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Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual
virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet.
ii) is "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now
though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves
it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same
subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge.
Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature,
inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being
perfected by an intellectual virtue.
Objection 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains
perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous
and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason.
Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
Objection 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good
works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a
natural inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be
without intellectual virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other
virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real
virtues." But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above
(Question 57, Article 5). Therefore moral virtues cannot be
without intellectual virtues.
I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual
virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without
understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence,
because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now
in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that
the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral
virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in
accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take
rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he
cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which
is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated
above (Question 57, Articles 5,6). Wherefore there can be no
moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be
without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that
we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical
matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in
so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the
understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the
right reason about things to be done.
Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of
reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of
necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with
choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires
that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use
of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those
things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men
have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through
lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mt.
10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent as serpents, and simple as
doves."
Reply to Objection 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue
is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the
stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be,
unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of
fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind,
the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more
grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue
be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according
to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is,
according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [Plato,
Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with right reason,"
as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
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