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Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not
unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My
lots are in Thy hands," says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for
it is a means of ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt."
Objection 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the
observances which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy
men. Now both in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men
practicing the casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14,
sqq.) that Josue, at the Lord's command, pronounced sentence by
lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing
lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kgs.
14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the
Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonas 1:7,
sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk.
1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the
apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that
divination by lots is not unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy,"
i.e. single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water,
which are called "popular" trials, seem to come under the head of
sortilege, because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet
these practices seem to be lawful, because David is related to have
engaged in single combat with the Philistine (1 Kgs. 17:32,
sqq.). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not
unlawful.
On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu.
v, can. Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which
means you make up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the
Fathers have condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft.
For which reason we wish them to be condemned altogether, and
henceforth not to be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the
practice thereof under pain of anathema."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), sortilege consists,
properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result
one may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots
one seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a
possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or
other, it is called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know
what ought to be done, it is called "sortilege of consultation"; if
one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of
divination." Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege
and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars.
Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the
human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the
dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and
consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that a
divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.
Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must
needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If
we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege of
allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as
in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of
something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus
leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.
If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual
cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech.
21:21) that "the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the
head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired
of the idols, and consulted entrails": sortilege of this kind is
unlawful, and forbidden by the canons.
Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to
Prov. 16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are
disposed of by the Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in
itself, as Augustine declares [Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2;
cf. Objection 1].
Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have
recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount
to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Lk.
1:8, says: "He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment
of men." Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have
recourse to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the
Apostles, Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): "But if anyone,
compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, after the apostles'
example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take note that the
apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling together the
assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God." Thirdly,
if the Divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence
Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): "Those who
tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that
they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does
this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the
Divine oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things of this
life." Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in
ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the
inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super
Act. Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias
was decided by lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost
was not yet poured forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons
were ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is
different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of
earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have recourse
to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions.
If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the
divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed.
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a
time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of
them is to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them
is to flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be
no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they
must be chosen by lot." Again he says (De Doctr. Christ.
xxviii): "If thou aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give
to him who hath not, and which cannot be given to two; should two come
to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either in need or in some
claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot
to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not give to both."
This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.
Reply to Objection 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is
directed to the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of
something done by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of
lots. But in so far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it
surpasses the common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial
is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of
the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such
like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a
decree of Pope Stephen V [II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]:
"The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from
anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one
must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not
sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable
that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the culprit
has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been approved,
with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown crimes must
be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men."
The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that it
approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous
effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in
strength or skill.
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