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Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult
good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible
passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But
the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to
that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1,
ad 1; FP, Question 81, Article 2). Now "that which
removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4).
Therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions.
But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to
cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain."
Therefore the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute
good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the
difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the
restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the
irascible.
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity
than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we
find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something
belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible
passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which
belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a
thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous;
whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible
passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of
execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions
of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes
it, according to the Apostle (Rm. 12:12): "Rejoicing in
hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil,
viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because it
follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil
that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since the
movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the
movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to
pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he
rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible
faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz.
either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something
to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the
irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of
the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort,
and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous
good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain
lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it
is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal
object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the
arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that
which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty
is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible,
as the common precedes the proper.
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct
but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as
directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion
removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its
object. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede
those concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads
to the same conclusion.
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