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Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals.
Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the
competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses
and does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb
animals.
Objection 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good,
possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of
the true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope
in dumb animals, since they have no mind.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14)
that "animals are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of
things unseen: "for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?"
(Rm. 8:24). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.
On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible
faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.
I answer that, The internal passions of animals can be gathered from
their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb
animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far
off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it:
whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in
hopes of catching it. Because as stated above (Question 1,
Article 2; Question 26, Article 1; Question 35, Article
1), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural
appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension of an
intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is
called the will. But there is a difference, in that the will is moved
by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the
movement of the natural appetite results from the apprehension of the
separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as does also the
sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural
instinct. Consequently, in the actions of irrational animals and of
other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that
which we observe in the actions of art: and in this way hope and
despair are in dumb animals.
Reply to Objection 1: Although dumb animals do not know the
future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something
future, as though it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is
planted in them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future.
Reply to Objection 2: The object of hope is not the possible as
differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the
relation of a predicate to a subject. The object of hope is the
possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the
possible given in Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have
just mentioned.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the thing which is future does not
come under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something
present, an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something
future.
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