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Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably
assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts
to fortitude, namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience,"
and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to
liberality; since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent
man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic.
iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above
(Question 117, Article 5). Therefore magnificence should not
be reckoned a part of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope.
But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue
by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of
fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face
of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply
any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as
parts of fortitude.
Objection 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet.
ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same
to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a
part thereof.
Objection 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue
should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is
required in every virtue: for it is written (Mt. 24:13):
"He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore
perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude.
Objection 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons
seven parts of fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence,
security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability."
Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these
are, "courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness,
perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems that Tully's
reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.
Objection 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five
parts of fortitude. The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces
brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is
"military" fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of
warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces
brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is
the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to
overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely
through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are
not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these
enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 48), a virtue can have
three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But
fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts,
since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for
it is about a very special matter.
However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to
it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of
which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts,
because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships,
namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter
of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as
secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Question
123, Articles 3,6), the act of fortitude is twofold,
aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of
aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists
in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully
mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great
and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of
the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has
confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence,"
which he describes as being "the discussion and administration,"
i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain
broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with
greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the
proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be
quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no
fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less
hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude,
but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus
"magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to
great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as
confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the
other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind
be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason
of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions
"patience," which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged
endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or
profit." The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships
man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Heb.
12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." In
this respect he mentions "perseverance," which accordingly he
describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered
purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of
fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be
referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds
a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty
which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly
by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is
accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Question 17,
Article 5; FS, Question 62, Article 3). But by confidence
which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet
under God withal.
Reply to Objection 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve
danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore
although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment
of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain
connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
Reply to Objection 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death,
with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also
any other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a
virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it
is an integral part thereof.
Reply to Objection 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a
good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it
is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the
Article.
Reply to Objection 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid
mentioned by Tully, namely "confidence, magnificence,
forbearance," which he puts in the place of patience, and
"firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds
three, two of which, namely "magnanimity" and "security," are
comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is
more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's
hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite
stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to
magnanimity. For it has been stated above (FS, Question 40,
Article 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped
for.
A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of
hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped
for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for
sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but
hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is
somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, (FS, Question 40,
Article 4, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes
fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised
under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs
to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence
consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing
them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to
perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not
desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on
account of any other obstacles.
Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as
the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance"
and "magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity."
"Strength of will" is the same as patience or forbearance, for he
says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt
what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be
endured"---i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance,
for he defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its
purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he
says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of
virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions andragathia, i.e. manly
goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence
consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great
deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain
manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs
to andragathia, strenuousness: wherefore he says that andragathia is
the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.
Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the
four principal parts mentioned by Tully.
Reply to Objection 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short
of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of
fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above (Question
123, Article 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts
but modes of fortitude.
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