|
Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not
hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does
not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is
higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not
hindered through suspension of the senses.
Objection 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect.
But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn.
et Vigil. i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while
asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered
through suspension of the senses.
On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against the moral
law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while
asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the
judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.
I answer that, As we have said above (Article 7), our
intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible
thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed,
unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially
if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the
Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical
science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is
perceived principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek
knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he
may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural
philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse,
save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things
which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith
cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the
knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge
perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But in
the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison
to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our
intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended,
through which sensible things are known to us.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect is superior to the
senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its
first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. And
therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to
the judgment of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper
through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as
we read in De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to
the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended.
For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses
suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms;
thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating
and drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat
less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it
happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more
attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus
especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and
those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be
very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but
also the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a
man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were,
between things, and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense
remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates
some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some
particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and
imagination are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered,
though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep,
when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.
|
|