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Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is
in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the
genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist,
there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to
substand; whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form
cannot be a subject": and the above properties are found in the
angel. Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure
act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone.
Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.
Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by
matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But
the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite.
Therefore the form of an angel is in matter.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first
creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal."
I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and
form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of
the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are
distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal
from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is
subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is
its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual
and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that
the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of
spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed
in the matter of corporeal things.
But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of
matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under
quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle
says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the
matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be.
Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should
have the same matter.
It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according
to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according
to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence
it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.
But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in
a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on
the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect
cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its
own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way
also it apprehends God (Question 3).
Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the
species. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is
determined to some special grade of being because "the species of
things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of
unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But
in material things there is one thing which determines to a special
grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined,
and this is the matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is
derived, and from the former the "difference." Whereas in
immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing
determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in
being; and therefore in them "genus" and "difference" are not
derived from different things, but from one and the same.
Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch
as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of
their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it
derives the idea of their "difference."
Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the
Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive
mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly
false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be
constituted in some species, either of air, or of fire, or of
something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the
same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5,
text 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth,
and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect
according to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by
the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter,
but of an immaterial substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter
and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can
be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which
contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter,
whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its
own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is
related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if
there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without
matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to
its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of
composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some
say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what
is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For
"what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself
is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner
runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as
was explained above (Question 3, Article 4). Hence God alone
is pure act.
Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as
its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some
nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature
being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite
on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by
the matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are
finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that
their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say,
for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards
the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one
subject; while its "being" is finite as determined to some one
special nature.
Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is
finite from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is
"infinite from below," as not received in any matter.
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