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Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all
things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and
power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially.
But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the
essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in
things by essence, presence and power.
Objection 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be
absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by
His essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the
presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same
thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in
things by His essence, presence and power.
Objection 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But
it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore
neither is He present by His power.
Objection 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the
substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added.
Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by
grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a
special mode of God's existence in things.
On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says
that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power
and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some
by grace" .
I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and
the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is
especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually
or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Question 12). He
is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole
kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a
thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to
its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone,
who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject
to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is
necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
things" (Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say
that God is in all things by His presence.
Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
by His essence.
Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all
things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all
things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all
things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause
of their being.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be in all things by essence,
not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of
their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is
present to all things as the cause of their being.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be said to be present to
another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in
substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of
presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing
known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one
who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God
than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another;
hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing;
thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.
Reply to Objection 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of
God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own
place (TP).
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