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Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of
superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13),
"if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now
religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various
species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore
neither has superstition various species.
Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
religion, to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things
whereby we are directed to God, as stated above (Question 81,
Article 1). Therefore superstition, which is opposed to religion,
is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or by
the observances of certain human actions.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things
have . . . a show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to
say in a hypocritical religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be
reckoned a species of superstition.
On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of
superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).
I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in
going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances
(Article 1). For as we have stated (FS, Question 72,
Article 9), not every diversity of corrupt circumstances
differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to
diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that
moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above (FS,
Question 1, Article 3; FS, Question 18, Articles
2,6).
Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on
the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the
divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given,
namely, to the true God, but "in an undue mode," and this is the
first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given,
namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of
superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various ends
of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place
to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of
this genus is "idolatry," which unduly gives divine honor to a
creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God
Whom he worships; and to this must be referred "divinatory"
superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with
them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship
is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God
the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the
superstition of certain "observances."
Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20),
where he says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping
idols is superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then
he goes on to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons
for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which
refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: "To
this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers
to the third species.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
"good results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises
from each single defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one
virtue, as stated above (Article 1; Question 10, Article
5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein
there is the same reason of multiplicity.
Reply to Objection 2: Divinations and certain observances come
under the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain
actions of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with
them.
Reply to Objection 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for
"religion as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to
explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than
worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man
were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the
rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the
gloss speaks literally.
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