|
Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is
to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one
and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and
the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of
reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal
things. Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But
passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go
a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of
more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.
Objection 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all
virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore
all sins are equal.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11):
"He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet
it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin
is greater than another.
I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in
the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are
equal: from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not
only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of
hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero
the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the
side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure
from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of
more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider
the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of
privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists,
so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life,
and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit
of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence
a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the
third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already
dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be
covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade
shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation
which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it
consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted,
like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the
humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the
animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the
like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what
remains or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or
deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration
of humors or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in
them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to
destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys
itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance of the act,
or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something
remained of the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the
gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of
reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal.
Reply to Objection 1: To commit sin is lawful on account of some
inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater
inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it
were a pure privation.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and
the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence
according to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than
another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above (Question
66, Articles 1,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it
would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected,
and vices or sins are not.
|
|