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Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does.
For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that
He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He
would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except
what He does.
Objection 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and
what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does
not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore
He cannot do except what He does.
Objection 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and
befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting
them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except
what He does.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My
Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of
angels?" (Mt. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor
did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do
what He does not.
I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways.
Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way
that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what
actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a
man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the
divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order
of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (Question
19, Article 3) that God does not act from natural necessity, but
that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally
and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at
all is the present course of events produced by God from any
necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however,
said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of
events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which
God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His
essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly
said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order
of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency
of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine
wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said
above (Question 21, Article 2), is not so adequate to the
divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this
present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order
which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end.
So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end,
the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the
divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things
created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any
particular order that no other course of events could happen.
Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those
He has done.
Reply to Objection 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are
distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and
will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in
the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and
essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the
same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot
also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless,
because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that
order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above
(Question 19, Article 3), neither are the wisdom and justice of
God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing
prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not
will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in
things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as
commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is
attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able
to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is
everything which has the nature of being, as was said above (Article
3). What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according
as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said
to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say
that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He has
foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that
He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not
pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject
to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is
His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to
do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from
His nature.
Reply to Objection 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself.
Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing
else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is
befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and
"just" may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with
the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order
of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the
objection is false; for the sense is that God can do nothing except
what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly
with the verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the
meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be
signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then
be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if
He did it, would be suitable and just."
Reply to Objection 3: Although this order of things be restricted
to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus
restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and
good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and
impose upon them another order.
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