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Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called
cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a
division are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is
not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite
members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of
them should be called principal.
Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the
means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral
virtues are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues,
rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in
comparison with that which is so by participation. But the
intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational:
whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by
participation, as stated above (Question 58, Article 3).
Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the
moral virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the
poor in spirit" (Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are
four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and
fortitude." But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral
virtues are cardinal virtues.
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to
speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Question
56, Article 3), is one that answers to the perfect idea of
virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue
not only confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good
deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that
answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require
rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of
doing well without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident
that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so
those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal
virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the
intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as
was clearly shown above (Question 57, Article 4).
Consequently, those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are
fittingly placed among the moral virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its
species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the
generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one
species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect
of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is
applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another,
nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance
principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue
into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not
found in the same way in all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as
stated above (Question 58, Article 3, ad 3). Hence they
should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike
virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in
prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their
subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as
such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.
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