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Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in
God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible
predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for
nothing can be predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in
God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in
God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that,
"Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to
the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same." But a
relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation
requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine
relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of
a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does
not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore
paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for
the same reason to the other relations in God.
Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an
intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation
in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.
On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and
the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or
filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really
Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is
the Sabellian heresy.
I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we
may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in
the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other
genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their
strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject.
But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to
another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of
things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered
to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are
necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination
and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a
certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other
things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by
relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing
one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for
instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the
genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same
nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession,
agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each
other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the
same nature, as above explained (Question 27, Articles 2,4),
these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily
real relations.
Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God
according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far
as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is
inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless
Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to
show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of
inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by
way of relation to another.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term "the
same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same
thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order
observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself,
according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise,
however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but
generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine
relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as
regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these
relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.
Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in
diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation,
nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He
does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His
intellect and will, as is above explained (Question 14, Articles
3,4; Question 19, Article 8). Therefore there is no real
relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real
relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine
order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other
hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no
parallel exists.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental
operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only,
inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects
perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the
operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word
intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not
logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the
intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to
that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is
related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and
filiation are real relations in God.
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