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Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the
sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But
the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the
intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal
effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot
cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as
following the universal apprehension of the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover
is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be
reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite,
inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the
sensitive appetite does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is
tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But
man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were
moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides.
Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), that which is
apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object.
Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two
causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or
of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of
relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that
taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in
various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is,
such does the end seem to him."
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is
affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not
seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way,
the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply
and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect.
Accordingly the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive
appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant,
in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is
more excellent.
Reply to Objection 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to
singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is
a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i,
2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command,
the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic
sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and
politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and
can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
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