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Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For
nothing increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold,
namely dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which
is a spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects
in respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest
charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore
charity does not increase.
Objection 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme
receives no increase. But charity consists in something extreme,
being the greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest
good. Therefore charity cannot increase.
Objection 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore
wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase
of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of
essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity
cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or
corrupted, which is unreasonable.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [Ep.
clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
perfection."
I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are
called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to
God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the
affections of the soul" [St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan.
xxxii]: and this approach is the result of charity, since it unites
man's mind to God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a
wayfarer that it can increase, for if it could not, all further
advance along the way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity
the way, when he says (1 Cor. 12:31): "I show unto you yet
a more excellent way."
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but
only to virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number
of objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater
excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual
quantity of charity increases.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to
its object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from
this it follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet
not every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of
the act.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that charity does not increase
in its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or
according to its fervor.
But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet more
in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject.
Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that
an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of
more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by
beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection
imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.
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