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Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will.
For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But
there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the
human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
Objection 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its
active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive
force: for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10).
Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it
seems that sometimes it is compelled.
Objection 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to
nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to
nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore
the movement of the will can be compelled.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that
what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is
done under compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done
by the will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be
compelled to act.
I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate
act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is
an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of
some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are
commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer
violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from
executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act,
violence cannot be done to the will.
The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an
inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: just
as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior
principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from
an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of
the will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and
violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural
inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from
violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural
inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by
force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be
dragged of his own will.
Reply to Objection 1: God Who is more powerful than the human
will, can move the will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: "The
heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will
He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion, it would no
longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved,
but something else against the will.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a
passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is
done against the interior inclination of the passive subject.
Otherwise every alteration and generation of simply bodies would be
unnatural and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the
natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a
disposition. In like manner when the will is moved, according to its
own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent
but voluntary.
Reply to Objection 3: That to which the will tends by sinning,
although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature,
nevertheless is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature,
in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable
sensation or some vicious habit.
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