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Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For
whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name
itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is
communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us
great and precious promises, that by these we may be made partakers of
the divine nature" (2 Pt. 1:4). Therefore this name "God"
can be communicated to others.
Objection 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now
this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which
appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text,
"I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this
name "God" is communicable.
Objection 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as
explained. But other names given to God from His operations or
effects are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like.
Therefore this name "God" is communicable.
On the contrary, It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name
to wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine
name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.
I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by
similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable
according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance
this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same
nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who
participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
strength, and those who thus participate are called lions
metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly
communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular
subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in
reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality,
and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in
reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood
as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind
understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the
singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside
the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a
species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular,
from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others.
Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is
incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this
individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no
name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called
"Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of
the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand,
forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of
themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in
themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea;
but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals.
Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms
as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms
in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them
concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum."
Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we
impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us
to signify simple subsisting natures.
Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature
as stated above (Article 8), and since the divine nature cannot be
multiplied as shown above (Question 11, Article 3), it follows
that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable
in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be
communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many
suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who by nature are
not gods," (Gal. 4:8), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in
nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is
communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it
by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in
divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are
gods" (Ps. 81:6).
But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as
to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this
something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for
instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is
like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine nature is only communicable
according to the participation of some similitude.
Reply to Objection 2: This name "God" is an appellative name,
and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the
possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor
particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things,
but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is
incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above
concerning the name "sun."
Reply to Objection 3: These names "good," "wise," and the
like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to
creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather
signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are
in truth communicable to many. But this name "God" is given to God
from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to
signify the divine nature.
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