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Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but
of the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that
"volition is of the end, while choice is of the means."
Objection 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are
corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1).
Now, the end and the means are in different genera of good: because
the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the
genus "quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good
which is useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus
"relation" (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the
end, it is not of the means.
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since
they are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called
practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art;
thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of
the) helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to
the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since
volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a
thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus.
But the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at
the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is
also of the means.
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power
of the will, sometimes its act. Accordingly, if we speak of the will
as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For
every power extends to those things in which may be considered the
aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight
extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the
aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be
found not only in the end, but also in the means.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then,
properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act
denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power:
thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the understanding.
Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself
the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself
is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end
itself. On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in
themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is
directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that
what it wills in them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly
directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first
principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things
known through first principles, except in so far as we see the
principles in those things. For in morals the end is what principles
are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in
reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power
of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that
differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color
are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and
sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but
are as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to
another. Now such like objects are always referred to the same power;
for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by
which color is seen.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits,
diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of
powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art
considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does
indeed consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as
that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art
considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that
which is the end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And
again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and means
that belong properly to that art.
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