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Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue.
For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to
temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for
God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that
"what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of
soul." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is
not a special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that
"we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that
"whatever is just is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as
proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De
Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10)
reckons it a special virtue.
I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common
term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to
which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically to designate Rome. Accordingly the word
"temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with
its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a
general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain
temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations
and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is
a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take
them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from
things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude
incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he
forsakes the good of reason.
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to
man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a
special matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those
things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine
law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance,
can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general
sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence.
Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is
concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason
that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (Articles
4,5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way
of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue,
it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons.
First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists
in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
animal nature, as we shall state further on (Articles 4,5;
Question 142, Article 4), wherefore it is natural that such
things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost
attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled.
In like manner honesty is a special attribute of temperance: for
Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has no
defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most
applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most
dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Question 142,
Article 4).
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