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Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special
virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now
there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety,
which is about drink, a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures
of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to
make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry
nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a.
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment,
drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats
and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,
seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different
kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem
that sobriety is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Macrobius [In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons
sobriety to be a special part of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 146, Article 2),
it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those
things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance
to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now
intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason,
inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to
remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety,
is requisite.
Reply to Objection 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering
the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure:
and in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But
intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above,
wherefore it requires a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and
drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence
it does not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different
kinds of food.
Reply to Objection 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind
of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks
bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not
call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of
meats.
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