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Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear
is a sin, as stated above (Article 1). But sin does not excuse
from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse
from sin.
Objection 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all
would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is,
a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no
excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does
not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from
sin.
Objection 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or
spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because
instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of
temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor
sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own
wickedness." Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse
from sin.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Question 1,
Cap. Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly
ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), fear is sinful in so
far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges
certain evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin
not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason
judges to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided
than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin
if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a
robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners,
rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the
other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according
to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to
reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from
sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the
soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and evils of the
body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to
incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the
body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as
loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to
avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet
one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear
is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a
certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear
are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its
sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to
all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an
object of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who
held temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence
that temporal evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are
nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
ii) these temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was
also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are
indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to
renounce that which is good according to virtue.
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