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Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For
charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon
friendship a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor
is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual.
Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power"
(De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something
ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems
that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of
joy and peace.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But
charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing
than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its
subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi):
"Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly
ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him."
I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by
their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the
principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of
human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Question 17,
Article 1), viz. human reason and God.
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
right reason," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of
virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to
faith, (Question 4, Article 5) and hope (Question 17,
Article 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for,
since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the
authority of Augustine quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not
deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a
virtue or with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue
about works done in respect of another person, but under a different
aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of
another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship
considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a
gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii,
13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue
distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness
and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to
wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is
evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and
virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility.
Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue
rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity
since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the
goodness of God.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man
and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above
(FS, Question 25, Article 2) in the treatise on the
passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which
is an effect of love. And when virtue is described as being something
ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in
the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
Reply to Objection 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we
consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an
accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species,
an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior
to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an
accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is
superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher
nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way
charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of
the Holy Ghost.
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