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Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the
end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the
object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not
diversify the species of an action.
Objection 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute
the species, as stated above (Article 5). But it is accidental to
an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give
alms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to
species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained
to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various
virtues and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which
are taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
On the contrary, It has been shown above (Question 1, Article
3) that human actions derive their species from the end. Therefore
good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of actions.
I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they
are voluntary, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1). Now,
in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior
action of the will, and the external action: and each of these actions
has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of
the will: while the object of the external action, is that on which
the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action
takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior
act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper
object.
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that
which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the
limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of
morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the
species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end,
but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he
may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than
thief."
Reply to Objection 1: The end also has the character of an object,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is accidental to the external
action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to
the interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external
act, as form to matter.
Reply to Objection 3: When many actions, differing in species,
are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on
the part of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of
the internal action.
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