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Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into
sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii,
12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the
carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second
stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of
thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to the
deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it
is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four
degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart";
the second, "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is
formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to
presume on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no
distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two
other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was
unfitting.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless
there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ
specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one
another.
On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23: "The
human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is
either by thought, or word, or deed."
I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when
each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ
specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from
diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the
complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations,
and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to
the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these
three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various
complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed,
wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first
beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of
thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is
ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third
degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these
three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it
is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin,
since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through
desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks
out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and
the same applies to lust and to any other sin.
Reply to Objection 1: All sins of thought have the common note of
secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is,
however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure,
and consent.
Reply to Objection 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly,
and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under
one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23)
distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing
but manifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of
deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally
intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit
and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as
boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not
distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it,
but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not
distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but
only when there is a break in the movement.
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