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Objection 1: It would seem that the time for contrition is not the
whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so
should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's
life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose sin is
forgiven has nothing to be ashamed of." Therefore it seems that
neither should contrition last all one's life, since it is sorrow for
sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that
"perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain." But
sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain
in the state of perfect charity.
Objection 3: Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past
(since it is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so
far as something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in
this life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing remains of
a past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of
punishment. Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that
sin.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Rm. 8:28) that "to
them that love God all things work together unto good," even sins as
a gloss declares [Augustine, De Correp. et Grat.]. Therefore
there is no need for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.
Objection 5: Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided
with satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction.
Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.
On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa
Poenitentia] says that "when sorrow ceases, penance fails, and when
penance fails, no pardon remains." Therefore, since it behooves one
not to lose the forgiveness which has been granted, it seems that one
ought always to grieve for one's sins.
Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear
about sin forgiven." Therefore man should always grieve, that his
sins may be forgiven him.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 3, Article 1), there
is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is
detestation of the sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part,
and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for
contrition is the whole of the present state of life. For as long as
one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one
from reaching the end of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards
the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given
to us for the course cannot be recovered), it follows that the state
of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the
detestation of sin. The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow,
which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by
sinning, deserved everlasting punishment, and sinned against the
eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal
one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man's eternity,
i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason
Hugh of St. Victor says [Richard of St. Victor, De Pot.
Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man from
eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal
detestation of sin."
Reply to Objection 1: Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act;
wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no
further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow,
which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but
also as having a hurt connected with it.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear which charity casts out, is
opposed to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the
punishment. But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as
stated above (Question 3, Article 2): wherefore the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Although, by penance, the sinner returns to
his former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet
he never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something
always remains from his past sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man ought not to do evil that good
may come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason
that good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace
or providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those
goods; rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in
this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.
Reply to Objection 5: Satisfaction depends on the punishment
appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an
end, so that there be no further need of satisfaction. But that
punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence
to a creature whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand,
the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the
aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition
ought to continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes
remains, when that which follows is taken away.
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