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Objection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to
reason. For the Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another
law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the
members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ.
Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.
Objection 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but
power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason.
In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits
of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above
(Question 57). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then
law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while
we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.
Objection 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to
act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is
evident from what has been said above (Question 9, Article 1).
Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will;
according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const.
Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of
law."
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid.
But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above (Question
17, Article 1). Therefore law is something pertaining to
reason.
I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is
induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is
derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now
the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first
principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above
(Question 1, Article 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason
to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of
action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which
is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus:
for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in
the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something
pertaining to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it
may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and
rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this
way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is
measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are
inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination
arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by
participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to
concupiscence is called "the law of the members."
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in external action, we may
consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building
and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act
itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something
produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is
first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the
syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use
of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above
(Question 13, Article 3; Question 76, Article 1) and
since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find
in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard
to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition
holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal propositions of
the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of
law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual
consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means
of a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason has its power of moving from the
will, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1): for it is due
to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands
as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition
of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in
accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood
the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law;
otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than
of law.
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