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Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the
Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in
potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of
good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as
the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act,
as is clear from the foregoing (Article 2), it seems that God does
not know evil things.
Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the
thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the
cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know
evil things.
Objection 3: Further, everything known is known either by its
likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows
through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (Article 5).
Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil
contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know
evil things.
Objection 4: Further, what is known through another and not through
itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through
another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him
imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not
imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 15:11), "Hell and
destruction are before God."
I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that
can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which
corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good
things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is
knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence
of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows
good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known
darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through
Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness
except through light."
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be
understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality,
does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees
with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing
are known by privation of division. This is because simple and
indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not
be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by
separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation
existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.
Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of
evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
Reply to Objection 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine
essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the
effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them,
He knows the opposite evils.
Reply to Objection 4: To know a thing by something else only,
belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable;
but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of
evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined
nor known except by good.
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