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Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the
intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the
end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first
and highest power.
Objection 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a
progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in
the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is
more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows
the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and
perfect power than the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as
perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects
the will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which
perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If
I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and
have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher
power than the intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the
higher power than the intellect.
I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be
considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a
thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in
itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else.
If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to
themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear
if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object
of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the
will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible
good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect,
is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a
thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the
object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will.
Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its
object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is
higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with
something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the
intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in
something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect.
Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler
than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler
than something in which there is color, though color is nobler and
simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Question 16,
Article 1; Question 27, Article 4), the action of the
intellect consists in this---that the idea of the thing understood is
in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in
this---that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in
itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did.
v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are
in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the
intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which
there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea
understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than
the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the
soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher
than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge
of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is
better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is
nobler than the will.
Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by
comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of
good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more
absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good
is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch
as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends
this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other
powers.
Reply to Objection 2: What precedes in order of generation and time
is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes
act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes
absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act
precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the
will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the
active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the
will.
Reply to Objection 3: This reason is verified of the will as
compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by
which we love God.
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