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Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any
act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of
the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.
Objection 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the
will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish.
But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to
voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act
of the will ceases.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as
stated above (Articles 1,2). But knowledge involves an act.
Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.
On the contrary, The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which
we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to
act, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will
are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one
thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which
sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for
instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense
something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the
sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased
to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from
want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then
when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable
to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the
sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be
due to his absence from the helm.
Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes
ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and
not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And
thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes
without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one
wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when
one does not will to act.
Reply to Objection 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to
that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but
also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
Reply to Objection 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses.
First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of
"I-do-not-wish." Consequently just as when I say "I do not
wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not to read"; so "not to
wish to read" is the same as "to wish not to read," and in this
sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness. Secondly it is taken as
a sentence: and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this
sense "not to wish" does not imply involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in
the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it
be in one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just
as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act,
is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
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