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Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself.
For Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers"
(Coel. Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power
is known. Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.
Objection 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he
would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing
single is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only
knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible
object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a
kind of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as
appears in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand
himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the
angel knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by
truth."
I answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said
(Question 14, Article 2; Question 54, Article 2), the
object is on a different footing in an immanent, and in a transient,
action. In a transient action the object or matter into which the
action passes is something separate from the agent, as the thing heated
is from what gave it heat, and the building from the builder; whereas
in an immanent action, for the action to proceed, the object must be
united with the agent; just as the sensible object must be in contact
with sense, in order that sense may actually perceive. And the object
which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this
kind as does the form which is the principle of action in other agents:
for, as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the
species of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.
It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object
exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then
there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be
actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be
actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the
species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding
change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the
nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as
knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the
action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something
else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the
less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something
else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be
any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And
since an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and,
consequently, he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he
understands himself by his form, which is his substance.
Reply to Objection 1: That is the text of the old translation,
which is amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they,"
that is to say the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which
the old translation read---"and furthermore they do not know their
own powers." Although even the letter of the old translation might be
kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power
perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine
Wisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.
Reply to Objection 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal
things, not because of their particularity, but on account of the
matter, which is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if
there be any single things subsisting without matter, as the angels
are, there is nothing to prevent them from being actually
intelligible.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as if
is in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does
not happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact
that he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is
not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which
passes into some other matter.
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