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Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For
no man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept,
since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are
disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of
evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved
to be innocent [1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by a
Divine precept to accuse.
Objection 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the
end of the precept" [Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus.
vi, qu. 1]: wherefore it is written (Rm. 13:8): "Owe no
man anything, but to love one another." Now that which belongs to
charity is a duty that man owes to all both of high and of low degree,
both superiors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not
accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher
degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it
seems that it is no man's duty to accuse.
Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity
which he owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he
would not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes
contrary to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written
(Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth
secrets; but he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to
him by his friend." Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one
sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either
because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter
it, he shall bear his iniquity."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 33, Articles 6,7;
Question 67, Article 3, ad 2), the difference between
denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation we aim at a
brother's amendment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of
his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not for their
own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in
their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the
sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the
punishment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in
denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly
accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to the injury
of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he can
offer sufficient proof, since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as,
for example, when anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual
corruption of the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to
affect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is
not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he
cannot duly accomplish.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin
from doing what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from
meriting eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the
Church. Nor does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous
fault to fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are
perfections of man.
Reply to Objection 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their
superiors, "if it is not the affection of charity but their own
wickedness that leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their
superiors" [Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii,
qu. 7] ---or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his
superior is himself guilty of crime [Decret. II, qu. vii, can.
Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects
qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their
superiors out of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known
secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the
good of the community, which should always be preferred to a private
good. Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the
common good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are
sufficient witnesses to prove it.
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