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Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally
good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since
"morals are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super
Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has
them in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is
morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being
in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but
in the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question 22, Article
3). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral,
good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5)
that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we
are praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions
are not morally good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while
speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is
evil; good if our love is good."
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of
the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in
themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus
there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the
reason, as stated above (Question 18, Article 5). If,
however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and
will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive
appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and
yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or
evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the
passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or
evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded
by the will, or from not being checked by the will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves,
are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason,
they are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort"
(Ethic. i, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does
not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they
are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who
fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who
is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason."
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