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Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because
"the natural law is what nature has taught all animals" [Digest.
I, i, de justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes
are united without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural
law.
Objection 1: Further, that which is of natural law is found in all
men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every
state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), "at the
beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children, nor
was he bound by any marriage tie," wherein matrimony consists.
Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 3: Further, natural things are the same among all. But
matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies
according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.
Objection 4: Further, those things without which the intention of
nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature
intends the preservation of the species by generation which is possible
without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore matrimony
is not natural.
On the contrary, At the commencement of the Digests it is stated:
"The union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of
natural law."
Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that "man is
an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political
society." But "man is naturally a political and gregarious
animal," as the same author asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore
he is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal
union or matrimony is natural.
I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First,
as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward
movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural,
nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or
motion of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to
which nature inclines although it comes to pass through the intervention
of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are
called natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural
reason inclines thereto in two ways. First, in relation to the
principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For
nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its
education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as
man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things
from our parents, namely "existence," "nourishment," and
"education." Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless
it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case
unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman and it is
in this that matrimony consists. Secondly, in relation to the
secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married
persons render one another in household matters. For just as natural
reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not
self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is
described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too
among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to
men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man
and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by
the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12).
Reply to Objection 1: Man's nature inclines to a thing in two
ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic
nature, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it
is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species
in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of
prudence or temperance. And just as the generic nature, though one in
all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it
incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one.
Accordingly man's nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the
difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12; Polit. i) gives this
reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it
inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting
of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline
thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose
offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are
sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between
male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of
both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as
may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs
the parents' care for a long time, there is a very great tie between
male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Tully may be true of some
particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the
proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct from
others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in
all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy
Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the
human race.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii) "human nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is."
Hence things that are of natural law vary according to the various
states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to
things Divine nowise vary.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature intends not only being in the
offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary,
as shown above.
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