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Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the
contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the
love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our
neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor,
since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the
contemplative life also precedes the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
"It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from
action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn
from the contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is
not simply prior to the contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily
any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now
the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different
subjects; for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who
were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have
fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live
advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are
killed by the sword of their inaction."
I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with
regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and
are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active
life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is
compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the
husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband,
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).
Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first
in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the
contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above
(Article 1; Question 181, Article 1, ad 3); and, in the
order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter
precedes simply and according to its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The contemplative life is directed to the
love of God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect;
whereas the active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our
neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without
the contemplative life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom,
provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot
enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we
can do."
From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative
life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of
generation, that which is proper to the perfect.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative
life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from
the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of
direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the
contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the
acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii,
7.
Reply to Objection 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on
account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life
by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi,
37) that "there be some so restless that when they are free from
labor they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for
thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on
the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they
are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly
to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says
(Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they
chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very outset."
Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful
souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed in
contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the active
life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the practice of the
active life; while none the less, those who are more adapted to the
contemplative life can take upon themselves the works of the active
life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.
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