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Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than
our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 4:20): "He that
loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he
seeth not?" Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is
visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing,
according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God is less visible than our
neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our
neighbor.
Objection 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus.
13:19: "Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more
likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his
neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves God.
Objection 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now
God is not greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore
He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor.
Therefore we ought not to love God more than our neighbor.
On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to
be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's
sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Lk.
14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and
mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . .
he cannot be My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of
charity, more than our neighbor.
I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in
which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that
friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of
the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence
to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the
friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which
consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it
flows to all who are capable of happiness.
Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of
charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our
neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness
from Him.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways:
first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause
of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of
goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire
love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as
though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by
seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that
what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we
meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's
argument. For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the
first lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from
those things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says
in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any
man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his
neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand
our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and
causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact
that we share along with our neighbor in something received from God,
we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we
ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3: Considered in His substance, God is
equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by
being in anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's
goodness equally with God, for God has it essentially, and our
neighbor by participation.
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