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Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the
episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said
(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election
loosens a monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic
profession, and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop." Now
the regular observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore
religious who are appointed bishops are not bound to religious
observances.
Objection 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher
degree is seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower
degree: thus it was stated above (Question 88, Article 12, ad
1) that a religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the
world. But a religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to
something greater, as stated above (Question 84, Article 7).
Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound to those things
whereto he was bound in the state of religion.
Objection 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to
obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious
who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their
order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to
poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (Objection 1)
"when the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the
right, as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance."
Moreover they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less
therefore are they bound to other regular observances.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i,
can. De Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence
in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay
aside their former purpose."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, ad 2) the religious
state pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while
the episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of
perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal
state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to
perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of
perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with
perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with
perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has
become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it
becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we
must assert that if there be among religious observances any that
instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard
of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a
religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to
observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which
is a sign of this obligation.
On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious
observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for
instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or
watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the
episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them,
according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life
of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors
dispense themselves in such matters.
Reply to Objection 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is
loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything,
but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of those who are living in the world
are compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the
universal, as stated above (Question 88, Article 12, ad 1).
But the vows of religion are compared to the episcopal dignity as
disposition to perfection. Now the particular is superfluous when one
has the universal, whereas the disposition is still necessary when
perfection has been attained.
Reply to Objection 3: It is accidental that religious who are
bishops are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because,
to wit, they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same
religious superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains
virtually, so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they
would be bound to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both
the statutes of their rule in the way mentioned above, and their
superiors if they have any.
As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal
inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is
added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been
ordained bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed
according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.
Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the
sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his
death, after which a testament comes into force according to the
Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's
permission he make a will, he is not to be understood to bequeath
property of his own, but we are to understand that by apostolic
authority the power of his administration has been prolonged so as to
remain in force after his death.
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