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Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of
charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes
have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
Objection 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its
contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is
contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even
holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of
their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from
one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the
effect of charity.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of
different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to
Is. 32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace."
Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much
peace have they that love Thy Law."
I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above
(Article 1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being
directed to one object; while the other results from one's own
appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these
unions is effected by charity---the first, in so far as man loves
God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that
all his desires tend to one object---the second, in so far as we
love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil
our neighbor's will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a
sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things"
(Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends
"like and dislike the same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)
Reply to Objection 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of
sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him
place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave
chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence,
without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6)
friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce
to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension
in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing
hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is
this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect,
which precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if
there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to
some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a
dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that
it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight
matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect
peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire
fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the
wayfarer.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly,
in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work
of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature,
causes peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite's
inclinations.
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