|
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the
practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written
(Prov. 10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom
consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24):
"Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the
desire of fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative
reason. Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to
the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not
only practical but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal
arts. Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none
but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical
reason only.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a
prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now
counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and
the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the practical
reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the
practical reason.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question 45, Articles
1,3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the
consideration of the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to
wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause
is the common end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence
intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as
he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end, such as
victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular
genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with regard to right
conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is
clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom
absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for
it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. And so
it is stated significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not
wisdom absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent.
ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense for any human
knowledge, whether speculative or practical. And yet it may also be
replied that the act itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it
is voluntary, is a matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise;
and consequently comes under the direction of prudence. On the other
hand, as regards its specification in relation to its object which is
the "necessary true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.
Reply to Objection 3: Every application of right reason in the work
of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the
application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those
wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in
Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things
such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process
follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things
it is possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and
so we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative
prudence.
|
|