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Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the
irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A
swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the
light." Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible
but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that
"the proud observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves
beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with
pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue
observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the
rational faculty.
Objection 3: Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in
sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while
it consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus.
10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from
God." Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive
appetite, cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore
pride cannot be in the irascible.
Objection 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber
Sententiarum, sent. 294, "Pride is love of one's own
excellence." But love is not in the irascible, but in the
concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the
gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is
in the irascible.
I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained
from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be
other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now
the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the
desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (Articles 1,2).
Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible
faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a
strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as
anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to
belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is
sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the
angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice
pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this
broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated
above in the FP, Question 59, Article 4; FS, Question
82, Article 5, ad 1 and 2.
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were
merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might
tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the
sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in
view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs
say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so
called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider
acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore
pride is ascribed also to the demons.
Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is
purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its
cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he
may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Mt.
11:25, "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the
prudent," i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their
own eyes, "and hast revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the
humble.
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt
receive instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and
this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through
delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth;
thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although
certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot
realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish
them." Hence it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility
is there also is wisdom."
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 161,
Articles 2, 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby
a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of
right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is
the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man
is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that
his appetite is borne towards things higher than what become him.
Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem
lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's
failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory
(Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy men, by a like observation of other
people's virtues, set others above themselves." Accordingly the
conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one
of its causes is in the reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a
part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general
signification, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7,9), "love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is
their cause," wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other
emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of
one's own excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume
inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly
to pride.
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