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Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in
reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that
whence it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their
causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore
they differ specifically in reference to their causes.
Objection 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to
have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like
its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically
according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in
reference to their other causes.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17,
"Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due
either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to
undue ardor." For it is written (1 Jn. 2:16) that "all that
is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or the
concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life." Now a thing is
said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world
denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in
Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all
sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions
refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ
specifically according to the diversity of their causes.
On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one
species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written
(Ecclus. 10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin,"
and (1 Tim. 6:10) that "the desire of money is the root of all
evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins.
Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different
causes.
I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are
attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal"
and the "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing;
and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form,
both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard
directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations
differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways,
however, because the natural active principles are always determined to
the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken
not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts,
but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are
specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other
hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of
sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently
from one active or motive principle, diverse species of sins can
proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to
theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and
these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor.
Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to
their various active or motive causes, but only in respect of diversity
in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it
has been shown above (Question 1, Article 3; Question 18,
Articles 4,6) that human acts take their species from the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not
being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human
acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the
end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16),
and consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the
end.
Reply to Objection 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have
the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the
interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is
owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even
considered as the matter "about which," they have the character of
term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4;
Ethic. x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so
far as term has the character of end.
Reply to Objection 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as
distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.
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