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Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin
from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now
dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory
(Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since
understanding denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense
is the same as blindness of mind.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking
of dulness describes it as "dullness of sense in respect of
understanding." Now dulness of sense in respect of understanding
seems to be the same as a defect in understanding, which pertains to
blindness of mind. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness
of mind.
Objection 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be
chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated
above (Article 1), while dulness of sense is a natural defect.
But a natural defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of
sense would not be a sin, which is contrary to what Gregory says
(Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it among the sins arising
from gluttony.
On the contrary, Different causes produce different effects. Now
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from
gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these
others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be
sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through
being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of
metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its
object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive
the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in
corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can perceive
a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on
the other hand they are said to be dull, through being unable to
perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or of great
power.
Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in
connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of
certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the
senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of
knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does
not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but
through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a
thing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its
effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in
connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a
property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing
itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details:
whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his
understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a thing,
without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is unable to
obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature of
that thing.
Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a
certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual
goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the
knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of
understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending
them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This
dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that
is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to
his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful
consideration of spiritual things.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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