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Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect
friendship is that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is
the cause of friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not
a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of
this kind of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both
from those he loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it
seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of
friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with
virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a
wise man decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles.
7:5): "The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the
heart of fools where there is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a
virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now
this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv,
6), "is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to
give pain." Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue.
Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the
congregation of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we
mean by friendship, is a special virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 109, Article 2;
FS, Question 55, Article 3), since virtue is directed to
good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a
special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above
(Question 109, Article 2). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual
relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that
they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need
of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and
this virtue is called friendliness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold
friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection
whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue. We have
stated above, in treating of charity (Question 23, Article 1,
Article 3, ad 1; Questions 25,26), what things belong to
this kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, which
consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect
nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far
as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in
contact.
Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by
a certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19)
that "every beast loveth its like." This love is signified by signs
of friendship, which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to
those who are strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no
dissimulation in this: because we do not show them signs of perfect
friendship, for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as
those who are united to us by special friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise
is where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rm. 14:15): "If, because
of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to
charity": but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful,
according to Ecclus. 7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them
that weep, and walk with them that mourn." Again, "the heart of
fools is where there is mirth," not that they may gladden others, but
that they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the
wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not
lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures,
according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how pleasant it
is for brethren to dwell together in unity."
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the
sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil,
the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8):
"Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent,"
and further on (2 Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you
were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto
repentance." For this reason we should not show a cheerful face to
those who are given to sin, in order that we may please them, lest we
seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin
further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26): "Hast thou
daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance
gay towards them."
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