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Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that
some angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some
"ill-tempered" or "stern." According to him, a person is said to
be "sullen" whose anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a
long time." But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of
time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically
in respect also of the other circumstances.
Objection 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that
"ill-tempered" or "stern" persons "are those whose anger is not
appeased without revenge, or punishment." Now this also pertains to
the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered
is the same as bitterness.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger,
when He says (Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his
brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say
to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and
whosoever shall say" to his brother, "Thou fool." But these
degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems
that the above division of anger is not fitting.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxi] says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the
anger which is called wrath," and "ill-will" which is a disease of
the mind, and "rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the
three aforesaid. For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and
movement," and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to
"choleric" persons: "ill-will" he describes as "an anger that
endures and grows old," and this the Philosopher ascribes to
"sullenness"; while he describes "rancour" as "reckoning the time
for vengeance," which tallies with the Philosopher's description of
the "ill-tempered." The same division is given by Damascene (De
Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned
by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to
the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated
when treating of the passions (FS, Question 46, Article 8)
how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem
that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in
view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these
species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the
Philosopher.
For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight
cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that
anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way,
because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too
long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a
lasting displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to
himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which
a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered"
or "stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have
inflicted punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to
anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of
consideration in the aforesaid species.
Reply to Objection 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people
have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a
"sullen" person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding
displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not
break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him
out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except
his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the
other hand, the anger of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on
account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear
out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.
Reply to Objection 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord
do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the
course of the human act [FS, Question 46, Article 8,
Objection 3]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in
reference to this He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother."
The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs,
even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He
says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!" which is an
angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly
breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt
under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is
done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says:
"Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!" Consequently it is
clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the
others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred
to by our Lord, as stated above (Article 3, ad 2), much more so
are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as
corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is
assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says
[Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be
delivered, there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case
"council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on
the punishment to be inflicted": to the third case is assigned
"hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation."
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