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Objection 1: It would seem that a marriage already contracted ought
to be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow. For the stronger tie
takes precedence of the weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than
marriage, since the latter binds man to man, but the former binds man
to God. Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence of the
marriage tie.
Objection 2: Further, God's commandment is no less binding than
the commandment of the Church. Now the commandment of the Church is
so binding that a marriage is void if contracted in despite thereof; as
instanced in the case of those who marry within the degrees of kindred
forbidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine
commandment to keep a vow, it would seem that if a person marry in
despite of a vow his marriage should be annulled for that reason.
Objection 3: Further, in marriage a man may have carnal intercourse
without sin. Yet he who has taken a simple vow of chastity can never
have carnal intercourse with his wife without sin. Therefore a simple
vow annuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows. It is clear
that it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow of
continence, since according to Jerome [St. Augustine, De Bono
Viduit, ix] "for those who vow virginity it is damnable not only to
marry, but even to wish to marry." Now the marriage contract is not
contrary to the vow of continence, except by reason of carnal
intercourse: and therefore he sins mortally the first time he has
intercourse with his wife, and for the same reason every other time,
because a sin committed in the first instance cannot be an excuse for a
subsequent sin.
Objection 4: Further, husband and wife should be equal in
marriage, especially as regards carnal intercourse. But he who has
taken a simple vow of continence can never ask for the debt without a
sin, for this is clearly against his vow of continence, since he is
bound to continence by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt
without sin.
On the contrary, Pope Clement [Alexander III] says (cap.
Consuluit, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a "simple vow is an
impediment to the contract of marriage, but does not annul it after it
is contracted."
I answer that, A thing ceases to be in one man's power from the fact
that it passes into the power of another. Now the promise of a thing
does not transfer it into the power of the person to whom it is
promised, wherefore a thing does not cease to be in a person's power
for the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple vow
contains merely a simple promise of one's body to the effect of keeping
continence for God's sake, a man still retains power over his own
body after a simple vow, and consequently can surrender it to another,
namely his wife; and in this surrender consists the sacrament of
matrimony, which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is
an impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since it is a sin to
marry after taking a simple vow of continence, yet since the contract
is valid, the marriage cannot be annulled on that account.
Reply to Objection 1: A vow is a stronger tie than matrimony, as
regards that to which man is tied, and the obligation under which he
lies. because by marriage a man is tied to his wife, with the
obligation of paying the debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God,
with the obligation of remaining continent. But as to the manner in
which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple vow, since by
marriage a man surrenders himself actually to the power of his wife,
but not by a simple vow as explained above: and the possessor is always
in the stronger position. In this respect a simple vow binds in the
same way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled on
account of a simple vow.
Reply to Objection 2: The contracting of a marriage between blood
relations is annulled by the commandment forbidding such marriages, not
precisely because it is a commandment of God or of the Church, but
because it makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be
transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the commandment
forbidding marriage after a simple vow has not this effect, as already
stated. Hence the argument is void for it assigns as a cause that
which is not cause.
Reply to Objection 3: If after taking a simple vow a man contract
marriage by words of the present, he cannot know his wife without
mortal sin, because until the marriage is consummated he is still in a
position to fulfill the vow of continence. But after the marriage has
been consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful for him
not to pay the debt when his wife asks: wherefore this is not covered
by his obligation to his vow, as explained above (ad 1).
Nevertheless he should atone for not keeping continence, by his tears
of repentance.
Reply to Objection 4: After contracting marriage he is still bound
to keep his vow of continence in those matters wherein he is not
rendered unable to do so. Hence if his wife die he is bound to
continence altogether. And since the marriage tie does not bind him to
ask for the debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can
pay the debt without sin on being asked, when once he has incurred this
obligation through the carnal intercourse that has already occurred.
And this holds whether the wife ask expressly or interpretively, as
when she is ashamed and her husband feels that she desires him to pay
the debt, for then he may pay it without sin. This is especially the
case if he fears to endanger her chastity: nor does it matter that they
are equal in the marriage act, since everyone may renounce what is his
own. Some say, however, that he may both ask and pay lest the
marriage become too burdensome to the wife who has always to ask; but
if this be looked into aright, it is the same as asking
interpretively.
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