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Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For
that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an
internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause,
the effect follows.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the
internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause
of sin.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or
voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for
sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth.
ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be
inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the
cause of the first sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x,
10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the direct cause of
sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish
a twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other
proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason
and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote
cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive
appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the
will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an
apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to
something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason,
as we shall explain further on (Question 77, Article 1).
Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one
proximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the other remote,
on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.
But since we have said above (Article 1, ad 3) that the cause of
sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz.
the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent
good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the
appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason,
whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the
voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the
will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is within a thing as its natural
power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal
act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now
the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual
by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first
place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is
proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is
inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so
that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements
that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually
sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not true that all the internal acts
belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the
act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.
Reply to Objection 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces
its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part,
from which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when
anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being
unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man,
in accord with his nature, ought to observe.
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