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Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what
has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for
salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been
taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not
seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
another.
Objection 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for
salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is
impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one
has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it
is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
another.
Objection 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now
sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted.
Therefore that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to
him: so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has
taken.
Objection 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good
thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to
lack little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the
Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man
from obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to
restore the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible.
Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has
taken.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii):
"Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not
forgiven."
I answer that, Restitution as stated above (Article 1) is an act
of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality.
Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken;
since it is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If,
however, it be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so
there will be no need for restitution, for justice consists in
equality. Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for
salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore
what has been taken unjustly.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is impossible to repay the
equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor
due to God and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii, 14). Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be
restored in equivalent, compensation should be made as far as
possible: for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he
must make compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of
either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good
man.
Reply to Objection 2: There are three ways in which one may take
away another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this
justly, as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the
right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution.
Secondly, by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound
to restore that man's good name, by confessing that he told an
untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a
man reveals another's sin contrarily to the right order of so doing,
and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet
without telling an untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill,
or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good
name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases,
as stated above (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: The action of the man who has defamed another
cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to
undo its effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal
dignity in the opinion of other men.
Reply to Objection 4: There are several ways of preventing a man
from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having
in view the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its
being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no
obligation whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly,
unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders,
through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the
benefice has been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being
conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on
him, one is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of
the circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a
prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man
had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many ways
from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already
been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue cause
procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man
of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to
compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.
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