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Objection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous
than a sin of transgression. For "delictum" would seem to signify
the same as "derelictum" [Augustine, Questions. in Levit.,
qu. xx], and therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But
"delictum" denotes a more grievous offence than transgression,
because it deserves more expiation as appears from Lev. 5.
Therefore the sin of omission is more grievous than the sin of
transgression.
Objection 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater
good, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to
do good is a more excellent part of justice, than to decline from
evil, to which transgression is opposed, as stated above (Article
1, ad 3). Therefore omission is a graver sin than transgression.
Objection 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or
mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are
opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to be
a graver sin than transgression.
Objection 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being
deprived of seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a
greater punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the
sin of transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super
Matth.). Now punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the
sin of omission is graver than the sin of transgression.
On the contrary, It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to
accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain
from an evil deed, i.e. "to transgress," than not to accomplish a
good deed, which is "to omit."
I answer that, The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from
virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to
Metaph. x [Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further
removed from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is
further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is
not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression
is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation
thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give
one's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to
revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that,
simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than
omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a
particular transgression.
Reply to Objection 1: "Delictum" in its widest sense denotes any
kind of omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission
of something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it
were contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain
gravity, for which reason it demands a greater expiation.
Reply to Objection 2: The opposite of "doing good" is both "not
doing good," which is an omission, and "doing evil," which is a
transgression: but the first is opposed by contradiction, the second
by contrariety, which implies greater remoteness: wherefore
transgression is the more grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative
precepts, so is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore
both, strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin.
Transgression and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any
infringement of an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the
opposite of such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may
be venial sins.
Reply to Objection 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond
both the pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the
pain of sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable
good. In like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but
also the pain of sense, according to Mt. 7:19, "Every tree
that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast
into the fire"; and this on account of the root from which it grows,
although it does not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.
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