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Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster.
i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in
all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears
from what is said above (Question 3). Therefore to be everywhere
does not belong to God alone.
Objection 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the
whole universe, and is thus everywhere.
Objection 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect
body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is
everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be
everywhere does not belong to God alone.
Objection 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would
exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.
Objection 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin.
vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its
parts." Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its
soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to
God alone.
Objection 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The
soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it
lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession
of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight.
Therefore the soul is everywhere.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7):
"Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things,
and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity
alone?"
I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper
to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its
whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to
its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong
to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs
primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere
absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally,
that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be
everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs
therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any
supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God
alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite
number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary
that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by
Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to
God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be
supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of
Him, but as to His very self.
Reply to Objection 1: The universal, and also primary matter are
indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
Reply to Objection 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not,
of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but
only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not
follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
Reply to Objection 3: The whole body of the universe is
everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each
place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere
absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides
itself, it would not be in them.
Reply to Objection 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be
everywhere; but according to its parts.
Reply to Objection 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would
be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
Reply to Objection 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere,
this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this
sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the
heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not
follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to
exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of
the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where
the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to
this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is
everywhere.
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