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Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For
excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But
presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore
daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame,
except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who
puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with
daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to
injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not
to fortitude but to justice.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and
daring, as stated above (Question 123, Article 3). Now since
timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there
is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If
then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive
daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of
deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore neither
should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and Third
Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 126, Article 2),
it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter
about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of
moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue,
as immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a
vice, implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of
daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of
fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above
(Question 122, Article 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not
depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very
species. Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the
same virtue as presumption which is its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does
not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now
the harm done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the
opposition of daring depend on this.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of daring consists in a man
taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and
nature inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is
hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the
vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only
timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of
timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the
daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the
danger is present," namely through fear.
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