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Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the
heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models
them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born
into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of
offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the
domain of fate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1)
that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and
power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things
are subject to fate.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate
"is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures
are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
(Question 9, Article 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some
things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), fate is the ordering
of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore,
is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is
done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes,
neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of
spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God
have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate."
Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind,
the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more
it is bound up with second causes.
Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are
done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are
contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything
else, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will
and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow
that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also
to fate, as already stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way
changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created
causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated
above.
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