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Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature.
Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (Article 1).
Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as
stated above (Question 63, Articles 1,2,3). Therefore vice
is not contrary to nature.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that
which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to
upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated
to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found
in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now
vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mt.
7:13): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many
there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to
nature.
Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit,
as stated above (Article 1). Now sin is defined as "a word,
deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above
nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law,
rather than to nature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13):
"Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), vice is contrary to
virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed
in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above (Article 1).
Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner
not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing
"vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form
from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species
from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the
order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man,
as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the
nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with
reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man
good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much
as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's
nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature
as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which
accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero
says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with
reason, like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is
said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is
contrary to nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing
being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary
to "being from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature"
is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense
virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they
incline us to that which is suitable to nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational
nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the
operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence
there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature,
than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning
of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices
and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of
his sensitive nature against the order of his reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is
unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is
compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art.
Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the
order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law.
Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every
nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as
it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made."
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