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Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For
Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one
who does not flee from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But
flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs
to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Objection 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But
love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into
hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Objection 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their
effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on
seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from
pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (Questions.
83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does
nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv). But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good
and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred.
I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its
cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above
stated (Article 2). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be
stronger than love absolutely.
But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger
than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to
the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the
gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's
movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of
evil.
Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two
reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For,
since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression;
when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as
in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever,
though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian
fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a
second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the
absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x,
12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love."
And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated is
felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved.
Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a love which
are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different
degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which correspond
different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a
greater love, moves us more than a lesser love.
Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love
of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which
corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we
love pleasure.
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