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Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin.
For whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against
prudence. But imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as
stated above (Article 1). Therefore imprudence is not a special
sin.
Objection 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than
knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is
reckoned one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should
imprudence be reckoned among those causes.
Objection 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the
circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "evil results from each single defect." Now many things are
requisite for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility,
and so on, as stated above (Questions 48,49). Therefore there
are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin.
On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above
(Article 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore
imprudence too is one special vice.
I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways;
first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all
sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices,
which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be
general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated
of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as
neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with
special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by
participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just
as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs
them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin
can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason,
which defect belongs to imprudence.
If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in
some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin,
then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in
three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of
prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the
individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above
(Question 48; Question 50, Article 7), so also we
distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the
quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with
it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of
"counsel" to which euboulia (deliberating well) corresponds,
"precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence; by defect
of "judgment," to which synesis (judging well according to common
law) and gnome (judging well according to general law) refer, there
is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and "negligence"
correspond to the "command" which is the proper act of prudence.
Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things which are
requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of
prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the
direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all
the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above.
Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in
"thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable
to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of
shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers generality by
participation.
Reply to Objection 2: Since knowledge is further removed from
morality than prudence is, according to their respective proper
natures, it follows that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not
of itself, but on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the
consequent result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the
general causes of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very
nature, denotes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a
special sin.
Reply to Objection 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for
the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the
same species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought
not, and when one ought not. If, however, there be various
motives, there are various species: for instance, if one man were to
take another's property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a
sacred place, this would constitute the species called sacrilege,
while if another were to take another's property when he ought not,
merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of simple
avarice. Hence the lack of those things which are requisite for
prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, except in so far
as they are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above.
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