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Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature
immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same
action, as above stated (Article 1, ad 4). But God created all
things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another.
But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less
therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore
God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving
them.
Objection 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not
only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created
causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming,"
for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Question 45,
Article 3). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects
in being.
On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it
being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.
Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), a thing keeps
another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by
removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly,
directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the
other's being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And
in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear
that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the
action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called
preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in
like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect
depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of
causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while
the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also
depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the
first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect
which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and
all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first
cause.
For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and
continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first,
namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things
generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is
the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like
manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets,
those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God
keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.
Reply to Objection 1: God created all things immediately, but in
the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some
depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He
remains the principal cause of their preservation.
Reply to Objection 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper
cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but
can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the
power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
another.
Reply to Objection 3: No created nature can be the cause of
another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition,
except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on
something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in
the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause
preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up
anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the
preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due
to the presence of the source of light.
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