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Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons
can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge
of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they
said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says
(De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely,
three---"we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one
God, surpassing all things created." And Augustine says
(Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in their works, not in so many
words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning
was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,"
and so on; in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down.
We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rm. 1 and Ex. 8 that the
magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as regards
knowledge of a third person---i.e. of the Holy Ghost ---and
thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise
Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon
itself its own heat." By which words the generation of the Son and
procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore
knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i,
4): "I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary
arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth." So even to
prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite
goodness of God, who communicates Himself infinitely in the
procession of the divine persons; while some are moved by the
consideration that "no good thing can be joyfully possessed without
partnership." Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x,
11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the
word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this
(Question 27, Articles 1,3). Therefore the trinity of
persons can be known by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what
cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that
the divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the
trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think
to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And
Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the
secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent." But
the trinity of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of
generation and procession (Question 30, Article 2). Since,
therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for
which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of
persons cannot be known by reason.
I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Question
12, Articles 4,12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by
natural reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the
knowledge of God, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by
natural reason we can know of God that only which of necessity belongs
to Him as the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental
principle in treating of God as above (Question 12, Article
12). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole
Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not to
the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can
know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to
the distinction of the persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the
trinity of persons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two
ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which
consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed
human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that "faith is of things
that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle says
also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this
world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom of
God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6,7).
Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For
when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons
which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers:
since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe
on such grounds.
Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly
resists the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he
regards the truth of the word"---i.e. "the sacred word, we too
follow this rule."
Reply to Objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of
the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as
paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's
words, "We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
world"---i.e. the philosophers---"knew" (1 Cor.
2:6). Nevertheless, they knew some of the essential attributes
appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the
Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So,
when Aristotle said, "By this number," etc., we must not take it
as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished to say
that the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and
prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three. In
the Platonic books also we find, "In the beginning was the word,"
not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal
type whereby God made all things, and which is appropriated to the
Son. And although they knew these were appropriated to the three
persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third sign---that
is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from
the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing God
"they did not glorify Him as God" (Rm. 1); or, because the
Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also
declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained
the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called
"mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea of all
things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not,
however, assert the existence of a third separate substance which might
correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the
Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of
Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When
Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad," etc., this does not
refer to the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy
Ghost, but to the production of the world. For one God produced one
world by reason of His love for Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to
establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient
proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof
can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of
uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as
furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an
already established principle, by showing the congruity of its
results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is
considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of
the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this
proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain
them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the
like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as,
when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not,
however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such
reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the
infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to
produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God
communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary
that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to
its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness.
Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires
partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect
goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have
the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an
adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not
in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract.
xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not
conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two reason why the knowledge of the
divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right
idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His
Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by
necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we
show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor
because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there
be light," to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw
the light that it was good," to show proof of the divine love. The
same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way,
and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the
human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of
the Holy Ghost.
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