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Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which
is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever
reason may appear to the contrary."
Objection 2: Further, false is derived from "fallere". But
things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false
is not found in things.
Objection 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by
conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above (Question
16). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God.
Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus
nothing is false.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34):
"Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity
without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet
falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites
stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in
things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the
intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs
to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it
accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared
with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared
"per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another
intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things
depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.
Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in
themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art;
whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short
of the proper operation of his art.
In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far
as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes
place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless
perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their
power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists
the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in
the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you
love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the
other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being
obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He
that doth truth, cometh to the light" (Jn. 3:21).
But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared
thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but
relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing
signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or
represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything
can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as
if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says
(Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector":
even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to
that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called
false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that
naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to
judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its
rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external
accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things
other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those
things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding
this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things
false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false
that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are
not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in false
opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way
many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in
Metaph. v, 34.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said
to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is
not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in
Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a
certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of
falseness.
Reply to Objection 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature,
but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness
they bear to things which they actually are not.
Reply to Objection 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared
with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply,
but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only
relatively.
To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as
it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said
to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the
resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any
one case, but in the majority of instances.
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