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Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most
part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the
number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the
imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his
youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for
the worst rather than for the best.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
27) that "he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his
estimate of things, and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now
he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side.
Therefore this should not be done.
Objection 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself.
Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters
for the worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my
works." Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one's
neighbor should be interpreted for the worst.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 14:3, "He that eateth not,
let him not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be
interpreted in the best sense."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3, ad 2), things from
the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient
cause, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in
any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently,
unless we have evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought
to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful
about him.
Reply to Objection 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the
best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better
to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err
less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because
in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.
Reply to Objection 2: It is one thing to judge of things and
another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no
question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging,
since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about
it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he
judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is
the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in
Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment
accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of
men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the
part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is
deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good,
and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason
we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good,
unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge
falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good
feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it
pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent
singulars in themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: One may interpret something for the worst or
for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and
thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or
another's, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater
certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted,
since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it
efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something
for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this
case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing
according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things
for the best as stated above.
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