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Objection 1: It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Lk.
14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy
friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most
closely united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those
rather who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers
and to those who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when
thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.
Objection 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of
very great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help
a fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
preference to those who are most closely united to us.
Objection 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring
gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who
have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our
benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.
Objection 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his
children, as stated above (Question 26, Article 9). Yet a man
ought to be more beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the
children to lay up for the parents," according to 2 Cor.
12:14. Therefore we are not bound to be more beneficent to those
who are more closely united to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28):
"Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly
who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of
chance are more closely united to us."
I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which
is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that
every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on
the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next
to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness
first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him,
as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of
benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be
most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.
Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to
the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the
intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens
is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and
so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways
according to these various connections, because we ought in preference
to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which,
speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this
may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or
matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to
succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own
father, if he is not in such urgent need.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to
invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so
that they may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of
charity but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought
rather to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it
must be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor
those rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two,
one be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is
not possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to
help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as
well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a
prudent man.
Reply to Objection 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than
the good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man
to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the
temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage
together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the
soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a
private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a
whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be
preferred to one who is a blood relation.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is
one which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but
rather as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a
man may have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either
because he has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or
in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what
he owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless
perchance the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take
another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet,
again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in
which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be
weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would take
into consideration, because, on account of the different particular
cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is
impossible to lay down a general rule.
The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the
debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not
because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity,
as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers
a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents:
wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give the first
place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other side,
there be such weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance,
for instance the common good of the Church or state. In other cases
we must take to account the connection and the benefit received; and
here again no general rule can laid down.
Reply to Objection 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a
parent's love tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love
tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme
urgency it would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's
parents, to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the
obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have received
from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
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