|
Objection 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative
intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we
have said above (Question 55, Article 2). But speculative
habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from
practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the habits of the
speculative intellect are not virtues.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is about those things by which man is
made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue"
(Ethic. i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human
acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather
things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits
cannot be called virtues.
Objection 3: Further, science is a speculative habit. But science
and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not
subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore
speculative habits are not virtues.
On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary
things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of
the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than
they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are
virtues.
I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as
stated above (Question 55, Article 3), a habit, as we have
already observed (Question 56, Article 3), may be called a
virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing
good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of
it. The latter condition, as above stated (Question 55, Article
3), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of
the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the
powers and habits to their respective uses.
Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect
the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the
intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they
confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth
(since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not
called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right
use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative
science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but
he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has
scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has,
is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects
the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these
speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the acts
of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says
(Moral. vi) that the "contemplative life has greater merit than the
active life."
Reply to Objection 1: Work is of two kinds, exterior and
interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is
contrasted with the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior
work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is
ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the
truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue is about certain things in two ways.
In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these
speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made
happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the
efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is
the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be
about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about
those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of
these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they
are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the
contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (Question 3,
Article 7).
Reply to Objection 3: Science is contrasted with virtue taken in
the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.
|
|