|
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not
suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another.
Because men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what
belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law:
since it is written (Dt. 23:24): "Going into thy neighbor's
vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest."
Therefore the Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man's
peace.
Objection 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of
states has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher
says (Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law;
for it is written (Num. 27:8): "When a man dieth without a
son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law
made unsuitable provision for the welfare of the people.
Objection 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of
human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying
and selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the
force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the
jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev.
25:28). Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an
unfitting command.
Objection 4: Further, man's needs require that men should be ready
to lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the
pledges: hence it is written (Ecclus. 29:10): "Many have
refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be
defrauded without cause." And yet this was encouraged by the Law.
First, because it prescribed (Dt. 15:2): "He to whom any
thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot demand it
again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord"; and (Ex.
22:15) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the
owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution.
Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost:
for it is written (Dt. 24:10): "When thou shalt demand of
thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his
house to take away a pledge"; and again (Dt. 24:12,13):
"The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt
restore it to him presently." Therefore the Law made insufficient
provision in the matter of loans.
Objection 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited
with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be
observed in such matters: hence it is stated in 2 Mach 3:15 that
"the priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law
concerning things given to be kept, that He would preserve them safe,
for them that had deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law
observed little caution in regard to deposits: since it is prescribed
(Ex. 22:10,11) that when goods deposited are lost, the
owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law
made unsuitable provision in this matter.
Objection 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire,
so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant
to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an
unnecessarily hard prescription (Lev. 19:13) that "the wages
of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until
morning."
Objection 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a
judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore
unfitting that the Law (Dt. 17:8,9) should command them to go
to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters.
Objection 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three
or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably
stated (Dt. 19:15) that "in the mouth of two or three
witnesses every word shall stand."
Objection 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the
gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written (Dt.
25:2): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure
also of the stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments for
certain faults: for it is written (Ex. 22:1) that the thief
"shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep."
Moreover, certain slight offenses are severely punished: thus
(Num. 15:32, seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on
the sabbath day: and (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is
commanded to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions,
viz. because "he gave himself to revelling . . . and
banquetings." Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an
unreasonable manner.
Objection 1:: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi,
11), "Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of
punishment, indemnity, prison, stripes, retaliation, public
disgrace, exile, death, slavery." Now some of these were
prescribed by the Law. "Indemnity," as when a thief was condemned
to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when
(Num. 15:34) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned.
"Stripes"; thus (Dt. 25:2), "if they see that the offender
be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to
be beaten before them." "Public disgrace" was brought on to him who
refused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she
took "off his shoe from his foot, and" did "spit in his face"
(Dt. 25:9). It prescribed the "death" penalty, as is clear
from (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother,
dying let him die." The Law also recognized the "lex talionis,"
by prescribing (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for
tooth." Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have
inflicted the two other punishments, viz. "exile" and "slavery."
Objection 1:: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault.
But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is
unreasonable in punishing them (Ex. 21:29): "If the ox . .
. shall kill a man or a woman," it "shall be stoned": and (Lev.
20:16): "The woman that shall lie under any beast, shall be
killed together with the same." Therefore it seems that matters
pertaining to the relations of one man with another were unsuitably
regulated by the Law.
Objection 1:: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a
murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is
reckoned of much less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder
cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal.
Therefore it is unfittingly prescribed (Dt. 21:1,4) that
"when there shall be found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it
is not known who is guilty of the murder . . . the ancients" of the
nearest city "shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in
the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and they shall bring her into a
rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there
they shall strike off the head of the heifer."
On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps.
147:20) that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation;
and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21),
quoting Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent
to the law and by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the
essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered
by just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold:
some are effected under the guidance of those in authority: others are
effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever is
subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according to
his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between one man and
another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of
those in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand, the
power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess: and
consequently their dealings with one another, as regards such things,
depend on their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving,
and so forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of
these relations between one man and another. For it established
judges, as is clearly indicated in Dt. 16:18: "Thou shalt
appoint judges and magistrates in all its gates . . . that they may
judge the people with just judgment." It is also directed the manner
of pronouncing just judgments, according to Dt. 1:16,17:
"Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country or a
stranger: there shall be no difference of persons." It also removed
an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges to
accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Dt. 16:19). It prescribed the
number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it appointed certain
punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state farther on (ad
10).
But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the
Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be
distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly
granted to others by the will of the possessors. These three points
were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the
possessions themselves were divided among individuals: for it is
written (Num. 33:53,54): "I have given you" the land
"for a possession: and you shall divide it among you by lot." And
since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the
matter of possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii,
6); therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the
regularity of possessions. The first was that they should be divided
equally, wherefore it is written (Num. 33:54): "To the more
you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second
remedy was that possessions could not be alienated for ever, but after
a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to
avoid confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed
at the removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be
succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place, the son;
secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the
father's brother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in
order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that
heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num.
36:6.
Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of
things should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care
of them; for it was prescribed (Dt. 22:1-4): "Thou shalt
not pass by, if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray;
but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother," and in like manner as
to other things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were
allowed on entering a friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not
to take any away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was
prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and
fruit, should be left behind for them (Lev. 19:9; Dt.
24:19). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was common
property, as stated in Ex. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4.
Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner.
There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Dt.
14:28,29): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe
. . . and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the
fatherless, and the widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be
filled." And there was a transfer for a consideration, for
instance, by selling and buying, by letting out and hiring, by loan
and also by deposit, concerning all of which we find that the Law made
ample provision. Consequently it is clear that the Old Law provided
sufficiently concerning the mutual relations of one man with another.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rm. 13:8),
"he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to
wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning our
neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men should love one another.
Now it is an effect of love that men give their own goods to others:
because, as stated in 1 Jn. 3:17: "He that . . . shall see
his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth
the charity of God abide in him?" Hence the purpose of the Law was
to accustom men to give of their own to others readily: thus the
Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich "to give easily and
to communicate to others." Now a man does not give easily to others
if he will not suffer another man to take some little thing from him
without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it
should be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to
eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should
lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a disturbance of
the peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does
not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather strengthens friendship and
accustoms men to give things to one another.
Reply to Objection 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should
succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue:
failing which it was necessary that succession should be granted to the
female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to
think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law
observed due caution in the matter, by providing that those women who
succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within their own
tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in
Num. 36:7,8.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii,
4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation
of a state or nation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was
forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone
should sell his possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For
if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to
come into the hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a
state or country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law,
in order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that while
provision was made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of
possessions to avail for a certain period, at the same time the said
danger was removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions
after that period had elapsed. The reason for this law was to prevent
confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite
distinction among the tribes.
But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates,
therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable
goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas
there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be
exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On
the other hand, houses situated not in a town, but "in a village that
hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses
are built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of
possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription in
regard to both (Lev. 25).
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of
the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come
to one another's assistance: because this is a very great incentive to
friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in
the matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of
mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more frequent
and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this
purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be
ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined to do so as
the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in Dt. 15:7, seqq.
Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant
a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life
in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they
should be restored at once. For it is written (Dt. 23:19):
"Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and (Dt.
24:6): "Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone
to pledge; for he hath pledged his life to thee": and (Ex.
22:26): "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge,
thou shalt give it him again before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding
them to be importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written
(Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of my people that is
poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an
extortioner." For this reason, too, it is enacted (Dt.
24:10,11): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything
that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a
pledge, but thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee
what he hath": both because a man's house is his surest refuge,
wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and
because the Law does not allow the creditor to take away whatever he
likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs
least. Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts should cease together
after the lapse of seven years. For it was probable that those who
could conveniently pay their debts, would do so before the seventh
year, and would not defraud the lender without cause. But if they
were altogether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting the
debt from love for them, as there was for renewing the loan on account
of their need.
As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through
the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or
deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if
they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper
care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they
were hired for a consideration: because they might have died or
deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the
lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the
lender would have gained something by the loan which would no longer
have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when
animals were hired for a consideration: because then the owner received
a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right
to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless the
person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of
animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he should
receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the
hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated.
Reply to Objection 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit
is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the
person to whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the
benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter
obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit.
Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably:
i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held
in deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic
cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a
beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the
owner what was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other
cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only
to take an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly, the
goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance
by theft: and then the depositary was bound to restitution on account
of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an
animal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when
it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for less
negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of
theft.
Reply to Objection 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are
poor men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law
commanded wisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should
lack food. But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to
be rich: nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a
livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed
among men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of
justice. Now a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among
simple-minded people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it
was prescribed (Dt. 16:18) that "judges and magistrates"
should be appointed in each tribe, "to judge the people with just
judgment." Secondly, a matter may be doubtful even among experts:
and therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law
prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen by
God, where there would be both the high-priest, who would decide
doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine worship; and the
chief judge of the people, who would decide matters relating to the
judgments of men: just as even now cases are taken from a lower to a
higher court either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written
(Dt. 17:8,9): "If thou perceive that there be among you a
hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and thou see that the
words of the judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to the
place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come to
the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at
that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often occur for
judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this account.
Reply to Objection 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no
such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be
content with a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an
orator employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite
possible for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is
neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore
their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver
in giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that
witnesses might not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded
that they should be most carefully examined, and that those who were
found untruthful should be severely punished, as stated in Dt.
19:16, seqq.
There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number,
in token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are
sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the
other two Persons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on
Jn. 8:17: "In your law it is written that the testimony of two
men is true."
Reply to Objection 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on
account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons.
First, on account of the greatness of the sin, because a greater
sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment.
Secondly, on account of a habitual sin, since men are not easily
cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on
account of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men
are not easily deterred from such sins unless they be severely
punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of committing a sin
and of concealing it: for such like sins, when discovered, should be
more severely punished in order to deter others from committing them.
Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be
observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin
is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether
involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is
written (Dt. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence
in a field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was
no man to help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and
yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion,
the sin is diminished: and the punishment, according to true
judgment, should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal
requires that the sin be severely punished in order to deter others from
committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a
man sins through ignorance: and then he was held to be guilty to a
certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge:
yet he was not punished by the judges but expiated his sin by
sacrifices. Hence it is written (Lev. 4:2): "The soul that
sinneth through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as
applying to ignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine
precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree was when a
man sinned from pride, i.e. through deliberate choice or malice: and
then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin [Dt.
25:2]. The fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness
or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a
destroyer of the commandment of the Law [Num. 15:30,31].
Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft,
the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently
(Ex. 22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things
which can easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only
twice their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a
thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened more
frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law
inflicted a heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored for
the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to
safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in
flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted in
their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. And
this I say, unless perchance the animal itself were discovered in the
thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only twice
the number, as in the case of other thefts: for there was reason to
presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it
alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow is
useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for
food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": and
therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep was
useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for
its wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank:
but on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always
punished by death, as stated above. As to the man who gathered sticks
on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which
commanded the sabbath to be observed, to testify the belief in the
newness of the world, as stated above (Question 100, Article
5): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever.
Reply to Objection 1:: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty
for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed
against God, and for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards
one's parents, adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other
things it inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of
blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and
likewise for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less
degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.
The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases.
First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of
the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the
seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a
slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not
wherewith to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.
The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law:
because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other
nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from
that people absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into
idolatry. For this reason it is related (1 Kgs. 26:19) that
David said to Saul: "They are cursed in the sight of the Lord,
who have case me out this day, that I should not dwell in the
inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods." There
was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written in Dt.
19:4 [Num. 35:25] that "he that striketh his neighbor
ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall
flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there until the death
of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him to return
home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot
their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not
so eager to kill the slayer.
Reply to Objection 1:: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not
on account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their
owners, who had not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses.
Hence the owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone
"yesterday or the day before" (in which case steps might have been
taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in
detestation of the sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight
thereof.
Reply to Objection 1:: The literal reason for this commandment,
as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the
slayer was frequently from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of
the calf was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was
brought about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city
swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads.
Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of
his beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was
not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, remained
uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the
men of the city would readily make known the murderer, if they knew who
he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would
escape about the matter. Or again, this was done in order to frighten
people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer,
which is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it has
been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder,
however useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and
that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off of its
head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off
from the fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that the
heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated
place.
Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of
Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor
did it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt.
The fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified
the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and
the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer.
|
|