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Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ
according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are
objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those
moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the
objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a
house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice.
Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ
according to the objects of those passions.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the
sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the
species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so
that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and
the same applies to the other passions.
Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now
various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species
of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the
same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified
according to the objects of the passions.
Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces
good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good
things: thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch,
and "eutrapelia" [eutrapelia] about pleasures in games. Therefore
there should be different virtues about fears of evils.
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence
about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in
games.
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;
whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their
relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the
appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are
variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different
species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of
reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore
nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of
passions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is
about several passions, as stated above (Article 4); and again, a
difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a
difference of passions, since several virtues are directed about one
passion, e.g. pleasure.
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always
belong to diverse virtues, as stated above (Article 4); therefore
a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers
always causes a specific difference of virtues---for instance the
difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that
which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules
man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward
things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is
apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according
as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various
relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause a
difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of
love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily
sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good
may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his
soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such
difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates
virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of
the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
"temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they
are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason:
hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like
art, is about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the
body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind.
These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way
they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to
obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which
distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch;
since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as
he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in
reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of
desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we
consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our
hope, there is "magnificence" [megaloprepeia]. With regard to
that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of
love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [philotimia], i.e.
"love of honor": while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as
an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality
and "philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible part, while
magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard
to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the
concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his
behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to
wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions,
viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the
same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in
his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue
which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [philia],
and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one man behaves towards
another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to
another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls "truthfulness"
[aletheia]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure,
and serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue about the
pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia"
[eutrapelia] (Ethic. iv, 8).
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness,
friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in
respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we
add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in
all.
Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation
have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same
specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the
passions do.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same
rule as virtues are, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of
species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil:
because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove
an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be
great; there being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each
kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every
form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms
of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty, which
requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind
of passion. Consequently there are various moral virtues about
desires, as stated above.
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