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Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For,
as was said above (Article 7), beatitude does not do away with
nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can
fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin.
Objection 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to
opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3).
But the will of the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational.
Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for
man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not
lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there
is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the
holy angels cannot sin.
I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this
is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His
essence. Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness.
Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the
same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of
goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do
anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away
from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither
will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or
acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel
cannot sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Created good, considered in itself, can
fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is
the union of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason
already alleged.
Reply to Objection 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites
in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the
things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to
opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known
principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good,
formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to
its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to
opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have
no tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see
to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is
towards God, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end
is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident
that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to
different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to
proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the
principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the
perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose
between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it
comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away
from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater
liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in
ourselves, who can sin.
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