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Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into
those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence
belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (Article 1, ad
3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal
appetite. Therefore no concupiscence is natural.
Objection 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of
species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside
the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and
some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts
to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore
concupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and
those that are not.
Objection 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated
in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which
is not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible:
because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive
appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite.
Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not natural.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor.
i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not
natural.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), concupiscence is the
craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways.
First, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for
example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such
pleasurable things is said to be natural. Secondly, a thing is
pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as
when one apprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently
takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is
said to be not natural, and is more wont to be called "cupidity."
Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural
concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both
is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in
these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11)
calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the
second kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something
as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences
are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because
different men reason differently, therefore the latter are also called
(Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition
to those that are natural.
Reply to Objection 1: The same thing that is the object of the
natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is
apprehended. And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of
food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural
appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: The difference between those concupiscences
that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material
difference; it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises
from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite
is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows
from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as
suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural
concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet.
i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence
arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this
very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, 11).
Reply to Objection 3: Man has not only universal reason,
pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason
pertaining to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the FP, Question
78, Article 4; FP, Question 81, Article 3: so that even
rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover
the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason also,
through the medium of the particular imagination.
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