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Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are
unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down
corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom,
understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to
prudence; whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is
the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included
corresponding to justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to
fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to
correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated
insufficiently.
Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of
fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself.
Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set
down.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any,
direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as
he is moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the
theological virtues, should have been included.
Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He
of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions
condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so
ought the other three.
Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct
understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct
piety. Therefore, some gift should have been added for the purpose of
directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are
unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is.
11:2,3).
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), the gifts are habits
perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy
Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that
they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive
powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all
the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior
power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human
actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues;
and such powers are the reason and appetite.
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the
practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the
speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by
"knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's
relations to another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching
himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers;
and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to
Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth
from evil," and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with
Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear
that these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both
intellectual and moral, extend.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in
matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such
matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the
right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made
(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the
infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost,
Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His
organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a
manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly
speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good
appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to
withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of
the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift.
But the name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father
and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship
of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei
x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for
God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.
Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy
Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the
instrument is not moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or
some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man
with God is by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these
virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore
all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived
therefrom.
Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their
object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of
these passions are transferred to the theological virtues which unite
man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which
can nowise apply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God,
but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence
it does not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift,
which withdraws us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue
does.
Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the
affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to
wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the
gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of
fear. Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a
consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
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