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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly
united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form.
But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not
properly united to a corruptible body.
Objection 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly
immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal
matter does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has
it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle
body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to
a terrestrial body.
Objection 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the
species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the
intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to
a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species.
Objection 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form
should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most
perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are
naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of
clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally
provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the
intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is
imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that
"the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life
potentially."
I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the
matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the
matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual
soul, as we have seen above (Question 55, Article 2) in the
order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances;
inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as
the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by
way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But
nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul
had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also
with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not
performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the
intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ
of sense.
Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the
organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot
and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has
the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries,
and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is
reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the
touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its
completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists
more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united
should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable
complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of
touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the
best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are
refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in De Anima
ii, 9.
Reply to Objection 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this
by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This
answer does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was
immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its
immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the
immortality of the devil.
Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two
conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the
matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the
first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the
saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that
the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of
the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable
complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter.
If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that
in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might
do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by
applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace.
Reply to Objection 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual
soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on
account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable
temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such
a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which
fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability
of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity
of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby
resembling in a way a heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the
eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the
species; but the whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we
cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of
various dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul,
which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its
perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various
operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to
which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater
variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a
greater variety than in plants.
Reply to Objection 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending
universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot
be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to
certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case
with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and
power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man
has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of
organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for
himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of
purposes.
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