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Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we
believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in
Evang.) that "there is no merit in believing what is shown by
reason." If, therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof,
the merit of faith is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that
any kind of human reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes
the merit of believing.
Objection 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue,
lessens the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of
virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human
reasoning seems to diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since
it is essential to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above
(Question 1, Articles 4,5). Now the more a thing is supported
by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human reasons in support
of matters of faith diminish the merit of faith.
Objection 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now
an inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith
whether it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to
force a man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to
do so. Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of
faith.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 3:15): "Being ready
always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith and
hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give this advice,
if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. Therefore reason
does not diminish the merit of faith.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 9), the act of faith can
be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to
the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of
what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the
believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for
instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will,
to believe, unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human
reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said
above (FS, Question 24, Article 3, ad 1; Question 77,
Article 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes
choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a man
ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of
his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe
matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of
the Divine authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to
the will of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe,
he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart
whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human
reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater
merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign
of a more prompt will, as stated above (FS, Question 24,
Article 3, ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words of
the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We now
believe, not for thy saying" (Jn. 4:42).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who
has no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by
reasons. But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on
the authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in
demonstration of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the
merit of his faith is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons which are brought forward in
support of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can
bring intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not
cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing
that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do
not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand,
though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith, but
not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since
they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the
measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even
if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether
it consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases
the merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt
and firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith,
through not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the
wise have greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on
account of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
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