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Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For
magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since
"magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the
irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the
Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and
mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a
concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it
seems that magnanimity is not about honors.
Objection 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must
needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about
operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows
that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore
magnanimity is not about honors.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard
pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous
because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for
desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not
about honors.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
"magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."
I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth
of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two
things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity,
secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such
matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its
act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do
some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one
way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called
great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or
ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it:
but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best
use of the greatest thing.
The things which come into man's use are external things, and among
these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to
virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated
above (Question 103, Articles 1,2); and because it is
offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain
honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a
man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great
absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of
things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that
magnanimity is about honors.
Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard
the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is
added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity
regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something
great or difficult.
Reply to Objection 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an
operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which
tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about
the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope:
even so, we have stated (Question 123, Articles 4,5) with
regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they
are the object of fear and daring.
Reply to Objection 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches
in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor
have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise
honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be
deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the
sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so
as to think much of the honor accorded by man.
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