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Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for
happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum;
Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.): "To reach God with the mind is
happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is
without comprehension.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
and will, as stated in the FP, Questions 79 and following. But
the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by
enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a
third.
Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But
operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to
vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
comprehension as a third.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run
that you may comprehend." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual
race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good
fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the
rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice." Therefore
comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end,
those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the
way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an
intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his
will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect
knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will,
first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything;
secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which
relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present
to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is
not present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is
not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is
raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it
forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which
he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the end. To
these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself.
For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge;
presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in
the end now present results from love, as already stated (Article
2, ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness;
to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end;
comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or
enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion
of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is
comprehended by the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot
be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension
means nothing but the holding of something already present and
possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend him
when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is necessary
for Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will,
because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards
it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to
the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
therein.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation
from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained.
Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is
present, is the object of comprehension.
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