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Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably
distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in
God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it
is one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are
three acts of faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith
should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to
believe God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded
on the First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish
it from certain other acts of faith.
Objection 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers,
cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to
believe in a God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of
faith.
Objection 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the
will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an
act, not of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe
in God," which implies movement towards an end, should not be
reckoned as a species of that act.
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this
distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in
Joan.).
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation
of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(Article 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either
on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the
intellect.
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Question 1,
Article 1). One of these is the material object of faith, and in
this way an act of faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as
stated above (Question 1, Article 1) nothing is proposed to our
belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the
formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which
we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith
is "to believe God," since, as stated above (Question 1,
Article 1) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to
Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever
he believes.
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in
God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having
the aspect of an end.
Reply to Objection 1: These three do not denote different acts of
faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the
object of faith.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a
God" as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they
do not believe that God exists under the conditions that faith
determines; hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since,
as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know
simple things defectively is not to know them at all."
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (FS, Question 9,
Article 1) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the
soul to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is "to believe in
God."
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