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Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit
than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed
is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall
receive his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is
ascribed to the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for
Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to
God must first of all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia,
that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the
principle." Therefore the active life is of greater merit than the
contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the
happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jn.
21:22, "So I will have him to remain till I come," says
(Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): "This may be expressed more clearly:
Let perfect works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion,
and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may be
perfected when I shall come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.) that "contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in
our heavenly home." Now the life to come will be a state not of
meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the
contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit
than the active, but more of the character of reward.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that
"no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now
by the zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active
life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of
greater merit than the active.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are
the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the
contemplative."
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question 114, Article
4), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above
(Question 25, Article 1), charity consists in the love of God
and our neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than
the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Question 27, Article
8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God
is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the
love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the contemplative life
pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the Divine
"truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life, for
it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as
stated above (Question 181, Article 4, ad 2). On the other
hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our
neighbor, because it is "busy about much serving" (Lk.
10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of
greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by
Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The contemplative life
surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the
stress of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our
neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of
the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of God.
Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the
active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For
instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer
separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time
being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus
the Apostle says (Rm. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an
anathema from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom
expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [Ad Demetr. de
Compunct. Cordis.]): "His mind was so steeped in the love of
Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he
despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ."
Reply to Objection 1: External labor conduces to the increase of
the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the
essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor
borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this
life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.
Reply to Objection 2: In the state of future happiness man has
arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by
merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by
reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation
is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect;
wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet
greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
Reply to Objection 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually
when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God
specially accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in
sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his
soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own
soul, pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others,
according to Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say:
Come." And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul
to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is
more acceptable to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of
others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement
that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls,"
does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the
merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to
offer to God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other
external gifts.
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