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Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are
synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly
the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing
in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is
His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
Objection 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the
same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an
idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if
these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all
these ideas are vain notions.
Objection 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea,
is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant,
as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied
to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the
like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful,
the Lord of hosts is Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This
would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to
remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it
would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But
even according to what was said above (Article 2), that these names
signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is
also clear from what has been said (Articles 1,2) that they have
diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception
in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our
intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand
God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from
God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and
simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and
multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures,
there corresponds one simple principle represented by different
perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to
the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there
corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these
conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names
applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that
under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and
absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through
the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty
and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what
are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and
unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet
multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold
manner, as things represent Him.
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