|
Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for
the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all
particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are
the subject of decrees," which are also individual matters, since
decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed
not only for the community, but also for the individual.
Objection 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated
above (Question 90, Articles 1,2). But human acts are about
individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for
the community, but rather for the individual.
Objection 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as
stated above (Question 90, Articles 1,2). But a measure
should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in
human acts no general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in
some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in
general but for individual cases.
On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i,
tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made
to suit the majority of instances; and they are not framed according to
what may possibly happen in an individual case."
I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that
end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any
private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence
human laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common
good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take account of many
things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the
community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is
procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a
short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one
another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides
the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some
things are laid down simply in a general way: and these are the general
laws. Of these he says that "the legal is that which originally was a
matter of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer":
as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the
community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are
called "privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, because
they regard private persons, although their power extends to many
matters; and in regard to these, he adds, "and further, all
particular acts of legislation." Other matters are legal, not
through being laws, but through being applications of general laws to
particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and in
regard to these, he adds "all matters subject to decrees."
Reply to Objection 2: A principle of direction should be applicable
to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says
that all things belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is
the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or
measures as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be
of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many things.
Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one
single act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the
decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual
actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above (Question
92, Article 2, Objection 2).
Reply to Objection 3: "We must not seek the same degree of
certainty in all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in
contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for
a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of
instances, though at times and less frequently it fail.
|
|