|
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a
general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as
neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man
sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is
no need for a particular justice.
Objection 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary
according to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man
to another in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above
(Articles 5,6). Therefore there is not another species of
justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the
individual.
Objection 3: Further, between the individual and the general public
stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to
general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the
individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice
directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not
the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a
legal justice.
On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Mt. 5:6,
"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says
(Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the
general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to
covetousness."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), legal justice is not
essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which
directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other
virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular
goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another
individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice
there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to
himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal
justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his
relations to other individuals.
Reply to Objection 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man
sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common
good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it
does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to
direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.
Reply to Objection 2: The common good of the realm and the
particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the
"many" and the "few," but also under a formal aspect. For the
aspect of the "common" good differs from the aspect of the
"individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole" differs from that
of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that
"they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like
differ only as many and few and not specifically."
Reply to Objection 3: The household community, according to the
Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold
fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and
slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the
other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply,
but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in
Ethic. v, 6.
|
|