|
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and
meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow.
Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or
fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest
that which we are free to do be done without devotion and
unwillingly." Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the
necessity of fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to fast
without taking the vow.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7):
"Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or
of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil
sorrowfully what they have vowed: and this seems to be due to the
necessity arising from the vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow
according to Metaph. v [Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is
better to do something without a vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.
Objection 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing
the will on that which is vowed, as stated above (Article 4). But
the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that
thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow
than without a vow.
On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye
and pay," says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel
is about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed
in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it
without a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it,
whereas he that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the
counsel to vow and the counsel to do it.
I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to
do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to
vow, as stated above (Article 5) is an act of religion which is the
chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the
better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior
virtue is the better the more meritorious for being commanded by a
superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it,
just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by
charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for instance,
fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is
an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious, if they be done
in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship,
being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg.
viii) that "not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it
is consecrated to God, and cherished by godly continence."
Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects
himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself
to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in
future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives
the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm
[Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank
even those who promise, as stated above (Article 5, ad 2).
Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do
anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection
of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as
to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin
against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Question 14, Article
2).
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted should be understood as
referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary
and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we
are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the
other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the
immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases
devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of
coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But
the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in
so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent
not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer
do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If,
however, the very deed, considered in itself, were to become
disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to
fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it
were done without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of
religion which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is
an act.
Reply to Objection 3: He who does something without having vowed it
has an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and
at the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether
fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow:
for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did
that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.
|
|