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Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual
virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a
gift, speculative and not practical.
Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of
operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things
which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be
practical.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that
"in contemplation we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action
we labor under a mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the
vision of Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load,
since according to Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness." Therefore wisdom is
merely contemplative, and not practical or active.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with
wisdom towards them that are without." Now this pertains to action.
Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the
higher part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower
part is the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to
the same authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the
consideration and consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine,
"types" [FP, Question 79, Article 9; FS, Question
74, Article 7]; it considers them, in so far as it contemplates
Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it
judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts
according to Divine rules.
Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also
practical.
Reply to Objection 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the
number of things to which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop.
x, xvii. Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more
excellent than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to
God more intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is
able to direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.
Reply to Objection 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and
eternal in themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things
which are the subject-matter of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is considered in itself before being
compared with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all
contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the
direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the
direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human
acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter
sweet, and labor a rest.
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