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Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as
its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine
(De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated
above (Article 1). Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not
in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the
preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore
unbelief is in the will.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss [Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on
2 Cor. 11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an
angel of light," says that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good
angel, and be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an
unhealthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a good
angel." This seems to be because of the rectitude of the will of the
man who adheres to the angel, since his intention is to adhere to a
good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief seems to consist entirely in
a perverse will: and, consequently, it does not reside in the
intellect.
On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the
same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in
the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 74, Articles
1,2), sin is said to be in the power which is the principle of the
sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two principles: one is its
first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sin; and
this is the will, because every sin is voluntary. The other principle
of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits
the sinful act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and
lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now
dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the
intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.
Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in
which way every sin is said to be in the will.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's
dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of
unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good
one, does not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily
senses are deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and
right judgment" as the gloss observes [Augustine, Enchiridion
lx]. But, according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when
he begins to invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is
not without sin.
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