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Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement
and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with
God, for He is immovable, as was said above (Question 2,
Article 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot
sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13.
Therefore He is not omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His
omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [Collect,
10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible
to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much
greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to
create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not
omnipotent.
Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the
wisdom of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God
hath made the wisdom of this world foolish by showing those things to be
possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that
nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior
causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to
the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would
be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the
impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily
exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at
all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is
an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with
God" (Lk. 1:37).
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that
God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is
said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in
relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said
to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the
relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot
be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are
possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than
that. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because
He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a
vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would
be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do
all that He is able to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can
do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of
power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus
of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being.
Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered
among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of
God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible
thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in
terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which
God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does
not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have
the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary
to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with
God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word,
because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to
His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above (Article
1). Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not
repugnant to His omnipotence.
Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action;
hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin,
because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says
(Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But
this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which
is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can
do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional
proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and
consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a
donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God
can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He
did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the
common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like
Jupiter or Mercury.
Reply to Objection 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in
sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God
has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for
one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads
them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Question
21, Article 4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation
of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on
account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this
way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it
pertains the first foundation of all good things.
Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in
reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in
reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is
named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things
which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example,
to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in
reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of
such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in
reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the
condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or
necessity, as was shown above (Question 14, Article 1, ad
2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish,
because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to
God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away
from things their impossibility and necessity.
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