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Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because
on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy
crown," (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat.
15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose
it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be
both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
Objection 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible
follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g.
Peter---may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would
follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This
then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can
do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined.
Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore
predestination is not certain.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew,
He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge
and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed
will most certainly be freed."
I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its
effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above
(Article 1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not
all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening
from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes,
which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order
of providence is infallible, as was shown above (Question 22,
Article 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet
free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has
its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine
knowledge and will (Question 14, Article 13; Question 19,
Article 4) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not
destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most
certain and infallible.
Reply to Objection 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person
in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses
his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a
certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin.
Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the
former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without
raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in
pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their
stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels;
and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for
another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in
that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in
which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by
others.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible for one who is
predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not
possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is
predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall
short of its effect.
Reply to Objection 3: Since predestination includes the divine will
as stated above (Article 4): and the fact that God wills any
created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on
account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary
absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one
ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has
predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely
speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty
of predestination is not destroyed.
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