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Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For
knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports
relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies
according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of
God is variable according to the variation of creatures.
Objection 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But
God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He
knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and
diminution.
Objection 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But
He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not
to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He
once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.
On the contrary, It is said, that in God "there is no change nor
shadow of alteration" (James 1:17).
I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is
clear from the foregoing (Article 4), just as His substance is
altogether immutable, as shown above (Question 9, Article 1),
so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
Reply to Objection 1: "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import
relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the
knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in
God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in
the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an
invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may
also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the
relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating
in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these
relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation
of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import
relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God;
and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.
Reply to Objection 2: God knows also what He can make, and does
not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes,
it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this
be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said
to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from
the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that
some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His
knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of
things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously
know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable.
But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of
time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that
a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by
God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know
more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of
all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
Reply to Objection 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the
same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was
born"; because the same thing is signified by these three---viz.
the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that
whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is
born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This
opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts
of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would
follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true;
which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii)
when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he
is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be
conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He
knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of
this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For
as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one
and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is
without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable
proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of
God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way
of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our
intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and
falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and falsity,
for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same
opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first
thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not
sitting; neither of which can be in God.
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