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Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof.
But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be
reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should
be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and
science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should
not be reckoned a part of prudence
Objection 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially
from the intelligence, as stated above (FP, Question 79,
Article 8). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of
prudence, it is superfluous to add reason.
On the contrary, Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i], following the
opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as
stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from
certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore
it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And
since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called
requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason
should be numbered among these parts.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of
reason, but its good use.
Reply to Objection 2: The certitude of reason comes from the
intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect,
since those things in which the intellective power is in full vigor,
have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple
insight, as do God and the angels. On the other hand particular
matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the
condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are
less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are
singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many
of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as
stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other
intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet
prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may
rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and
uncertain.
Reply to Objection 3: Although intelligence and reason are not
different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For
intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the
truth [SS, Question 8, Article 1], while reason is so called
from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part
of reason as explained above (Article 2; Question 47, Article
2,3).
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