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Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from
intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21)
"that virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an
intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not
differ.
Objection 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of
virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit
regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and
holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his
duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore
moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that
"virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs
to the intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13.
Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.
Objection 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is
included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the
definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by
reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that
fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as
stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ
from intellectual.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are
two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral."
I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and
whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason
somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and
without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body,
provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason
commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body
like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right
to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man
are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to
act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently,
since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good
actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there
would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of
Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated
in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in
possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins,
does so through ignorance.
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive
faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of
opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that
"reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby
a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of
opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that
"sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or
follows not at all," in so far as the habits or passions of the
appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some
particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying
of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does
not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include
the use of reason in this individual act of choice.
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that
his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue;
but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral
virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the
appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the
principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are
moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in
conformity with reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to
any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is
the right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right
reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that
"virtue is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence
essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as
they are directed by prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given,
were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according
to what we have said about art (ad 1).
The same applies to the Third Objection.
Reply to Objection 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence
is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its
essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the
moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of
prudence.
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