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Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For
true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
"truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which
is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as
contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
Objection 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other.
But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq.
ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were
not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
Objection 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for
"nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an
idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying"
(Jer. 8:5), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says.
Therefore false and true are not contraries.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a
false opinion is contrary to a true one.
I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not,
as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it
must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines
any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for
instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing,
whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a
subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is
not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries,
however, both assert something and determine the subject, for
blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a
thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27),
inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not,
or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate
apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is
clear that true and false are contraries.
Reply to Objection 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing;
but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth
primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as
apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies
contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii),
the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not
good."
Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is
contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is
contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens
in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with
being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a
being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in
some truth.
Reply to Objection 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of
privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there
is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with
respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can
be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist,
for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So
idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the
false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the
divine unity.
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