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Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the
supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every
good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a
compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is
supremely simple; as was shown above (Question 3, Article 7).
Therefore God is not the supreme good.
Objection 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing
but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other
good but God. This appears also from what is said (Lk.
18:19): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word
supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in
comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the
supreme good.
Objection 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not
in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly
greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same
genus as other good things, as appears above (Question 3, Article
5; Question 4, Article 3) it seems that God cannot be called
the supreme good in relation to others.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the
Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by
purified minds."
I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as
existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to
God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired
perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above
(Question 4, Article 2); but as from an agent which does not
agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of
an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the
equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun
more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as
in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be
in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the
supreme good.
Reply to Objection 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is
in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with
relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because
knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
deficient in comparison with it.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it
is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by
all; but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it
is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
Reply to Objection 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now
we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not
that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by
excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
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