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Objection 1: It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined:
"Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or
grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him." For the child
should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted
does not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is
not always the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 2: Further, "Parents should lay up for their children"
(2 Cor. 12:14). But the adoptive father does not always
necessarily lay up for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted
does not inherit the goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not
the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 3: Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a
child, is likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten
naturally. Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally
is competent to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who is
not his own master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor
a woman can adopt, and yet they can beget a child naturally.
Therefore, properly speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone
as a child.
Objection 4: Further, to take as one's child one who is not one's
own seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten
naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or
impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children of his own
begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as
his child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore adoption is
not the taking of someone as one's child.
Objection 5: Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is
taken as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence
whether an older person become the father of a younger, or "vice
versa," since a youth can baptize an old man and "vice versa."
Therefore, if by adoption a person is taken as a child without being
carnally begotten, it would make no difference whether an older person
adopted a younger, or a younger an older person; which is not true.
Therefore the same conclusion follows.
Objection 6: Further, there is no difference of degree between
adopted and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a
child; and consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted
as a grandchild.
Objection 7: Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God
is said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should
have greater charity towards those who are connected with us than
towards strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger but
of someone connected with us.
I answer that, Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature
where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural
procreation, so by positive law which is the art of what is good and
just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness to
one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the
children he has lost, this being the chief reason why adoption was
introduced. And since taking implies a term "wherefrom," for which
reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person
taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural
procreation has a term "whereto," namely the form which is the end of
generation, and a term "wherefrom," namely the contrary form, so
legal generation has a term "whereto," namely a child or grandchild,
and a term "wherefrom," namely, a stranger. Consequently the above
definition includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a
"lawful taking," and the term "wherefrom," since it is said to be
the taking of "a stranger," and the term "whereto," because it
says, "as a child or grandchild ."
Reply to Objection 1: The sonship of adoption is an imitation of
natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one
which imitates natural sonship perfectly, and this is called
"arrogatio," whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of
the adopter; and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted
father if the latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive
him of a fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this
way except one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or,
if he has, is of age. There can be no adoption of this kind without
the authority of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates
natural sonship imperfectly, and is called "simple adoption," and by
this the adopted does not come under the power of the adopter: so that
it is a disposition to perfect adoption, rather than perfect adoption
itself. In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt,
without the consent of the sovereign and with the authority of a
magistrate: and one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of
the adopter, nor is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his
goods in his will, unless he will.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural procreation is directed to the
production of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature
is not hindered is competent to be able to beget naturally. But
adoption is directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone
are competent to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate.
Consequently one who is not his own master, or who is less than
twenty-five years of age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by
special permission of the sovereign.
Reply to Objection 4: An inheritance cannot pass to posterity
through one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for
this very reason it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him
by right of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither
can he beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for
children one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded from
begetting need no solace for their lack of children as those who have
had and have lost them, or could have had them but have them not by
reason of some accidental impediment.
Reply to Objection 5: Spiritual relationship is contracted through
a sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom
there is no difference between male and female, bondman and free,
youth and old age (Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). Wherefore
anyone can indifferently become another's godfather. But adoption
aims at hereditary succession and a certain subjection of the adopted to
the adopter: and it is not fitting that older persons should be
subjected to younger in the care of the household. Consequently a
younger person cannot adopt an older; but according to law the adopted
person must be so much younger than the adopter, that he might have
been the child of his natural begetting.
Reply to Objection 6: One may lose one's grandchildren and so
forth even as one may lose one's children. Wherefore since adoption
was introduced as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be
adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a
grandchild and so on.
Reply to Objection 7: A relative ought to succeed by right of
relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen
to succeed by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to
inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but
as a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter's goods.
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