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Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For
envy is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from
sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil
we hate. Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our
neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above (Question
25, Article 1; Question 26, Article 2). Therefore hatred
of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God
does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far
removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise
from envy.
Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now
hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that
"anger grows into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from
envy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of
envy cometh hatred."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 5), hatred of his
neighbor is a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is
opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a
man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to
avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every
animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love
arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as
we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that
very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate
whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes
the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our
neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful
to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred."
Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the
apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is
a kind of circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power.
And so according to the first forward course of the appetitive
movement, love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one
has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking
pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that
pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different,
for the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures,
wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place
in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has
been stated above (Article 1), that God is not an object of
hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to His
effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before
being directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the
mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the
cause of hatred towards God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various
causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from
anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which
looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
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