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Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not
distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as
to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues
which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the
virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral.
Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which
direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one
which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine
things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the
theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows
how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is
charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues
are not distinct from the theological.
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from
that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are
above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in
proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Question 58,
Article 3). Therefore they are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 54, Article 2, ad
1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of
the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the
theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as
surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object
of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to
human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically
distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect
man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human
nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine
things so far as they are open to the research of human reason.
Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so
far as they surpass human reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not
always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the
order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general
sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love,
commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of
love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions;
and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above
(Question 27, Article 4; Question 28, Article 6, ad 2;
Question 41, Article 2, ad 1). If, however, it be
understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other
virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on
charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Question 65,
Articles 2,5; SS, Question 23, Article 7).
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