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Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible
appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are
parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore
it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do
not obey reason.
Objection 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist
it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason:
according to the Apostle (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in
my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the
irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.
Objection 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the
rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the
sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear
nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the
powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey
reason.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that
"the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is
divided into concupiscence and anger."
I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers
obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the
will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the
reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive
appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a
sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the
estimative power, as we have said above (Question 78, Article
4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some
'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions.
Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this
particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided
and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic
matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.
Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive
appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this
appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from
universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of
the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said
to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can
experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.
To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which
is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement
follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for
instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has
no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved
at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but
he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite.
For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the
second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite
is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite
consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the
higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, the
irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in
what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and
concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the
part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have
said.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i,
2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle:
for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect
dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is
called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right
to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since
they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and
royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to
the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own,
by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And
so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the
members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but
at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is
naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the
intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a
politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its
own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the
sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power
in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the
universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense.
Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible
powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something
pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason
commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible
resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not
obey.
Reply to Objection 3: The exterior senses require for action
exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence
of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both
appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things.
Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not
only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can
also form the phantasms of the imagination.
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