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Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at
the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
14,16,17) that man's intention cannot be directed at the same
time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason,
neither to any other two things.
Objection 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will
towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same
direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several
things at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of
the intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things
at the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii,
10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at
the same time.
On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two
purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the
purpose of taste and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for
the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to
two ends: so that one can intend several ends at the same time.
I answer that, The expression "two things" may be taken in two
ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if
they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been
said, that a man can intend several things at the same time. For
intention is not only of the last end, as stated above (Article
2), but also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same
time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine
and the giving of health.
But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus
also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is evident
from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the
better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one thing is
better than another is that it is available for more purposes:
wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another, because of
the greater number of purposes for which it is available: so that
evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the
same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to
two last ends: since, as stated above (Question 1, Article 5),
one man cannot have several last ends.
Reply to Objection 2: There can be several termini ordained to one
another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not
unless they be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be
observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the
reason. Now intention is a movement of the will to something already
ordained by the reason, as stated above (Article 1, ad 3).
Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as
one term of intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one:
either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a
proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two
things are included in one which may be intended. For instance, the
acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something
common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to
acquire wealth, from intending both the others.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the FP, Question 12,
Article 10; FP, Question 58, Article 2; FP, Question
85, Article 4. it is possible to understand several things at the
same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one.
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