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Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not
only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any
truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are
Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of
God's works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore
it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate
not only the divine truth, but also any other.
Objection 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that
"contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty,
secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His
promises." Now of these four the first alone regards the divine
truth, and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the
contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of the divine
truth, but also in the consideration of truth regarding the divine
effects.
Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [De Grat.
Contempl. i, 6] distinguishes six species of contemplation. The
first belongs to "the imagination alone," and consists in thinking of
corporeal things. The second is in "the imagination guided by
reason," and consists in considering the order and disposition of
sensible objects. The third is in "the reason based on the
imagination"; when, to wit, from the consideration of the visible we
rise to the invisible. The fourth is in "the reason and conducted by
the reason," when the mind is intent on things invisible of which the
imagination has no cognizance. The fifth is "above the reason," but
not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we become cognizant
of things that cannot be comprehended by the human reason. The sixth
is "above reason and contrary to reason"; when, to wit, by the
divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason,
such as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last
of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the
contemplation of truth regards not only the divine truth, but also that
which is considered in creatures.
Objection 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation
of truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
consists in the contemplation of any truth.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in
contemplation we seek the principle which is God."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), a thing may belong
to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily,
or dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative
life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this
contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine
says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised
us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection
of our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to
come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us
perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is
competent to us imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark
manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain
inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life
to come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's
ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible
good.
Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation
of God Himself, according to Rm. 1:20, "The invisible things
of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made," it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects
also belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided
thereby to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera
Relig. xxix) that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an
empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to
things unperishable and everlasting."
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (Articles
1,2,3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the
contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts
exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine
effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of
the divine truth itself.
Reply to Objection 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works,
so that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere
(Ps. 142:5,6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I
meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to
Thee."
Reply to Objection 2: By considering the divine judgments man is
guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering
the divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of
God's mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to
be vouchsafed.
Reply to Objection 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend
by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step
consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step
consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible
things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible
objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is
the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by
means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth
step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can
neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation
of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.
Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate perfection of the human
intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect
in relation to the divine truth.
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