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Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead can be seen by the
wicked without joy. For there can be no doubt that the wicked will
know with the greatest certainty that Christ is God. Therefore they
will see His Godhead, and yet they will not rejoice in seeing
Christ. Therefore it will be possible to see it without joy.
Objection 2: Further, the perverse will of the wicked is not more
adverse to Christ's humanity than to His Godhead. Now the fact
that they will see the glory of His humanity will conduce to their
punishment, as stated above (Article 2, ad 4). Therefore if
they were to see His Godhead, there would be much more reason for
them to grieve rather than rejoice.
Objection 3: Further, the course of the affections is not a
necessary sequel to that which is in the intellect: wherefore
Augustine says (In Ps. 118: conc. 8): "The intellect
precedes, the affections follow slowly or not at all." Now vision
regards the intellect, whereas joy regards the affections. Therefore
it will be possible to see the Godhead without joy.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is received into "a thing is
received according to the mode of the receiver and not of the
received." But whatever is seen is, in a way, received into the
seer. Therefore although the Godhead is in itself supremely
enjoyable, nevertheless when seen by those who are plunged in grief,
it will give no joy but rather displeasure.
Objection 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible object, so is
the intellect to the intelligible object. Now in the senses, "to the
unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the healthy palate sweet," as
Augustine says (Confess. vii), and the same happens with the other
senses. Therefore since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it
would seem that the vision of the uncreated light will give them pain
rather than joy.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is
eternal life: That they may know Thee, the . . . true God."
Wherefore it is clear that the essence of bliss consists in seeing
God. Now joy is essential to bliss. Therefore the Godhead cannot
be seen without joy.
Further, the essence of the Godhead is the essence of truth. Now it
is delightful to every one to see the truth, wherefore "all naturally
desire to know," as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics.
Therefore it is impossible to see the Godhead without joy.
Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens
sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is never painful
since "the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief
opposed to it," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii). Since
then the Godhead cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that
the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.
I answer that, In every object of appetite or of pleasure two things
may be considered, namely the thing which is desired or which gives
pleasure, and the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness in that
thing. Now according to Boethius (De Hebdom.) that which is can
have something besides what it is, but 'being' itself has no
admixture of aught else beside itself. Hence that which is desirable
or pleasant can have an admixture of something rendering it undesirable
or unpleasant; but the very aspect of pleasurableness has not and
cannot have anything mixed with it rendering it unpleasant or
undesirable. Now it is possible for things that are pleasurable, by
participation of goodness which is the aspect of appetibility or
pleasurableness, not to give pleasure when they are apprehended, but
it is impossible for that which is good by its essence not to give
pleasure when it is apprehended. Therefore since God is essentially
His own goodness, it is impossible for the Godhead to be seen without
joy.
Reply to Objection 1: The wicked will know most clearly that
Christ is God, not through seeing His Godhead, but on account of
the most manifest signs of His Godhead.
Reply to Objection 2: No one can hate the Godhead considered in
itself, as neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is said to
be hated by certain persons in respect of some of the effects of the
Godhead, in so far as He does or commands something contrary to their
will [SS, Question 34, Article 1]. Therefore the vision of
the Godhead can be painful to no one.
Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Augustine applies when the
thing apprehended previously by the intellect is good by participation
and not essentially, such as all creatures are; wherefore there may be
something in them by reason of which the affections are not moved. In
like manner God is known by wayfarers through His effects, and their
intellect does not attain to the very essence of His goodness. Hence
it is not necessary that the affections follow the intellect, as they
would if the intellect saw God's essence which is His goodness.
Reply to Objection 4: Grief denotes not a disposition but a
passion. Now every passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause
supervene, and does not remove that cause. Accordingly the grief of
the damned would be done away if they saw God in His essence.
Reply to Objection 5: The indisposition of an organ removes the
natural proportion of the organ to the object that has a natural
aptitude to please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered. But the
indisposition which is in the damned does not remove the natural
proportion whereby they are directed to the Divine goodness, since its
image ever remains in them. Hence the comparison fails.
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