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Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to
several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or
spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget.
But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget.
But He cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son.
Therefore there can be several Sons in God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii,
12): "The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not,
but that it behoved Him not."
Objection 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget
than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons.
Therefore God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is
not diminished after begetting the Son.
On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that
which is" do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible
for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus
there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one
Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be
given.
The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the
Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations
themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or
several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or
more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible
except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are
not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God.
Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as
there could be but one subsistent whiteness.
The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For
God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore
there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which
person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of
love, which person is the Holy Ghost.
The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons
proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said
(Article 2), and nature is determined to one.
The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.
For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation
is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is
similar in regard to the other persons.
Reply to Objection 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the
Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the
Son has the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking
"generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would
be that the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although
Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son
is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word
"generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the
passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son---that is, the
power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the
gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power of
generation"---that is, a power by which it is generated by some
person.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words
that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not
because He could not, as we shall see later on (Question 42,
Article 6, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of
matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as
we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not
due to any lack of begetting power in the Father.
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