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Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue
of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a
thing signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to
be opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any
virtue, and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer
and alms deeds, as stated in Mt. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy
is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from
guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to
prudence as above stated (Question 55, Article 4). Therefore,
hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to
prudence or simplicity.
Objection 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their
end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or
vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, "What is the hope of
the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by violence," says:
"A hypocrite or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a
covetous thief: for through desire of being honored for holiness,
though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is not
his" [St. Gregory's Moralia, Bk XVIII]. Therefore since
covetousness or vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems
that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation.
On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above
(Article 1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore
dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text.
13, 24, x), "contrariety is opposition as regards form,"
i.e. the specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation
or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way
directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposition or
contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the
act, and this species depends on that act's proper object. Wherefore
since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a
character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it
follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows himself
in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7.
The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered
in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an
instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.
Reply to Objection 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards
it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to
have it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have
it. Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth,
inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And
he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own
sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his
hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that
virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question 55, Articles
3,4,5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to
which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are
apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in
words, and by fraud in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence,
as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed
chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore
it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and
in this way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth
as stated above (Question 109, Article 2, ad 4). There is,
however, a mere logical difference between them, because by truth we
mean the concordance between sign and thing signified, while simplicity
indicates that one does not tend to different things, by intending one
thing inwardly, and pretending another outwardly.
Reply to Objection 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the
dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species
from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself
other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend
great things of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of
hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also
we have said above with regard to lying (Question 110, Article
2).
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