|
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For
that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest
he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering
into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners."
Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and
meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his
heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not
a virtuous good.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against
our will." But not to will those things which are actually taking
place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose
providence whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of
the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the
will, as stated above (Question 19, Article 9), it seems that
sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that
consequently it is not virtuous.
On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is
virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Mt. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted."
Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.
I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous
good. For it has been said above (Article 1) that sorrow is a good
inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two
things, as regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of
nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature
shuns, the harmful thing that causes pain. As regards interior
sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of
reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well
disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good results from
these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore
it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul should be
regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the
virtuous good; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking,
oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a
right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is
due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good.
Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the
virtuous good; for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
Reply to Objection 3: Some things do actually happen, not because
God wills, but because He permits them to happen---such as sins.
Consequently a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in
another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen
actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the
rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: but
only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as
stated above (Question 19, Article 10).
|
|