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Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For
the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has
for its object singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in
the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual
power, as is evident from what was said above (Question 54,
Article 5). Consequently they do not know singulars.
Objection 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some
assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible
for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object,
in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above
(Question 50, Article 2), an angel is immaterial, while matter
is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know
singulars.
Objection 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is
either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular
species; because in this way he would require to have an infinite
number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the
universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as
such, because singular things are not known in the universal except
potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars.
On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels
guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given
His angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know
singulars.
I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of
singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic
faith, which asserts that these lower things are administered by
angels, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering
spirits." Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could
exercise no provision over what is going on in this world; since acts
belong to individuals: and this is against the text of Eccles.
5:5: "Say not before the angel: There is no providence."
Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy,
according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the
heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and
will.
Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of
singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular
effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming
eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This
opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a
singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as
singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer,
knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is
about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as
taking place now, except by the senses. But administration,
providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now
existing.
Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular
and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental
power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a
thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus
in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than
the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything
apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no
outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and
sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly,
since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable
to say that a man knows by any one of his powers something which an
angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does
not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a
discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima
i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15).
The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that
they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes
forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature,
but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of
individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the
thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He
causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as
was shown above (Question 14, Article 8). Therefore as by His
essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all
things, and knows all things, not only as to their universal natures,
but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to
them do the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature,
but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the
manifold representations of that one simple essence.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our
intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by
such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a
universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the
nature of the angels, as was said above (Question 55, Article
2, Article 3. ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not according to their nature that the
angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another
by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears
resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way
there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and
form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever
is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the
angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence,
are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to
their matter.
Reply to Objection 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms,
which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal,
and as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known
by the same species, has been already stated above (Question 55,
Article 3, ad 3).
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