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Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence.
For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin.
i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the
rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of
prudence.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by
experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is
not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence
regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as
stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of
prudence.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places
memory among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as
stated above (Question 47, Article 5). Now in such like
matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and
necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases:
because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and
"like must be concluded from like" (Ethic. vi, Anal. Post. i.
32). But we need experience to discover what is true in the
majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1)
that "intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and
time." Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in
Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many
things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question 47, Articles
3,6), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are
objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive
faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our
nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too,
as Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii,
16,24], memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by
art and diligence.
There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when
a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet
somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us
more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the
mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were
children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these
illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions
easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some
corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible
objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of
the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he
must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily
from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor.
et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the
reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other."
Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to
remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less
it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric
[Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the
figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the
things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria
i) that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De
Memoria ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect
on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing
from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.
Reply to Objection 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about
the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in
order to take good counsel for the future.
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