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Objection 1: It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned
have an evil will, as stated in the last Distinction of Sentent.
iv. But they demerited by the evil will that they had here.
Therefore if they demerit not there, their damnation is to their
advantage.
Objection 2: Further, the damned are on the same footing as the
demons. Now the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God
inflicted a punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gn.
3:14,15). Therefore the damned also demerit.
Objection 3: Further, an inordinate act that proceeds from a
deliberate will is not excused from demerit, even though there be
necessity of which one is oneself the cause: for the "drunken man
deserves a double punishment" if he commit a crime through being drunk
(Ethic. iii). Now the damned were themselves the cause of their
own obstinacy, owing to which they are under a kind of necessity of
sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds from their free will,
they are not excused from demerit.
On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault
[FP, Question 48, Article 5]. Now the perverse will of the
damned proceeds from their obstinacy which is their punishment.
Therefore the perverse will of the damned is not a fault whereby they
may demerit.
Further, after reaching the last term there is no further movement,
or advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the
judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation,
since then there "will cease to be two cities," according to
Augustine (Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the
damned will not demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their
damnation would be augmented.
I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the damned before
the judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment
day there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is
because merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further
good or evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have
reached their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further
addition to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will
not be a merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a
demerit but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially
to the state of happiness and their contraries to the state of
unhappiness (Ethic. i, 9,10).
On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the
good merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the
essential reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect
both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the
accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to
increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the
demons, or to the good angels, by whose activities some are drawn to
salvation, whereby the joy of the blessed angels is increased, and
some to damnation, whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented
[FP, Question 62, Article 9, ad 3; SS, Question 13,
Article 4, ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion
expressed here as to merit or demerit.].
Reply to Objection 1: It is in the highest degree unprofitable to
have reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that the
damned are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no
advantage from their sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Men who are damned are not occupied in
drawing others to damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the
latter demerit as regards their secondary punishment [FP, Question
62, Article 9, ad 3; SS, Question 13 , Article 4, ad
2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as
to merit or demerit].
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why they are not excused from
demerit is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but
because they have reached the highest of evils.
However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause,
in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin
needs to be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it
proceeds from a previous act of the will: and consequently the whole
demerit of the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.
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