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Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For
the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason
is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused
from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the
reason.
Objection 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as
stated above (Article 1). Now reason precedes the will, since it
directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which
are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not
among those things which are under our control: since by nature some
are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is
in the reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin
is in the lower and in the higher reason.
I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we
have clearly shown (Articles 1,2,3). Now reason has a twofold
act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this
is the act of knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as
directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin
in the reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of
truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in
ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly,
when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers,
or deliberately fails to check them.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the defect in the
proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with
regard to the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something
which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a
sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of
madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a
man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin,
and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs
only to the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to
reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of
its proper act.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 17, Article
1), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the
will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves
and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will
can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary.
Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a
voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason being the
principle of the will's act.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said
(ad 1).
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