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Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of
analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of
our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.
from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always
proceed by way of analysis.
Objection 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But
reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow,
according to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past
precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems
that in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to
the future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore the process
of counsel is not one of analysis.
Objection 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are
possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as
to whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are
able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end.
Therefore the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that
"he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from some principle.
And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the
process is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause
to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple
than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the
order of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment
deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple causes.
Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes
indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the
inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to
say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until
it arrives at that which is to be done at once.
Reply to Objection 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions
take their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning
about actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason begins with that which is first
according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point
of time.
Reply to Objection 3: We should not want to know whether something
to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining
that end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the
end, before considering whether it be possible.
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