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Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow.
For it is written of Christ (Is. 42:4): "He shall not be
sad nor troublesome."
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:21):
"Whatever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad."
And the reason of this the Stoics asserted to be that no one is
saddened save by the loss of his goods. Now the just man esteems only
justice and virtue as his goods, and these he cannot lose; otherwise
the just man would be subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss
of the goods fortune has given him. But Christ was most just,
according to Jer. 23:6: "This is the name that they shall call
Him: The Lord, our just one." Therefore there was no sorrow in
Him.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
13,14) that all sorrow is "evil, and to be shunned." But in
Christ there was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow
in Christ.
Objection 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 6): "Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly." But
Christ suffered nothing against His will, for it is written (Is.
53:7): "He was offered because it was His own will." Hence
there was no sorrow in Christ.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 26:38): "My soul is
sorrowful even unto death." And Ambrose says (De Trin. ii.)
that "as a man He had sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it
sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the cross."
I answer that, As was said above (Article 5, ad 3), by Divine
dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as
not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out
sensible pain. Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive
appetite, so also is sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or
object; for the object and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the
sense of touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and motive
of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the
reason or the imagination, as was said in the FS, Question 35,
Articles 2,7, as when anyone grieves over the loss of grace or
money. Now Christ's soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to
Himself, as His passion and death---or to others, as the sin of
His disciples, or of the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as
there could be true pain in Christ, so too could there be true
sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three ways above
stated (Article 4), when we were speaking of the passions of
Christ's soul in general.
Reply to Objection 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect
passion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a "propassion." Hence
it is written (Mt. 26:37): "He began to grow sorrowful and
to be sad." For "it is one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow
sorrowful," as Jerome says, on this text.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
8), "for the three passions"---desire, joy, and fear---the
Stoics held three eupatheias i.e. good passions, in the soul of the
wise man, viz. for desire, will---for joy, delight---for
fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the
soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and
they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and for this
reason, because they believed that only the virtuous is good, since it
makes men good, and that nothing is evil, except what is sinful,
whereby men become wicked. Now although what is virtuous is man's
chief good, and what is sinful is man's chief evil, since these
pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there are certain
secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the exterior
things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise
man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending
these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this
way are we to understand that "whatsoever shall befall the just man,
it shall not make him sad," because his reason is troubled by no
misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a
passion.
Reply to Objection 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it
is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an
inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
9): "Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when
and where needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious
passions?"
Reply to Objection 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of
itself be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the
end, to which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself
desired, but only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ's
death and passion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow,
although they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the
redemption of the human race.
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