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Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated
above (Question 110, Article 2). Now no accident can act upon
its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating.
Objection 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly
brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For
Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also
shall do," says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without
thyself, will not justify thee without thyself." Therefore no grace
ought to be called simply operating.
Objection 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior
agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more
than free-will, according to Rm. 9:16: "It is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy."
Therefore no grace ought to be called cooperating.
Objection 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But
to operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing
can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly
divided into operating and cooperating.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit.
xvii): "God by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by
operating in us, since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are
willing, beings by operating that they may will." But the operations
of God whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace
is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 110, Article 2)
grace may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby
God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift
divinely bestowed on us.
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and
cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the
thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind
is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the
operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that
we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind
both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God,
but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of
"cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First,
there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the
will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the
will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence,
inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of
operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is
commanded by the will, as was shown above (Question 17, Article
9) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because
God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly
so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of
operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating
grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: "He
operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we
may perfect." And thus if grace is taken for God's gratuitous
motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly
divided into operating and cooperating grace.
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a
double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of
which is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of
heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus
habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes
it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is
the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will,
it is called cooperating grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental
quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as
whiteness makes a surface white.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not justify us without ourselves,
because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's
justification [justitiae] by a movement of our free-will.
Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect;
hence the whole operation pertains to grace.
Reply to Objection 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another
not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but
when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will
the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end
being already intended, grace cooperates with us.
Reply to Objection 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same
grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain
from what has been said.
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