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Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For
"the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous"
(Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a
division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are
naturally simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Objection 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of
the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not
the cause of hatred.
Objection 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that
which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred
implies a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning
towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that
all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is
an emotion of the soul, is caused by love.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), love consists in a
certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred
consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should
consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which
disagrees: since a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or
hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs
precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a
suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is
caused by love.
Reply to Objection 1: The opposite members of a division are
sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g.
two species of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are
simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes
the other; e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements.
Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g.
substance and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of
accident; and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated
of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of
accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and
hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really.
Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered
in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries,
they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for
it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate
its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its
contrary.
Reply to Objection 3: In the order of execution, the turning away
from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse
is the case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is
the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive
movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of
execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an
appetitive movement.
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