|
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the
most disgraceful of sins.
Objection 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are
seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now
sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things
connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen
to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most
disgraceful.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6)
temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now
certain desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is
not the most disgraceful of sins.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."
I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory.
Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Question 103,
Article 1), and glory denotes clarity (Question 103, Article
1, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for two
reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence,
since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as
stated above (Question 141, Articles 2,3). Wherefore it is
written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did not
understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like
to them." Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity
or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
being most slavish.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says [Moral. xxxiii. 12],
"the sins of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of
intemperance, although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The
reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of
the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on
the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the
shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as
regards the nature of the vices themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that intemperance is most
disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely,
that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of
human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are
apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess:
for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing
the unnatural vice.
|
|