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Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
Objection 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will
be, nor have been, as has been said above (Article 9). But of
such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and
effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of
all things known by Him.
Objection 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there
can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Objection 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only
species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are
not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught
ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi).
Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But
God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore
He has ideas of all things known by Him.
I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar,"
and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has
respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a
principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even
though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in
a speculative manner.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is known by God not through its own
type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in
God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a
"type."
Reply to Objection 2: God has no practical knowledge, except
virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been.
Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as
idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a
"type."
Reply to Objection 3: Plato is said by some to have considered
matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of
matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to
be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in
God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in
itself can neither exist, nor be known.
Reply to Objection 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of
species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot
exist except in some species. The same is the case with those
accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into
being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the
subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through
the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as
painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other
form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea
than that of species; both because particular things are individualized
by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the
concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the
species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be
preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species;
but to individuals as will be shown later (Question 22, Article
3).
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