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Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species
of lust. For incest takes its name from being a privation of
chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore
it seems that incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in
general.
Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI,
qu. 1 [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is
intercourse between a man and a woman related by consanguinity or
affinity." Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is
not one but several species of lust.
Objection 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a
deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But
intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity
does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have
been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to
the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful
intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the
woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
consanguinity or affinity as stated (Objection 2). Therefore
incest is a determinate species of lust.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles 1,6) wherever we find
something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there
must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse
with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to
venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a
certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood
relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so
much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates
[Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son
to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now
from what has been said (Question 142, Article 4: Question
151, Article 4), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a
certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are
ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be
united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated
(Lev. 18:7) where we read: "She is thy mother, thou shalt
not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed further on with
regard to others.
The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close
touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from
venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very
frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in
the Old Law [Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed
specially to those persons who must needs live together.
The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many
friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his
wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as
though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most
perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the
various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a
useful and becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships
in one, but each should have one."
Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is
natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if
to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse,
his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to
lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that
incest is a determinate species of lust.
Reply to Objection 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related
to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account
of the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of
love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse
between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 2: Persons are related by affinity through one
who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on
the other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of
unbecomingness.
Reply to Objection 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and
contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related
by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly
and immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe
their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De
Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw
itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have
begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness
attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly
but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or
unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law:
because, as stated above (Article 2), sexual intercourse, being
directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of
brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more
worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it.
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