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Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive.
For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual
knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of
knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding
regards only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many
things, Himself and others, as shown above (Articles 2,5), it
seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one
to another.
Objection 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect
through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an
effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is
discursive.
Objection 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than
we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus
we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems
that the same applies to God.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not
see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw
alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at
once."
I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the
proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold
discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have
actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something
else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as
when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The
first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things,
which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we
understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for
instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different
things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which
is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not
successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied
to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes
the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions
does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is
to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that
when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the
second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term
discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first,
by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion
ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause,
His knowledge is not discursive.
Reply to Objection 1: Altogether there is only one act of
understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in
one (medium), as shown above.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as
it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the
cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown
above.
Reply to Objection 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the
causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a
manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the
knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence
His knowledge is not discursive.
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