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Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of
prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term
for demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the
reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with
contingencies. Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
Objection 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according
to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for
shrewdness [Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of
eustochia, i.e. "a happy conjecture": for the latter is
"unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated
in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a
part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above (Question 48)
is a "happy conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use
of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than
to prudence.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is
one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs
to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 9).
Therefore shrewdness does also.
I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of
action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both
in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it
oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility
consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from
another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right
estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for eustochia, of
which it is a part. For eustochia is a happy conjecture about any
matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding
the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher
[Andronicus; Cf. Question 48, Objection 1] who calls
shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for eustochia, in general,
hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are
discovered rapidly."
Reply to Objection 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of
the middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical
syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends
they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher
says (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to
prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason
(Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that euboulia, i.e. good counsel, is
not eustochia, which is commended for grasping quickly what should be
done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in
so doing, and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy
conjecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity,
when, for instance, something has to be done without warning. It is
for this reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of
prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical
matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to
rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not
only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as
applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture
the truth.
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