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Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not
denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its
name from "standing." Now a person is said to stand on account of
his being upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To
fall by speaking harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of
righteousness." But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by
submitting his will to God; wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1,
"Praise becometh the upright," says: "The upright are those who
direct their heart according to God's will." Therefore it would
seem that obedience to the Divine commandments suffices alone for the
notion of a state.
Objection 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility
according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast [stabiles] and
immovable"; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.):
"The stone is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no
disturbance will make it fall." Now it is virtue that enables us "to
act with immobility," according to Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it
would seem that a state is acquired by every virtuous action.
Objection 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height
of a kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is
made higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are
raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore
the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a
difference of states.
On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu.
vi, can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where
life or state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his
own person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or
servitude. Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a
man's state, except that which refers to freedom or servitude.
I answer that, "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of
position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a
manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his
head should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground,
and his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and this
is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when he
stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but only
when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a matter
is said to have stability [statum] in reference to its own disposition
in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently
matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute
a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or poor, of high or
low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law [Dig. I,
IX, De Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it
is said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his
dignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains to
a man's state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in so
far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another, not
indeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly
established; and this is something pertaining to the nature of freedom
or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or servitude
whether in spiritual or in civil matters.
Reply to Objection 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the
notion of state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the
addition of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to
stand without its being required that they should be upright; nor again
are men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they
be still.
Reply to Objection 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of
state; since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is
not said to stand.
Reply to Objection 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades
denote an order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires
immobility in that which regards a condition of the person himself.
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