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Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are
not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of
the Old Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8:
"I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the
execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts
of justice.
Objection 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the
character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice
alone and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice
consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of
the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only
about the acts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as
Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice
alone regards the common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1). Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of
justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is
a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the
commandments of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts
of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts
of virtue.
I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the
common good, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2), the
precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to the various
kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches
that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be
different from the laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by
a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for one
kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because
human law is ordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties
of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward
acts, whereby men live in communion with one another. This life in
common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function
consists in directing the human community. Wherefore human law makes
precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other
virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice,
as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of
men in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come.
And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is
united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image.
Wherefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts
of all the virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order
the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set in
good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions
and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law
fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so
that certain matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the
order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of
precept; while other matters, which pertain to the well-being of
perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the
Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has
the character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should
obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to
man should be subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty
of one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the
lower powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the
Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical
justice.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said
about the different kinds of community.
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