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Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For
whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our
intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it
belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our
intellect knows this singular, Socrates.
Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action.
But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect
knows the singular.
Objection 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in
itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own;
for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows
singulars.
Objection 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by
an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more,
therefore, can the intellect know it.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that
"the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by
sense."
I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material
things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the
principle of singularity in material things is individual matter,
whereas our intellect, as have said above (Question 85, Article
1), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such
matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the
universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only.
But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know
the singular, because, as we have said above (Question 85,
Article 7), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the
intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in
which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7.
Therefore it understands the universal directly through the
intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the
phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition "Socrates is a man."
Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done
is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect,
as is said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be
directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the
medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of
the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the
particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima
iii, 11.
Reply to Objection 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the
singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood
otherwise than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial
singular such as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be
intelligible.
Reply to Objection 4: The higher power can do what the lower power
can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows
materially and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the
intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the
universal.
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