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Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For
the same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white
and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is
not only of good, but also of evil.
Objection 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite
purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But
the will is a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is
stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to
opposites; and consequently its volition is not confined to good, but
extends to evil.
Objection 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But
volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For
sometimes we wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at
times we wish for future things, which are not actual beings.
Therefore the will is not of good only.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is
outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite
is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards
that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to
the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is
being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every
inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all
desire."
But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a
form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature
of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or
rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended
form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing
in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which
is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to
anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but
that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good."
Reply to Objection 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is
not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is
referred both to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil,
by shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called
"volition", meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this
sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the
shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just
as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all
opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper
object; for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the
object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such
opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or
to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will
can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is not a being in nature, is
considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations
are said to be "beings of reason." In this way, too, future
things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly,
in so far as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the
aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil
is considered as a good."
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