|
Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not
several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as
stated above (Question 92, Article 2). If therefore there were
many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also
many natural laws.
Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human
nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its
parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of
the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or
there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The
result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the
concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as
stated above (Question 90, Article 1). Now reason is but one
in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in
relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles.
Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 91, Article 3), the
precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first
principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because
both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be
self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation
to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its
predicate is contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one
who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a
proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition,
"Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident,
since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who
knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence
it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or
propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those
propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is
greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are
equal to one another." But some propositions are self-evident only
to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such
propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body,
it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place:
but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under
apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all
things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the
same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and
"not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is
stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first
thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the
first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason,
which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under
the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical
reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that
which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of
law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this:
so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's
good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something
to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature
of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a
natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being
good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as
evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of
natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.
Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in
accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances:
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being,
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever
is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles,
belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination
to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature
which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this
inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law,
"which nature has taught to all animals" [Pandect. Just. I,
tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so
forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to
the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has
a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in
society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination
belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid
offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things
regarding the above inclination.
Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have
the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first
precept.
Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever
of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in
so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are
reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of
the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common
foundation.
Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it
directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by
reason, is contained under the law of reason.
|
|