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Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from
passion, and says that "operation is a movement in accord with
nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight
is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12;
x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated
in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but
in having been moved; for it arises from good already gained.
Therefore delight is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one
who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in
Ethic. x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being
passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De
Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5
seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of
the soul.
I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly
called passions, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3).
Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement
of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight,
since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is
a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all
at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing."
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural
things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this
happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not
occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur
all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other
natural things, that when these latter are established in the state
becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do.
And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in
the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly
by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its
genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping with the
thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we
assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good.
By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this
establishing is to be understood not as in the process of
establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the
term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as
Plato [Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete fact,"
as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this
establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible
things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that,
since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an
apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered,
is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore
when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered
operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion,
as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an
operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.
Reply to Objection 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an
animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs
to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this
belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has
already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution
ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the
appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired
that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is
possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if
we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the
appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the
appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of
movement.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the name of passion is more
appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil
tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the
soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated
above (Question 23, Articles 1,4): and in this sense delight
is called a passion.
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