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Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures
are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De
Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the
divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which
is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but
eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally,
but eternally.
Objection 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally
can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white.
But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be
predicated of God temporally.
Objection 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally
as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all
things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of
God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from
eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I
have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3).
Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as
"Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity.
Objection 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation.
Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature
only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for
in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation
which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite.
Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing
temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names
are not applied to God temporally.
Objection 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation;
for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore
if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea,
it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Objection 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous
in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says
(Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and
creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be
predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the
creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are
predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are
applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from
the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension
of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason
apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a
certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to
relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason,
apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of
relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and
the like.
Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and
half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the
same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive
power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively
to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they
are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and
intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real
relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to
the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in
themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real
relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the
intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are
called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things,
but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the
right" is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an
animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column,
but in the animal.
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is
no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch
as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent
these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated
of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason
of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an
animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
Reply to Objection 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify
the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant,"
"father," and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called
predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the
things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing
moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and
these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus,
there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some
signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these
do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so
far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes
power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine
essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as
"Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the
action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of
God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or
consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or
indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2: As relations applied to God temporally are
only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are
applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance
when we say, "Lord, Thou art become our refuge" (Ps.
89:1).
Reply to Objection 3: The operation of the intellect and the will
is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon
the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from
eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according
to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God
temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations signified by these names which are
applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite
relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God
should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet
so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us
at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the
creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
relatively because knowledge relates to it.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God is related to the creature for the
reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of
subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not
in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the
manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
Reply to Objection 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by
nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of
things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations
themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,
then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and
son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to
science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a
potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but
if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with
science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is
known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the
signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,
these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous
by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature
subject to Himself.
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