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Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the
angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in
potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text.
19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality.
But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are
subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.
Objection 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly
bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly
bodies. Therefore neither can there by in the angels.
Objection 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it.
But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love
towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But
in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
Objection 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently
good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a
true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at
least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it
truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.
Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.
On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He
found wickedness."
I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in
his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to
sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the
condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is
nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to
have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act
alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never
fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself
engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but
if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the
engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole
rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any higher end.
But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is
regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be
referred: as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the
will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to
the will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can
there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every
creature; considering the condition of its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to
natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective
part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In
this respect there can be evil in them.
Reply to Objection 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural
operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their
nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural
action. But besides their natural action there is the action of
free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God
by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his
natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object of
supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be
turned away by sinning.
Reply to Objection 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of
free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by
choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of
ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as
good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of
an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the
inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his
universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In
this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no
passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest
from what has been said above (Question 59, Article 4); nor,
again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In
another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in
itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the
defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not
properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one
were to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church.
Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of
consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way
the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will,
insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.
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