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Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more
gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts
against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Lk.
12:47, "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and
did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Now the
incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the
intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent
man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless
acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he
desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate.
Objection 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more
incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being
most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of
incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of
intemperance. For a person's sin is cured by admonishment and
correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since
he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it
seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were
good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the
incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
Objection 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous
his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate,
since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the
intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man
sins more gravely than the intemperate.
On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that
"impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not
inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every
incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore the intemperate
man sins more gravely than the incontinent.
I answer that, According to Augustine [De Duab. Anim. x, xi]
sin is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and
live aright" [Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a
greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in
the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas
in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion.
And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition
difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents
at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate
man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has
become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in
reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that "they
are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked
things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much worse
than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
vii, 7).
Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes
the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the
ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so
far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the
reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such
like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the
inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in
both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the
appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the
incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless
greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the
incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the
incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures,
just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is
disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without
ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is
likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the
intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the
ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of
choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing
now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is about the end
itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may
follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better than the
intemperate, because he retains the best principle," to wit, the
right estimate of the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the
incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which
quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy
of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his
desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above
(Question 142, Article 2). By these same means the
intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for
two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as
regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as
the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring
back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same
in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other
reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the
intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to
remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a
passion, which is more easily suppressed.
Reply to Objection 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a
sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as
explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive
appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does
not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate
man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more
the intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it
or with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done
if he had desired it with passion?"
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