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Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony still comes under a
precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But
the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 26); nor do we read anywhere that this
precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed (Mt.
19:6): "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put
asunder." Therefore matrimony still comes under a precept.
Objection 2: Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in
respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above
(Article 1). Therefore, etc.
Objection 3: Further, the good of the species is better than the
good of the individual, "for the good of the State is more Godlike
than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2). Now the precept given
to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the
individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much
more therefore does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since
it refers to the preservation of the species.
Objection 4: Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the
same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men
were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease
to multiply. Since then the result would be the same, if each one
were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes
under a precept.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:38): "He that
giveth not his virgin in marriage doth better," namely than he that
giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract of marriage is not now
a matter of precept.
Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a
special reward, namely the aureole, is due to virgins [Question
96, Article 5]. Therefore matrimony does not come under a
precept.
I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way
as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and
such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections
are common to all. In another way it inclines to that which is
necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many
things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination
does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound
to husbandry and building and to such offices as are necessary to the
human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the
accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals.
Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that
some should devote themselves to the contemplative life to which
marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage
is not binding by way of precept even according to the philosophers.
Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to
marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i).
Reply to Objection 1: This precept has not been recalled, and yet
it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above,
except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake
himself to the begetting of children.
The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been
said.
Reply to Objection 4: Human nature has a general inclination to
various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is
variously in various subjects, as individualized in this or that one,
it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another
subject more to another, according to the difference of temperament of
various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as
to Divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one
office such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is
too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative.
Wherefore no danger threatens.
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