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Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of
predestination. For the Apostle says (Rm. 8:29): "Whom He
foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rm.
9:15: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says:
"I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his
whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the
cause of predestination.
Objection 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine
will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is
"the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed.
Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for
predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be
the cause of reason of predestination.
Objection 3: Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Rm.
9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to
equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original
sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their
actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by
predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of
their merits and demerits.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by
works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He
saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be
saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason
of predestination.
I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above
(Article 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the
same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
(Question 19, Article 5), that we cannot assign any cause of
the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be
found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one
thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so
insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as
regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question,
whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what
comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give
the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination
was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a
former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the
souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the
diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this
world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this
opinion where he says (Rm. 9:11,12): "For when they were
not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but
of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the
younger."
Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and
cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that
the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from
God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was
granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning
by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the
saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not
sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no
principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking.
Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason
of the effect of predestination.
And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination
are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God
gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it,
because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace,
as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will
make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction
between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free
will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however,
manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and
this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is
contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything
else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect
of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from
free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction
between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For
the providence of God produces effects through the operation of
secondary causes, as was above shown (Question 22, Article 3).
Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of
predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of
predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in
particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of
predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a
subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final
cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as
its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the
matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on
account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit
glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered
in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of
predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us;
because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all
included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for
grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help,
according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert us,
O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination
has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its
reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as
to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving
principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the
cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause;
as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Predestination has its foundation in the
goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its
particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as
already stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the predestination of some,
and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God.
Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so
that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is
necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided,
should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures
in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
for the completion of the universe there are required different grades
of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the
universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in
things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never
happen, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Let us
then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole
universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to
those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them;
and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His
justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some
and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rm.
9:22,23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath, and to
make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath,
fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on
the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2
Tim. 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels
of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed,
unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for
glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will.
Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He
draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost
not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can
be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part
of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire,
another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of
species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is
under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the
simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it
depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another;
although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place,
and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to
be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal
things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice,
if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not
gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can
give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of
his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the
master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is
it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Mt. 20:14,15).
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