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Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with
the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves
distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command
to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the
power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not
one with the command.
Objection 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one
another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But
sometimes the commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes
the command is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore
command is a distinct act from the act commanded.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as
precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally
precedes the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that
"where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But
there is no commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore
they are one.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one
respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one
in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a
difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and
one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now
"one" is predicated in the same way as "being." And substance is
being simply, whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only
in a certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance
are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus
substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is
one simply: because the whole is being and substance simply, and the
parts are being and substances in the whole. But those things which
are distinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are
distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one
people, and many stones are one heap; which is unity of composition or
order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or
species are many simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one
in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the
reason.
Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of
matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has
many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the
act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act
of a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the
higher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as
the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident
that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole
is one, yet in its parts, many.
Reply to Objection 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to
one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the
mover of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the
act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys.
iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that command and the commanded act
can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts.
Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet
they form one whole.
Reply to Objection 3: In those things that are many in parts, but
one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus
the soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other
members.
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