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Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is
but one virtue about operations.
Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which
are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause
diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common
good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs
a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations
does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about
various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow
diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the
function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of
commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic.
v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different
operations.
On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety,
both of which are about operations.
I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree
in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due
to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions.
The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of
reason is established, as we have stated (Article 2), not
according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according
to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we
derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of
justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give
another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations,
bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the thing due is
not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an
equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in
yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises
from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And
corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues:
e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety,"
whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country;
"Gratitude," whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so
forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Justice properly so called is one special
virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the
equivalent. But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in
which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special
virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: That justice which seeks the common good is
another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an
individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and
Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which
directs man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs
man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command:
since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the
common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that
justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ,
save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical
difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that
is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (SS, Question
61, Article 1).
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