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Objection 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal
punishment. Because punishment, as stated above (Article 4), is
proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely
from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs
infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot
be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting
punishment, as stated above (Article 4), it seems that no sin
incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins,
wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest
punishment is incurred by those who are punished for original sin
alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since
children who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will
never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words (Jn.
3:3): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins
be everlasting.
Objection 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment
through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted
its punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal
punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in
hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself
deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due
for any sin.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain
slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not
punished eternally.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), a sin incurs a debt
of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder
in the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very
principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that
in some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve
contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things
referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent
on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for
instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not
offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments.
Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal
punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one
another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which
constitutes the substance of the sinful act; but they do differ
infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because
some sins consist in turning away from the last end, and some in a
disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end
differs infinitely from the things that are referred to it.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment,
not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the
subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is
no remission of sin.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin.
Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of
the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above (Article 3).
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