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Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written
(Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to
Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he
goeth forth boldly to meet armed men." But no vice redounds to a
man's praise. Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
9), "one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has
been counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing.
Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.
Objection 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as
stated above (FS, Question 45, Article 2) when we were
treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a
virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on
the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no
man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore
daring is a sin.
I answer that, Daring, as stated above (FS, Question 23,
Article 1; Question 55), is a passion. Now a passion is
sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks
moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the
passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes
employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any
but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way
daring as implying excess is accounted a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is
moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude.
Reply to Objection 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after
taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly
before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be
to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above
(Question 58, Article 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to
act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some
virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv,
4,5,6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be applied
to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ
especially the names of those passions the object of which is an evil,
as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love
have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate
virtues.
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