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Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their
substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the
angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things
which are happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his
essence. Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which
are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object
understood." But the object understood is the same as the one who
understands it, as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore
in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the
object is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it.
Objection 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is
there according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an
intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an
intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower
orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in
the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in
all. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the
angels are enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know
by the forms of things, and not by their own substance.
I answer that, The medium through which the intellect understands,
is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it
is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may
be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to
which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is
that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly
complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of
the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that
form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding
all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or
universal truth. The angel's essence, however, does not comprise
all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and
species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite,
simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God
alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all
things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some
species in order to know things.
Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the angel knows things
according to his own nature, the words "according to" do not
determine the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the
similitude of the thing known; but they denote the knowing power,
which belongs to the angel of his own nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act,
as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive
power is the sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but
because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so
likewise the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in
act, not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude
by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form.
Now, it is precisely the same thing to say "in things which are
without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object
understood," as to say that "the intellect in act is the thing
understood in act"; for a thing is actually understood, precisely
because it is immaterial.
Reply to Objection 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and
those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not
indeed perfectly, nor according to their own proper
formality---because the angel's essence, as being finite, is
distinguished by its own formality from other things---but according
to some common formality. Yet all things are perfectly and according
to their own formality in God's essence, as in the first and
universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or
common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all
things by His own essence: and this the angel has not, but only a
common knowledge.
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