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Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For
increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are
not in the genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there
can be no increase of habits.
Objection 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text.
17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term,
it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot
increase.
Objection 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are
subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as
is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot
increase.
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore
the disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase
our faith." Therefore habits increase.
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity,
is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things,
on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal
things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal
quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the
perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is
reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And
so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And
since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things which
are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be
better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections
of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or
science. But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in
respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be
"more" or "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now
this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of
the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not
more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion
in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of
the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they
held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less,
for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The
fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial
forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms
are.
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be
something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for
whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and
whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species,
more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph.
viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which
addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form,
or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself,
or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that,
considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can
be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like
qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something else:
and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those
things which receive their species from something to which they are
related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to
more or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on
account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from
which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself
more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species,
on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may
observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of
health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's
nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which
disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal
the nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is
not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but
down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health."
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the
most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or
less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or
decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns
the cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot
be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And
therefore every form which is participated substantially by its
subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the
genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because
quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity,
therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more
or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15)
that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be
altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further
removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions,
are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by
the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this
diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives
its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something
indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be
participated more or less. First because the participator has its
species in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial
form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or
less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that
is, in respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so
far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material
dispositions, "more or less are found in substance."
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must
needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason
we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more
or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible
unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity,
which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and
treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible
of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a
triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to
wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such,
wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate it in its
indivisibility.
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that
in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and
dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less
science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect
of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health
is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and
disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they
essentially imply indivisibility.
We shall say further on (Question 66, Article 1) how it is with
the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal
quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so
also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a
perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term
giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a
habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers.
Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more
or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the
qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the
qualities of the first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot
and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and
sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions
of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an
alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text.
20).
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