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Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the
soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says
(Hypognosticon iii) that grace is related to the will or to the free
will "as a rider to his horse." Now the will or the free will is a
power, as stated above (FP, Question 83, Article 2). Hence
grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject.
Objection 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as
Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit
consists in acts, which proceed from a power. Hence it seems that
grace is a perfection of a power of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper
subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be
capable of grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every
soul would be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is
not the proper subject of grace.
Objection 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its
powers. Now what is prior may be understood without what is
posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be taken to be in the
soul, although we suppose no part or power of the soul---viz.
neither the will, nor the intellect, nor anything else; which is
impossible.
On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But
generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore
grace is in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.
I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace
is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul
as in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of
virtue, as stated above (Question 56, Article 1). But if
grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul
is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul's powers
has the nature of virtue, as stated above (Question 55, Article
1; Question 56, Article 1). Hence it remains that grace, as
it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul,
so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his
intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the
virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine
love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul
does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a
likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.
Reply to Objection 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its
powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues,
whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul
from grace. And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the
moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the
horse---but not as an accident to a subject.
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For
grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of
virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds
through the medium of the powers.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being
in the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not
classed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural
properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul
differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb
animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the
essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be
the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul,
inasmuch as it is of such a species.
Reply to Objection 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural
properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without
them. Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be
called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would
actually have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a
species, from which these powers naturally flow.
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