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Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God
univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion.
For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of
affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction.
But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a
pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses
is spoken of univocally.
Objection 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in
truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in
opinion, and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied
univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness.
Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true
God, and to God also in opinion.
Objection 3: Further, names are called univocal because they
contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God,"
he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated
above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An
idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to
both.
On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is
in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal"
applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal.
Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in
opinion is applied equivocally.
Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen
does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he
does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic
signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God.
Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but
equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.
I answer that, This name "God" in the three aforesaid
significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but
analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean
absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different;
whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be
placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as,
for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in
the definition of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy"
applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to
urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal,
and medicine is the cause of health.
The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God,"
as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used
to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone
god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of
the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god
we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is
manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said
analogically.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiplication of names does not depend
on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this
name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or
falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by
the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance,
if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and
another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else.
Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God
contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them
uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan
says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in
opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics
sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods
of the Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).
The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For
these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and
not from its various significations.
Reply to Objection 4: The term "animal" applied to a true and a
pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes
equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because
also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be
predicated equivocally of different predicaments.
Reply to Objection 5: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the
very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according
to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Question
12, Article 12). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the
same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying
an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God
altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
names the meaning of which we know not.
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