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Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
(Article 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are
not convertible.
Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is
not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and
not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not,
is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under
the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is
the same disposition of things in being and in truth.
I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth
is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being,
so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that
"the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is
the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the
true adds relation to the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the
intellect, as said before (Article 1). But the true that is in
things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that
is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation
with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has
been said already (Article 1). It may, however, be said that
being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true;
although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and
being differ in idea.
Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it
can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it
knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is
a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be
apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood
in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not
apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of
being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being
cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also;
and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea
of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of
the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object
with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is
intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is
not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the
true is not understood by understanding being.
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