|
Objection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end.
For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys,
uses." But man enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last
end.
Objection 2: Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose
of the will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than
anything else, is the object of the will's application. Therefore it
can be the object of use.
Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that
"Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image," i.e. in
the Son, "Use in the Gift," i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the
Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore the last
end can be the object of use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 30):
"No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him." But God alone is
the last end. Therefore we cannot use the last end.
I answer that, Use, as stated above (Article 1), implies the
application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to
another is regarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently
use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted
to a certain end are said to be "useful"; in fact their very
usefulness is sometimes called use.
It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two
ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For
since the end, as stated above (Question 1, Article 8; Question
2, Article 7), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and
sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the miser's
end is either money or the possession of it); it is evident that,
simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the possession
of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money. But in
regard to the individual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for
the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it.
Therefore, simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because
he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess
it, he is said to use it.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in
so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man
seeks in that end.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the
will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in
the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use
of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not
only in being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which
the will finds rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as
applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general
sense, one may be said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it,
as stated above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that
"this love, delight, felicity, or happiness, is called use by
him."
|
|