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Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward
actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to
other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let
your modesty be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about
outward actions.
Objection 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it
will not be concerned with inward passions.
Objection 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things
pertaining to the appetite---which is proper to the moral
virtues---and about things pertaining to knowledge---which is
proper to the intellectual virtues---and again about things
pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore,
if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all
of them.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint
is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less
difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about
modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special
difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of
modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to
all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special
difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the
moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from
modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters
that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is
the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated
by "humility." The second is the desire of things pertaining to
knowledge, and this is moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed
to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which
require to be done becomingly and honestly [Question 145, Article
1], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward
show, for instance in dress and the like.
To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed
certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [De Affectibus] mentions
"meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of
which we have spoken above (Question 143); while Aristotle
(Ethic. ii, 7) assigned eutrapelia to pleasures in games, as
stated above (FS, Question 60, Article 5). All these are
comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way
modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding
externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown
by certain outward signs.
Reply to Objection 2: Various virtues assigned by various
authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents
modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet
there is not so great a difference between the various parts of
modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and
temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions
that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on
the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each
kind of moderation.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
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