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Objection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are
natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ
generically" (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same
genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man
is naturally corruptible.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is
naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of
corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally
corruptible.
Objection 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture.
Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since
therefore the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural
heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death
and such like defects are natural to man.
On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him.
Now "God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is
not natural to man.
(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a
punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to
it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original
sin, as stated above (Article 5). Therefore they are not natural
to man.
(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to
its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above
(Question 2, Article 7; Question 5, Articles 3,4): and
the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the
FP, Question 75, Article 6. Therefore the human body is
naturally incorruptible.
I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways;
first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its
particular nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of
action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every
corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo
ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation
of the thing to which it belongs.
On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some
universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or
again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said
by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." This force intends
the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate
generation and corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect
corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the
inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection,
but as regards the inclination of matter which is allotted
proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of
the universal agent. And although every form intends perpetual being
as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its
own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the reason that the
latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed
it has an immaterial operation of its own, as stated in the FP,
Question 75, Article 2. Consequently as regards his form,
incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things.
But since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the
inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole.
In this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of
his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.
The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the
other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve
them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul,
in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is
everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible,
considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its
form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold
condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another
which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition of
matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter
both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for
cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for
a knife: but that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results from
the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in
the iron, indeed he would do without it if he could: wherefore this
disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor
to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter
chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in
order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other
sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible
is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed
nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to
Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of
nature, and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain
incorruptibility, as was stated in the FP, Question 97, Article
1. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death,"
and that death is the punishment of sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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