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Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of
all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue.
But human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above (Article
2). Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But
virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot
come under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe
all acts of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as
stated above (Question 90, Article 2). But some acts of virtue
are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore
the law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the
law "prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and
the acts of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man:
and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing
the former, forbidding the latter."
I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their
objects, as explained above (Question 54, Article 2; Question
60, Article 1; Question 62, Article 2). Now all the
objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an
individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus matters of
fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for
upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with the other
virtues. But law, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2) is
ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts
cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human law does not
prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard
to those that are ordainable to the common good---either
immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common
good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things
pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the
upholding of the common good of justice and peace.
Reply to Objection 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts,
by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts
of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it
prescribes some acts of each virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two
ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus
the act of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is
to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of
virtue. Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing
in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds
from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the
end at which every lawgiver aims.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no virtue whose act is not
ordainable to the common good, as stated above, either mediately or
immediately.
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