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Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion
of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its
object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as
it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power
in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the
object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good
defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive
appetite does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower;
thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the
rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher
mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even
as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore
the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which
is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not
use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De
Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material
force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a
passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective
appetite.
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath
perverted thy heart."
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or
move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two
ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the
soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of
necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power
becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both
because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the
contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be
directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a
certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one
thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of
distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in
respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational
appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether
impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension
of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in
those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the
apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power
follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of
the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we
observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn
their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result
being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the
sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it
also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive
appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a
certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the
lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as
stated.
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
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