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Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as
joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their
objects. But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good
obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.
Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But
one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight.
Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.
Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that
there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and
cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions
of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not
differ from delight.
On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals;
whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same
as delight.
I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a
kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some
concupiscences are natural, and some not natural, but consequent to
reason, as stated above (Question 30, Article 3), so also some
delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa
[Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are
of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the same. For
we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we
get them, and in those things which we desire as a result of reason.
But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so
we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight.
Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned
desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be
the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational
beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since
sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing
thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more
things than does joy.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul
is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way,
to diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are
also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not
called otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to
concupiscences (Question 30, Article 3, ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in
concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence,
while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to
concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose
corresponding to the difference of movement.
Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight are
derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is
derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say
"latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of
inward delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy
breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from
certain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names
seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of
rational beings.
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