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Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of
a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a
circumstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength
to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived principally
from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the
definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also
Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a
circumstance is not an accident of a human act.
Objection 2: Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But
that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore
the circumstances are not accidents of human acts.
Objection 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts
themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not
accidents of acts.
On the contrary, The particular conditions of any singular thing are
called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [ta kath'
ekasta], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the
circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm.
i), "words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be
that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge.
Now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the
less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are
transferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is
that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, "the notion of distance has been
transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of
opposition": and in like manner words that signify local movement are
employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are
circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that
the word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts.
Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is
outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly,
whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in
some way touch the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is
outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is
called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should
be called their accidents.
Reply to Objection 1: The orator gives strength to his argument,
in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from
the circumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first,
through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it
fraudulently, or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and
so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that the
orator "adds strength to his argument," as though this were something
secondary.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is said to be an accident of
something in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus,
whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because
it is together with that thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is
an accident of the art of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same
subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. And in this sense
circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 2), an accident is
said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in
the same subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as
two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any
relation to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in
Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another;
as when the subject receives one accident by means of the other; for
instance, a body receives color by means of its surface. And thus
also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as
being in the surface.
Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways.
For some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the
agent otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of
person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as
the manner in which the act is done.
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