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Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is
essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all
virtue, but differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ
merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially.
Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same
as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but
the whole of virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially
the same as all virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change
through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the
habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be
directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the
acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common
good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single
individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all
virtue.
Objection 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the
good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem
without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue
cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any
virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the
common good; and so it seems that general justice is essentially the
same as all virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that
"many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are
unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit.
iii, 2) that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as
the virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is
general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the common good.
Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it
is possible to have one without the other.
I answer that, A thing is said to be "general" in two ways.
First, by "predication": thus "animal" is general in relation to
man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general
must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it
is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the
species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said
to be general "virtually"; thus a universal cause is general in
relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to
all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this
sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be essentially
the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since
cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter
sense that, according to what has been said (Article 5), legal
justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it
directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to
move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be
called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the
virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it
directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly,
just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is
a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a
special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the
common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign
principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and
administratively in his subjects.
However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so
far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid
legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless
virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially
the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in
this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are
manifest.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument again takes legal justice for
the virtue commanded by legal justice.
Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its
act to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed
to a further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that
virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct
it to that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue
essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the
virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice.
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