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Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For
whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he
wills; for it is written (Rm. 7:19): "For the good which I
will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do."
Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to
will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's
power: for it is written (Rm. 9:16): "It is not of him that
willeth"---namely, to will---"nor of him that
runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by
another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written
(Prov. 21:1): "The heart of the king is in the hand of the
Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it" and (Phil.
2:13): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to
accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own
actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written
(Jer. 10:23): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it
in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will.
Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5):
"According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it
is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to
us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some
particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made
man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel";
and the gloss adds: "That is of his free-will."
I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels,
exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would
be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some
things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like
manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment,
but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the
wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free
judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural
instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute
animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive
power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But
because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from
a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason,
therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being
inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may
follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and
rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and
therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite
courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is
rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above (Question 81,
Article 3, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the
reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason
forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he
wishes---namely, "not to desire against reason," as Augustine
says.
Reply to Objection 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be
taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will,
but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved
and helped by God.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement,
because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of
necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause
of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be
the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves
causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural
causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving
voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary:
but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He
operates in each thing according to its own nature.
Reply to Objection 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in
the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he
will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes
the help of God.
Reply to Objection 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and
adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual
part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore,
that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the
intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is
happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not
subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above
(Question 82, Articles 1,2). But on the part of the body and
its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as
he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression
whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the
intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And
such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his
end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to
choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the
judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said
(Question 81, Article 3). Wherefore this is in no way
prejudicial to free-will.
The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which
a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even
these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such
qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either
to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to
them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is
repugnant to free-will.
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