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Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with
sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when
they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that
"fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil."
Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The
brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes
measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his
mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should
say afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could
possibly happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the
future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of
fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
that the "brave man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the
future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the
operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that
"fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the operation of
fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not
about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think
beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to
Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen
strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly
wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The
other thing to be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the
display of the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly
about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in
sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a
person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when
necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong
proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.
Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude,
to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same way
as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
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