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Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can
be said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature
is predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own
Nature. Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be
predicated of the Divine Nature.
Objection 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "we say, after the
blessed Athanasius and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was
incarnate." Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what
belongs to the human nature may be said of the Divine Nature.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs
to Christ's human nature; such as to know future things and to
possess saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that
what belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4):
"When we mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms,"
i.e. the properties, "of the humanity; for we do not say that the
Godhead is passible or creatable." Now the Godhead is the Divine
Nature. Therefore what is proper to the human nature cannot be said
of the Divine Nature.
I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless
they are both the same; thus "risible" can be predicated only of
man. Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human
natures are not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is the
same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the
other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for
the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may
predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature---whether the
word of which they are predicated refers to one nature, as the word
"Christ," by which is signified "both the Godhead anointing and
the manhood anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word
"God" or "the Son of God"; or to the manhood alone, as this
word "Man" or "Jesus." Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad
Palaest. cxxiv): "It is of no consequence from what substance we
name Christ; because since the unity of person remains inseparably,
one and the same is altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and
altogether Son of God by the Godhead which He has with the
Father."
Reply to Objection 1: In God, Person and Nature are really the
same; and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated
of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is
different; and hence certain things are said of the Son of God which
are not said of the Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God
is born, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was
said in the FP, Question 39, Article 5. So, too, in the
mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of God suffered, yet
we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.
Reply to Objection 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather
than any property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to
the other in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is
said to be incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above
(Question 2, Article 1, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is
predicated of the human nature---not, indeed, as it belongs
essentially to the Divine Nature, but as it is participated by the
human nature. Hence, whatever cannot be participated by the human
nature (as to be uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of
the human nature. But the Divine Nature received nothing by
participation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the
human nature can nowise be predicated of the Divine Nature.
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