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Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are
appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For
Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the
species in the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he
designates three names proper to the persons: the name of the
"Father," the name "Image" proper to the Son (Question 35,
Article 2), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift," which is proper
to the Holy Ghost (Question 38, Article 2). He also
designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity"
to the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" to the Holy
Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity"
imports duration of existence; "species," the principle of
existence; and 'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and
operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore
the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
5): "Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the
Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity." This does not,
however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal
denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is
not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained (Question 37,
Article 2, ad 1). But, as he subjoins, "All these three are
one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the
Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated
to the Persons.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is
attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost
"goodness." Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of
power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son,
according to the text, "Christ the strength of God" (1 Cor.
1:24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost,
according to the words, "strength came out from Him and healed all"
(Lk. 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the
Father.
Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10):
"What the Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him,"
is not to be taken in a confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii)
"'from Him' refers to the Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in
Him' to the Holy Ghost.'" This, however, seems to be
incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to imply the relation
of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this
relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the
principle from no principle."
Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son,
according to Jn. 14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the
Life"; and likewise "the book of life," according to Ps.
39:9, "In the beginning of the book it is written of Me,"
where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who is My
head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is.
65:1, "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The
Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am." These appear to
belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For "truth,"
according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme
similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems
that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the
"book of life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from
another"; for every book is written by someone. This also, "Who
is," appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to
Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have
said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy
Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He
Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to
you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false;
because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it
cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God
from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves
to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is
considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly,
its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The
fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects.
Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to
God.
According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider
God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary
applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the
Father, "species" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For
"eternity" as meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness
to the property of the Father, Who is "a principle without a
principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the
Son. For beauty includes three conditions, "integrity" or
"perfection," since those things which are impaired are by the very
fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and lastly,
"brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which
have a bright color.
The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son,
inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature
of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation
(De Trin. vi, 10): "Where---that is, in the
Son---there is supreme and primal life," etc.
The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the
express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to
be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is
indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10),
"Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc.
The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which
is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says
(De Trin. vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in
anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc.
"Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided
the "use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of
"to enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the
beck of the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the
Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the
Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin.
vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that felicity or
beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by
which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as
the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin.
vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of
the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His
immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is clear how "eternity,"
"species," and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the
persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there
is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the
Persons.
The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that
view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity"
to the Father, "equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to
the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in
different ways. For "unity" is said absolutely, as it does not
presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the
Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the
"principle without principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards
another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So
equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a
principle." "Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two.
And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says
(De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that "The Three are one, by reason
of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united
by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it is clear that we trace a thing
back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we
attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the
first trace of life. Now "unity" is perceived at once in the person
of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons
were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the
Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality
in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So,
all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the
principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal
to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His
equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the
Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son.
Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be
excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the
Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy
Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and
the Son are said to be united.
According to the third consideration, which brings before us the
adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be
a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and
"goodness." This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of
similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason
of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For "power"
has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly
Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an
earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age.
"Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a
word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is
sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the
nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems
repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent
impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the strong is
as a blast beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the
Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a
thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from
power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is
its strength.
According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His
effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by
Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes
implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in
God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause,
which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it
is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The
preposition "by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause;
thus we may say that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word
"by" is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son
properly and strictly, according to the text, "All things were made
by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as
"the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the
habitude of a form "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an
artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated
to the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition
"in" strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God
contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus
things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this
sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated to the Son.
In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His
goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end;
and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude of
the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the
Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the
divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed
from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but
They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to
the nature of a natural power.
Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth"
belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Question 16, Article
1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a
property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the
thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in
their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and not to the
persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted
from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The
"book of life" directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life.
For, as above explained (Question 24, Article 1), it is
God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life.
Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of
interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the
Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence
of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work
produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an
appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated
to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of
an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured
the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet,
forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may
sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would
be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son
is the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is
personal." But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And
although the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a
particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be
grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not
a person; as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So,
speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies
and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the
pronoun "this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God,
and I will glorify Him."
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