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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced
from the semen. For it is written (Gn. 46:26): "All the
souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing
is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore
the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
Objection 2: Further, as shown above (Question 76, Article
3), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in
substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is
generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the
Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and
the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is
made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is
produced from the semen.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is
directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the
form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual
soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of
the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the
power of the semen.
Objection 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the
human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the
rational soul is from the begetter.
Objection 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin.
But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in
the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit
intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.
On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that
"the rational soul is not engendered by coition."
I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in
matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect.
Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends
matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part
whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce
the intellectual principle.
Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter
according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making
use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to
do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the
intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It
follows that the intellect alone comes from without."
Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the
body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Question 75, Article
2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover,
since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through
generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that
the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than
to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with
the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul
is transmitted with the semen.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put
instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of
synecdoche.
Reply to Objection 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in
the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or
from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are
false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth
cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said
that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning,
then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which
existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and
in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul.
Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in
potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Question
76, Article 3).
Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely
vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power,
becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes
intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the
power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from
without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect
comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no
substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of
greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of
unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible
for the same identical form to belong to different species. Secondly,
because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a
continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the
perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow
that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply,
because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the
vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and
is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply
addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding
perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly
so called. Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the
action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be
essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was
non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is
not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from
this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with
the body, which cannot be admitted.
There is again another explanation, according to those who held that
all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved
above (Question 76, Article 2).
We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in
other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is
corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of
the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that
through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate
substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is
apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We
conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the
end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive
and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse
agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents
ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent
from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the
generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but
the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has
been said above (Question 105, Article 5; Question 110,
Article 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument
of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders
the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while
the intellectual soul is from God alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his
seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain
species of form.
Reply to Objection 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of
nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate
lust is evil; in this God does not concur.
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