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Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the
sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his
actions. Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals.
Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot
prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since
"the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this
mortal life; wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine
declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate
movement of the sensuality is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not
imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves,
which we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which
is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a
sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 7:19): "The good which
I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do":
which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De
Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of
concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality.
Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles 2,3), sin may be
found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein
consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the
sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved
by the will. Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
Reply to Objection 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive
part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us,
they have a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus
we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have
the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the FP,
Question 78, Article 4. In the same way our sensitive appetite
surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence
consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this
respect it can be the principle of a voluntary action, and,
consequently, the subject of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is
to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never
completely destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original
sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the
"fomes" does not hinder man from using his rational will to check
individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for
instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is
turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may
arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the
movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal
pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an
unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man
cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid
corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin,
that he be able to avoid each single one.
Reply to Objection 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he
does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of
man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act;
and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is
something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the
sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is
something imperfect in the genus of sin.
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