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Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more
than any be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues
should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility:
for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other
virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the
wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be
principal. But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4:
"Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be
reckoned a principal virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), these four are
reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles
of virtue as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly
in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of
reason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel
or its judgment, as stated above (Question 57, Article 6).
Again, good as defined by reason and put into our operations as
something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and
distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of
equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those
passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the pleasures of
touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by
reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils of
death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way
they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison
with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes
good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every
virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called
justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in
this way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens
against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because
the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are
called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
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