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Objection 1. It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a
literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial
precepts, the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal
lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because
each was given as a sign. For it is written (Gn. 17:11):
"You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a
sign of the covenant between Me and you": and of the celebration of
the Passover it is written (Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a
sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much
more did the other ceremonial precepts have none but a figurative
reason.
Objection 2. Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause.
But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above
(101, 2). Therefore they have no other than a figurative
cause.
Objection 3. Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a
certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or
not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain
points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of
indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for
instance, the number of animals to be offered, and other such
particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the
precepts of the Old Law.
On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed
Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written
(1 Cor. 10:11) that "all (these things) happened to them in
figure." Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the
mystical or figurative, there is the literal sense. Therefore the
ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes.
I answer that, As stated above (1), the reason for whatever
conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the
ceremonial precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine
worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of
Christ; just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in
such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as
Jerome says on Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First,
in respect of the Divine worship which was to be observed for that
particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to
the shunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or
remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of
mind which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly,
their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being
ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative
and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ Himself and the
Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of
the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the
state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by
Christ, which refers to the anagogical sense.
Reply to Objection 1. Just as the use of metaphorical expressions
in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are
employed in order to convey that particular meaning; so also the
meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine
benefits, on account of which they were instituted, and of others
similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order of
literal causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the
celebration of the Passover was its signification of the delivery from
Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with
Abraham, we assign the literal cause.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument would avail if the ceremonial
precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not
for the purpose of worshipping God then and there.
Reply to Objection 3. As we have stated when speaking of human laws
(96, A1,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but
not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment of
those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the
ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a
figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause.
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