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Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and
form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever
things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God;
by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are
living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div.
Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality
participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is
primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner,
in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is
potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must
participate of primary matter, as part of itself.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found,
there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the
soul---namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a
subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to
knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause
of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did.
vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is
created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.
Objection 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is
a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone.
Therefore the soul has matter.
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9)
proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of
spiritual matter.
I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this
question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general;
for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now,
either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue
of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then
it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we
understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an
act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act,
since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto.
If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we
call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first,
we call the "primary animate."
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is
received into something is received according to the condition of the
recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the
knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature
absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and
therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal
idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul
itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and
form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form,
the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it
would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive
powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the
principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore,
that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has
knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and
form.
Reply to Objection 1: The First Act is the universal principle of
all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all
things," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things
participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of
Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be
proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the
First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse,
so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as
there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for
then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of
the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual
soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as
appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary
matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives
absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the
intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and
form.
Reply to Objection 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to
matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the
potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of
primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of
subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge,
and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in
potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does
the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it
actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent
form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle,
nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after
the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things
composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which
moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter
are simply beings at once."
Reply to Objection 4: Everything participated is compared to the
participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to
subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even
life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence,"
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is
limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who
is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual
substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not,
indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence.
Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are"
and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a
thing is.
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