|
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule
of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is
the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is
not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and
desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral
matters.
Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence
that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and
multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore
pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more
certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of
operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because
"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those
are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x,
5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness
and malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The
searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and
thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the
architect," i.e. the principal, "end, in regard to which, we say
absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will,
as stated above (Question 20, Article 1); and it is chiefly
from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the
end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of
the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore
man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of
the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes
pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure
in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the
rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally
pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men.
But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with
reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order
of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end,
which serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which
is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of
their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this
respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good,
whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests
in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its
end, as stated above (Question 33, Article 4); an operation
cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good:
because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a
way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the
operation.
|
|