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Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be
reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the
agent is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil.
Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But
hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater
power should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the
causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something
external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow
in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while
pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), a present evil, is
cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is
the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain
or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of
the appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary
to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of
something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as
being the cause of sorrow.
But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to
transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will
be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its
action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its
consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.
Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from
the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations,
pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when
the contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine
says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will
"resisting a stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to
yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not
potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the
corruptive evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply
greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is
able to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no
harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
Reply to Objection 3: External agents can be the causes of
appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the
object: and it is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause
of sorrow.
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