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Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected
with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the
exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can
exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself
in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one
moral virtue without another.
Objection 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral
virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having
magnificence or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have
other virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small
things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous."
Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.
Objection 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive
part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the
intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually
connected: since we may have one science, without having another.
Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one
another.
Objection 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected,
this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But
this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For,
seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to
one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another
virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, without
the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about
things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily
connected with one another.
On the contrary, Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: "The virtues are
connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to
have several": and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the
virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one
another": and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue
without the other is either of no account whatever, or very
imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): "If you
confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you
have none at all."
I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as
imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or
fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good
deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation.
If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected:
since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed,
are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing
deeds of chastity.
But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good
deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that
they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this
two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning
the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above
(Question 61, Articles 3,4), some distinguish them according
to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying
that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation
to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter
we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the
connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as
virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and
so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by
Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be
perfect" as a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be
no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he
continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. Question
61, Article 4, Objection 1). Augustine also gives the same
reason (De Trin. vi, 4).
Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their
matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for
their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above
(Question 58, Article 4), no moral virtue can be without
prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice,
for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the
inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of
moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end,
which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands
in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one
cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence
is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of
reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly
disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative
science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither
can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it
follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his
general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have
to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise
himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if
he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will
acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise
himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to
another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not
in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of
restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue,
through the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of
concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the
complete character of virtue, if prudence be lacking.
But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some
eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does
not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such
virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues,
without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we
speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired
those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality.
Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small
gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money,
he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice:
even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific
knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his
mind before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point
of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys.
ii, text. 56): "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at
all."
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers
matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with
the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the
connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about
passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For
all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz.
love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and
sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral
virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the
whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.
Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first
principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on
the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral
virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles
which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do
not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other
intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence,
because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason
the appetite, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1; Question
58, Article 5, ad 1).
Reply to Objection 4: Those things to which the moral virtues
incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of
art are not the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident
that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in
another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be
deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about
the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot
acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander
from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are
related to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad
3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to
be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be
done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.
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