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Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being."
For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which
penetrates all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it
is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
"one" adds something to "being."
Objection 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an
addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many."
Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."
Objection 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being,"
"one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be
nugatory to call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would
be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore
"one" is an addition to "being."
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.):
"Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false
if "one" were an addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it.
Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being."
I answer that, "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is
only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being."
This is the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now
every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is
undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound,
has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and
compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists
in undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it
guards its being.
Reply to Objection 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible
with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of
number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato,
seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any
reality to "being," but signified the substance of "being" as
undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the
principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they
thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna,
however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the
principle of number, added a reality to the substance of "being"
(otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of
quantity), thought that the "one" convertible with "being" added a
reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This,
however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its
substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its
substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again
"one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence
we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the
"one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to
being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add
a reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.
Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in
one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is
divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a
thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if
it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what
belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is
outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many
accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided
potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in
parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many"
accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally,
and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided
in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and
"one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in
species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided
by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by
"many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained
under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one."
Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that "there is no
kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their
parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are
one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and
what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in
processions, are one in principle."
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say
"being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
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