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Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not
always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality
of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him
that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that
which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed
into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the
person that took it, but by the one that has it.
Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime.
But by making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as
in the case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not
always bound to restitution.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several
times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time,
and one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a
thing is not always bound to restitution.
On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now
restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a
thing is bound to restore it.
I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken another's
property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the
taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as
long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in
addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to
him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the
other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may
be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will
of the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is
bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by
reason of the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in
his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain
nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he
that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for
the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he
must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes
another's property for his own profit but without committing an
injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a
loan: and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason
of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost
the thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a
favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose
thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to
the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit;
wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account
of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound to
restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this thing
be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not bound to
restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the thing
through a grievous fault on his part.
Reply to Objection 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he
who has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has
less than his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for
restitution in those things which one man may receive from another
without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from
another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something
from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having
transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is
his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on
account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of the
thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his
crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in
confession; and so he may make restitution of another's property
through the priest to whom he confesses.
Reply to Objection 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the
compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has
been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received
sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to any
further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the
person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them
from so doing.
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