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Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary.
For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the
Father led to beget the Son."
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to
the kingdom of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love
belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by
will.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But
the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son.
Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.
Objection 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect,
as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker.
Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by
nature.
Objection 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary.
Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to
follow that He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what
Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii).
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the
Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the
will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the
ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man
by my will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can
be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by
will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In
the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it
is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the
principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God
the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced
the creature by His will. Whence in the book De Synod, it is
said: "If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as
a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason of
this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in
such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will is not
determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the
form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that
of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and
hence such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form
whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the
number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will's action
does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will
and understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which
may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which can be only
in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in
different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the
nature of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary
being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians,
wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot
the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on
the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by
will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The
will of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth
gave the Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn.
All things created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son,
born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God."
Reply to Objection 1: This saying is directed against those who did
not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation
of the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a
manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we
ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural
necessity---as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills.
This appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the
words quoted, for thus we read: "Not against His will, nor as it
were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the
Father beget the Son."
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the
love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not,
however, as if love were the principle of the Son's generation.
Reply to Objection 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills
something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and
likewise God naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to
things other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined
in itself, as above explained (Question 19, Article 3). Now,
the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself,
and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of
will.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions
of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are
naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and
thus the conception of the divine Word is natural.
Reply to Objection 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of
itself," and "by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense,
it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling
cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a
final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an
end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at
least, so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine
generation necessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is
He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of
itself" which cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to
be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the
Son.
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