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Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not
all equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7):
"Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and
another after that." Now one gift would not be more proper than
another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each
man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and
the same man.
Objection 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in
one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in
one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly
not the case: since various saints are specially praised for different
virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (Rm. 4), Moses for his
meekness (Num. 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12).
This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: "There was not
found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [Lesson in the
Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], since each one was remarkable
for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in
one and the same man.
Objection 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater
one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience
shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue
than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and
the same man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those
who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and
so on. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were
equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.
I answer that, As explained above (Article 1), the comparative
greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as
referring to their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt
that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example,
charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring
to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue
becomes intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the
virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far
as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size,
but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.
Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as
the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their
connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (Question
65, Article 1) that a twofold connection of virtues may be
assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who
understood these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues,
each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this
way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have
all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality
(De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal
in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than the other; it follows
that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they
are not really equal in fortitude, since the former's fortitude is
more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if
you run over them all in the same way."
The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of
those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters
(Question 65, Articles 1,2). In this way the connection
among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused
virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the
part of the subject, as stated above (Question 65, Article 1).
Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be
considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal
in all the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long as his
reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be
proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of
virtue.
But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz.
the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the
act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either
from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to
refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all,
nor are all of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say
that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which
one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on
account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in
which all the infused virtues are connected.
Reply to Objection 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue,
another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable
readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
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