|
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act
of the appetite." But inquiry is not an act of the appetite.
Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
Objection 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the
intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge
is not discursive, as we have shown in the FP, Question 14,
Article 7. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written
(Eph. 1:11) that "He worketh all things according to the
counsel of His will." Therefore counsel is not inquiry.
Objection 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel
is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 7:25): "Now concerning virgins I have no
commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore counsel is
not an inquiry.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
xxxiv.] says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry
is a counsel."
I answer that, Choice, as stated above (Question 13, Article
1, ad 2; Article 3), follows the judgment of the reason about
what is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that have
to be done; because actions are concerned with contingent singulars,
which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things
doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without
previous inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an
inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is
called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that
choice is the "desire of what has been already counselled."
Reply to Objection 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to
one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other
power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power.
Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the
means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the
reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there
is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of
the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of
reason, something of the will---both as matter (since counsel is of
what man wills to do)---and as motive (because it is from willing
the end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means).
And therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that
choice "is intellect influenced by appetite," thus pointing out that
both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "appetite based on inquiry," so
as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose
behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason
that executes the inquiry.
Reply to Objection 2: The things that we say of God must be
understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus
in us science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to
effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all
effects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like
manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His
knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of
counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this
respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only
take counsel who lack knowledge."
Reply to Objection 3: It may happen that things which are most
certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not
certainly good in the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded
men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
|
|