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Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of
these are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue.
Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect"
[Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a
certain decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness
decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Mt.
5:4) among the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the
fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits.
Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every
good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is
virtue properly that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that
makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic.
ii, 6). Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection
of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i,
13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For
clemency, in mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason,"
according to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness,
likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and
meekness are virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to
severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity
regards the external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it
would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards
external punishing, as stated above (Article 1). Yet they are not
really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right
reason. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment
when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also
according to right reason, when and where this is requisite.
Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the
same thing.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
5), "the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that
the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger, and is
designated by the name of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to
diminution than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire
vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire,
since "scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself," as
Sallust observes [Question 120]. As to clemency, it mitigates
punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason,
but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the
object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular
consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were,
that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De
Clementia ii, 1): "Clemency grants this, in the first place,
that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further
punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon."
Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity
['epieikeia'] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as
regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet
clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (Article
3, ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the
fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders
meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
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