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Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love.
For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are
sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since
"to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says
(Questions 83, qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them,
and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of
love.
Objection 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving
something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than
they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but
cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of
love.
Objection 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there
would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things
there is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there
is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause
of love.
On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that
"none can love what he does not know."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), good is the cause of
love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the
appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some
apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the
Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily sight is the
beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of
spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love.
Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good
is, which can be loved only if known.
Reply to Objection 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely
without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some
respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or
from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
1,2). But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it
perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Something is required for the perfection of
knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For
knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish
things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a
fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another.
Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know
distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and
properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power,
which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for
the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known
in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than
it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being
perfectly known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences,
which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for
instance, they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to
persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same
applies to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Even natural love, which is in all things,
is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things
themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above
(Question 26, Article 1; cf. FP, Question 6, Article
1, ad 2).
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