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Objection 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to
the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jn.
1:18): "No man hath seen God at any time"; and Chrysostom in
his commentary says (Hom. xiv in Joan.) that "not even the
heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever been
able to see Him as He is." Now, only equality with the angels is
promised to men (Mt. 22:30): "They . . . shall be as the
angels of God in heaven." Therefore neither will the saints in
heaven see God in His essence.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. Nom. i):
"Knowledge is only of existing things." Now whatever exists is
finite, since it is confined to a certain genus: and therefore God,
since He is infinite, is above all existing things. Therefore there
is no knowledge of Him, and He is above all knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) shows
that the most perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God
is when it is united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which
is seen in its essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for
our intellect to see God in His essence.
Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.)
that "the darkness"---for thus he calls the abundance of
light---"which screens God is impervious to all illuminations, and
hidden from all knowledge: and if anyone in seeing God understood what
he saw, he saw not God Himself, but one of those things that are
His." Therefore no created intellect will be able to see God in
His essence.
Objection 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad
Hieroth.) "God is invisible on account of His surpassing glory."
Now His glory surpasses the human intellect in heaven even as on the
way. Therefore since He is invisible on the way, so will He be in
heaven.
Objection 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the
perfection of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between
intelligible and intellect, as between the visible object and the
sight. But there is no possible proportion between our intellect and
the Divine essence, since an infinite distance separates them.
Therefore our intellect will be unable to attain to the vision of the
Divine essence.
Objection 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than
the created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise
attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will
our intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Objection 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something
actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object
understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual
operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of
heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be
by means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this
cannot be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must
needs have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our
intellect in essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our
intellect is informed in understanding God must needs be a likeness
impressed by God on our intellect. But this likeness, being
something created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God except as an
effect leads to the knowledge of its cause. Therefore it is impossible
for our intellect to see God except through His effect. But to see
God through His effect is not to see Him in His essence. Therefore
our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.
Objection 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our
intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna
(Metaph. iii), "the existence of an intelligence in our intellect
does not imply that its essence is in our intellect," because in that
case our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an
accident, "but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect."
Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us,
except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But
this impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence,
for since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it
degenerates to another image much more than if the image of a white
thing were to degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore,
just as a person in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates
to the image of a black thing, on account of an indisposition in the
organ, is not said to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect
be able to see God in His essence, since it understands God only by
means of this impression.
Objection 1:: Further, "In things devoid of matter that which
understands is the same as that which is understood" (De Anima
iii). Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our
intellect, which is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated
essence, it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His
essence.
Objection 1:: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as
to what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but
only what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene
(De Fide Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be
unable to see God in His essence.
Objection 1:: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is
unknown. But God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is
altogether unknown. Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be
seen in His essence by a created intellect.
Objection 1:: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep.
cxlvii): "God is by nature invisible." Now that which is in God
by nature cannot be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to
be seen in His essence.
Objection 1:: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in
another way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be
seen in another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His
own mode, but will be seen by the saints according to their mode.
Therefore He will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will
not be seen in His essence.
Objection 1:: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not
seen in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium
which is the light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy
light we shall see light." Therefore He will not be seen in His
essence.
Objection 1:: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to
face, we see him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will
be seen through His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see
now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face." Now
that which is seen face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God
will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear
we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is."
Therefore we shall see Him in His essence.
Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father," says: "Where,"
i.e. in heaven, "the essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost
shall be seen: this is given to the clean of heart alone and is the
highest bliss." Therefore the blessed will see God in His essence.
Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me
shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest
Myself to him." Now that which is manifested is seen in its
essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in
heaven.
Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex.
33:20, "Man shall not see Me and live," disapproves of the
opinion of those who said that "in this abode of bliss God can be seen
in His glory but not in His nature; for His glory differs not from
His nature." But His nature is His essence. Therefore He will
be seen in His essence.
Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated.
Now the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence,
according to Ex. 33:13, "Show me Thy glory"; Ps.
79:20, "Show Thy face and we shall be saved"; and Jn.
14:8, "Show us the Father and it is enough for us." Therefore
the saints will see God in His essence.
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man's
life is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man's
ultimate happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to
their being. Hence in reference to this question we find that
philosophers and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same
difference of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive
intellect can never come to understand separate substances. thus
Alfarabius expresses himself at the end of his Ethics, although he
says the contrary in his book On the Intelligence, as the
Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In like manner certain
theologians held that the human intellect can never attain to the vision
of God in His essence. on either side they were moved by the distance
which separates our intellect from the Divine essence and from separate
substances. For since the intellect in act is somewhat one with the
intelligible object in act, it would seem difficult to understand how
the created intellect is made to be an uncreated essence. Wherefore
Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan.): "How can the creature see
the uncreated?" Those who hold the passive intellect to be the
subject of generation and corruption, as being a power dependent on the
body, encounter a still greater difficulty not only as regards the
vision of God but also as regards the vision of any separate
substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First,
because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture,
as Augustine declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii).
Secondly, because, since understanding is an operation most proper to
man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist in that
operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of an
intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the most
perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to the vision of
the Divine essence, but to something else, we shall be forced to
conclude that something other than God is the object of man's
happiness: and since the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its
being united to its principle, it follows that something other than
God is the effective principle of man, which is absurd, according to
us, and also according to the philosophers who maintain that our souls
emanate from the separate substances, so that finally we may be able to
understand these substances. Consequently, according to us, it must
be asserted that our intellect will at length attain to the vision of
the Divine essence, and according to the philosophers, that it will
attain to the vision of separate substances.
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some,
like Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our
intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to
the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two
arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not
diversified in various individuals, except as united to various
individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in
me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary
forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea
understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity
understood, which is one and the same in the various persons
understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance.
Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any
intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the
separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that
our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which
it abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a
quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of
the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate
substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the
quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna
says (Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from
this particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows
that the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity,
and consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to
some quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a
separate quiddity [FP, Question 88, Article 2].
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the
quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is
not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and
consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities
of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows
the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine
essence, which more than any other is of a different nature from any
created quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same
nature, nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead
to the knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the
most remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect
unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only
as an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially:
and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence
to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the
essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know
Him in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason
Avicenna in his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding
separate substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by
us by means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being
images of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since
they are immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way
also seems inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is
agreed that "whatever is received into any thing is therein after the
mode of the recipient": and consequently the likeness of the Divine
essence impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our
intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect
reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness
may occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way
there is a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according
to the same specific nature, but not in the same measure of
perfection: such is the defective likeness in a subject that has little
whiteness in comparison with one that has much. In another way the
likeness is yet more defective, when it does not attain to the same
specific nature but only to the same generic nature: such is the
likeness of an orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a
white one. In another way, still more defective is the likeness when
it does not attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain
analogy or proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in
that each is a being: and in this way every likeness received into a
creature is defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in
order that the sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive
the likeness of whiteness according to its specific nature, although
not according to the same manner of being because the form has a manner
of being in the sense other from that which it has in the thing outside
the soul: for if the form of yellowness were received into the eye,
the eye would not be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order
that the intellect understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to
receive its likeness according to the same specific nature, although
there may possibly not be the same manner of being on either side: for
the form which is in the intellect or sense is not the principle of
knowledge according to its manner of being on both sides, but according
to its common ratio with the external object. Hence it is clear that
by no likeness received in the created intellect can God be
understood, so that His essence be seen immediately. And for this
reason those who held the Divine essence to be seen in this way alone,
said that the essence itself will not be seen, but a certain
brightness, as it were a radiance thereof. Consequently neither does
this way suffice for the Divine vision that we seek.
Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers
held, namely Alexander and Averroes (De Anima iii.). For since
in every knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or
seen, this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see
separate substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect
from composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an
impression left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the
second opinion affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to
our intellect as its form, so as to be both that which is understood,
and that whereby it is understood. And whatever may be the case with
other separate substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our
way of seeing God in His essence, because by whatever other form our
intellect were informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine
essence. This, however, must not be understood as though the Divine
essence were in reality the form of our intellect, or as though from
its conjunction with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as
in natural things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is
that the proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the
proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which
is the perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient,
the proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the
less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and
color are received into a transparent object, light being to color as
form to matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the
soul, together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are
not received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the
intellect as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect
to be able to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may
be shown as follows.
As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter,
there results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect
understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing
intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be
the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts,
since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if
this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from
being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite
itself is as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we must take
the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the intelligible
species as form; so that the intellect actually understanding will be
the composite as it were resulting from both. Hence if there be a
self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself besides that which
is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the form whereby the
intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in respect of its
actuality and not of its potentiality (Met. ix): in proof of which
an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter and from all the
properties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine essence is pure
act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby the intellect
understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence the Master
says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body with the soul
is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted can be explained in three
ways, according to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii).
In one way as excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or
will see God in His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual
vision of God in His essence from those who dwell in this mortal
flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision of comprehension from a
created intellect. It is thus that Chrysostom understands the saying
wherefore he adds: "By seeing, the evangelist means a most clear
perception, and such a comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
This also is the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds: "The
Only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath
declared Him": his intention being to prove the Son to be God from
His comprehending God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God, by His infinite essence,
surpasses all existing things which have a determinate being, so His
knowledge, whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as
our knowledge is to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to
His infinite essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to
wit, the knower and the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we
shall see God in His essence is the same whereby God sees Himself,
as regards that whereby He is seen, because as He sees Himself in
His essence so shall we also see Him. But as regards the knower
there is the difference that is between the Divine intellect and ours.
Now in the order of knowledge the object known follows the form by
which we know, since by the form of a stone we see a stone: whereas
the efficacy of knowledge follows the power of the knower: thus he who
has stronger sight sees more clearly. Consequently in that vision we
shall see the same thing that God sees, namely His essence, but not
so effectively.
Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge
whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is
informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (De Videndo
Deo: Ep. cxlvii), "God evades every form of our intellect,"
because whatever form our intellect conceive, that form is out of
proportion to the Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our
intellect: but our most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to
know that He is above all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we
are united to Him as to something unknown. In heaven, however, we
shall see Him by a form which is His essence, and we shall be united
to Him as to something known.
Reply to Objection 4: God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now
illumination is the impression of light on an illuminated object. And
since the Divine essence is of a different mode from any likeness
thereof impressed on the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the
"Divine darkness is impervious to all illumination," because, to
wit, the Divine essence, which he calls "darkness" on account of
its surpassing brightness, remains undemonstrated by the impression on
our intellect, and consequently is "hidden from all knowledge."
Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives something in his mind,
this is not God but one of God's effects.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the glory of God surpasses any form
by which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine
essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and
therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.
Reply to Objection 6: Although there can be no proportion between
finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite
is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to
proportion between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite
thing, so is an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in
order that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that
there be proportion between knower and known, because the power of the
knower needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and
equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes, however, the
knowableness of the thing surpasses the power of the knower, as when we
know God, or conversely when He knows creatures: and then there is
no need for proportion between knower and known, but only for
proportionateness; so that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable
object, so is the knowable object to the fact of its being known: and
this proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the
finite, or conversely.
We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in
which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on
a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to
denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say
that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing
hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as
proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the
comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.
Reply to Objection 7: Likeness and distance are twofold. One is
according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from
the created intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense.
The other is according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other
way about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the
immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any
immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former
that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect
understanding a stone is not like it in its natural being; thus also
the sight apprehends red honey and red gall, though it does not
apprehend sweet honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to
honey as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey.
Reply to Objection 8: In the vision wherein God will be seen in
His essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as it
were, of the intellect, by which it will understand: nor is it
necessary for them to become one in being, but only to become one as
regards the act of understanding.
Reply to Objection 9: We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as
regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also
disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that Avicenna refers
to the knowledge of separate substances, in so far as they are known by
the habits of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things.
Hence he makes this statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is
not a substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine
essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our
intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the
point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of
potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances.
Nor will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in
the genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but
only as regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act
will not be the very substance either of the person understanding or of
the thing understood.
Reply to Objection 1:: A substance that is separate from matter
understands both itself and other things; and in both cases the
authority quoted can be verified. For since the very essence of a
separate substance is of itself intelligible and actual, through being
separate from matter, it is clear that when a separate substance
understands itself, that which understands and that which is understood
are absolutely identical, for it does not understand itself by an
intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects.
And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher (De Anima
iii.) as indicated by the Commentator (De Anima iii). But when
it understands other things, the object actually understood becomes one
with the intellect in act, in so far as the form of the object
understood becomes the form of the intellect, for as much as the
intellect is in act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of
the intellect, as Avicenna proves (De Natural. vi.), because
the essence of the intellect remains one under two forms whereby it
understands two things in succession, in the same way as primary matter
remains one under various forms. Hence also the Commentator (De
Anima iii.) compares the passive intellect, in this respect, to
primary matter. Thus it by no means follows that our intellect in
seeing God becomes the very essence of God, but that the latter is
compared to it as its perfection or form.
Reply to Objection 1:: These and all like authorities must be
understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way,
for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 1:: The infinite is unknown if we take it in
the privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of
completion whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the
infinite amounts to the same as matter subject to privation, as stated
in Phys. iii. But if we take the infinite in the negative sense, it
indicates the absence of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat
limited by its matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself
most knowable; and it is in this way that God is infinite.
Reply to Objection 1:: Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by
which God will never be seen. This is evident from what precedes:
"For no man hath seen God at any time, nor can any man see Him as
these things which we call visible are seen: in this way He is by
nature invisible even as He is incorruptible." As, however, He is
by nature supremely being, so He is in Himself supremely
intelligible. But that He be for a time not understood by us is owing
to our defect: wherefore that He be seen by us after being unseen is
owing to a change not in Him but in us.
Reply to Objection 1:: In heaven God will be seen by the saints
as He is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the
saints will see that God has the mode which He has. But if we refer
the mode to the knower, He will not be seen as He is, because the
created intellect will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the
Divine essence has to the effect of being seen.
Reply to Objection 1:: There is a threefold medium both in bodily
and in intellectual vision. The first is the medium "under which"
the object is seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to
see in general, without determining the sight to any particular
object. Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the
light of the active intellect in relation to the passive intellect, in
so far as this light is a medium. The second is the light "by which"
the object is seen, and this is the visible form whereby either sight
is determined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone
to know a stone. The third is the medium "in which" it is seen; and
this is something by gazing on which the sight is led to something
else: thus by looking in a mirror it is led to see the things reflected
in the mirror, and by looking at an image it is led to the thing
represented by the image. In this way, too, the intellect from
knowing an effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in
the heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit,
God be known by the images of other things, as He is known now, for
which reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the
second medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby
our intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium,
which will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to
be united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this
medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not
come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives
the knower the power to know [FP, Question 12, Article 5].
Reply to Objection 1:: Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen
immediately, except when that which in them is capable of being brought
into conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they
are not capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence
on account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when
their image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be
united to the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be
seen immediately, unless His essence were united to the intellect:
and this vision, which is effected immediately, is called "vision of
face." Moreover the likeness of the corporeal object is received into
the sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although
not according to the same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads
to the object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in
this way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison
fails.
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