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Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons
are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the
Father, Son and Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but
one in harmony." But the substance of God is His essence.
Therefore the three persons are not of one essence.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what
can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the
Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this
should not be asserted.
Objection 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine
essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of
one nature.
Objection 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of
the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore
it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one
essence.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that
we do not say that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una
essentia]," lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the
essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply
transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to
say that the three persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."
Objection 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be
occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one
essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary
says (De Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and
the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or
one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior
substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not
be said that the three persons are of one substance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the
word homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the
Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence.
I answer that, As above explained (Question 13, Articles
1,2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really
are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way
that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses,
whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species
is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form,
and the individual is the "suppositum" of the form; so also in God
the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our
mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs
to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man
belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that
it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as
when we say: "That woman is of a handsome figure," or: "This man
is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as in God the persons are
multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence
of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided
that these genitives be understood as designating the form.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance is here taken for the
"hypostasis," and not for the essence.
Reply to Objection 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy
Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence,
nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for
instance, "I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30)," and
"I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)";
and there are many other texts of the same import.
Reply to Objection 3: Because "nature" designates the principle
of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be
said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things
which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one
essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better
described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than
by saying they are "of one nature."
Reply to Objection 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be
designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say
"the virtue of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is
not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish
to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are
required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the
determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter
is of great virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must
have the force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of
blood"---that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi
sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as
regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the
person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to
designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of
the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one essence."
Reply to Objection 5: The preposition "from" or "out of" does
not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude
of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases
distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For
nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a
thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So,
when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as
having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different
from person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from the
same essence."
Reply to Objection 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It
would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them,
just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand
homoousion, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . .
The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or
from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both
Father and Son."
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