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Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all
activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from
the passage of the Apostle quoted above (Article 2, Objection
1). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle
says (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to present thyself .
. . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Therefore sorrow is
not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work well.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action.
Therefore sorrow does too.
Objection 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so
are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a
thing is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain
actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow
hinders it" (Ethic. x, 5).
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), sorrow at times does
not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement,
internal or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by
sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to
sorrow. First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow
hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so
well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason
for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and
consequently when we do something that gives pain, the action must of
necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in
relation to sorrow, as to its principle and cause: and such action
must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account
of a certain thing, the more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided
there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action
would result from that sorrow.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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