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Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For
virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But
the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is
the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore
virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of
habit.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii)
[Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is
good use of free-will." But use of free-will is an act. Therefore
virtue is not a habit, but an act.
Objection 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our
actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep.
But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits,
but acts.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv)
that "virtue is the order of love," and (Questions. lxxxiii, qu.
30) that "the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying
what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order,
or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore
virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.
Objection 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are
there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but
powers. Neither therefore are human virtues habits.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science
and virtue are habits.
I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now
a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But
the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect,
according as it is determinate to its act.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their
acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these
natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational
powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular
action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are
determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have
said above (Question 49, Article 4). Therefore human virtues
are habits.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to
that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object,
or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which
we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which
we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of
power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest
point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for
instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue
is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes
virtue as being essentially the limit of power.
Reply to Objection 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a
virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because
it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the
act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will.
Reply to Objection 3: We are said to merit by something in two
ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by
running; and thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit
by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to
run by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and
habits.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say that virtue is the order or
ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered:
because in us love is set in order by virtue.
Reply to Objection 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate
to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no
comparison, as we have said.
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