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Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we
have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as
stated above (Article 1). But choice is about all things that we
do. Therefore counsel is too.
Objection 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry.
But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in
virtue of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about
everything that we do.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3)
that "if it appears that something can be done by more means than one,
we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and
best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done
by this." But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several.
Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxxiv.] says that "counsel has no place in things that are done
according to science or art."
I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
(Article 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of
doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument,
"is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt"
[Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation
to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source.
First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain
determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain
fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form
his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact
that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs
in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the
end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings.
Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel,
although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way
of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of
those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and
the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxiv.].
Reply to Objection 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its
judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is
evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters that are evident, the reason
makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need
of counsel in all that is done by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one
means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be
accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when
not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed,
then there is no need of counsel.
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