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Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain
after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like
angels, according to Mt. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral
virtues in the angels, as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore
neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life.
Objection 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active
life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for
Gregory says (Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life
pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after
this life.
Objection 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral
virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul
are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of
bodily organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain
after this life.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:15) that "justice is
perpetual and immortal."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero
held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and
that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life
men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which
nothing is better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which
created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues
remain in the future life, but after a different manner.
In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues
there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The
material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the
appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain
mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is
precisely this order of reason.
Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the
future life, as regards their material element. For in the future
life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food
and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions
and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as
regards the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this
life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most
perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that
state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved entirely
according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same
state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that "prudence
will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the
anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the
desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to
God; fortitude will adhere to Him most steadfastly; and temperance
will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it
is yet more evident what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be
subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior
is part of justice.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these
moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of
justice, as regards "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude,
as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of
"lewd desires."
The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that
concern the active life, belong to the material element of the
virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold state after this life;
one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate
from the body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will
be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the
irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are.
Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and
temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be
perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the
resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually,
but only radically in its essence, as stated in the FP, Question
77, Article 8. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually,
but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are
certain nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Question 63,
Article 1). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the
will. Hence of justice it is specially said that it is "perpetual and
immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is
incorruptible; and because its act will not change, as stated.
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