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Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or
diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more
lasting than passion-like qualities, as we have explained above
(Question 49, Article 2, ad 3; Question 50, Article
1). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished
by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through not
affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot.
Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation
from act.
Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now
nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit
can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the
intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither,
therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of
time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev.
Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is
the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5)
that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like
manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through
cessation from act.
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a
cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing
causes movement by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat.
Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle.
It is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit
results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease
from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or
weakened that habit. For it has been stated (Article 1) that
habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary
agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by
contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from
those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long
cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and
of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man
ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails
to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions
or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to
observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the
sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is
destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to
the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of
those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man
ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies,
sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that
unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent
use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright,
and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the
intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation
from act.
Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing
to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of
heat were to increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause,
conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles,
thereto, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul,
considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject
to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the
passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of
apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text.
117) that time makes us forget.
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