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Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the
state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more
excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain
after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv,
9). Much more then does hope remain.
Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains
after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for
ever---in the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like
manner, hope can remain.
Objection 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is
desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for
the glory of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as
Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory
of the soul, according to Ecclus. 24:29: "They that eat me,
shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and 1
Pt. 1:12: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it
seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 8:24): "What a man
seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the
object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), that which, in its
very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with
the opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that
movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since
it is "the act of that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys.
iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the
movement ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when
once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which
is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the
passion of hope (Question 40, Articles 1,2). Therefore when
we possess that which we hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it
will no longer be possible to have hope.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its
object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not
incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is;
except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do
not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in
respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something
which is in our actual possession.
Reply to Objection 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we
shall state further on (SS, Question 19, Article 2).
Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of
glory, since there will no longer be possibility of being punished.
Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and
with regard to this act, it remains: the other is an act of fear lest
we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not
remain. Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and
no evil will be feared there, according to Prov. 1:33: "He .
. . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is
opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above
(Question 23, Article 2; Question 40, Article 1), and
therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope.
In the lost there can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory
in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession of
punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there,
which is the object of fear: but the glory of the saints has no
succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of
eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the
present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there
fear. For, as stated above (Question 42, Article 2), fear is
never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope.
Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking in a
general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called
fear.
Reply to Objection 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no
desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something
future, for the reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst
are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same
reason desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of
the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not
hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus
its object is God, and not a created good; nor in its general
signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as
stated above (Question 40, Article 1): while a good whose
unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something
difficult. Hence he that has money is not, properly speaking, said
to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the
glory of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the
glory of the body, but only to desire it.
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