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Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for
both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of
virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if
distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would
seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.
Objection 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with
distributive justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever
can be distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v,
2), which very things are the subject matter of commutations between
one person and another, and this belongs to commutative justice.
Therefore the matters of distributive and commutative justice are not
distinct.
Objection 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs
from that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ
specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to be
no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2)
reckons commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds
of matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is,
seemingly, not of many kinds.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that "one kind of
justice directs distributions, and another commutations."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 51, Articles
8,10), justice is about certain external operations, namely
distribution and commutation. These consist in the use of certain
externals, whether things, persons or even works: of things, as when
one man takes from or restores to another that which is his; of
persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person of another,
for instance by striking or insulting him, or even by showing respect
for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another,
or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter of
each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are
the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the
same, since things can be distributed out of the common property to
individuals, and be the subject of commutation between one person and
another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of
laborious works.
If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the
principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things,
and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For
distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice
directs commutations that can take place between two persons. of these
some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when
anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will,
and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In
either case the offence may be committed against the other man's
chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the
offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called
"theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against
another man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his
person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his
person, a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck
or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck
or maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured
secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is
deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of
law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a
man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most
part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be
induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly.
The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury
may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them
also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master
are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a
slave is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary
commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another
person. And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no
debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of
liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it
includes the notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First
when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for
another thing, as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man
transfers his thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it
with the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use
of a thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear
fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no
fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is
granted gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a
man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for
the purpose of its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a
"deposit," or under some obligation, as when a man pledges his
property, or when one man stands security for another. In all these
actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the
same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence all these
actions belong to the one same species of justice, namely commutative
justice. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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