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Objection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and
that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil
acts not, save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue
of the good. Therefore no action is evil.
Objection 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in
act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but
according as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its
potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph.
ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only
according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and none is
evil.
Objection 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally,
as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some
effect which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every
action is good.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 3:20): "Every one
that doth evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are
evil.
I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good
and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act
that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has
being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the
FP, Question 5, Articles 1,3. But God alone has the whole
plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing
has its proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore
it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and
yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the
fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having all
the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore if any
man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the
fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has
he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness, and is said
to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he
lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however,
which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either
evil or good. But since this same fulness of being is of the very
essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being, it
is not said to be good simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as
it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a
non-being in a certain respect, as was stated in the FP, Question
5, Article 1, ad 1. We must therefore say that every action has
goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in
goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its
fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it
lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or
something of the kind.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness.
For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being
nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not
deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a
deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in
a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect
deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man
has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but
inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by
stumbling when he walks.
Reply to Objection 3: An evil action can have a proper effect,
according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the
cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and
female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
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