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Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is
proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is
clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now
shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue
or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is
praiseworthy. But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part
of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is
it a part of justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion,
whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of
fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and
aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from
something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is
about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a
part of honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that
"shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind,
averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of
sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the
beautiful." Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now
certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and
inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according
to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act;
wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of
praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 12). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9)
that shamefacedness is not a virtue.
I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in
a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in
Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with
perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue.
Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the
fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is
fear of a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and
difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as
stated above (FS, Question 40, Article 1; FS, Question
41, Article 2; FS, Question 42, Article 3), when we
were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous
habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to
do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a
virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way
/shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a
praiseworthy passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the
notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in
virtue's definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that
it be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice.
Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of
baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated (Question 142,
Article 4) that the vice of intemperance is most base and
disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than
to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base
action though not according to the species of the passion, namely
fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are
base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other
virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing
that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the
perfection of honesty.
Reply to Objection 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every
good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not
follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although
every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
Reply to Objection 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of
an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would
be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
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