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Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without
unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so
long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man
cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be
removed.
Objection 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy
and goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy,
and so savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own
guilt to the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gn. 4:13:
"My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore
whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.
Objection 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an
unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned
heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon
for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is
an unbeliever.
On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, that which
precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Question
17, Article 7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can
remain; so that, not everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.
I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to
the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the
appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive
movement is from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are
particular. Now it may happen that a man, while having a right
opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive
movement, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter,
because, in order to pass from the universal opinion to the appetite
for a particular thing, it is necessary to have a particular estimate
(De Anima iii, 2), just as it is impossible to infer a particular
conclusion from an universal proposition, except through the holding of
a particular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having right
faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive movement, in regard
to some particular, his particular estimate being corrupted by a habit
or a passion, just as the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a
good for himself at this particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a
particular matter, although he retains the true universal estimate
according to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the
same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the true estimate of
faith, viz. that there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins,
may suffer a movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such
a state, there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a
particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there
can be other mortal sins, without belief.
Reply to Objection 1: The effect is done away, not only when the
first cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed.
Hence the movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal
of the universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first
cause of the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the
particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.
Reply to Objection 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that
God's mercy is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who
despairs judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account
of some particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
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