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Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was
God's substance. For it is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed
man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of
life, and man was made a living soul." But he who breathes sends
forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives,
is of the Divine substance.
Objection 2: Further, as above explained (Question 75,
Article 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act.
Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone.
Therefore the soul is of God's substance.
Objection 3: Further, things that exist and do differ are the
same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they
could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be
composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15)
mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently
perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the
first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but
from Himself."
I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance
involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has
been said (Question 77, Article 2; Question 79, Article
2; Question 84, Article 6), the human soul is sometimes in a
state of potentiality to the act of intelligence ---acquires its
knowledge somehow from things---and thus has various powers; all of
which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure
act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety
in itself, as we have proved (Question 3, Articles 1,7;
Question 9, Article 1).
This error seems to have originated from two statements of the
ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things,
being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but
bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they
considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held
that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as
the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that
the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this
supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal
light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the
body.
Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the
existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the
form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the
world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei
VII 6, IV 31). So some supposed man's soul to be part of
that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were
unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual
substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.
But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Question
3, Articles 1,8; and Question 75, Article 1), wherefore
it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The term "breathe" is not to be taken in
the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe
[spirare], is the same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the
material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his
own substance, but an extraneous thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its
essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by
participation, as above explained (Question 75, Article 5, ad
4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.
Reply to Objection 3: That which differs, properly speaking,
differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find
also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way
be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble
each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet
all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are
diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter
into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the
difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these
again differ by some further difference.
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