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Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to
exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a
sense to live" (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the
angel to understand is to exist.
Objection 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as
effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as
the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the
angel to understand is to exist.
On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement,
as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not
movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any
creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix,
text. 16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes
out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and
cutting; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains
within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such
actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place
within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action
that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agent's
existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes
something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the
second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or
relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act "to
understand," of which the object is "the true"; and the act "to
will," of which the object is "the good"; each of which is
convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of
themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species
from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for
it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things
visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus
and species; God's being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all
things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the
Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of
the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is,
for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the
Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for
there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to
the various functions of life.
Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his
entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of
understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence.
Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is
compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of
understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal
object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that,
although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence
and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account
it does not follow that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to
understand.'
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