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Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies
of the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iv): The devil, and "demons, and his
men" [2 Thess. 2:3], namely Antichrist, "together with the
ungodly and sinners will be cast into everlasting fire, not material
fire, such as that which we have, but such as God knoweth." Now
everything corporeal is material. Therefore the fire of hell will not
be corporeal.
Objection 2: Further, the souls of the damned when severed from
their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 32): "In my opinion the place to which the soul is
committed after death is spiritual and not corporeal." Therefore,
etc.
Objection 3: Further, corporeal fire in the mode of its action does
not follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burned at the stake,
rather does it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same
corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of
hell, in its mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in
the person punished; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63):
"There is indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture all
sinners equally. For each one will suffer as much pain according as
his guilt deserves." Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.
On the contrary, He says (Dial. iv, 29): "I doubt not that
the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are
tortured there."
Further, it is written (Wis. 5:21): "The . . . world
shall fight . . . against the unwise." But the whole world would
not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and
not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a
corporeal fire.
I answer that, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell.
For some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the
resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after
death. And as they considered it impossible for the soul, being
incorporeal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that
the fire whereby the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended
that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by
any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the
joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object,
but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so
will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will
be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire whereof is in
them by nature. Wherefore, just as all descriptions of the soul's
delight after death that seem to denote bodily pleasure---for
instance, that they are refreshed, that they smile, and so
forth---must be taken metaphorically, so also are all such
descriptions of the soul's suffering as seem to imply bodily
punishment---for instance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from
the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual pleasure and pain are
unknown to the majority, these things need to be declared under the
figure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved
the more to the desire or fear thereof. Since, however, in the
punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of loss
corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but also pain of
sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows that it is not enough
to hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna
himself (Met. ix) added another explanation, by saying that the
souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by
images of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is
suffering various pains on account of such like images being in his
imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 32), as is clear from the text. But this
would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power
that makes use of a bodily organ: so that it is impossible for such
visions of the imagination to occur in the soul separated from the
body, as in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also that he
might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul separated from the body
uses as an organ some part of the heavenly body, to which the human
body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational
soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body---thus following
somewhat the opinion of certain philosophers of old, who maintained
that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But this is
absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's teaching, since the
soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite
instruments, so that it cannot pass from one body to another, as
Pythagoras is stated (De Anima i, text. 53) to have
maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how
it is to be answered (ad 2). However, whatever we may say of the
fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire
which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is
corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body
unless that punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (Dial.
iv) proves the fire of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the
wicked will be cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine,
as quoted in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits
(De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that the fire by which the bodies are
tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at issue for the
present. We have said elsewhere (Question 70, Article 3) how
the souls of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene does not absolutely deny that this
fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it
differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that
since that fire does not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on
them for their punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this
reason that it is stated not to be material, not as regards its
substance, but as to its punitive effect on bodies and, still more,
on souls.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Augustine may be taken in
this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death be
described as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not
corporeally, i.e. as bodies are in a place, but in some other
spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or we may reply that
Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he
often does in those books.
Reply to Objection 3: That fire will be the instrument of Divine
justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its
own power and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal
agent, and as directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able,
of its own power, to torture certain persons more or less, according
to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as
its action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice: even so the
fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith,
according as the effect of his art requires.
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