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Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be
directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last
end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts
of nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing.
Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many things.
Objection 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do
not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in
opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is
the last end of the will does not exclude others.
Objection 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in
one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed
its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in
something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his
last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in
riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at
the same time to several things, as last ends.
On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is
master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of
life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose
god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the
pleasures of the belly. Now according to Mt. 6:24, "No man
can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one
another. Therefore it is impossible for one man to have several last
ends not ordained to one another.
I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at
the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own
perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires
as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it
passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be
complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill
man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire.
Which is not possible, if something else be required for his
perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to
tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning,
the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of
the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that
which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature
tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the
rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will
tends, as to its last end, is one.
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their
species from the end, as stated above (Article 3), they must needs
receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all:
just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common
form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will,
belong, as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And
all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; and
the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above.
Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human
race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual.
Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the
will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
Reply to Objection 1: All these several objects were considered as
one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the
last end.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible to find several
things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary
to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that
thing's perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will does not extend to
making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were
it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown
above (ad 2).
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