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Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in
this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the
Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor.
13:8).
Objection 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy
knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit
of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that
some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who
are better; which seems unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by
influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge
here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two
forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which
cannot be.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi,
4,5), that "a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes
knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like." But in this life
there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the
habit of knowledge is destroyed by death.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let
us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in
heaven."
I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in
the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the
imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible
species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it
would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here
acquired would also be entirely destroyed.
But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode
of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the
habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid
sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by
considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits
are like the actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here
acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the
aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive
intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species
received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude
in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to
consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides
chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides
materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same
distinction is to be applied to habit.
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in
the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers;
but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain;
because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae
ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when
corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly,
indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that
human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for
the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Question
79, Article 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in
the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no
contrary to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple
intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety may exist in the
intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also
reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary
to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a
false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this
reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which
knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part
of the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false
argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore
we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the
intellect, remains in the separated soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as
a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of
the assertion quoted, "Now, I know in part."
Reply to Objection 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in
bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge
in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge,
however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the
better man.
Reply to Objection 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the
same species, so there is no impossibility.
Reply to Objection 4: This objection considers the corruption of
knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.
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