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Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of
gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to
make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not
attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend
to something yet greater.
Objection 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has
received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his
turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor
which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that
first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and
so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite,
since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii,
text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the
favor received.
Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more"
is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every
virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful
and opposed to justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We
should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them
return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received.
Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 5), gratitude regards
the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems
be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a
moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not
seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the
favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he
would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has
received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible,
to pay back something more.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Article 3, ad 5;
Article 5), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition
rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of
beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and
to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the
giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back
something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef.
iii). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back
would be sufficient for gratitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity,
which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rm.
13:8, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another."
Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no
limit.
Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal
virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider
equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own
free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other
hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has
received.
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