|
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not two keys but only
one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal
of which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the
Church does not require two keys for one sin.
Objection 2: Further, the keys are given when orders are
conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes
is acquired, nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is
possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a
key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging.
Objection 3: Further, the power which the priest has over the
mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ's
true body. Now the power of consecrating Christ's true body is but
one. Therefore the power which regards Christ's mystic body is but
one. But this is a key. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that there are more than
two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to
act, so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a
key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve
should be counted as a key.
Objection 5: Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now
the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of
sins. Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be
conformed to the Trinity.
I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the
recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the
act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and
accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a
man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to
discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power
is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we
have in our power; nor can there be judgment, without the right to
enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing,
which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first
principles which cannot be gainsaid, and, in practical matters, from
the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act
of the key requires fitness in the person on whom it is
exercised---because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key,
"admits the worthy and excludes the unworthy," as may be seen from
the definition given above (Article 2)---therefore the judge
requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be
worthy, and also the very act of receiving (that man's confession);
and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary.
Accordingly we may distinguish two keys, the first of which regards
the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while
the other regards the absolution.
These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since
both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison
with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.
Reply to Objection 1: One key is ordained immediately to the
opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be
ordained to the act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For
it is the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that
opens the lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to
whom that lock should be opened.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about the key of
knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit,
acquired or infused, is the key in this case, and that it is not the
principal key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another
key: so that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for
instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although
priests lack this key at times, through being without knowledge,
acquired or infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make
use of their natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion call a
little key, so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with
orders, yet with the conferring of orders the knowledge becomes a key
which it was not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the
Master (Sent. iv, D, 19).
But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby
the keys are promised to Peter (Mt. 16:19), so that not only
one but two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion
holds that the key is not knowledge considered as a habit, but the
authority to exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is
sometimes without knowledge, while the knowledge is sometimes present
without the authority. This may be seen even in secular courts, for a
secular judge may have the authority to judge, without having the
knowledge of the law, while another man, on the contrary, has
knowledge of the law without having the authority to judge. And since
the act of judging to which a man is bound through the authority which
is vested in him, and not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be
well performed without both of the above, the authority to judge,
which is the key of knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one
who lacks knowledge; whereas knowledge void of authority can be
possessed without sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of consecrating is directed to only
one act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys,
nor is it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to
different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority it is
but one, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: Everyone is free to will, so that no one
needs authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.
Reply to Objection 5: All three Persons remit sins in the same way
as one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the
minister of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since
the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key,
as stated above (ad 4).
|
|