|
Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For
one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are
contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that
"evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a
piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
Objection 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and
takes away good. But that from which something is always being
removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which
cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes
good.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil
cannot wholly consume good."
I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we
must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly
destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is
wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of
good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is
the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of
the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is
diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the
aptitude of a subject to some actuality.
The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered
by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of
remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission
likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity.
For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions
whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are
multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its
perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission
by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the
matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the
potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.
Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and
intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the
aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the
active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and
humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is
diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the
contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid
aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet,
nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always
remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque
bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the
aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still
it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its
very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to
infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more
lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed
between us and God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have
divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul
is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly
taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
Reply to Objection 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between
subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by
evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was.
Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its
relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially
taken away.
Reply to Objection 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this
kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the
continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever
same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a
third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not
avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we
continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half
of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above
mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either
equally or more.
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but
accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased
infinitely, as explained above.
|
|