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Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For
the Apostle says (Rm. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto
sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an
operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last
end, which is happiness, is not an operation.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that
happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good
things." But state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness
is not an operation.
Objection 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the
happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of
operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather
something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.
Objection 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now
operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.
Objection 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But
operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Objection 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one
uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for
instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation.
Therefore happiness is not an operation.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that
"happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created,
existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For
happiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in
so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is
evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the
Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because
that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who
knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other
things, too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel
ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an
operation.
Reply to Objection 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the
very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it
has been shown (Question 2, Article 5) that the being of a man,
no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of
God alone is it true that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly,
life means the operation of the living, by which operation the
principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active and
contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense
eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from Jn.
17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only
true God."
Reply to Objection 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered
happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common
good; and he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made
perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the
state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But
Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man
is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of
operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect
good" (Ethic. i, 7).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is
twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as
"to burn" and "to cut." And such an operation cannot be
happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of
the agent, but rather of the patient, as is stated in the same
passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to
feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection
and an act of the agent. And such an operation can be happiness.
Reply to Objection 4: Since happiness signifies some final
perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain
to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings
applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially;
since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other
than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in
respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated
Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But
in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection
is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this
operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one
only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for
this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be
attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's
happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is
imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men
happy, but only as men." But God has promised us perfect
happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven"
(Mt. 22:30).
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection
fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united
to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present
life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that
operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is
a participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the
operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active
life, which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the
contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the
contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged
in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and
since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself
otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it
were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5
and 6 are evident.
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