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Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of
sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20):
"I should hesitate to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to
be preferred to a heretic, in whose life one finds nothing
reprehensible beyond the fact that he is a heretic." But a heretic is
an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief
is the greatest of sins.
Objection 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is
not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or
diminishes sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13):
"I . . . before was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and
contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it
ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of
sins.
Objection 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater
punishment, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure
of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater
punishment is due to believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb.
10:29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse
punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath
esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was
sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. 15:22, "If
I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says
(Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers
to a singularly great sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the
sin to which all others may be traced." Therefore unbelief is the
greatest of sins.
I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above (FS, Question 71, Article 6; FS, Question
73, Article 3). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the
graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by
unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false
knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from
Him.
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know
Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin
that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the
sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated
further on (Question 20, Article 3; Question 34, Article
2, ad 2; Question 39, Article 2, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in
its genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances.
Hence Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a
heretic not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is
more grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and
conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be
aggravated.
Reply to Objection 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an
accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the
latter respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this
ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man
sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.
Reply to Objection 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for
his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we
consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g.
adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the
believer, other things being equal, sins more gravely than the
unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge of the truth through
faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has been
satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.
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