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Objection 1: It would seem that "euboulia, synesis, and gnome"
are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For
"euboulia" is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi,
9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated
(Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore "euboulia" is not a virtue annexed
to prudence, but rather is prudence itself.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower.
The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is
judgment. Now "synesis" enables us to judge well. Therefore
"synesis" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a
principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, just as there are various matters to pass
judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take
counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel.
Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no
need, besides "synesis" of the virtue of "gnome."
Objection 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii)
mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past,
understanding of the present, and foresight of the future."
Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet
others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like. Therefore it
seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.
On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed
to prudence.
I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one
another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest
act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by
man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the
third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the
speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is
a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect,
in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to
command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things
done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest
are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which perfects the
command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other
secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. "eustochia," which perfects
counsel; and "synesis" and "gnome," which are parts of prudence in
relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further
on (ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as
though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but
because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue,
viz. "euboulia."
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed
to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a
man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter
does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded
aright in the point of what has to be done.
Reply to Objection 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that
thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper
principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should
need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence
only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are
two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on
common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative
matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all
matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment,
differ according to their different objects. "Synesis" and "gnome"
differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based:
for "synesis" judges of actions according to the common law; while
"gnome" bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where
the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (SS,
Question 51, Article 4).
Reply to Objection 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as
also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from
prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as
they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover,
subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political
economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion,
potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as
secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them
later (SS, Question 48, seqq.).
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