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Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills,
one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and
first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and
commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was
moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was
only one will, viz. the Divine.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will
but by the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the
instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not
moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which
belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to
nature: for natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary
is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.
Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
14) that "to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but
to our intellect," i.e. our personal intellect. But every will is
this or that will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at
the same time in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs
to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person.
Therefore in Christ there is only one will.
On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): "Father, if
Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but
Thine be done." And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian
(De Fide ii, 7) says: "As He assumed my will, He assumed my
sorrow;" and on Lk. 22:42 he says: "His will, He refers to
the Man---the Father's, to the Godhead. For the will of man is
temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal."
I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem
to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did
not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word
was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence
since "the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human
will; and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches
and all who held one composite nature in Christ were forced to place
one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of
God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in
Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of
Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their
followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although they held
that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because
they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its own
motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is plain
from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho [Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4].
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [Act. 18]
it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in
Christ, in the following passage: "In accordance with what the
Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us
Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us,
we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations." And
this much it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of
God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Question
5; Question 9, Article 1). Now the will pertains to the
perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as
the intellect, as was stated in the FP, Questions 79,80.
Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together
with human nature. Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of
God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature,
to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the FP, Question
19, Article 1. Hence it must be said that there are two wills in
Christ, i.e. one human, the other Divine.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ
was moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow
that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human
nature, for the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will,
"Who worketh" in them "both to will and to accomplish," as is
written Phil. 2:13. For although the will cannot be inwardly
moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was
said in the FP, Question 105, Article 4. And thus, too,
Christ by His human will followed the Divine will according to Ps.
39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have desired
it." Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where
the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou
willest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He
shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we
denied that man's will ought to be subject to God's will?"
Reply to Objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by
the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its
nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by
the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument
animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a
horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is
moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved
to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And
hence it was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the
instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will is natural, and
necessarily follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this
power---which is also called will---is sometimes natural and
necessary, e.g. with respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs
from free-will and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from
what has been stated in the FS, Question 10, Articles 1,2
[FP, Question 82, Article 2]. And yet even reason itself,
which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence besides
the Divine will it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not
merely as a natural power, or a natural movement, but even as a
rational movement.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we
signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards
the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to
the nature, "to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not
indeed considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence
the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being
in a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with
the bidding of the Divine will.
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