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Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a
part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every
intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But
docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it
should not be accounted a part of prudence.
Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in
our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are
praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this
is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it
is not a part of prudence.
Objection 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas
prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to
teachers, who are also called "preceptors." Therefore docility is
not a part of prudence.
On the contrary, Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following
the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 2, ad 1; Question
47, Article 3) prudence is concerned with particular matters of
action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can
consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it
requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in
very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who
have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right
to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions
of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent,
than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an
insight into principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5):
"Lean not on thy own prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35):
"Stand in the multitude of the ancients" (i.e. the old men),
"that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom."
Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and
consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence
Reply to Objection 1: Although docility is useful for every
intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the
reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even
as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count
for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must
carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of
the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising
them through pride.
Reply to Objection 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for
others, but also for himself, as stated above (Question 47,
Article 12, ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even
in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which docility pertains.
And yet even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no
man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated
above.
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