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Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from
covetousness. As stated above (Question 43, Article 6) lust is
the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices
are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise
chiefly from lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many
colored" and that "he who is incontinent in desire acts with
cunning."
Objection 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to
prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13). Now,
since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be
more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the
aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying
hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the
former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger.
Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud.
Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but
also from anger.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud
is a daughter of covetousness.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3; Question 47,
Article 13), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and
fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of
the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the
use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational
appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices
opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the
aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and
of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising
its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason,
albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust.
When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is
referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away
suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means
of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and
pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the
wisest man" [Iliad xiv, 214-217].
Reply to Objection 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due
to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride
resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices
which make use of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride,
but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets
little by excellence.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts
with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the
aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use
stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from
hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [Ethic. vii, 6].
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