virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be
superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore synesis (judging
well according to common law) is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But
euboulia, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is
synesis (judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being
good judgment.
I answer that, synesis (judging well according to common law)
signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence.
Hence in Greek some, in respect of synesis (judging well according
to common law) are said to be synetoi, i.e. "persons of sense,"
or eusynetoi, i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other
hand, those who lack this virtue are called asynetoi, i.e.
"senseless."
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at
research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to
another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of
imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such
persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in
the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common
sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides
euboulia (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges
well, and this is called synesis (judging well according to common
law).
Reply to Objection 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive
power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to
the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be
well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,
whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and
misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive
things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but,
as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and
this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power
itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but
with true and correct ideas: this belongs to synesis (judging well
according to common law) which in this respect is a special virtue.
Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive
power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of
appetite: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of
moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas synesis
(judging well according to common law) is rather about the means.
Reply to Objection 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of
a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the
particular matter of action, as stated above (Question 47,
Article 13).
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to
execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue
which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal
virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
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