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Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment arising
through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that
of the sins previously pardoned. Because the greatness of the favor of
the pardon of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned,
and so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingratitude
whereby this favor is scorned. But the greatness of the consequent
debt of punishment is in accord with the greatness of the ingratitude.
Therefore the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect
of a subsequent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all
the previous sins.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater sin to offend God than to
offend man. But a slave who is freed by his master returns to the same
state of slavery from which he was freed, or even to a worse state.
Much more therefore he that sins against God after being freed from
sin, returns to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred
before.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 18:34) that "his
lord being angry, delivered him" (whose sins returned to him on
account of his ingratitude) "to the torturers, until he paid all the
debt." But this would not be so unless the debt of punishment
incurred through ingratitude were as great as that incurred through all
previous sins. Therefore an equal debt of punishment returns through
ingratitude.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to
the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be,"
whence it is evident that a great debt of punishment does not arise from
a slight sin. But sometimes a subsequent mortal sin is much less
grievous than any one of those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt
of punishment incurred through subsequent sins is not equal to that of
sins previously forgiven.
I answer that, Some have maintained that the debt of punishment
incurred through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is equal to
that of the sins previously pardoned, in addition to the debt proper to
this subsequent sin. But there is no need for this, because, as
stated above (Article 1), the debt of punishment incurred by
previous sins does not return on account of a subsequent sin, as
resulting from the acts of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the amount of
the debt that returns must be according to the gravity of the subsequent
sin.
It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subsequent sin to
equal the gravity of all previous sins. But it need not always be so,
whether we speak of the gravity which a sin has from its species (since
the subsequent sin may be one of simple fornication, while the previous
sins were adulteries, murders, or sacrileges); or of the gravity
which it incurs through the ingratitude connected with it. For it is
not necessary that the measure of ingratitude should be exactly equal to
the measure of the favor received, which latter is measured according
to the greatness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may
happen that in respect of the same favor, one man is very ungrateful,
either on account of the intensity of his scorn for the favor received,
or on account of the gravity of the offense committed against the
benefactor, while another man is slightly ungrateful, either because
his scorn is less intense, or because his offense against the
benefactor is less grave. But the measure of ingratitude is
proportionately equal to the measure of the favor received: for
supposing an equal contempt of the favor, or an equal offense against
the benefactor, the ingratitude will be so much the greater, as the
favor received is greater.
Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment incurred by a
subsequent sin need not always be equal to that of previous sins; but
it must be in proportion thereto, so that the more numerous or the
greater the sins previously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of
punishment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: The favor of the pardon of sins takes its
absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins previously pardoned:
but the sin of ingratitude does not take its absolute quantity from the
measure of the favor bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or
of the offense, as stated above: and so the objection does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: A slave who has been given his freedom is not
brought back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of
ingratitude, but only when this is grave.
Reply to Objection 3: He whose forgiven sins return to him on
account of subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far
as the measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his
subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.
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