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Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something
real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every
number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God
signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in
God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures,
belongs to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the
numeral terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more
so in God.
Objection 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything
real in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing
sense, as plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove
plurality; it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the
mind and obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it
must be said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of
oneness and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When
we say one God, unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply
quantity in God." Hence we see that these terms are applied to God
in order to remove something; and not to denote anything positive.
I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that
the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have
only a negative meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material,
and is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is
a species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material
things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of
division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but
is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by
many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.
Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God,
but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the
strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in
God there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in
the proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which
is quantity.
But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only
a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude
in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to
the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with
"being" is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add
anything to being, except a negation of division, as we saw when
treating of the divine unity (Question 11, Article 1); for
"one" signifies undivided being. So, of whatever we say "one,"
we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance, "one" applied
to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the
same way, when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter sense
points to those things as being each undivided in itself.
But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident
added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that
number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of
which they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated
(Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right
(Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say, the essence is one, the
term "one" signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the
person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we say the
persons are many, we signify those persons, and their individual
undividedness; for it is of the very nature of multitude that it should
be composed of units.
Reply to Objection 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider
and more general than substance and relation. And so likewise is
multitude; hence in God it may mean both substance and relation,
according to the context. Still, the very signification of such names
adds a negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in
creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking
of God: unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision
to those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is
applicable to God.
Reply to Objection 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but
division, which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does
not remove unity, but division from each of the individuals which
compose the multitude. This was explained when we treated of the
divine unity (Question 11, Article 2).
It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude
is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does
not follow that these terms express this signification alone. For
blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness
does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
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