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Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear
not." For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality,
since it is a theological virtue, as stated above (FS, Question
62, Article 3). Therefore it is not a substance.
Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects.
Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they
should not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were
its object.
Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by
hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on
(Article 3). Therefore the definition of faith should have
included the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in
different genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different
genera, and neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is
unfitting to state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."
Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter
for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its
truth is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction
to speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.
On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.
I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle
are not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright,
this definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith
can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the
form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles
of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a
habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper
object. Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above
(Question 2, Articles 2,3), which is an act of the intellect
determinate to one object of the will's command. Hence an act of
faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and
the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true. And
since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated above
(FS, Question 62, Article 2), has one same thing for object
and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to
one another. Now it has been already stated (Question 1, Articles
1,4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the
aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act
of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the
Apostle (Rm. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not":
because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what
one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above (FS,
Question 67, Article 4). Accordingly the relation of the act of
faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the
words: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." For we
are wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning of a
thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually
contained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the
first self-evident principles are the substance of science, because,
to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science,
the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way
then faith is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for,"
for the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for
is brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all
things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through
seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made
evident when we were speaking of happiness (FS, Question 3,
Article 8; FS, Question 4, Article 3).
The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words,
"evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for
the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere
to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the
non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence
another reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of
the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what
it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to
the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the
mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent
to what is non-apparent."
In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we
distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make
the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of
things that appear not," we distinguish it from science and
understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we
say that it is "the substance of things to be hoped for," we
distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which
has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.
Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of
this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl
in Joan.: Questions. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a
virtue whereby we believe what we do not see," and when Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without
research," and when others say that "faith is that certainty of the
mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of
science," these all amount to the same as the Apostle's words:
"Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of the
believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth
in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped
for."
Reply to Objection 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the
supreme genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness
to substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing
in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as
commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to
the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is
hope, as we shall prove further on (Question 18, Article 1).
For this reason the definition of faith includes the object of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen,
of the present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is
not so adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is
always of the absent and the unseen.
Reply to Objection 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in
the definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor
different acts, but different relationships of one act to different
objects, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of
a thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine
authority does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the
evidence referred to in the definition of faith.
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