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Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain
persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred
from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to
defend a man's suit, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore no
man should be debarred from this office.
Objection 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the
same effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about
sin are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some
should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of
religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account
of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics.
Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself.
Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause.
Therefore it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from
pleading the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their
own cause.
On the contrary, According to Decretals III, qu. vii, can.
Infames, many persons are debarred from the office of advocate.
I answer that, In two ways a person is debarred from performing a
certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because
it is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act is
impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an
act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do
away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from the
office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack of
sense---either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors---or
exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs
to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the justice
of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he may
speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are
defective in these points, are altogether debarred from being advocates
either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness of
exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a man
being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that monks
or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that clerics
should plead in a secular court, because such persons are engaged in
Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal defect, either
of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of
justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill becomes one who
has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the justice of another.
Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill repute, unbelievers,
and those who have been convicted of grievous crimes should be
advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by
necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead either their own
cause or that of persons closely connected with them. Moreover,
clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own church, and monks in
the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by
unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of
mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons:
thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much"
and "too little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and
"less." For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are
debarred from pleading in causes, because they are above such an
office; and others because they are less than competent to exercise
it, such as persons of ill-repute and unbelievers.
Reply to Objection 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of
others is not so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own
cause, because others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the
comparison fails.
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