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Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the
greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it
directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now
meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is
written (James 1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted
word," and (Ecclus. 5:13): "Be meek to hear the word" of
God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that
"Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his
great meekness." Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater
according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would
appear to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus.
1:34,35): "That which is agreeable" to God is "faith and
meekness"; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto
Himself (Mt. 11:29), where He says: "Learn of Me,
because I am meek and humble of heart"; and Hilary declares
[Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells in us by our
meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore
it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in
meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for
which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the
King's "throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness
and clemency are the greatest of virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 2) that "the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and
resist not evil, but overcome evil by good." Now this seems to
pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of
virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose [Hilary the deacon] on 1
Tim. 4:8, "Piety is profitable to all things," observes that
"piety is the sum total of the Christian religion." Therefore
meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.
On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are
annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest,
not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus.
It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest
virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a
man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more
perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like
faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which
direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency
and meekness.
Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain
restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations.
For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its
impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth:
wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep thy soul in
meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more
shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is
more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above
(Question 141, Article 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch
as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to
charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards
our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of
God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because
it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above;
secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not
contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by
anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7):
"To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand
it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we
might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth."
Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to
God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of
the virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness
and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the
mitigation of our neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to
motive. For piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a
superior, for instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a
neighbor's evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far
as one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Question
30, Article 2): and this results from friendship which makes
friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by
removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through
leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person be no
further punished.
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