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Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for
happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is
the entire reward of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is
happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9).
Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of
all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But
that which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then
the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above
(Question 3, Article 8); it seems that delight is not necessary
for happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should
be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the
operation of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for
happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that
happiness is "joy in truth."
I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is
necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is
necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly,
as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary
for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it
is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained.
Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the
Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to
anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this
consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very
notion of reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight.
Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation
of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as
stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with
greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is
extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by
distracting the attention because, as already observed, we are more
attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very
attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another:
sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is
contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it
hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
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