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Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to have contrition
for his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will:
and the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since
choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about future
contingents, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore contrition is about
future sins rather than about past sins.
Objection 2: Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues
from it: wherefore Jerome says [St. Basil in De Vera Virgin.]
that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible
for some to be ruined through his heresy, by reason of whose ruin his
punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a man who is
judged guilty of murder, if he has committed a murderous assault, even
before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought to be contrite during
that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition ought to
be proportionate not only to his past act, but also to its eventual
result: and consequently contrition regards the future.
On the contrary, Contrition is a part of penance. But penance
always regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and
consequently is not for a future sin.
I answer that, In every series of things moving and moved ordained to
one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement,
and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the
superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which,
in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first
heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence,
which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently each moral
virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the
movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is a moral virtue,
as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires
the movement of prudence. Now its proper movement is towards its
proper object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and
principal act, viz. contrition, essentially regards past sins alone;
but, inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it
regards future sins indirectly, although it is not essentially moved
towards those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is
sorry for his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do
not speak of contrition for future sins, but of caution, which is a
part of prudence conjoined to penance.
Reply to Objection 1: The free-will is said to regard future
contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the
object of acts: because, of his own free-will, a man can think about
past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far
as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the
act the contrition also is a future contingent, in so far as it is
subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something past.
Reply to Objection 2: The consequent result which aggravates a sin
was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin
was committed, its degree of gravity was already complete, and no
further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless
some accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the
damned will have the more motives of regret for the more evils that have
resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome [Basil]
speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than
past sins.
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