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Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the
same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same
apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is
accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and
lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and
filial fear are substantially the same.
Objection 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects.
Now the same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since
they both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are
substantially the same.
Objection 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain
favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be
punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy
God, and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above
(Question 17, Article 2, ad 2). Therefore filial fear,
whereby we fear separation from God, is the same as servile fear
whereby we fear His punishments.
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix)
says that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste
fear.
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts
and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (FS,
Question 54, Article 2), it follows of necessity that different
kinds of fear correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above (Article 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial
fear are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as
regards the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a
God, but in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or
absence of charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the
other hand, servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and
hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard
God in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause
of the infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him,
not as the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it
shrinks to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of
object, viz. God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since
also natural movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not
only of the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever.
This cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
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