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Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be continuous. For
it is written (Jer. 31:16): "Let thy voice cease from
weeping, and thy eyes from tears." But this would be impossible if
penance were continuous, for it consists in weeping and tears.
Therefore penance cannot be continuous.
Objection 2: Further, man ought to rejoice at every good work,
according to Ps. 99:1: "Serve ye the Lord with gladness."
Now to do penance is a good work. Therefore man should rejoice at
it. But man cannot rejoice and grieve at the same time, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore a penitent
cannot grieve continually for his past sins, which is essential to
penance. Therefore penance cannot be continuous.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:7):
"Comfort him," viz. the penitent, "lest perhaps such an one be
swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But comfort dispels grief, which
is essential to penance. Therefore penance need not be continuous.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on Penance [De vera et
falsa Poenitentia]: "In doing penance grief should be continual."
I answer that, One is said to repent in two ways, actually and
habitually. It is impossible for a man continually to repent
actually. for the acts, whether internal or external, of a penitent
must needs be interrupted by sleep and other things which the body
needs. Secondly, a man is said to repent habitually. and thus he
should repent continually, both by never doing anything contrary to
penance, so as to destroy the habitual disposition of the penitent,
and by being resolved that his past sins should always be displeasing to
him.
Reply to Objection 1: Weeping and tears belong to the act of
external penance, and this act needs neither to be continuous, nor to
last until the end of life, as stated above (Article 8): wherefore
it is significantly added: "For there is a reward for thy work."
Now the reward of the penitent's work is the full remission of sin
both as to guilt and as to punishment; and after receiving this reward
there is no need for man to proceed to acts of external penance.
This, however, does not prevent penance being continual, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Of sorrow and joy we may speak in two ways:
first, as being passions of the sensitive appetite; and thus they can
no. wise be together, since they are altogether contrary to one
another, either on the part of the object (as when they have the same
object), or at least on the part of the movement, for joy is with
expansion [FS, Question 33, Article 1] of the heart, whereas
sorrow is with contraction; and it is in this sense that the
Philosopher speaks in Ethic. ix. Secondly, we may speak of joy and
sorrow as being simple acts of the will, to which something is pleasing
or displeasing. Accordingly, they cannot be contrary to one another,
except on the part of the object, as when they concern the same object
in the same respect, in which way joy and sorrow cannot be
simultaneous, because the same thing in the same respect cannot be
pleasing and displeasing. If, on the other hand, joy and sorrow,
understood thus, be not of the same object in the same respect, but
either of different objects, or of the same object in different
respects, in that case joy and sorrow are not contrary to one another,
so that nothing hinders a man from being joyful and sorrowful at the
same time---for instance, if we see a good man suffer, we both
rejoice at his goodness and at the same time grieve for his suffering.
In this way a man may be displeased at having sinned, and be pleased
at his displeasure together with his hope for pardon, so that his very
sorrow is a matter of joy. Hence Augustine says [De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "The penitent
should ever grieve and rejoice at his grief."
If, however, sorrow were altogether incompatible with joy, this
would prevent the continuance, not of habitual penance, but only of
actual penance.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
3,6,7,9) it belongs to virtue to establish the mean in the
passions. Now the sorrow which, in the sensitive appetite of the
penitent, arises from the displeasure of his will, is a passion;
wherefore it should be moderated according to virtue, and if it be
excessive it is sinful, because it leads to despair, as the Apostle
teaches (2 Cor. 2:7), saying: "Lest such an one be swallowed
up with overmuch sorrow." Accordingly comfort, of which the Apostle
speaks, moderates sorrow but does not destroy it altogether.
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