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Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin.
For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal
act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq.
i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind
from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily
contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
Objection 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of
reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and
"deficiency" as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal
act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that
"it is incompatible with the act of understanding," as the
Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome
[Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.]
states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment,
insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be
without sin.
Objection 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect.
Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without
which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup.
et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without
sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This
is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that
no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor
morals, nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual
intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives.
Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.
I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the
order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering
everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if
one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a
fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted,
provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the
preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good,
so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very
great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the
preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts
directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine
says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well
being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human
race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it
be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the
body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided
they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of
human procreation.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two
ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to
this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards
the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by
that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual
intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height,
i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono
Conjug. viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy
about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in
hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's
conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much
more that of the Virgin Mary."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 152, Article
2, ad 2; FS, Question 64, Article 2), the mean of virtue
depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and
consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed
according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover,
virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the
external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what
matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure.
Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue,
from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual
things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not
contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for
something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be
against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal
concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation
of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the
reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should
rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii,
13), "the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly
concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a
daughter of sin." Hence it does not follow that the act in question
is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first
sin.
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