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Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For
virtue conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps.
104:18, "They humbled his feet in fetters." Therefore
humility is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now
humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus.
19:23): "There is one that humbleth himself wickedly."
Therefore humility is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims
at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
that humility is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is
perfect" (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly
belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble,
since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is
not a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and
passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned
by the Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is
it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would
seem not to be a virtue.
On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, "He hath
regarded the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in
Luc.): "One of the virtues, humility, is particularly commended
in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am
meek, and humble of heart.'"
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 23, Article
2) when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good has
something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and
likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of
obtaining it. In respect of the former there arises the movement of
hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it
has been stated above (FS, Question 61, Article 2) that for
those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an
object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue,
while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part
of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on.
Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult
good: one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high
things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and
another to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the
pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is
magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a
humble man is so called because he is, as it were, 'humo
acclinis'", i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in
two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when
one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own
failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus
Abraham said to the Lord (Gn. 18:27), "I will speak to my
Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a
virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance
when man, "not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless
beasts, and becomes like to them" (Ps. 48:13).
Reply to Objection 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as
it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to
the lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward
signs and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which
Augustine says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous
pride," since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory.
Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul,
and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue,
because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in the inward
choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
Reply to Objection 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming
at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind
to great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
that each is according to right reason.
Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways.
First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its
nature nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is
perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine
nature, but only as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing
may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in
respect of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is
perfect: although in comparison with God his perfection is found
wanting, according to the word of Is. 40:17, "All nations are
before Him as if they had no being at all." In this way humility may
be competent to every man.
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues
as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another
is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a
matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special
virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake
he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.
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