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Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by
means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for
the offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation
is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our
sufferings, as appears from Tobias 3:22. Therefore satisfaction
need not be made by means of penal works.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work
proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain "
according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction
need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less
satisfactory will they be: which is false.
Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur
Deus homo i) "consists in giving due honor to God." But this can
be done by other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs
not to be made by means of penal works.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is
just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so
much the greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself
by his sin."
Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by
satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should
be made by means of penal works.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 12, Article 3),
satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is
made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved
thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of
penal works. For compensation for an offense implies equality, which
must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now
equalization in human justice consists in taking away from one that
which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom
something has been taken. And, although nothing can be taken away
from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part,
deprives Him of something by sinning as stated above (Question 12,
Articles 3,4). Consequently, in order that compensation be
made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of
God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such,
does not deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the
deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal.
Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good
that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be penal, so that
something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.
Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not
easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3)
punishments are medicinal.
Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our
punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and
thus they can be satisfactory.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note
the penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its
difficulty. Now if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished,
other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the
difficulty be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will,
this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like
manner, diminution of the penality of a work, on account of the will
being made more prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of
satisfaction, but increases it.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for
the offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner.
It is of this debt that Anselm speaks.
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