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Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For
habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is
pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is
not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as
its subject remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due
either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness
ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of
health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through
corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its
subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i,
text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the
action of its contrary: since intelligible species are not contrary to
one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of
science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement.
But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted
by a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of
the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i,
10), "virtue is more lasting than learning."
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev.
Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of
science." Moreover, by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and
again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic.
ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its
contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When
therefore a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a
contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case
with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those
habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted
indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing
chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in
a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly
indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive
powers of apprehension, as stated above (Question 50, Article
3, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted
indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only on the
part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active
intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary.
Wherefore if in the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused
immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both
directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles,
both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says
about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being
forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a
habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which
is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in
two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the
starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good"
is contrary to the assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii).
Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a
sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative
syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the
habit of a true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher,
as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science."
As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason
itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what we
have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral
virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be
said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are
caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason.
Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a
judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or
virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is
like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that
while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a
thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect,
in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason
can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted.
Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than
learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or
cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the
whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.
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