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Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not
fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural
inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the
virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue,
viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but
one theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than
the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among
the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since
it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the
moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a
passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological
virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to
God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the
intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore
there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the
intellect, the other, the will.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now
there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the theological
virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the
natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the
latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the
reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal
principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect,
and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in
practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which
tends naturally to good as defined by reason.
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness,
according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear
heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God
hath prepared for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of
both the above things man needed to receive in addition something
supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards
the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are
held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith,
about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end,
both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to
hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so
to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity.
For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural
end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the
thing with its end.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect requires intelligible species
whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in
addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it
to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the
end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power
is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be
directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was
need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection:
since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed.
Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall
short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are
above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in
proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of
God is stronger than men."
Reply to Objection 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz.
movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love.
Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human
appetite, namely, hope and charity.
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