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Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but
in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl.
xv): "Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help
and those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the
appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.
Objection 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it
belongs to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the
appetitive faculty, as stated above (FS, Question 13, Article
1). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive
faculty.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5)
that "in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily,
whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse."
Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the
appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence
is in the appetitive rather than in the rational faculty.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu.
61): "Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to
avoid."
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is
one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he
foresees the event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the
appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that
prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive
faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach
and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the
future from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to
prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a
process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly
speaking, is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (FP, Question 82,
Article 4) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the
first act of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above (FS,
Question 25, Articles 1,2). Accordingly prudence is said to
be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the
act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that "prudence
is love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in
tending to God." Now love is said to discern because it moves the
reason to discern.
Reply to Objection 2: The prudent man considers things afar off,
in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to
be done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which
prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to
the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is
counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two,
counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man "takes good
counsel." But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is "the
desire for what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it
follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so
far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought
merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the
practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most
contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in
everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst
of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5)
that prudence is "something more than a merely rational habit," such
as art is, since, as stated above (FS, Question 57, Article
4) it includes application to action, which application is an act of
the will.
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