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Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in
irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii):
"Effects are contingent images of their causes." But God is the
cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures.
Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.
Objection 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer
it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the
Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness,
the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in
goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all
things together are called "very good" (Gn. 1:31). Therefore
the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man.
Objection 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of
God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His
image." Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not
only the rational creature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12):
"Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own
image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the
beasts of the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made
to God's image.
I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's
image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is
made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that
thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But
the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of
the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident,
and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper.
Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same
species."
Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because
they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says
(Questions. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in
likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It
is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly
speaking, are made to God's image.
Reply to Objection 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of
what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an
image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God,
participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says
that effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as
much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine
goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity
which is involved in the idea of an image.
Reply to Objection 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than
the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but
intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is
found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the
highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided
against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we
say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do
not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but
that the other parts are excluded.
Reply to Objection 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to
express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic
species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of
the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however,
using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in
nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the
First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as
intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.
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