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Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided
with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii,
27): "Sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal
law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be
mortal. Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is
not condivided with mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31):
"Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the
glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, because
sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a
commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins,
sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves
either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves
to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that
good which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4).
Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we
should use is human perverseness," as Augustine again says (Qq.
lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" denotes a
mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
Objection 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very
fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a
mutable good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good,
so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly
condivided with mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that
"a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that
does not." But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin
is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed,
if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken
metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but
if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and
fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if
mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it
does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus.
But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is
opposed to that which is venial.
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Question
71, Article 1, ad 3; Question 72, Article 5; Question
74, Article 9, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a
disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable
defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above
(Question 72, Article 5). Now the principle of the spiritual
life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last
end, as stated above (Question 72, Article 5; Question 87,
Article 3): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired
by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated
above (Question 87, Article 3), because disorders in things
referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error
about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles.
Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through
something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about
principles. Wherefore such sins are called mortal, as being
irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things
referred to the end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are
reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its
acquittal [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and
this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above (Question 87,
Article 6).
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and
irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic
principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all
diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is
fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is
not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of
the generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into
its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the
other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which
Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial
sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and
in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in
relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being.
For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither
does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be
done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode
of reason, which the law intends.
Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative,
and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does
not actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not
therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid
mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to
God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to
God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the
human act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it
does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually.
Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins
mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal
good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but
as using it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term
in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed
therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of
finality.
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