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Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh,
concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly
described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1
Tim. 6:10), "covetousness is the root of all evils." Now
pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not
be reckoned among the causes of sin.
Objection 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly
by what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty
hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not
be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as
stated above (Question 30, Article 2). Now objects of pleasure
are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses.
Therefore "concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses
should also have been mentioned.
Objection 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through
inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate
avoidance of evil things, as stated above (Article 4, ad 3).
But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil.
Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): "All that is
in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or pride of life." Now a
thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is
written (1 Jn. 5:19): "The whole world is seated in
wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 4), inordinate
self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes
inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one he
loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause
of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive
appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first,
absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part;
secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the
object of the irascible part, as stated above (Question 23,
Article 1). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above
(Question 30, Article 3). One is natural, and is directed to
those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards
the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the
like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual
matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called
"concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence,
and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or
pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in
respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of
perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this
spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the eyes,"
whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the
eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to
Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of
things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote
covetousness, according to the explanation of others.
The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of
life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we
shall state further on (Question 84, Article 2; SS, Question
162, Article 1).
It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can
be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible
part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to
the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible
passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness
according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of
good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of
"avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on
(Question 84, Article 1).
Reply to Objection 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean
here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes,
but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of
touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.
Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of
all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i:
and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the
inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm.
xxxiii).
Reply to Objection 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite
for good, as stated above (Question 25, Article 2; Question
39, Article 2); and so those passions alone are mentioned which
incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately
the avoidance of evil.
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