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Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of
nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no
part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every
operation of nature and art there is creation.
Objection 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its
cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form,
which is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form
is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be
produced by creation.
Objection 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things
are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident
in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these
is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to
other things.
Objection 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If
therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would
follow that nature's productions are not creatures; which is
heretical.
On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15)
distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from
the work of creation.
I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms
which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature,
but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are
latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not
knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because
forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that
they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms
were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and
accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But
this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to
consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is
that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be
created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above
(Article 4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be
created, but to be "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made
by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is
presupposed to the work of nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite
things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only
"indirectly."
Reply to Objection 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue
of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces
its like according to quality, but according to species.
Reply to Objection 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a
universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial
power to which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to
a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are
created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect
animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is
required, in the shape of a univocal generator.
Reply to Objection 4: The operation of nature takes place only on
the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of
nature are called creatures.
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