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Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out
of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that
there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man
has charity towards himself.
Objection 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies
mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of
one man towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as
stated above (Question 23, Article 1). Therefore a man cannot
have charity towards himself.
Objection 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be
blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor.
23:4). Now a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since
it is written (2 Tim. 3:1,2): "In the last days shall come
dangerous times, men shall be lovers of themselves." Therefore a man
cannot love himself out of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt
love thy friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity.
Therefore we should love ourselves too out of charity.
I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated
above (Question 23, Article 1), we may consider charity from
two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and
in this way we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a
friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship
implies union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is
a unitive force," whereas a man is one with himself which is more than
being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of
union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root
of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we
do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix,
4,8, that "the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our
relations to ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we have
something greater than science, namely understanding.
Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place,
and, consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man
himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he
loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also
himself out of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the
general notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken
in the same sense.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed,
in so far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature,
which they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to
one's rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things
which pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it
is through charity that a man loves himself.
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