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Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of
justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be
reconciled to the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act
of love, belongs to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of
charity and not of justice.
Objection 2: Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of
the soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about
operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes
of sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems
that it is not an act of justice.
Objection 3: Further, to be careful about the future is not an act
of justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs
to satisfaction, "to give no opening to the suggestions of sin"
[XP, Question 12, Article 3, Objection 1]. Therefore
satisfaction is not an act of justice.
On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that
which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm
states (Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of
justice.
Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external
things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality
between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is
an act of justice.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
3,4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation
between thing and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore,
since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind,
because the adverb "satis" [enough] denotes an equality of
proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act of
justice. Now the act of justice, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by one man to another,
as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by one man
between two others, as when a judge does justice between two men.
When it is an act of justice of one man to another, the equality is
set up in the agent, while when it is something done between two
others, the equality is set up in the subject that has suffered an
injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it
denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to another.
Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and passions or
in external things; even as one may do an injustice to another, either
by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give
is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so far as it
establishes equality between external things, signifies, properly
speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly points to
equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for the other.
Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal, wherefore
satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which inequality
constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a previous
offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense, except
vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently, whether
the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone punishes
himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another
man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same applies
to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it is the
penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that penance is
in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that
satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a
previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is
called penance.
Reply to Objection 1: Satisfaction, as appears from what has been
said, is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury
inflicted entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently
an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back
directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship.
And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is
immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is
directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is
commanded by charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Although justice is chiefly about
operations, yet it is consequently about passions, in so far as they
are the causes of operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest
it inflict an unjust injury on another, and concupiscence from invading
another's marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other
sins.
Reply to Objection 3: Each moral virtue shares in the act of
prudence, because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential
to virtue, since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the
ruling of prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given
in Ethic. ii, 6.
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