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Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is
written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law,
but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty
of transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all
sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a
transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.
Objection 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now
whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (Question
65, Article 1). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived
of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of
all sins.
Objection 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have
a principle in common, as stated above (Question 65, Articles
1,2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins,
because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, is the
beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the
city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as Augustine declares
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also
connected so that whoever has one, has them all.
On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one another, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be
together in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins
and vices to be connected with one another.
I answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue
in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the
sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every
man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason,
wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end,
so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of
things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (Question 65,
Article 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the
point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to
tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these
goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from
reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact
they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices
and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident
that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are
not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in passing
from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are
connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.
Reply to Objection 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the
thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as
stated above (Question 72, Article 1), but as regards that from
which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a
commandment of the law. Now all the commandments of the law are from
one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the
same God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that
whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much
as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through
his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 71, Article
4), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because
venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused
virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal
sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; though if such
acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of
acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss
of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts
against prudence, without which no moral virtue is possible, as stated
above (Question 58, Article 4; Question 65, Article 1).
Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and
formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of
prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which
inclinations, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not
follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first,
because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue can
be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present;
secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as regards the
virtue's inclination to act, as stated above (Question 71,
Article 1). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations
remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.
Reply to Objection 3: The love of God is unitive, in as much as
it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the
virtues, which flow from the love of God, are connected together.
But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in
so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods,
which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise
from self-love, are not connected together.
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