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Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are
they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the
gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude
corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting
after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude
corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a
desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the
gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated
above (Question 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not
to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the
beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to
Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining
to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i):
"Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to
enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material
things, must toil."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 121, Article 2),
Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the
order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain
fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude,
concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift,
namely fortitude.
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated
(Article 1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very
difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common
designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an
unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for
justice.
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in
Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also
universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to
Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that
fortitude which is a gift.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and
gifts, as stated above (Question 23, Article 8, ad 3; FS,
Question 68, Article 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to
fortitude may also be referred to charity.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which
regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the
long delay and accomplishment of goods.
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