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Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of
precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now
almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24:
"Let my counsel be acceptable to the King; redeem thou thy sins with
alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep
what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore
it is lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a
matter of precept.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can
always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in
some other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be
needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it
seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the
precepts of the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to
almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what
is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mt. 25:41-43.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.
I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept,
whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a
matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not
only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his
well-doers, according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in
word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth." And in order to
be a person's well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his
needs: this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter
of precept.
Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that
all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is
necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right
reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into
consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on the
part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted
that he should give of his surplus, according to Lk. 11:41:
"That which remaineth, give alms." This surplus is to be taken in
reference not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to
the individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge
(in which case we have the expression "necessary to the person"
taking the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each
one must first of all look after himself and then after those over whom
he has charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of
others. Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it
requires for the upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the
residue for the formation of another by the power of generation.
On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in
need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it
is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are
not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not
be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed
him, thou hast slain him" [Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the
words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms
of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme:
otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of
counsel.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to
God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law
which he did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have
been speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a
matter of precept.
Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are
ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not
to us alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what
we have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [Hom. super
Luc. xii, 18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal
goods, "as coming from God, is He unjust because He apportions
them unequally? Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be
that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of
patience? It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked
man's cloak that you have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that
you have left to rot, the money of the needy that you have buried
underground: and so you injure as many as you might help." Ambrose
expresses himself in the same way.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we
omit to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his
need is evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous
goods, which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can
judge with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may
possibly occur in the future, for this would be to think about the
morrow, which Our Lord forbade us to do (Mt. 6:34), but he
should judge what is superfluous and what necessary, according as
things probably and generally occur.
Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced
to the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness is
profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and
of that which is to come," and he says this because the precept about
honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou mayest be
longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving.
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