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Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united
to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's
attribute alone---that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood
to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of
corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super
Cant.): "Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do
immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on
account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But
it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance."
Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called
animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial
bodies." But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore
angels have bodies naturally united to them.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel
a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul.
Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.
Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in
souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body.
Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to
them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the
angels are understood to be incorporeal."
I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them.
For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found
universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings,
because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every
animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any
corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Question 75, Article
2), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature
of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some
intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it
belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is
imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual
substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but
acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be
explained later on (Question 84, Article 6; Question 89,
Article 1). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus
we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the
intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances,
which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things.
Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but
some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (Question 50, Article
1) it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and
consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal
substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some
even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us
(De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith,
which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps.
8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens"; Origen,
while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion
of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was
also in many other points, by following the opinions of the ancient
philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the
created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally
united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained
(Article 2). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but
merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there
are some aerial animals, which they termed demons.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal
metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection
simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kgs.
2:6): "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life
formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which
has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an
intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect
than one which is united to a body.
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