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Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For
whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are
all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things
which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither
is God altogether simple.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God.
But with us that which is composite is better than that which is
simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and
animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said
that God is altogether simple.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God
is truly and absolutely simple."
I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there
is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not
a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature
differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence;
neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of
subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise
composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every
composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on
them; but God is the first being, as shown above (Question 2,
Article 3). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for
things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them
to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Question 2,
Article 3), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly,
because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality;
but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates
another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one
of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar
parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the
foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although
something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part
(as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),
nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be
predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of
water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every
composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if
this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something
which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which
does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form
itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is
absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way
composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin.
vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are
weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as
caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a
thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence
differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Question 4,
Article 3).
Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than
simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be
found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of
divine goodness is found in one simple thing (Question 4, Article
1 and Question 6, Article 2).
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