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Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had
omnipotence. For Ambrose [Gloss, Ord.] says on Lk. 1:32:
"The power which the Son of God had naturally, the Man was about
to receive in time." Now this would seem to regard the soul
principally, since it is the chief part of man. Hence since the Son
of God had omnipotence from all eternity, it would seem that the soul
of Christ received omnipotence in time.
Objection 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His
knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of
all that God knows, as was said above (Question 10, Article
2). Therefore He had all power; and thus He was omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now
knowledge is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a
practical knowledge of what He knows, i.e. He knew how to do what
He knows; and thus it seems that He can do all things.
On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any
creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to
Ex. 15:2,3: "He is my God and I will glorify Him," and
further on, "Almighty is His name." Therefore the soul of
Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence.
I answer that, As was said above (Question 2, Article 1;
Question 10, Article 1) in the mystery of the Incarnation the
union in person so took place that there still remained the distinction
of natures, each nature still retaining what belonged to it. Now the
active principle of a thing follows its form, which is the principle of
action. But the form is either the very nature of the thing, as in
simple things; or is the constituent of the nature of the thing; as in
such as are composed of matter and form.
And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the
Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very
uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div.
Nom. v), it has an active power over everything that can have the
nature of being; and this is to have omnipotence; just as every other
thing has an active power over such things as the perfection of its
nature extends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the
soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly have
omnipotence.
Reply to Objection 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives
omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the
result of which union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He
said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct
(as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but
because there is one Person of God and man.
Reply to Objection 2: According to some, knowledge and active
power are not in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the
very nature of the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come
forth from the agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very
essence or form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of
the knower to the thing known by the aid of received species. But this
reason seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a
likeness obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained
from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire.
Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know
all things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God,
cannot do these things by the same similitudes.
It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in
the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner;
for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had
in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior
nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not
received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they had
in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of
Christ's soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner
of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of
Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the
soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God
knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all
things present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge
of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into
Christ's soul do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e. so as
to do all that God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does,
Who acts with an infinite might whereof the creature is not capable.
Now there is no thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is
needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite
power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite
power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said
in the FP, Question 45. Hence Christ's soul which, being a
creature, is finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not
in every way; yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the
nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it
cannot create itself.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative
knowledge; yet it is not necessary that it should have practical
knowledge of those things of which it has speculative knowledge.
Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of
the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge
it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be
operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something
else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to
enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of
Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode
of God's creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode,
since it has no knowledge operative of creation.
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