|
Objection 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to
anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to
God. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to
God, Who judges "with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18).
Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.
Objection 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether
useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as
Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9,
seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv), "man's evil is to be without reason." Now the judgment of
reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away.
Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [Hom. xi in Matth. in Opus
Imperfectum] says: "He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to
be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it
fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good
to do wrong."
I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as
a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger
is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in
Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but
judgment. For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of
passion": and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer
from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In
another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite,
which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This
movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will,
since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher
appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in
the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the
movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack
of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in
the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he
ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to
God's punishing by judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other
movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to
the more prompt execution [FS, Question 24, Article 3] of
reason's dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no
purpose, whereas "nature does nothing without purpose" [Aristotle,
De Coelo i, 4].
Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment
of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but
also of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above.
Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is
removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is
lacking.
|
|