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Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites
consent." But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are
devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things
at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all
men do not desire peace.
Objection 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a
certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have
said (Mt. 10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore
all things do not desire peace.
Objection 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the
sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace,
since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly
command (Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all
things do not desire peace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14)
that "all things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div.
Nom. xi).
I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing
it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in
consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining
it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by
a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are
removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that
whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires
anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance,
to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which
Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of
order."
Reply to Objection 1: Peace denotes union not only of the
intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both
of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite.
Hence Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of
connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites
proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of
natural appetites.
Reply to Objection 2: Even those who seek war and dissension,
desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For
as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another
man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of
war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order
that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will.
Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than
that which they had heretofore.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite.
Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what
is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent.
There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to
what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a
way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless
many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and
disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good
things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance
thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas
they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great
evils peace."
Reply to Objection 4: Since true peace is only about good things,
as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly,
so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists
in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's
desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the
rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed
peace in thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be
had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest
in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb
the peace.
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