|
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the
theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while
hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is
compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now
intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident
above (Question 62, Article 3). Therefore faith is greater
than hope and charity.
Objection 2: Further, when two things are added together, the
result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something
added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says
(Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching
forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now
faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Mt. 1:3
says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith
and hope are greater than charity.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now
there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of
these is charity."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), the greatness of a
virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the
three theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it
cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of
its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches
nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater
than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a
certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen,
and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of
that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner,
in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with
the beloved; hence it is written (1 Jn. 4:16): "He that
abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him."
Reply to Objection 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in
the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons.
First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the
human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things
beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more
excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the
known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being
drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in
itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of
the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man.
Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements
pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the
appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the
theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive
movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to
Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all
knowledge."
Reply to Objection 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man
hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he
who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the
other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by
hope, as stated above (Question 62, Article 4).
Reply to Objection 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its
effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire
would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the
matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity:
in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.
|
|