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Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for impediments to be assigned
to marriage. For marriage is a sacrament condivided with the others.
But no impediments are assigned to the others. Neither therefore
should they be assigned to marriage.
Objection 2: Further, the less perfect a thing is the fewer its
obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of the sacraments.
Therefore it should have either no impediments or very few.
Objection 3: Further, wherever there is disease, it is necessary
to have a remedy for the disease. Now concupiscence, a remedy for
which is permitted in matrimony (1 Cor. 7:6), is in all.
Therefore there should not be any impediment making it altogether
unlawful for a particular person to marry.
Objection 4: Further, unlawful means against the law. Now these
impediments that are assigned to matrimony are not against the natural
law, because they are not found to be the same in each state of the
human race, since more degrees of kindred come under prohibition at one
time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set impediments
against marriage, since marriage, like the other sacraments, is not
of human but of Divine institution. Therefore impediments should not
be assigned to marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry.
Objection 5: Further, lawful and unlawful differ as that which is
against the law from that which is not, and between these there is no
middle term, since they are opposed according to affirmation and
negation. Therefore there cannot be impediments to marriage, placing
a person in a middle position between those who are lawful and those who
are unlawful subjects of marriage.
Objection 6: Further, union of man and woman is unlawful save in
marriage. Now every unlawful union should be dissolved. Therefore if
anything prevent a marriage being contracted, it will "de facto"
dissolve it after it has been contracted; and thus impediments should
not be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being contracted,
and dissolve it after it has been contracted.
Objection 7: Further, no impediment can remove from a thing that
which is part of its definition. Now indissolubility is part of the
definition of marriage. Therefore there cannot be any impediments
which annul a marriage already contracted.
Objection 8: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be
an infinite number of impediments to marriage. For marriage is a
good. Now good may be lacking in an infinite number of ways, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite
number of impediments to marriage.
Objection 9: Further, the impediments to marriage arise from the
conditions of individuals. But such like conditions are infinite in
number. Therefore the impediments to marriage are also infinite.
I answer that, In marriage, as in other sacraments, there are
certain things essential to marriage, and others that belong to its
solemnization. And since even without the things that pertain to its
solemnization it is still a true sacrament, as also in the case of the
other sacraments, it follows that the impediments to those things that
pertain to the solemnization of this sacrament do not derogate from the
validity of the marriage. These impediments are said to hinder the
contracting of marriage, but they do not dissolve the marriage once
contracted; such are the veto of the Church, or the holy seasons.
Hence the verse:
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"The veto of the Church and holy tide
Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied."
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On the other hand, those impediments which regard the essentials of
marriage make a marriage invalid, wherefore they are said not only to
hinder the contracting of marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted;
and they are contained in the following verse:
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"Error, station, vow, kinship, crime,
Difference of worship, force, holy orders,
Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence,
All these forbid marriage, and annul it though
contracted."
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The reason for this number may be explained as follows: Marriage may
be hindered either on the part of the contract or in regard to the
contracting parties. If in the first way, since the marriage contract
is made by voluntary consent, and this is incompatible with either
ignorance or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage,
namely "force," i.e. compulsion, and "error" in reference to
ignorance. Wherefore the Master pronounced on these two impediments
when treating of the cause of matrimony (Sent. iv, DD
29,30). Here, however, he is treating of the impediments as
arising from the contracting parties, and these may be differentiated
as follows. A person may be hindered from contracting marriage either
simply, or with some particular person. If simply, so that he be
unable to contract marriage with any woman, this can only be because he
is hindered from performing the marriage act. This happens in two
ways. First, because he cannot "de facto," either through being
altogether unable---and thus we have the impediment of
"impotence"---or through being unable to do so freely, and thus we
have the impediment of the "condition of slavery." Secondly,
because he cannot do it lawfully, and this because he is bound to
continence, which happens in two ways, either through his being bound
on account of the office he has undertaken to fulfill---and thus we
have the impediment of "Order"---or on account of his having taken
a vow---and thus "Vow" is an impediment.
If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not simply but in
reference to a particular person, this is either because he is bound to
another person, and thus he who is married to one cannot marry
another, which constitutes the impediment of the "bond of
marriage"---or through lack of proportion to the other party, and
this for three reasons. First, on account of too great a distance
separating them, and thus we have "difference of worship";
secondly, on account of their being too closely related, and thus we
have three impediments, namely "kinship," then "affinity," which
denotes the close relationship between two persons, in reference to a
third united to one of them by marriage, and the "justice of public
honesty," where we have a close relationship between two persons
arising out of the betrothal of one of them to a third person;
thirdly, on account of a previous undue union between him and the
woman, and thus the "crime of adultery" previously committed with her
is an impediment.
Reply to Objection 1: There may be impediments to the other
sacraments also in the omission either of that which is essential, or
of that which pertains to the solemnization of the sacrament, as stated
above. However, impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than to
the other sacraments for three reasons. First, because matrimony
consists of two persons, and consequently can be impeded in more ways
than the other sacraments which refer to one person taken individually;
secondly, because matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while
some of the other sacraments have their cause in God alone. Wherefore
penance which in a manner has a cause in us, is assigned certain
impediments by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 16), such as
hypocrisy, the public games, and so forth; thirdly, because other
sacraments are objects of command or counsel, as being more perfect
goods, whereas marriage is a matter of indulgence, as being a less
perfect good (1 Cor. 7:6). Wherefore, in order to afford an
opportunity of proficiency towards a greater good, more impediments are
assigned to matrimony than to the other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: The more perfect things can be hindered in
more ways, in so far as more conditions are required for them. And if
an imperfect thing requires more conditions, there will be more
impediments to it; and thus it is in matrimony.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, were there no
other and more efficacious remedies for the disease of concupiscence;
which is false.
Reply to Objection 4: Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for
marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is
established. Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is
established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the Divine law;
as fulfilling an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently a
person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the
aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments
hold, for they are sacraments only. And since the natural law is
particularized in various ways according to the various states of
mankind, and since positive law, too, varies according to the various
conditions of men, the Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that
at various times various persons have been unlawful subjects of
marriage.
Reply to Objection 5: The law may forbid a thing either
altogether, or in part and in certain cases. Hence between that which
is altogether according to the law and that which is altogether against
the law (which are opposed by contrariety and not according to
affirmation and negation), that which is somewhat according to the law
and somewhat against the law is a middle term. For this reason certain
persons hold a middle place between those who are simply lawful subjects
and those who are simply unlawful.
Reply to Objection 6: Those impediments which do not annul a
marriage already contracted sometimes hinder a marriage from being
contracted, by rendering it not invalid but unlawful. And if it be
contracted it is a true marriage although the contracting parties sin;
just as by consecrating after breaking one's fast one would sin by
disobeying the Church's ordinance, and yet it would be a valid
sacrament because it is not essential to the sacrament that the
consecrator be fasting.
Reply to Objection 7: When we say that the aforesaid impediments
annul marriage already contracted, we do not mean that they dissolve a
marriage contracted in due form, but that they dissolve a marriage
contracted "de facto" and not "de jure." Wherefore if an
impediment supervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form,
it cannot dissolve the marriage.
Reply to Objection 8: The impediments that hinder a good
accidentally are infinite in number, like all accidental causes. But
the causes which of their own nature corrupt a certain good are directed
to that effect, and determinate, even as are the causes which produce
that good; for the causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by
which it is made are either contrary to one another, or the same but
taken in a contrary way.
Reply to Objection 9: The conditions of particular persons taken
individually are infinite in number, but taken in general, they may be
reduced to a certain number; as instanced in medicine and all operative
arts, which consider the conditions of particular persons in whom acts
are.
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