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Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is
incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii,
qu. 15) that "the thing which is understood is bounded by the
comprehension of him who understands it." But the thing which is
believed is not comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to
the Philippians 3:12: "Not as though I had already
comprehended, or were already perfect." Therefore it seems that
faith and understanding are incompatible in the same subject.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the
understanding. But faith is of things that appear not, as stated
above (Question 1, Article 4; Question 4, Article 1).
Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding in the same
subject.
Objection 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science.
But science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated
above (Question 1, Articles 4,5). Much less, therefore, can
understanding and faith be in the same subject.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that
"understanding enlightens the mind concerning the things it has
heard." Now one who has faith can be enlightened in his mind
concerning what he has heard; thus it is written (Lk.
24:27,32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to His
disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore understanding
is compatible with faith.
I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on
the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain
things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery
to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son;
whereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in
one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that
is contained in the Divine Scriptures.
On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,
we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence
of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of
the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of
faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the direct
object of faith: although certain other things that are subordinate to
faith can be understood even in this way.
In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of
a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or
mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things
which are the direct object of faith.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
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