|
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue
are not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is
seemingly previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known
to us than God is; according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth
not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth
not?" But the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while
the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the
affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative
precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the
Categories [Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be
uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts
concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the
affirmative.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's
actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward
deed. Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our
thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 13:1): "The things
that are of God, are well ordered". But the precepts of the
decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above (Article
3). Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles 3,5, ad 1), the
precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp
at once. Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily
grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant
to reason. Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins
with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his
end, is supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and
society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the
decalogue, first of all, to direct man to God; since the contrary to
this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to
the commander as to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier
should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most
grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should be in
coordination with the other soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is
that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in
common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him
reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an
army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a
compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and this
last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of
service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his
neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a
more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those
persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those
precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first
place is given to that one which regards his parents. Among the other
precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin.
For it is more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than
by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder
which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than
adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is
more grave than theft, which regards external goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Although our neighbor is better known than
God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the
reason for the love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on
(SS, Question 25, Article 1; SS, Question 26, Article
2). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of
the others.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of
being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in
respect of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was
fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument
holds in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same
kind of deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For
although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before
virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from
evil, and do good," and Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do
perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge,
virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line is known by the
straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge of sin"
(Rm. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the
first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that
which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which
belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last,
since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the
order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the
order of reason.
|
|