|
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the
active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the
cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power.
Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power.
Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
the "active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it
is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear
eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore
it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
Objection 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the
intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the
active life, as stated above (Article 1), so do the intellectual
virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem
that prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative
life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes
mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that
prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues
belong.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, ad 3; FS,
Question 18, Article 6), if one thing be directed to another as
its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of
the thing to which it is directed: for instance "he who commits
adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident
that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral
virtues as its end, since it is "right reason applied to action"
(Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the
principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book.
Accordingly, as it was stated above (Article 1, ad 3) that the
moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation
belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which
is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs
directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its proper
sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.
If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any
kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part
thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully
(De Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and
quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be
considered most prudent and wise."
Reply to Objection 1: Moral works take their species from their
end, as stated above (FS, Question 18, Articles 4,6),
wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that
which has its end in the very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge
of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power,
belongs to the active life.
Reply to Objection 2: External occupation makes a man see less in
intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with
which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the
external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more clearly
in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on
account of experience, and on account of the mind's attention, since
"brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes
[Bell. Catilin., LI].
Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between
the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same
subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter
as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate
between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things
about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the
contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
|
|