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Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive,
but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27)
says that "free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature."
But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive
power.
Objection 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a
free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power.
Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
Objection 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to
choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a
certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the
cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that
choice is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire
is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But
free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an
appetitive power.
I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say
that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing
another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature
of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things
concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on
the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power,
counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to
another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that
the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore
Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice
belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he
says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual
appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an
intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding
from counsel." And the reason of this is because the proper object of
choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature
of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such,
is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an
act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive
power.
Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive powers accompany the
apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will
straightway accompanies the rational power.
Reply to Objection 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and
terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the
judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite:
whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having
formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that
counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which
free-will takes its name.
Reply to Objection 3: This comparison which is implied in the
choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason.
For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it
is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some
likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.
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