|
Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence,
saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog.
iv, 1): "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of
God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the
company of the good angels."
Objection 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from
the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body
which "is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15.
Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above
explained (Question 89, Article 2). But the body of the first
man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible.
Therefore he was able to see separate substances.
Objection 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate
substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of
the first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.
On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours.
But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore
neither could Adam's soul.
I answer that, The state of the human soul may be distinguished in
two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence;
and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from
the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the
soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the
state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of
innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's
soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the
body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a "living
soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body---namely animal
life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the
body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we
have said above (Article 1). Now it is clear from what has been
already said (Question 84, Article 7; Question 85, Article
1; Question 89, Article 1) that since the soul is adapted to
perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting
that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to
phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the
soul of the first man also.
Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees
of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The
first is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its
powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be
associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the
third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme
good," that is, to God.
In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to
itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the
intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external
things, as we have said above (Question 87, Article 3): and so
by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known
perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual
operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a
power through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not
find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand
by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we
have said above (Question 55, Article 2); the above-mentioned
mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient
to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the third
movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by
the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the
knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing
excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the
angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of
knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge
of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our
knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that
Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."
This makes clear the reply to the first objection.
Reply to Objection 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of
the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact
that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural
object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in
our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul of the first man was not able to
arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its
self-knowledge, as we have shown above; for even each separate
substance knows others in its own measure.
|
|