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Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct
from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to
the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the
memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also
distinct from the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in
the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory
in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said
(Question 78, Article 4). Therefore memory in the intellectual
part is distinct from the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x,
11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one
another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if
memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the
same power.
On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or
storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii)
attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (Article 6, ad
1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect.
I answer that, As has been said above (Question 77, Article
3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal
aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to
that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has
also been said above (Question 59, Article 4) that if any power
by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of
the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the
individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight,
which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is not
differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect
regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive
intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the
passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being.
Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active
intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same
object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be
distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing
in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in
act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the
contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a
being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in
the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear
that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs
to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1)
that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in
accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De
Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as
always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not,
they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean
that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean
that love or affection which unites the child and its parent."
Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for
three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of
retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will,
the act of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Past and present may differentiate the
sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give
above.
Reply to Objection 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from
habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a
power.
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