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Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly
reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor,
our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super
Joan. lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself."
Hence love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love
of oneself is not distinct from the love of God.
Objection 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the
whole. But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to
be condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.
Objection 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his
neighbor. Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is
distinct from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with
which a man loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the
love with which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are
not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23):
"There are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely
God, "another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us,"
namely our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our
own body.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 23, Articles
1,5), the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of
happiness. Now, in this fellowship, one thing is considered as the
principle from which happiness flows, namely God; a second is that
which directly partakes of happiness, namely men and angels; a third
is a thing to which happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the
human body.
Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its
being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness,
can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being
identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in
partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to
be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: The different relations between a lover and
the various things loved make a different kind of lovableness.
Accordingly, since the relation between the human lover and God is
different from his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as
distinct objects of love, for the love of the one is the cause of the
love of the other, so that the former love being removed the latter is
taken away.
Reply to Objection 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind
that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not
reach directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his
reasonable mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of
charity, loves himself in one way, and his own body in another.
Reply to Objection 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul
and as to his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness.
Wherefore, on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for
loving him; and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special
object of love.
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