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Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter
immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves
(Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any
particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like
begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot
cause a form in matter.
Objection 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will
produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by
some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of
some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal
cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form,
except by means of a particular agent.
Objection 3: As universal being depends on the first universal
cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes;
as we have seen above (Question 104, Article 2). But the
determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form.
Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of
particular causes.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God formed man
of the slime of the earth."
I answer that, God can move matter immediately to form; because
whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active
power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the
Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be
reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by
matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause
in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is
generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually
contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually
contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and
plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they
are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as
regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the
power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above
(Question 14, Article 2; Question 44, Article 2);
wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by
way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator
by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator
can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself;
so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do
this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over
matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by
imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold if God were to act
of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect,
which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all
forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form
on matter.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to
determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other
causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by
Himself without any other cause.
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