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Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several
powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in
various way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason
as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as
executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4)
that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to
will, and to work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the
intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can
be in several powers.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the
right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is
also in the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will
(Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.
On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But
the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue
cannot be in several powers of the soul.
I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in
two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way
it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of
powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity
of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever
there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not
vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or more,
not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue
can belong to several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it
extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition,
in so far as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from
another.
Reply to Objection 1: One act cannot belong to several powers
equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of
view, and in various degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: "To know" is a condition required for moral
virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But
moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but
it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall
see further on (Article 3; Question 57, Article 4).
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