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Objection 1: It would seem that to believe in not meritorious. For
the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (FS,
Question 114, Article 4). Now faith, like nature, is a
preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act of nature is not
meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural gifts, so neither is
an act of faith.
Objection 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and
scientific knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically
known. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious, nor on
the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either
has a sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a
sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit
on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe:
whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark
of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is hasty to
give credit, is light of heart," so that, seemingly, he gains no
merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints
"by faith . . . obtained promises," which would not be the case if
they did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 114, Articles
3,4), our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from
the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act
proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be
meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect
assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the
grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to
God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.
Reply to Objection 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the
principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to
charity as the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is
evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the
form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form:
but after the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding
disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of
action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form
of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without charity,
produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act
of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a
natural act of the free-will.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in science:
namely the scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his
consideration of that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject
to free-will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of
the demonstration, wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious.
But the actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is
subject to his free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to
consider. Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be
referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good
of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these
things are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of
faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no
firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes
(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a
perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent,
it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards
the actual consideration.
Reply to Objection 3: The believer has sufficient motive for
believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching
confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of
the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has
not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he
does not lose the merit.
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