|
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of
quality. Because, as we have said (Article 1), habit, in so far
as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed
is disposed well or ill." But this happens in regard to any quality:
for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape,
and in like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all
such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the
Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or
habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition
is not distinct from the other species of quality.
Objection 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference
belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or
passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a
difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a
genus," as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42.
Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems
not to be a distinct species of quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the
Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit
and disposition."
I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments
(Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of
quality. Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that
some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its
nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused
from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those
which are adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in
the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural
qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of
potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: while
others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted
therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the third
species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of
quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an animated
being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems
unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities,
which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many
dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health,
beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the
species, since that which is the more natural is always first.
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and
habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies
a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it
implies a certain determination according to a certain measure.
Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material
potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial
being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the
substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject
is determined to its accidental being, is called an accidental
quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the
Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).
Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be
taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to
action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are
matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode
or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then
have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered
in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of
good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality
whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly
transitory.
But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or
passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality.
And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done
with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in
them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or
evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end,
whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in
regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of
quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says
(Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and
of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best;
and by perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its
nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the
end and the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25),
therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also
changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain
nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher
(Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby
someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says
that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the
passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it
has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect
of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration in
anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of
quality.
Reply to Objection 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as
stated above (Article 1, ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to
be disposed by some quality except in relation to something else. And
if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of
habit, we must consider the quality's relation to the nature, which
is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not
said to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the
nature of a thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability.
Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as
they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a
thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color,
according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty;
while heat and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a
thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the
Philosopher, in the first species of quality.
Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some
give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the
Predicaments.
Reply to Objection 3: This difference, "difficult to change,"
does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from
disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way,
as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of
habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it
is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called,
can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and
imperfect within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition,
retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to
be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly,
so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit,
just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as
diverse species of the one subaltern genus: so that we call
dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of
their very nature are easily lost, because they have changeable
causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those
qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are not easily
changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and
virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The
latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of
Aristotle: for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the
common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by
reason of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident,
becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while the
contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature,
difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have a science
imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is
disposed to that science, rather than that he has the science. From
this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness:
while the word "disposition" does not.
Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are
specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion
and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences,
though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate
differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same
way, in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of
substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential
principles are designated.
|
|