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Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in
God. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there
is nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is
there procession in God.
Objection 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that
whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme
simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.
Objection 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against
the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle,
as shown above (Question 2, Article 3). Therefore in God there
is no procession.
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (Jn.
8:42).
I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names
which signify procession. This procession has been differently
understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect,
proceeding from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son
proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both.
In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true
God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, "That . .
. we may be in His true Son. This is true God" (1 Jn.
5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not that
your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Cor.
6:19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others
take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as
moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was
understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son
in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called
Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to
life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He
speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot of Himself do anything"
(Jn. 5:19); while many other passages show the same, whereby
we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows
that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act;
hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself;
whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an
outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter,
so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining
within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect,
the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we
understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something
within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a
conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our
knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken
word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of
the voice.
As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of
God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely
bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the
intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived from these
fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession,
therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either
according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its
exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the
thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an
intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which
proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the
Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection comes from the idea of
procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to
external matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession
does not exist in God, as we have explained.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward
procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds,
whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not
necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the
more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is
clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent;
since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with
the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very
supreme perfection of God (Question 14, Article 2), the divine
Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He
proceeds, without any kind of diversity.
Reply to Objection 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be
something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable
with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform
procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a
first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the
house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art;
and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the
builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first
principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the
architect is to things designed.
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