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Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue
from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same,
one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the
same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate
which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are
the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity
is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12)
likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need
chastising. Now "chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" of
the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by
abstinence, it seems that abstinence is chastity.
Objection 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the
concern of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch;
which are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate,
which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal
pleasures, which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says
[Ep. cxlvii ad Amand.;Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on
Titus 1:7, "Not given to wine, no striker," etc.: "The
belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood
of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice." Therefore
abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons
"chastity" together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 141, Article 4),
temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of
touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are
different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are
proportionate to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in
Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that actions connected with the
use of food whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ
generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal,
whereby the nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity,
which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from
abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of
touch, not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of
touch. which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such
objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal
matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different
virtues, though they regard the one sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and
are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since
if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and
weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq.
i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind
from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts
which belong to the married state."
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not
pertain to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they
are directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such
pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the
pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal
pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man's
life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue,
although this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to
chastity as its end.
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