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Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in
the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that
loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is
love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place.
Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is
Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit." Therefore
charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.
Objection 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just
as the soul is the life of the body, according to Dt. 30:20:
"He is thy life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body.
Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by
charity, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: "We know that we have
passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Therefore
God is charity itself.
Objection 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on
the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity,
indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it
brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not
something created in the soul.
On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,
10): "By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the
enjoyment of God for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is
something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created
in the soul.
I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in
Question 17
of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something
created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the
mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we
love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from
the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous
acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues,
for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and
this he said on account of the excellence of charity.
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the
contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the
human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in
such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the
principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic
motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act,
whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (FS,
Question 6, Article 1): so that it would follow that to love is
not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of
its very nature, implies an act of the will.
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will
in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an
instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action,
nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the
act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been
stated above (FS, Question 114, Article 4) that the love of
charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the
Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also
should be the efficient cause of that act.
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be
connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle
of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due
ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end
appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things
sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity
surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore,
unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to
the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural
acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and
pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue
has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any
virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most
necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be
in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining
that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity,
even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to
be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which
is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a
participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are
formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity
whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine
charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists,
with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting
to this has been to some an occasion of error.
Reply to Objection 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul
by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the
life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.
Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is
immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of
a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form,
wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it
produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites
it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is
the author of charity.
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