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Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of
commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.
Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.
Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.
Objection 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more
cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain
actions and passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore
restitution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken
away. Now something may be taken away from a man not only in
commutation, but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one
gives a man less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an
act of commutative than of distributive justice.
On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is
an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.
Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs
commutations.
I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a
person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in
restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of
one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence
restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person
having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance
on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is not due to another is not his
properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time:
wherefore it is a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone
renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like
a restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it
is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which
considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is
not restitution properly so called.
Reply to Objection 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes
something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it
would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which
can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both
substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as
the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those
actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit
on another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to
things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their
effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being
struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored
by injurious words.
Reply to Objection 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to
the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing
with thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he
received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative
justice.
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