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Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides
pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems
to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De
Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore
covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it
alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to
the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the
head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the
character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.
Objection 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive
capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are
punished thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific
sins.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain
special vices under the name of capital.
I answer that, The word capital is derived from "caput" [a
head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an
animal's body, which is the principle and director of the whole
animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a
head, and even men who direct and govern others are called heads.
Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from
"head" taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is
given to a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in
this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another
sense, in which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken
metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a
capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being
their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above (Question
72, Article 6). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the
principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their
leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always
the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the
"leaders of an army."
Reply to Objection 1: The term "capital" is taken from "caput"
and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as
having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken
literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which
have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called
the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but also those
which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away
from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to
Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode,
species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to
something, it regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there
can be order in sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers capital sin as so
called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not
taking it here.
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