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Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about
games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord
said: 'Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I
consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided."
Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether.
Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us,
without us," as stated above (FS, Question 55, Article 4).
Now Chrysostom says [Hom. vi in Matth.]: "It is not God,
but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to
those who played: 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and they
rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no virtue about games.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6)
that "playful actions are not directed to something else." But it is
a requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his
action to something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii,
4). Therefore there can be no virtue about games.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray
thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to
relax the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this
relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds.
Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such
things at times. Moreover the Philosopher [Ethic. ii, 7; iv,
8] assigns to games the virtue of eutrapelia, which we may call
"pleasantness."
I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's
refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is
finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with
his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of
work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work,
he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul
works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective
soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible
goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above
sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there
results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the
operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the
speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be
occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised
higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of
the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case,
however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he
is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness
of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul
must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul's rest is
pleasure, as stated above (FS, Question 25, Article 2;
FS, Question 31, Article 1, ad 2). Consequently, the
remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of
some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus
in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of
Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized
on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have
told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the
latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it
indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the
bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that in
like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.
Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the
soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is
necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it
were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life
there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and
consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.
Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points
which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the
pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds
or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one
kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene."
Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's
mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We
should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all
that harmony which is the concord of good works": and Tully says
(De Offic. i, 29), that, "just as we do not allow children to
enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is
consistent with good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something
of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other
human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and
take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the
hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a
habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can
be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of
wittiness (eutrapelia), and a man is said to be pleasant through
having a happy turn of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a
cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from
immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, fun should fit with
business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i,
17) that "when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the
speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not
incompatible with the gravity of the subject." Now the sacred
doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to
Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I will speak of great things."
Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech,
but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: "Although
jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are
incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have
recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?"
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the
inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of
games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They
have accounted our life a pastime." Against these Tully says (De
Offic. i, 29): "We are so begotten by nature that we appear to
be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for
occupations of greater gravity and moment."
Reply to Objection 3: Playful actions themselves considered in
their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from
such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and
accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use
of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed
lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have
recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done
our duty by grave and serious matters."
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