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Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl.
xix) that "the function of temperance is to control and quell the
desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of
God and from the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he
adds that "it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements
and popular praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only
by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for
pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily
allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory:
wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire is the root
of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of
pleasures of touch.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3)
that "one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of
them is temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether
small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of
pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore
temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem
to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.
Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the
pleasures of the body, as stated above (FS, Question 31,
Article 5) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men
forsake God's laws and the state of virtue through desire for
spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of
knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gn.
3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil."
Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter
of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures
of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which
occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter
of temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), temperance is about
desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and
daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the
greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers
of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of
the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and
drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense
of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of
touch.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently
takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter,
but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter
whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However,
we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures,
much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and
properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and
secondarily other pleasures.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting
moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that
which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the
soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a
different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals
pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to
sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to
hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man
derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but
also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore
temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to
pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far
as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of
their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized
sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of
nature. Hence these passions are not of such importance that
temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their
nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to
the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the
sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is
safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual
pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason,
wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one
spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding.
Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the
preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that
temperance is about all pleasures of touch.
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