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Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For,
as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing
which is devoid of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term
"wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term
"whereto," for it is then already moved; consequently it remains
that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in
the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an
angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.
Objection 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect
being," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a
beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is
not moved locally.
Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the
holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved
locally.
On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be
moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be
said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of
faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified
angel is moved locally.
I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As,
however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an
angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in
so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the
place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be
commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it
is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of
magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local
movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an
angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as
containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an
angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to
the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it
is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only
by virtual contact, as was said above (Question 52, Article
1), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place
is nothing else than the various contacts of various places
successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several
places at one time, as was said above (Question 52, Article
2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous.
Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such
contacts. Because, as was said above (Question 52, Article
1), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to
an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is
assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body
successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was
before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so
likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he
was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at
once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the
whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a
twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration
deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds
a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement
which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it
might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term
"wherefrom," and while it is in the term "whereto": because the
very succession of "wheres," regarding the same thing, would be
called movement: hence, in whichever of those "wheres" the thing
might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of
movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its
term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore
it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the
terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in
the other. Therefore, according as the angel's movement is not
continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But
according as the angel's movement is held to be continuous, it can be
so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the
term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that
such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance, but to the
place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is
in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but
while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place
which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies.
This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to
the angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying
his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it
follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it
is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his
power can be applied to something which is divisible.
Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality
is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by
application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies
actuality.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality
is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for
any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because
of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb.
1:14: "They are all ministering spirits, sent to minister for
them who receive the inheritance of salvation."
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