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Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with
regard to His own body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
20,23) that "all natural things were voluntary to Christ; He
willed to hunger, He willed to thirst, He willed to fear, He
willed to die." Now God is called omnipotent because "He hath done
all things whatsoever He would" (Ps. 113:11). Therefore it
seems that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the natural
operations of the body.
Objection 2: Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than
in Adam, who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing
could happen to the body against the will of the soul---and this on
account of the original justice which it had in the state of innocence.
Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to
His body.
Objection 3: Further, the body is naturally changed by the
imaginations of the soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the
soul's imagination, as was said in the FP, Question 117,
Article 3, ad 3. Now the soul of Christ had most perfect strength
as regards both the imagination and the other powers. Therefore the
soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:17) that "it behooved
Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren," and especially
as regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it
belongs to the condition of human nature that the health of the body and
its nourishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or
will, since natural things are subject to God alone Who is the author
of nature. Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore
Christ's soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), Christ's soul may
be viewed in two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in
this way, as it was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the
course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its
own body from its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own
nature, has a determinate relation to its body. Secondly, Christ's
soul may be viewed as an instrument united in person to God's Word;
and thus every disposition of His own body was wholly subject to His
power. Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly
attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, this
omnipotence is attributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ's
soul.
Reply to Objection 1: This saving of Damascene refers to the
Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter
(De Fide Orth. xix, 14,15), it was by the consent of the
Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what was proper
to it.
Reply to Objection 2: It was no part of the original justice which
Adam had in the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the
power of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it
from any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He
had wished. But since man has three states---viz. innocence,
sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed
comprehension and from the state of innocence, freedom from sin---so
also from the state of sin did He assume the necessity of being under
the penalties of this life, as will be said (Question 14, Article
2).
Reply to Objection 3: If the imagination be strong, the body obeys
naturally in some things, e.g. as regards falling from a beam set on
high, since the imagination was formed to be a principle of local
motion, as is said De Anima iii, 9,10. So, too, as regards
alteration in heat and cold, and their consequences; for the passions
of the soul, wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the
imagination, and thus by commotion of the spirits the whole body is
altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which have no natural
relation to the imagination are not transmuted by the imagination,
however strong it is, e.g. the shape of the hand, or foot, or such
like.
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