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Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory
punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written
(Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his
works." Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.
Objection 2: Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition
and confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for
another. Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.
Objection 3: Further, by praying for another one merits also for
oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he
satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man
satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.
Objection 4: Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as
he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from
his debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die
after the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another;
else, if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid
for the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and
by him who is punished in Purgatory.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one
another's burdens." Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden
of punishment laid upon another.
Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before
man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much more,
therefore, can this be done before the judgment seat of God.
I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz.
to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.
Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one
does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing,
through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a
man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin.
But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other
hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for
another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may
avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for
another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would
have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more
by his own punishment than by another's), because punishment derives
its power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it.
And since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another
than for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for
another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the
Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a
sin which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his
charity his brother was released from a sin which he had committed.
Nor is it necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should
be unable to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he
would be released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead.
But this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is
medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for
another, unless there be evidence of some defect in the penitent,
either bodily, so that he is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that
he is not ready to undergo it.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential reward is bestowed on a man
according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God
will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore
just as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man
does not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has
infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to
eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured
according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since
sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment.
Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from
punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity
whereby we are "all one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28).
Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is ordained against the guilt
which affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one
man is not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner
by confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can
one man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament
grace is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there
is no comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In the payment of the debt we consider the
measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is
charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at
least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for
another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the
punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by
satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release from
punishment, viz. eternal life.
Reply to Objection 4: If this man bound himself to undergo a
certain punishment, he would not be released from the debt before
paying it: wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as
the other makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both
are debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin
committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that
one sin is twice punished.
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