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Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For
strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x)
that the word "rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling
[rictu] of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to
contradict; he delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now
contention is not always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.
Objection 2: Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the
servants of Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they
quarrelled likewise." Now it is not credible that the household of
Isaac quarrelled publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing
it were a sin. Therefore strife is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between
individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not
always a sin.
On the contrary, Strifes are reckoned among the works of the flesh
(Gal. 5:20), and "they who do such things shall not obtain the
kingdom of God." Therefore strifes are not only sinful, but they
are even mortal sins.
I answer that, While contention implies a contradiction of words,
strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another
through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it
takes place between private persons, being declared not by public
authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is
always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks
another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts
harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who
defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a
venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his
intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole
intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend himself
with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly that
there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his
self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin.
It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance
obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending
himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with the
fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on him.
Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not just the same as contention:
and there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which
express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man
is always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever
ready to contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or
does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and
so the passage proceeds, "and delights in brawling." Thirdly,
"he" provokes others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and
provokes contention."
Reply to Objection 1: The sense of the text is not that the
servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country
quarrelled with them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of
Isaac, who bore the calumny [Gn. 26:20].
Reply to Objection 3: In order for a war to be just it must be
declared by authority of the governing power, as stated above
(Question 40, Article 1); whereas strife proceeds from a
private feeling of anger or hatred. For if the servants of a sovereign
or judge, in virtue of their public authority, attack certain men and
these defend themselves, it is not the former who are said to be guilty
of strife, but those who resist the public authority. Hence it is not
the assailants in this case who are guilty of strife and commit sin,
but those who defend themselves inordinately.
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