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Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce
judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the
contrary. For it is written (Dt. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to
the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at
that time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the
truth of the judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged
against the truth, as when something is proved by means of false
witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment
according to what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which
he knows.
Objection 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform
to the Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Dt.
1:17). Now "the judgment of God is according to the truth"
(Rm. 2:2), and it was foretold of Christ (Is.
11:3,4): "He shall not judge according to the sight of the
eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the ears. But He shall
judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove with equity for the meek
of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment
according to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what he knows
himself.
Objection 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a
court of law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth
of the matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no
need of judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some
men's sins are manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently,
if the judge by his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should
pay no heed to the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to
the truth which he knows.
Objection 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application
of knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the FP, Question
79, Article 13. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's
knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according
to the evidence but against his conscience of the truth.
On the contrary, Augustine [Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm.
20] says in his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does
nothing according to his private opinion but pronounces sentence
according to the law and the right." Now this is to pronounce
judgment according to what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a
judge ought to pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and
not according to his private opinion.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1; Question 60,
Articles 2,6) it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as
much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his judgment should be
based on information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a
private individual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now
the latter knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular
---in general through the public laws, whether Divine or human,
and he should admit no evidence that conflicts therewith---in some
particular matter, through documents and witnesses, and other legal
means of information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to
follow rather than the information he has acquired as a private
individual. And yet this same information may be of use to him, so
that he can more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and
discover its weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that
evidence juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in
pronouncing sentence.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it
is stated that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons,
is to make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in
accordance with the evidence.
Reply to Objection 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His
own power: wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He
Himself knows, and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is
to be said of Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other
judges do not judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no
comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle refers to the case where
something is well known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to
others, so that the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in
the case of notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the
evidence of the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the
judge, but not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then
it is necessary for the judge to sift the evidence.
Reply to Objection 4: In matters touching his own person, a man
must form his conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters
concerning the public authority, he must form his conscience in
accordance with the knowledge attainable in the public judicial
procedure.
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