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Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin.
For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now
transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose
says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine
law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
Objection 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its
genus. But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin
is a "word, deed or desire against the law of God," according to
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is
also against nature, or custom. Therefore transgression is not a
species of sin.
Objection 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which
its genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the
capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed.
Therefore transgression is not a special sin.
On the contrary, It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.
I answer that, The term transgression is derived from bodily movement
and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to transgress in
bodily movement, when he steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed
boundary---and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary that
man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress,
properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept.
Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of
sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of
mortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special
aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in two
ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that
are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs properly to
legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it belongs properly
to a transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt.
Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from omission which is opposed
to an affirmative precept.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as legal justice is "all virtue"
(Question 58, Article 5) as regards its subject and matter, so
legal injustice is materially "all sin." It is in this way that
Ambrose defined sin, considering it from the point of view of legal
injustice.
Reply to Objection 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts
of the natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a
precept; since as Augustine says in an epistle On the Fast of the
Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked
upon as law." Hence both sin and transgression may be against a
laudable custom and against a natural inclination.
Reply to Objection 3: All these species of sin may include
transgression, if we consider them not under their proper aspects, but
under a special aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission,
however, is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression.
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