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Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent makes a
marriage, at least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For
matrimony is a sign of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is
by charity may be with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage is
possible with one who wills it not.
Objection 2: Further, if she who was compelled consents
afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her
before is not bound by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by
virtue of the consent he gave before.
On the contrary, Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a
relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is
an impediment on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part
of the other.
I answer that, Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation
cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it
follows that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an
impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man
to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a
wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to be a mother without
having a child. Hence it is a common saying that "marriage is not
lame."
Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of the lover can be directed
to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love
be mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that
friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.
Reply to Objection 2: Marriage does not result from the consent of
her who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's
previous consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his
consent there would be no marriage.
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