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Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost
among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render
to each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of
one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a
greater virtue than justice.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing
than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of
all the virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity
is more excellent than justice.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult"
and "good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about
more difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of
death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more
excellent than justice.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is
the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good
man."
I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it
stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common
good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of
the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the
evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular
justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first
reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more
excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will,
whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite,
whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral
virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the
other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the
virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of
the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that
justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic.
v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): "The
greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other
persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For
this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just,
since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to
others both in warfare and in time of peace."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own,
yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his
own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through
consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards
all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which
gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each
man what is his.
Reply to Objection 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it
increases the latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not
even be a virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Although fortitude is about the most
difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in
warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated
above.
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