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Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to
another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of
the resurrection "each one's body will not hide his mind from his
fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from
another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the
mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to
another.
Objection 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one
speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But
exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or
gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and
this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to
another.
Objection 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to
what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to
listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore
one angel does not speak to another.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I
speak with the tongues of men and of angels."
I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory
says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the
properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and
unknown methods of interior speech."
To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that,
as we explained above (Question 82, Article 4), when treating
of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to
its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect
in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); secondly, as actually considered or
conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear
that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage
by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these
words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the
intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the
will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something
else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to
being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the
actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to
himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word."
And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be
made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of
one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to
another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental
concept to another.
Reply to Objection 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold
obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental
concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone
can see the mind of another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What
man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in
him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from
another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that
even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself
known, it is not at once make known to another; but some sensible sign
must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral.
ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the
wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out
as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are." But
an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept
known to another at once.
Reply to Objection 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a
necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does
not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this
includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its
being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an
angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests
his mental concept.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the
good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for
as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to
himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each
other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say
that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is
affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by
the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to
attention by some intelligible power.
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