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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for
sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is
evident from Phil. 4:4, where the gloss on the words, "Rejoice
in the Lord always," says that "it is necessary to rejoice." Now
it is not possible to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore
it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.
Objection 2: Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a
thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far
as it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of
burning or cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil;
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): "Drive away sadness
far from thee," and the reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25):
"For sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it."
Moreover the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14;
x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer than
suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out
after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not expedient to
grieve any longer.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.):
"Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be
mingled with wormwood." Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to
grieve continually.
On the contrary, Augustine [De vera et falsa Poenitentia] says:
"The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice in his grief."
Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is
possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow
for sin, as is shown by the words of Mt. 5:5, "Blessed are they
that mourn." Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual
as possible.
I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues,
that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in
Ethic. ii, 6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a
kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the
virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its
intensity, or as to its duration, except in so far as the act of one
virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time
being. Consequently the more continually a man can perform acts of
this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the acts of
other virtues when and how he ought to. On the other hand, passions
can have excess and defect, both in intensity and in duration.
Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon
itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be of moderate
duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair,
cowardice, and such like vices.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to
worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has
sorrow itself for object.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly
joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of
which we should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it
is assumed, demands.
Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
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