|
Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in
the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If
therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be
passion in the predestined.
Objection 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was
predestined," etc. (Rm. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who
is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De
Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of
one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually
exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.
Objection 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing
prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits,
as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore
predestination is something in the predestined.
Objection 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition
of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the
definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of
grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore
predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is
in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is
eternal.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14)
that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But
foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who
foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who
predestines, and not in the predestined.
I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined;
but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that
predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything
in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider,
as was proved above (Question 22, Article 1). But the
execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way
in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence
it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of
some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind.
The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the
predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is
the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rm.
8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He
called, them He also magnified."
Reply to Objection 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply
of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and
cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding
and willing, as said above (Question 14, Article 2; Question
18, Article 3, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this
latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the
predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things,
has an effect in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission
of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of
someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense
for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner
we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In
this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any
unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus
destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination,
however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be
attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way
destination is accepted.
Reply to Objection 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in
respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent
to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is
predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself
to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done.
Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving
the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
Reply to Objection 4: Grace does not come into the definition of
predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as
predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and
of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is
anything temporal.
|
|