|
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (Articles
1,2). But "reason deals with universals," according to Phys.
i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of
universals.
Objection 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the
reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore
prudence which is right reason, is not about singulars.
Objection 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But
prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward
senses are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take
cognizance of singulars.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that
"prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take
cognizance of singulars also."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, ad 3), to prudence
belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the
application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But
no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows
both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be
applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary
for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason,
and the singulars about which actions are concerned.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with
universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular
cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but
also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends
to matter, as stated in De Anima iii.
Reply to Objection 2: It is because the infinite number of
singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels
are uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces
the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a
general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know
sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by
memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases.
This does not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in
its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind
of application it extends to this sense.
|
|