|
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God.
For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of
sin is not a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing.
Therefore the act of sin is not from God.
Objection 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin,
except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works,
intending evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God
is not a cause of sin, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore
God is not the cause of the act of sin.
Objection 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their
species, as was shown above (Question 18, Articles 2,8).
Now whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in
respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He
would be the cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above
(Article 1). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will.
Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine
declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the
cause of the act of sin.
I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in
both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode
of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius
declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by
something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so
far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First
Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence.
Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an
action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this
defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling
away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently
this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the
free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg
as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes
whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the
cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because
He does not cause the act to have a defect.
Reply to Objection 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name
of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in
this sense the act of sin is not a thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is
reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being
subject to Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this
principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the
cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the
defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question 72, Article
1), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation
itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to
which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in
not being from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently,
and not as a specific difference.
|
|