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Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of
the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii,
1): "Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul
of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we
know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its
existence"; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the
soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts,
but by themselves.
Objection 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by
their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be
known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their
essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by
their essence.
Objection 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such
is still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things
to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the
soul in themselves.
On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But
as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically
prior to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to
habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.
I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and
mere act. Now, it has been said (Article 1) that nothing is known
but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a
perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be
known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit
from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he
may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the
act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being
present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is
known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful
inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (Article 1).
Reply to Objection 1: Although faith is not known by external
movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it
resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he
has faith unless he knows that he believes.
Reply to Objection 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as
its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's
object is the nature of a material thing as stated above (Question
84, Article 7), but as that by which it understands.
Reply to Objection 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a
thing being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of
the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for
example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and
therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of
different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is
caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more
desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final
causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So
of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of
knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the
more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit
as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are
things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object
known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject
knows: and therefore the argument does not prove.
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