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Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be
appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in
faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as
Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [In substance
Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which
are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it
may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they
are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to
the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be
appropriated to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the
abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to
another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of
which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially
when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the
persons.
Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for
property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the
essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the
persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the
essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and
the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that
the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For
although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as
was above expounded (Question 32, Article 1), nevertheless it
is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us.
Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the
standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can
derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures
which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain
regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (Question
32, Article 1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of
the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the
divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the
essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons
by the use of the essential attributes is called "appropriation."
The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the
essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things
which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who
proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by
dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine
says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest
anything of the kind be imagined of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated
to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to
make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as
above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather
manifestation of the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated
to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would
follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which
Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that
the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only
the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only
can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the
Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from
the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom;
and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by
the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own
essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its
proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;
nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to
prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is
appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but
is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white.
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