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Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived,
understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to
exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore
falsity does not exist in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no
falsity in the intellect.
On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,22 that
"where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and
falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore
truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.
I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the
knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known.
Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs
to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to
be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the
thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with
regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto.
For it has been said (Article 2) that sight is not deceived in its
proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that
object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is
directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the
intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the
intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the
intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it
understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or
is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards
judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or
accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference,
as before mentioned regarding truth (Question 16, Article 2),
that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect
is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas
in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above (Article
2).
But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with
the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in
that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a
thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it.
This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect
applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a
circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of
another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are
mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the
thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable
four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in
making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are
four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect
cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either
true, or it understands nothing at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper
object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing
when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes
place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense
Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived,
understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense
that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is always right as regards
first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same
reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known
principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the
subject.
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