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Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted
for a sin. For it is written (Jn. 9:3,2) about the man born
blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that
he should be born blind." In like manner we see that many children,
those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments,
fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet
there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before
they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other
children who do not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment
is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the
innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each
of these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written
about the wicked (Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of
men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and (Job
21:7): "The wicked live, are advanced, and strengthened with
riches" (?); and (Hab. 1:13): "Why lookest Thou upon
the contemptuous, and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man
oppresseth, the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not
every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pt.
2:22) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth."
And yet it is said (1 Pt. 2:21) that "He suffered for us."
Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): "Who ever
perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the
contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by
the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all
punishment is just, and is inflicted for a sin."
I answer that, As already stated (Article 6), punishment can be
considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A
satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who
differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of
love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the
punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the
debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of
punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has
always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a
relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a
sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and
this, either principally or consequently---principally, the
punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and
deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties
which result from this defect in human nature.
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and
yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as
stated in the FP, Question 48, Article 5. Now evil is
privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of
the soul, good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes
that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a
greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily
health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health
and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not
simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of
punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man
prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to
health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking,
they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted
sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of
penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the
punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of
innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so
that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to
original sin as its cause.
Reply to Objection 1: Such like defects of those who are born with
them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the
punishments of original sin, as stated above (Question 85,
Article 5); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause
stated above (Question 85, Article 5, ad 2): and that they
are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is
left to itself, as stated above (Question 85, Article 5, ad
1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the
salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are
admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of
man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's
chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give
spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal
goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the
fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact
that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual
good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore
pride hath held them fast."
Reply to Objection 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not
for His, but for our sins.
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