|
Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign
type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there
are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to
its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type
existing in the Divine mind.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be
promulgated by word, as stated above (Question 90, Article 4).
But Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the FP,
Question 34, Article 1: whereas type refers to the Essence.
Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx):
"We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law
which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the
eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a
type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign
type.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that
"the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always
conform."
I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of
the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there
must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be
done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the type
of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of
the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts
of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other
conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Question 90).
Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation
to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as
stated in the FP, Question 14, Article 8. Moreover He
governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single
creature, as was also stated in the FP, Question 103, Article
5. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It
all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea;
so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end,
bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing
else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and
movements.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the
ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and
consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality,
according to their different relations to things, as stated in the
FP, Question 15, Article 2. But law is said to direct human
acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Question
90, Article 2). And things, which are in themselves different,
may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common
thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this
order.
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points
may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed
by the word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of
man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The
same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that
something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts
mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the
Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the
Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the
Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as
Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things
expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby.
Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God:
yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between
type and word.
Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not
stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human
intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that a
human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its
being consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false
according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect is
the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it
represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the FP, Question
16, Article 1. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in
itself; and its type is truth itself.
|
|