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Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about
intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which
are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good:
because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being
reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of
truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the
human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection
consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot
be about intellective knowledge.
Objection 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which
he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of
knowledge is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom
is from the Lord God," and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the
true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole
world, and the virtues of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing
the truth man is likened to God, since "all things are naked and open
to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13), and "the Lord is a God of all
knowledge" (1 Kgs. 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge
of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is
not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the
intellective knowledge of truth.
Objection 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any
kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the
philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being
intent on them: for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those
who refused to partake of the king's meat and wine, lest they should
be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the
Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that
which was unlawful": and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii,
40) that "if the philosophers made any true statements, we must
claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors." Therefore
curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.
On the contrary, Jerome [Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17]
says: "Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with
the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces
the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?"
Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful.
Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 166, Article 2, ad
2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about
the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge
differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and
study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of
truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally,
by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the
truth, according to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or
because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.
On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of
truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to
the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for
instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in
their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21):
"Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is,
and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine
they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and
keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the
world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they
dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue." In like manner,
those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a
sinful study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, "They have
taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit
iniquity."
Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed
to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four
ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from
a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says
[Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the gospels and
the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of
pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by
whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to
know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity,
of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the
philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in
seeking knowledge from the demons."
Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures,
without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge
of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in
studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable
curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding
things."
Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of
his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things
that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy
ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious," and
further on (Ecclus. 3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of
them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity."
Reply to Objection 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of
truth; yet man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any
truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in
the knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such
knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the
sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.
Reply to Objection 2: Although this argument shows that the
knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from
misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring
the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good
should be regulated in due manner.
Reply to Objection 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful
and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers
acquired through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rm.
1:19. Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in
order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8):
"Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit,
according to the tradition of men . . . and not according to
Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain
philosophers that "they make an unholy use of divine things against
that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the
worship of God."
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