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Objection 1: It would seem that consanguinity is unsuitably defined
by some as follows: "Consanguinity is the tie contracted between
persons descending from the same common ancestor by carnal
procreation." For all men descend from the same common ancestor,
namely Adam, by carnal procreation. Therefore if the above
definition of consanguinity is right, all men would be related by
consanguinity: which is false.
Objection 2: Further, a tie is only between things in accord with
one another, since a tie unites. Now there is not greater accordance
between persons descended from a common ancestor than there is between
other men, since they accord in species but differ in number, just as
other men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie.
Objection 3: Further, carnal procreation, according to the
Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from the
surplus food [FP, Question 119, Article 2]. Now this
surplus has more in common with that which is eaten, since it agrees
with it in substance, than with him who eats. Since then no tie of
consanguinity arises between the person born of semen and that which he
eats, neither will there be any tie of kindred between him and the
person of whom he is born by carnal procreation.
Objection 4: Further, Laban said to Jacob (Gn. 29:14):
"Thou art my bone and my flesh," on account of the relationship
between them. Therefore such a kinship should be called
flesh-relationship rather than blood-relationship [consanguinitas].
Objection 5: Further, carnal procreation is common to men and
animals. But no tie of consanguinity is contracted among animals from
carnal procreation. Therefore neither is there among men.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11,
12) "all friendship is based on some kind of fellowship." And
since friendship is a knot or union, it follows that the fellowship
which is the cause of friendship is called "a tie." Wherefore in
respect of any kind of a fellowship certain persons are denominated as
though they were tied together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens who
are connected by a common political life, of fellow-soldiers who are
connected by the common business of soldiering, and in the same way
those who are connected by the fellowship of nature are said to be tied
by blood [consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition "tie" is
included as being the genus of consanguinity; the "persons descending
from the same common ancestor," who are thus tied together are the
subject of this tie. while "carnal procreation" is mentioned as being
its origin.
Reply to Objection 1: An active force is not received into an
instrument in the same degree of perfection as it has in the principal
agent. And since every moved mover is an instrument, it follows that
the power of the first mover in a particular genus when drawn out
through many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches something that
is moved and not a mover. But the power of a begetter moves not only
as to that which belongs to the species, but also as to that which
belongs to the individual, by reason of which the child is like the
parent even in accidentals and not only in the specific nature. And
yet this individual power of the father is not so perfect in the son as
it was in the father, and still less so in the grandson, and thus it
goes on failing: so that at length it ceases and can go no further.
Since then consanguinity results from this power being communicated to
many through being conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it
destroys itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix).
Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take a remote common
ancestor but the nearest, whose power still remains in those who are
descended from him.
Reply to Objection 2: It is clear from what has been said that
blood relations agree not only in the specific nature but also in that
power peculiar to the individual which is conveyed from one to many:
the result being that sometimes the child is not only like his father,
but also his grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim.
iv, 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Likeness depends more on form whereby a thing
is actually, than on matter whereby a thing is potentially: for
instance, charcoal has more in common with fire than with the tree from
which the wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed by the
nutritive power into the substance of the person fed has more in common
with the subject nourished than with that from which the nourishment was
taken. The argument however would hold according to the opinion of
those who asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from its matter
and that all forms are accidents: which is false.
Reply to Objection 4: It is the blood that is proximately changed
into the semen, as proved in De Gener. Anim. i, 18. Hence the
tie contracted by carnal procreation is more fittingly called
blood-relationship than flesh-relationship. That sometimes one
relation is called the flesh of another, is because the blood which is
transformed into the man's seed or into the menstrual fluid is
potentially flesh and bone.
Reply to Objection 5: Some say that the reason why the tie of
consanguinity is contracted among men through carnal procreation, and
not among other animals, is because whatever belongs to the truth of
human nature in all men was in our first parent: which does not apply
to other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consanguinity
would never come to an end. However the above theory was disproved in
the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30: FP, Question 119,
Article 1). Wherefore we must reply that the reason for this is
that animals are not united together in the union of friendship through
the begetting of many from one proximate parent, as is the case with
men, as stated above.
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