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Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not cause
involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that
which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to
1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not, he shall not be
known." Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
Objection 2: Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to
Prov. 14: 22: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore,
ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is
involuntary: which is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that
"every sin is voluntary" (De Vera Relig. xiv).
Objection 3: Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness,"
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things
are done out of ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man
may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he
is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause
involuntariness.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through
ignorance is involuntary."
I answer that, If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far
as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of
voluntariness, as was declared above (Article 1). But it is not
every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we
must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of
the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another,
"consequently"; in a third way, "antecedently."
"Concomitantly," when there is ignorance of what is done; but, so
that even if it were known, it would be done. For then, ignorance
does not induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that a
thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus in the example
given (OBJ 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but killed
him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of this
kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause
involuntariness, since it is not the cause of anything that is
repugnant to the will: but it causes "non-voluntariness," since
that which is unknown cannot be actually willed. Ignorance is
"consequent" to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is
voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in accordance with the two
aforesaid modes of voluntary (Article 3). First, because the act
of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes
not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be
withheld from sin; according to Job 21:14: "We desire not the
knowledge of Thy ways." And this is called "affected ignorance."
Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it regards that
which one can and ought to know: for in this sense "not to act" and
"not to will" are said to be voluntary, as stated above (Article
3). And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not
actually consider what one can and ought to consider; this is called
"ignorance of evil choice," and arises from some passion or habit:
or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one
ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of
law, which one to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence.
Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it
cannot cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it causes
involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the
movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if
there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the act of the
will, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing
what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some
circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result
being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that
circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution,
may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots
an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness
simply.
From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the
first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know.
The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain
extent, as stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is
concomitant with the act of the will.
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