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Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say
anything of God but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture."
But Holy Scripture does not say anything concerning notions.
Therefore there are none in God.
Objection 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of
the essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not
concern the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for
neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions:
for instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can
what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not
say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore
there do not exist notions in God.
Objection 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract
notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of
composition: for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons
are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in
God.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5):
"We recognize difference of hypostases, in the three properties;
i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional."
Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.
I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the
persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and
wherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the
concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your
kindness"---i.e. you who are kind---so when we speak of
paternity in God, we mean God the Father.
But, as shown above (Question 3, Article 3, ad 1), the use
of concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to
the divine simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we
understand it. Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute
simplicity of the divine essence, considered in itself, and
therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names divine things,
according to its own mode, that is in so far as they are found in
sensible objects, whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we
use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent
things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as
above stated, by abstract names, to express their simplicity;
whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we use
concrete names.
But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but
the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity
and Father.
Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who
ask: "Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three
persons?" as we answer that They are one in essence or deity; so
there must also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the
persons are distinguished; and these are the properties or notions
signified by an abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore
the divine essence is signified as "What"; and the person as
"Who"; and the property as "Whereby."
The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
persons---namely, the person of the Father to the person of the
Son and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by
one relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the
Holy Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same
relation. Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it
would follow that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two
persons. Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that as God is related
in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers
ways, so the Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons are related to the Father by
two relations. For, since the very specific idea of a relation is
that it refers to another, it must be said that two relations are not
specifically different if but one opposite relation corresponds to
them. For the relation of lord and father must differ according to the
difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related
to God as His creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and
the Holy Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the same kind
of relation. Hence there is no parity.
Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the
creature (Question 28, Article 1,3); while there is no reason
against our admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the
Father there must be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy
Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of
the Holy Ghost, whereby they are related to the Father, we must
understand two relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the
Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person
of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be separately
signified in the abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and
notions.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in
Holy Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea
of notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.
Reply to Objection 2: In God the notions have their significance
not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby
the persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are
real, as stated above (Question 28, Article 1). Therefore
whatever has order to any essential or personal act, cannot be applied
to the notions; forasmuch as this is against their mode of
signification. Hence we cannot say that paternity begets, or
creates, or is wise, or is intelligent. The essentials, however,
which are not ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions
from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that
paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also on account
of the real identity, substantive terms, whether personal or
essential, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that
paternity is God, and that paternity is the Father.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the persons are simple, still
without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons
can be abstractedly signified, as above explained.
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