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Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the
same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper
to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it
belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable.
Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.
Objection 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems
to be derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now
what pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to
suffer, to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to
the human nature can nowise be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature;
yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human
nature cannot be said of God.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that
"God assumed the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since
God is said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified."
I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide
words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained
to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as
pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man.
Hence Nestorius said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to
the Word, let him be anathema" [Council of Ephesus, Part I,
ch. 29]. But if there are any words applicable to both natures,
of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as "Christ"
or "Lord." Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin,
and that He was from eternity; but they did not say that God was born
of a virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the
other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in
His Divine or in His human nature may be said either of God or of
man. Hence Cyril says [Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch.
26]: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances," i.e.
hypostases, "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by
Himself of Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the
Man, and apportions some to the Word alone---let him be
anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one
hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the
name of either nature. Thus whether we say "man" or "God," the
hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of
the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a
hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs
to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which
something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what
the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being
predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of
Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are
predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are
predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to
the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what
is said by Scripture in reference to the form of God, wherein He is
equal to the Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant,
wherein He is less than the Father": and further on he says (De
Trin. i, 13): "The prudent, careful, and devout reader will
discern the reason and point of view of what is said."
Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible for contraries to be
predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their
being predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries
are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.
Reply to Objection 2: If the things pertaining to defect were
attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy,
since it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of
wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed
nature. Hence in a discourse of the Council of Ephesus [Part
III, ch. 10] it is said: "God accounts nothing a wrong which
is the occasion of man's salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed
for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet
makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since
these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but
bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the
cause of our salvation was the occasion of harm to God?"
Reply to Objection 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not
in its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to
God.
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