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Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in
being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from
departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be.
Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The
middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the
nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot
be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot
possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because
everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some
creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels
(Question 50, Articles 2,5): and thus to be is in them of
themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter
is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly
bodies (Question 66, Article 2). Therefore such creatures as
these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for
there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which
has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot
lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.
Objection 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created
agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its
effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand
after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some
time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can
God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to
create it.
Objection 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be
some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be.
Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some
active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature
that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances
and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to
not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.
Objection 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is
done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be
efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the
preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But
this is not so; because this action does not give being to the
creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does
it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep
the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding
something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable.
Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all
things by the word of His power."
I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures
are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that
a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and
accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing
the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child,
whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves
some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature
that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them
from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another 'per
se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the
preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this
manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of
every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it
subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by
the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so
far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the
cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its
"being." This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings:
for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the
direct cause of its "being." For it is clear that the "being" of
the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting
together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural
qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying
the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by
making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put
together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the
"being" of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as
its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same
principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause
of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being"
which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect,
in its "becoming" only.
Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot
directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the
cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the
other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in
matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter"
receives "this form." And this is to be the cause of "becoming,"
as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural
effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause
an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the
"becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the
agent.
Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the
impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as
may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the
same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the
generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such
an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing
in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of "becoming"
but also the cause of "being."
Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action
of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of the effect: so
neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the
agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in
"becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat
after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary,
the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the
sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the
fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it
were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that
form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and
inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the
imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand,
air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it
exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since
it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the
sun.
Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun
which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature,
and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God
alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is
His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so
that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were
withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and
all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii,
12) he says: "As the air becomes light by the presence of the
sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His
absence returns at once to darkness."
Reply to Objection 1: "Being" naturally results from the form of
a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light
results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the
sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures
and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His
influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be
preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as
neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself.
For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being
of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no
comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but only of
"becoming."
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in regard to that
preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all
creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: The preservation of things by God is a
continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action
is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in
the air is by the continual influence of the sun.
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