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Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their
natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God
"by His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds."
Afterwards he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is
remote from all knowledge."
Objection 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an
angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it
appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12):
"We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face." From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of
God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, according to
which He is said to be seen face to face; the other whereby He is
seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown (Question
12, Article 4), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his
natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the
angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible
things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the
angels cannot know God by their natural powers.
On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet
men can know God through their natural principles; according to Rm.
1:19: "what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore
much more so can the angels.
I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their
own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a
thing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in
the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that
an angel knows himself---secondly, by the presence of its similitude
in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its
image being in the eye---thirdly, when the image of the object known
is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else
in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.
To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which
He is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot
accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above
(Question 12, Article 4). The third class comprises the
knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth, by His likeness
reflected in creatures, according to Rm. 1:20: "The invisible
things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made." Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But
the knowledge, whereby according to his natural principles the angel
knows God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that
knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from
it. For since God's image is impressed on the very nature of the
angel in his essence, the angel knows God in as much as he is the
image of God. Yet he does not behold God's essence; because no
created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine essence. Such
knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the
angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine
image.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of
comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not
known by any created intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are
infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend
Him; nor can he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it
does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at
all: because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the
knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge
which an angel has of Him.
Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is
midway between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches
more to one of them, as was said above.
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